

# **Could the Outcome of the Genocide in Rwanda be Different with an Operational Planning Cell in the United Nations?**

**A Monograph  
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## **Abstract**

COULD THE OUTCOME OF THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA BE DIFFERENT WITH AN OPERATIONAL PLANNING CELL IN THE UNITED NATIONS? by MAJ Jean-François Duval, Canadian Army, 44 pages

Viewing the genocide in Rwanda as a case study, the monograph asks whether an operational planning cell could have provided appropriate tactical direction and strategic-level guidance to the UN decisions-makers. The document provides a synopsis of Rwanda's historical violence and examines how the UN was structured to do operational planning at the time of the Rwanda mission. It concludes by arguing that the UN's inability to link the strategic intent to tactical actions because of the absence of an operational planning capacity resulted in the UN leaders moving forward with an inaccurate set of assumptions. Having an operational planning cell would likely have changed the ultimate outcome in Rwanda.

In addressing the above, the paper examines the related issues of the UN operating mandate and rules of engagement (ROE). Finally, it explores why the UN deliberately ignored the situation in Rwanda until it had deteriorated to a point where DPKO action was unable to make a difference to the outcome of the genocide.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                                 |    |
|-------------------------------------------------|----|
| ILLUSTRATIONS .....                             | v  |
| Introduction .....                              | 1  |
| Tutsi: a Superior Race .....                    | 4  |
| The First Sign of the Genocide.....             | 14 |
| Missing the Link from Strategy to Tactics ..... | 22 |
| DPKO and Operational Art .....                  | 24 |
| Operational Art.....                            | 35 |
| Conclusion.....                                 | 38 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY .....                              | 41 |

## ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Figure 1: Flow of Information for the UN Mission in Rwanda.....27

Figure 2: Flow of Information that should have occurred with the UN Mission in Rwanda .....27

## Introduction

There is no doubt that United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have come to be the main tools to maintain peace around the world. From a military perspective, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is the main player in assisting Member States and the Secretary-General in maintaining international peace and security. DPKO maintains close relations with the Security Council, UN missions, and financial contributors. DPKO's task is to plan, prepare, and manage peacekeeping operations in order to fulfill the UN mandate. Every UN mission is provided a mandate by the Security Council, which underlines the task that the tactical commander must perform to successfully accomplish the assigned mission.<sup>1</sup>

This monograph will explore how the UN in general and DPKO in particular are structured to conduct operational planning. To address this issue the monograph will look in depth at the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda from 1993 to the genocide in 1994. Taking the genocide in Rwanda as a case study, the study asks whether an operational planning cell could have provided better tactical and strategic level guidance to the UN decisions makers. In 1941, during the Second World War, the American President and British Prime Minister discussed how to maintain and re-establish peace after the war. The outcome was the Atlantic Charter. The Atlantic Charter was "a common programme for the allied states and pledged mutual support in the war efforts and rejected any separate peace or armistice."<sup>2</sup> After much discussion between the British Prime Minister and the President, the term "United Nations" came to life on 24 October 1945. The intent of the United Nations (UN) was to prevent another world war. Considering that the UN had no legal application it made progress through inspirational example: "WE, THE

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<sup>1</sup>The United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko> (accessed 3 January 2012).

<sup>2</sup>Peter R. Baeh and Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations in the 1990s* (New York: St-Martin's Press, 1992), 15.

PEOPLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime had brought untold sorrow to making.”<sup>3</sup> With time, the main purpose of the UN came to be international peace and security, to establish friendly relations with other nations and promote human rights. The United Nations was to replace the League of Nations to facilitate cooperation with international laws, security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and most of all, world peace. Eventually peacekeeping, peace-building, conflict prevention, and human efforts became the promotional image under which the UN forged its reputation.

The UN started with a mission in 1948 in the Middle East with unarmed observers, which quickly evolved to an armed peacekeeping operation in 1956 to address the conflict on the Suez Canal. Since then the world has witnessed thousands of blue helmets deployed around the world in order to maintain peace and security. In 1988, the Noble Peace Price was awarded to UN members.<sup>4</sup>

Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the successes of the UN came from its functional organization and exceptional leadership. Six sub-organizations form the heart of the UN. They include the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat.<sup>5</sup>

Assuredly, the UN demonstrated success as a professional and functional organization but also by following a code of conduct, the UN Charter. The UN charter forms the core values under which peace, justice, human rights, and collective security are embedded and are the values that the UN promotes in the world. The core members form the nucleus of the UN and they

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 20.

<sup>4</sup>The United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko> (accessed 3 January 2012).

<sup>5</sup>The United Nations, UN at a Glance, <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml> (accessed 3 January 2012).



exercise political power through their common values and interest. The decision making process within the UN is influenced greatly by the divergence in policies and political agreement displayed by member states. Therefore the UN is a political organization more than anything else.<sup>6</sup>

After much success the UN embarked in 1990 on a difficult decade with disappointing results that would force the UN to question its purpose. Those disappointing results were clearly observed in Bosnia, Somalia, and most of all, the genocide in Rwanda where between 800,000 to 1 million human beings, including women and children, lost their life under the supervision of UN military forces.

The document will analyze three crucial problems to validate the thesis. First, it examines how the UN was structured to do or not do effective operational planning at the time of the Rwanda mission. Second, the paper examines the related issues of the UN operating mandate and rules of engagement (ROE) which the tactical commander must follow to accomplish his mission. Lastly, it explores why the UN deliberately ignored the situation in Rwanda until it had deteriorated to a point where DPKO action was unable to make a difference to the outcome of the genocide.

This document contains five sections. The first section gives a brief history of Rwanda and introduces the topic of operational planning cells. The next section looks at Rwanda, the start of the genocide and how the UN initially sent forces into Rwanda. The third section will outline the three problems faced by the UN mission in Rwanda. The fourth section will analyze the problems specific to Rwanda and those more generally related to the structure of the DPKO. Finally, the last part will offer analysis and recommendations concerning future UN operations planning.

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<sup>6</sup>Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Colorado, Westview Press, 1994), 4-28.

## **Tutsi: a Superior Race**

To understand the situation and the environment the author must synthesize Rwanda's history. The 1994 genocide is the outcome of the continuous historical fighting between the Tutsi and Hutu. In the case of the Genocide in Rwanda, history provides an understanding of how a country evolved from within. The continuous history of violence between the Tutsi and the Hutu is crucial to the planning as the Arusha Accords try to unify the two tribes that are in constant disagreement. The UN should have anticipated from a historical point of view that the Arusha Accord was in fact another reason for both tribes to turn to violence against each another.

European nations governed and ruled Rwanda from its beginning up to the 20th century. It started with the council of Berlin identifying Rwanda-Burundi as part of a German sphere of interest in 1885. The Germans came to Rwanda during a crucial time when political reform was taking place after the death of King Kigeli IV. The Germans instituted a colonial policy of indirect rule using the existing government structure to facilitate the process. The impact was significant because it provided for a very flexible monarchy, which was twofold; first to increase Tutsi power and second to control the Tutsi as they used the German forces to reinforce their own power. Over time, the Germans realized the limited possibility for economic expansion with cattle compared with the surrounding region that exploited the commerce of diamonds, gold, and copper. The Hutu quickly realized the relation between money and power. Money provided a better lifestyle for the Tutsi versus raising cattle. This new money economy reduced Tutsi influence. The Rwanda coffee crop changed the economy significantly. Another factor that jeopardized Tutsi's power was the new head tax, which the Hutu perceived as the German

becoming their protectors.<sup>7</sup> The Germans started to educate the Tutsi. This allowed the Tutsi to work under the Germans in various capacities within the administration. The Germans also educated a few Hutu, which played a major role in their efforts to obtain political rights and equality. Educated Hutu possessed the ability to access positions of influence previously inaccessible.<sup>8</sup> The relation between the two tribes started to take a different turn when the new European leadership appeared. Therefore, Rwanda was influenced by the Westerners. The Tutsi always have been elevated in power over the Hutu and this inevitably created friction between them.

