

Operational Design and Convergent Threats: A Comparison Case Study of Plan Colombia and Afghanistan Aimed to Enhance the Fight against Narcotic-Funded Insurgencies

A Monograph

by

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
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
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Abstract

OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND CONVERGENT THREATS: A COMPARISON CASE STUDY OF PLAN COLOMBIA AND AFGHANISTAN AIMED TO ENHANCE THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTIC-FUNDED INSURGENCIES by MAJ Brendan E. Sullivan, U.S. Army, 56 pages.

Due to the parallels between Colombia and Afghanistan facing narcotic funded insurgencies, Colombia offers insights into Afghanistan's future. The monograph compares case studies of campaigns in Colombia and Afghanistan. These case studies locate empirical, circumstantial, and anecdotal data through an ends, ways, and means framework that links areas of joint and interagency design theory to increased effectiveness opposing the convergence of crime, insurgency, and impunity. The monograph concludes with recommendations to increase the use of effective elements from campaigns in Colombia and Afghanistan in any further efforts against narcotic-funded insurgencies.

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ACRONYMS

ACI	Andean Counterdrug Initiative
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
AUC	United Self Defense Forces of Colombia
ASNF	Afghan Special Narcotics Force
CD	Counterdrug
CJIATF-	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Nexus
CN	Counternarcotic
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COG	Center of Gravity
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
ELN	Army of National Liberation
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GNP	Gross National Product
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
ICE	Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy
NDIC	National Drug Intelligence Center
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Develop Program
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WOG	Whole of Government

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Introduction

Combating transnational criminal and trafficking networks requires a multidimensional strategy that safeguards citizens, breaks the financial strength of criminal and terrorist networks, disrupts illicit trafficking networks, defeats transnational criminal organizations, fights government corruption, strengthens the rule of law, bolsters judicial systems, and improves transparency. While these are major challenges, the United States will be able to devise and execute a collective strategy with other nations facing the same threats.¹

—President Barack Obama

The convergence of crime, insurgency, and impunity is a growing concern for the United States. In the past decades, the interactions between these threats are increasing.² Additionally, the expanded links between criminal syndicates, insurgent groups, and government impunity increases United States' vulnerability to a wide range of security challenges.³ Threats posed by a crime-insurgency-impunity nexus are particularly challenging, as the scale and nature of their cooperation vary widely and limited anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for current understanding of the problem. United States' efforts to combat convergent threats are a subset of broader policy responses to crime, insurgency, and impunity individually.⁴ While effective in the context of an idiosyncratic threat, a lack of unified strategy fails to consider the possible conflicts between objectives by varying agencies combating crime, insurgency, and impunity, best overarching approaches to pursue convergent threats, and gaps between interagency analysis and efforts. The thesis question of this monograph is: does fusing civilian and military capabilities, rooted in operational design under a unified strategy, increase the operational

¹ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy, May 2010* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010): 1.

² Barack Obama, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011): 6. The Department of Justice reports that 29 of the 63 organizations on its FY 2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most significant international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) threatening the United States, were associated with terrorist groups.

³ See Appendix A for definition of impunity.

⁴ Department of Justice and National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2011* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 1. Also see *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011*, 6.

effectiveness against the convergent threats of narcotics trade and insurgency while reducing impunity?

While numerous United States' strategies, organizations, and programs are designed to combat crime and insurgency separately, these often do not effectively address the confluence of these two threats. These strategies must also bolster foreign government's capacity to shape the environmental conditions and prevent root causes that foster malicious partnerships. This monograph advocates for increased unified operational capabilities against the convergent threats of crime, insurgency, and impunity, across governmental agencies rooted in the practices of operational design and operational art. This approach leads to increased effectiveness of United States forces to combat the convergent threats. Importantly, the strategic aims of such practices are not to abolish crime, insurgency, or impunity but to fracture the relationship between these threats that present challenges to United States' national security. Our national objectives are to reduce transnational organized crime from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem in the United States and in strategic regions around the world.⁵ The strategic aims should also alleviate operational gaps through joint and interagency efforts, not through additional laws, expanded authority, or expanded resources but rather through shared understanding of the environment and practicing unified action against the convergent threat.

The *USA PATRIOT Act*, the *Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, the *USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005*, and appropriations-related legislation through the Congress for various United States agencies, including the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense Legislation, expanded agency authorities, resources,

⁵ Barack Obama, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011* (Washington, DC.: Government Printing Office, 2011), 6.

and responsibilities.⁶ However, this monograph focuses on the joint and interagency operational campaigns previously established against the confluence of crime, insurgencies, and impunity. The two international case studies, Colombia and Afghanistan illustrate the crime-insurgency-impunity convergence and variances in perspectives, including the strategies to combat these threats under joint and interagency campaigns. The foundation of this monograph will use an ends, ways, and means framework and select operational design elements to develop its argument. The methodology demonstrates the complex relationships between crime, insurgency, and impunity and assist in developing holistic approaches to combat their effects.⁷

The blending of crime and insurgency will continue. There are varying motivations for insurgent groups to adopt crime, however, the most overarching motive is money to sustain and grow the organization and finance ideological-based activities.⁸ Out of this sense of perceived need, insurgencies such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia rely heavily on partnering with criminal syndicates for continued viability and survival.⁹ Over time, these insurgent groups have become increasingly motivated by the lucrative nature of their illicit financing activities and transform from a group that is mainly ideological to one that is profit-driven. This monograph explores the fight over legitimacy, which requires political capital to remain viable and views illicit sources of funding as enabling such groups to

⁶ Congressional Research Service, *International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 18 March, 2010, 51. See Appendix A for definitions of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. USA PATRIOT is a ten letter backronym from Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. See definition for interagency authorities including, the Department of Homeland Security, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance program,

⁷ HQs, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 5-0, Change 1, Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 3-2.

⁸ Congressional Research Service, *International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress* (Washington, D.C, Government Printing Office, 18 March, 2010), 51.

⁹ Richard Barrett, "The Economic Crisis: Al-Qaeda's Response," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Policy watch #1485*, March 9, 2009. See Appendix A for definitions of Taliban and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

expand and prolong their longevity.¹⁰ This is observed in Plan Colombia, the Government of Colombia response to the challenging their by drawing struggling populations into the cocaine trade. This is also observed in the case study of Afghanistan in which the Taliban reversed their Islamic ideology against opium to procure funds for their insurgency. This monograph also examines the fight over security and lessons learned in operational design from varying organizational perspectives that combat the violence used by these asymmetrical threats.

There are common motives and disincentives for insurgencies to partner with criminal syndicates.¹¹ Criminal syndicates are motivated by a desire for access to illicit funds, which outweighs the potential risks associated with the perceived support for the ideological aims of insurgent groups. In the cases of Colombia and Afghanistan, criminal networks, particularly those more loosely organized than traditionally hierarchical organizations, have become ideologically radicalized and actively pursue operations that will not only result in lucrative illicit profits but also further the goals of the insurgent group.¹² However, there are also common disincentives for insurgent groups and criminal syndicates partnering, which included increased attention from government authorities, fear of compromising internal organizational security, ideological resistance to illicit endeavors, such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, and fraud, and potential loss of sources of non-criminal funding from charities, large private donors, and state sponsors.¹³ Notably, a group that initially avoids involvement with criminal syndicates may change its position at a later point if original funding sources are eliminated, or if other opportunities present themselves. These disincentives are among the primary reasons why the

¹⁰ Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, "The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance," *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2004): 51.

¹¹ Congressional Research Service, *International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress* (Washington, DC.: Government Printing Office, 2010), 6.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

core leadership of international terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda in Afghanistan are not partnered with transnational criminal networks.¹⁴ This too can change. In contrast, the Taliban, who lacked external funding for their ideologies rely on funding from drug trafficking.

Facing similar challenges of crime-insurgency-impunity in Afghanistan; the United States formulated current Afghanistan strategy from both the successes and failures in South America.¹⁵ However, some operational mistakes and logical fallacies were repeated, for example, crop eradication was used in both Colombia and Afghanistan, which fueled increased violence. However, the current counternarcotic strategy in Afghanistan phased out eradication, and emphasizes the interdiction of drug shipments and encouraging farmers to adopt alternate crops.¹⁶ The Department of State counternarcotic strategy for Afghanistan also fuses counternarcotic capabilities into a civilian-military campaign plan. The strategic intent of this current policy is to fracture the links among the Afghan narcotics industry and Afghan insurgencies, and decrease the amount of impunity in the Afghanistan government. This policy change was followed by the creation of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat.¹⁷ This multi-agency task force provides a much-needed operational capability between the strategy

¹⁴ Congressional Research Service, *International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 6.

¹⁵ HQs, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1. The rapid evolution in the U.S. counterinsurgency theories was embodied by Gen. David Petraeus's 2006 Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Also see Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-07.04 Counter Drug Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarter Department of Defense, 2007), II-2. The lead agency for counternarcotic operations is the Department of State. "The DOS is the lead federal agency for the coordination of US international illegal drug supply reduction strategies. Through United States ambassadors and the country teams, the DOS executes programs designed to increase the PN's CD resolve and capabilities. The INL is the organization within the DOS responsible for developing and implementing international initiatives in support of the NDCS."

¹⁶ United States Department of State, "United States Counternarcotic Strategy for Afghanistan March 2010." <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141756.pdf> (accessed September 6, 2011). "Goal 1: Counter the link between narcotics and the insurgency and significantly reducing the support the insurgency receives from the narcotics industry and Goal 2: Address the narcotics-corruption nexus and reinforce the government of Afghanistan."

