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**DILEMMAS IN FORWARD BASING: UNDERSTANDING
THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY
PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN**

by

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June 2014

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THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN**

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. military operates and maintains a vast forward basing infrastructure in countries throughout the world. Periodically, these bases become the central focus of either protest or violence from the citizens of the host nation. Questions have recently surfaced as to whether NAVCENT headquarters in Bahrain is in danger of experiencing protest or violence following the Arab Spring.

This thesis seeks to understand the causes of protest and violence toward U.S. personnel stationed overseas. To answer this question, this thesis uses case studies from base conflicts in Okinawa, Germany, and Turkey to analyze the friction points between the host nation citizens and the U.S. military base.

This thesis finds that the main friction points for conflict fall into three categories: economic, military, and social. The most common friction point in the three case studies is the impact of U.S. military operations on the host nation, with the exception of Bahrain. Bahrain is unique because military operations have not caused resentment to date within the current government or the opposition movement. Despite this lack of conflict, NAVCENT's position in Bahrain is by no means secure, since economic causes, present in the Bahrain case, have caused the most vociferous protests when present.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BAPCO	Bahrain Petroleum Company
BICI	Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CNU	Bahrain Committee for National Unity
GCC	Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
GRI	Government of the Ryuku Islands
HLG	NATO High Level Group
INF	Intermediate-range Theater Nuclear Forces
LDP	Japanese Liberal Democratic Party
MARCENT	Marine Forces Central Command
NAVCENT	Naval Forces Central Command
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PACOM	Commander of U.S. Pacific Forces
PRV	plant replacement value
RAF	Red Army Faction
RZ	Revolutionare Zelle
SOFA	Status of forces agreement
TLP	Turkish Labor Party
USCAR	U.S. Civilian Administration of the Ryuku Islands

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the conditions under which citizens protest or become violent against American military service members serving at major overseas U.S. military installations, and to determine whether these conditions exist in Bahrain.

B. BACKGROUND

During the Cold War, the United States developed a vast infrastructure and network of military bases on foreign soil in an attempt to use these strategic locations to contain and deter the communist threat. Despite the Cold War being over, the U.S. has maintained this large overseas military structure in what Chalmers Johnson has given the rather controversial label as “America’s Empire.”¹ The exact size of U.S. installations and their number of personnel is so large and in some cases so classified that it is difficult to ascertain. The official count according to the Department of Defense FY2012 “Base Structure Report” is 666 overseas military installations, with 21 of them being what the military considers to be “large sites” based on Plant Replacement Value (PRV).²

Over the years, the countries and citizens that play host to these installations have filed legitimate complaints concerning effect of the U.S. military on a wide range of concerns. People have protested the effect that U.S. troops have on the local economy, the conduct and criminal behavior of U.S. personnel, the hazards created by the placement and operation of military equipment, as well as violations in national sovereignty in the use of the installation in carrying out the foreign policy efforts of the U.S. government. These complaints often play out in the political arena between diplomats, or the complaints become more public as citizens protest in front of U.S.

¹ Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000), 5.

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Base Structure Report: FY 2012*, 23. PRV is calculated by estimating the cost in terms of today’s construction costs and techniques to replace the buildings and infrastructure. A large base would be considered a PRV of \$1.75B.

installations to voice their concerns. In some cases, the protests are enough to force policy change by at least hindering the U.S. military's ability to operate, and at the extreme end, these protests can turn violent, causing harm to U.S. military personnel. By examining the protests against the presence of U.S. service members in Okinawa, Germany and Turkey, we will see what the common friction points are and which ones caused the greatest negative reaction or outrage from the citizens of the host nation.

