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14. ABSTRACT Since independence in 1947, India has been battling numerous insurgencies. The Maoist insurgency in India started as a violent peasant agitation in the state of West Bengal in 1967. Over the next three decades, the movement grew relatively unhindered. However, till the late 90s, the movement was still fragmented, lacked strength, and remained of only nuisance value to the states. Thanks to the economic reforms in 1991, the Indian economy has registered unprecedented growth in the past decade and, ironically, this period has also witnessed a rapid growth of the Maoist insurgency. Historically, Maoist movements have thrived due to poverty and economic deprivation; however in case of India, the demands of rapid economic growth have contributed to the intensification of the insurgency. This study seeks to portray how the rapid industrialization drive, among other key factors such as the merger of the hitherto fragmented Maoist movement and an incoherent COIN response contributed to the movement's growth. Finally, this study proposes a multi-pronged population centric COIN strategy as a permanent solution.					
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Preface

The problems of insurgency and terrorism are global phenomena today. Most of these movements have been profoundly influenced by the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, one of the greatest thinkers of the last century, either in terms of ideology or tactics, or both. While the Maoist ideology of “people's war” by the rural proletariat against the bourgeoisie has resonated in several insurgencies in the nations of the Third World, Mao's tactics of guerrilla warfare have had even wider influence on most insurgencies across the ideological spectrum.

After the success of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the Maoist ideology of people's war gained roots in several Third World countries: Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Peru, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and India, where poverty, feudalism, social and economic exploitation existed. I find it ironical that Maoism still remains an attractive ideology, three decades after Mao, when Communism's influence is dwindling world over, when China itself has moved towards free market economy, and the world is getting globalized. There could not be a better example of this irony than India, which has come a long way from an impoverished newly independent nation in 1947 to a booming economy today. India's economic growth in the last decade has been so promising that many say, “India has finally arrived on the world scene.” Surprisingly, this decade has also seen the otherwise fledgling Maoist movement develop into a major insurgency, challenging India's internal security and economic growth. I have chosen to study this irony with an aim of drawing some lessons applicable to most developing countries in similar situations. Being a native of one of the states worst hit by this insurgency, I have experienced first-hand, how a once peaceful state with sizable under-privileged and simple-minded tribal population has gradually transformed into a theater of brutal Maoist violence.

I would like to thank my project mentor, Dr Mark H. Jacobsen, for the invaluable help and direction he provided, in spite of his busy schedule. His insightful suggestions and

considered approval, on the numerous occasions I consulted him, reassured me and kept me focused. I am also thankful to the staff at the Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, who helped me with the necessary books, research material, and valuable guidance without which this research would not be possible.

I am deeply indebted to members of my family: wife Roshni, daughter Adya, and son Shlok, who were my source of inspiration throughout and who extended their full support and cooperation to me while I worked on this paper.

KK Choudhury

March 2010

Executive Summary

Title: Maoism in India

Author: Lt Cdr Kamal K Choudhury, Indian Navy

Thesis: India's rapid economic growth coupled with the consolidation of the hitherto fragmented Maoist movement and incoherent Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies of the affected states allowed the insurgency to grow rapidly into the single largest threat to internal security, forcing the Central Government to consider a military option to defeat the insurgency.

Discussion: After gaining independence in 1947, India has been battling numerous problems such as widespread poverty, backwardness, illiteracy, and caste-based social and economic exploitation. This grim socio-economic situation facilitated the rise of Maoism in India, which started with a violent peasant agitation in the state of West Bengal in 1967. Over the next three decades, the movement went through several ups and downs and grew relatively unhindered. However, till the late 90s, the movement was still fragmented, lacked strength, and remained of only nuisance value to the states. Thanks to the economic reforms in 1991, the Indian economy registered unprecedented growth in the past decade and, ironically, this period also witnessed a rapid growth of the Maoist insurgency. Historically, Maoist movements have thrived due to poverty and economic deprivation; however in case of India, the demands of rapid economic growth have contributed to the intensification of the insurgency. This study seeks to portray how the rapid industrialization drive, among other key factors such as the merger of the hitherto fragmented Maoist movement and an incoherent COIN response contributed to the movement's growth.

Conclusion: A multi-pronged COIN strategy that combines the use of force with concrete steps to ameliorate the genuine grievances of the people and win back their hearts and minds is essential for a permanent solution.

INTRODUCTION

India became independent on August 15, 1947, at a time when the Second World War had just ended, the cold war was beginning, and Mao Tse-tung was leading the Chinese Revolution. India was at the crossroads of competing ideologies: the free market and democratic path championed by the US; socialism espoused by the Soviet Union; and Maoism propagated by China. At that time, the feudal society, class and caste based social structure, and widespread poverty posed immense challenges to India's progress. India chose to become a socialist democracy, with the State assuming the lion's share of responsibility for economic and social development. The post-Independence era also saw the rise of a strong Communist movement within India's polity as the Communists performed well in parliamentary (Lok Sabha) elections and formed governments in few states. During the 1960s, there was a clash between the Soviet revisionist ideology and the Chinese Maoist ideology.¹ This clash of ideologies resulted in the polarization of the Indian Leftist movement into the democratic Soviet-oriented Communists and the revolutionary Maoists.² A violent peasant agitation at Naxalbari in the state of West Bengal on May 23, 1967 marked the beginning of the Indian Maoist armed struggle.³ Over the next four decades, the Maoist movement went through several highs and lows to evolve into the most widespread insurgency within India. Like many insurgencies, this movement was born out of a number of socio-economic factors; however, unlike other insurgencies, this movement is unique in two ways: first, it is not secessionist in nature, i.e. the Maoists do not want a separate country and second, the movement is mostly indigenous and does not depend on other countries for support. In fact, the Maoists aim to capture political power through armed struggle and supplant the existing parliamentary system with their own. In 1991, India liberalized her economy through sweeping economic reforms and transitioned from a socialist model to a free market economy, thus ushering in rapid and sustained economic growth. In fact, during

the past decade, the Indian economy has registered an annual growth rate of over seven percent. Ironically, this period has also seen such an intensification of the Maoist insurgency in India's hinterland that in March 2006, the Indian Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, described it as the largest security challenge the country ever faced.⁴ The potency of the insurgency and the gravity of the situation was evident when again in 2009, the Prime Minister expressed concern that the country was losing the battle against the Maoist rebels.⁵ Historically speaking, such insurgencies thrive and grow due to poverty and lack of economic progress. Ironically, India's rapid economic growth coupled with the consolidation of the hitherto fragmented Maoist movement and incoherent Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies adopted by the affected states allowed the insurgency to grow rapidly into the single largest threat to internal security, forcing the Central Government to consider a military option to defeat the insurgency.