During World War I, the Belgians overwhelmed the German army in Rwanda. The Germans wanted to unite German East Africa with the Cameroons and South West Africa. The German army in Rwanda was less than 2000 troops with a majority of African soldiers, with three canons, and twelve machine guns; they were no match for the Belgian army that included 7,700 troops, fifty-two artillery canons, and fifty-two machine guns. The Belgian colonials were the second European power to come to Africa in 1916 to take control of Rwanda. In 1923, The Council of Four, (the United States (US), Great Britain, France, and Italy) created the mandate under which the Belgians provided leadership in Rwanda. The League of Nations eventually approved the mandate. The mandate directed the Belgians to promote peace, order, remove slavery, fraud, and the illegal sale of weapons. It was only between 1926 and 1931 that a progression in the colonial policy was implemented and known as “les réformes voisin.” The Belgians intended to determine how to manage the indirect administration system and most of the

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<sup>7</sup>Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Colombia University Press 1995), 25; Department of Army, Pamphlet 550-84, *AREA HANDBOOK for RWANDA* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969), 5-11; William J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

<sup>8</sup>Department of Army, Pamphlet 550-84, 12.

entire Tutsi chiefly hierarchy.<sup>9</sup> Belgium intended to manage the country through the Tutsi's administration in a manner similar to their predecessor. However, contrary to Germany, the Belgians only allowed the Tutsi to attend school. This made a distinction between both tribes and again elevated the Tutsi as the superior race. Creating two distinct groups of people generated hostility between the two.<sup>10</sup> During this period, Belgium concentrated their efforts in promoting social and economic progress: Again, Westerners create a significant hierarchy that would only aggravate the situation in the long term.

The greatest mistake this government could make would be to suppress the Mututsi caste. Such a revolution would lead the country directly to anarchy and to hateful anti-European communism. "We will have no better, more active and more intelligent chiefs than the Batutsi. They are the ones best suited to understand progress and the one the population like best. The government must work with mainly with them."<sup>11</sup>

Belgium developed the Rwandans' population to be individualist, by introducing taxation, which became a responsibility for all citizens; they transformed their economy based on family to an individually-based economy. It resulted in each individual acting and thinking for himself.<sup>12</sup>

The United Nations (UN) was the result of the Second World War. Consequently, the formation of the UN resulted in the recognition of Rwanda-Burundi as a Trust Territory, which ended the mandate of the League of Nations. In 1946, the General Assembly approved the Trusteeship Agreement and Belgium remained responsible for Rwanda-Burundi. The UN

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<sup>9</sup>Prunier, 26.

<sup>10</sup>Charles Freeman, *Crisis in Rwanda*. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-Vaughn, 1999), 16; William J. Durch., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars or the 1990s* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press 1996), 369.

<sup>11</sup>Prunier, 26.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 42.

agreement was explicit on the intent of the active participation of the local habitant in political development. The agreement stated:

“Promote the development of free political institutions suites to Rwanda-Burundi. To this end, the Administration Authority shall assure to the inhabitants of Rwanda-Burundi an increasing share in the admiration and services...of the territory...to the political advancement of the people of Rwanda-Burundi in accordance with Article 76(b) of the Charter of the United Nations.” <sup>13</sup>

The UN took a very direct approach to the situation. Up to 1951, they visited the mission on many occasions. The UN asked Belgium to expedite their efforts. To satisfy the UN, Belgian officials changed the education curriculum. The Belgian administrators modified the current African curriculum to a curriculum base on the Belgian school system.

In February 1957, the Tutsi tribe formed the entire high Council of Rwanda and published a “Statement of Views.” The statement proposed a plan to reform the government through a rapid preparation of the elite. The statement prepared the elite (the Tutsi) to take higher responsibility within the government. This situation brought great concerns to the Hutu, as they viewed the efforts of the Tutsi as an attempt to maintain their superiority. <sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, in March of 1957, a group of nine Hutu intellectuals saw an opportunity to influence the UN mission. They published a text called the “Bahutu Manifesto” which many describe as the racial problem in Rwanda. The text is as follows: “The problem is that the political monopoly of one race [sic], the Mututsi. In the presence circumstances, this

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<sup>13</sup>Department of Army, Pamphlet 550-84, 15.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 17.

political monopoly is turned into an economic and social monopoly...selection in school, the political, economic, and social monopoly turn into a cultural monopoly.”<sup>15</sup>

Following the first public statement of a group of Hutu in March of 1957, in June of the same year their political parties started to make their appearance. First, Grégoire Kayibanda created the Mouvement Social Muhutu (Hutu Social Movement). Then Joseph Gitera created the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (Association for the Social Promotion of the Mass (APROSOMA). His political party, APROSOMA did not demonstrate its ability to become an efficient political party. The last political party was the Union National Rwandaise (Rwandese National Union (UNAR) created by conservative Tutsi, which promoted the idea of immediate independence. In 1959, Gregoire Kayibanda transformed his party to the Mouvement Democratique Rwandais/Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu (Rwanda Democratic Movement/Party of the Movement and the Hutu Emancipation (PARMEHUTU)). PARMEHUTU intended to terminate Tutsi hegemony and put an end to the feudal system. Following the transformation of the PARMEHUTU, the Governor of Rwanda-Burundi disapproved all political meetings. Because of the creation of all the new political parties, the cultural tension was at its maximum.<sup>16</sup>

The inevitable happened; in February 1959, physical attacks began between the Hutu and Tutsi. The Tutsi paid a big price; the current Rwandan administration arrested many leaders of UNAR party, while many others fled Rwanda to Tanganyika or Uganda with the intent to escape prosecution. Approximately 5,000 Tutsi saw their huts burned and this action resulted in more than 7,000 refugees. In April 1960, more than 22,000 refugees fled to a refugee camps provided

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<sup>15</sup>Prunier, 45.

<sup>16</sup>Prunier, 46-48.

through the Government refugee centers in the country. Many others left the country in the direction of Burundi, Uganda, and the Congo.<sup>17</sup>

In February 1960, Rwanda saw the formation of the first commune and the announcement of a communal election occurred in June. The UN Trusteeship Commission strongly opposed the action considering the tension in the country. They proposed to postpone the election and concentrate on unifying the Hutu and Tutsi before moving forward. Belgium disregarded these recommendations and moved forward with the election that took place between June 26 and July 30, 1960. The Hutu won the election. UNAR party boycotted the election even though a few of their candidates were elected. It is important to underline the fact that this was the first time women had a chance to vote in Rwanda. Gitera represented the President of the Legislative Council and Kayibanda represented Provisional Government. Both members came from the Hutu tribe.<sup>18</sup>

Belgium hosted a conference, ordered by the UN's General Assembly, which included all parties of Rwanda with the intent to unify their relation between parties before the general election in 1961. The UN General Assembly acknowledged the discontent of Rwanda political parties from suspending Mwami. As a result, Mwami did not to return to Rwanda.

Two days before the election, Belgium announced its postponement. The Belgians agreed to follow the recommendations from the UN General Assembly, with the intent to bring national harmony within Rwanda. In a meeting held in January 1960 by the Minister of the Interior, Jean-Baptiste, Rwasibo, Gitera, President of the Council of Rwanda and Kayibanda, the Prime Minister of the Provincial Government displayed discontent with the *biru* and the Kakinga not

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<sup>17</sup>Freeman, 18: Department of Army, Pamphlet 550-84, 20.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 19: Department of Army, Pamphlet 550-84, 21.

representing the culture well. As a result, a new flag was approved and the proclamation of the new Republic was announced.<sup>19</sup>

In an attempt to prevent disorder in Rwanda, the Belgians decided to grant de facto recognition to the Republican regime. The UN and Trusteeship Commission did not support the decision. To prevent further unilateral decision from the Belgium administration, the General Assembly passed a resolution where the Belgium's administration had "exclusive responsibility" of Rwanda-Burundi. The intent of this resolution was to make Belgium accountable to the UN for the execution of the Trusteeship Agreement. The overall outcome of the resolution forced the Belgians to withdraw the de facto recognition of the Republican regime.<sup>20</sup>

On September 1961, elections took place that resulted in the beginning of a new era of Kayibanda. Out of a possible forty-four seats, the PARMEHUTU won the majority of seats with thirty-five. UNAR won seventeen percent of the seats and therefore lost control even though colonial powers described them as the supposable superior race.<sup>21</sup> Instead of having equilibrium within the government, the election resulted in just another monopolist government.