C. IMPORTANCE

The United States has benefitted from a positive relationship with the ruling al-Khalifa family in Bahrain for over the last sixty years. Bahrain is host to the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) headquarters and has signed a formal defense pact in 1991 making Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally.”³ The Sunni al-Khalifa family has held non-democratic/authoritarian power on the island kingdom since 1783, and has ruled over the majority Shia population that currently makes up 60–70% of the kingdom's population.⁴ Protests regarding human rights violations and the lack of Shia representation in Bahraini government have been in existence as early as the 1920s, well before the Arab Spring, but these grievances really came to light and gained international attention during at the protests at Pearl Roundabout on February 14, 2011.⁵ Since then, human rights organizations have specifically highlighted alleged systematic torture by the Bahraini Security Forces against the Shia protestors. The U.S. State Department (DOS) also acknowledged these claims of abuses in a human rights report in 2011.⁶

Violence on the island has continued since the government crackdown on Shia protestors in February 2011. A moderate opposition group called the Al Wefaq Islamist National Party organizes regular occurring protests against the monarchy. In April 2012,

³U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service *Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy*, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RL 95–1013 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Research Service, November 6, 2012), i.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.

an improvised explosive device killed seven Sunni members of the national police force. Sunni citizens then retaliated by attacking Shia owned businesses. In June 2012, bomb-making materials were found in several locations around the island, and in November 2012 five explosions killed two non-Bahrainis.⁷ The use of car bombs has become more regular in 2014 beginning with the explosion of a car bomb on April 7, 2014 in the largely American populated area of Manama during the 2014 Bahrain Formula One Grand Prix.⁸ While no one was injured in the April 7th incident, two people were killed and a third was severely wounded by later car explosion only 12 days later on April 19th.⁹

While the April 7th Grand Prix attack was not successful, and it is speculated that those killed by the April 19th car bomb were killed by their own device, it has started to cause some to speculate as to whether or not this level of violence will become the new norm. Al Wefaq has been silent following these attacks, and has not been active in condemning nor condoning the violence. These violent events coupled with the silence by the moderate opposition leaves many questioning whether the mainstream opposition is starting to give way to more violent organizations like the February 14th Youth Coalition, which has recently been labeled a terrorist organization by the Bahraini government.¹⁰

The events surrounding the Arab Spring coupled with this recent escalation in violence puts the United States in a difficult position between the Bahraini government and the protesting citizens. The U.S. benefits greatly from the island's strategic physical location near the Strait of Hormuz and from the development of the NAVCENT headquarters on the island. The U.S. also gains legitimacy throughout the Persian Gulf and with other countries in the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

⁷ Ibid., 16.

⁸ "Blast Rocks Bahrain During Grand Prix," *Aljazeera*, April 7 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/blast-rocks-bahrain-during-grand-prix-201447675399917.html>

⁹ "Two killed in Bahrain Car Explosion," *BBC News*, April 19, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27086763.

¹⁰ Elizabeth Dickinson, "Bahrain's Disappearing Moderates," *Al-Monitor*, April 22, 2014, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/bahrain-violence-opposition-moderates-disappearing.html.

(GCC) through a strong political alliance in Bahrain. Bahrain has been a major regional ally during some of our recent conflicts in the Persian Gulf. During Operation Desert Storm, Bahraini pilots flew strike missions in Iraq and in retaliation; the Iraqi Army fired nine scud missiles at the island kingdom.¹¹ Following the World Trade Center attacks on 9/11, and in the opening stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Bahrain played host to thousands of U.S. troops as they moved into the theater and the island became the new forward headquarters for Marine Forces Central Command (MARCENT).¹² Bahrain also allowed combat missions to be flown from Shaykh Isa Air Base during OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and is one of only two Gulf Nations to deploy their own forces to Afghanistan.¹³

Amidst the latest protests and accusations of human rights violations, the White House has not called for the al-Khalifa royalty to step down to opposition like it has in other cases during the Arab Spring. This is due in large part because the use of force by the al-Khalifa regime appears to be less drastic than the crackdown tactics used by Assad in Syria, Qadhafi in Libya, or even Mubarak in Egypt.¹⁴ Despite this appearance of less drastic tactics, human rights organizations are critical of the White House's position and accuse the U.S. of turning a blind eye to Bahrain because of its strategic partnership.¹⁵ As of yet, the elite Sunni citizens of Bahrain have not criticized the United States for its implied suggestions on expanding democracy within the Bahraini government, nor has the U.S. been the target of Shia attacks or protest for at least passively supporting the al-Khalifa regime. As tensions continue and with little movement in the way of democratic change on the island, the potential for conflict between U.S. military personnel and the citizens of Bahrain exists. If the U.S. supports the Shia opposition, it loses its critical ally in the ruling al-Khalifa family with their strong ties to Saudi Arabia and the U.S. will lose an ally in the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC). Conversely, if

¹¹ U.S. Library of Congress, *Bahrain: Reform*, 24.