This paper will first describe the rise of Maoism in India with emphasis on the causes leading to its rapid expansion in the past decade. Then it aims to examine the COIN strategy followed hitherto and evaluate its shortfalls which have led to its failure in defeating the insurgency. Finally, the paper aims to recommend a way ahead for a successful COIN campaign to defeat the insurgency.

SECTION I: RISE OF MAOISM IN INDIA

The Communist movement started in India with the founding of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in 1925. In its early days, the CPI opposed the non-violent independence movement led by the Indian National Congress (INC) and advocated an armed struggle instead. Subsequently, its political agenda aligned with the INC and the CPI evolved into a principal political party of independent India. In the first decade after independence, the CPI

followed a limited agenda of armed struggle against “class enemies,” which was suppressed by the government. In the 1957 general elections, the CPI emerged as the principal opposition party and came to power in the southern state of Kerala.⁶ The Communist Party of China (CPC) criticized the CPI for its parliamentary approach and for forming a ministry in Kerala.⁷ The CPI, on its part, did some introspection and proclaimed its resolve to achieve peaceful transition to socialism and national democracy, the Soviet ideology hitherto.⁸ The already prevalent Sino-Soviet ideological divide coupled with the party's stand in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 precipitated a serious rift within the CPI leading to its split in 1964 and the formation of a new party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or the CPM.⁹ While the CPI had accepted the Soviet ideology of peaceful transition and national democracy, the CPM rejected national democracy and advocated a powerful mass revolutionary movement by combining both peaceful means and armed struggle to achieve transition.¹⁰ The CPC soon recognized the CPM as the real Communist Party of India.¹¹

Although the CPI and the CPM claimed separate ideologies, in fact, there was little difference in their political agendas. In the 1967 general elections, the CPM forged an alliance with the CPI and came to power in two states, Kerala and West Bengal.¹² These electoral victories did not enthuse the CPC, which banked on the CPM to wage an armed struggle.¹³ Moreover, there was no unanimity of thought within the CPM on the implementation of land reforms. The extreme leftist elements within the CPM, led by pro-Chinese leaders such as Charu Mazumdar found an opportunity to express their thoughts in a peasant agitation at Naxalbari, in the state of West Bengal, which was ruled by the CPM led alliance.¹⁴ Some unwarranted violence during the agitation and police excesses provided the spark that turned the agitation into a conflagration of a violent struggle. The resultant violence soon spread to other areas and the ultra-leftist CPM leaders were quick to take command of the agitation.¹⁵ The CPM which was part of the government in West Bengal was

now faced with the dilemma of either crushing the agitation or supporting it and risking dismissal of its government. The CPM opted for the former. The party distanced itself from the movement, crushed the agitation, and expelled the ultra-leftist leaders from the party.¹⁶ Irked by the CPM's weakness for power in the parliamentary system, the CPC called for the formation of a true Marxist-Leninist party.¹⁷ The CPC also assessed the conditions in India to be ripe for an armed revolution and interpreted the events at Naxalbari as the beginning of a mass movement, thereby calling for an armed revolution in India in June 1967.¹⁸

The period since 1967 can be divided into three significant periods: Phase I from 1967-76, Phase II from 1977-98, and Phase III from 1998 through the present. Please see Appendix A for a more detailed history of the Maoist movement from 1967 to the present. Phase I included the birth of the movement in West Bengal, its subsequent expansion to few other states, fragmentation of the movement due to regional contradictions, and finally its suppression by government action during the National Emergency in 1975. The next phase, post Emergency, was characterized by the movement's resurgence, diversification, and adaptation to the changing socio-economic and political situation in the country. The movement remained fragmented but expanded its support base. Finally, Phase III was characterized by an unprecedented expansion of the movement's support base into the tribal belt and consolidation of the movement through merger of various Maoist groups. With this merger, the territorial extent of Maoist influence stretched over a large expanse of territory known as the "Red Corridor" from the Indo-Nepal border in the north to the southern state of Andhra Pradesh covering several states. This phase has also been characterized by high incidence of Maoist violence. Please refer to Appendix B for the map depicting the "Red Corridor."¹⁹ The proliferation of major Maoist parties from 1967 through this day is tabulated at Appendix C.²⁰ Appendix D shows the numbers of incidents of Maoist violence and

fatalities suffered by various states during the period 2001-08.^{21, 22} From the available data, the following trends emerge:

- The number of fatalities has been rising in recent years, thus indicating increased lethality of Maoist attacks.
- Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, and Bihar account for majority of such incidents, indicating consolidation of Maoist influence in these states.
- Andhra Pradesh has shown definite decline in Maoist violence in recent years, indicating a successful COIN campaign by the state.

These trends demonstrate an unprecedented intensification of the insurgency in eastern and central India during the past decade.

Causes of Maoist Expansion

The Maoist movement began as an agrarian movement due to the simmering discontent among the poor and under privileged sections against the social and economic exploitation by the upper classes. Poverty, tardy implementation of land reforms, and social and economic exploitation of lower classes in a caste-based society have remained the motivating factors driving the movement throughout its four decades of existence. Ironically, rapid economic growth and industrialization over the past decade have acted as catalysts for the unprecedented expansion of the insurgency. The major factors that contributed to the insurgency's growth are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Poverty: From its inception, the Maoist movement has derived support from the weaker and deprived sections of the society. Presently, the Red Corridor comprises the poorest regions of the country. The percentage of population living below the poverty line in most of the Maoist-affected states is higher than the national average of 27.5%. Appendix E

shows the percentage of population and number of people below the poverty line in various Maoist affected states since 1973.²³ Analysis of this data reveals following:

- Although the percentage of total Indian population living below the poverty line has fallen by half since 1973, the absolute number of people below the poverty line has fallen only marginally. The gains of poverty alleviation have clearly been negated by rapid population growth.
- In absolute terms, the number of poor people in Orissa, Maharashtra, Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh has increased over the past three decades.
- There is no discernible change in the poverty alleviation trend in the post-Liberalization period; therefore, it is clear that the benefits of economic growth have not passed to those living in abject poverty. In today's information age, this increasing gap between the rich and the poor has given rise to a feeling of "relative deprivation" among the poor, thus paving the way for a "revolution of rising expectations."²⁴

Land Reforms: At the time of independence, Indian society was predominantly feudal with a small group of landlords owning vast tracts of land and the majority of people working as landless tenants. The implementation of land reforms post-independence has not been very successful. Thus, even after 60 years of independence, the absolute landless and near landless (those with less than half acre of land) make up for 43% of rural households of India. Unofficially, in many parts of the country, landlords continue to hold large tracts of land using legal loopholes and exploit poor peasants.²⁵

Caste Based Society: The rural society in India is polarized along the lines of caste. The peasants and the landless predominantly belong to the lower castes while the landlords and the wealthy represent the upper castes. Prolonged exploitation of the lower castes has generated animosity among the lower castes towards the upper castes which has now found

expression through the Maoist struggle. While the Maoists in Bihar and Jharkhand draw most of their cadres from the lower castes, the landlords and upper castes have formed “senas” or private armies to counter the violence perpetrated by the Maoists. Thus caste-based massacres and counter killings have for long characterized the Maoist violence in the polarized society of Bihar.²⁶

Tribal Backwardness and Isolation from the National Mainstream: The forests of the Red Corridor are home to majority of India's tribes, also identified as Scheduled Tribes (ST) under the Constitution, which account for 8.2 percent of the total Indian population. “Primitive traits,” distinct culture, economic backwardness, widespread illiteracy, and geographic and social isolation from the mainstream society differentiate them from the rest of the population. Constitutional provisions provide for special government efforts for tribal welfare, such as 7.5 percent reservations for STs in government jobs and educational institutions. A separate Central Ministry of Tribal Affairs and corresponding departments of state governments are primarily responsible for tribal development. However, despite years of developmental activity, the improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the STs has been marginal. Their rates of poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and child and infant mortality far exceed the national average. Due to the continued backwardness, they have been unable to benefit from the opportunities provided by a fast expanding economy.²⁷ Further, as many of these tribes live in isolated communities, a feeling of nationalism is yet to develop among them. The backwardness and isolation of the tribes have been easily exploited by the Maoists in recruiting cadres to fight against the State.

Industrialization and Displacement of Population: India, being the second most populous country in the world, has a high population density of about 357.3 persons/ km² (world average is 45.6 persons/ km²). The population density map of India is placed at Appendix F.²⁸ Over 70% of this population resides in rural areas, and agriculture alone

accounts for 52% of employment.²⁹ In tribal areas, about 82% people depend on agriculture for their livelihoods.³⁰ This large agrarian population exerts tremendous pressure on the fixed land resources. Unused land being scarce, industrialization invariably requires displacement of people from agricultural or forest lands which have historically been the habitat and the source of livelihood for millions of farmers and the STs. The tribal belt encompassing the forested areas of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, and Orissa is also India's richest reservoir of mineral wealth with large deposits of iron ore, copper, coal, and bauxite. Since independence, these areas have been harnessed for their mineral wealth; however, the pace of industrialization had been gradual until the 90s. Therefore, the displacement of tribal population was minimal. Post liberalization, these mineral rich states have pursued aggressive policies to attract investments by signing numerous Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with Indian and foreign companies selling mining rights and for setting up industry and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the region. The states have used the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 to acquire land from the people for industrial projects. In the absence of the Right to Property as a Fundamental Right under the Constitution, the people depend on the government and private industry for compensation and rehabilitation.³¹ While some people accept the compensation, many others do not wish to give up their traditional means of livelihood. This clash of interests between the people and the government has led to protests, both violent and non-violent, ultimately stalling several projects in the region worth billions of dollars.³² These protests have often been exploited by political parties to further their own political agendas. Moreover, the occasional use of force by the government to quell violent opposition has only worsened matters. Thus, the discontent among the displaced people has provided a good opportunity for the Maoists to join cause with the people and expand their support base, especially in the tribal belt. Consequently, the tribal population, which was hitherto indifferent to the Maoists, has now come out in support of the Maoists.

Strategic Communication by Maoists: Over the past 40 years, the Maoists have succeeded in winning over the support of the rural poor with their propaganda. They have undermined the legitimate government's authority by highlighting its failures in providing basic amenities and social justice, despite 60 years of independence. Further, passive support from some members of the intelligentsia has lent credibility to their voice. The Maoists have reinforced their authority and exposed the haplessness of the state by selectively targeting security forces and government institutions. In many “liberated areas”, they have moved in to fill the void left by the non-existent administration by running parallel administrations, providing essential services in times of need, and dispensing swift justice.³³ Besides taking advantage of prevalent dissatisfaction and feelings of perceived neglect and injustice among the under privileged and remote segments of population, the Maoists make “systematic efforts to prevent execution and implementation of development works, including infrastructure like railways, roads, power and telecom through violence and terror, to keep the remote and background areas in a state of inaccessibility and deprivation, as also to show the State and governance structures at field levels as being ineffective.”³⁴

Political Support: In the past, some Maoist groups have participated in the electoral process or supported certain political parties.³⁵ This nexus and political patronage has also helped the Maoist movement in surviving successive governments.³⁶

Consolidation and Merger of Maoist Groups: Till the late 90s, the Maoist movement was fragmented and a number of groups operated within their separate localized areas of influence. For example, the PWG was active in the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and a few districts of Maharashtra, while the MCC, the CPML- Party Unity and the CPML- Liberation groups operated in their respective areas in Bihar and Jharkhand.³⁷ The regional character of the groups and occasional inter-group rivalry localized their influence and limited their ability to pose a major threat to India's internal security. The

merger of these groups between 1998 and 2004 and the resultant formation of the CPI(Maoist) has been a very important factor in strengthening the insurgency.³⁸ In the early 90s, the Maoists were active in only 15 districts in four states. Post merger, the CPI(Maoist) has expanded its territorial base rapidly and is present in 223 districts (out of total 629 districts) spread over 20 (out of 29) states of the country.³⁹ Moreover, the CPI(Maoist) has also established links with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) during this period.⁴⁰

