

SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE DARK CONTINENT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE FOR U.S. ARMY REGIONAL ALIGNMENT

A Monograph

by

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ABSTRACT

SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE DARK CONTINENT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON REGIONAL ALIGNMENT, by MAJ Angelica R. Martinez, 89 pages.

The U.S. Army is in a transition period. After over a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, several units are in the process of regionally aligning activities with foreign militaries in support of Combatant Commanders' requirements. This transition period marks an important time for Army leaders and planners to reflect on the last several years of combat and to approach regional alignment with an eye toward incorporating lessons learned.

One way regionally aligned forces can prepare for partnership activities is through a design process informed by historical case studies. The case study method is particularly useful for understanding the operational environment in complex regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to gain a deeper understanding of African militaries, planners would benefit from an appreciation for the European colonial experience. The colonial era had a dramatic impact upon the development of the political, social, and military institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Carl von Clausewitz offers a model to achieve a deeper understanding of war in the paradoxical trinity. His second trinity is a useful lens through which to examine the colonial experience and to draw implications for future engagement in the region. Two historical case studies, one of the British colonial experiences in Uganda and the other of the French experiences in Senegal, reveal a number of historical insights relevant to operational planners engaged in regional alignment activities.

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INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War the United States ‘contained’ enemies to protect partners; during the Clinton administration the U.S. ‘enlarged’ the number of democratic partners, and now the U.S. would ‘enable’ partners to help us maintain global stability.

—Hans Binnendijk, “Rethinking U.S. Security Strategy,” *New York Times*

A country has to look back before it can move forward.

—Samantha Power, “Force Full,” *New Republic*

In light of over a decade of war and amid budgetary austerity, the United States is in the process of tailoring its armed forces to achieve its strategic aims in lean times. While the marketplace of ideas is rife with proposals for how the United States might best achieve its core interests at home and abroad, there are clear indications that partnerships and multilateral interventions in conjunction with other nations will be the cornerstone of efforts to cut costs while mitigating threats to national security.¹ In terms of national defense, the strategy of Forward Partnering, developed at the National Defense University in 2012, aptly describes a military mechanism to, “engage broadly with designated partners and friends to preserve regional stability without extensive forward stationed forces.”² In essence, the underpinnings of this strategy attempt to cope with a multiplicity of threats and challenges given dwindling resources and increasing uncertainty.³ Regardless of how senior policymakers characterize U.S. security

¹The U.S. National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Defense Reviews, and National Defense Strategy refer to partnership with other nations in one form or another. Over the last decade, U.S. Army and Joint Military doctrine also emphasize the importance of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partnership in military operations. For instance, Army capstone doctrine emphasizes the importance of partnership and integration with larger JIIM-related efforts. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 3, 7.

²Office of the Vice President for Research and Applied Learning, “U.S. Grand Strategy Options, Research Highlights,” National Defense University, 2, no. 1, January 2012.

³U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf (accessed 30 June 2013). The National Intelligence Council emphasizes challenges associated with a diminished U.S. role amid worldwide instability. The report specifically highlights Sub-Saharan Africa as an area

strategy going forward, it is clear that the military will increase its role in operations that enable partner security forces as a means to protect U.S. interests and ultimately, to prevent conflict.⁴ One important manifestation of the move toward increased partnership is evident in the U.S. Army's initiative to assign regionally aligned forces to each of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) as a means of providing security sector assistance to individual countries within their respective areas of responsibility.⁵

Background

Since 2012, the employment of regionally aligned forces has emerged as the U.S. Army's contribution to support the current National Military Strategy while fulfilling its strategic role to prevent, shape, and win.⁶ The centerpiece of the Army's support to the policy of Security Sector Assistance involves building partner capacity in foreign militaries to address mutual security

prone to violence and conflict. Ray Locker, "Pentagon's Futurist Office Now Studying Africa's Future," *USA Today*, 28 August 2013, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/nation/2013/08/28/office-net-assessment-seeks-africa-future-study/2714693/> (accessed 30 August 2013). The Pentagon's internal think tank, Office of Net Assessment, recently funded studies to consider the future security challenges in Africa.

⁴Hans Binnendijk, "Rethinking U.S. Security Strategy," *New York Times*, 24 March 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/opinion/global/rethinking-us-security-strategy.html?_r=1& (accessed 25 June 2013). As a former drafter of National Security Strategies, Hans Binnendijk argues that among myriad approaches to security strategy, burden sharing with allies and partners is a useful way to overcome budget realities. Regionally aligned forces are an important component of this approach.

⁵The U.S. Department of Defense assigns Combatant Commanders areas of responsibility on a regional and functional basis. The Combatant Commands currently slated to receive regionally aligned forces include U.S. African, Central, European, Pacific, and Southern Commands.

⁶Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1-0, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-5. According to U.S. Army capstone doctrine, the Army's role is to prevent, shape, and win. The Army's vision is to be globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America's Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape, and Win.

concerns.⁷ If successful, the time and resources invested into partner nations' security sectors will pay dividends in terms of stability and responsiveness in times of crisis. In practice, regionally aligned forces will support Combatant Commanders' validated requirements to defeat enemies, deter aggression, and promote active global engagement. In practice, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T. Odierno's intent is for regional alignment to provide Combatant Commands with versatile, responsive, and consistently available Army capabilities to meet requirements across the range of military operations, to include operational missions, operations support, theater security cooperation activities, and bilateral and multilateral military exercises.⁸ This means that when the need arises, COCOMs would have access to a pool of U.S. forces with region-specific knowledge, understanding, and most importantly, established relationships with host nation security forces to tackle emergent challenges. This model is a significant break from the past in terms of force posture that placed units forward in Europe and the Middle East to deal with theater-specific threats.⁹ Regionally aligned forces, primarily based in the continental United States, will deploy for short durations to fulfill roles and missions aimed at strengthening

⁷U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, *Statement by the Press Secretary on U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy*, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/statement-press-secretary-us-security-sector-assistance-policy> (accessed 28 June 2013). Security sector assistance refers to the policies, programs, and activities the United States Government employs to engage with foreign partners in these areas, including to help them build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.

⁸An example of COCOM validated requirements could include requests for forces to conduct a variety of missions within their designated area of responsibility. For instance, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command may request forces for routine military-to-military training or for contingency operations such as humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.

⁹U.S. Department of Defense, "Army Announces Force Structure and Stationing Decisions," <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16114> (accessed 2 July 2013). Two of the four Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Europe will deactivate in Fiscal Year 2013 leaving two to fulfill strategic commitments.

partner nations' security forces.¹⁰ Thus, regional alignment marks a period of transition away from active conflict to preventive action, from forward basing of troops overseas to basing within the continental United States, and from ad hoc military-to-military partnerships to regional alignment and security cooperation.¹¹

As the Army transitions out of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to partnerships via regional alignment, it will be important to carefully assess the implications of this endeavor—especially in the early stages of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) mission planning, preparation, and execution. Operational planners and staffs will assume responsibility for designing engagements, across time, space, and purpose, to meet the strategic aims of regional alignment efforts. Initial approaches to this expanded method of military engagement will be critical to the development and codification of best practices in what amounts to a rather broad and diverse set of roles and missions. Codification in training, doctrine, planning guidance, and mission orders will support effective and efficient partnerships well into the future. Nevertheless, formalizing how the Army conducts various aspects of regional alignment will take years to develop and disseminate given the breadth of activities across the Army and the larger Joint Force. Thus, the transition period also represents a crucial moment for careful analysis, reflection, and refinement of this new approach to defense cooperation and security sector assistance.¹² Even at this early stage in the

¹⁰Short duration deployments could last for a few weeks or months depending on the COCOM mission. This type of deployment is short relative to the past decade in which forces served anywhere from 12–15-month tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.

¹¹U.S. Department of Defense Instruction 5123.13, “Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel,” <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/5123p.pdf> (accessed 11 June 2013). The Department of Defense (DOD) defines security cooperation as all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

¹²Security Force Assistance, Military-to-Military partnerships, and defense cooperation initiatives are not new given the Special Operations Forces (SOF) traditional role in these roles of

regional alignment process,¹³ scholars like Dr. Anna Simons, Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, question underlying assumption that foreign countries will enthusiastically accept U.S. forces training their militaries specifically to support American interests.¹⁴

The initial foray into regional alignment also marks an important moment for the Army, as an organization, to reflect upon the experience of over a decade of armed conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. Leaders will have to determine the extent to which those experiences translate to this new endeavor of building partner capacity. While much of what the Army has learned over the past decade remains relevant, new challenges abound especially in the U.S. Army Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility. As operational planners approach regional alignment, historical analysis of the dynamics unique to Sub-Saharan Africa may present an insightful lens through which to gain a deeper understanding of the region's history and diversity given its projected rate of population¹⁵ and economic growth.¹⁶ Scholar and President of Colgate

missions. In general, SOF units align regionally however mission requirements in the past decade shifted the preponderance of effort to the Central Command area of responsibility. There is also historical precedence for General Purpose Force (GPF) regional alignment however specifically assigning BCTs to certain COCOMs is new in terms of organization, structure, and scale.

¹³U.S. Army Stand To, "Regionally Aligned Forces," <http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-12-20> (accessed 28 June 2013). As planned, I Corps will align with U.S. Pacific Command, III Corps will align with U.S. Central Command, and XVIII Corps will maintain the Global Response Force (GRF). Some of the first forces to begin regional alignment included BCTs from the 1st Infantry Division (aligned with AFRICOM) and the 1st Armored Divisions (aligned with CENTCOM).

¹⁴Anna Simons, "But What Can You Do for Us?" *The American Interest* (11 April 2013), <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1416> (accessed 1 May 2013).

¹⁵Margaret Slattery, "The Foreign Policy Survey: Africa Rising?" *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2013), under "Failed States: An Annual Special Report by FP and the Fund for Peace," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/the_fp_survey_africa_rising#0 (accessed 12 July 2013). There is an active scholarly debate over the international implications of major shifts in demographics and economic activity in Africa. For instance, scholars believe that that the population growth rate and urbanization in Africa will have a dramatic impact upon the global economy. Today 40 percent of all Africans live in cities compared to 28 percent in 1980. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth outpaced advanced economies and Foreign Direct

College, Jeffrey Herbst, argues that developed nations will no longer be able to ignore Africa due to its importance to the global economy.¹⁷ Sub-Saharan Africa is also an important region to consider in the context of recent events such as the Arab Spring, the coup in Mali, the spread of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and other potential drivers of instability, especially in countries that have not had significant interaction with U.S. military forces.¹⁸ Given the vast array of challenges and issues in the region, military planners will certainly draw upon prior experience to inform future operations, but in many cases, it would be a mistake to limit thinking to the recent past. Working in the AFRICOM area of operations warrants fresh approaches to military partnerships based upon a firm understanding of the relevant history of the region. Operational planners, charged with sequencing tactical actions, in whole or in part, to achieve strategic aims, have a critical role in determining the relevant operational variables¹⁹ that will have the most significant impact on U.S. Army operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, operational-level

Investment (FDI) increased by six fold in the past decade and experts believe it will reach record levels in 2015.

¹⁶David Smith, "IMF: Africa's Economic Growth Surging South of the Sahara," *The Guardian* (17 April 2013) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/apr/17/imf-africa-economic-growth-surging> (accessed 19 April 2013). The International Monetary Fund estimates that Sub-Saharan Africa will grow by 6.1 percent next year, 4 percent ahead of the global average.

¹⁷Richard Sincere, "Scholar Reflects on Why Africa was Absent from Presidential Debate," *Examiner.com* (23 October 2012) <http://www.examiner.com/article/scholar-reflects-on-why-africa-was-absent-from-final-presidential-debate> (accessed 14 June 2013).

¹⁸Hilary Matfess, "Are We Pivoting to Africa instead of Asia?" *The Atlantic* (6 October 2013) <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/are-we-pivoting-to-africa-rather-than-asia/280318/> (accessed 8 October 2013). Al-Shabab's recent attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya along with the recent U.S. raids on suspected terrorists in Tripoli, Libya and Barawe, Somalia serve as prime examples of threats emanating from the African continent and U.S. responses.

¹⁹Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2. The Army considers the following operational variables in order to understand the operational environment: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical terrain, and time. While these variables are useful, regionally aligned forces would do well to understand the variables and the environment in the historical context of European colonization.

field grade officers, including commanders and planners, represent some of the most relevant thinkers for their role in designing and developing plans and operations for regional alignment.

Scope

Operational-level planners for regional alignment could benefit from historical analysis of relevant security institutions, society, and politics in Sub-Saharan Africa for a deeper understanding of partner nations and the operational environment. Over the last several years, the U.S. Army learned and codified a number of valuable lessons applicable to operating in foreign cultures through a series of activities across the spectrum of military operations. While multiple training and doctrinal efforts improved U.S. forces' cultural understanding, regional alignment presents new challenges and opportunities. Unlike operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, regionally aligned forces will operate in multiple countries, often with a relatively small number of personnel serving in a wide variety of roles and missions.²⁰ For instance, the U.S. Army will operate in 54 different African countries in fiscal year 2013 (not counting recurring security cooperation initiatives housed in various U.S. diplomatic missions).²¹ This new type of force employment represents an opportunity to apply some of the lessons learned from the last decade of war and more importantly, to identify gaps in understanding, training, and doctrine. In the early stages of regional alignment, operational planners would benefit from a firm understanding of the historical evolution that shaped the partner nation's military, government, and society. To achieve this understanding in the Sub-Saharan context, one must study the history of the European colonial experience because this era serves as the seminal event in the development of

²⁰This observation serves to distinguish regional alignment roles and missions from those associated with duty in Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. Army had a relatively large footprint and mission set.

²¹Ken Hanly, "U.S. Army is Involved Military Directly or Advising in 74 Countries," *Digital Journal Online*, <http://www.digitaljournal.com/print/article/349806> (accessed 10 June 2013).

contemporary African military forces and informs their structure, organization, and culture today.²² Indeed, Africa historian Amii Omara-Otunnu argues that the origins and traditions of the present day armed forces in Uganda, and in most of ex-colonial Africa, have roots in the establishment of colonial rule in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.²³

Research Question

The prospect of using a deeper, historical understanding of the colonial experience to inform partnership efforts in the AFRICOM area of responsibility may seem daunting given the breadth and depth of information available concerning radically different Sub-Saharan African states. Even when culled down to a specific region, it may be difficult to distinguish which aspects of the historical record are relevant for modern military planners. Yet, attaining a deeper conceptual basis for operational planning is precisely what the Army Design Methodology (ADM) attempts to achieve. The ADM is “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex problems and develop approaches to solve them.”²⁴ The advent of design is emblematic of the challenges the Army experienced over

²²Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 58; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 4. Africa scholars such as Jeffrey Herbst and Mahmood Mamdani persuasively argue the importance of understanding the European colonial history for a deeper appreciation of contemporary African challenges. Herbst argues that the European colonial powers established boundaries, economic systems, and infrastructure that still determine patterns of trade. He also notes that the colonial powers left their religions, languages, and cultural practices. Mamdani examines contemporary challenges in light of the legacy of late colonialism. He argues that much of the institutional remnants of the colonial legacy remain intact. Herbst, Mamdani, and others address several variables associated with the colonial era that shaped the security sector and how African societies view the use of force.

²³Amii Omara-Otunnu, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 7.

²⁴Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-4 and 2-5. Originally, design appeared in the now rescinded TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500. It is simply a cognitive framework

the last decade. In fact, Army doctrine of the post 9/11 era suggests that war will be amongst the people²⁵ and therefore, the Army will no longer be able to focus on simply achieving military objectives—it will have to incorporate political and social objectives.²⁶ Dr. William Gregor, Professor of Social Science at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, argues that the advent of design reflects the Army's experience with over a decade of conceptual challenges in addressing the human and social problems associated with complex contingencies.²⁷ As such, design offers a variety of approaches to thinking about how to transform ill-structured problems in what Richard Swain describes as “complex social-cultural-political systems that have slipped beyond the bounds of tolerance.”²⁸ Design broadens planners' apertures through conceptual planning and the use of narratives. Narratives are stories that give meaning to things and events as a way of explaining how a group or person defines themselves through the incorporation of symbols, historical events, and artifacts tied together with a logic that explains their reason for being.²⁹ Both the process and product of design enhance operational plans and orders. But, how

and iterative learning system useful in the development of broad actions that will set the conditions to bring about a desired end state.

²⁵Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2005), 17-18. General Rupert Smith is one of the progenitors of the phrase and concept of “war amongst the people” through his contribution to the body of knowledge based upon his personal experience and reflections on the political and military challenges associated with modern warfare.

²⁶Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-8. U. S. Army. Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5-500, *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 4.

²⁷William Gregor, “Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations,” *PRISM*, no. 3 (June 2010): 108, 111. Dr. William Gregor argues that design intends to address human and social problems. While there may be exceptions to this rule, human and social problems certainly represent complex, adaptive systems.

²⁸Richard Swain, “Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 53, (2009): 61.

²⁹ADRP 5-0, 2-5.

could such a process lead to better operational outcomes upon engagement in a region as complex as Sub-Saharan Africa?