¹² David F. Winkler, *Amirs, Admirals & Desert Sailors: Bahrain, the U.S. Navy, and the Arabian Gulf* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 197.

¹³ U.S. Library of Congress, *Bahrain: Reform*, 25.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

the U.S. continues to support the ruling Sunni minority, the presence of U.S. personnel could become an outlet for Shia frustrations for at least tacitly supporting an oppressive regime.

Problems with forward basing are not new, and past conflicts over the presence of the U.S. military and equipment on foreign soil have been seen in Okinawa, Germany, and Turkey. By examining the friction points that caused protests or violence between these host nations and the U.S. bases located within their borders, we may be able to determine the potential causes for protest or violence against U.S. personnel living in Bahrain. As of yet, the U.S. has not encountered a significant threat or complaint about the presence of our troops in Bahrain, but that does not mean the potential does not exist. Identifying the root causes of tensions between the host nation's citizens U.S. military personnel will give commanders insight on how best to deal with both our political position and presence in Bahrain.

D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

There are two hypotheses that can be formulated by conducting a comparison of U.S. forward basing experiences in Germany, Okinawa, and Turkey. The first, posits that the same triggers for conflict in these three nations also exist in Bahrain. This hypothesis would therefore predict that based on these comparisons, we would find that the triggers for anti-Americanism are present in Bahrain and that conflict stemming from our military presence and foreign policy will happen. The second hypothesis posits that Bahrain is somehow unique and in particular that the elites and leaders of the opposition movement in Bahrain (primarily Al Wafeq) are not calling for a violent protest or outrage against the United States and their control in keeping the dialogue between the protestors and the royal family has kept the opposition movement focused on the Bahraini Government. This hypothesis would predict that the key factor in igniting anti-American sentiment in Germany, Okinawa and Turkey is the mobilization of the elites toward anti-Americanism, and if this is not present in Bahrain Americans would not be at risk to hostile acts or protests. The conclusion for the second hypothesis, then, only holds as

long as those leaders continue to avoid making the American presence the main issue. That decision itself could change due to future variables.

If the evidence supports the second hypothesis, it does not mean that there is nothing to be learned from past basing experiences. As the effects of the Arab Spring continue to ripple throughout the Middle East, Bahrain could find itself anywhere in a broad spectrum of change ranging from regime change as seen in Egypt or Tunisia, to what has become a bitter sectarian war such as the situation in Syria. It is best to determine the potential causes for conflict now, while the Kingdom of Bahrain seems to be at a stalemate, and the day-to-day life of service members remains largely uninterrupted.

E. DEFINITIONS

Due to the complex nature of social movements, and the fact that they rarely have single variable causes, this thesis will attempt to divide the causes into three major friction points. The first category contains the economic consequences of having U.S. personnel operating in another country, and will be labeled *Economic* friction points. Examples of economic friction points may include the purchase, rent or seizure of land for use by the American military, or possibly what role the base plays in local economy by hiring local laborers, or purchasing goods and services from the local economy. The second friction point will be labeled *Military*. Examples of military friction points include the effect the base and U.S. military operations have on national security and sovereignty by having the military conduct operations from national territory. The third friction point will be labeled *Social*. This friction point will contain the consequences and cultural disputes of having U.S. service members live among a foreign population. Examples of social friction points include crimes committed by U.S. service members against citizens of the local community as well as conflicts that originate from cultural misunderstandings or possibly outright racism.