It was the end of the Mwami monarchy; the Legislative Assembly abolished it. On October 26, Kayibanda became President of the Republic of Rwanda. Finally, on June 1962 the Belgian Administration came to an end when the General Assembly voted to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. Seventy-two hours later, on 1 July 1962 Rwanda officially became an independent country.<sup>22</sup>

During the Presidential term of Kayibanda, the Hutu displayed an overwhelming dominance throughout the high government and military in making positions available only to

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<sup>19</sup>Department of Army, Pamphlet 550-84, 23.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Prunier, 53.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 54: Department of Army, Pamphlet 550-84, 24.



Hutu tribe, which significantly segregated the Tutsi. Also during the presidency of Kayibanda, Tutsi refugees tried on many occasions to invade Rwanda with the intent to regain control of the government.<sup>23</sup>

In 1973, General Habyarimana took power, becoming President after planning, and executing a “coup d’état.” The country under Kayibanda had become internationally isolated and Habyarimana viewed the situation diplomatically and economically as unacceptable. The urbanized population welcomed the change in Presidency yet the countryside population remained indifferent.<sup>24</sup> In 1973, the Hutu separated in two regional groups, the central/south part, and the second group representing the northern region. The country lacked cultural harmony. The northwestern Hutu became the leaders in politics, economics, and military.<sup>25</sup> For example, there was only one Tutsi officer in the whole army, two Tutsi members in parliament, and one Tutsi minister out of thirty members. Considering those restrictions, the Tutsi focused their efforts in the private sector. Furthermore, the President created his own political party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD), which obviously came to control every aspect of the Rwanda society.<sup>26</sup>

Thereafter, for many years, the country came to enjoy stability in the absence of violence and cultural dispute, and saw a growing economy with growth of a coffee based economy. Unfortunately, the country’s stability eventually suffered with the emerging growth in population

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<sup>23</sup>Kuperman, 95.

<sup>24</sup>Prunier, 75.

<sup>25</sup>Kuperman, 95; Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006) 23. Kayibanda came from Gitarama Prefecture in the south-center region of the country. His rule largely benefited Hutus from his home region. Habyarimana, by contrast, came from Gisenyi Prefecture, and his rule largely benefited northerners, in particular those from the northwest.

<sup>26</sup>Freeman, 19: The President was unabashed about his decision: “I know some people favour multipartyism, but as far as I am concerned, I have had no hesitation in choosing the single party system.” In 1978, article 7 of the Constitution enshrined single-party rule as a basic value of the regime. Prunier, 75-74.

and the collapse in the world coffee price in 1989. The RPF saw this instability as an opportunity to invade and take government by force. The invasion was short. Their commander died which generated confusion within the invading force. Opposing forces implemented a ceasefire in March 1991.<sup>27</sup> Throughout 1991, the international community applied pressure to Rwanda. France, as Rwanda's first international backer, strongly recommended that President Habyarimana cease all formal activities as the executive ruler of his party. With the end of the Cold War, the fall of the communist regime in Europe changed the perspective of single-party dictatorships. Considering the pressure from their international supporters, President Habyarimana formed a coalition government with the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR). This coalition initiated negotiations with the RPF rebels. In August of 1993, both sides agreed and signed the Arusha Accords. The outcome of this agreement is significant as it was favorable to the rebels. They received fifty percent of the total position of the officer corps in the Rwandan armed forces and forty percent of regular military personnel. The accord allocated the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement (MRND) only a third of the possible political positions, which was a significant reduction for the MDR party. The author Bruce Jones properly describes in his book the impact of this reform: "The MDR had gone from an oligarchic party in control of the state to a minority party that wouldn't be able to win a vote." The last key factor of the Arusha Accords was a ceasefire monitored by an international peacekeeping force during the time of transition.<sup>28</sup> The UN was unaware of the vital role they would play during this transitional period.

Furthermore, after the invasion of the rebels of 1990, Rwanda saw not only a change political orientation but also a growth in the Rwandan armed forces. After the unsuccessful

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<sup>27</sup>Freeman, 21.

<sup>28</sup>Straus, 24-25; Freeman, 22.

invasion of the rebels, the President of Rwanda saw an opportunity to strengthen his military. With the support of France, who provided weapons and training instructors, the Rwandan armed forces grew from 5,200 men in October 1990 to 50,000 in 1992.<sup>29</sup> The majority of the enlisted were landless peasants, the urban unemployed with little to no education.<sup>30</sup> This was one of the major signs that the inevitable was being prepared or the Hutu would not return under a Tutsi regime.

For Rwanda, history demonstrated a pattern of constant violence. In 1959, Hutu crowds burned Tutsi homes forcing the Tutsi to leave. From 1962-64, Hutu killed thousands of Tutsi under the Kayibanda regime. In 1973, Hutu purged Tutsi from schools triggered by 1972 violence in Burundi in preparation of a military coup. From 1990-94, the massacre and arrest of Tutsi and war with in RPF. In 1994, President Habyarimana assassination resulted in the Rwandan Genocide.<sup>31</sup> In Rwanda, there is a constant struggle for power. The general assumption in this type of democracy is that tribes will not share power. Another assumption is that the Hutu will remain reluctant to lose political power considering that they lived under Tutsi control from the 14th century until 1957.<sup>32</sup>

The intent of the Arusha Accords was to create a government that would include ministers from both tribes and that would generate options on the best possible way to reintegrate Tutsi refugees and provide for their protection, generate an integrated army. Finally, new parliamentary elections would occur in 1995.<sup>33</sup> Paying close attention to the short historical pattern of violence, the Arusha Accords put everything in place to provoke both tribes to fight

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<sup>29</sup>Freeman, 21.

<sup>30</sup>Prunier, 113.

<sup>31</sup>Straus, 198.

<sup>32</sup>Department of Army, Pamphlet 550-84, 17-18.

<sup>33</sup>Durch, 371.

against each other. With the combination of the Arusha Accords and the historical pattern of violence of Rwanda, the outcome was an unsustainable peace. The outcome of this analysis indicates the limit interests in the prospect of sharing power and therefore achieving peace. By understanding the history of the two tribes, any operational approach would have taken a different turn. The analyses would have taken in consideration that trying to unify the Hutu and Tutsi would create tension and generate to a point of violence.

## **The First Sign of the Genocide**

The intent of this document is not to get into details of the genocide but instead to analyze how the UN came to deploy forces into Rwanda. Considering the mandate changed three times in the course of this tragic phenomenon, therefore, there is a need to understand how the UN failed in the execution of the mission. Before we move to the analysis section, there is a need to understand what happened in the days and months prior to when the genocide started. The chronology:

August 1993: Reconnaissance of future Force Commander Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda.

September 1993: Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali proposes a plan to Security General for the mission in Rwanda.

October 1993: Security Council approve UN mission in Rwanda under resolution 872.

11 January 1994: Gen. Dallaire's informs UN of a possible "coup" includes informant's allegations.

6 April 1994: Downing of President Habyarimana's plane and launch of genocide.

7 April 1994: Ten Belgian soldiers are murdered.

20 April 1994: Belgian Foreign Minister informs UN Secretary General (SG) that the Belgian contingent will withdraw from the UN mission.