¹⁷ See Appendix A for definition of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat.

led by the Department of State and the counternarcotic operations conducted in Afghanistan.¹⁸ The Department of State tasked Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat to collect intelligence, conduct targeting, and fuse civilian-military capabilities in support of multifaceted operations. This organization recognizes the complexity of convergent threats and the interdependent relationship of the components of modern conflict. However, developing an integrated approach rooted in design theory in Afghanistan took over a decade, despite the example of the government having faced a similar threat in Colombia. These lessons cannot be lost given the likelihood of similar conflicts in the future.

Parallels of Colombia and Afghanistan

Two nations share many tribulations on the wars against convergence of crime and insurgency. Worldwide, Colombia is the largest supplier of cocaine and Afghanistan is the largest supplier of heroin. The drug trafficking networks behind the Colombian and Afghan drug trades are complex nodes of national and international organizations and individuals.¹⁹ Both, Colombia and Afghanistan are also vulnerable to multiple insurgent groups that finance their fight from proceeds of the drug trade. In Colombia, these insurgents are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Army of National Liberation (ELN), and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).²⁰ In Afghanistan, these insurgents are the Taliban, and Haqqani network.²¹ Both countries also have impoverished rural populations and weak economies that are easily enticed into drug trafficking. The insurgencies and farmers

¹⁸ United States Department of State, *Report to Congress on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*. November, 2010. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf (accessed 6 November, 2011), 84.

¹⁹ Antoine Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 173. “The nebulous characteristic of the term (complexity) reflects in part the fact it covers broad field of enquiry into non-linear dynamic systems rather than denoting a clearly defined scientific theory.”

²⁰ See Appendix A for definitions of the Army of National Liberation (ELN), and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

²¹ See Appendix A for definitions of Taliban and Haqqani network.

participating in drug trades are diverse groups and individuals with similar interests but different motivations.²² Whether or not these varying groups actually cooperate, drug farmers, drug traffickers, terrorists, and insurgents have a common interest in weak government.²³ Drug smugglers and criminal syndicates will evade and/or corrupt government to mobilize people and resources in the drug trade.²⁴

This monograph uses a framework of ends, ways, and means to examine lessons that exist under a unified strategy that seeks “to build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security.”²⁵ Observing through the case studies of Colombia and Afghanistan, the initial campaign designs and objectives lacked unified action, failed to integrate operational design, and initially focused heavily on either the counternarcotic effort, or the counterinsurgency effort. Initially each campaign lacked a whole of government approach that collectively targeted decisive points and balanced the campaign in order to collectively shape the operational environment. However in each case, over time, these approaches gravitated to a whole of government response in order to counter the gaps exploited by the convergence of these multifaceted threats. Furthermore, it took time to design a holistic response against a convergent of threats that already implemented a collective emergent strategy in areas of mutual interest leading to a nexus of narcotics and insurgency. These narcotic-funded insurgencies capitalized on opportunities in gaps in time and interagency collaborations. The threats quickly adapted to unilateral approaches. If the majority of the effort is placed on increased security, the threat adapts warfare to the fight over legitimacy

²² Frank Shanty, *The Nexus: International Terrorism and Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan* (New York: Praeger Security International, 2011), 6.

²³ *Ibid.* 8.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 6.

²⁵ Barack Obama, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 1.

through criminal syndicates. If too much effort is placed on legitimacy the threat adapts warfare against security through paramilitary arms.

Semblance between the threat of narcotic funded insurgencies in Colombia and Afghanistan led to calls for exporting elements from Plan Colombia to Afghanistan.²⁶ Admiral Mike Mullen commented on this comparison saying: “The counterinsurgency approach; the providing security for the people; the need for governance upon which the people can depend, not just national governance, but local governance; the ability to create jobs and opportunities for people who feel secure in those jobs are fundamentals that apply here [Colombia] and apply in Afghanistan.”²⁷ Others criticize the comparison, citing that since the inception of Plan Colombia in 2000, the strategy failed to reduce drug production in Colombia, or end a half-century of civil conflict.²⁸ The same critics caution exporting elements of Plan Colombia's given this negligible performance against both the collective nature of insurgencies and drug trafficking.²⁹

A principal point of contention of Plan Colombia and Afghanistan are whether counter drug efforts are enough to turn the tide against insurgencies. On one end of the debate, Plan Colombia and Afghanistan underscored the need for multifaceted campaigns with access to a full range of assets, both civilian and military, in order to pursue both increased security and legitimacy. On the other end of the debate are the realities of domestic politics and political aversion to supporting ambiguous conflicts. Crossing the line into counterinsurgency versus counternarcotic is not an easy step to take. There are also different perspectives and biases in

²⁶ Stephen Johnson, “Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency,” April 26, 2001. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2001/04/Helping-Colombia-Fix-Its-Plan> (accessed October 31, 2011).

²⁷ ADM Mike Mullen, “Press Conference with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Colombian Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, and Colombian Military Forces Commander General Freddy Padilla,” (March 5, 2009). <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1139> (accessed October 31, 2011).

²⁸ Zachary P. Mugge. “Plan Colombia: The Environmental Effects and Social Costs of the United States' Failing War on Drugs,” *Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy*, (2004), 309.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 309.

organization decision-making caused by political and social beliefs.³⁰ However, from an operational design perspective the challenges are: what objectives, end states, and conditions should be established against narcotic-funded insurgencies? What is the center of gravity, decisive point(s), and operational design practices that best fracture the convergent threat? What capabilities, resources, and force mix are best suited to combat narcotic-funded insurgencies?³¹

Methodology

The methodologies selected for this monograph are case studies of ends, way, and means observed within the strategic historical contexts of Colombia and Afghanistan.³² The case study method provides the ability to deal with a variety of evidence, documents, perspectives, and observations. These case studies will locate empirical, circumstantial, and even anecdotal data that link areas of design theory in Plan Colombia and Afghanistan to increased effectiveness opposing the nexus of crime, insurgency, and impunity.³³ These case studies are examined through the ends, ways, and means framework using select elements of operational design and operational art. The ends will examine the objectives, end states, and conditions designed to fracture the links between crime and insurgency, as well as decreasing overall drug production and violence. The ways will examine the centers of gravity, decisive points, and operational

³⁰ Daniel W. Drezner, *Theories of International Politics and Zombies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 33. These varied organizations biases and prospective add to the complexity in our present political relationships with the world. Internationally, these doctrines also lead to some polarizing views of the United States. These policies employ a mix of prominent international relations theories including realism, liberalism, constructivism, neo-conservatism, and bureaucratic politics.

³¹ Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy* (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005), 4. “Strategists will instead search for the right questions; those to which the panorama of answers provides insight and spurs ever more questions. No solutions are in this construct, only working hypothesis that the strategist knows that can be proven false or tossed aside.”

³² Colin S Gray, *War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 4. “The themes are historical continuity and discontinuity, the relationship between politics and war, the relationship between war and warfare; the relationship between politicians and soldiers; the interdependent of war and society; and the relationship between war and peace; peace and war. The contexts of strategic history are political; sociocultural; economic; technological; military-technological; geographical; and historical”

³³ Frank Shanty, *The Nexus: International Terrorism and Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan* (New York: Praeger Security International, 2011), 44.

design against the ends. The means will examine overall capabilities including law enforcement, military forces, and government capacity such as legal resources and jails, and the force mixture of interagency and joint efforts. The conclusion will follow from the evidence presented and recommends the use of effective lessons in operational elements from Colombia in the civilian-military counternarcotic-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan and future campaigns.³⁴

³⁴ Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 8. Operational art seeks to identify strategic objectives, visualize the theater of operations, and determine the sequence of military actions, organization, battles, logistics, and command arrangements in order to achieve operational objectives.

Section 1: Case Study Colombia

Colombia's weak state is beset with a complex interaction of violence and corruption from the terrorist left and right, as well as the workings of international organized crime that prospers on the movement of illicit narcotics. At stake for the United States and the hemispheric community is the security of the immediate Andean and adjacent areas. Given the region's worsening economic situation and the fragility of democratic institutions, the strategic denial of Latin America is taking shape.³⁵

—Gabriel Marcella

Overview

Colombia was a highly favorable environment for drug traffickers, crime, corruption, and insurgency to thrive.³⁶ Colombia faced three narcotic funded insurgencies, two leftist groups the FARC and ELN, and the rightist group the AUC. These insurgencies preyed on Colombia by developing the drug trade and shaping the operational environment slowly over time.

Throughout the 1980s and into the mid-1990s, these insurgencies levied a tax on the harvesters and buyers of cocaine that was cultivated and sold in the territory they controlled within their sphere of impunity. Drug traffickers paid the insurgencies to protect their processing laboratories from government forces and to use their airfields.

As a basis for peace negotiation, the Colombian government provided the FARC with superficial control over 42,000 square kilometers in the southern Cauqueta region.³⁷ The FARC and ELN controlled 30-40 percent of Colombia.³⁸ With impunity and territorial haven free from government interference, the FARC turned the territory into a massive drug network.³⁹ In 2000,

³⁵ Gabriel Marcella, "Plan Colombia: The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity" (Monograph, The Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 1. See Figure 1 for map of Colombia.

³⁶ Michael Deal, Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 2001. <http://bogota.usembassy.gov/testimony6.html> (accessed 8 November 2011). Hereafter cited as Deal, "Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee," 1.

³⁷ CNN, "Colombia extends rebel land-for-peace deal," 4 December, 1999. Available <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/farc/extends.html> (accessed January 18, 2012).