F. LITERATURE REVIEW

Much of what has been written concerning the impacts of forward basing seems to follow the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the

existence of U.S. bases on foreign soil served to counter the Soviet threat, but now that the war has ended, the reasons for maintaining these bases has been called into question, and therefore this where much of the current argument begins. Chalmers Johnson and many others who write on this topic often use the word “empire” with all intended negative connotations to describe our post-Cold War military structure. Much of this literature examines the political effects of forward basing while some examine the broader social implications of service personnel being deployed overseas.

In the case of Chalmers Johnson’s book *Blowback*, there are both political and social consequences. Johnson posits that it is time for America to examine its need for forward deployed bases now that the Cold War has ended. Johnson believes the U.S. government is now doing whatever it can within its power to maintain this vast structure without the Cold War justifications, and this is problematic. Johnson states that without a communist threat, a “balance sheet” of grievances against the U.S. military will begin as crimes are committed and accidents occur, and this will lead to resentment against all Americans.¹⁶ Johnson also fears that the maintenance of our military structure overseas is creating a scenario of unintended social and political consequences that will plague the United States for years to come due to its financial and political cost.

Johnson, Alexander Cooley, and David Steinberg all use Okinawa as the classic case and point for the problems caused by basing troops on foreign soil. Okinawa was the scene of a hard-fought battle between the U.S. and Japan in World War II. By the close of fighting, an estimated 14,000 Americans and 234,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were killed before Japan surrendered the island following the horrible three month long campaign.¹⁷ From 1945 to 1972 the island was governed by the U.S. military and was used as a staging point to fight war in Vietnam. By the 1960s, the U.S. had built more than 100 bases on the island by taking lands from Okinawan citizens who had no rights or legal protections after Japan’s surrender. By the end of the 1960s, complaints about brothels, the placement of nerve agents and B-52 bombers as well as bars and crimes

¹⁶ Johnson, *Blowback*, 5.

¹⁷ Johnson, *Blowback*, 30.

related to troops on the island reached created a tense environment and the U.S. returned governing of the island to its citizens.¹⁸

By the 1990s, events on the island erupted when three servicemen raped and killed a 12-year-old schoolgirl. As details of the crime were released, 85,000 citizens took to the streets to demand the removal of the all forces and bases on the island.¹⁹ Okinawa's governor Ota Masahide used the rape case as a cause to announce the renewal of private land leases of military installations. This move was ultimately put down by the Japanese court system in 1996, and Ota gave up his campaign after the Japanese prime minister promised a substantial monetary package for Okinawa's development along with a promise to help reduce the presence of U.S. troops and to relocate them to other parts of the island where they would not be as intrusive.²⁰ The Japanese government also created a special ambassador to Okinawa to help smooth American and Okinawan relations. The U.S. military created programs and regulations to curb drinking off base and established community outreach programs to help soften the image of U.S. troops.²¹ The situation remains tentative to this day as the U.S. looks to reposition forces and equipment on the island of Guam and has begun forward basing Marines in Australia.

Much of the literature on the situation in Germany in the late 1970s to 1980s has less to do with the actions of U.S. service members and is focused specifically on the placement of nuclear weapons on German soil under NATO's intermediate-range theater nuclear forces (INF). Jeffrey Boutwell describes how the INF proved to be an explosive topic across many of West Germany's social movements, because the issue touched many levels of society. The German idea of *Ostpolitik* began to gain a large audience as citizens began to feel the need to begin rapprochement with East Germany rather dig the trenches of the Cold War even deeper. German citizens found themselves at the mercy of

¹⁸ Ibid., 50

¹⁹ Brad Glosserman, "Anti-Americanism in Japan" in *Korean Attitudes toward the United States: Changing Attitudes*, ed. David I. Steinberg (New York: ME Sharpe, 2005), 38.

²⁰ Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democracy, Change, and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008) 152.

²¹ Ibid., 154.