A design process in support of regional alignment in the AFRICOM area of responsibility would necessarily consider the interaction of cultural, historical, and political factors in terms of the extent to which these forces shaped the security sector. Understanding the historical formation and development of a partner nation's security sector security is critical because these institutions receive the majority of U.S. Army training and partnership efforts associated with regional alignment. While a basic understanding of the last few decades of military operations and history is necessary, it would be insufficient to meet U.S. Army goals associated with regionally aligned forces. Sufficiently detailed case studies present a model for how Army planners could approach design for regional alignment as a way to gain a better understanding of how partner nations' governments and societies interact with the security sector. In the Sub-Saharan Africa context, many of the military institutions developed during the colonial period participated in world wars as well as regional conflicts. U.S. Army planners would benefit from an examination of partner nations' military cultures within the context of larger national cultures forged through the colonial experience. Understanding colonial history could lead to better outcomes, fewer misunderstandings, and an overall appreciation for the context in which U.S. forces will operate. Therefore, in order to build and sustain effective engagements with foreign partners, U.S. Army regionally aligned forces would benefit from a design process informed by the historical development of partner nation's security sector institutions, societies, and governments. Taking the time to achieve this understanding could assist operational planners in sequencing tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to achieve strategic aims. An appreciation for history may also provide insight into what questions Army leaders should ask prior to partnering with foreign militaries and the governments and societies they serve. Historical case studies of the impact of

colonialism on Uganda and Senegal highlight some of the challenges and opportunities associated with military partnership in two dramatically different Sub-Saharan African states.

METHODOLOGY

In his book, *On War*, Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) suggests that to understand war one must understand the universal elements of war included in his metaphor of the paradoxical trinity: primordial violence, hatred, and enmity which are to be regarded as blind natural force, the play of chance and probability, and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy.³⁰ Viewed through the lens of the so-called second trinity, war reflects the attitude of the population, the professional qualities of the army, and the government directing policy.³¹ The interplay and tensions among elements of the trinity explain much about the nature of war and potentially, how a given people, government, and military understand the utility of force. It is clear to see how Clausewitz arrived at this conclusion. His mentor, Gerhard Johann David Scharnhorst (1755-1813), was the first to argue that in Napoleonic warfare, French military success was due to their political transformation.³² Scharnhorst's influence drew Clausewitz's attention to the link between the revolution in French society and the new French way of war. Both Scharnhorst and Clausewitz pushed to reform the Prussian military based on this understanding.³³ Clausewitz scholar, Antulio J. Echevarria II argues that the nature

³⁰Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

³¹Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 20; Beatrice Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz* (London: Random House, 2002), 53-54. Scholars refer to the military, society, and government as the second trinity. Heuser argues that the second trinity attracted more attention than primary trinity citing Mao Zedong's view that the mobilization of the people in support of great revolutionary war was essential. While some scholars such as John Keegan and Martin Van Creveld doubt the second trinity's relevance to low intensity conflict, in terms of historical analysis, the concept remains useful.

³²Howard, *Clausewitz*, 17.

³³Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz*, 2. Heuser argues that Clausewitz shared Scharnhorst's reforming spirit.

of war “varies according to the diverse societies which use it, the purposes they pursue, and the means they employ.”³⁴ In many ways, it is easy to see Clausewitz’s ideas develop as a result of his personal experience. As Michael Howard argues, Clausewitz bore witness to the utter disregard the people under the Hohenzollern monarchy had for the Prussian army’s defeat at the hands of France in 1806.³⁵ His theory of war reflects insights from his experience in an era of rapidly changing social, political, and military circumstances. Based upon this Clausewitzian insight, an examination of the social, political, and military institutions in two African nations, Senegal and Uganda, through European colonization could lead to a deeper understanding of the historical evolution of the security sector.

Contemporary scholars also use Clausewitzian insights to understand the root causes of internal conflict, in the form of elements of the second trinity, as a way to explain violence and instability in a given state. For instance, Dr. Michael Brown, a political scientist, developed a theory specifically to understand the underlying causes of internal conflict.³⁶ Brown grouped the root causes into four categories: structural factors, political factors, economic and social factors, and cultural and perceptual factors.³⁷ In many ways, Brown’s factors overlap with and include elements of the Clausewitzian trinity.

³⁴Antulio Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 192.

³⁵Howard, *Clausewitz*, 18.

³⁶Michael Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996). Brown is the Dean of the Elliot School of International Affairs and Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at George Washington University in Washington, DC.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 577.

Underlying Causes	Proximate Causes
Structural Factors	Structural Factors
Weak states	Collapsing states
Intra-state security concerns	Changing intra-state military balances
Ethnic geography	Changing demographic patterns
Political Factors	Political Factors
Discriminatory political institutions	Political transitions
Exclusionary national ideologies	Increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies
Inter-group politics	Growing inter-group competitions
Elite politics	Intensifying leadership struggles
Economic/Social Factors	Economic/Social Factors
Economic problems	Mounting economic problems
Discriminatory economic systems	Growing economic inequities
Economic development and modernization	Fast-paced development and modernization
Cultural/Perceptual Factors	Cultural/Perceptual Factors
Patterns of cultural discrimination	Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination
Problematic group histories	Ethnic bashing and propagandizing

Figure 1.

The Underlying and Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict

Source: Michael Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

According to Brown, it is important to understand both the underlying causes of internal conflict as well as the proximate, or trigger, causes of violence and instability. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the underlying causes of conflict have roots in the colonial period when some security institutions formed upon weak foundations. In several instances, Brown's ideas highlight the challenges associated with post-independence state formation given the security sector's inability to project power and maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Brown also highlights the extent to which the combination of ethnic geography and decolonization contributed to episodic violence and instability. In Sub-Saharan Africa ethnic tensions often intensified as a result of what Brown refers to as, "historical grievances, patterns of political, economic, and cultural discrimination, and, in some cases, the effects of economic development

and modernization.”³⁸ Colonial powers often exacerbated these problems through their influence on the distribution of power and resources. Finally, Brown argues that most major internal conflicts are triggered by internal, elite-level actors, who turn volatile situations into open warfare.³⁹ In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, many of the elite triggered internal conflicts that began in the security sector resulted in military coups. Understanding the extent to which some militaries pose a serious threat to their political leadership is an important insight for contemporary operational planners to carefully consider. Furthermore, insight into the underlying causes of internal conflict may also shed light on regional, and in some cases, international, conflict. Brown notes that it is a rarity to find hermetically sealed internal conflict. In most cases, internal conflict involves or affects neighboring states and thus, has an impact on regional stability.⁴⁰

Historical case studies viewed through the lens of the trinity in general, but specifically focused on Uganda and Senegal, may expose some of the many challenges U.S. military leaders will face upon regional alignment. In addition to Brown’s insights into internal conflict, an understanding of how a nation understands and uses violence, the essence and primary means of war according to Clausewitz, supports historical analysis.⁴¹ This method may also contribute to a better understanding of how Sub-Saharan African states’ histories shaped existing institutions—especially the military and how the military interacts with the state and society. In many ways, Clausewitz was ahead of his time in considering the elements of the trinity in his theory of war.⁴²

³⁸Ibid., 583.

³⁹Ibid., 571.

⁴⁰Ibid., 572.

⁴¹Howard, *Clausewitz*, 18.

⁴²Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz*, 49. Of course Clausewitz wrote according to his views of the European inter-state system characterized as a system of conflicting interests. The French

Modern political scientist and historians still study the interaction between states' institutions and society, many arguing that the means of violence and coercion remain the among the most important of all elements.⁴³ Over the last decade, senior U.S. military officers also increasingly placed emphasis on achieving a holistic understanding of the operational environment in modern warfare.⁴⁴ In the future, military planners could benefit from design and planning processes informed by historical analysis of colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa in preparation for regional alignment.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Despite vast differences in social, military, and political development among countries within the AFRICOM area of responsibility, the one historical legacy that they have in common is some degree of a colonial history. Therefore, an overview of the relevant literature concerning military development during the colonial period in Sub-Saharan Africa and some of its broader implications is critical as operational planners approach deeper engagement in the region. Specifically, military planners for Sub-Saharan Africa would do well to design operations with an appreciation for how the colonial experience shaped state and societal views on the security sector and the utility of force. The historical literature in this field of study falls into a few broad

Revolution (and certainly the associated nation in arms) and the Thirty Years War influenced his writing yet his ideas and approach remain applicable to understanding modern day conflicts.

⁴³John A. Hall and John Ikenberry, *The State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 2. Hall and Ikenberry also include "rule making" as a critical function of the state. They credit Max Weber and Michael Mann's contributions to the body of knowledge of the state in their work.

⁴⁴Octavian Manea, "Reflections on the 'Counterinsurgency Decade,'" interview with General David H. Petraeus," *Small Wars Journal*, (1 September 2013) <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reflections-on-the-counterinsurgency-decade-small-wars-journal-interview-with-general-david> (accessed 2 September 2013); George W. Casey, Jr., *Strategic Reflections Operation Iraqi Freedom July 2004–February 2007* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2012). Petraeus argues that it is critical to understand the political, historical, cultural, economic, and military situation in civil-military campaigns. Casey discusses his emergent understanding of the many variables undermining stability in Iraq.

categories. Primary source documents include reports and reflections of those directly involved in the organization, development, and employment of colonial military and police forces.⁴⁵ The British have a wealth of historical documents since one of the first institutions established in a British colonial territory was some form of, “uniformed, armed, and disciplined force of soldiers.”⁴⁶ Therefore, the reports and diaries from those who lived through and carried out the colonial experience remain relevant. For instance, several well-known British colonial authorities documented their firsthand experiences including, but certainly not limited to, Cecil Rhodes, Sir Percy Anderson,⁴⁷ and Sir Frederick Lugard.⁴⁸ Scholarly studies, such as *Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa*, sponsored by Ohio University’s Monographs in International Studies, offer additional insights by combining primary source documents into useful compilations for modern scholars and researchers. Firsthand accounts prove exceptionally useful for understanding the historical development of the first indigenous colonial forces through the mid-twentieth century, when many Africans served in World War I and World War II.⁴⁹ Relevant doctrine, training guidance, and field reports also offer insight into the key decisions colonial rulers’ made that would have ramifications after independence.

⁴⁵There are a few ways of describing indigenous colonial forces, depending on the country. For instance, in some places colonial forces resembled constabulary or gendarmerie-type forces.

⁴⁶Anthony Clayton and David Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and British Police in Colonial Africa* (Athens: Ohio University: Monographs in International Studies, Africa Series, no. 51, 1989), 145.

⁴⁷Anderson was a British Foreign Office official who shaped the outcome of the European conquest of the African continent.

⁴⁸Lugard was a prolific writer on his extensive experience in British East and West Africa. Two of his major works include *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* and *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, explaining his experience as well as the concept and practice of indirect rule.

⁴⁹Historians highlight the two world wars as critical in African militaries’ development given the formal training, equipping, and organization associated with coalition wartime experience.

A second type of historical literature is more analytical in nature and addresses both colonial military history as well as the military's role in state formation. Relevant works from this field often include contributions from the social science fields of international relations and comparative politics. In his book, *Importing the European Army*, David B. Ralston argues that European style military institutions exert powerful political and social influence where they are established. He also notes that the full impact of the Europeanization of developing world militaries stands as a recent development, and therefore, scholarly work in the field is in the realm of political scientists.⁵⁰ Morris Janowitz agrees that some developing nations' military institutions are based on the wholesale transplantation of Western military technology and organizational format.⁵¹ In another analytical examination of contemporary challenges rooted in European colonial history, Jeffrey Herbst argues in *States and Power in Africa* that the state-based international system is not structured to address Sub-Saharan Africa challenges of projecting authority over inhospitable territories of low densities of people.⁵² If Herbst's thesis is accurate, it has profound implications for African militaries and their partners working towards improving stability and security. Other scholarly works attempt to explain how European colonialism contributed to wider socioeconomic challenges or what Crawford Young calls, pathologies.⁵³ The

⁵⁰David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996).

⁵¹Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 13.

⁵²Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 5.

⁵³Crawford Young traces modern Africa's pathologies to the colonial experience in his book, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). There are numerous other examples such as Robert I. Rotberg's book, *Imperialism, Colonialism, and Hunger: East and Central Africa* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1983). Rotberg's book is but one example of a scholarly work dedicated to tracing the roots of problems such as instability and poverty to the European colonial legacy.

security sector plays an important role in addressing pathologies that result in violent internal and external conflict. In the last few decades, scholars also focused on the continued military threat to democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa given the number of military coups in the region.⁵⁴ Hence this truly interdisciplinary area of academic inquiry often includes social scientists' contributions as they attempt to assess historical evolution in the context of modern policy questions and challenges.⁵⁵

A final type of literature encompasses survey work focused on the economic, social, military, and political history of specific colonial states or regions and the ramifications of the experience. Due to the breadth of issues surrounding this complex topic, edited multi-volume series of collected essays written by leading scholars provide a useful foundation upon which to gain a deeper understanding from multiple perspectives. Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, Stanford University historians, authored or co-authored multiple books and articles on colonial history. They also edited the Hoover Institution of Stanford University's five-volume *History and Politics of Colonialism* offering a chronological account of major developments in addition to specific regional and thematic issues such as the role of missionaries and humanitarians. The first volume in the series, *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1914*, provides a historical account of colonialism from the opening years of the "Scramble for Africa" through World War I. The second volume covers colonial history through 1960 and the essays therein delve deeper into relationships between local political authorities and colonial ruler. Subsequent volumes examine other economic, social, and

⁵⁴A few examples include Chuka Onwumehili, *African Democratization and Military Coups* (Westport: Praeger, 1998); Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); and John W. Harebeson, *The Military in African Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1987).

⁵⁵Samuel Huntington's work on civilian-military relations and change in developing states are among the most important thinking on these issues in his books, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics and Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage, 1957) and *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

political issues. Both a broad and deep understanding of certain aspects of colonialism are useful for operational planners using the Army Design Methodology.⁵⁶ There are also a handful useful works in the form of collected essays focused specifically on the military and politics in colonial Africa.⁵⁷ One of the most interesting types of emergent historical writing includes the multi-volume edited series devoted to African History, published by University of California Press and sponsored by UNESCO (United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization). This series is unique because the authors are Africans and as such bring a different perspective to volumes such as *Africa under Colonial Domination, 1880–1935*. In total, the aforementioned multi-volume works offer breadth by way of overarching themes presented in the introductions and conclusions as well as depth in the individual essays devoted to specific issues in certain countries.

Despite the abundance of scholarly work devoted to assessing the colonial influence on Sub-Saharan Africa, there is dearth analysis, assessment, and implications of the colonial legacy for modern military partnership. While there is an ample amount of scholarly literature devoted to the root causes of military coups in the post-independence era, these works usually focus on political problems related to institutional weakness and problematic state formation. Military operational planners need focused and specific analytical research on the most crucial aspects of the European colonial legacy that shaped and continues to influence African militaries and their societies. This work attempts to contribute to the body of knowledge through the consideration of how two very different military institutions evolved through colonization and how the experience

⁵⁶This is especially the case as commanders build the conceptual foundation upon which to base subsequent operational approaches, mission analysis, and detailed planning.

⁵⁷Three such useful compilations include George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese, *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004); A. B. Assensoh and Yvette M. Alex-Assenshoh, *African Military History and Politics: Coups and Ideological Incursions, 1900–Present* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); and John W. Harbeson, *The Military and African Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1987).

still influences prospects for future cooperation and partnership. In short, colonial history provides a cognitive roadmap with which regionally aligned forces could navigate partnership activities.

European Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Security Sector

In the broadest sense, European colonization of Sub-Saharan Africa began in earnest in the late-nineteenth century with the “Scramble for Africa” made possible by the simultaneous advent of will and ability. As competition for power and resources among European powers steadily increased, technological innovations such as the steam engine and quinine prophylaxis removed barriers to deeper exploration of Africa’s interior. Prior to the scramble, European states had few capabilities to access Sub-Saharan Africa and rather modest ambitions. These limited aims and means reflected in European’s meager presence in small coastal settlements established primarily to facilitate trade. Europeans viewed the effort required to expand and explore inland as cost prohibitive given the dearth of and navigable road networks to gain access to the interior along with a perceived lack of economic incentives. Furthermore, prior to the advent of prophylaxis, Europeans in Africa contracted malaria and other diseases in large numbers.⁵⁸

European disinterest in Sub-Saharan did not continue indefinitely as engagement expanded rapidly with the onset of the scramble coupled with technological developments. After several years of European claims and counterclaims to various parts of the continent, the major stakeholders arrived at an agreement codified in the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. The resulting agreement served as the legal basis to divide Africa up into mutually agreed upon colonial possessions with recognized, albeit arbitrary, borders. As a result of the conference, articles 34 and 35 of the final agreement merely required a given European power to notify the others of the establishment of a base territory outside of present possessions. The colonial powers

⁵⁸Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, 63.

also had a requirement to establish authority in occupied regions sufficient to protect existing rights and freedom of trade and transit.⁵⁹ The language of the agreement was rather broad and therefore, the colonial powers assumed a wide variety of roles and levels of engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. To varying degrees, colonial powers attempted to maintain political order through administrative, judicial, and even coercive power. Many assumed responsibility for segments of the economy, promoting production, consumption, and financial viability.⁶⁰ European colonial powers often ensured that traditional rulers owed allegiance to the colonial government, instead of their people and this practice may partially explain the preponderance of autocratic one-party rule or military dictatorships in post-independence Africa.⁶¹ The extent to which several African governments distanced themselves from the governed is but one important relationship in the trinity that shaped military organizations and the use of force.