³⁸ Ana Carrigan, "Colombia's Best Chance," *The Nation*, January 21, 1999, 2.

³⁹ Deal, "Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee," 1. The State Department's Agency for International Development estimates there are 18,000 small family farms that cultivate about 90,000 acres of coca.

the FARC's membership totaled 18,000 with an estimated half being armed combatants, and the other half made up of plainclothes militia who provide intelligence or logistical support.⁴⁰ The United Nations estimated that the FARC's average annual income was \$342 million of which \$204 million came from the drug trade.⁴¹ The convergence of operational failures against the insurgency and the rapid expansion in the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics pointed to a potential failed state. These convergent threats presented serious challenges to United States' national security.

Colombia became responsible for 75% of the world's cocaine production and 90% of the cocaine entering the United States. In 2000, when Plan Colombia was executed, the United States experienced 50,000 drug related deaths and \$160 billion in economic losses due to the illicit drug trade.⁴² The insurgencies based in Colombia were financed from the narcotics industry, kidnapping, and extortion, and threatened United States citizens' economic interests. With economic losses of \$160 billion to the United States and \$2.5 billion in Colombia corruption the United States aid to Colombia of \$1.3 billion would survive any cost benefit analysis. Furthermore, the FARC and ELN kidnapped fifty-one United States citizens and killed ten between 1992 and 2000.⁴³ During 2001, the FARC and ELN were responsible for the vast majority of the terrorist attacks that killed 3,000 Colombians. Beyond drug trafficking, terrorism, illegal arms smuggling, and other criminal activities, there are broad and important United States' national interests in Colombia that include stability in the Andean Region, trade, immigration, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and protection of environment.

⁴⁰ John Otis, "Colombia's Guerrillas: The Rebellion That Would Not Die," *Time*, 16 July, 2011.

⁴¹ Congressional Research Service, *Plan Colombia: A Progress Report*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 1.

⁴² United States Department of State, *A Report to Congress on United States Policy towards Colombia and Other Related Issues*, February 3, 2003, 3. <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rpt/17140.htm> (accessed March 15, 2012).

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Colombia harbored multiple drug cartels that operated out of Cali, North Valle, and North Coast. One of the most notorious drug cartels was the Cali Cartel based in the city of Cali, Colombia. The Cali drug trade network orchestrated the manufacture of hundreds of tons of cocaine in Colombia in the early 1980s, which then moved through the Caribbean and Mexico to the United States.⁴⁴ By the early 1990s, the Cali drug cartel was responsible for approximately 80 percent of the world's cocaine supply. Actions taken by United State and Colombian authorities led to the surrender of many of its leaders dismantling of the Cali drug and fracturing the cartel's trafficking infrastructure. However, it took years of investigation and preparation by Colombian and international law enforcement to disrupt the narcotic empires. Shortly after the counternarcotic only approach that dismantled of the Cali Drug Cartel, the North Valle drug cartel rose to power in the 1990s filling the void left by the Cali drug Cartel. The reconstitution of this drug network is a prime example of how adaptive complex systems resist linear causality solutions by regenerating its behavior autonomously.⁴⁵ North Valle began as a splinter group of the Cali drug cartel following the arrest of Cali drug cartel leaders. Through its brutal tactics and affiliations with insurgent organizations such as the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the North Valle drug cartel exported over 500 tons of cocaine, worth an estimated \$10 billion, to the United States via Mexico between 1990 and 2004.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Economic Sanctions Against Colombian Drug Cartels," March 2007, 12. Available from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/narco_impact_report_05042007.pdf (accessed November 11, 2011).

⁴⁵ Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for Designing Business Architecture. 2nd edition* (New York: Elsevier, 2006), 123. "Self-organizing, purposeful, socio-cultural systems must be self-evolving in order to be viable. They cannot passively adapt to their environments but should co-evolve with them. They should be able to change the rules of interaction as they evolve over time."

⁴⁶ Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Economic Sanctions Against Colombian Drug Cartels," March 2007, 12. Available from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/narco_impact_report_05042007.pdf (accessed November 11, 2011). In 2004, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) described the North Valle drug cartel as the largest and most powerful drug cartel in Colombia and stated that the North Valle drug cartel was responsible for one-third to one-half of the cocaine that reached the United States.

ENDS: Objectives, End States, Conditions

Frustrated by the failure of years of a counternarcotic only approach, the United States adopted a more comprehensive approach to Colombia's deeply rooted and complex security problem. Factors that drove this change included the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and as well as the convergence of crime and violence of the insurgents that threatened the state and society in Colombia. The Plan Colombian strategy evolved as a result of the perceived risk from the impunity of weak states and ungoverned spaces, factors that also allowed Al Qaeda to plan their astonishing attacks from Afghanistan. The objectives of Plan Colombia included expanding the size of the police and armed forces to provide security; conducting aggressive eradication of illicit narcotics; mobilizing people, money, and programs to reestablish the effective presence and services of the state across the national territory; building international support to isolate the terrorists and control international borders; and developing a more comprehensive relationship with the United States.⁴⁷ Two major end states of the Colombian government were to halve the cocaine production and end the armed conflict that had beleaguered the country for more than 40 years.

Plan Colombia had modest accomplishments but ultimately fell short of achieving the strategic aims of halving cocaine production and ending Colombia's forty year-long civil war. The campaign moderately decreased overall cocaine production, enhanced Colombian capacity to interdict drugs, and decreased economic dependency on cocaine. Overall, this amounted to fracturing some of the links between crime and insurgency which led to overall increases in

⁴⁷ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy, September 2002* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 3. "In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenges the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective sovereignty over the entire national territory and to provide basic security to the Colombian people."

security. However, the operational and logical approach of massive forced eradication campaigns targeted only a fraction of Colombian coca farms and fueled further violence throughout Colombian major cities. Plan Colombia could have accomplished more to effectively target the criminal and insurgency links and the root causes of the partnerships.

WAYS: Center of Gravity, Decisive Points, Operational Design

Foremost, combined civilian and military efforts must correctly identify the center of gravity of a narcotic-funded insurgency.⁴⁸ The Colombian government argued that the operational center of gravity was the FARC and the strategic center of gravity was legitimacy. Furthermore, the Colombian government saw their friendly strategic center of gravity as security and the operational center of gravity as the Colombia Ministry of Defense. The Colombian Ministry of Defense is responsible for the guidelines, design, and execution of national defense. Their mission and strategic objectives were to maintain national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order and ensure the conditions necessary for the free exercise of rights, duties, and public liberties.

The Colombian Ministry of Defense changed the military's approach to doctrine in support of Plan Colombia. The Ministry of Defense abandoned the military operations other than war doctrine, with its division of conflict into war and military operations other than war.⁴⁹ The revised Colombian approach enabled the emergence of a new holistic and direct approach against the FARC. Previously, the Colombian government characterized the FARC as a problem of public order, a criminal organization that involved a law enforcement response. However, the FARC developed into an insurgency movement capable of massing units to seize towns. The

⁴⁸ See Appendix A for definitions of center of gravity.

⁴⁹ Thomas A. Marks, "Colombia: Learning Institutions Enable Integrated Response," *PRISM 1*, no. 4, September 2010, 127.

FARC operated as a Mao doctrine based insurgency using People's War doctrine to advance on multiple lines of effort with the ultimate objective of seizing power in Colombia.⁵⁰ Therefore, in order to achieve decisive action against the FARC, Colombia required a broader integrated response that also aimed at combating the FARC insurgency at new decisive points.⁵¹

Plan Colombia marked a shift in United States strategy for dealing with the complexity of a foreign nation faced with a narcotic-funded insurgency.⁵² Rather than tackling Colombia's drug industry and insurgency separately, Plan Colombia eventually became one of the first campaigns targeting the drug trade and insurgency nexus at a new decisive point. Plan Colombia's decisive point was to gain an advantage over this nexus by curbing narcotics trafficking in Colombia through a comprehensive approach that also included reforming the justice system, fostering social development, stimulating economic growth, and advancing security. However, the approach also included a forced eradication campaign designed to directly target the funding source for the FARC insurgency. The eradication aspect of the campaign betrayed a reductionist linear view of the narcotic funded insurgency threat. This increased operational capability was critical, but the forced eradication approach was flawed. The FARC capitalized on the flawed design of eradication by framing the fight as an attack on economic opportunity. In doing so the FARC expanded the drug trade so rapidly that the narcotic operations temporarily surpassed insurgent activities in importance and scope.⁵³

The operational design behind Plan Colombia was very simple; operational center of

⁵⁰ See Appendix A for definitions of Mao doctrine and People's War doctrine.

⁵¹ See Appendix A for definition of decisive point.

⁵² Peter DeShazo, "Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State." (Monograph, The Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 14. Before Plan Colombia, 85 percent of the counternarcotic budget of the United States focuses on demand reduction at home. United States' policy evolved from a strictly counternarcotics focus to support for Colombia's fight against IAGs. In 2002, the Administration requested, and Congress approved, expanded authority to use U.S. counternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations in Colombia.

⁵³ Sibylla Brodzinsky, "Colombia's FARC Rebels Kill Governor, Prompting Calls for Security Shift," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 23, 2009.

gravities of security and legitimacy were directly linked. Interdicting drug money reduced the capacity of all three insurgent groups, thereby reducing the level of violence. However, the approach also recognized the need to reenergize the economy, restore civil society and social order to promote legitimacy. Plan Colombia effectively addressed the holistic system of threats through a shared understanding and framework, balance, and integration to influence the outcome. Ultimately, the unified strategy rooted in design practices enhanced the fight against both the insurgent network and the criminal network, while strengthening government.