NATO, the U.S., and the USSR creating a volatile environment.²² Boutwell sees the INF issue as a merging two German sentiments, “One strand is German uneasiness with American security policy, and the other uneasiness is with American society in general as a model to be emulated.”²³ The result was an outpouring of hundreds of thousands of people who took to the streets calling for disarmament and the withdrawal of U.S. personnel and bases.²⁴

While Boutwell does not delve into specific acts against Americans, J.F. Pilat makes note of targeted terrorism at the United States. He explains that German hostilities towards the presence of American troops existed well before the INF debate but they grew in audacity and violence under the antinuclear movement. As the rise of the antinuclear protests began to gain popularity, far right German terrorist groups began to exploit this momentum. In 1981, the first terrorist attacks occurred in August with a bombing at Ramstein Air Force Base that injured 20 people including military and civilian personnel. In September, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army in Europe and his wife were targeted when his armored Mercedes was attacked by RPG fire and small arms fire.²⁵ These attacks seemed to die down as the peace movement favored nonviolent protest, and as President Regan and the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev went to the negotiating table to sign the INF Treaty in 1987 balancing the size of the U.S. and USSR arsenals.²⁶

In the case of Turkey, the literature tends to lean more towards Anti-Americanism as a whole rather than a debate about the presence of U.S. troops, but the root of much of this sentiment seems to point to the use of Turkey by the United States as a staging point for projecting power in the Middle East. In his paper, “Friends No More? The Rise of

²² Jeffrey Boutwell, “Politics and the Peace Movement in West Germany,” *International Security* 7, no. 4 (1983), 73, <http://www.jstore.org/stable/2626732>.

²³ *Ibid.*, 79.

²⁴ Boutwell, “Politics and the Peace Movement,” 72.

²⁵ J.F. Pilat, “European Terrorism and the Euromissiles,” *Terrorism* 7, no 1, (1984), 66, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576108408435560>.

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, “Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty),” <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm>.

Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,” Ioannis N. Grigoriadis notes that anti-Americanism in Turkey is unlike the liberal, social, or radical type, seen in other regions; instead it takes on a sovereign-national flavor.²⁷ Nur Bilge Criss agrees with this sentiment and believes that it stems from the notion that Turkey is the heir to the Ottoman Empire with a long tradition in statehood.²⁸

Following Turkey’s entry into NATO, it allowed its territory to be used in defense of communist powers and saw America as an extension of NATO and therefore allowed the U.S. broad access to its territory. Issues over sovereignty began in the 1960s following the forcible grounding of a U2 spy plane that taken off from the American Air Force base in Incirlik. Turkey denied knowledge and responsibility for the flight, but the Soviet Union held Turkey accountable as third party to U.S. spying. Following another incident in which a spy plane crashed into the Black Sea, the Turkish government began to exercise more control over U.S. installations, attempting to limit U.S. actions to only NATO operations.²⁹

By the late 1960s, Turkish politics became severely divided and the left leaning Turkish Labor Party (TLP) began to speak out against U.S. bases on the basis of sovereignty. During an appearance at a Central Treaty Organization meeting, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was greeted by a protest from faculty from Ankara University and a leftist trade union demonstrating on behalf of Turkish citizens employed on the U.S. bases. This is an important moment in U.S.-Turkey relations because it is the first time anti-American slogans were shouted on the streets.³⁰ Another incident in 1968 against U.S. personnel was sparked by a visit of the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet. As sailors arrived in Istanbul, they were met by protesting students and some sailors were thrown into the Bosphorus. This is another important event because in the riot that ensued a student was killed by Turkish security forces, sparking a deep divide between leftist who

²⁷ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Friends No More? The Rise in Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,” *Middle East Journal* 64, no. 1 (2010): 51, JSTOR (10.3751/64.1.13).