4 July 1994: RPF takes control of Kigali.

17 May 1994: Security Council approved a new mandate under resolution 918.

It was a very ambitious plan to unify Hutu and Tutsi with the goal of power sharing, a combined army, democratic elections, and a transitional government considering their historical background of continuous dislike and cruelty between tribes. The Arusha Accords asked the UN to send troops to monitor the cease-fire and provide security for the Broad-Base Transitional Government, which remained in place until the next upcoming election held twenty-two months later.<sup>34</sup>

The DPKO needed a success story. Considering the negative publicity faced by the UN with regards to the missions in Bosnia and Somalia, Rwanda was an avenue to bring success to the UN. At that time, Rwanda was the UN mission leaders believed would bring quick success and that would bring confidence back to the key financial supporters of the UN.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, the DPKO promoted the Rwanda mission to the Permanent Five as a winnable mission that could restore the UN's tarnished image.<sup>36</sup> To evaluate the situation in Rwanda, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali sent a reconnaissance mission from 19 to 31 August 1993 led by future mission commander Brigadier-General Dallaire. Gen. Dallaire served as the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) when he executed the reconnaissance mission. Considering the situation, Gen. Dallaire was the best choice based on his situational understanding of the current environment. Rwandan officials expressed the need to have a legitimate neutral UN force to provide security throughout the country. They also underlined the crucial need for an early deployment of the UN force to prevent escalation of the tension between the Hutu and Tutsi.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamic of Failure* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 104.

<sup>35</sup>Roméo Dallaire, *Shake hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003), 50.

<sup>36</sup>Jones, 104.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 105.

General Dallaire, back from his reconnaissance, acknowledged the risk associated with this mission but was optimistic. To mitigate the risk in a country with a serious history of violence, he determined an optimal mission size required the deployment of 8,000 troops.<sup>38</sup> Unfortunately, the Security Council faced an urgent dilemma in Somalia. Two days before the DPKO introduced the Rwanda resolution for approval in the Security Council, eighteen American soldiers and five hundred Somalis lost their life in a similar UN mission in Somalia. With a prior similar situation in Bosnia, the US was therefore reluctant to take part in another peacekeeping operation.

September 1993, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, proposed a plan to the Security Council that included a total peacekeeping force of 2,548 soldiers, which was not in line with Gen. Dallaire recommendations. Overall the mission supported the establishment of a multiparty democratic government and monitored the integration of the RDF troops into the Army.<sup>39</sup> In this regard the Security Council approved the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) but with restrictions. These restrictions limited the UN force to operate in Kigali, the Rwandan capital. The big dilemma was over the size of the force. Most Western leaders envisioned a force of less than 3,000 troops while the US envisioned only a force of 100 troops.<sup>40</sup>

On 5 October 1993, the Security Council approved the mission under United Nations resolution 872. The purpose of the mission focused on the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The mission would operate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter titled Pacific Settlement of

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<sup>38</sup>“I was feeling very confident about our plan for the reconnaissance or, in UN-speak, the “technical mission.” Maurice listened to me carefully but told me not to come back to him with a request for a brigade-sized mission. His words were roughly, ‘this thing has to be small and inexpensive, otherwise it will never get approved by the Security Council.’ I was taken aback.” Roméo Dallaire, 56; Jones, 105.

<sup>39</sup>Freeman, 44.

<sup>40</sup>Frederick H. Fleitz Jr., *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests* (Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 151.

Dispute.<sup>41</sup> The specifics of the UN Charter became important in the later analysis of the mission.

It was a classic peacekeeping operation focused on the consent of both parties involved in the agreement. The UNAMIR's mandate included the following tasks:

“To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, *inter alia*, within a weapon-secure area established by the parties in and around the city;

To monitor the observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zones and other demilitarization procedures;

To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate, leading up to the election;

To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes;

To investigate, at the request of the parties, or on its own initiative, instances of alleged noncompliance with the provisions of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, and or pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriated to the Secretary-General;

To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwanda refugees and settlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;

To assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations; and

To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the *gendarmerie* and police.”<sup>42</sup>

The mandate, as detailed as it was, did not include the fundamental purpose as outlined in the Arusha Accords which ensured overall security in Rwanda, ensured security for civilians, prevented arms flow, and neutralized armed groups.<sup>43</sup> This omission contributed largely to the mission failure. These omissions from the mandate's main tasks had a devastating impact on the options available to Gen. Dallaire. In light of the approved mandate for Rwanda, the author finds

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<sup>41</sup>Baehr and Gordenker, 171.

<sup>42</sup>Jones, 107.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.,106.

it difficult to believe the mandate was in line with the original purpose of the United Nations.<sup>44</sup>

How can a tactical commander maintain peace and security if he does not possess the tools to accomplish his mission? The purpose of the UN is, in general terms, to maintain peace and human rights, but the ROE's and mandate did not go hand in hand to provide this peaceful environment. Further discussion on this matter will follow below.

The first sign of the possibility of a tragedy came from a fax from Gen. Dallaire. In this communication addressed to Kofi Annan, who was running the UN peacekeeping operation in New York, he explained there was a significant possibility of a conspiracy by Rwanda's leader to conduct a mass killing in the near future. Gen. Dallaire based his assessment of an anonymous informant named "Jean Pierre" who was high in the Interahamwe Rwandan Militia organization. The information provided by "Jean Pierre" alarmed Gen. Dallaire as "Jean Pierre" explained that the current government was finalizing a plan to eliminate Rwanda's Tutsi.<sup>45</sup> The plan included the importation of weapons including AK-47 assault rifles, grenades, and large quantities of machetes--many more than could be classified as for "agricultural use." The informant's information provided Gen. Dallaire with the possible rate of killing, described as 1,000 Tutsi in 20 minutes.<sup>46</sup> Gen. Dallaire's report highlighted that the planning described by "Jean-Pierre" took

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<sup>44</sup>"To maintain international peace and security, and to end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or others breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful methods, and in conformity with the principals of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situation which might lead to a breach of the peace;

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principal of equal rights and self-determination of people, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamentals freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and "to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." Peter R. Baehr, and Leon Gordenker. 164.

<sup>45</sup>United Nations, Request for Protection for Informant, Cable 212-963-9852, Gen Dallaire, 11 Jan 1994.

<sup>46</sup>Adam Lebor, *Complicity with Evil* (London: Yale University Press, 2006), 167.



into consideration the political environment and the need to prevent the involvement of the UNAMIR forces. As a result, they intended to murder Belgian peacekeepers. The plan was well thought out and they understood the political ramification the Belgian government would withdraw their forces from Rwanda.<sup>47</sup>

This consideration is important as the UNAMIR forces relied upon the Belgian contingent as the most professional and experienced soldiers under Gen. Dallaire's command. The Belgian contingent of 420 soldiers was located in Kigali, reinforced by 400 Ghanaian soldiers, and supported by 600 logisticians, engineers, medical and headquarters personnel. Another Ghanaian battalion monitored the RPA in Byumba. A Bangladeshi battalion monitored the FAR in Ruhengeri, together generating a force of 1,000 peacekeepers.<sup>48</sup> At this point, the force ratio is essential to understanding the problem faced by the UN. The Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR) under the Hutu had a force between 55,000 to 70,000, which included the Presidential Army the guard, and National Police. The Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) under the Tutsi had a force between 20,000 to 25,000. On the other hand, the UNAMIR peacekeepers were only 2,500 of which only 420 from the Belgian contingent could be considered professional soldiers.<sup>49</sup>

Annan took a close look at the cable sent by his force commander in Rwanda. Annan ordered Gen. Dallaire to maintain his neutral status under the Chapter IV of the UN Charter. Annan also told Gen. Dallaire to advise the president about the plot. The problem was that the president was most likely involved in the planning of the mass killing of the Tutsi tribe.<sup>50</sup> Gen.