Acquisition of Sophisticated Arms and Explosives: Over the years, the Maoists have acquired sophisticated arms and explosives which out gun the security forces. At its inception, the movement relied on primitive arms such as bows, arrows, and spears. Today the movement boasts of sophisticated arms such as AK-47s and other automatic weapons, many of which have been looted from the security forces. The illegal arms manufacturing and trafficking business has also been a major source for weapons. The Maoists have also perfected the skill of making Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) with explosives stolen from the local mining industry. The CPI(Maoist) with its accumulated cache of arms, explosives, and know-how on IEDs is in a strong position to challenge the security forces. The rise in intensity of Maoist violence in recent years testifies to this enhanced firepower.⁴¹

Terrain: The Maoists have thrived in the contiguous forest and mountainous terrain of eastern and central India. They have used the inaccessible terrain to organize, train, and execute their operations transcending borders of multiple states. While the respective state police forces have their borders of jurisdiction, the Maoists move freely, perpetrating crimes in one state and retiring to regroup in another. Although, there are several other regions within India with similar socio-economic problems, the movement has been unable to thrive in those areas due to unavailability of suitable terrain. The inaccessible terrain of the Red

Corridor is one of the prime strengths of the insurgency- it provides sanctuary and favors the guerrilla tactics of the Maoists.

Financial Enterprise: The Maoist movement has become a lucrative financial enterprise. This movement has historically derived its financial resources through extortion from the class enemies. The class enemies have changed over the years. As landlords have given way to industrialists and contractors, the money involved has multiplied. According to the Chhattisgarh state police chief, the business of extortion run by the Maoists has an annual turnover of about Rupees 20 billion (about \$400 million).⁴² Roughly 30 percent of government developmental funds and other investment finds its way to the Maoists in the form of commissions paid by contractors and industrialists.⁴³ It is therefore not surprising that the Maoist movement has expanded exponentially in the past decade which is also characterized by rapid industrialization.

SECTION II: SHORTFALLS IN COIN STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS

Since independence, India has fought several insurgencies. The security forces, especially the Army, the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPF), and police forces of many states have gained a wealth of experience through successful COIN campaigns in Kashmir, Punjab, and the North-Eastern states. In this backdrop, the rapid growth of the Maoist insurgency to such alarming levels warrants analysis. This section seeks to analyze the main shortfalls in the COIN approach which have led to the growth of the Maoist insurgency.

Constitutional Position: The Indian Constitution places law and order on the State List. Thus the Central Government is obliged to assist the states in maintaining law and order only when the states request for such assistance.⁴⁴ In the initial stage of the movement, the states were successful in defeating the insurgency with CPF assistance.⁴⁵ However, in the post

Emergency period, when the movement resurfaced and strengthened, the states treated it as a law and order problem and employed their respective police forces against the insurgents. Moreover, the Central Government's preoccupation with other immediate security threats such as the insurgencies in Kashmir, Punjab, and the North-East relegated the then insignificant Maoist threat to be handled by the states.

Political Will: In the initial stages, the movement was only of nuisance value to the state governments, as the incidents of violence were limited to interior areas far from the seat of power in the state capitals. The Maoists garnered support from the rural masses by highlighting their legitimate grievances arising out of poverty and social exploitation, issues which should have been addressed by the government itself. Appropriate steps to mitigate these grievances in time would have preempted the Maoists, but lack of timely action allowed these problems to fester into a widespread insurgency today.

COIN Doctrine: The only documented COIN doctrine among India's security forces is the Indian Army's Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations, published in 2006. The state security forces and the CPF do not have a similar documented COIN doctrine to guide such operations.⁴⁶ In the absence of a common strategy against the common enemy, different states have adopted separate approaches to this problem. For example, the Andhra Pradesh government created the elite "Greyhound" force within its state police as a specialized anti-guerrilla force; the Chhattisgarh government created armed anti-Maoist citizen vigilante groups called "Salwa-Judum" to defend the population against the Maoists; and the West Bengal government, until recently, treated the insurgency as a social problem. The Andhra Pradesh government's strategy has been successful in stemming the insurgency to a large extent. Besides creating the specialized anti-Maoist force, the government upgraded the security apparatus of the entire state to cater to COIN. The improvements to security include better weapons, communications equipment, vehicles, protective walls and lighting around

police stations, enhanced intelligence capability, and better coordination within the force.⁴⁷

While the Andhra Pradesh government's approach is praised for its success, Chhattisgarh's approach of creating the "Salwa Judum" has earned criticism for the lack of success and alleged human rights violations by these groups.⁴⁸ Similarly, the COIN efforts of other states have largely been unsuccessful.

Coordination between States: As each state countered the Maoists in its own way, the COIN operations became compartmentalized. The states have a mechanism of sharing intelligence, however, separate organizational structures and chains of command of their forces leave gaps in a coordinated effort. The Maoists operate in the jungles contiguous to the various state boundaries and move freely across state borders after perpetrating crimes, while the police force of one state has to coordinate with those of neighboring states to continue and coordinate operations.⁴⁹ The real need for effective COIN is combined operations with unity of command and effort.

Political Support to Maoists: The Maoists and politicians alike depend on the population for support. As Indian politics is polarized on caste lines, there have been several allegations of politicians depending upon the popular support base provided by the Maoists for electoral gains.⁵⁰ This nexus has undermined a serious COIN approach in many states.

Inconsistencies in Political Strategy: Different political parties in power have adopted different approaches towards the Maoists. While some parties pursued a hard line approach involving use of force, other parties opted for softer options such as initiating dialogue with the insurgents. Certain governments imposed bans, then lifted them, and subsequently reimposed them.⁵¹ The insurgents have exploited these inconsistencies to their advantage to consolidate their movement.

Deficiencies in Security Forces: As the movement intensified in the past decade, the deficiencies plaguing the state security forces constrained COIN operations and limited the ability of the states to counter the threat.