In terms of the impact of European colonialism on the security sector and its institutions, the historical literature reflects a wide variety of interpretations, experiences, and outcomes. In examining the nature of various African states, Mahmood Mamdani argues that the current form directly reflects the colonial experience.⁶² Colonial state formation also shaped the formal and informal security institutions that developed as the nature of conflict shifted from pre-colonial competition over cattle and the like to colonial era wars fought for the acquisition of slaves, land, and natural resources. In addition to new purposes and organization for armed conflict in Africa, contact with Arab traders and European colonial powers also ushered in new ways and means of

⁵⁹“General Act of the Berlin Conference” in *The Scramble for Africa*, ed. R. J. Gavin and J. A. Betley (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1973), 299-300.

⁶⁰Gardner Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy* (London: Fountain Publishers, 2003), 4.

⁶¹Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, 16.

⁶²Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 23.

warfare including hardware such as weapons as well as ideas such as tactics and doctrine.⁶³ In many ways, colonial powers profoundly shaped the formal security institutions that generated the capacity to use force against internal and external threats. Much of this foundational influence of the European colonial experience remains an important part of African security institutions today.

Foreign influence on the African security sector was a gradual and cumulative process. During the early period of colonization, Karl P. Magyar argues that in general, Muslims (or Arabs) sought expansion, consolidation, security, and conversions to Islam while Europeans pursued commercial expansion, lands on which to settle, pacification of warring tribes, and Christian souls.⁶⁴ A multitude of other actors, including but not limited to, foreign militaries and hired workers brought into Africa by European powers, pursued various aims as well. Clearly, in a period rife with a multiplicity of actors and influences throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, the colonial influence on a given security sector's development did not result in a carbon copy of European norms and institutions. Yet, in many cases, foreign influence was dramatic given that the rise of standing armies throughout Africa coincided with colonization roughly dating from the mid to late nineteenth century. Several African security institutions emerged with the influx of new firearms and forms of warfare that demanded regular training.⁶⁵ African membership in various colonial armies, and certainly participation in World War I and World War II, served as formative events in the development of national armed forces in ways that also had a dramatic impact on society. While many assume that minerals were Africa's greatest export in the modern period, scholars argue that military manpower was a more significant contribution. Some 160,000 West Africans served in World War I. Uganda alone contributed 77,000 troops during World War

⁶³Karl P. Magyar, *Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions*, eds. Stephen J. Blank and Lawrence Grinter (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1993), 248.

⁶⁴Magyar, *Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions*, 249.

⁶⁵Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, 7.

II. ⁶⁶ The colonial armies' diverse wartime experiences also shaped the character of the resulting postwar security sectors. Yet, African militaries also took on a uniqueness given the dual influence of colonial as well as local culture and practices. Local practices certainly influenced African governments, society, and the way each viewed the utility of force. Exposure to European military training and ideas also shaped African soldiers' expectations and views of society.

Aside from African military participation in World War I and World War II, scholars such as Robin Luckham argue that the extent to which colonial governments used African soldiers to quell internal rebellions meant that African soldiers subsequently saw themselves as a necessary part in resolving internal conflicts.⁶⁷ Upon independence, several militaries emerged with an inclination to intervene in internal political crises, and often, to assume power. For instance, in Uganda, the military primarily came from certain northern tribes prone to clash with the political leadership and elites, primarily from the south.⁶⁸ It was no surprise that this foundation set Uganda on a path toward violence and instability upon independence. On the other end of the spectrum is the West African nation of Senegal, where remarkably apolitical security sector institutions developed. To date, Senegal remains the only country in West Africa to have never experienced a military coup.

⁶⁶Brian Catchpole and A. I Akinjobin, *A History of West Africa in Maps and Diagrams*, (London: Collins Educational, 1983), 106-107.

⁶⁷Robin Luckham and Gordon White, *Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 125. Luckham also wrote extensively about the 1966–1967 military coups and later, civil war in Nigeria through the historical lens of the British colonial experience in *The Nigerian Military: A Social Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). This is a perfect example of a relevant case study for U.S. forces regionally aligned in the AFRICOM AOR as it provides sufficient historical background on critical post-colonial interactions between the government, society, and the military in Nigeria.

⁶⁸As explained later in this paper, southerners in Buganda held the preponderance of power and resources in colonial Uganda. The British colonial authorities reinforced this power disparity through their actions and resource allocation.

Historian Wayne Lee argues that in Clausewitzian terms, war has a unique grammar, or structure, pattern, logic, and way of communicating meaning.⁶⁹ To some extent, the European colonial legacy had an impact on African society's grammar of war and use of violence. In fact, historians suggest that the only way to understand ills ranging from state frailty to non-state armed groups is to examine the colonial period to understand the limits of state power.⁷⁰ In many cases, scholars such as Ali Mazrui argue that British colonial rule sharpened ethnic loyalties, and that colonial policy made the task of national integration more difficult.⁷¹ However, this is not to say that European colonial rulers were the only actors responsible for shaping African colonies and their nascent state institutions. In his book on the colonial experience of governing Uganda, Thompson Gardner makes the compelling argument that, "from the arrival of first foreign explorers, missionaries, soldiers, traders and officials, Africans and Europeans acted on each other. Africans were never passive observers of their own fate: every dimension and detail in the emergent relationship between 'ruler' and 'ruled' had to be forged and crystallized, through the human agency of the colonized as well as the colonizers."⁷² In much the same way, contemporary U.S. Army forces participating in regional alignment will be influenced as much as they influence their foreign military partners.

The extent to which a state could control the military and employ the use of force is a critical aspect of colonial history relevant for modern military practitioners. It also demonstrates Clausewitz's enduring insight into the relationship among elements of the trinity. In some cases, the security sector specifically focused on internal threats and keeping the ruling elites in power.

⁶⁹Wayne Lee, *Brothers and Barbarians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2.

⁷⁰Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 3.

⁷¹Ali A. Mazrui, "Privilege and Protest as Integrative Factors: The Case of Buganda's Status in Uganda," in *Protest and Black Power in Africa*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali M. Mazrui (New York: OUP, 1970), 1074.

⁷²Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 2.

In other cases, the security apparatus focused on external threats and political opposition. In general, European colonial powers initially used force to repress internal rebellion and to protect a variety of economic interests often using third party foreign militaries. For instance, in Uganda the British relied upon Sudanese soldiers to deal with internal as well as external threats to the protectorate. When colonial powers used indigenous forces, recruitment often targeted specific tribes, some perceived as particularly martial, and certainly those most loyal to the colonial power. Selectivity in recruitment meant that colonial armies often did not represent the larger population.⁷³ It is not difficult to imagine how, upon independence, many of the highly organized, trained, and capable military leaders used their power to assume political leadership, often by the threat and use of force.

In sum, the state, societal, and security sector's historical development through the colonial period is a useful lens through which to achieve an understanding of the challenges and opportunities associated with military partnership in Sub-Saharan Africa. Understanding institutional development through the lens of the Clausewitzian trinity also exposes some of the underlying causes of internal conflict. Absent this deeper historical understanding, there exist several opportunities for fundamental missteps and counterproductive efforts in regional alignment. For military planners, understanding the historical, political, and social terrain is just as important as understanding the physical terrain.

Case Study Selection Criteria

Given the wide variety of colonial experiences and legacies in Sub-Saharan African, two case studies will highlight how the colonial period shaped two very different sets of security sector institutions, one in East Africa and the other in West Africa. The first case covers the

⁷³E. C. Ejiogu, "Colonial Army Recruitment Patterns and Post Colonial Military Coups in Africa: The Case of Nigeria," *South African Journal of Military Studies* 35, no. 1 (2007).

British experience and influence on Uganda and the second covers the French in Senegal. Britain and France had distinctively different approaches to colonialism. The former practiced indirect rule and considered Uganda a protectorate. The latter practiced direct rule and considered Senegal a colony. Whereas the British took a slower approach in its development of indigenous officer cadres, the French were concerned with the political assimilation of colonial nations into the French polity.⁷⁴ The historical record clearly reflects how the two distinct approaches influenced the security sector and thus, the legacies that remain today.

Uganda and Senegal are appropriate case studies for a variety of reasons. Together, France and Britain held the preponderance of colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa and therefore, it is easier to draw broad conclusions about their practices and policies. Unlike the Italian experience in Ethiopia, neither Uganda nor Senegal had a warlike minority militarily defeat its colonial rulers.⁷⁵ These cases also avoid grappling with Belgian colonial “divide and rule” legacy of preferential treatment for the Tutsis, a factor that contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. French and British colonial powers also implemented what historian William Roger Louis calls “steel frames” of military, police, and administrative resources far beyond minimal occupation.⁷⁶ Finally, the cases underscore the nature of the colonial era competition in the “scramble for Africa” and its ramifications. Competition between the French and the British manifested in policies towards the security sector as different colonial possessions changed hands over the years. In fact, the British ousted the French from Egypt out of concern that the French might

⁷⁴Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, 90.

⁷⁵William Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 39. Ethiopia inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Italians at the battle of Adowa in 1896.

⁷⁶Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization*, 41.

attempt to divert water from the upper reaches of the Nile to threaten the British position there.⁷⁷ During the Seven Years War (1756-1763), Britain took over French posts in Senegal and formed Senegambia until the French took Senegal back during the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783).⁷⁸ Competition was not limited to political control. During the scramble, British representatives of the crown contested control over the future of Uganda against French priests seeking influence in the region—often with the threatened or actual use of force.

Decolonization is another critical distinction between Senegal and Uganda as it relates to the security sector. Upon the transition to political independence, each state made important decisions about how to recruit, generate, and employ its armed forces and the role security institutions would play in state formation. With over 200 coups in Sub-Saharan Africa since decolonization, many at the hands of the military, scholars attempt to explain what led to different outcomes. Kristen Harkness, a political scientist at Princeton University, notes greater degrees of stability in states where military recruitment was inclusive, and based upon civic nationalism, as was the case in Senegal. In comparison, there was less stability in Uganda where the military was built on ethnic foundations, whereby recruitment, promotion, and access to patronage was based on shared identity.⁷⁹ However, Gardner Thompson argues that in order to gain a deeper appreciation for the difficulty of governing Uganda, one must study colonial period in order to understand the origins of state frailty.⁸⁰ In sharp contrast, and despite pockets of instability such

⁷⁷L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1914*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 8.

⁷⁸British Broadcasting Company News, “Senegal Profile,” *BBC World News: Africa*, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14093813 (accessed 12 August 2013).

⁷⁹Kristen Harkness, “The Origins of African Civil-Military Relations: Ethnic Armies and the Development of Coup Traps,” (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2012), ProQuest http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp01b2773v72b/1/Harkness_princeton_0181D_10216.pdf (accessed 12 June 2013).

⁸⁰Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 3. Gardner Thompson argue that it is necessary but insufficient to understand how the security sector

as the ongoing conflict in the Casamance region, Senegal is the only country in West Africa to have never experienced a coup. While it is still certainly possible that Senegal's good fortune could suffer a reversal, perhaps its colonial history will shed light on its post-independence experience characterized by relative stability underwritten by a decidedly apolitical security sector.

The Ugandan and Senegalese past and present partnership with the U.S. military underscores the importance of achieving a deeper appreciation for their respective colonial histories. Currently both states receive security sector assistance from the U.S. government. In the case of Uganda, the U.S. military actively supports efforts to combat the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) through military training, equipping, and advising efforts.⁸¹ Meanwhile, with U.S. military partnership and training, Senegal is in a position to become a regional and continental military leader in light of its recent peaceful and democratic transition in executive political power and its leading role as one of the most professional military forces in West Africa.⁸² Despite its reputation for stability, the Senegalese military is also involved in longest running counterinsurgency campaign in West Africa in the disputed Casamance region. Therefore, in both cases, there exists a wide variety of challenges and opportunities for partnership.

contributed to instability in Uganda. One must also appreciate how the colonial legacy shaped the government and society as well.

⁸¹U.S. Africa Command Fact Sheet, "U.S. Military Support to African Efforts to Counter LRA," U.S. Africa Command, www.africom.mil/Doc/10691 (accessed 12 August 2013). Since May of 2010, the U.S. military actively supported the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act to protect civilians, apprehend or remove Joseph Kony from the battlefield, demobilize fighters, and to provide humanitarian relief.

⁸²British Broadcasting Company, "Senegal Profile," *BBC World News: Africa*, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14093674 (accessed 12 August 2013). Senegal's multiparty system and tradition of civilian rule over the military continued as demonstrated by the peaceful end to the 40-year rule of the Socialist Party in 2000 and the subsequent peaceful, democratic transition in presidential power in 2012 from Abdoulaye Wade to Macky Sall. Furthermore, Senegal's military continues to contribute to regional stability through its participation in multiple United Nations and African Union peacekeeping efforts.

Rather than merely understand the broad history of these two countries, military planners would also do well to gain an appreciation for the existing grammar and discourse about the use of force in partner nations.⁸³ Understanding historical and contemporary narratives⁸⁴ reveals much about a given states' orientation and purpose for employing the security sector in support of national interests.⁸⁵ In the case of Uganda, the historical absence of a common identity and social cohesion, along with a series of weak governments capable of extending power over its territory, explains much about the root causes of endemic violence and instability. In contrast, the Senegalese people's common identity, history of peaceful political transitions, and apolitical military may partially explain its relative stability. In each case, the nature of the security sector and the grammar surrounding the utility of force offer insights into the past, present, and perhaps, the future.

⁸³The term grammar refers to the Clausewitzian sense of societies' assumptions and thoughts about war.

⁸⁴ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 2-5. A narrative is a story constructed to give meaning to things and events. Individuals, groups, organizations, and countries all have narratives with many components that reflect and reveal how they define themselves. Political parties, social organizations, and government institutions, for example, all have stories bound chronologically and spatially. They incorporate symbols, historical events, and artifacts tied together with a logic that explains their reason for being. Narrative construction is central to framing and to the Army Design Methodology as codified in Chapter 2 of ADP and ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*.

⁸⁵The use of the words state, nation, or national interest must be tempered in the Sub-Saharan Africa context because in the period under consideration there were very few stable states in existence. States only emerged several years after independence, and few were stable given the artificial borders with which colonial powers carved up the continent.



Figure 2. Map of Uganda

Source: Uganda, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/64747.htm>

(accessed November 13, 2013).

Case Study: Uganda

Uganda's history reveals a country fraught with ethnic, linguistic, class, and religious divisions. Situated on the northern bank of Lake Victoria, Uganda is a landlocked country on the Equator. In writing about Uganda in 1959, C. C. Wrigley noted that Uganda's special characteristic is that it has no special characteristic meaning that it did not appear to have great

mineral wealth or other resources of note.⁸⁶ Unlike other East African coastal colonies, Uganda appeared to be devoid of gold or other minerals to attract significant European attention in the early days of colonization. Furthermore, it took several days and hundreds of miles over treacherous roads to reach the land on the banks of Lake Victoria.⁸⁷ Most sources count 15 ethnic and 3 main linguistic groups in Uganda: the Bantu in the south and west, the Nilotic in the east, and the Sudanic in the northwest.⁸⁸ Lake Kyoga, roughly in the center of the country, serves as a natural boundary separating the Bantu from the other linguistic groups. Historian Samuel Decalo argues that Nilotic people traditionally feared and resisted expansion and domination by the Bantu.⁸⁹ Today, Uganda brings to mind its spectacular collapse after independence and its subsequent struggle for stability after a series of military coups. Scholars argue that in order to understand contemporary challenges, one must look beyond the regimes of Idi Amin Dada and Apolo Milton Obote to the colonial period where the seeds of endemic frailty were sown.⁹⁰ However, prior to the scramble and unlike other pre-colonial regions in Sub-Saharan Africa, Uganda had well-established social, political, and military organizations prior to contact with Europeans. The southern Kingdom of Buganda was a highly developed, hierarchical, and organized society with access to the Nile and Lake Victoria. Buganda also had a relatively dense

⁸⁶C. C. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda: A Short Agrarian History* (Kampala: East Africa Institute of Social Research, 1959), v.

⁸⁷Ake Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895* (Akademiförlaget: Scandinavia University Press, 1966), 394.

⁸⁸Omara-Otunnu, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*, 1. Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 141. Linguistic and ethnic group numbers vary from source to source. Decalo argues that there are twenty-one ethnic groups in Uganda, ten of which number over 400,000.

⁸⁹Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, 141.

⁹⁰Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 3.

population,⁹¹ easy communications with other tribes, and steady annual rainfall.⁹² In fact, both Buganda by 1854 and its chief rival Bunyoro by 1887 had standing armies and access to modern weapons, mostly from Arab traders. Even the smaller, more segmented societies in the northern and eastern parts of the country exhibited strong traditions of military service and warfare prior to European colonization.