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<sup>47</sup>He also gave us the road map to the structure and planning process of the extremists. By mid-January, thanks to Jean-Pierre, we had all the information we needed to confirm that there was a well-organized conspiracy inside the country, dedicated to destroyed the Arusha Peace Agreement by any means necessary. Dallaire, ix-169. ; Lebor, 167.

<sup>48</sup>Kuperman, 40.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>To notify the Rwanda president (who was himself thought to be implicated in the plot)... Dallaire, x.

Dallaire disagreed with Annan and contested his decision and directives, but the UN political leader remained firm and did not change his mind. Annan, on his own initiative decided not to inform the major powers of the Security Council and “buried the genocide fax.”<sup>51</sup> Even Boutros-Ghali’s representative, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, tried to convince Kofi Annan how UNAMIR trusted the informant and warned Annan that they had a maximum of forty-eight hours before the Hutu distributed the weapons and therefore, UN forces would be unable to retrieve them.<sup>52</sup> All efforts exhausted, Gen. Dallaire did not obtain the permission from Annan to plan a raid on the weapon cache under the current restrictive mandate UN Security Council Resolution 872, and Annan remained firm. Kofi Annan, instead of testing the major power or attempting to shame them by leaking the alarming news, buried the genocide fax.<sup>53</sup>

Even considering all the efforts from Gen. Dallaire to advise the DPKO of the possibility of a “coup d’état,” the inevitable event took place. The plane of president Habyarimana was shot down on the 6 April 1994 as it prepared to land in Kigali. Everyone aboard died including the president and Cyprien Ntaryamira, President of Burundi. This served as the signal to initiate the genocide plan. The Presidential guard, only minutes after the death of the President, set up many roadblocks followed by the Interahamwe, Rwandan Army and the gendarmerie.<sup>54</sup>

The Hutu used a selective process to kill their first victims. They attacked the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, in her house. The Belgian contingent provided her close protection. The Belgians were young soldiers with no experience and without a leader among

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<sup>51</sup>Lebor, 168; But there was no will and no way. General Dallaire’s cable, now known as the “genocide fax” – a clear, unambiguous warning of a planned, even announced, mass slaughter – was sidelined by the DPKO; Dallaire, x.

<sup>52</sup>The next day, his boss, Boutros-Ghali’s special representative, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, a former foreign minister of Cameroon, replied to Annan. Lebor, 168-169.

<sup>53</sup>Dallaire, x.

<sup>54</sup>“The Interahamwe are trained military killers, It has been said in many quarters that the MR.ND government is training Interahamwe in commando tactics such as the use of knives, machetes, rope trapping and binding of victims and silent guns so as to kill people.” Freeman, 24-25.

them. They followed the mandate and complied with the orders of the Rwandan forces. They gave up their weapons, which was a regrettable action on their part because they were immediately transferred to a military camp and killed. Others on the list of “VIP Killing,” included the President of the Constitutional Court, Charles Shamukiga, and a civil rights activist, Landwald Ndqsingwa, just to name a few who suffered the same fate as the ten Belgian soldiers.<sup>55</sup>

From that day on, thousands and thousands of Tutsi and Hutu, supporters of president Habyarimana, were massacred in the genocide. No one was spared as women and children fell under the same horrifying tragedy as male adults. On the 29 April, the United Nations calculated the massacre at that more than 200,000 people. This is 8,695 deaths per day, a rate of 362 deaths per hour. Sadly enough, it took so many deaths to gain the attention of the UN Security Council and thus reopening the Rwanda dilemma.<sup>56</sup>

After the loss of the ten Belgian soldiers, everything went according to the genocide plan. As predicted, the Belgians withdrew their forces from Rwanda and eventually the UN decided to draw down its commitment to a symbolic force with the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 912. By the end of April, only 470 troops remained in Kigali.<sup>57</sup>

On the 17 May 1994, the Security Council approved a new mandate under Resolution 918. This new resolution created UNAMIR 2, which authorized 5,500 troops deployed over a period of thirty-one days. This new mandate gave flexibility to Gen. Dallaire to apply force where required. The mandate enabled UNAMIR to protect refugees and civilians at risk, establish and

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<sup>55</sup>Prunier, 230.

<sup>56</sup>Jones, 122.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 122-123.

maintain a secure humanitarian zone, and provide security to relief missions. By the time the approved third mandate was in effect on the ground, the total cost was 500,000 deaths.<sup>58</sup>

## **Missing the Link from Strategy to Tactics**

At the end of this tragedy the death toll reached 800,000 to 1,000,000 people. How could the United Nation let a tragedy go on for more than three months, considering that some of the most powerful countries in the world, including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China served as core components of the UN?<sup>59</sup>

In the case of Rwanda, many books and articles shed light on the genocide with the intent of providing answers to the tragedy that almost resulted in the annihilation of the entire Tutsi tribe. This portion of the document will also offer an answer to the question.

The first problem is the inefficient organizational structure of the UN, a problem that contributed to the failure of the mission. The inability of the UN to link the strategic intent to tactical actions demonstrates the absence of an operational planning capacity, ultimately resulting in UN leaders moving forward with an inaccurate set of assumptions. The structure of the UN provides the organization with the ability and capacity to operate in a bureaucratic and political forum. This structure reveals itself ineffective in an operational sense. DPKO did not have the capability to plan at the operational level. The incapacity of the UN to command and control its operations resulted in the tragic outcome in Rwanda. From the perspective of command and control, it is a matter of providing accurate and timely information on decisions and guidance to the force commander. In this case, Gen. Dallaire “is still looking for the operational and moral

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<sup>58</sup>Dallaire, 375.

<sup>59</sup>“The five permanent members have an individual right of veto on any matter within the SC competence.” Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping* (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 25.

guidance that never came.”<sup>60</sup> DPKO did not have the resources to analyze and bring sound recommendations to UN leaders and therefore the tactical commander was left alone trying to connect the strategic intent to tactical action. However, as in the case of Rwanda, this occurred too late to be effective.

The second problem highlights concerns about the mandate associated with this specific mission. The mandate should have provided Gen. Dallaire the flexibility and strength to take action that would have provided success to the mission. Instead, Gen. Dallaire was unable to make a difference to link tactical actions into the UN strategy. In the absence of an operational planning cell, DPKO was unable to analyze the situation as it developed and took timely and sound actions. Before the genocide, Gen. Dallaire requested from DPKO the authority to search for and seize the weapons and machetes. Unfortunately, Kofi Anna denied Gen. Dallaire the authority to act. On January 14, DPKO’s refusal to authorize action was confirmed by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali himself.<sup>61</sup> The mandate proves crucial for the success of any mission as it outlines the tasks that a commander must execute. Most importantly, it defines the rules of engagement (ROE) employed by the troops at the tactical level. Therefore, the relationship between the strategic intent and the tactical level depends on one another since the actions on the ground reflect the strategic end-state provided at the political level.

Lastly, the United Nations lacked the ability to develop a current situational understanding of the strategic context. Gen. Dallaire provided situational updates of the situation in Rwanda. As outlined in the previous paragraph, Mr. Kofi Anna refused to accept the possibility of a genocide and ordered Dallaire to stick to his limited mandate. The literature indicates that this information was never analyzed in any depth other than through Mr. Kofi Annan’s own

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<sup>60</sup>Dallaire, xi.

<sup>61</sup>Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda* (Human rights Watch & FIDH, New York, 1999), 154.

perspective of the situation. The problem is the UN's inability to grasp the available information, understand the depth of the situation in Rwanda, and therefore take appropriate actions. An operational planning cell would have provided options with regard to the risk associated with the impact of the weapons cache. The strategic context takes into consideration variables such as the UN's political will and a deep analysis of the host nation political, cultural, and operational environment, to include an understanding of Rwanda's history. The UN's political considerations always includes available resources, financial and troop commitments. The next chapter will analyze those issues.