Strength: The police forces of most Maoist affected states suffer from personnel shortages. The average police-to-population ratio in India is 142 police personnel per 100,000 people. Bihar and Orissa have averages of 60.69 and 74 respectively. Such large vacancies put considerable strain on the police forces in discharging their traditional responsibilities of maintaining law and order, let alone fighting an insurgency. The states grappling with manpower shortages have to increasingly depend on CPF to counter the Maoist threat. The CPF help the state police, but lack familiarity with local terrain, culture, and access to intelligence from local sources.⁵²

Equipment and Infrastructure: The police forces of most Maoist affected states lack sophisticated equipment viz. assault rifles, bullet-proof vehicles, anti-landmine vehicles, communication sets, night-vision devices etc. Many police stations and pickets in Maoist affected states still lack basic infrastructure such as boundary walls and perimeter lighting.⁵³ The Maoists armed with better firepower have exploited these deficiencies to outgun and overrun police outposts in recent times, inflicting heavy casualties on the security forces.

Intelligence: COIN operations depend heavily on intelligence. Traditionally, the state police forces rely on Human Intelligence (HUMINT), which is generated through a network of informers nurtured with years of interactions between the police and the local population. Manpower shortages within the police have affected their intelligence collection abilities.⁵⁴ Further, the inaccessible jungle and mountainous terrain and the lack of sufficient technical intelligence capability with the state police forces have also been major constraints in gathering actionable intelligence.

COIN Training: The police forces are normally trained to maintain law and order.

Fighting armed guerillas requires different expertise which can be obtained through specialized training. While the Andhra Pradesh Police has raised a specialized force with a good measure of success, most other states are fighting the Maoists with their conventional police forces.

Human Rights: The Maoists operate among the population; therefore, any action against the Maoists, unless carefully planned, is bound to affect the population. There are a number of allegations of human rights violations against the security forces involved in anti-Maoist operations. Furthermore, protests against the government's land acquisition drive have sometimes turned violent and invited police action, causing deaths and injuries among protestors. In Chhattisgarh, the action of "Salwa Judum" in relocating villagers to its camps to sanitize the region has invited criticism from human rights groups.⁵⁵ While the veracity of all such allegations are debatable, they definitely help the Maoists in their information campaign in alienating the population and vilifying the government.

Disconnect between the Maoist Strategy and COIN Effort: The Maoist strategy over the past four decades has been consistent in two aspects: first, to increase the support base and second, to increase the combat power. The movement has adapted to changing times and continued to grow from a fragmented peasant movement of limited territorial influence into becoming India's greatest security headache. Similarly, the movement's evolution from executing despotic murders of defenseless landlords using primitive weapons in the 60s to challenging elite Special Forces with sophisticated weapons, IEDs, and guerrilla tactics today speaks volumes of the growth of the combat power of the insurgency. On the other hand, the states' response to this problem has been incoherent and inadequate. The Maoist attacks have gradually increased in intensity, sophistication, and brazenness, shifting from pure guerrilla attacks against class enemies to daring attacks against security forces challenging the

authority of the government. The ill-equipped state forces, trained for law and order responsibilities have failed to counter the tactics and onslaught of a vigorously expanding insurgency, thus prompting the Central Government to step in to the states' assistance.

SECTION III: WAY AHEAD

The rapid growth of Maoist influence over the past decade has two major repercussions: first, the security situation has deteriorated in the affected states and second, the economic development and industrialization of the region has been threatened. In late 2009, the Central Government and the affected states prepared to launch a coordinated campaign against the Maoists, thus generating considerable debate within the country on the suitability of a military approach to resolve this vexed issue. There are many who favor a soft approach of seeking a political solution by inviting the Maoists for peace talks, while others advocate the use of force to defeat the insurgency. This section will discuss these options and recommend a comprehensive COIN approach.

Present Status of the Maoist Insurgency: The Maoists now have presence in 223 districts spread over 20 states of the country.⁵⁶ They also control large expanse of territory along the Red Corridor and run parallel government structures which undermine the government's authority in these areas. They have gained considerable support among the tribal population which has been alienated due to the industrialization drive in recent years. With considerable firepower, the Maoists are successfully challenging security forces. Further, they have also been successful in disrupting and stalling government sponsored development activity and industrial projects within their areas of influence. These areas need substantial development, investment, and industrialization and government efforts to usher in progress are being countered by the Maoists for their selfish ends.

Feasibility of a Political Solution: A political solution wherein the Maoists give up violence, join talks with the government, and ultimately participate in the democratic political process seems an ideal solution to the insurgency; however, this possibility seems remote at this stage. There are several reasons for the Maoists' aversion to a political solution.

Support Base: Although the Maoists have been successful in spreading their influence to a majority of states, they draw popular support primarily in the tribal belt, which accounts for only eight percent of the total population. Despite significant Maoist influence, intimidation, and poll-boycott calls, all Maoist-affected states have demonstrated robust voter turnouts during the elections held in recent years. Appendix G shows how the voter turnouts have remained largely unaffected despite rapid increase in Maoist influence.^{57, 58, 59} Clearly, the Maoists enjoy minimal support beyond the tribal belt, whether in the urban centers or in the rural areas. Moreover, in the fiercely competitive multi-party electoral politics of India, it would take a long time for the Maoists to establish themselves and win elections. Furthermore, the expanding middle class, which drives public opinion in India, perceives the extreme Leftist Maoist ideology to be regressive. Therefore, the Maoists stand to lose and risk marginalization by opting for a political solution.

Ideology: Since inception, the Maoists have blamed the current system of parliamentary democracy for most of the country's problems. The Maoists aim to capture power via “people's war” by the proletariat. Any ideological compromise would cause the movement to forfeit its ideological “superiority” and reduce it to another left wing group, scores of which already exist within India.

Gains from Illegal Activities: In the past, several states have banned the Maoist organizations and more recently, in June 2009, the Central Government banned the CPI(Maoist) as a terrorist organization. The Maoists depend on illegal activities such as extortion, abductions, and looting for finances, thus making their movement a profitable

enterprise. As the banned status of the party suits these unlawful activities, the Maoists stand to lose financially by joining the mainstream.

Past Experience with Peace Processes: In the past, several state governments have attempted negotiations with the Maoists, sometimes declaring unilateral ceasefires as goodwill gestures. However, the talks have always failed and a political solution has remained elusive. Instead, the Maoists have always exploited these occasions to regroup, consolidate, secure release of their cadres from government captivity, and strike back.