Pre-colonial history

Given its geographic location, Uganda served as a crossroads for cattle-herders, agriculturalists, and Arab traders. In the sixteenth century, immigrants to Uganda from southeast Sudan formed the kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, and Ankole. Perhaps as many as 60 years prior to European colonization, Arabs brought items such as modern weaponry, cloth, brass, and copper to Uganda to trade for ivory and slaves. The first Europeans in Uganda were primarily missionaries, explorers, and traders. One of the first Britons in the region was Henry M. Stanley (1841-1904) who reached Buganda in 1875 and met *Kabaka* Mutesa I, the hereditary ruler of Buganda from 1852 until 1884. Stanley's Anglo-American expedition sought to discover the extent of Lake Victoria and the source of the Nile.⁹³ He went on to explore other lakes and rivers throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and recorded his experiences in books such as *Through the Dark Continent* (1877) among other works.⁹⁴

⁹¹Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895*, 318-319. Henry M. Stanley estimated a population of 2 million but this seems exaggerated, as the 1911 census was 660,000.

⁹²Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895*, 317.

⁹³Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate* (London: Horace Marshall and Son, 1900), 81. Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 144. Decalo wrote that Mutesa I was the thirteenth *Kabaka* of Buganda.

⁹⁴The Atlantic Online, "Henry Morton Stanley," <http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/96sep/congo/hmsbio.htm> (accessed 10 October 2013).

Kabaka Mutesa I held a great deal of power over Buganda through a hierarchical system of hereditary and non-hereditary ministers, governors, lords, and village chiefs. Bugandan society included an amalgamation of tribes including the Waganda who invaded in the 1500s. However, Buganda existed as an independent entity for nearly five hundred years before Stanley's arrival, and its people represented the, "largest, wealthiest, most advanced and most strategically placed of the African tribes in Uganda."⁹⁵ The *Kabaka's* chiefs, and the land-owning class or *Lukiiko*, served as the King's council. Over time, Mutesa expanded his control over other parts of Uganda using Bugandans as "agents" in places such as Bukedi, Teso, and Lango to train local chiefs to work with British officials.⁹⁶ The vast majority of Bugandans were peasants or *Wakopi* who cultivated chiefs' plantations and often followed their chief into battle, armed with spears. Bugandan peasants had little to fear in terms of external threats due to their association with the most powerful kingdom however, they had few rights and did not own land. *Wakopi* could own slaves, often won in battle.⁹⁷ The lowest position in society was that of slaves who were often foreigners or captives from war.⁹⁸ A man's status increased in proportion to his number of wives and due to constant warfare, women often outnumbered men in society. Typically, Bugandan families provided a virgin to the king's vast harem. However, societal patterns changed as East Africans converted to Christianity and stopped practicing polygamy, indicative of the influence of European missionaries and mores.⁹⁹

⁹⁵R. C. Pratt, "Nationalism in Uganda," *Political Studies* 9 (1961): 158.

⁹⁶Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 44.

⁹⁷Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895*, 318-319.

⁹⁸Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, 27-28. In Buganda there were about 1,000 slaves sold in 1878.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 29.

Pre-colonial military organizations formed on a geographic basis and reflected societal organizational patterns and structures.¹⁰⁰ Mutesa's father, Suna, regularly engaged in wars with rivals around Lake Victoria.¹⁰¹ In Buganda, Mutesa had a standing army of several thousand by the late 1880s and, with guns from Arab traders, often used force to establish client states from which to exact tribute. Buganda's main enemy to the northwest, Bunyoro, was smaller, structurally similar, and fell under the leadership of King Omukama Kabarega who ruled from 1870-1899. Kabarega developed the Nyoro army, a multi-ethnic force armed with Remington rifles that by 1887 focused on preserving the kingdom.¹⁰² In the colonial period, Bunyoro often served as a safe haven for Buganda's enemies which over time were predominantly Muslim.

The cleavages in Uganda's pre-colonial social and political systems foreshadow its inability to develop an overall sense of civic nationalism once Europeans shifted the balance of power to Buganda. Scholars such as Nelson Kasfir suggest that the British preferential treatment of Buganda exacerbated pre-existing ethnic tensions leading to instability.¹⁰³ These underlying tensions also exemplify what Michael Brown classifies as cultural and perceptual sources of internal conflict.¹⁰⁴ Pre-colonial social systems determined how networks, obligations, and privileges operated in society and continued into the colonial period. Buganda's centralized

¹⁰⁰Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organizations and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). Andreski argues that there is a link between the type of military organization found in particular society and its social structure. He goes so far as to develop taxonomy of military structures and corresponding social structures.

¹⁰¹Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, 75.

¹⁰²Omara-Otunnu, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*, 2.

¹⁰³Nelson Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a Case Study of Uganda* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1976), 141. Kasfir, among others, argues that the British history of preferential treatment and empowerment of Bugandans exacerbated tensions with other ethnic groups leading to conflict.

¹⁰⁴The cultural and perceptual source of internal conflict, including patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories, worsened as British colonial powers privileged the Bugandan Kingdom over all others.

political system was largely based upon patron-client relationships whereas Bunyoro operated on lineages or age set. Like Bunyoro security institutions in the east and north of Uganda formed according to clan, lineage, or age-sets reflecting segmentation. Yet, even the smaller ethnic groups had strong military traditions such as the Acholi in northern Uganda where society organized into territorial units to facilitate military mobilization.¹⁰⁵ In regions where the socio-political structure was hierarchical, so was the military. In more egalitarian and segmented societies, the security sector resembled what scholar Omara-Otunnu calls “military democracies”. Omara-Otunnu makes this distinction because most of the colonial army under the British, as well as the post-independence Ugandan national army, came from regions where soldiers were unaccustomed to hierarchy and prone to assert their independence.¹⁰⁶

Thus, in Uganda, the pre-colonial grammar of warfare highlights how society viewed the use of force and in many cases, the use of force shaped political and societal organization. For instance, political organization in smaller, segmented societies such as that of the Langi in northern Uganda was essentially military.¹⁰⁷ In hierarchical societies like Buganda, every man who could handle weapons, including spears and shields, was a soldier. Upon declaring war on an enemy, the *Kabaka* made his appointed general take an oath of allegiance prior to engaging in battle. Then, the chiefs acquired recruits from their respective provinces. In battle, the military leadership made use of scouts, skirmishers, and foragers. The primary means of communication was through a drummer used to convey orders. Battles tended to be hand-to-hand despite the introduction of firearms. A military defeat meant death whereas victory meant spoils—often in the form of women and slaves. Stanley estimated that Mutesa’s father, Suna, had a Bugandan army of up to 250,000 when he fought the Watuma—but the numbers greatly decreased after a

¹⁰⁵Omara-Otunnu, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*, 2-3.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 3.

prolonged period of nearly constant battle towards the late nineteenth century. Given Buganda's position on the banks of Lake Victoria, Stanley also noted the use of a fleet of several hundred-war boats throughout the early years of British involvement in Uganda. Early British colonial powers also witnessed the extent to which local armies harmed the people during combat resulting in crop depletion, famine, and massive slave raids. Lord Lugard, who arrived in Uganda in 1889, thought that the British influence on the Buganda mitigated military depredation on civilians however, there is strong evidence that foreign influence also solidified tribal, ethnic, and religious cleavages extending and deepening internal conflict in the long term.¹⁰⁸

Early Colonial Influence: Religion and Conflict

Upon arrival in Buganda, Stanley set about converting Bugandans to Christianity from Islam and in doing so, paved the way for others from Great Britain to join him in East Africa. Before the arrival of Abrahamic religions, pre-colonial religious beliefs were polytheistic or pagan and often involved worship of naturally occurring phenomena such as air and water. Some communities erected temples and made sacrifices to a variety of deities. Yet, with the introduction of Arab traders and then Christian and Catholic missionaries in Uganda, religion emerged as an additional source of division and hostility among ethnic groups. Historians credit Stanley with Mutesa's conversion from Islam to Christianity.¹⁰⁹ Mutesa subsequently welcomed the arrival of the Church Ministry Society (CMS) in 1876 under Scotsman Alexander Mackay's leadership.¹¹⁰ Shortly thereafter, in 1879, a competing group of French priests from the Society of

¹⁰⁸Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, 52-54.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 89. According to Lord Lugard's memoirs, Mutesa initially espoused paganism and then converted to Islam. He then converted to Christianity, apparently with Stanley's influence, and ultimately reverted to paganism.

¹¹⁰Ibid. The Church Missionary Society was the first British institution to coordinate its activities with Bugandan political leadership highlighting the important role of religious organizations in the early colonial period.

the White Fathers arrived with an anti-slavery agenda and in doing so added another feature to the fabric of society. Missionaries also introduced book-based learning in the form of mission schools.¹¹¹ Holmberg argues that despite the missionaries' non-political agenda, due to their very presence and competition with Arab traders, faith-based groups became political actors and stakeholders in society. In fact, religious identity remained the basis upon which political parties formed long after independence.¹¹² Lord Lugard observed that the introduction of competing Christian groups led to deplorable rivalries and hostility to the religion of Islam.¹¹³ Thus, understanding the role of religion in Ugandan politics and society is critical to understanding its history.

British Assert Dominance in Uganda

The confluence of an increasing number of foreign actors with different reasons for being in Uganda, along with their diverging interests, shaped the nature of the colonial state. Some historians view the British acquisition of Uganda and Sudan as a strategic backdoor to Egypt, where their interests truly resided. Holmberg argues that the British were not the only power concerned about Egypt. He believes that Mutesa used European missionaries' competing interests in Buganda as a hedge against expansionist Egypt. In May 1876, the Egyptian government announced that it annexed Buganda, and all of the territories around Lake Victoria. Holmberg argues that Egypt's aggression disturbed Mutesa enough to seek firm ties with the British and

¹¹¹Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 63.

¹¹²Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 144. In 1886, a spate of religious wars led to the deaths of over 200 Christians in Uganda as different factions fought over denominations and political power.

¹¹³Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, 88. Lugard's observation is evident as the British helped Bugandan leaders to militarily defeat Muslim groups, who often took refuge in Bunyoro, Buganda's historical rival.

French governments given his repeated requests for arms and ammunition.¹¹⁴ Of course, the British were also interested in commercial opportunities available in the East African interior and in securing their investments from foreign competition. Specifically, Britain had an abiding interest in buying cotton from East Africa and selling manufactured goods up until World War II when this arrangement was no longer profitable.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, British, French, German, and Arab groups engaged in competition with one another for power and influence in Uganda. In Buganda, Mutesa's death coincided with the onset of the scramble lasting through the mid-1880s, leaving his son, Mwanga at the helm amid a deteriorating relationship with the British colonial powers. As competition for East African colonies increased, local African leaders grew deeply suspicious of foreigners in the region. In 1885 Bugandan army units launched attacks on British missionaries and even attacked, burned, mutilated, and tortured fellow Africans working with them or known to be converts to Christianity.¹¹⁵ The violence against Christians culminated with the murder of Bishop Hannington who Mwanga put to death for entering Uganda via a forbidden route through Usoga.¹¹⁶

The level of violence ebbed and flowed throughout the late 1880s. Meanwhile the British introduced a new type colonial power in the form of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), a business venture with ties to the government interested in making a profit and securing the crown's interests in the region. William McKinnon, a Scottish immigrant to India, served as the first chairman in 1888. Upon arrival, the IBEAC authorities found the Bugandan

¹¹⁴Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895*, 320. Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, 89. Lugard wrote that Mutesa "begged for guns from every visitor and bought them from every trader."

¹¹⁵Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895*, 344.

¹¹⁶Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, 92-94.

state fracturing along religious lines: the Christians divided into two opposing groups, commonly referred to as the Wafransa, Catholics who were pupils of the French priests and the Waingleza, Protestants. A third group followed Islam. Each faction's leadership rallied their peasant followers to take up arms.¹¹⁷ What followed was a series of coups to overthrow different Bugandan leaders organized along religious lines. The IBEAC played a key role in reinstalling Mwanga (who converted to Catholicism) in 1889 by driving out the Muslims who took refuge in the northwest region and formed an alliance with Bunyoro.¹¹⁸ Thus, the precedent was set for the British colonial powers to support the Christians (which remained divided between Catholics and Protestants) against the Muslims and to arm various parties to what became an ongoing internal conflict. The Germans and French also vied for influence over Bugandan leaders, but in the end, the British reigned supreme. In return for support to the Bugandan rulers, the IBEAC demanded and received exclusive commercial privileges. Preferential treatment for Buganda led to enduring grievances among those who did not benefit equally or, in many cases, at all from the British presence in the region. Decalo argues that the British colonial powers exacerbated the historic imbalance of power and contributed to contemporary Ugandan political problems through policies such as unequal socioeconomic development which made it difficult to integrate different ethnic groups into a cohesive nation.¹¹⁹

In December 1890, Lord Lugard entered Buganda with 350 men including Sudanese soldiers. At this point, the Anglo-German agreement established the legal boundary across Lake Victoria formally ceding Buganda to the British. Therefore, Lugard set about establishing

¹¹⁷Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895*, 352.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, 353.

¹¹⁹Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 141. Michael Brown's theory of internal conflict highlights several of these factors (economic, political, and social) directly related to British actions that undermined long-term stability.

additional legal frameworks, in the form of treaties, with the Mwanga, the Catholic leader. Lugard, like those before him, also had to contend with a variety of competing interest groups: the Protestants were the biggest and wealthiest group; the so-called “heathen party” was the majority but lacked the Christian parties’ arms; the Muslims were in exile, but allied with Bunyoro and did not hesitate to raid Christian groups.¹²⁰ The balance of power between the Waingeleza and Wafransa remained delicate and in an effort to establish a strong central force, Lugard took an army of Bugandans and Sudanese on an expedition to fight, and defeat the Muslim army in the northwest. With the military balance of power in his favor, Lugard concluded a variety of commercial treaties favorable to the IBEAC throughout the region. For continued security, he maintained an army of Sudanese soldiers in Buganda and had them build a series of fortifications to provide a degree of stability for the company.¹²¹ Thus, Lugard set yet another precedent in Uganda—that of hiring foreign forces to perform security functions within the region.¹²²

For a time in the early 1890s, it appeared as though civil war would break out among the various ethno-religious factions but eventually the British retained dominance, often through the use of force. Meanwhile the two Christian parties engaged in a series of conflicts, ultimately resulting in two agreements signed in 1892. The first gave the Catholics Buddu, the southernmost province and one third of Buganda. All Catholics who fought against the IBEAC had to move to Buddu while those who remained unarmed were free to live wherever they wished. The second

¹²⁰Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895*, 360.

¹²¹Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, 114. Lugard wrote that he amassed a force of about 8,000 people to include the women and slaves that accompanied the soldiers on campaign.

¹²²The Sudanese forces serving in Uganda mutinied in the late 1890s citing poor living conditions and low pay. The British had to use Indian forces to reassert control. Later, the British incorporated more Ugandans into the colonial army and increased wages to head off another mutiny.

treaty between the IBEAC and Mwanga gave the British exclusive commercial rights to Buganda. It also ensured that Mwanga would follow the advice of the Company's Resident. At the time, various participants in the ongoing violent conflict blamed the IBEAC for the civil war and perceived the use of force as an attempt to control the Bugandan economy and politics.¹²³ In sum, missionaries, British businessmen, and government officials representing the crown, effectively divided Buganda up into sets and sub-sets of competing religious groups, many willing to use force to achieve their interests.¹²⁴

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was a question as to whether Britain should remain in Buganda or abandon it to pursue interests elsewhere. Lugard fought to maintain a presence in the landlocked region in order to buy cotton, to sell manufactured goods, and to protect Protestant missionaries. He argued that without the British, the missionaries would have to leave and the slave trade would resume.¹²⁵ Many in England argued that interior East Africa was of little value and that the costs exceeded the benefits of maintaining a presence there. In the end, those in favor of retaining Uganda had their way, even at the cost of subsidizing the IBEAC operations in the region. Ultimately, the Church Missionary Society's influence and funding kept the IBEAC engaged in Uganda. In 1893, Imperial Commissioner Gerald Portal arrived in Buganda with 240 soldiers and Colonel Cecil Rhodes. Portal immediately recognized the underlying conflict among the Catholic Wafransa, the IBEAC, and the Protestants. Although initially critical of what he perceived as IBEAC predatory practices and for failure to make even modest infrastructure-related improvements, Portal set about re-negotiating Lugard's power

¹²³Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895*, 364-365.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 370. Holmberg argues that the British Government delegated powers and functions to the IBEAC under which it concluded treaties and pledged to protect Buganda.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, 373. Holmberg notes that Lugard made commercial, political, and humanitarian arguments for retaining Buganda.

sharing agreements in conjunction with local religious leaders and in many ways, went further toward European control thus, ushering in the era of imperial rule.¹²⁶ In 1894, Uganda officially received protectorate status, rather than colony status since direct administration proved cost prohibitive. A treaty between Colonel Henry Colville,¹²⁷ Imperial Commissioner after Portal, and Bugandan King Mwanga codified the relationship that would carry through to independence in 1962.¹²⁸

The early colonial period reflects a great number of struggles of the time. There was a struggle between those who espoused Christianity and those who espoused Islam. There was conflict between those who saw economic benefit to retaining Uganda and those who did not. Some were concerned that abandoning Uganda would also abandon key waterways—the Lake Victoria region, the Nile Valley, and other natural waterways to the interior of East Africa. As such, there was great interest in building a railroad alongside the Nile. Of course, those who favored and profited from the slave trade took issue with those espousing an anti-slavery agenda. There was also fierce competition between Protestant and Catholic missionaries for converts and for power and influence throughout the region.¹²⁹ In the end, the British and their Bugandan counterparts retained dominance and codified their relationships in the Uganda Agreement concluded in 1900. The agreement divided the land giving roughly 50 percent to the crown and 50 percent to the ruling Buganda elite. The ruling family further divided their half with other members of the landowning class. This solidified the ruling class and their position in society. Other parts of the agreement provided for aspects of self-government and justice, as well as

¹²⁶Ibid., 390.