MEANS: Capability, Resources, and Force Mix

At the start of Plan Colombia, the Colombian armed forces had little operational reach and little mobility with about one third (50,000 soldiers) from the Colombian military, defending fixed installations.⁵⁴ Thirteen percent defended critical infrastructure points, such as bridges, roads, communications networks, oil, electrical installations, and airports. Additionally, five percent were border guards. Therefore, less than half of the standing military was available for any other military operation such as counternarcotic missions.⁵⁵ To implement Plan Colombia's counternarcotic military component, the Colombian army created three new counter-narcotics battalions.⁵⁶ The new counter-narcotics battalions had modern equipment unlike regular battalions, making them lucrative targets for the insurgency.⁵⁷ Extending the operation reach of

⁵⁴ Rand Corporation, "The Colombian Armed Forces," (Monograph, The Rand Corporation, 2000), 103. The budget for Colombia's military and police was \$2.5 US billion or 3.56 percent of Colombian GDP and it has not changed substantially over the past decade.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 102.

⁵⁶ Gabriel Marcella, "Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives." (Monograph, The Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 14. "Another strategic reality is that no other nation is willing and able to provide Colombia with the full helicopter package: equipment, training, and maintenance."

⁵⁷ Peter Chalk and Angel Rabasa, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 103. "The new doctrine emphasizes mobility and a shift from a defensive posture to offensive posture. To implement Plan Colombia's counternarcotic military component, the army is creating three new counternarcotic battalions that are at the heart of the plan's military component. The new counternarcotic battalions will be more proficient than regular battalions but will also present more lucrative targets for the guerillas."

the Colombian armed forces, in a manner equipped and trained to target the link between crime and insurgency was essential.⁵⁸ This was a critical capability to combat the FARC and ELN, whom appeared capable of defeating the Colombian military. The FARC and ELN paramilitary arms were capable of conducting combined attacks on small towns and isolated police stations. The convergent threat of crime and insurgency stretched the Colombian army's requirement making the increased operational capability and operational reach crucial to fracturing the link between the narcotic trade and the insurgency.

An additional capability shortfall was Colombia's judicial system which was weak and dysfunctional, with 95-98 percent of crimes committed going unpunished despite the fact that Colombia's judicial system allocation was the second highest percentage of a national budget, worldwide. The ineffectiveness was compounded by the lack of police presence in 247 of over 1,000 municipalities.⁵⁹ The lack of capacity for law enforcement was an invitation to the FARC, ELN, and AUC to converge crime and insurgency. Much of the impunity originated from the intimidation of judges and witnesses and some from the complexity of the system itself. The impunity also originated from the lack of operational capability, from a lack of police presence, and a stretched Colombian military. Strengthening both the military and police capacity was critical to fracturing the link between the cocaine trade and FARC insurgency.

Conclusions

The FARC develop institutionalized criminal structures rooted in the cocaine trade to complement their insurgency efforts. The FARC accomplished this by recruiting existing criminals into the organization, cultivating criminal skills, and combining crime and insurgency. The FARC designed their criminal activity as a secondary machine to achieve their political and

⁵⁸ See Appendix A for definition of operation reach.

⁵⁹ Peter Chalk and Angel Rabasa, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 103.

ideological aspirations morphing into a hybrid entity that is equal parts criminal and insurgency. By capitalizing on economic dependency on the drug trade, the FARC legitimizes their insurgency. This conundrum highlights an important strategic truth about the nature of the drug trades in Colombia and Afghanistan, namely that the amount of drug production and participation correlated directly with the level and approach to intervention. Understanding this aspect of the problem is important in applying elements of operational design. Understanding this correlation is also equally important when merging civilian and military capabilities to disrupt the narcotic-funded insurgency threat. Narcotic-funded insurgencies fought solely or singularly by counternarcotic assistance are doomed. The fight must include operational capabilities designed to simultaneously increase both security and economic opportunity without sacrificing legitimacy or political capital in order to disrupt the links between drug trafficking networks and insurgency.

The intellectual impetus for Plan Colombia eventually produced a Colombian national security strategy and ends, ways, and means in the fight against narcotic funded insurgencies. Plan Colombia became a foundation for linking the national military strategy and social and economic programs necessary to bring legitimacy and security to the people. The United States was instrumental in assisting Colombia through design planning and shared framework for the application of all the instruments of national power against the convergence of crime, insurgency, and impunity. There are substantial benefits for nations taking on these challenges. In Plan Colombia, a positive effect was the change of climate that fostered human rights abuse brought on by the aid to military police that allowed the Colombian government to investigate and prosecute those abuses in civilian courts. Colombia became the only Latin American country over the past decade to have significantly reduced violent crime. A lesson learned from Plan

Colombia was how in the matter of a few years the increased security improved economic conditions and vice versa. In 2003, the World Bank characterized Colombia as a middle income country, with per capita Gross National Product (GDP) of \$7,040. GDP growth was 3.5% and an inflation rate of 5.5%. The World Bank estimated that the drug trade only contributed between 2.0-2.5% of Colombia's annual GDP. In 2004, Colombia had the best performing stock market in the world. Colombian exports helped the economic situation, especially the benefits it received under the Andean Trade Promotion and Andean Counterdrug Initiative.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ See Appendix A for definition of Andean Counterdrug Initiative.

Section II: Case Study Afghanistan

Sooner or later it seems, all great powers have found themselves in Afghanistan, and their experience is replete with bitter resistance, harsh conditions, and failure. In contrast to its predecessors, the United States came not as a conqueror, but as a liberator. Equally unprecedented, the United States seeks to reinstitute Afghanistan as a fully sovereign and functioning state.⁶¹

—Raymond A. Millen

For the United States, Afghanistan is the contemporary challenge associated with the convergence of crime, insurgency, and impunity. Afghanistan illustrates the extreme difficulty of strengthening government in a country where an illicit economy constitutes the dominant economic sector. The illicit economy is made up of a multitude of actors across all segments of society insurgents, terrorists, tribes, government officials and representatives, and the rural population. As a result of this massive partnership, to date counter narcotics efforts are relatively ineffective as measured by trends in opium production, civilian ties to the Taliban, and levels of corruption generated at all levels of Afghanistan's government. Much of the internal dynamics of the nexus of crime and insurgency in Afghanistan is identical to the dynamics in Colombia. However, Afghanistan greatly surpasses Colombia in the size of the illicit economy, economic significance in terms of the number of people, and percentage of GDP. Afghanistan is in a region of far greater geostrategic significance for United States national interests.

The relationship between Afghanistan and the opium poppy has existed for thousands of years. However, it is only in the last decade that Afghanistan has cultivated an overwhelming majority of the world's opium and heroin. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 destabilized the country. Many warlords took over areas wrecked by Soviet troops and began looking for new ways to fund their rule. Afghan farmers quickly began cultivating opium for

⁶¹ Raymond A. Millen, "Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State" (Monograph, The Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005), iii. See Figure 2 for map of Afghanistan.

export. Cash-strapped farmers chose to grow opium because it sold for as much as \$50 per pound, many times more than other traditional crops, such as wheat, would earn.⁶² Also, pushing farmers toward the cultivation of poppies is the scarcity of water, since poppies consume less water than other crops. Farmers plant their reduced acreage with a high-value, water efficient crops in order to survive.⁶³

Afghanistan is a landlocked country, with rugged terrain, few natural resources, and an arid climate with harsh winters.⁶⁴ As one of the poorest countries in the world, its 31 million people have an average per capita income of just \$800, with 80 percent of its rural population living in poverty. The 2011 United Nations Development Program ranked Afghanistan number 216 of 220 countries, using a human development index, with Afghanistan near or at the bottom of virtually every development indicator including nutrition, infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy.⁶⁵ Drug cultivation migrated to areas most affected by the insurgency and the most insecure areas capable of producing it.

The opium trade grew until the mid-1990s when the Taliban rose to power and enforced a prohibition on opium cultivation through brutal means such as beatings and beheadings. The Taliban maintained this prohibition until the coalition invasion of Afghanistan after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks. The catalysts behind this increase include economic conditions set by ongoing warfare and civil violence, the historical absence of a legitimate

⁶² Sarah Cheyes, "Why Farmers Grow Poppies", *New York Times*, 20 July, 2006.
<http://chayes.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/07/20/why-farmers-grow-poppies/> (accessed 14 January, 2012).

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ James Risen, "U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 14 June 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html?no_interstitial (accessed February 6, 2012).
Geologists found indications of abundant deposits of colored stones and gemstones, including emerald, ruby, sapphire, garnet, lapis, kunzite, spinel, tourmaline and peridot. In 2010, U.S. Pentagon officials along with American geologists have revealed the discovery of nearly \$1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan. Plans are being made by the Afghan government to begin extracting these but with the Taliban insurgency and the corruption there is no telling what will happen.

⁶⁵ United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report, 2011,"
http://www.beta.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/human_developmentreport2011.html (accessed January 14, 2012).

centralized government, and the opportunity set by the first two elements leading to a shared mutual interest between the Taliban and the Afghan drug traffickers. Despite Afghanistan's remote location, this mutual interest has worldwide effects. Afghan opium and heroin kills 100,000 people every year worldwide, more than any other drug.⁶⁶ Fifteen million people around the world abuse heroin, opium, or morphine, fueling a \$65 billion market for the drug and also fueling further violence. This drug market allowed the Taliban to rise between \$450-\$600 million dollars over the past four years by taxing farmers or charging a protection fee to opium farmers and traffickers.⁶⁷ Not all the drug money is going into the pockets of rebels or drug dealers, some corrupt Afghan officials are making money off the drug trade as well.⁶⁸ As the primary source of revenue in Afghanistan, drug money is an incentive for impunity. The United States must continually adapt the ends, ways and means to support the main objectives; the legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of the Afghan people and protecting our national security interested.

