Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment
Abstract
September 11 was, obviously, a seminal event for al-Qaida. Historically, terrorists and insurgents successes have had two kinds of effects on recruiting: the positive effects of the action, measured in more recruits and approbation by state sponsors; and the negative effects of the reaction, measured in arrests, compromise of intelligence assets, etc. Thus when there is a significant development in a terrorist or insurgent campaign, there are almost always significant changes in recruiting. Al-Qaida and its affiliates have had to adapt since September 11 and since the loss of their training base in Afghanistan, and to incorporate new and more clandestine methods of recruitment. A priority of the American-led campaign against global terrorism is to move beyond responding to attacks and threats and take proactive steps to cripple al-Qaida. One prong of this proactive strategy is to diminish the ability of al-Qaida and its affiliated terrorist organizations to recruit new members. Manpower for carrying out attacks and sustaining operations is a critical resource for terrorist organizations; therefore, hindering recruitment strikes a blow at their ability to function. A first step toward hindering al-Qaida s recruitment is to understand how it works where al-Qaida recruits, what tools it uses, whom it targets, and why. A clearer picture of this recruitment process could help the United States and its allies develop strategies and interventions to counter terrorist groups ability to replenish and increase their numbers.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA604384
Entities
People
- Sara Daly
- Scott Gerwehr
Organizations
- RAND Corporation