¹²⁷Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, 114. Colville was part of the expedition to defeat Bunyoro, leading 450 Sudanese, Bugandan rifles, and some 13,000 spearmen.

¹²⁸Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies: Colonization and Humanitarianism in British South and East Africa 1870-1895*, 393.

¹²⁹Ibid., 392.

access to timber and minerals. Ultimately, this legal structure changed the economic system in Uganda and ended the feudal system.¹³⁰ Furthermore, it gave the Bugandan kingdom coequal status with the British colonial powers.¹³¹ The agreement, however, became problematic in the 1930s when British authorities attempted to implement changes to what Bugandans viewed as inviolable.¹³²

Societal Considerations

Overall, colonial Uganda lacked a common basis for social cohesion. There was no single common identity or ethnic group upon which to base an effective “national” government. After the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, Ugandan borders represented artificial boundaries with no regard for where its roughly three million people lived. People remained divided by language, ethnicity, and geography. The presence of colonial powers, missionaries, and foreign armed forces exacerbated societal divisions. For instance, British quickly became involved in conflicts among the people as was the case with their support of the Buganda against the Bunyoro, subjugating the latter to a period of military occupation.¹³³ Throughout the colonial era, emergent religious and socio-economic cleavages led to episodic internal conflict. While the British attempted to impose taxation, there was no social contract in the European sense of functioning government’s provision of services in exchange for taxes approved by representatives of society.¹³⁴ Traditional patterns of patronage and clientage remained. The evolution of the colonial

¹³⁰Ibid., 397.

¹³¹Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 142. Decalo argues that the agreement solidified Bugandan preeminence and made the prospect of universal franchise and socioeconomic promotion of less developed regions directly threatening to the *Kabaka*’s supreme political status within Uganda.

¹³²Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 45.

¹³³Ibid., 44.

¹³⁴Ibid., 16.

era society as divided, diverse, and decentralized underscores the challenges associated with attempts to exert control over Uganda.

Thus, the British did not set out to create an integrated society, nor could they have done so with limited resources committed to the Protectorate. At times, the British had to use overwhelming force in the north against groups they considered “martial tribes.” Ironically, these northern groups would eventually make up much of the colonial army.¹³⁵ Because the Bugandans were physically closer to the heart of the Protectorate, they enjoyed access to resources, ideas, and other advantages and opportunities denied to those living in outlying areas.¹³⁶ Scholars argue that these tensions and contradictions in Uganda’s history are the root of its post-independence problems. This background is useful in understanding contemporary Ugandan societal views on government and the military.¹³⁷

The State

Overall, the British colonial approach was pragmatic and tended toward administrative decentralization allowing Ugandans to do what was necessary within limits.¹³⁸ In a sense, the British governed Uganda in conjunction with a select group of African leaders of the various societies they ruled.¹³⁹ Scholars refer to this approach as indirect and it involved a small cadre of British colonizers and charter companies who co-opted local chiefs willing to support British rule. Lord Lugard, known as the architect of indirect rule, essentially developed the system by which Uganda became a protectorate, not a colony, officially established in 1894. The difference is that

¹³⁵Ibid., 43.

¹³⁶Ibid., 65.

¹³⁷Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 142.

¹³⁸Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 17.

¹³⁹Ibid., 10. The governing elite were primarily Bugandan.

colonies were territories of European settlement whereas protectorates were of European dominion, not settlement.¹⁴⁰ Lugard made this point clear in his writing that “the term protectorate gradually changed its meaning from that of a pact with the ruler of a State, which maintained its internal but not external sovereignty, to a declaration of the territorial status of a region included in the Empire, in which not only the external but to varying degrees the internal sovereignty also, had passed to the controlling power without even the treaty consent of the people.”¹⁴¹

The Bugandan Kingdom was largely autocratic, yet the king was subject to the *Lukiiko*, or council of chiefs which dispensed justice and could depose the king if need be. If the council found a party guilty of some offense, it could issue punishment and fines paid in oxen or girls. Bunyoro did not have a council like Buganda and was therefore even more autocratic.¹⁴² British support and empowerment of these pre-colonial structures complicated state formation after independence. As described, in Buganda, the British found a developed, organized, and hierarchical kingdom capable of concluding agreements and controlling its territory. Scholars emphasize the importance of the 1900 Uganda Agreement which set the foundation for colonial policy. In many ways, the agreement codified the manner with which the *Lukiiko* chiefs participated in state governance through activities such as tax collection, recruitment for the army, and organizing labor for infrastructure projects among other activities. In other words, the Bugandan Kingdom’s organization proved capable of governance. The British depended on this system and tried to extend it beyond Bugandan borders during World War I and World War II in

¹⁴⁰Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 17.

¹⁴¹Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922), 35.

¹⁴²Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate*, 24.

order to garner support for the war efforts. Prior to the world wars, there was little evidence of a “Ugandan” state capable of penetrating and organizing society outside of Buganda.¹⁴³

World Wars

The transformative power of war reshaped the British relationship with their protectorate in Uganda. The two world wars heavily influenced the development and expansion of the colonial army and the wartime economy. In the years leading up to World War II, British colonial rulers had very limited aims and objectives in Uganda opting for a role as administrators, not governors. Given the British colonial ruler’s “indirect” approach, at the onset of conflict, native administrators were accustomed to carrying out various functions of government to include tax collection, legal jurisdiction, and law and order. In fact, Buganda had armed police and other organizations capable of carrying out administrative roles which only expanded during the world wars as British nationals shifted their efforts and attention away from East Africa.¹⁴⁴ Before the world wars, the colonial army was used infrequently and rather small, roughly the size of a battalion.¹⁴⁵ In fact, it was a common practice for British colonial administrators to rely upon forces imported from other countries, like Sudan and India, to quell internal conflict. Although the native colonial army gradually assumed responsibility for internal stability, as was the case during the 1960s Bukedi riots, at independence the Ugandan colonial army was only about 700 strong.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, it is clear that external events drove the size, scale, and activities of the colonial army, as was the case in World War I and World War II.

¹⁴³Hall and Ikenberry, *The State*, 13.

¹⁴⁴Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 63.

¹⁴⁵Omara-Otunnu, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*, 35.

¹⁴⁶Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 31.

Much has been made of the composition of the Ugandan armed forces. Before World War I the largest number of recruits for the colonial army came from the northern provinces of Acholi and Lango, where there were few economic opportunities during the first forty years of British colonial rule. Therefore, people from northern tribes tended to volunteer for military service in larger numbers than those from the south.¹⁴⁷ During World War I, the Ugandan armed forces grew from a force of roughly 1,000 to 8,000 with the majority serving in East Africa. Some scholars emphasize Buganda's minimal contribution to the Ugandan armed forces, but Thompson argues that it was a rational choice not to serve because there were perceivably few benefits for peacetime colonial service given the economic alternatives available in the south such as education and other employment opportunities.¹⁴⁸ World War I and especially World War II changed this dynamic. By 1943, as many as 12,000 Bugandans served in the military.¹⁴⁹

World War I and World War II had a dramatic impact upon Britain's economic relationship with Uganda. During the interwar years, Uganda increased its level of economic integration into the British Empire through the production and sale of cotton. Meanwhile, East Africans increasingly purchased manufactured goods from Europe. After 1939, Britain sought to exploit Uganda in support of the war effort as part of an overall push to levy more requirements on its African colonies.¹⁵⁰ For instance, the sales tax on cotton exported to Britain and British India funded the government with revenue. During World War II, Ugandans from the north and

¹⁴⁷Ibid., 105. Whereas those living in and around Buganda and to some extent, Bunyoro, had at least limited access to resources and opportunities associated with European influence, individuals north of Lake Kyoga did not benefit equally. This is why scholars highlight the extent to which northern tribes exhibit increased levels of independence as opposed to those from the south who were more accustomed to hierarchical social and military organization.

¹⁴⁸Buganda, the heart of the British Protectorate, was the hub of all economic activity.

¹⁴⁹Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 31. Interestingly, Bugandans also deserted in higher numbers than any other ethnic group.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 2.

west provided a labor pool for the cash economy of the south reflecting geographically-based uneven development. Meanwhile Indians working in Uganda dominated the cotton trade and processing industries.¹⁵¹ Between 1939 and 1945 protectorate revenues to the war effort doubled but the British were careful not to overtax Uganda ensuring that prices did not increase to a level that would price Africans out of the manufactured goods market.¹⁵² Uganda also proved to be a source of strategic materials such as rubber, foodstuffs, minerals, and timber. These items were necessary to support the war effort in enemy-held North and East Africa. Finally, the war economy increased Uganda's reliance on immigrant labor from Rwanda and Burundi, indicative of Uganda's inability to control its borders—a historical problem that continues today.¹⁵³

World War II had a particularly dramatic impact upon the Ugandan security sector. Some 77,000 Ugandans, or about 10 percent of the available male population, participated in military service during World War II.¹⁵⁴ Organizationally, Ugandans served in battalions of the Kings African Rifles (KAR); the East African Army Service Corps; the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps; and the East African Military Labour Service in the British Army. These units saw combat in Ethiopia, Somaliland, Madagascar, the Middle East, Ceylon, India, and Burma.¹⁵⁵ While the Ugandan soldiers' reasons for serving varied from the lure of accommodations, healthcare, rations, and 14 shillings per month, as with World War I, the preponderance of the armed forces came from the north and western parts of the country. In terms of tribal affiliation, the Acholi and

¹⁵¹Ibid., 60. This is the case in several developing countries when a foreign community becomes involved in the most lucrative part of the economy. In Senegal, the Lebanese community controls key businesses and industries in Dakar.

¹⁵²Ibid., 135-136.

¹⁵³Ibid., 190.

¹⁵⁴Brian Catchpole and A. I. Akinjobin, *A History of West Africa in Maps and Diagrams*, (London: Collins Educational, 1983), 106-107.

¹⁵⁵As opposed to World War I where Ugandans primarily served in East Africa, service in World War II took soldiers to different parts of the world.

Buganda came forward in large numbers, with Bugandans making up about a quarter of all recruits.¹⁵⁶ Most of the conscripts volunteered for service however, local chiefs helped fill the ranks as necessary.¹⁵⁷ The British offered additional incentives for service such as providing soldiers with the ability to send money home to their families and with an opportunity to buy land upon their return from the war. The poorest recruits were attracted to the prospect of being well fed, a promise fulfilled as early as 1930 when the average soldier could expect access to a steady diet of maize, meat, tea, beans, and rice. In fact, at various times, more Ugandans volunteered than were required. Although, several proved unfit for service due to malaria, malnutrition, and spinal meningitis.¹⁵⁸ Once in the military, Ugandan soldiers gained access to health care, especially during World War II when British and Indian doctors volunteered for service with African battalions as a way to learn about tropical illnesses. Those in the medical field reported treating soldiers and their families because many lived with the soldiers in barracks designed to accommodate those who were married. However, soldiers were limited to one wife and up to three children if living in the barracks.¹⁵⁹ Thus, military service had an impact on Ugandan families and society.

In many ways, the war offered young men economic and social opportunities for advancement, depending on the individual's pre-war socio-economic prospects. Even those not involved in military service were heavily involved in supporting the wartime economic production of food and other essential items. Clayton and Killingray's research shows that recruitment trips or so-called "safaris" often took place after the harvest season. Some of the best

¹⁵⁶Bantu-speaking Bugandans are the largest ethnic group in Uganda.

¹⁵⁷Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 101.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 105, 107.

¹⁵⁹Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and British Police in Colonial Africa*, 235. The authors discuss how camp Jinja in the 1950s housed over 300 wives and had a five-room maternity ward and midwife-training center for 140 births per year.

recruiters were former soldiers.¹⁶⁰ In terms of Ugandan soldier quality, the results are telling. The Buganda, representing 25 percent of the Ugandan military serving in World War II represented 85 percent of the desertions, reinforcing the British perception that the Bugandans were unreliable, and would cause problems in the future.¹⁶¹ African soldiers often resented unequal treatment, especially on the Burma campaign during World War II. European soldiers had better rations, accommodations, and had longer leave periods in India.¹⁶² Although, according to his memoir, Field Marshall Viscount Slim attempted to treat his multinational force equally, understanding the importance of unit morale and cohesion on his ability to defeat the Japanese.¹⁶³

Throughout World War II, Britain's influence over Uganda eroded. In general, World War II shifted colonial rulers' attention elsewhere in support of the larger, existential threat posed by the Axis powers. For instance, British colonial rulers could do little to punish deserters given their diminishing presence and power in East Africa. Still, those British military officers organizing the Ugandan armed forces learned a few lessons applicable to postwar security sector development that would be important upon independence. For instance, the British realized that it would be necessary to diversify the Ugandan military's sources of enlistees. By 1957, no more than 35 percent of recruits were to be from the same ethnic group although certain patterns naturally developed over the course of two world wars. For example, artillery gunners were primarily Acholi¹⁶⁴ and drivers and signalers were Kamba or Nandi. The Buganda also trained as

¹⁶⁰Ibid., 222.

¹⁶¹Ibid., 113.

¹⁶²Ibid., 241.

¹⁶³Field Marshall Viscount William Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (London: Pan McMillan, 2009), 322.

¹⁶⁴Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and British Police in Colonial Africa*, 229. This is probably because the Acholi were known for their shooting ability.

drivers since the days of World War I.¹⁶⁵ Other ethnic groups developed reputations for special skills as well.¹⁶⁶ In fact, in the Burma campaign, British officers noted Kings African Rifles' shooting and other skills, especially when these units were on the offensive in the bush and in jungle warfare. Such adaptability was critical given the seemingly superior Japanese enemy forces in the Burma area of operations.¹⁶⁷ However, African troops struggled in the defense and in once case an entire platoon was court-martialed fleeing in the aftermath of an ambush.¹⁶⁸

Training

During World War II, the Kings African Rifles' training grew in sophistication given the requirement for African recruits to use armored cars, heavy mortar artillery, and other conventional weapons. Ugandans also trained in wireless signals, Morse code, map reading, and tactics. Most training happened at the battalion level, although, during World War II larger training depots formed to service the expanding ranks. The methods of training included a simplified version of the British approach: explanation, demonstration, and practice. Due to widespread illiteracy, training took much longer and was often rote, meaning the trainees simply imitated the trainer, a practice that can stifle initiative. After an initial basic training, an African soldier would join his unit and progress from individual, section, platoon, company, and battalion-level training exercises. Trainers, either British Royal Army Educational Corps sergeants or literate African NCOs, taught in English or sometimes Swahili. Clayton and Killingray believe the language barrier proved difficult for African trainees from different ethnic

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., 222.

¹⁶⁷Slim, *Defeat into Victory*. Slim's account details the difficulties the Allies faced in the Burma theatre and how it was critical to adapt his multinational force to a new style of fighting a tough, and determined Japanese enemy.

¹⁶⁸Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and British Police in Colonial Africa*, 254.

and linguistic groups. Training consisted of basic tactics, exercises, sports, marksmanship, and literacy classes in English and Swahili. After World War II, literate African soldiers received a monetary bonus.¹⁶⁹ Training in the post war era focused on internal security, anti-terrorist operations, patrolling, ambushes, and limited conventional warfare training. Low-level tactics manuals were translated into Swahili.¹⁷⁰

Return of Ugandan Soldiers and Post War Roles and Missions

Post WWII developments with regard to the military undermined long term stability in Uganda. Those who served in World War II returned from the war used to a higher standard of living and therefore added to the growing number of Ugandans dissatisfied with the British colonial rule—particularly in terms of material grievances.¹⁷¹ British colonial officers realized the potential for instability associated with demobilizing 77,000 returned soldiers. Thus, they made a concerted effort to look after veteran’s economic well being by channeling returning soldiers into agriculture, education, and programs to learn trades.¹⁷² Despite the government’s efforts, there were simply too few opportunities and too many returning soldiers.¹⁷³ Expectations went unmet and unemployment led to Ugandan resentment toward the Indian population, many of whom held the lucrative jobs that veterans hoped to fulfill.¹⁷⁴ Another post-World War II development that proved detrimental to stability included the manner with which the Ugandan military

¹⁶⁹Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 227–228.

¹⁷⁰Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and British Police in Colonial Africa*, 259-260.