## **DPKO and Operational Art**

Peace operations often emerge as more complicated than conventional war fighting operations because peacekeeping troops must serve as a neutral third party attempting to satisfy both entities involved in the conflict. Therefore, minor tactical actions and decisions by this neutral third party could have potentially significant strategic ramifications. To be successful, commanders must thoughtfully execute tactical military actions in concert with other political efforts to achieve a common end-state. The United States (US) Army defines operational art under Joint Publication (JP) 3.0, *Joint Operations* as “the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs--supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience--to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations, to organize and employ military forces.” The new Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, dated October 2011 describes operational art “as the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.” Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means and considers risk across the levels of war. Operational art is not a recipe that if followed will always, without a doubt, provide successful outcomes. Commanders must not forget that the enemy has a vote. However, if performed with creative imagination incorporated with knowledge, skill, and experience, operational art provides better results than without. In other

words, “Operational art is pivotal to success in war, as it is the essential link between the goals of strategy and the capabilities of tactics.”<sup>62</sup>

The first problem with the organizational structure of the UN is arguably the lack of an operational planning cell. This structural problem rests on one’s interpretation of the situation. In this case, Annan’s interpretation jeopardized the mission by providing an inaccurate representation of the situation. The UN Secretariat failed to provide the Security Council a current analysis or projected outcome of the situation in Rwanda.<sup>63</sup> An operational planning cell would have generated options in terms of risk analysis, but there was no such analysis. Gen. Dallaire based his optimism on his expectation that a contingent of 8,000 troops could achieve optimum success. The least that Gen. Dallaire could operate with was a contingent of 5,000 troops. Even after Gen. Dallaire reported the number of troops required, DPKO toned down his report reflecting the unpopular view of the mission in the Security Council.<sup>64</sup> With inaccurate information, it is unclear how the Security Council could be “empowered to take executive decisions and to call upon members states under the Charter to carry them out.”<sup>65</sup> The operational planning cell could have generated an analysis that defined, provided courses of action (COAs) and determined the required capacity to do so. The U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) published a report in 1994 reflecting the common experiences of French and British officers conducting recent peace operations in Bosnia and Somalia. The report argued that:

It was generally unclear as to how far a commander could or should go to accomplish his mission. UN mandates contain language that is vague or hard to translate into military

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<sup>62</sup>Clayton R Newell, and Micheal D. Krause. *On Operational Art* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1994), 14.

<sup>63</sup>Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, *United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 161.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>65</sup>David J. Whittaker, *United Nations in Action* (New York: ULC Press Limited, 1995), 17.

end-state. Commanders are left to translate UN mandates into useful and understandable mission and end-state.<sup>66</sup>

This clearly indicates the lack of an operational planning cell for all missions at the time of the genocide.

The conventional chain of command for a tactical commander is to report to an operational level authority. In Gen. Dallaire's context, the command relationship was inadequate to provide sufficient guidance to make the mission a success. In the context of a UN mission, the force commander is subordinate to a political chief of mission. The chief of mission then reports directly to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council who informs the members of the Security Council on the situation regarding the application of the mandate. The Secretary-General plays a crucial role in advising the Security Council on whether or not a mission should move forward. It is the responsibility of the Secretary-General to provide options.<sup>67</sup>

Figure 1 demonstrates the simplified flow of the information-decision making process that Gen. Dallaire and the UN used. Unfortunately, DPKO and the Security Council are not involved in the flow of information-decision making. Figure 2 demonstrates the proper flow of the information-decision making process between Gen. Dallaire and the UN necessary for success. Obviously, in Figure 2, DPKO and the Security Council are included in the information-decision making process as it should be.

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<sup>66</sup>Center For the Army Lessons Learned, *French and British*, 40.

<sup>67</sup>United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principales and Guidances. [http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbpps/library/capstone\\_doctrine\\_eng.pdf](http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbpps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf) , March 2008.






Figure 1: Flow of Information for the UN Mission in Rwanda  
Source: Created by Author.




Figure 2: Flow of Information that should have occurred with the UN Mission in Rwanda  
Source: Created by author.

DPKO is responsible for planning, support and direct peacekeeping operations. DPKO is also responsible to assist Member States and the Secretary-General in promoting peace and security. Taking into consideration the responsibility of DPKO to plan UN missions and the tragic result of the mission in Rwanda, the assumption is that the organizational construct of DPKO not only lacks an operational planning cell, but also lacks the methodology to link the strategy to tactical actions. As the CALL study showed, there was simply no operational planning structure inside DPKO. In effect, operational planning occurred in the Secretary-General's office far removed from events on the ground. The Secretary General endorsed in 2006 the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principal and Guidelines*, which introduced the methodology that DPKO is now using for mission planning which is called the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). The intent of the IMPP is "designed to facilitate achievement of his common understanding by establishing a planning process that engages the capabilities of all parts of the UN system relevant to achieve impact in a given country setting. Most importantly, "DPKO will be designated as the lead for the operational planning."<sup>68</sup> This new process is intended to unify tactical level actions with the strategic intent. IMPP will eliminate individual decision-making process and provide efficient and effective methodology for future missions. The IMPP "aims to assist UN actors to achieve a common strategic and operational plan that is responsible to the objectives of the UN system and the Security Council mandate through a shared understanding of the priorities."<sup>69</sup> Unfortunately, this change came too late for the genocide in Rwanda.

The Undersecretary General is in charge of DPKO. The Undersecretary reports directly to the Secretary General. Most importantly, the Military Staff Committee's (MSC)

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<sup>68</sup>United Nations, *Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)*, Guidelines Endorsed by Secretary-General on 13 June 2006, 7.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 4.

responsibilities are to advise, assist, employed, and command operational forces. Article 47 from Chapter VII of the UN Charter outlines the composition and responsibilities of the MSC.

DPKO is responsible for the planning and controlling UN operations. Considering the lack of an operational planning cell to conduct adequate planning, the UN therefore did not possess the ability to provide subordinate commander with proper guidance. Furthermore, the capacity to analyze information provided by the troops on the ground was inefficient. Therefore, the operational planning cell serves a crucial function at both the strategic level and tactical level.

In a 1993 report, Mr. Annan explained the UN structure for command and control as having four levels: Grand Strategic Level, Strategic Level, Operational Level, and a Tactical Level.

Grand Strategic Level: The applications of multinational resources to achieve policy objectives (mandate). (This is the preserve of the Security Council with the support of the Governments of Member States).

Strategic Level: The application of military, political and other supporting resources to achieve those objectives specified by Grand Strategy. (It will be determined by the Secretary-General and his senior advisors on peace-keeping operations in consultation with contributing Member States).

Operational Level: The direction of military, political and other supporting resources to achieve the objectives of strategy. (It will be conducted by an in-theater Head of Mission or Force Commander but will be heavily subject to influence or direction from the Grand and/or Strategic level authorities).

Tactical Level: the disposition of units and supporting agencies for particular tasks which will themselves support operational objectives. (Commanders subordinate to the operational level will conduct it).<sup>70</sup>

Mr. Annan expressed that one of the structural problems of the UN was the confusion at the strategic level created by two levels of strategy. Having a strategy formulated at two distinct levels, the Secretariat and the Security Council, is unnecessarily confusing and inefficient. Two

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<sup>70</sup>United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, *Command And Control Review – 9 Nov 93, Working Papers for Mr. K. Annan* (New York: USG Department of Peace-Keeping Operation, 9 Nov 93) Annex C.

organizations providing guidance can only result in conflicting ideas. Consequently, in the case of the mission in Rwanda, the outcome was devastating. Again, the intent of an operational planning cell is to navigate through those confusing problems at the strategic level and to generate operational options to leaders. The UN Security Council conducted an independent inquiry into the actions or inaction of the UN prior to and during the genocide. The inquiry concluded that the mission was not “planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed” in a way to provide the tools and proper mandate for the tactical commander to make the mission a success.<sup>71</sup>

Joint Publication 3.0 (JP 3.0), *Joint Operations*, defines strategy as a “prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” Therefore, a strategy must outline clearly the objective to achieve in order to get to the desired end-state. The strategic context under which the Rwanda mission emerged states “some people in DPKO thought that a small and quick success story in Rwanda might inspire member nations to place increase confidence in the UN’s efforts and be more generous with military and financial resources.”<sup>72</sup> A professional operational planning cell may have recommended a different mandate and ROE considering the history of violence between the Hutus and Tutsi.