Based on the above reasons, the possibility of the Maoists volunteering for a political solution seems remote. Instead, it is likely that they would resist the security forces with their guerrilla tactics and continue expanding their support base among the tribal population. Faced with an offensive by the state, any willingness shown by the Maoists for a political solution may well be part of their strategy to buy time and consolidate. The Central Government's recent calls to the Maoists to abjure violence in favor of a political process have gone unheeded by the Maoists as violence continues unabated.

Multi-pronged Approach- The Way Ahead: In the absence of a political solution, the option of employing force remains a viable alternative. However, the use of force alone cannot resolve the Maoist problem, as it has wider socio-economic dimensions. Therefore a multi-pronged approach is necessary. India's 1.3 million strong Army and an equally large CPF have considerable COIN experience. Until recently, the state governments fought the insurgency on their own with limited Central assistance. Understandably, the piecemeal approach has not worked so far. A combined effort mounted by all affected states, augmented by Central forces is essential to defeat the insurgency. The Central Government, in cooperation with the affected states, is already working on such an approach. The Center has made its intention clear on launching a combined offensive, dubbed as "Operation Green Hunt" by the media, employing about 80,000 CPF specially trained at the Army's elite

Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School. This offensive would be coordinated with the state police forces and supported by airlift and surveillance provided by the Indian Air Force (IAF).⁶⁰ The aim of this offensive is to flush the Maoists out of their hideouts in the jungles and reestablish government control over the territory. This is to be followed up by development work to mitigate the root causes which have led to this insurgency.⁶¹

Combined Operations: Combined operations need to be conducted with participation of all stake-holders: the Central government, the State governments, the CPF, the state police forces, the local administrations, central and state intelligence agencies, and the IAF, with the aim of achieving unity of command and effort.

Human Rights: The COIN operations should be carefully planned to avoid human rights abuses. Reports of such violations must be treated with urgency, sensitivity, and transparency to punish those guilty. A stringent human rights policy would gradually help win the battle of hearts and minds of the tribal population and deny the Maoists much needed support.

Popular Support: The strength of the Maoists comes from its popular support among the tribal population and the poor. The main reason why the fledgling movement from the 60s till the 90s could expand so rapidly in the past decade was its ability to enlist popular support. The people are thus the “Center of Gravity” for both sides in this fight. The government's anti-Maoist strategy must therefore aim to win back the people's confidence in its institutions. Towards this end, instead of talking to the Maoists, the government should initiate dialogue with the disenchanted sections of population, especially the tribal people.

Development: The Maoist affected areas are among the most under developed areas in the country. India's progress has been inequitable; while the Maoist affected areas have remained neglected, the rest of the nation leaped forward. The development activity in such a large area would require tremendous capital, which may not be feasible for the state

governments to provide. Therefore, the Central Government needs to assist the states with funds. More importantly, the development projects should be carried out within strict parameters of accountability and time frames to prevent corruption and cost and time overruns. The development activity should first focus on providing basic services such as education, health, safe drinking water, electricity, and roads which are non-existent in most of the tribal areas.

Land Reforms: The support for Maoists outside the tribal belt mostly comes from the poor and landless farmers. The states need to urgently pursue land reforms and carry out redistribution of land to the landless to stop economic exploitation of the poor by the landlords.

Land Acquisition and Industrialization: The Maoist affected states need immense capital inflows for economic progress and industrialization seems to be the only viable option for long term development. However, the current method of land acquisition, using the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 is the center of discontent among the people. The Draft National Rehabilitation Policy of 2006, albeit with its deficiencies, is a step towards addressing this problem.⁶² A comprehensive law that allows land acquisition for industrialization while protecting the land owners' rights and providing proper rehabilitation and compensation needs to be enacted. Further, transparency and participation of the affected population in land acquisition deals would ameliorate most of the grievances of the people being displaced. The Central Government enacted the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 into law on December 31, 2007.⁶³ This path-breaking law recognizes and protects the rights of the STs to agricultural land and natural resources within the forest areas. Effective implementation of this law can go a long way in protecting the rights of the tribal people against forcible displacement and thus ameliorate much of their present grievances.

Amalgamation of Tribal Population into the Mainstream: Many sections of the tribal population are yet to join the national mainstream. They still exist as communities and a feeling of nationalism is yet to develop among many tribes. Further, the policy of job reservations has achieved only limited success. Eight percent of the national population remaining disjointed from the national mainstream does not augur well for the country's future. The states would need to bring them into the national mainstream through development, empowerment, and proactive interaction with these communities.

Police Modernization: The police forces of most Indian states need modernization to counter the Maoists and other emerging threats of the 21st Century. Once the Maoists are cleared with the assistance of Central forces, the responsibility of maintaining law and order would dwell again on the state police. If the state police forces do not modernize, the chances of the movement's resurgence cannot be ruled out. Therefore, it is urgent that the states undertake police modernization in the right earnest.

Police Presence: The tribal belt is also characterized by very sparse police presence. For the government's writ to run in its territory, permanent police presence in the form of police stations is essential. A permanent police presence, besides bolstering confidence among the population, also serves as a source of intelligence about local insurgent activities.

Intelligence Collection and Sharing: There is a need to coordinate intelligence collection and dissemination between the Center and the affected states for a coordinated response to a common threat. In addition to the traditional sources of HUMINT, the state police forces should be equipped with sufficient technical intelligence capability and expertise to exploit the full spectrum of intelligence sources.

Constitutional Amendment: Law and order which exists on the State List of the Constitution needs to be placed in the Concurrent List to facilitate greater involvement of the Central agencies in tackling law and order challenges beyond the capability of the states.

CONCLUSION

The Maoist movement which started as a minor peasant uprising in 1967 has grown into India's biggest security challenge today. Its survival and successful growth is attributed to its ability to adapt to the changing socio-economic and political situation of the country and the lack of a serious COIN response from the states. Until the late 90s, the movement was still fragmented, lacked strength, and remained only of nuisance value to the states. However, the rapid industrialization drive during the past decade provided a fillip to the Maoist insurgency. The forced displacement of tribal and rural population due to the government's aggressive land acquisition policies gave the Maoists a good opportunity to turn people's grievances into support for their own cause. During the past decade, the Maoists were also successful in merging the numerous regional groups into a single pan-India Maoist party, thus consolidating control over a large swathe of territory across central and eastern India. The lack of a coordinated response by the affected states, deficiencies plaguing the state forces, and the shortcomings in their COIN approaches only contributed to the expansion of the insurgency. Considering the grave threat to India's internal security and economic progress, the Central Government has stepped in with massive CPF assistance to coordinate a comprehensive COIN approach against the Maoists. A multi-pronged COIN strategy that combines the use of force with concrete steps to ameliorate the genuine grievances of the people and win back their hearts and minds is essential for a permanent solution. Moreover, the state governments need to urgently overcome deficiencies in their police forces and upgrade their capabilities to counter such threats and effectively police their territory to maintain lasting peace.