¹⁷¹Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 269. As mentioned, after World War II, the British could no longer sell European manufactured goods at the rate or quantity East Africans demanded.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, 272-273. Only a few had educational opportunities.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, 274. Thompson highlights some of the challenges associated with placing demobilized soldiers into training programs; some 90 percent were illiterate.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 276.

demobilized. The preponderance of the force that remained in service was Acholi and Langi. Thompson argues that the underrepresentation of Bugandans was not a British decision noting that people had a choice to leave the military. The northern peoples simply chose to stay.¹⁷⁵ Finally, the government's program to pay ex-service members upon their return exacerbated inflation, despite efforts to curb it through savings accounts. In sum, East African soldiers returned with increased expectations of themselves, society, and the government. Thompson argues that the military was representative of an institution increasingly frustrated with British rule and African complicity. The British colonial rulers proved wholly inadequate in addressing their concerns. Some scholars like Musazi argue that ex-soldiers' political consciousness and organizational ability was indispensable to the strikes of January 1945.¹⁷⁶ After independence, the military increasingly asserted its authority, eventually taking over the government.

The inability to reintegrate returning veterans was emblematic of deeper challenges associated with governing Uganda. Thompson argues that British post war initiatives, especially in Buganda, did not diffuse grievances and instead bolstered an increasingly unpopular regime. Meanwhile the British relationship with Buganda deteriorated as the former attempted to purge those deemed disloyal from the government. To make matters worse, Bugandan leaders lost the support of the population.¹⁷⁷ This series of events set the foundation for what would become internal conflict and post-independence collapse. Leading indicators of such a fate included the degree of disconnectedness and divergence in goals of the Bugandan elite, society, and the British colonial officers. The level of discontent and increasing separation between the local chiefs,

¹⁷⁵Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 33. The ethnic composition of the Ugandan military is a factor in the post-independence coups and military control of the government

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 301. Thompson argues that part of the problem lay in the paradox of East African soldiers who fought for liberty returned home to face dictatorship.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 304.

society, and the British colonial rulers reached a fever pitch in April 1949 when Buganda erupted in a wave of riots, strikes, and violence that quickly exceeded the security forces' capabilities to restore order. Both the Bugandan chiefs and the colonial rulers lost control over large areas to a population with very specific demands: to elect their own chiefs; to elect members of the *Lukiiko*; and to dismiss the incumbent government.¹⁷⁸

Despite its internal struggle to achieve a level of post war stability, Ugandan soldiers also took part in a handful of major military operations on its borders. The first included participation in quelling the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya where Ugandans conducted cordon and search operations, ambushes, and patrols. Ugandan soldiers also maintained a garrison in the Italian Somaliland area and on the Ethiopia-Somaliland frontier. They even deployed to stop internal cattle raids while maintaining a border presence with Sudan and Congo as both suffered bouts of unrest.¹⁷⁹ As Uganda approached independence, the army took on more of a role in internal security. In fact, quelling domestic unrest was the 4th KAR's focus in 1960-61 during riots in Mbale and during elections in Kampala, Buganda, and Bunyoro. The longest lasting commitment from 1960-62 was in Karamoja where cattle raiding led to conflict among different ethnic groups. Finally, the 4th KAR worked to contain a secessionist movement in Toro. Overall, the 4th KAR assumed a variety of roles and missions due to its flexibility and capability to deploy as a self contained company in less than six hours without prior warning.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 307.

¹⁷⁹Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and British Police in Colonial Africa*, 259-260.

¹⁸⁰Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and British Police in Colonial Africa*, 259-260.

The Role of the Military Post-Independence

Upon gaining independence, Uganda almost immediately fell into a state of internal and external conflict, directly related to historical challenges associated with establishing power over the Bugandan Kingdom, inherent state weakness, and the presence of a security sector dominated by a few ethnic groups.¹⁸¹ There were early indications that the Ugandan political and military structure laced with ethnic tensions was bound to cause unrest. Upon gaining independence from Britain in 1962, the hereditary ruler, or *kabaka* of Buganda, vied for power against the modern Uganda People's Congress Party (UPCP). The constitution granted Mutesa II the Presidency and Milton Obote assumed the role of Prime Minister. This arrangement pitting those who would favor a strong central government based upon non-ethnic nationalism against a group more comfortable with a federalist or regionalist system. Four years after independence, Obote's troops attacked Mutesa and sent him into exile.¹⁸²

The modern military power vested in the army, was led by a northern Acholi, Idi Amin Dada, who seized power in a military coup in 1971.¹⁸³ Prior to the coup, General Amin served as Chief of the Army. In 1970 Prime Minister Obote planned to remove him for alleged embezzlement and illegal recruitment from his ethnic group. Scholars argue that the Army was dominated by the Acholi and Langi yet Amin argued that he organized the coup to prevent Obote's ethnic policies against the Gandan people.¹⁸⁴ After ousting Prime Minister Obote, Amin used his control of the military and support from Libya to remove political opposition, often using violent means and in the course of his eight-year rule, about 100,000 Ugandans were killed. Amin

¹⁸¹There were other factors leading to collapse however these are the most germane to the security sector's role in undermining political stability in the post-independence era.

¹⁸²Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa from 1935 to the Present* (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1984), 103-104.

¹⁸³Ieuan Ll. Griffiths, *An Atlas of African Affairs* (London: Methuen, Inc., 1984), 70-73.

¹⁸⁴Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, 56.

did not limit his use of force to internal political opponents. He also attacked Tanzania in 1978 but was later militarily defeated by Kenya and Tanzania who took control of Kampala. Thereafter, various factions fought over political and military control of Uganda continuing the transfer of power from one military head of state to another.¹⁸⁵

After Amin fled Uganda, Yusuf Lule, who fought against Amin with the Tanzanians as part of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), was named interim president in 1979. Then Milton Obote returned as president after elections in 1980 only to be overthrown by Lieutenant General Basilio Olara Okello in 1985 installing General Tito Okello (no relation to Olara-Okello) as the military head of state. The next year Yoweri Museveni, leader of the National Resistance Army fighting the Okello government, captured Kampala and assumed military and political leadership of Uganda. Museveni assumed leadership and eventually won 74 percent of the vote in a democratic election in 1996.¹⁸⁶ Although Museveni took power by force, observers credit him with stabilizing the country. In sum, the historical legacy of British colonial practices proved a weak foundation upon which to build a modern state.¹⁸⁷ The roots of instability are directly related to the development, composition, and cleavages within the security sector.

Today, Uganda faces a number of internal and external challenges. Internally the LRA remains a threat to national and international stability. In fact, the United States recently offered a substantial reward for information leading to the capture of Joseph Kony. Uganda also has a number of border conflicts dating from the colonial era when Europeans arbitrarily drew borders on the map of Sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo have an ongoing conflict over territory around the petroleum rich region of Lake Albert. Uganda also has

¹⁸⁵Ibid., 54-55.

¹⁸⁶Ibid.

¹⁸⁷Magyar, *Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions*, 264.

a disagreement with Kenya over fishermen's claims to the small island in Lake Victoria, Migingo.¹⁸⁸

In sum, the British exercised power in Uganda through a combination of force, coercion, and active and passive cooperation. They extended power through collaboration with the existing aristocracy and by providing ample opportunities for material advancement.¹⁸⁹ But their efforts exacerbated pre-colonial rivalries and in doing so, set Uganda on a path toward instability. Other factors, such as the role of religious organization, the introduction of certain cash crops, and arms sales to various factions, also contributed to post-independence challenges to long-term instability and the security sector's inability to restore order.

¹⁸⁸See War College paper and/or ICAF for other future challenges

¹⁸⁹Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 12.

Senegal Case Study



Figure 3. Map of Senegal

Source: Senegal, University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castaneda Map Collection, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/senegal_rel89.jpg (accessed November 14, 2013).

Pre-colonial Historical Background

Prior to colonization, Senegal was politically organized into chiefdoms organized around a dominant ruling lineage with power over others, often through the use of force. A social contract between the rulers and the ruled existed to the extent that communities paid taxes and

performed public or military service in exchange for relative autonomy.¹⁹⁰ The Tekrur kingdom, located in the middle of the Senegal River Valley and established in the eleventh century, converted to Islam en masse as part of the Almoravid movement. In the thirteenth century, Tekrur became a vassal state of the Mandinka Mali Empire while the non-Muslim Djolof Empire rose to power. Other powers came to the fore in the forms of the Baol, Cayor, Walo, Sine, and Saloum kingdoms by the end of the sixteenth century.¹⁹¹ The major modern-day ethnic groups that remain within Senegal's borders include the Wolof, Serer, Lebu, Tukolor, Fulbe, Sarakolle, Mandika, and Diola.¹⁹²

Pre-colonial Senegal's historic internal structure evolved as a highly stratified caste system dividing people into three main categories: freeman, slaves, and artisans. In general, society was based on maternally traced blood relationships.¹⁹³ West Africa Historian Cheikh Anta Diop argues that by the sixteenth century the social system was stable and most individuals fell into one of three groups. Freeman were essentially nobles with no other manual profession than agriculture. Artisans served as blacksmiths and shoemakers, professions passed down through generations. Slaves, who occupied the lowest rung of society and made up the majority of the population, could be recruited into their respective ruler's army or traded as a spoil of war.¹⁹⁴ A given ruler's power and prestige was judged in terms of his relative numerical superiority of the warriors and clients available to impose his will on others. Warrior crown slaves, or *creddo*, existed as a special social class in that members could work their way up to the ranks of the

¹⁹⁰Sheldon Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 2. Gellar suggest that Senegal followed the Sudanic state system model and was the case in Ghanaian and Malian empires.

¹⁹¹Ibid., 3-4.

¹⁹²Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 1.

¹⁹³Ibid., 4.

¹⁹⁴Cheik Anta Diop, *Pre-colonial Black Africa* (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987), 2-3.

nobility through demonstration of military prowess. In fact, certain warriors attained great wealth and even become slave-owners.¹⁹⁵ Today, Senegalese people casually refer to one another in terms related to the caste system even although it is no longer functionally operational.

Senegal's contact with Europeans began with the slave trade. Originating with the Portuguese in 1441 and lasting for three centuries, approximately 11 million West African people were sold into slavery and shipped across the Atlantic.¹⁹⁶ The majority of French colonial engagement was in West Africa and the first settlement was established in St. Louis, Senegal in 1659.¹⁹⁷ Throughout the colonial period, the French accumulated about 17 different colonies.¹⁹⁸ Senegal served as an important gateway to West Africa and Dakar, the capital, served as an important early French enclave.¹⁹⁹ Throughout the colonial era, the French established deep ties to the Senegalese people who assumed the French language, traditions, and culture. The French legacy also influenced Senegal's institutions including its education, government, and military organizations in a profound and enduring manner. Stanford University historians L. H Gann and Peter Duignan, among others, argue that the French tried to assimilate some Africans to French

¹⁹⁵Sheldon Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 5.

¹⁹⁶John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of the Continent* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 135. Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West*, 5. The Senegambia region was the largest supplier of slaves to Europe exporting 2,000 – 3,500 per year until the end of the eighteenth century.

¹⁹⁷Norman R. Bennett, *Africa and Europe from Roman Times to the Present* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975), 43.

¹⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 125. Although colonies regularly traded hands over the course of the colonial period, in general, the French held Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Ivory Coast, Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Gabon, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Somali, Comoros, and the Reunion Islands. The British held British Somaliland Botswana, Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zanzibar, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁹⁹Francis Terry McNamara, *France in Black Africa* (National Defense University Press: Washington, DC, 1989), 4. Dakar continues to serve as an important economic, transportation, and political hub of activity in West Africa.

ways going beyond business and trade endeavors to include security and protection from local Muslim rulers.²⁰⁰ Norman R. Bennett argues that French colonial rulers coerced subjects to adopt the French culture and religion, based on the assumption of cultural superiority.²⁰¹ Despite the different interpretations of the degree of assimilation, the French culture still permeates the political, social, and security sectors in contemporary Senegal as a direct result of the colonial experience.

French Colonial Rule, Assimilation, and Military Influence

According to former U.S. Ambassador Francis Terry McNamara, French interests in West Africa broadly, and Senegal specifically, stemmed from three underlying factors.²⁰² The first is related to the devastating loss France suffered at the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. The conflict not only left the military in shambles, the French government collapsed.²⁰³ This led to competition for human and natural resources among the major European powers. Ambassador McNamara argues that French interest in West Africa was also a manifestation of the increasing mercantilist competition for markets and raw materials among European powers in the late nineteenth century. He also views French interest in West Africa as a result of concern that Great Britain would annex the preponderance of colonies up for grabs at the onset of the

²⁰⁰Gann and Duignan, *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1914*, 3.

²⁰¹Bennett, *Africa and Europe from Roman Times to the Present*, 126; McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 10; Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 9. McNamara argues that some military officers served in colonial postings out of a desire to “civilize” Africans and provide the French culture as a gift. Gellar argues that France saw its “civilizing mission” as a way to bring peace, prosperity, and the benefits of French civilization to “backward and primitive” peoples fortunate to come under French rule.

²⁰²U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Ambassador McNamara,” <http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/mcnamara-francis-terry> (accessed October 8, 2013). Ambassador McNamara served in seven different postings in Africa throughout his Foreign Service career, culminating as the Ambassador to Gabon.

²⁰³This made conflict termination and postwar negotiation difficult for Prussia as it lacked a legitimate sovereign power with which to negotiate an end to hostilities.

scramble.²⁰⁴ Finally, Ambassador McNamara believes that the French saw Africa as a source of military manpower given their preoccupation with Germany's increasing population relative to France's stagnation.²⁰⁵

The French style of colonial rule, while explicitly military and bureaucratic, was largely focused on administrative centralization.²⁰⁶ Senegal's strategic location occupying the Western most point of the African continent made it an attractive colony for maritime trade and commerce. In fact, political institutions in West Africa were some of the most highly organized upon contact with colonial powers due to preexisting trade patterns and an agricultural surplus.²⁰⁷ Dakar, commonly referred to as the "Paris of West Africa," is known for its position as a financial and cultural epicenter in the region where people go to exchange goods and ideas. From 1536 until 1848, Senegal's Gorée Island served as an outpost for the slave trade. Further inland, Senegal was deeply influenced by its proximity to the Sahel, trans-Saharan trade routes, and a strong Islamic identity.²⁰⁸ The first French colonial administrators were military officers. Thus, those who gradually pacified much of West Africa, initiated peanut-based agricultural economy, and set up the earliest forms of government did so from the perspective of a security institution. The French approach and colonial philosophy shaped the Senegalese institutions left behind after independence, especially in light of the continuing French military presence in the region. In fact, post-independence French military forces remained engaged in West Africa from their base in

²⁰⁴Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 6. The British established a presence north of the Gambia River yet neither power was strong enough to drive the other out of the region.

²⁰⁵Francis Terry McNamara, *France in Black Africa* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), xiii – xv.

²⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 16.

²⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 11.

²⁰⁸Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 1. The Senegalese people were among the first West Africans to embrace Islam.

Senegal. From this strategic location French commanders could, “look both seaward and landward with relatively limited military forces still maintain a considerable importance as symbols of French influence in African and offshore areas.”²⁰⁹

In 1854, General Louis Leon Cesar Faidherbe received an appointment to become the governor of Senegal.²¹⁰ He served the previous two years there as a military engineer and therefore, had experience in the region and with the people. As governor, Faidherbe sought to expand the French base in Senegal and open trade routes to the Niger River basin. He also wanted to solidify a commercial advantage over the British by shifting trans-Saharan trade to French-controlled ports.²¹¹ In the process, four coastal cities, later known as communes, increased in size and importance forming a West African corridor consisting of: Gorée Island, Dakar, Rufisque, and St. Louis. Reflecting the French approach to colonialism, by 1848, the Senegalese people living in the coastal corridor received full French citizenship and representation in the National Assembly.²¹² This is a significant difference from the “indirect” British approach to colonialism. In order to unify and pacify Senegal, Faidherbe fought and defeated the Tukolor Army, led by El Hadj Omar Tall.²¹³ Tall rose to power as part of the Islamic revival in Senegal in the late nineteenth century. He was a clerical warrior who initiated the Tijaniyya brotherhood²¹⁴ and

²⁰⁹ Nelson, Harold, *Area Handbook for Senegal*, (Washington D.C: Foreign Area Studies of American University, 1973), 337.

²¹⁰ Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 7. At the time, Faidherbe held the rank of Major.

²¹¹ McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 6.

²¹² Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 11. Gellar notes that mastery of the French language and familiarity with the French culture and institutions was mandatory for those seeking political leadership of the four communes.

²¹³ McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 8. According to McNamara, the Tukolor are Muslim Peul people who originated in Senegal’s Futa-Toro region.

²¹⁴ Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 6. The Tijaniyya brotherhood, founded in Fez, Morocco by Ahmad al-Tijani in the late eighteenth century, appointed Tall as the caliph of (what was then) western Sudan, including Senegal.

organized and army to carry out a series of jihads to depose pagan rulers and to build a Tijani Islamic empire.²¹⁵ Thus, as French influence spread, so began the process of assimilation and association²¹⁶ of West Africans to the French culture, language, and traditions, sometimes through the use of force.²¹⁷

General J. S. Gallieni followed in Faidherbe's footsteps in the 1880s using Senegal as a staging point to thrust into West Africa and in doing so, fundamentally changed the preexisting local authority structures. In his approach to military intervention, Gallieni took advantage of internal African conflict by throwing French support behind one group or the other to effectively use force in pursuit of well-defined political goals.²¹⁸ Throughout the early colonial period, the French militarily defeated armed resistance and in doing so, disbanded the *ceddo* warrior class. This had a dramatic impact upon the Wolof and others who turned to Islam and religious leaders for guidance.²¹⁹ Gellar argues that the Islamization and integration of large segments of society created new authority structures centering on venerated religious leaders or, *marabouts*.²²⁰ Marabout-led Islamic brotherhoods remain a significant element in the fabric of contemporary

²¹⁵Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 7.