Ends: Objectives, End State, Successes

In Plan Colombia there was a political aversion in the United States to supporting ambiguous conflicts, crossing the line into counterinsurgency versus counternarcotic assistance. In Afghanistan there was an opposite aversion to crossing from counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism into counter-narcotics. Undersecretary of Defense, Doug Feith, stated in a National Security Council meeting that since there was an underlying belief that counter-narcotics was not part of the war on terrorism, therefore the Department of Defense did not want to get involved in

⁶⁶ CNN, "World failing to dent heroin trade, U.N. warns," October 21, 2009. http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-21/world/un.heroin.trade_1_afghan-opium-heroin-fund-attacks?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed March 22, 2012).

⁶⁷ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, "World Drug Report, 2011," <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2011.html> (accessed March 15, 2012), 83.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 29.

counternarcotics.⁶⁹ The prevailing belief was to defeat the insurgency first.⁷⁰ In other words, counternarcotic operations should only be undertaken once a local government has full and firm control over its territory. Initially, the Department of Defense's campaign was a sequential approach that first attempted to defeat the terrorists and insurgents and only then focus on the elimination of the drug cultivation. The belief was by solely focusing on the center of gravity of security there was a much greater chance of success than simultaneously fighting both the insurgency and drug trade. The Department of Defense also assumed that counternarcotics operations would force the military to turn on the very same warlords who were aiding the United States against the Taliban, and that would lead to another round of violent attacks on American troops.⁷¹ However, this logical fallacy not only failed to disrupt the link between crime and insurgency, but paved the way for the drug trade to enable the insurgency's survival.⁷² The historical lessons learned of a holistic approach in the fight in Colombia were not initially brought to the fight in Afghanistan. However, in 2006, when the United States established an integrated campaign in Afghanistan, attempts to generate a holistic approach were also criticized, both politically and academically.⁷³ Since, counternarcotic suppression policies progressively intensified in Afghanistan from 2001-2011, these policies have not resulted in a substantial and sustainable reduction in the cultivation of opium poppies nor have counternarcotic policies

⁶⁹Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 183. In October 2006, after Afghanistan harvest 1000 metric tons of opium US Congressman Henry Hyde and US Congressman Mark Kirk express the need for a new policy that addressed drugs and terror simultaneously. This idea was rejected by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld over concerns it would turn into a costly drug war like Colombia and counternarcotics was seen as mission creep.

⁷⁰ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "A Better Strategy against Narcoterrorism," February 14, 2006. <http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking06/BetterStrategy.html> (accessed March 31, 2012).

⁷¹ Douglas Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*, (New York, New York: Harper Books, 2009), 305.

⁷² Stephen Gerras, "Thinking Critical about Critical Thinking: A Fundamental Guide for Strategic Leaders." August 2008. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/crit_thkg_gerras.pdf (accessed April 4, 2012).

⁷³ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "A Better Strategy against Narcoterrorism," February 14, 2006. <http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking06/BetterStrategy.html> (accessed March 31, 2012).

succeeded in curtailing the Taliban's drug income.

The strategy to combat the drug trade in Afghanistan frequently changed. In 2006, the strategy against the narcotic funded Taliban changed tides and coalition commanders were instructed to provide assistance to the local counternarcotic authorities. The counter narcotic strategy consists of five core objectives of varying emphasis over the decade long war. First, the campaign waged a public information campaign. The public information campaign asserts that the purpose of counternarcotic operations is to enhance the livelihoods of the people of Afghanistan. Second, United States' Department of State provided opium farmers with alternative livelihood opportunities through their redirection into legal employment. Third, the strategy focused on eradicating opium crops. The forced eradication campaign was designed to directly target the funding source for the Taliban insurgency. Again, as in Colombia, the forced eradication aspect of the campaign betrayed a reductionist linear view of the narcotic funded insurgency threat. Fourth the strategy focused on interdicting the flow of narcotics within and beyond Afghanistan. Finally, the counternarcotic efforts promoted justice reform initiatives aimed at enhancing the capacity of Afghan law enforcement agencies to prosecute major narcotics traffickers through their imprisonment or extradition.

In 2010, the overall Afghanistan strategy changed again. The current focus is on dismantling the links among insurgency, drugs, corruption, and criminality that plague the Afghan people. The four main objectives for the proposed Afghan strategy are defeating the insurgency, stability of governance, economic viability, and long-term marginalization of opium poppy production. The unified counterinsurgency strategy and counternarcotic strategy also seeks to reconnect the Afghan people to effective government institutions. The key challenges remains to disrupt drug profits and fracture the powerful drug networks that bankroll the

insurgency.⁷⁴ Most Afghanistan smuggling networks are run by close-knit families and tribes making them difficult to penetrate.⁷⁵ These drug networks appear to work with both insurgents and corrupt state actors. The drug networks' motives are profit, not religion or politics. From a counternarcotic perspective it takes time to fracture the drug networks. From a counterinsurgency perspective another major challenge is winning back the hearts and minds of Afghan villagers whose lives, and livelihoods have been decimated by the drug trade and the persistent cycle of violence toward the western coalition of forces.⁷⁶

Ways: Center of Gravity, Decisive Points, Operational Design

Winning the counterinsurgency fight while engaging in counter-narcotics fight requires acknowledging the transition from a predominantly narcotics-based economy to a licit one will take years.⁷⁷ However, Afghanistan must take decisive action to end warlord involvement in the narcotics trade and fracture the partnership with insurgency. Understanding and managing transitions is one of the primary goals of United States Army design methodology.⁷⁸ It is not possible to win the consent of communities to state authority while treating their livelihoods as criminal. Escalating forced eradication does not speed this transition.⁷⁹ Depriving rural communities of their livelihoods before alternatives are available recruits support for the insurgency. Effort to help Afghan communities gradually to move out of dependence on the drug

⁷⁴ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 183.

⁷⁵ Gretchen Peters, "How Opium Profits the Taliban," August 2009, 26. http://www.usip.org/files/resources/taliban_opium_1.pdf (accessed March 20, 2012).

⁷⁶ See Appendix A for definition of hearts and minds.

⁷⁷ Barnett R. Rubin, and Jake Sherman, "Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication," Center on International Cooperation, New York University, February 2008, 6

⁷⁸ HQs, United State Army. *Field Manual 5-0, Change 1, Operations*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 3-1.

⁷⁹ Barnett R. Rubin and Jake Sherman, *Ibid.*, 6.

trade without being stigmatized as criminals during the transition will more effectively integrate counternarcotics with counterinsurgency objectives.⁸⁰

The center of gravity in Afghanistan changed from security to both security and legitimacy. The initial strategy focused solely on security and defeating the Taliban. Unable to confront the overwhelming force of the United States and coalition forces the Taliban turned to the narcotics trade for survival. In 2006, the strategy implement forced eradication and greatly resembled that of Plan Colombia. However, the Afghan government's destruction of poppy fields was too random to be effective and only served to strengthen the partnership between Afghan drug farmers and the Taliban.⁸¹ This would serve as another catalyst for change in strategy in 2010 with the requirement to fracture this malicious partnership.

Means: Capability, Resources, Force Mix

In October 2010, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat was established comprising of three subordinate task forces, Task Force Spotlight, Task Force 2010, and Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Nexus. Through the efforts of these organizations, Afghanistan and coalition forces have gained a better understanding of the nexus of crime and insurgency. The creation of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat leverages capabilities, resources, and force mix into a holistic approach.⁸² This integrated approach allows Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat to collectively attack and protect the operational centers of gravity of security and legitimacy. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat is critical to refining and improving existing methods of applying operational art,

⁸⁰ Barnett R. Rubin and Jake Sherman, "Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan," 6.

⁸¹ Ibid, 7.

⁸² Department of Defense. *Report on the Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April, 2011, 78.

operational design, and sequencing lines of effort under unified action. Each joint and interagency component of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat brings fundamental differences not only on the nature and role of counternarcotic and counterinsurgency but on the perspectives of the regions, the struggles, and the challenges. This diversity and discourse balances the campaign efforts and offers a more complete understanding, visualization, description, and direction.

In cooperation with all coalition partners, the United States government provides support to the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy and assistance to the Afghanistan's Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defense. Afghanistan's now has 125,589, Afghan national police and 141,038 Afghan national army.⁸³ The Department of State has built six police academies and law enforcement agencies became more professional through better vetting of recruits, greater salaries, and adequate equipment. However, Afghanistan is made up of 34 provinces, 300 districts, and over 30,000 villages.⁸⁴ Despite the emergence of democracy, the country never had a strong central government.⁸⁵ Village, tribal, and regional leaders tend to have significant influence over the local population. Some of these drug trade leaders even have their own militias. These drug trade leaders hold high political offices within the Afghanistan government, including provincial governorships. Due to the central government's weakness and dependency on the opium economy, the Afghan national police and Afghan national army have not been effectively employed against the decisive points of counternarcotic fight in many remote and drug dependent areas.

⁸³ Department of Defense, *Report on the Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 21-30.

⁸⁴ U.S. General Accountability Office, "Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals," (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, November 2006), 5.

⁸⁵ John A Glaze, "Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy" (Monograph, The Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 2.