APPENDIX A

RISE OF MAOISM IN INDIA: A BRIEF HISTORY

Phase I (1967- 76): Birth of the Indian Maoist Movement

The expelled leaders of the CPM formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) or CPML.⁶⁴ The party was formed on April 22, 1969, the birth centenary of Lenin and launched at a May Day rally in Calcutta.⁶⁵ The CPC was quick to recognize CPML's legitimacy as India's only genuine communist party.⁶⁶ The party was meant to be a rural based, secret, and underground party committed to armed revolution.⁶⁷ It was ironical though for it to be launched at a public rally in India's biggest metropolis.⁶⁸ Although the names of Marx and Lenin were included in its name, the real inspiring figure was Mao.⁶⁹ The CPML echoed Mao's teachings of armed revolutionary struggle against the "class enemies"- the landlords, the policemen, and the revisionist elements, who deserved "annihilation".⁷⁰ The ideology also got its name of "Naxalism," owing to the origin at Naxalbari.

The dismal political and economic situation in the country helped the movement find support in diverse places in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu.⁷¹ However, the launch of the CPML could not consolidate and unify the movement due to the lack of a strong central leadership, diverse regional differences, and shortfalls in strategy and tactics. During this period, a number of revolutionary groups owing allegiance to Mao operated in different states. Although these groups agreed on the broad objective of achieving transition through armed struggle by the peasantry, there were disagreements on the tactics to be followed.⁷² One such party was the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) of Bihar, which thrived independent of the CPML for the next four decades. The CPML, instead of unifying these groups into a larger party through revolutionary struggles, chose to marginalize the dissenting groups by terming them as counter-

revolutionary.⁷³ Such an approach inhibited the growth of the CPML beyond West Bengal and resulted in a fragmented revolutionary movement spread across several states. Also, the tactics followed by the Maoists had a number of shortcomings and the party deviated from the basic teachings of Mao. Instead of building a mass movement, the party formed small groups of activists to attack and annihilate landlords, seize their lands, crops, and wealth.⁷⁴ Therefore, the movement gradually degenerated into a campaign of selective targeting and brutal murder of landlords by a handful of party workers.⁷⁵ Without the participation of the rural masses, the movement could not gain much headway in the countryside. Moreover, the movement had underestimated the power of the State. It relied on primitive weapons such as sickles and spears to execute its actions. Furthermore, it was based on offensive tactics against defenseless landlords and lacked defensive capability; therefore, when the police started cracking down, the movement crumbled. The arrest and death of some top-level leaders including Charu Mazumdar in July 1972 dealt a crippling blow to the movement. The post-Charu Mazumdar period was characterized by a number of splits of the CPML further weakening the movement. The imposition of National Emergency in June 1975 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and subsequent police repression froze the movement in its tracks. The pre-Emergency period saw the movement's growth primarily in West Bengal, and to a lesser extent in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh.⁷⁶

Phase II (1977- 98): From Emergency to the Merger of Maoists

After the Emergency was lifted in March 1977, the party leadership having realized the futility of relying solely on the peasantry, sought to diversify the movement by including labor unions, student organizations, and civil rights groups. The ideological bond between the CPML and the CPC also weakened in the 70s as the CPC got preoccupied with its internal matters. The CPML split again leading to the formation of the CPML-People's War (PW) in

Andhra Pradesh (April 1980) and the CPML-Party Unity (PU) in Bihar (April 1982).

Consequently, the main theater of violence also shifted from West Bengal to Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.⁷⁷

The CPML-PW consolidated itself in Andhra Pradesh by forming armed squads for violent attacks; forest committees for jungle areas; regional committees for the plains; and numerous front organizations representing diverse fields. In Bihar, the Maoist movement was waged by three main groups: the CPML-PU, the Maoist Communist Center (MCC), and the CPML-Liberation. These groups also diversified through a number of front organizations. The threat of leftist violence and the lack of government protection prompted the victims i.e. the landlords and the wealthy, who also represented the higher castes, to form “senas” or private armies to defend themselves, thus giving birth to a period of unabated caste based violence in Bihar.⁷⁸

The level of violence by these groups also increased, as did the level of sophistication of arms held by them. Besides attacks on landlords, police, and police informers, their targets included government property such as railways, post and telegraph, public transport corporations etc. The government response to these groups has been in the form of bans which have been imposed, then lifted, and then reimposed. These groups continued their activities and grew through new front organizations. Some groups have even forayed into electoral politics, albeit with limited success.⁷⁹

The Maoists followed a three-pronged approach: creation of support bases, mobilization of financial resources, and attacks on inimical elements. Popular resentment due to poverty, economic disparity, social exploitation of lower castes, improper implementation of land reforms, corruption in development activities, and government apathy towards the rural and tribal areas were successfully harnessed by the Maoists in expanding their support base. Extortion has remained the primary source of financial support for the Maoists. The

attacks became bolder with targeting of senior police officers, police stations, government property, and class enemies such as rich landlords. This period also saw attempts by some of the groups to coordinate their actions and approach other insurgent organizations such as the LTTE for support.⁸⁰

Phase III (1998 -2010) Intensification of the Insurgency Post-Merger of Maoist Groups

This phase has seen unprecedented strengthening of the movement through the merger of various groups, consolidation, and expansion of the support base. In 1998, the People's War and Party Unity factions merged to form the CPML-People's War Group (PWG), thereby consolidating the cadres and territories of the respective parties in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.⁸¹ In September 2004, the PWG and the MCC merged to form a single CPI(Maoist) party.⁸² With this merger, the territorial extent of Maoist influence stretched from the Indo-Nepal border in the north to the southern state of Andhra Pradesh, now known as the "Red Corridor" covering six states: Bihar, Jharkhand (new state created out of Bihar), Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh (new state created out of Madhya Pradesh), Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh.