²¹⁶Assimilation and association is another way of describing the French "direct" approach to colonialism.

²¹⁷McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 34. McNamara argues that assimilation and association worked better among small populations and became more difficult when expanded into the hinterland.

²¹⁸*Ibid.*, 14. McNamara argues that the French were deft in their use of a relatively small force in a way that, "ultimately became the decisive strategic element in the region." Gallieni receives credit for choosing to fight at the right time and keeping his enemies off guard, gradually asserting French dominance

²¹⁹Until engaging in armed conflict with the French, the Wolof resisted conversion to Islam. After fighting the French, the Wolof took on a Muslim identity.

²²⁰Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 8. Islam served as a catalyst for resistance to French colonial authority. The Wolof masses turned to the Mouride brotherhood and its leader, Amadou Bamba for support. Other ethnic groups turned to Malick Sy, leader of the Tijaniyya brotherhood. Both brotherhoods remain important in the lives and religious beliefs of contemporary Senegalese people.

Senegalese social, political, and religious life. It is clear that their influence begun and grew during the colonial period.

The French System in Colonial Senegal

French colonial administration, while military in nature, was patterned on the French system of government. At the top of the hierarchy was the colonial administration in Paris. Then two separate, geographically based, entities grouped colonies under governors general on the African continent: the colonial Federation of French West Africa (AOF) and the Federation of French Equatorial Africa (AEF).²²¹ Throughout the early colonial period, France sent military officers as *commandants de cercle* to assure firm control over a given territory.²²² In urban centers, a distinct political class of Western-educated, French-speaking Senegalese elites grew and increasingly participated in political life on an equal basis with the colonial powers.²²³ The French approach to governance differed in rural areas. Outside of the major cities, French military officers held the top positions in the chain of command leaving local African chiefs the lowest rungs of the administrative pyramid—the canton and the village.²²⁴ The structural elements of French colonial administration remained in place after independence and remain in place today.

The highly centralized and federal French administrative system dating back to colonial times is also deeply imprinted on the Senegalese political, economic, and security sectors—as is

²²¹McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 28. The AOF's seat was in Dakar, Senegal and included Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. The French governor of Senegal served as the AOF governor general. The AEF, headquartered in Brazzaville, Congo included Togo and Cameroon.

²²²*Ibid.*, 9. French officers serving in colonial outposts were from the marine infantry, the main force of the colonial army.

²²³Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 8. Gellar notes that Senegal is the only colony where the French pursued assimilation to the degree that West Africans attained full French citizenship.

²²⁴McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 26.

the social divide between urban and rural communities.²²⁵ Colonial urban dwellers in Dakar and the other three major communes gained access to the benefits of French presence in terms of economic, educational,²²⁶ and employment opportunities. In fact, a small segment took advantage of their French citizenship and traveled to France for advanced degrees becoming more akin to citizens than subjects.²²⁷ Extending French citizenship went a long way to develop the Senegalese elites who eventually governed with the French and assumed political leadership after independence. Rural communities did not fare as well and in most cases, remained subjects. Autocratic French colonial administration outside of major urban centers restricted rural communities' access to the benefits of French presence. Yet, the decidedly French approach to organizing political, and later military, institutions was deeply ingrained during the colonial period.

In an effort to make Senegal self-sufficient, the French introduced peanut cultivation for export along with other raw materials. Colonial leaders also collected custom and excise taxes or taxes in kind in the form of labor on public infrastructure. Eventually, the French followed the British model and offered private companies concessions in the form of land and by 1900, 40 companies held over 250,000 square miles throughout West Africa.²²⁸ However, in rural areas, Gellar argues that the introduction of peanut cultivation undermined long term economic development rendering Senegal dependent upon a single cash crop and thus, vulnerable to price

²²⁵One small example is the manner with which the Senegalese adopted the French tradition of organized protests and labor strikes to communicate dissatisfaction with the status quo. There are numerous other Senegalese practices with roots in the French colonial experience.

²²⁶McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 37. McNamara points out that while the French certainly improved education in Senegal, the majority of post primary education was vocational.

²²⁷Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 9. Gellar found that less than 5 percent of the population held French citizenship and therefore, access to economic, education, and occupation benefits. He also argues that Senegal took on notions of equality rooted in the ideals of the French Revolution, which awakened a missionary zeal.

²²⁸McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 32.

fluctuations.²²⁹ Senegal still struggles with uneven economic development, prioritizing investment in urban areas to the detriment of rural communities.

The French Military Model

As with Senegal's system of government, its military institutions reflect its colonial past and French influence. The Senegalese colonial army, created in the late nineteenth century, existed to support French conquest for African empire. As such, the Senegalese soldiers or riflemen (*Tirailleurs Senegalais*) served under French marine and infantry officers. Throughout West Africa, the French resisted creating national armies, opting instead for a force under the explicit control of French officers and noncommissioned officers.²³⁰ Over time, Senegal's military took on attributes that were decidedly French to include its uniforms, culture, organization, doctrine and training. After all, French aid programs forged the security sector's identity through the colonial period.²³¹ By independence in 1960, about 60,000 West African soldiers manned 90 garrisons across the region.²³²

The French have a long history of using Senegalese troops in the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, in Madagascar, and even against Mexico.²³³ In order to harness military manpower, the French colonial powers set out to militarily defeat armed opposition in Senegal. Then, they leveraged local fighters' skills and abilities to serve the colonial government as well as

²²⁹Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 14.

²³⁰McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 143. While the colonial army was primarily French-led, a small number of Senegalese soldiers earned commissions.

²³¹Nelson, *Area Handbook for Senegal*, 334.

²³²McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 143.

²³³First, Ruth, *Power in Africa* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 74-75; Nelson, *Area Handbook for Senegal*, 335. Senegalese soldiers also fought in Guinea in 1838 and in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, and in the French eastward penetration, notably into Madagascar and Morocco in 1912.

French political and military interests abroad. According to Harold Nelson, the first Senegalese soldier to serve in the army enlisted in 1765 and over time, the Senegalese earned a reputation for being tough and disciplined soldiers.²³⁴ Human resources, and specifically military manpower, were of deep concern for France, especially after the Franco-Prussian War. Senegal and West Africa broadly, provided the labor pool necessary to augment the French military, and other European militaries, for decades and especially during World War I and World War II.

World Wars

International events and armed conflict dramatically increased the number of West Africans serving in the colonial army. By 1916, France formally adopted conscription in its West African colonies maintaining a one-third, two-thirds ratio of regulars to conscripts. Like other Sub-Saharan African armies, Senegal's military underwent dramatic change through its participation in World War I and World War II in terms of its organization, training, and access to technology. During World War I, 181,000 Senegalese soldiers served, bolstering their reputation for being reliable fighters.²³⁵ This trend continued into World War II, especially after the West African colonies joined the Free French cause.

The French experience in World War II had a dramatic impact upon Senegal and its colonial leadership. Upon defeat in 1940, French colonial military leaders were torn between remaining loyal to the Vichy French government or to continue the fight against the Axis powers as part of the Free French. Ultimately, the colonial leaders in tropical Africa split into those loyal

²³⁴Nelson, *Area Handbook for Senegal*, 335.

²³⁵*Ibid.* West African soldiers serving in World War I were often called Senegalese even though not every single individual hailed from Senegal. Nelson estimates that the number of combat casualties equaled the number of those incapacitated from illness resulting from wartime service in dramatically different climates.

to the Vichy government and those loyal to the Free French and General Charles de Gaulle.²³⁶ Initially the AOF remained loyal to the Vichy government and the AEF to the Free French up until the Allied landings at in North Africa in 1942 at which time all Senegalese forces fought for the Free French in North Africa, France, and Germany.²³⁷ Janowitz argues that ex-colonial armies' successful operational experience contributed to internal cohesion. In Senegal's case, their experience was mostly fighting in North Africa.²³⁸ After WWII, France maintained a considerable West African military force committing 15,000 to Indochina, 30,000 to North Africa and the Suez area, and 4,000 to garrison duty in the region.²³⁹

Military developments in WWII also forged political and social change in colonial Africa. African governor of Chad, Felix Eboue led the political movement to align with the Free French and eventually brought about social change through the use of *notable evolue*, or a new form of status for African elites to achieve status comparable to their educational and social level. In the past, some elites refused French citizenship over social or cultural incongruities such as the prohibition on polygamy. Eboue's innovative approach to social justice provided legal recognition to those who wanted to retain African traditions yet enjoy French citizenship.²⁴⁰ Other social and political changes emerged from World War II leading to further self-determination and eventually, independence. Senegal's experience in World War II clearly highlights the extent to which wartime experiences shaped elements of the Clausewitzian trinity and the institutions left in its wake.

²³⁶McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 42. African governor of Chad, Felix Eboue led the West African movement to unite with the Free French.

²³⁷Harold Nelson, *Area Handbook for Senegal*, (Washington D.C: Foreign Area Studies of American University, 1973), 335.

²³⁸Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, 110.

²³⁹Nelson, *Area Handbook for Senegal*, 337.

²⁴⁰McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 45.

Post War Institutional Development

After World War II, the looming challenges associated with political independence heightened the need for competent African security forces. Thus, France opened a limited number of training and educational opportunities for African militaries.²⁴¹ Beyond educating leaders, France left small cadres in West Africa to train and equip national forces.²⁴² The French plan for a post-independence military formation in Senegal called for a small national army and gendarmerie of roughly 5,000 men each. Meanwhile the French army maintained forces within Africa and an expeditionary capability prepared to deal with emergent contingencies. This post-independence model gave France a degree of flexibility and a low-cost means to maintain presence on the African continent. It was also intended to support the development of national military capabilities through training cadres and equipping support.²⁴³ Therefore, French influence upon Senegal's military lasted long after political independence, carrying into the formation of a truly national military institution. While it took some time, by 1973, Senegalese officers filled the most senior positions in the 6,000-strong national army.²⁴⁴

Perhaps the most obvious mark of French influence upon Senegal's post-independence military was on its officers, many of whom held commissions in the French overseas forces. Beyond experiential ties forged through combat, many Senegalese officers were the product of

²⁴¹McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 144-145. By 1956, Senegal had the most officers trained by the French at their Training School for Officers of Overseas Territories in Frejus, France of all of West Africa. A limited number of West African military officers attended the French Military Academy at St. Cyr. The present day Senegalese Military Academy is modeled after its French counterpart.

²⁴²Nelson, *Area Handbook for Senegal*, 334. As Nelson argues, Senegal's military forces were patterned after those of France and were trained and equipped primarily through French aid programs.

²⁴³*Ibid.*, 146-147.

²⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 333. Although Senegalese officers assumed leadership in the mid 1970s, the French military remained engaged in the region through advisors. Furthermore, France retained the use of Senegalese facilities to enable naval, air, and ground forces in West Africa.

French education and training. Noncommissioned officers' experience was also decidedly French in terms of education and training. In fact, the majority of the post-independence NCO corps came from those who were recalled to active status for duty in the national army. Colonial army veterans also served in the formative years immediately following independence in 1960 as part of the Accord on Cooperation in Matters of Defense, to form the new, national military.²⁴⁵ In sum, the foundation upon which the nascent Senegalese military grew was heavily influenced by the French colonial experience and continued presence in the region.

The nature and extent of post-independence education and training was codified in the Accord on Cooperation in Matters of Defense between the Mali Federation and France.²⁴⁶ In this agreement, France committed to providing Senegal with military assistance and training. The agreement also granted France the rights to Senegalese airfields and ports. France also committed to support the Senegalese military and gendarmerie with logistical support.²⁴⁷ In exchange for continued support to the newly formed Senegalese military, France retained a strategic base from which to protect its interests in the region. This arrangement enabled Senegal to have, by the mid-1970s, a 6,000 strong armed force.²⁴⁸

The constitution is perhaps one of the most important and influential aspects governing civil-military relations in post-independence Senegal. Senegal modeled its very foundation on the French system and as such, the civil government retains authority over the military. To this end,

²⁴⁵Ibid., 336.

²⁴⁶Upon independence, Senegal was part of the Mali Federation but opted out in 1960 under the leadership of its first President, Leopold Senghor.

²⁴⁷Nelson, *Area Handbook for Senegal*, 337.

²⁴⁸Ibid., 338. The majority of Senegal's military of the 1970s was in the Army. The Army consisted of two infantry battalions and an engineer battalion plus two parachute companies, two commando companies and support units. The air force only had about 200 men with no combat aircraft. The navy only had 150 men with a few patrol craft.

the president is the commander-in-chief and as such he presides over the Supreme Defense Council, the senior policymaking body in military matters.²⁴⁹ Throughout the post-independence period, whenever it appeared as though certain individuals held a disproportionate degree of power in military matters, the government took active measures to institute checks and balances. Therefore, power was rarely concentrated in the hands of a few, ensuring that no single person could use the military instrument of power unilaterally.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, by the 1970s, the Senegalese military was an all-volunteer force, made up of majority Wolof soldiers. In fact, there were more volunteers than there were requirements giving recruiters the ability to be selective.²⁵¹ Of course France continued to contribute to the Senegalese military's professionalism and proficiency through training, equipping, and partnership activities well into the twenty first century.²⁵²

Challenges to Post-independence Stability

Despite Senegal's post-independence emergence as a model of democracy in West Africa, challenges abound. Colonial boundaries and historical rivalries remain a flashpoint for

²⁴⁹Ibid, 338. All cabinet ministers and ranking military chiefs sit on the Supreme Defense Council.

²⁵⁰Ibid., 340. For instance, in the 1970s, the Inspector General held a great deal of power over the military. Therefore, in 1972, a reorganization effort divided responsibilities among a few key leaders ensuring a degree of checks and balances. The French maintained influence on the Senghor government via military officers assigned to the Senegalese government as advisors.

²⁵¹ Ibid. Unlike Uganda where the post-independence military was dominated by a minority group, in Senegal, the Wolof make up about 43% of the population and as such, fill the ranks at a commensurate level.

²⁵²Ibid, 341. France offered specialized training, in Europe, for low density military specialists such as those in communications, medical, and ordnance fields. Senegalese officers often trained in France, Morocco, or the Malagasy Republic. The French even trained the Senegalese police, gendarmerie, and others for civil service type of employment. Training was not limited to individual level tactics and education. Battalion level training and large-scale maneuver exercises were also a key component of the French support to developing Senegal's security sector, especially in light of the conflict in the Casamance.

conflict between Senegal and its neighbors. The Senegalese conflict with its Mauritanian neighbors stems from ethnic rivalry and border violations by Mauritanian herders, decedents of the Beydane or “White Moors” who historically ruled over the Harratine. Scholars argue that the border dispute reflects “a historical legacy and attempt to break the master-slave relationship.”²⁵³ Internally, Senegal and its armed forces continue to fight the longest running counterinsurgency campaign in the Casamance region.²⁵⁴ Furthermore, with its modern transportation and communications infrastructure, Senegal most recently emerged as a transshipment point for illegal narcotics moving from Southeast Asia and Latin America to Europe and North America.²⁵⁵ Despite these challenges, Senegal has a strong history of peaceful political transitions and civil control of the military.²⁵⁶

Morris Janowitz argues that Sub-Saharan African nations that did not experience military coups share some similar characteristics. One set includes a charismatic or strong leader to maintain civil regimes by personal presence or limited use of paramilitary agencies which yields relative stability. Senegal is a prime example of both ideas given its history of an apolitical military subject to civilian authority.²⁵⁷ Scholars attribute Senegal’s relative political stability to the efforts of its first president, Leopold Sedar Senghor. Senghor led Senegal through its first two decades of independence and he did so in a manner that codified a multi-party system, free press,

²⁵³Magyar, *Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions*, 275-276.

²⁵⁴In the early 1980s the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) mounted a low level separatist insurgency against the government of Senegal.

²⁵⁵CIA World Factbook, “Senegal” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html> (accessed October 21, 2013). The conflict broke out over allegations that the majority ethnic Wolof marginalized the minority Diola living in the Casamance region of Senegal.

²⁵⁶The 2012 Presidential election in which Macky Sall defeated the incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, in a free and fair election serves as an example of the Senegalese people’s commitment to liberal, democratic values and processes.

²⁵⁷Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, 65, 110.

and other democratic values and processes, certainly with regard to the use of military force.²⁵⁸ In fact, Gellar argues that Senegalese “clan politics” is highly personalized and revolves around the prestige of a clan leader and his ability to reward followers with favors and resources.²⁵⁹

Senghor’s influence, as well as his successor’s commitment to the same principles has much to do with Senegal’s success.