Let us turn our attention to the mandate identified as the second problem affecting the success of this mission. The intent is to develop a deep understanding of the mandate and link its conceptual nature to concrete actions performed by the tactical commander in order to meet the strategic end-state. This is the main task of an operational cell.

The mandate included eight paragraphs, which provided to Gen. Dallaire the framework under which he ultimately operated. Gen. Dallaire also Annan knew that the mandate was

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<sup>71</sup>United Nations Security Council document S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, 30.

<sup>72</sup>Dallaire, 50.

inappropriate for this mission. When Dallaire informed Annan on the possibility of a “coup” against the Tutsi, Annan told Dallaire to “lie low, and to stick to his limited mandate.”<sup>73</sup>

Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze the mandate under which Gen. Dallaire had to work.

The first paragraph established the task, “to contribute to the security.” In military lexicon, one must ask the meaning of the term “contribute.” The task, “contribute” does not appear in any doctrinal materials, and the dictionary provides the only option in trying to grasp the meaning of the task performed by the tactical commander. The definition of the word “contribute” means, to “help, to cause, or bring about.” Obviously, this definition assists a tactical commander in a limited manner.

In the second and third paragraph, the mandate directs the tactical commander, “to monitor the observance of the cease-fire agreement...and to monitor the security situation.” Again, the UN presented the commander with the same problem, where the task “to monitor” does not appear in any doctrinal documents. The dictionary again provides an understanding of the meaning as it defines, “monitor” as to “observe and check the progress or quality of (something) over a period of time; keep under systematic review.” This definition in a military lexicon does not focus the action which the tactical commander must perform. A question that results from the second and third tasks of the mandates is whether this a military requirement or could a non-governmental organization (NGO) execute the task?

Paragraphs seven and eight request the tactical commander to “assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities and to investigate and report on incidents.” Again, this brings the question, why does this mission require the use of a military force? One can assume that if the mission required soldiers, the possibility exists that the situation may take a negative turn and those forces might require the use of force. In this case, the ROEs only authorized forces

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<sup>73</sup>Dallaire, x.

to use force in self-defense. Prudence would require that the commander on the ground be given autonomy to adopt a more strong and assertive approach. The failures by the UN did not go unnoticed. On 23 August 2000, the UN released a report, known as the Brahimi Report, which outlined more than fifty-six recommendations to solve the problems that the UN endured during the early 1990s operations. Most notable is recommendation three of the Brahimi Report which indicated the weakness in the ROEs and therefore inefficient accomplishment of the mandate: “United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates...with robust rules of engagement against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.”<sup>74</sup>

The most intriguing paragraph of the mandate was paragraph six, which directed the commander to “monitor the process of repatriation of Rwanda refugees and settlement of the displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner.”<sup>75</sup> The intent was not to question the significance of the word “monitor,” but in this case, the concept of a “safe and orderly manner” became the issue. From the perspective of providing safety and order to any situation, there remains an underlying assumption that disorder and chaos exist in the current environment. In making this assumption, the proper operational approach must develop the required means for the tactical commander to execute this task. Unfortunately, Gen. Dallaire did not have the proper ROE to execute his tasks. Gen. Dallaire sent a draft set of ROEs to DPKO. His draft included that the “mission could act, even to use force, in response to crises against and other abuses (there may also be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during

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<sup>74</sup>United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. Document A/33/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. Summary of Recommendations, Recommendation 3.

<sup>75</sup>Jones, 106.

the mandate which will morally and legally required UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them).”<sup>76</sup>

The DPKO proposed that the mission in Rwanda fall under Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Dispute of the UN Charter. Chapter VI clearly states, “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” There was a clear misunderstanding of paragraph six of the mandate, which is to assist the coordination of humanitarian assistance with relief operation in a safe and secure environment, and the principal foundation of Chapter VI from the UN Charter, “peaceful settlement of dispute.” How can the tactical commander provide a secure and safe environment when not authorized the use of force?

To make things worse for the tactical commander, the ROE followed the pacific intent of Chapter VI, which authorized the tactical commander to use lethal force only for self-defense. The commander must maintain a safe environment; it is the responsibility of the UN to provide the means to accomplish this task. The intention of ROEs is to balance the force ratio between superior and inferior forces. In this case, considering the ratio of forces, where 2,500 peacekeepers, of which only the 420 Belgians are considered professional military soldiers, against 55,000 to 70,000 armed Hutu, the ROEs did not allow Gen. Dallaire to generate options on how to solve an armed conflict.

Considering the large difference in quantity of soldiers between peacekeepers and the local armed forces, the peacekeepers absolutely needed authorization for the use of force to gain

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<sup>76</sup>United Nations Security Council document S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, 9.

leverage. In addition, the tactical force commander should have possessed the initial capabilities to deter both Hutu and Tutsi considering their past conflict history.

The last dilemma the UN faced in Rwanda was to develop a reasonable situational understanding of the operational environment. Before the UN engaged with troops and resources, they had to determine the political will of the international community and definitely the positions of the Permanent Five countries on the Security Council. This before everything was the first condition for mission success.

From a political point of view, the US promoted UN peacekeeping operations as a way to build, reform, promote democracy, and therefore end the post-Cold War era. Unfortunately, the mission in Rwanda came at a time when the US lost many soldiers in Somalia.<sup>77</sup> The US, still coping with the situation in Somalia, was not prepared to commit troops in another African conflict. The UN should have taken the US's unwillingness to commit forces in Rwanda into consideration in their analyses. The US was already strongly committed in troops and their financial commitment was reaching thirty-three percent of the funding for DPKO missions.<sup>78</sup> The UN should have asked the US if the situation in Rwanda deteriorated, what would US then be willing to commit? Why ask the US to serve as a quick reaction force? The answer was simple: because they have the capability to project forces in a timely manner. The US as the only nation during this period capable of strategic deployment with sufficient means to intervene in an acceptable time with significant impact on the ground. Instead, 420 Belgians soldiers formed the core of the military force available to the forces commander in Rwanda. What can 420 professional soldiers accomplish against 55, 000 armed Hutu?

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<sup>77</sup>Baehr and Gordenker. 151.

<sup>78</sup>Mathew J. Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., ed. Williams S. Durch (New York: St-Martin's Press 1996), 374.



## Operational Art

It is the author's intent to demonstrate that with operational art, UN leaders would have had a better understanding of the situation and therefore a means to develop an appropriate operational approach. Operational art enables leadership to envision how the mission will unfold by establishing the conditions that will allow it to reach a successful end-state.<sup>79</sup> The intent of operational art is to determine the most effective, efficient ways to accomplish the mission. Using the elements of operational art, it provides a methodology to link tactical actions to strategy.

As demonstrated in the analysis, the DPKO mission in Rwanda was likely to fail. Using the elements of operational art, the problem would have appeared in the analysis of the situation. The intended use of operational art is as an analytical framework to link ends, ways, and means to achieve mission success. In this context, peacekeeping operations were dangerously close to the concept of open conflict. However, a tactical defeat in a peacekeeping operation may result in the defeat of the overall strategic efforts.

The eleven elements of operational art provide a way to dissect a problem, outline the possible solution, and consequently frame mitigating elements.

1. End-state and conditions
2. Center of gravity
3. Direct and indirect approaches
4. Operational reach
5. Tempo
6. Phasing and transition
7. Lines of operations
8. Decisive points
9. Risks
10. Simultaneity and depth
11. Culmination<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC : Chief of Staff, 2011), 7.5.