Conclusions

The United States often undermined its own efforts in Afghanistan, due to the changing and lack of unified strategies. The United States strategy in Afghanistan also failed to build consensus among agencies and the international community. Modern counternarcotic or counterinsurgency campaigns are about understanding what paradoxical and/or linear relationships exist in war. The strategy in pursuit of security against the insurgency failed to capture the hearts and minds of the Afghan people in pursuit of legitimacy. The violence and misery has made the Taliban deeply unpopular in the south and southwest and nationwide polls indicate that they and other extremist groups have little support.⁸⁶ However, neither the Afghan government nor coalition forces are well respected especially in the violence-wracked south. The strategy ultimately has failed to fracture the links between insurgents and criminals.

The initial Afghanistan campaign strategy was centered on the false assumption that the counterdrug efforts undermine the far more important anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan. The growing of opium poppies remains a large part of Afghanistan's economy and roughly half of the country's annual gross domestic product. The greatest challenge remains weaning Afghanistan off of the opium based economy. However, this presents the current Afghanistan conundrum, limiting the production of opium increases both the price of opium and funding source of narcotic funded insurgencies. For poor Afghan farmers, growing opium poppies is the difference between prosperity and destitution. If the farmer's livelihoods are destroyed without any alternatives in place there is a serious risk that these farmers will turn against the United States and undermining both the legitimacy and any popular support for the Afghanistan government.

⁸⁶ United States Institute of Peace, "Hearts and Minds: Afghan Opinion on the Taliban, the Government and the International Forces," August 2007. <http://www.usip.org/publications/hearts-and-minds-afghan-opinion-taliban-government-and-international-forces> (accessed January 7, 2012).

The creation of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat enables the coalition to confront this conundrum of drug trade, insurgency, and impunity while supporting the Afghan Government. Furthermore, the Afghanistan national police and Afghan national army is the embodiment of the central government and have the greatest potential in connecting citizens with the central government. The United States continues to develop this Afghan Government capacity and balance its efforts with international law enforcement agencies in the conduct of counternarcotic operations and in support of comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. This increased capacity should continue to target network functions that drive the malicious partnerships between the drug trade and insurgency. This objective is critical to disrupting the network resiliency. Furthermore, this can only be achieved through a whole of government approach, such as Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat that targets network functions aiming to fracture the nexus of narcotics and insurgency. This capability is critical to both law enforcement investigations and military operations.

Section III: Lessons in Ends, Ways, and Means

The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime applies all elements of national power to protect citizens and U.S. national security interests from the convergence of 21st century transnational criminal threats. This Strategy is organized around a single unifying principle: to build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security and to urge our foreign partners to do the same. The end-state we seek is to reduce transnational organized crime (TOC) from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem in the United States and in strategic regions around the world.⁸⁷

—President Barack Obama

The strategies to combat narcotics funded insurgencies, such as in Colombia and Afghanistan, have varied greatly on the highly debatable assumptions. For example, the United States' initial strategy in Plan Colombia was fought on the assumption that it was a drug war that fueled the FARC insurgency versus the United States initial strategy in Afghanistan which was fought on the assumption that defeat of the insurgency would defeat the drug trade. As threats in each of these countries converged in order to survive, so did United States strategies leading to whole of government approaches. This was followed up multifaceted organizations seeking to balance the need to pursue not only the strategic objective of security but legitimacy as well. Any efforts combating insurgency movements should no longer be seen as separate from counternarcotic policies. Instead, balanced approaches and integrated organizations, such as Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat are needed to practice operational design across multiple agencies. A single strategy through a multifaceted organization is required to combat narcotic funded insurgencies. This single strategy must target the sources of funding for the drug trade through security measures while balancing the effects of long term legitimacy. Many take opposition to countering narcotic-funded insurgencies under a single strategy that

⁸⁷ Barack Obama, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 6.

include both counterinsurgency and counternarcotic effort. However, as two separate strategies, adequate attention may be given to combating the security issues, not the sources of it, through the drug trade. Or vice versa, adequate attention to efforts that promotes legitimacy and strengthens government versus combating the insurgency and the organized violence.

In Colombia and Afghanistan eradication became the short term operational approach to quickly and decisively eliminate the drug trade and source of funding for the insurgencies. In each case, this approach designed to accelerate the fracture of links between crime and insurgency only solidified it and further stimulated hostilities toward the both the United States, and respective government institutions. Eradication is also the only approach that is criticized from a counternarcotic prospective, counterinsurgency prospective, and governance prospective. From a counternarcotic perspective, the greatest short-term emphasis must be economic-based, and focused on increasing funding for farmers to establish alternative development strategies to their drug production. From a counterinsurgency perspective, security becomes the greatest short-term emphasis because the reality of the insurgency threat is “We are not fighting so that you will offer us something. We are fighting to eliminate you.”⁸⁸ From governance prospective, the emphasis is strengthening judicial institutions and legal remedies.

Ends: Objectives, End States, Successes

Plan Colombia and Afghanistan initial strategies attempted to tackle organized crime, insurgency, and impunity separately. This approach disrupted the respective insurgent groups but initially failed to fracture links that allow criminal syndicates and, and insurgent groups to collaborate. Furthermore, the objective of one organizational strategy may be counterproductive

⁸⁸ Hussein Massawi, “Winds of Jihad,” 2003. <http://sheikyermami.com/2012/02/12/we-are-not-fighting-so-that-you-will-offer-us-something-we-are-fighting-to-eliminate-you/> (accessed 15 March 2012).

to the objective of another organizational strategy. For example, in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense assumption that targeting narcotics may be counterproductive to counterterrorism and prevent states from negotiating with and co-opting powerful political actors engaged in criminal or terrorist activity, whose cooperation may be necessary to bring peace. In Colombia and Afghanistan, it was only after whole of government solutions were practiced against the convergence of insurgency, organized crime, and impunity and not entirely as distinct phenomena did the tides turn. This paved the way for collective interventions at decisive points such as geographic, financial, social, and ideological nodes where insurgency, organized crime, and impunity overlap. In Colombia and Afghanistan, this whole of government strategy amplified the risks for insurgencies partnering with criminal syndicates, harnessing the incompatibilities between the two making sustaining the nexus costly and dangerous.⁸⁹

Long term successes in Colombia and Afghanistan, and other nations that face similar threats will not be measured solely by progress in counternarcotic or counterinsurgency objectives. Success should be measured by the strength of their respective governments in terms of collectively promoting legitimacy and security.⁹⁰ Success will depend on the extent that the

⁸⁹ Britt Sloan and James Cockayn, "Building stronger partnerships to prevent Terrorism, Crime, and Conflict: Exploiting the Differences Among Transnational Threats?" Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Policy Brief, February 2011, 2.

⁹⁰ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 13. There are four root factors that determine the level of legitimacy and security that narcotic funded insurgencies can gain over the local and national government through their sponsorship of illicit economy. These factors include the state of the overall economy, the character of the illicit economy, the presence or absence of drug cartels or traffickers, and the government response to the illicit economy. First, the state of the overall economy, regardless of gross national product, or world ranking, determines the availability of alternative sources of income and the number of people in a region who depend on the illicit economy for their basic livelihood. Second, is the character of the illicit economy, measured by labor intensity determines the extent to which the illicit economy provides employment for the local population. For example, the cultivation of illicit crops, such as in Colombia or Afghanistan, is very labor intensive and provides employment to hundreds of thousands of local farmers. The third factor is the degree of presence of drug cartels and traffickers in a particular area. This factor directly correlates with the extent the population depends on the drug networks to preserve and regulate the illicit drug economy. These drug networks will often provide security in the communities they dominate. Although these same drug networks that are the sources of insecurity and crime in the first place, once in power they have an interest in regulating the level of violence, and suppressing street crime, such as robberies, thefts, kidnapping, and homicides. The last factor is the government's operational approach to the illicit economy, which can range from

operational approach builds functioning local governments, including the vast areas of Colombia and Afghanistan which never had one. If any approach fails to meet the standard of good governance, it will leave behind fertile ground for convergence of crime and insurgency. With important adjustments in operational approaches, organizational structures, and a willingness to recognize and incorporate the lessons learned from facing this nexus of threats, such as Colombia to Afghanistan, the United States can address the convergent threat.

Ways: Center of Gravity, Decisive Points, Operational Design

Clausewitz's theories in *On War* detail the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy.⁹¹ One of the key concepts Clausewitz introduced is the concept of center of gravity, which is still debated today.⁹² The center of gravity concept is the cornerstone of the operational art; yet, the term has many different, and debatable, meanings, definitions, and interoperations. Clausewitz stated the center of gravity is “always found where the mass is concentrated most densely.” Clausewitz intended the center of gravity to function much as its counterpart in the mechanical sciences, that is, as a focal point as the one element within a combatant's entire structure or system that has the necessary centripetal force to hold that structure together.⁹³ Due to the convergence of threats of

direct suppression, such as eradication or interdiction to a noninterventionist approach or even a conforming nature by participating in the corruption aspect of the drug trade.

⁹¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87-88.

⁹² Ibid, 485-486.