In sum, understanding the Senegalese military requires an appreciation for its history, culture, religion, and society. Unlike its neighbors, Senegal’s military developed in an apolitical manner given decades of political leadership committed to civil control of the military instrument of power. While the security sector focuses on internal issues such as the insurgency in the Casamance, the French colonial model provided for post-independence training, equipping, and partnership activities. This continued engagement went a long way to developing the professional force that serves Senegal, and its regional partners, today.²⁶⁰

CONCLUSION

Deductions and Implications

U.S. military partnership with Sub-Saharan African militaries presents continuities with the past as well as new challenges in the future. Given the historical record, it is clear that there are significant political and social ramifications of security cooperation in the region. As

²⁵⁸Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 25. The post-independence period, and Senghor’s tenure, were certainly not free of instability. For instance, in the spring of 1968 student and trade union unrest led to riots whereby the state had to use force to restore calm. The French even came to Senegal’s aid for a time. Senghor successfully negotiated with protestors, making concessions when necessary and co-opting key leaders to restore order.

²⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 28.

²⁶⁰United Nations Peacekeeping, “UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors,” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml> (accessed 8 October 2013). Senegal is a major troop contributor to several United Nations and African Union efforts. For example, it is in the top 15 of all contributions to police, UN military experts, and troop contributions.

Echevarria argues, the nature of war “varies according to the diverse societies which use it, the purposes they pursue, and the means they employ.”²⁶¹ Therefore, in terms of regional alignment, it will be important for operational planners to examine U.S. military efforts from a holistic perspective, understanding that changes in the security sector reverberate beyond the immediate recipients. The foregoing case studies of the colonial experience in Senegal and Uganda highlight Echevarria’s insight into the manner with which changes in one element of the Clausewitzian trinity impacts all others.

In Uganda and Senegal, the colonial influence on the relationship between the military and the political elements of the trinity was clear. In writing about Uganda, Gardner Thompson argues that the British in Uganda had to, “mediate between imperial expectations and local realities, in an internal context that was constantly in flux. Indeed its own impact induced change initially and continued to do so: ironically, colonial rule was itself eventually to undermine some of the collaborative political relationships on which it was first established.”²⁶² In other words, the extent to which the British changed the political dynamic undermined long term stability. This was most evident in the succession of military coups following independence. These same phenomena could occur as the U.S. military trains, equips, and partners with African militaries. As an articulated policy goal, the United States will work to further its own political interests in Sub-Saharan Africa through partnership. Yet American presence could change partner nations’ internal political, economic, and social dynamics in a variety of ways. As the Uganda case study showed, British influence and the use of military force empowered the Bugandans at the expense

²⁶¹Antulio Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 192.

²⁶²Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 4.

of virtually all others. British influence also extended Uganda's power outside of its borders.²⁶³ Shortly after independence, certain groups used their skills, abilities, and resources in ways that undermined stability.²⁶⁴ Senegal had an entirely different experience. Its close ties, and in some cases assimilation, into the French system led to political stability, underwritten by an apolitical security sector. Therefore, it is incumbent upon U.S. military planners to achieve an appreciation for the second and third order effects of strengthening a foreign military and the possible future scenarios that could result from regional alignment.²⁶⁵

The case studies also revealed the relationship between the military element of the trinity and society. In terms of recruitment, the post-independence Ugandan military was dominated by the Acholi and Langi from the northern portion of the country. This led to instability because, as Omara-Otunnu noted, soldiers from these areas tended to be independent, resistant to authority, and marginalized from the benefits that British colonial authorities bestowed upon Buganda.²⁶⁶ Knowing which ethnic groups serve in the military may be critical in understanding societal strengths, limitations, and underlying tensions. More broadly, it may be important to understand the extent to which recruitment is based on ethnic or civic nationalism and how this impacts the security sector's capabilities. Historically, Nigeria's military is replete with ethnic rivalries that resulted in a series of military coups and a three-year civil-war.²⁶⁷ This history is a critical

²⁶³ Under British colonial rule, Ugandan military forces took part in international conflicts such as the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya.

²⁶⁴ Military coup leaders certainly used the element of military power to assume political control of Uganda.

²⁶⁵ One need only remember the outcome of U.S. efforts to provide security sector assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq for a glimpse into some of the ramifications such as internal security dilemmas and inter-ethnic violence and instability.

²⁶⁶ Omara-Otunnu, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*, 4. Omara-Otunnu argued that soldiers from the more segmented societies in northern and eastern Uganda were unaccustomed to hierarchy and known to be independent.

²⁶⁷ Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, 41.

element in understanding and visualizing partnership with the Nigerian military and highlights the importance knowing something about the ethnic make-up of a given partner military. Knowing which groups serve in the security sector and how they are recruited may prove useful in avoiding problems.

In Senegal, the French spent decades developing, training, and inculcating the security sector. These efforts produced the professional and apolitical force that emerged after independence. While there is an ongoing counterinsurgency in the Casamance, Senegal avoided the ethnic and religious strife that has torn apart other African nations like Uganda.²⁶⁸ Furthermore, the security sector's composition reflected the ethnic, mostly Wolof, majority. Due to Senegal's relative levels of internal stability, political leaders rarely used military force to restore order.²⁶⁹ In Uganda, the political leadership relied upon the military to assert control of its population. Whereas Senegal developed level of social trust among its citizens giving way to democratic norms and institutions, Uganda lacked a commensurate experience upon which to build a sense of civic nationalism. Uganda never forged a national identity and British influence exacerbated underlying social and ethnic tensions. Operational planners would do well to determine whether foreign military partners ascribe meaning to a civic or to an ethnic identity. They also should understand how the use of force was historically deployed in a partner nation.

The military element of the trinity certainly reflected underlying social and economic problems in Senegal and Uganda. In Uganda, colonialism had a deep impact on peasants who cultivated crops in order to purchase imported goods from Great Britain. These terms of trade tied

²⁶⁸Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, 23.

²⁶⁹The exception to this statement is the government's use of the military in the counterinsurgency campaign in the Casamance. Fortunately for Senegal's overall stability, the Casamance region is mostly geographically separated from the rest of the country by The Gambia. Therefore, insurgency-related violence and instability mostly remains contained in the southern part of the country. It is interesting to note that the insurgents in the Casamance are from a different ethnic group, the Diola.

agricultural output to colonial priorities, a trend that deepened during WWII. In the post war era, instability resulted from British disengagement.²⁷⁰ Uganda's political leader's system of patronage also proved disastrous after independence. It is clear that the system of "haves" and "have-nots" originated in the colonial era when the British bestowed preferential treatment upon Buganda. In fact, the unraveling of the country was the result of Buganda's loss of relative power at the hands of Milton Obote. Therefore, it is important for military planners to understand how political leaders divide resources. Similarly, U.S. presence or activity in a given region has tremendous potential to impact local economies, security, and even perceptions of indigenous forces' capabilities and limitations. The impact of which may not be entirely felt until the U.S. military leaves a region. All of these variables are important to analyze prior to engaging in partnership activities.

In Uganda's case, World War II veterans returned home with heightened expectations only to be disappointed like so many other Ugandans of the post war period. British disengagement combined with economic turmoil to set the conditions for instability that continued all the way until independence. It stands to reason that the most organized, trained, and equipped element of the trinity, the military, took political power when given the opportunity. On the other hand, the French never really disengaged from Senegal.²⁷¹ In fact, French military advisors remained in Senegal long after independence contributing to a professional armed force. France even continued to support civil institutional development during President Senghor's successful first term in office which eventually led to a multi-party system and tradition of

²⁷⁰ Specifically, Ugandans grew accustomed to buying European goods that were no longer available in the post war era. In addition, demand for wartime supplies such as cotton and rubber decreased leaving economic turmoil in Uganda.

²⁷¹ Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization*, 48. Louis argues that the French are much more willing to than the British to commit troops and economic assistance to former colonies, not least to those torn by ethnic and religious strife.

peaceful political transitions.²⁷² On the other hand, Uganda experienced a series of military coups leading to internal and external conflict. Operational planners may find a partner nation's history of political transitions useful in understanding the operational environment and tendencies in the system.

Societal customs, mores, and practices certainly had an impact on the military in colonial Uganda and Senegal. In colonial Uganda, European missionaries and their efforts to win Christian and Catholic converts fundamentally changed society. Whereas pre-colonial family patterns allowed for polygamy, those who converted to one form or another of Christianity adopted the associated customs and practices.²⁷³ In fact, Ugandan soldiers were limited in the number of wives and children they could accommodate in military housing. Thus, the institutions developed in a manner preferential to European customs and traditions. In colonial Senegal, French customs and traditions heavily influenced the locals' way of life. In order to enjoy the privileges associated with citizenship, the Senegalese people had to accept European norms and practices. This included a prohibition on polygamy.²⁷⁴ During World War II, African troops became familiar with European norms, customs, and traditions. These practices remained long after the war was over became part of the post-independence social fabric. Therefore, U.S. military planners should be aware of the extent to which military service fosters the adoption of new social patterns.²⁷⁵

²⁷² Senghor served two terms and willingly left office at the conclusion of his second term, setting the conditions for peaceful political transitions in Senegal.

²⁷³ This includes discontinuing polygamous family patterns among other pre-colonial practices and traditions.

²⁷⁴ The prohibition on polygamy and other requirements for French citizenship prohibited some Senegalese people from fully enjoying the benefits of assimilation.

²⁷⁵ This simple statement is tremendously important in terms of foreign military partners' interpretation of human rights. A critical element in U.S. efforts associated with regional alignment will be to train and inculcate foreign partners with an understanding of the military application of basic international human rights norms.

The government obviously had a tremendous impact upon the security sector in colonial Uganda and Senegal. Whereas the Ugandan government developed along ethno-sectarian lines, Senegal emerged in a manner that fostered civic nationalism. These divergent patterns of state formation shaped the resultant security sector and its role in society. In this case, Brown's theory of internal conflict proves useful in identifying the colonial roots of violence and instability. Uganda is a textbook case of a state fraught with Brown's underlying sources of internal conflict to include: ethnic geography, discriminatory political institutions, discriminatory economic systems, and patterns of cultural discrimination.²⁷⁶ Furthermore, Uganda also experienced several of Brown's proximate causes of internal conflict including: changing intra-military balances, political transitions, growing economic inequities, and growing inter-group competitions.²⁷⁷ While relatively stable, Senegal also developed with an unfavorable ethnic geography and socio-economic divide between urban and rural communities that fueled internal conflict.²⁷⁸ Brown's theory of the underlying and proximate causes of internal conflict is a useful model for planners seeking a deeper understanding partner nations' propensity for instability.

Operational planners should also attempt to understand their partner military's role in society and how it could lead to tension. Part of this understanding comes from fully appreciating the historical context that informs how society sees the military and how the military views society. In the case of Uganda, it is clear that the military was dominated by certain ethnic groups which led to a post-independence series of military coups resulting in military political leaders who came to power by force. This is tremendously valuable insight when working in a country that may not have a tradition of separating the military from political spheres. In the case of

²⁷⁶ Almost all of these sources of internal conflict have roots in the British colonial preference and empowerment of the Buganda over virtually all other ethnic groups.

²⁷⁷ The proximate causes reached a peak during the military coups described in the case study and relating to the violent transitions from Milton Obote to Idi Amin.

²⁷⁸ The internal conflict in Senegal is limited to the insurgency in the Casamace.

Senegal, the all-volunteer military is decidedly apolitical, even uncomfortable voting in the 2012 presidential elections.²⁷⁹

The foregoing case studies of colonial Senegal and Uganda also revealed other key findings. In terms of military-to-military partnerships, there are several intangible challenges having to do with perceptions of U.S. efforts in the region. With the recent memory of colonialism and its association with brutality, resource extraction, and subjugation, the U.S. Army would do well to ensure that its activities are perceived as equally beneficial for all involved. Given increasing levels of cooperation, African partners may see U.S. involvement as part of a larger effort in the “war on terror” or as a way to access natural resources, like so many Western powers that have come before.²⁸⁰ In this sense, and with the penetration of cellular phones and internet, it is critical that the U.S. clearly communicates the purpose of its efforts to as wide of an audience as possible to avoid misunderstandings and perceptions of malfeasance.

As was the case in Senegal and Uganda throughout the colonial period, myriad actors with different, and often competing interests, will shape the security environment in a given country. Often the confluence of an increasing number of foreign actors, their reasons for being there, and their diverging interests will have a dramatic impact upon a complex, adaptive system. Just as the colonial powers faced a whole host of actors competing for power and influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, so too will the United States join in a diverse group of interest groups working toward different ends. It is important to note that both the European colonial powers and

²⁷⁹The author served as an election observer and political officer as part of the U.S. Embassy in Dakar, Senegal and interviewed several military and police officers who expressed a disdain for engaging in politics.

²⁸⁰Demba Moussa Dembele, “The United States of Africa: The Challenges,” *Pambazuka News* 298 (April 2007), <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/40573> (accessed 11 June 2013).

the local African leaders used each other in pursuit of varied objectives.²⁸¹ This insight rings true today and has implications for how the U.S. uses force and with whom we partner in Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, in the case of colonial Uganda, various *kabakas* clearly used foreign powers' influence and resources to their advantage. King Mutesa was adept at gaining British support to defeat his enemies while soliciting resources, especially weapons, from other foreign actors. In Senegal, this did not appear to be as dramatic however, in some instances, French support and resources went a long way to empower certain local actors over others. Perhaps the nature of the French long term commitment, codified in agreements and practice, led to more of an equal partnership and stake in Senegal's future.²⁸²

Planners should understand the extent to which partner nations hope to benefit from U.S. assistance, and how they may simultaneously court other actors' support.²⁸³ For instance, Senegal receives military assistance from a variety of other countries to include France, the Soviet Union, China, Israel, and Canada. There could be clear disadvantages from multi-state support to one military force. For instance, as Henry Bienen argues, too much diversification can lead to a lack of standardization of equipment and training. In many ways, the U.S. efforts could make problems worse. Also, as Bienen argues, internal cliques could form as a result of overseas training experiences exacerbating underlying regional, ethnic, religious, generational cleavages.²⁸⁴

²⁸¹Magyar, *Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions*, 249.

²⁸² This is not to say that the slave trade or the introduction of a peanut-based agricultural sector were beneficial for Senegal. In this case, the mutual benefit has to do with the types of liberal, democratic norms and institutions that the French introduced during the colonial period.

²⁸³ Several nations engage in military-to-military training in Sub-Saharan Africa. Planners should be aware of the other actors conducting similar activities and, more importantly, different actors' motives behind their efforts.

²⁸⁴Henry Bienen, *Armies and Parties in Africa*, (New York: African Publishing Co., 1978), 103-104.

Planners should also understand partner nation's experience with foreign assistance, whether it is related to defense, development or diplomacy. For instance, Ambassador McNamara argued that Senegal was relatively well prepared for independence. He attributes this preparation to years of "on the job training" for political elites and civil servants whose experience in governing proved critical. In fact, Senegal's first political leader, Leopold Senghor, experienced real power in his tenure as a cabinet member in the French government. Furthermore, Senegal is one of the few states to gain independence with a level of tolerance for political opposition.²⁸⁵ This was not the case in Uganda. This political history shaped the security sector. Senegal's security force remained decidedly apolitical and this characteristic went a long way towards long term stability. Unfortunately, this is not the case in Uganda or many other Sub-Saharan African nations. Thus, while the U.S. Army will primarily be in the AFRICOM area of responsibility to train military partners, it is important to be cognizant of situations where the political class, business community, and civil society have diverging ideas for what is best for a given state. It would be unwise to assume that the impact of U.S. military efforts will be limited to the security sector. Therefore, planners should have a holistic understanding of the key actors in a given operational environment and the extent that it could impact military operations.

Finally, the operational planner focused on regional alignment in Sub-Saharan Africa should attempt to achieve some sense of how a partner military sees itself. Chuka Onwumechili argues that African armies used for internal police actions often begin to see themselves as critical solutions to crises related to internal affairs and politics. Thus such armies are more prone to military coups.²⁸⁶ In the case of Uganda, it is clear that the military, and various insurgent

²⁸⁵McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, 89.

²⁸⁶Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, 8.

groups, used force to cause internal political change. This was not the case in Senegal where the military views its role as primarily focused on external threats, excluding of course the ongoing conflict in the Casamance. Interestingly, Gardner argues that in the aftermath of World War II, and in the face of ongoing challenges in Uganda, the British suffered from a paucity of imagination, knowledge, and understanding of what was taking place. He charges that officials like John Hall deluded himself when he said that he wielded a great deal of power over his Ugandan subjects when in reality this was not the case.²⁸⁷

Historical understanding is critical as the Army approaches this next decade of military partnerships. As argued, the origins and traditions of the present-day armed forces of ex-colonial Africa may be traced to the establishment of colonial rule in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The only way to truly understand partner militaries in Africa is to have an appreciation for the colonial history and dynamics that shaped their institutional development.²⁸⁸ As the foregoing case studies prove, given limited resources, the United States simply cannot afford to suffer from a paucity of understanding with regard to regional alignment. The historical record is rich with highly applicable and useful insights with which to approach this new challenge and opportunity.

²⁸⁷Thompson, *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy*, 8.

²⁸⁸Omara-Otunnu, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*, 7.

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