²⁸ Nur Bilge Criss, “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” *The Journal of American History*, 89, no. 2, (2002), 472, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092168>.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 474.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 477.

felt Turkey was ready for revolution and the right attempting to maintain control.³¹ U.S. concerns grew larger by 1969 and 1970 when the left attacked a U.S. ambassador's car and in a separate incident kidnapped U.S. personnel. The U.S. began to feel these attacks were the exception not the rule in Turkey, but recognized these actions had considerable influence on students and the press.³² Anti-American sentiments were exacerbated in 1974 when the U.S. established an embargo on Turkey due to its conflict and intervention in Cyprus. Turkey again felt this was an affront on its sovereignty and responded by closing all American installations.³³

The latest installment of conflict over U.S. personnel and Turkish sovereignty came in 2003 when President Bush asked to use Turkey as a point to invade Iraq. Turkey objected fearing retaliation from Iraqi Kurds, and the drain on the economy caused by the flood of refugees.³⁴ The result of not allowing the U.S. to attack Iraq from Turkish soil is lack of trust between the two nations. Turkish media about the war highlights this lack of trust in its anti-American rhetoric comparing President Bush to Hitler, or displaying fictionalized events of gum chewing soldiers shooting Iraqis at a wedding in a popular movie.³⁵

These events in Turkey highlight a growing lack of trust and understanding where Turkey's sovereignty is concerned. Despite all these negative feelings toward American violations to policy, it is important to note that Turkey remains a strong ally as Incirlik is used to carry out NATO and U.S. policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The base serves as a cargo hub and refueling point for flights going to Afghanistan, and also houses a large store of nuclear weapons.³⁶ Turkey presents a case where tensions seem to be at least

³¹ Ibid.

³² Aylin Guney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no.3, 21 (2008), 475, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200802021632>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 477.

³⁵ Ibid., 482.

³⁶ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views*, by Carol Migdalovitz, CRS Report RL34642 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, November 28, 2101), 50.

warming for the moment, but have proven political outrage over U.S. policy can result in violence and hostilities toward U.S. personnel.

The literature concerning the American presence in Bahrain tends to examine the recent events of the Arab Spring in 2011 as well as the close relationship between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as evidenced by Saudi Arabia's assistance in the suppressing the rebellion in Bahrain. U.S. Navy Commander Richard McDaniel perhaps sums up the Saudi-Bahrain relationship by saying "Saudi Arabia will never allow Bahrain to fall as long as Saudi Arabia remains stable."³⁷ Despite having a strong ally across the causeway that connects Bahrain to mainland Saudi Arabia, the odds of Bahrain remaining stable seem less likely. The island's population is approximately 65% Shia with a 35% Sunni minority.³⁸ The third tier in Bahraini society is the ruling al-Khalifa family from the Sunni sect. Unemployed Shia youth make up a large portion of the protestors. Shia are faced with higher unemployment, and see the Sunni lead government as slow in creating democratic reform and adherence to the recommendations made by the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry, Harsh crackdowns on Shia protestors only seems to exacerbate the situation.³⁹

Given the tensions and civil unrest, the U.S. could find itself in a position where its continual support for the Al-Khalifa family could make the U.S. presence politically unpopular. If the U.S. continues to do nothing or act slowly, the Shia uprising may eventually find the U.S. government act as an enabler in any violent responses to protest by the authorities. In this situation, the United States may need to consider moving the NAVCENT headquarters or change its position on the island.⁴⁰

Further examination is needed to determine whether or not any aspects of the current situation in Bahrain reflect any of the previous experiences in Okinawa, Germany, or Turkey. We can already see some similarities between the economic,

³⁷ Richard McDaniel, "No Plan B: U.S. Strategic Access in the Middle East and the Question of Bahrain," *Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence*, Policy Paper (2013) 7.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

military, and social conditions in all of these countries. As of yet there have been no outward protests or hostilities against American personnel in Bahrain. This thesis will attempt to see what causes problems at U.S. foreign bases, and will examine the current situation in Bahrain to see if any similarities exist, or determine if Bahrain is somehow unique. In any case, this trip around the globe in the perils of U.S. basing is worth a closer look as the situation in Bahrain continues to develop.