⁹³ Antulio Echevarria, “Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again!” (Monograph, The Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 16. “Clausewitz’s CoG is a focal point, not a strength nor a weakness, nor even a source of strength. CoGs are found only where sufficient connectivity exists among the various parts of the enemy to form an overarching system (or structure) that acts with a certain unity, like a physical body. Unless the enemy’s parts have sufficient connectivity, he may not necessarily have a CoG. CoGs possess a certain centripetal force that acts to hold an entire system or structure together. A blow at the enemy’s CoG would throw him off balance or, put differently, cause his entire system (or structure) to collapse. The concept necessitates viewing the enemy holistically, as a system. Identifying CoGs is not appropriate for all types of wars. As we have seen, Joint doctrine’s definition of CoGs departs from Clausewitz’s original concept. By equating CoGs to critical capabilities, strengths, or sources of strength, the Joint definition refers more to centers of critical capability than

crime and insurgencies the centripetal forces that hold organizations together are twofold; security and legitimacy.⁹⁴ This is in contrast to viewing narcotics as a source of funding, and drug funding as a source of power or strength for insurgents.⁹⁵ These opposing viewpoints are an important distinction which influences not only how one views the center of gravity of narcotic funded insurgencies, but how one designs strategies in pursuit of the threats center of gravity while protecting one's own center of gravity.

In both Plan Colombia and Afghanistan, narcotic funded insurgent groups, such as the FARC and Taliban generate the most legitimacy for their groups in poor areas, targeting labor intensive farming aspects. Both the Colombia and Afghanistan governments adopted harsh strategies, such as eradication, in the absence of legal livelihoods and opportunities. Furthermore, despite little evidence that a massive program of forced coca crop eradication worked in Colombia, and despite serious reservations by the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the Government of Afghanistan, in 2007 the Afghanistan coalition expanded forced poppy eradication into Afghanistan as a way to fight the Taliban.⁹⁶ This approach in absence of security, strong government, or alternate economic means only served to strengthen the narcotic funded insurgencies. These insurgencies gain legitimacy by protecting the cultivation of illicit crops and providing economic opportunity. Furthermore, even legitimacy can be gained by these groups from the less labor intensive aspects such as trafficking in illicit commodities and the production of cocaine and heroin drugs by creating power-brokers and spillover benefits such as

centers of gravity.”

⁹⁴ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs* (Washington DC: Brooking Press, 2010), 156. Hereafter cited as Felbab-Brown, “Shooting Up.”

⁹⁵ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 165.

⁹⁶ Joseph Kirschke, “State Department Pushing Aerial Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan” World Press. February 29, 2008. Available from <http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/3082.cfm> (accessed December, 15 2011).

thriving businesses such as restaurants, hotels, and the consumer goods.⁹⁷

The labor intensity in the illicit drug trade varies greatly in cultivating and trafficking. In both Colombia and Afghanistan, illicit drug cultivation, generates large-scale employment. However, other drug trade activities such as the refining of coca and opium, the production of synthetic drugs, or trafficking in illicit substances, require little labor. All else being equal, the more labor intensive the illicit economy, the more political capital, or legitimacy, a criminal network generates.⁹⁸ If the illicit economy is not labor intensive, it employs only a small segment of the population and hence generates only a small amount of political capital for the drug trade network. Conversely, if drug networks were to attempt to destroy a labor-intensive illicit economy, it would suffer a large loss of political capital, counterproductive to the center of gravity of legitimacy. Political capital is the main cause for the Taliban reversing their ideology and aligning with the illicit drug trade.⁹⁹ Political capital is also the cause for the FARC to aligning with the illicit drug trade in Colombia.¹⁰⁰

Means: Capability, Recourse, Force Mix

Colombia and Afghanistan have struggled for many years to establish governmental institutions capable of defeating the convergent threats of crime and insurgency. Even if the Colombian and Afghan government made the reduction of the drug trades the number one priority to combat the insurgency, these governments could not support timely arrests and prosecutions of all involved in the narcotics trade because they lack the number of police, prosecutors, jails, and judges necessary. For long-term counternarcotic strategies, building government capacity is crucial, but do not represent a feasible strategy for short-term responses.

⁹⁷ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, 156.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 113.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 69.

Strengthening these institutions requires long term commitments, sometimes outside the political will of United States domestic politics.

Colombia and Afghanistan are difficult to govern. Overall, success against narcotic funded insurgencies must also be measured in the strength government that enforces the law, provides services, and uphold the social contract established by people and their government. The consent of the governed is a political theory wherein a government's legitimacy and moral right to use state power is only justified and legal when derived from the people and society over which that political power is exercised. Afghanistan and Colombia are involved in a struggle for consent of the governed for many decades. Any support of efforts against narcotic funded insurgencies must consider how those efforts to strengthen the local government. Local governments are essential in these efforts. The formation of local neighborhood councils is excellent starting points for supporting local governance. Neighborhood and district councils are effective because they empower the population on many levels. Local governments help the populace devise solutions to local problems and help citizens and community leaders build skills in community decision making. Local police, judicial systems, legal capacity, and jail capacity are the embodiment of power and the foundation for local governments.

Conclusions

Briefly highlighted are lessons in elements of operational design from the successes and failures in Colombia and Afghanistan. This monograph draws continuous parallels between the campaigns in Colombia and Afghanistan. This was illustrated through basic framework of ends, ways, and means and associated operational design opposing the convergent threat of the narcotics trade, insurgency, and impunity. The strategic historical context is different due to the history of governance between the nations, their cultures, social structures, geographic importance, nature of threats, and economic dependency on illicit drugs. Nevertheless, many operational and policy lessons should be adapted for future conflict from Plan Colombia and Afghanistan. Those lessons placing primacy on security and legitimacy for stable governance, and not aggressively eradicating drug producing crops without an adequate income alternative and society support for the farmers involved.

Although no easy solution for the convergence of crime, insurgency, and impunity exists, many attempts are over-simplified and resulted in singular lateral and reductionist approaches. This waste resources and initially unsuccessfully built, balanced, and integrated the tools of American power. Complex adaptive systems are non-linear. Interactions in the network of threats are affected by and affect others in the network, insurgency affects crime, crime affects insurgency, both affect level of impunity, and impunity affects level of crime and insurgency. Operational campaigns in support of the national security strategy and strategy to combat transnational criminal organizations should consider these effects. In both campaigns the initial responses were not well integrated or balanced which has led to a dramatic increases in violence. Furthermore, this lack of whole of government approaches led to a decline in stability for the host government, which is the exact opposite outcomes of the campaigns.

The resiliency of the United States was able to overcome these challenges and arrived at effective whole of government solutions. The whole of government strategies and organizations effectively targeted the interaction of crime, insurgency, and impunity. The relationships among these threats take many forms, based on the motivations, objectives, opportunities, and level of resistance. Insurgent networks will continue to turn to crime to target places like, Colombia and Afghanistan, whose operational capacity is inadequate to carry out an effective a large scale and holistic campaigns, and where international intervention will be needed. In confronting narcotic funded insurgencies, the challenge in operational design is building, balancing, and integrating efforts to promote security, governance, and economic development without arousing the simultaneous hostilities of the crime network or insurgent network that have a stake.¹⁰¹

Campaign plans against narcotic funded insurgencies, therefore, by nature of the threat must include measures that increase security, but still give substantial recognition to the rule of law, and the fight over legitimacy.

For many nations, such as Colombia and Afghanistan, the failure to combat illegal drugs jeopardizes economic development, government stability, criminal justice reform, human rights, and the promotion of democracy. This comparison study shows the nature, extent, and complexity of narcotics and insurgencies vary. Equally varied have been the operational and strategic approaches against drug funded insurgencies. The fight against narcotics is a complex, evolving and multi-faceted problem that is rooted in the unique geography, economy conditions, and social and political structures. It is rooted in the understanding of governance, insurgency, violence, economy, and culture, and the relationship among these components. The heart of these

¹⁰¹ HQs, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006). Also see David Kilcullen "Counterinsurgency: Possible, Not Recommended: Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, May, 7, 2009"; http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC050709/Kilcullen_Testimony050709.pdf (accessed January, 26 2012).

challenges is people faced with daily struggles directly affecting their very livelihood.

Ultimately, it is the consent of these people that will form the social and political order that are essential in breaking the nexus of crime, insurgency, and impunity. Overall, the nexus of crime, insurgency, impunity in Colombia and Afghanistan fill the security void left by the weak central government by providing alternative sources of security and economic opportunity in areas of impunity. The security situations in both Colombia and Afghanistan were simply inadequate for the host nations to carry out effective campaigns against the confluence of crime and insurgency.

The United States government encountered similar frustrations against narcotic funded insurgency campaigns in Colombia and Afghanistan. In both countries, military commanders and defense planners began to speak more about the state's weakness and lack of credibility, and the need to win citizens' trust. This approach was also captured in General David Petraeus's 2006 Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual citing "[Counterinsurgency] requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies. The balance between them depends on the local situation. Achieving balance is not easy. It requires leaders at all levels to adjust their approach constantly."¹⁰²

Defense planners, through the joint forces and interagencies will continuously grapple with the intricacies, complexities, and convergence of modern threats. These planners must address questions of how organizations should be structured, and equipped in combating multi-faceted threats. This planning should be rooted in operational design and art that develop holistic understanding of the environment, the problems, and develop approaches that link the political aims to series of operational campaigns designed to achieve tactical objectives. Understanding the strategic contexts, both counternarcotic and counterinsurgency, and the unique operational

¹⁰² HQs, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), forward.

environments, and historical context of Colombia and Afghanistan are essential to an operational planner. The United States will continue to face multifaceted operations. These lessons will enhance the fight against narcotic-funded insurgencies.

APPENDIX

Glossary of Terms.

Andean Counterdrug Initiative. Is the primary U.S. program that supports Plan Colombia, as well as assistance to other nations in the Andean region. In addition to ACI funding, Colombia also benefits from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, and the Department of Defense's central counternarcotics account.