During this period, the Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand state governments initiated peace talks with the Maoist groups; however, these peace processes failed and the Maoists exploited the ceasefire period to further consolidate and expand their bases.⁸³ The side effects of rapid economic growth viz. land acquisition by the government for industrialization and consequent displacement of rural and tribal population contributed to the expansion of the Maoist movement, especially in the tribal areas. The Maoists expanded their base in all states except Andhra Pradesh, which stemmed this menace in recent years through an effective COIN campaign.⁸⁴ This period also witnessed an increase in the scale and brazenness of Maoists attacks: audacious attacks on patrols of security forces; overrunning police stations

and jails in towns using “swarming attacks” by large numbers of Maoist cadres; numerous assassination attempts against high profile political leaders, including State Chief Ministers and Union Cabinet Ministers; hijacking trains; brutal public executions of captured police officers, government officials, and informants, etc.⁸⁵ The combined CPI(Maoist) achieved ability to co-ordinate operations over a large area across several states, often by successfully exploiting the divided COIN effort of various states to its advantage by perpetrating crimes in one state and evading capture by sneaking into neighboring states. The seriousness of the situation is evident in the Prime Minister's statement describing the Maoist threat as India's greatest internal security challenge.

APPENDIX B

MAP OF RED CORRIDOR*

LEFT-WING EXTREMIST AFFECTED AREAS IN INDIA




Figure 1

* source: South Asia Terrorism Portal

APPENDIX C

MAJOR INDIAN MAOIST GROUPS: 1967 – 2010*

Name	Period	Original Leaders	Affected States
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) or CPML	1969-72	Charu Mazumdar	West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)	1969-2004	Kanai Chatterjee and Amulya Sen	Bihar, Jharkhand
CPML People's War	1980-98	Kondapalli Seetharammayya	Andhra Pradesh
CPML Party Unity	1982-98	M. Appalasuri and Bhowani Roy Chowdhury	Bihar, Jharkhand
CPML People's War Group (PWG)	1998-2004	Formed by merger of People's War and Party Unity	Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Maharashtra
Communist Party of India (Maoist) or CPI(Maoist)	2004-2010	Formed by merger of PWG and MCC	Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, and others

Table 1

* source: Jennifer L. Oetken, "Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler, 127-151 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 129.

APPENDIX D

STATE-WISE RECORD OF MAOIST VIOLENCE (2001-08)

State	Year wise Number of Incidents of Maoist Violence (Number of Fatalities)							
	2001*	2002*	2003*	2004**	2005**	2006**	2007**	2008**
Andhra Pradesh	461(180)	346(96)	575(139)	310(74)	535(208)	183(47)	138(45)	92(46)
Bihar	169(111)	239(117)	249(127)	323(171)	186(96)	107(45)	135(67)	164(73)
Chhattisgarh	105(37)	304(55)	254(74)	352(83)	385(168)	715(388)	582(369)	620(242)
Jharkhand	355(200)	353(157)	341(117)	379(169)	312(119)	310(124)	482(157)	484(207)
Madhya Pradesh	21(2)	17(3)	13(1)	13(4)	20(3)	6(1)	9(2)	7(0)
Maharashtra	34(7)	83(29)	74(31)	84(15)	94(53)	98(42)	94(25)	68(22)
Orissa	30(11)	68(11)	49(15)	35(8)	42(14)	44(9)	67(17)	103(101)
Uttar Pradesh	22(12)	20(6)	13(8)	15(26)	10(1)	11(5)	9(3)	4(0)
West Bengal	9(4)	17(7)	6(1)	11(15)	14(7)	23(17)	32(6)	35(26)
Kerala	2(0)	18(1)	16(0)	5(0)	--	2(0)	8(0)	2(0)
Karnataka				6(1)	8(8)	10(0)	7(5)	8(4)
Haryana				--	--	--	1(0)	2(0)
Tamil Nadu				--	2(0)	--	1(0)	2(0)
Other States				-	-	-	-	--
Total	1208 (564)	1465 (482)	1590 (513)	1533 (566)	1608 (677)	1509 (678)	1565 (696)	1591 (721)

Table 2

*source: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2003-04

**source: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2008-09

APPENDIX E

POVERTY SITUATION: MAOIST AFFECTED STATES*

State	Percentage/ Number of People (in Lakhs i.e 100,000) below Poverty Line							
	1973-74		1983-84		1993-94		2004-05	
	%	Number (Lakhs)	%	Number (Lakhs)	%	Number (Lakhs)	%	Number (Lakhs)
Andhra Pradesh	48.86	225.69	28.91	164.58	22.19	153.97	15.8	126.1
Orissa	66.18	154.47	65.29	181.31	48.56	160.6	46.4	178.49
Maharashtra	53.24	287.42	43.44	290.89	36.86	305.22	30.7	317.38
West Bengal	63.43	299.3	54.85	318.69	35.66	254.56	24.7	208.36
Bihar	61.91	0	62.22	0	54.96	493.35	41.4	369.15
Jharkhand							40.3	116.39
Madhya Pradesh	61.78	276.3	49.78	277.97	42.52	298.52	38.3	249.68
Chhattisgarh							40.9	90.96
All India	54.88	3213.36	44.48	3228.97	35.97	3203.67	27.5	3017.2

Table 3

*source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 2008-09.

APPENDIX F

POPULATION DENSITY MAP OF INDIA*




Figure 2

source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India_population_density_map_en.svg

APPENDIX G

VOTER TURNOUT IN MAOIST AFFECTED STATES (1999-2009)

State	Voter Turnout during General Elections (%)		
	1999*	2004**	2009***
Andhra Pradesh	69.14	69.95	72.4
Orissa	55.63	66.06	63.35
Maharashtra	60.96	54.38	49.17
West Bengal	75.05	78.04	78.93
Bihar	61.48	58.02	44.27
Jharkhand [#]		55.69	49.77
Madhya Pradesh	54.88	48.09	51.3
Chattisgarh		52.09	58.19
All India	59.99	58.07	56.97

Table 4

[#] Jharkhand registered 58% turnout in the State Assembly Elections in December 2009 despite poll-boycott calls and threats of violence from Maoists.

*Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 1999 to the Thirteenth Lok Sabha.

**Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 2004 to the 14th Lok Sabha.

***http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_general_election,_2009

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Notes:

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