<sup>80</sup>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual 5-0, *The Operations Process*. (Washington, DC: Chief of Staff, 2010), D-1. U.S. Army Doctrine Publication. ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operation. (Washington, DC : Chief of Staff, October 2011),

The risks associated with this mission were significant. The UN promoted the mission in Rwanda as a publicity stunt to reestablish the reputation that was compromised severely with the operations in Somalia and Bosnia. Consequently, the UN needed the mission to succeed, but ultimately lacked the forces to achieve the desired end-state. A planner using the elements of operational art have arrived at the following analysis:

End-State and Conditions (ES-C): FM 3-0 provides a definition of end-state and conditions that “is the desired future condition represented by the expressed conditions that the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. Clearly describing the end-state required understanding the operational environment and assessing the friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral populations.”<sup>81</sup> An end-state provides the tactical commander with an understanding of how the define mission success. The end-states are for a military operation are the successful reinforcement of the terms in the mandate. For Gen. Dallaire, the end-state and condition were unclear and confusing. Some end-states and conditions that the UN should have provided to the tactical commander include:

- ES-C: elections completed without violence.
- ES-C: Arusha Accord in effect.
- ES-C: relocation of displaced personnel under safe and secure environment.
- ES-C: transition responsibly to NGO.

The mandate outlines these end-state and conditions but the missing parts are the ways and the means needed to accomplish the mission. This is where an operational planning cell comes into play.

Risks (R): The purpose is to outline where risks existed within the mission, would have allowed a planner to identify mitigating factors (MF) and provide options to the decision-makers. This list of risks comes out of a planning staff detailed planning efforts:

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<sup>81</sup>U.S. Army and Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual 3-0, 7-6.

R: More than 70, 000 armed Hutus and Tutsis fighting each other.  
MF: Arm UN forces with an ROE that allows the use of lethal force to implement the mandate.

R: Unclear mandate, vague task and unclear end-state.  
MF: Develop ROE to enforce safety and security.  
MF: The composition of the UN Force must include professional soldiers from contributing nations.

R: The non-participation of the Belgian contingent.

Considering the situation in Rwanda, Gen. Dallaire had only 420 professional Belgian soldiers at his disposal to overcome any situation that was outside the perimeter of a “Pacific settlement.” The Belgians represented more than just a military force. The Hutu viewed the Belgian as the ultimate ruler, under whom Rwanda rose in the 1900s and, voluntarily or not, gave ultimate authority. The Belgians promoted democracy, introduced taxation, and changed the Rwandans’ school system to a Belgian curriculum. All those changes were realized under the supervision of the Belgians but most importantly under the Tutsi’s administration. The Belgians even prepared the Tutsi to take higher responsibilities in the government. In retrospect, the Belgian contingent represented more than a professional military force. By eliminating the Belgians from Rwanda it resulted in a manifestation of liberation against those that promoted a system under which the Tutsi were viewed as a superior race. The leaders of the genocide quickly discovered the limits of the commander’s authority. With this in mind, they understood the political ramifications of creating conditions that would force Belgium to remove its soldiers from the mission.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>82</sup>At the time there was simply no appetite for any operation that might lead to “friendly” casualties-the whole atmosphere within the DPKO and surrounding it was risk-averse. Dallaire, 147.

Culmination (C): From FM 3-0, culmination “is that point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capacity to continue its current form of operation.”<sup>83</sup> In this particular case, the intent is for planners to imagine how a mission could ultimately fail.

C: The international community’s unwillingness to participate in the mission.

MF: A robust mandate that provides flexibility and strength by the forces in place.

MF: Initially incorporate other elements of national power in the conflict to demonstrate the ability and flexibility to adapt to any changes to the environment.

C: Not having the resources to accomplish the mission.

MF: Sources a professional military force.

MF: Allocate military equipment prior to mission execution.

C: Inability to provide a safe and secure environment.

MF: Provide a capable UN force in strength and capability.

MF: Operate under Charter VII, which allow the use of force to accomplish the mission.

The overall purpose of operational art is to link the 11 elements in comprehensive analysis, that provides an assessment and analysis of the situation and therefore helps the commander to understand, visualize, describe, direct, and assess the situation. Consequently, leaders will be in a position to lead forces and make decisions being aware fully of the consequences of their actions.

## Conclusion

The Rwandan genocide was unacceptable. The mission plan was never going to succeed considering the premise that the UN needed a success story considering the missions in Bosnia and Somalia where the UN lost credibility worldwide. Moreover, the UN sealed the fate of the mission when they turned a blind eye on the weapons cache and informant information that highlighted the possibility of genocide.

On 13 May 1994, the Security Council authorized another force for Rwanda. This force included 5,500 soldiers. The UN armed these forces and included mobility assets to deter the

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<sup>83</sup>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual 3-0, 7-15.

ongoing hostilities. Nevertheless the question remains: What happened to the initial force requested by Gen. Dallaire after his reconnaissance and his draft ROE? Gen. Dallaire request 8,000 soldiers for an optimum result but agreed that a force of 5,000 can accomplish the mission successfully. This monograph provides an analysis of the problems faced by the UN in Rwanda before and during the genocide. The argument of the author is that an operational planning cell definitely would have overcome the problems and therefore changed the ultimate outcome in Rwanda. The structural problem, the mandate, the ROE and unfortunately a nonexistent situational understanding of the environment contributed to the loss of millions of human beings.

There is no doubt that having two levels of strategy making played a significant role in the mission's failure. The mandate and ROE's restricted Gen. Dallaire to a point of absolute chaos in Rwanda. Instead of providing the tools and resources necessary to accomplish his mission, it weakened Gen. Dallaire's ability to carry out his mandate in Rwanda. Confusion over the mandate based on a real appraisal of the situation and the definite lack of direction from DPKO in relation with the deterioration of the operating environment in Rwanda was a major contributing factor of the failure in Rwanda. The organizational planning structure proved to be ineffective. The Security Council investigation in 1999 attributed this failure to "the responsibility for the oversight in the planning of UNAMIR lies...in particular...in DPKO."<sup>84</sup>

As outlined in the document, the intent of an operational planning cell is to navigate through this environmental bureaucracy of the UN, analyze the operational environment, and provide leaders with options with the intent of having mission success. With the perspective of performing operational art, this planning cell defines the Ends, Ways and Means that would have generated a mandate that would allow flexibility and strength, through robust ROE, to the tactical commander to reach success. The fact that the DPKO did not provide recommendations in line

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<sup>84</sup>United Nations Security Council document S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, 31.

with an analysis of the operating environment, demonstrated the in DPKO inability to plan. The mandate used inappropriate assumptions. “The responsibility for the limitations of the original mandate given to UNAMIR lies...within DPKO for the mistaken analysis.”<sup>85</sup> The mission never had a chance of success since there was no operational cell to conduct contingency planning as the situation deteriorated.<sup>86</sup>

The consensus process of drafting a mandate resulted in ambiguous orders more precisely confusing tasks, which the achievability of the mission is questionable. Without any guidance from DPKO other than to stay within his limited mandate, as the situation unfolded in front of Gen. Dallaire, he had no time or resources to make a difference. The lack of interest of many influential leaders played a major role in the size and mandate of the force.

From the beginning, considering the levels of historical violence and the lack of international political will, this peacekeeping operation should have been approached with the same planning process as a combat operation. This monograph offers that the result of a successful UN mission relies on a functional operational planning cell within DPKO. As mentioned previously, the author could not find any literature that could indicate the presence of a functional planning cell within DPKO during the period of the Rwanda genocide. The introduction in 2006 of the new Integrated Missions Planning Process is clear demonstration that validates the author’s theory. As mentioned in IMPP document DPKO is in responsible of the planning process. This new planning process is in part what has been missing in the success of the mission in Rwanda.

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<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 32.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., 42.

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