Army of National Liberation (ELN). A revolutionary, avowed Marxist guerrilla group that has been operating in several regions of Colombia since 1964. Their membership is estimated at around 5,000 guerrillas as of 2010.

Center of Gravity (Clausewitz). "It is against that part of the enemy's forces where they are most concentrated that, if a blow were to occur, the effect would emanate the furthest; furthermore, the greater the mass our own forces possess when they deliver the blow, the more certain we can be of the blow's success. This simple logic brings us to an analogy that enables us to grasp the idea more clearly, namely, the nature and effect of a center of gravity in the mechanical sciences."

Center of gravity (US Joint Doctrine). The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (Joint Publication 5-0).

Counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (Joint Publication 3-24).

Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat. Established to eliminate seams and attack complex threats, such as the insurgent-narcotics-corruption nexus. CJIATF-Shafafiyat targets network functions including safe haven, movement, communications, and finance, rather than targeting only individuals to disable the networks' resiliency. CJIATF-Shafafiyat has enabled the Coalition to conduct a relentless assault on the insurgency, corruption, and the drug trade while amplifying pro-Afghan Government actors."

Decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. See also center of gravity. (Joint Publication 5-0).

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It does not appear that DHS has an organization or program specifically focused on foreign borne risks to the homeland stemming from the confluence of insurgency and crime. However, some interagency-supported activities in which DHS participates could assist in the gathering and sharing of relevant security related information toward identification of possible crime based terrorist groups.

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). DEA is the primary federal law enforcement agency

tasked with combating drugs both domestically and internationally. While not tasked to pursue insurgent organizations specifically, DEA has been involved in drugs cases that have some nexus to insurgent or terrorist activities since at least the 1980s and continues to consider narcoterrorism a top priority.

Department of Justice (DOJ). Among DOJ's primary missions is to combat international terrorism and other forms of transnational crime. DOJ's 2011 Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime, for example, discusses as a priority issue the threat posed by crime-terrorism cooperation. Several elements within DOJ have law enforcement responsibilities associated with combating potential links between crime and terrorism internationally, including, though not limited to, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as DOJ Criminal Division's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). DOJ's Criminal Division also coordinates the Extraterritorial Criminal Travel (ECT) Strike Force, which uses intelligence to target those who smuggle aliens from foreign countries of special interest. DOJ's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) also maintains programs to support research grants related to transnational crime and terrorism issues, as well as an evaluation unit to assess foreign country programs and efforts to establish effective criminal justice systems.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI provides investigative and intelligence support to DOJ. Since 9/11, the FBI has focused on and devoted increased attention and resources to the confluence of terrorist organization and international organized crime activities. The organizations in the FBI responsible for coordinating with foreign law enforcement and security partners are the Office of International Operations and the Legal Attaché Offices located in U.S. Embassies. The objective of these offices is to strengthen international coordination efforts and expand foreign partnerships in the fight against global crime and terrorism.

Hearts and Minds. The term was made popular in the Malayan Emergency. This was a guerrilla war fought between British Commonwealth armed forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army and the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party, from 1948 to 1960. This counterinsurgency shifts from a search and destroy approach to winning "the hearts and minds." This phrase was coined by General Gerald Templer. He served as the British High Commissioner in Malaya from 1952 to 1954. British forces were able to employ relocation method and hearts and minds approach with considerable success.

Haqqani Network. An insurgent group fighting against US-led NATO forces and the government of Afghanistan. Originating from Afghanistan during the mid-1970s, it was nurtured by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the 1980s Soviet war in Afghanistan. Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani lead the group, which operates on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border but U.S. officials believe is based in Pakistan's Waziristan tribal frontier. It is allied with the Taliban.

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Within DHS, ICE is tasked with a broad law enforcement mission that includes combating international terrorism and transnational crime. ICE's international presence includes 60 permanent offices in 43 foreign countries. While its investigative mission focuses mainly on the homeland and border environment, ICE reportedly conceptualizes the border environment broadly to include more than just the territorial boundaries of the United States.

Impunity. The exemption from punishment or loss or escape from fines. In the international law of, it refers to the failure to bring perpetrators of criminal violations to justice and, as such, itself constitutes a denial of the victims' right to justice and redress. Impunity is especially common in countries that lack a tradition of the rule of law, suffer from corruption or that have entrenched systems of patronage, or where the judiciary is weak or members of the security forces are protected by special jurisdictions or immunities.

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). Located within DOJ's criminal division, ICITAP is a criminal justice sector development organization that works with foreign governments to build capacity in the areas of police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections. Their international development assistance programs are in support of DOJ and U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives, chief among them combating international terrorism and transnational crime.²⁰⁵ This program supports U.S. efforts to foster regional and international cooperation on terrorism and crime issues, including information sharing, strategy development and compatibility.

Legitimacy. The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy. Legitimacy is a balance of consent and coercion: The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments described as legitimate rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as illegitimate tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Citizens of the latter obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. A government that derives its powers from the governed tends to be accepted by its citizens as legitimate. It still uses coercion but most of its citizens voluntarily accept its governance. (FM 3-34, 1-113).

Line of effort. In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions. (Joint Publication 5-0).

Line of operation. A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). (Joint Publication 5-0).

Mao Tse-tung doctrine. Also known as protracted war, is a revolutionary strategy that involves three phases of revolution. The first phase is political organization which focuses on generating support of the population. In this phase support may be fluent but the key aspect is to generate increased popular support over time. The next phase is drawing the

enemy deep into the geographical interior. The opposing faction is then targeted through guerrilla warfare tactics. This guerilla warfare is gradually widened or reduced based on popular support, resources, and capabilities of the revolutionists. Finally, the third phase progresses to a war of movement. War of movement takes place in open country; where by military operations are not restricted by extensive defensive obstacles. This type of warfare attempts to limits the technological advantage and resource advantage of opposing forces.

Operational Approach. A description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. (Joint Publication 5-0).

Operational Art (ADP 3-0). Operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. Operational art seeks to identify strategic objectives, visualize the theater of operations, and determine the sequence of actions, organization, logistics, and command arrangements in order to achieve operational objectives. Operational art is the method of linking strategic objectives into operational design and, ultimately, tactical actions (U.S. Army, ADP 3-0).

Operational Art (JP 3-0). The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment — to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (Joint Publication 3-0)

Operational Design. Spans a continuum of theory, history, and doctrine in order to form comprehensive strategy and plan into concrete military tactical actions in a given theater of operation. The design aspect of any campaign is the most critical aspect since operational design is the most difficult to revise. Successfully applying operational design seeks four concrete goals that, once achieved, provide the reasoning that guides future detailed planning. The goals of design include understanding ill-structured problems, anticipating change, creating opportunities, and recognizing and managing transitions.

Operational Reach. Distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. (Joint Publication 3-0).

People's war doctrine. A military-political strategy first developed by the Chinese Marxist-Leninist revolutionary and political leader Mao Zedong . The concept behind People's War is to preserve the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the interior where the population in order to wage mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare.

Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a six-year plan to end the country's 40-year old armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and social development. President Uribe (2002- present) has continued the work of Plan Colombia, but with an increased emphasis on security concerns. It was envisioned that a significant portion of the costs of Plan Colombia would be provided by the international community, although to date, the United States has been the most significant contributor.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). A Marxist–Leninist revolutionary guerrilla organization based in Colombia which is involved in the ongoing Colombian armed conflict.

Taliban. An Islamist militant and political group that ruled large parts of Afghanistan and its capital, Kabul, as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from September 1996 until October 2001. It gained diplomatic recognition from only three states: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The main leader of the Taliban movement is Mullah Mohammed Omar.

Title 10 USC. Provides the legal basis for the roles, missions and organizations of each of the services as well as the Department of Defense (Office of the Law Revision Counsel 2008b). The code is divided into subtitles, parts, chapters and sections. This research investigated the material in Subtitle A (General Military Law), Part I (Organization and General Military Powers), Chapter 18 (Military Support to Law Enforcement Agencies).

United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). An umbrella organization of regional far-right paramilitary groups in Colombia, each intending to protect different local economic, social and political interests by fighting left-wing insurgents in their areas. It is estimated that it has more than 31,000 militants. The AUC has been designated a terrorist organization by many countries and organizations, including the United States and the European Union. The organization was formed in April 1997 and was supported by the Colombian government

USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act. Passed by Congress as a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Act allows federal officials greater authority in tracking and intercepting communications, both for purposes of law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering. It gives the Secretary of the Treasury regulatory powers to combat corruption of US financial institutions for foreign money-laundering purposes; it more actively works to close our borders to foreign terrorists and to detain and remove those within our borders; it establishes new crimes, new penalties and new procedural techniques for use against domestic and international terrorists.

USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. Signed into law on March 9, 2006. It allows the following: "The executive branch shall construe the provisions of H.R. 3199 that call for furnishing information to entities outside the executive branch, such as sections 106A [p.10] and 119 [p.29], in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties. "The executive branch shall construe section 756(e)(2) [p.85] of H.R. 3199, which calls for an executive branch

official to submit to the Congress recommendations for legislative action, in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to recommend for the consideration of the Congress such measures as he judges necessary and expedient.

Whole of Government. Whole of government denotes public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery.

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
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Figure 2. Map of Afghanistan



Source: Google, "Google Maps," <http://maps.google.com/> (accessed April 15, 2012).

Note: Afghanistan is a landlocked nation located in the heart of Asia between West Asia (Middle East) and Central Asia. Strategically located at the crossroads of major trade routes, it has attracted a succession of invaders since the sixth century.