G. METHODS AND SOURCES

I will use a comparative study approach, comparing the problems in American basing in Okinawa, Germany, and Turkey to see if they yield any similarities to the situation in Bahrain following the Arab Spring. As of yet, there has not been an outpouring of anti-American sentiment or significant attacks on US personnel, but I would like to see if the potential exists, and possibly identify any social or economic markers the US should look for to aid in making future decisions regarding NAVCENT and its personnel.

I will use a variety of sources to include scholarly journals, policy papers, newspaper articles as well as the Report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) presented in November 2011. I will also use books that examine the history American overseas basing to help gain a general understanding of our basing structure and experience

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II. OKINAWA

An examination of DOD and U.S. activities on Okinawa following WWII will show that there is direct link between a significant anti-base movement and the previously defined economic, military, and social friction points. In economic terms, the primary point of contention between the U.S. and Okinawan citizen's is rooted in how the U.S. acquired a significant base structure that today takes up 20% of Okinawa's landmass of only 454 square miles.⁴¹ Military friction points result from a wide range of military activity which ranges from the carrying out of combat missions over North Vietnam in the 1960s to the nuisances and environmental hazards created by the day to day operations and training of the armed forces. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a series of crises sparked social activism and the largest anti-base protests over issues ranging from crime committed by U.S. service members to the impacts of military activity on the environment. Okinawa is an excellent case study in base politics, because each one of these friction points sparked waves of protests with various sizes at different periods.

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS

Economic problems between the U.S. military and the citizens of Okinawa are centered on the seizure of land for use by the U.S. military. How the U.S. acquired the land dates back to the conclusion of World War II and the details of the peace agreement made with the Japanese. The conflict over the land began immediately following the war and continues to this day. Of all the friction points examined, the economic effect of obtaining land for use by the U.S. is the longest running and perhaps the most volatile friction point being studied. Okinawa was an independent island kingdom separate from Japan until the later 19th century when it became integrated into Japan as a province. The island is perhaps best known for the battle that took place there during World War II from April to June 1945. This was the scene of one of the last and possibly one of the bloodiest battles in the Pacific Theater in World War II. The three-month campaign claimed the

⁴¹ Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 166.

lives of over 14,000 American servicemen and 234,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians.⁴² The toll exacted on the civilian population was so costly, that nearly one-third of the island's inhabitants were either killed in the fighting, or were killed by the hands of the Japanese by various methods including forced suicide.⁴³ To put the human cost into perspective, the fighting in Okinawa exacted a similar death toll to that of the atomic bombs being used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁴⁴ While much of this history is common knowledge to the average American or serviceman, the island's crucial role in the conflicts that follow, and the island's status as a pseudo American military colony are probably lesser known.

The American military occupied both Okinawa and mainland Japan from 1945 until 1952 when the Japanese-American Security Treaty was signed. Under the conditions of the treaty, the Japanese mainland was able to regain its sovereignty, but Article III of the treaty left Okinawa in a controversial status. Okinawa was to remain in a possession of Japan, but the island would be under the administration of the United States, military "with no guarantees of reversion until the security situation in East Asia allowed it."⁴⁵ Under a concept known as residual sovereignty, the U.S. military would establish the U.S. Civilian Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and a parallel government called the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) that would form the executive, parliament, and judicial system for the indigenous people. The USCAR appointed the governor of the GRI until 1968, and had the power to veto all executive orders and judicial decisions "subject to the requirements of military security."⁴⁶ This meant that the American military could act similarly to a colonial power in the centuries prior, and they began by taking land from the Okinawan people for military use.

Right away, land seizures by the American military generated social protest as farmers and landowners were evicted from their homes. According to the testimony of

⁴² Johnson, *Blowback*, 38.

⁴³ Brad Glosserman, "Anti-Americanism in Japan," 43.

⁴⁴ Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*: 166.

⁴⁵ Cooley, *Base Politics*, 145.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Okinawan Governor Ota Masahide in 1995, immediately following the battle on Okinawa, the U.S. military confined indigenous survivors into camps and began to enclose privately owned lands for military installations. Ota stated, “It was done as if drawing lines on a blank map. When residents were allowed to come home from the camps, they found their hometowns had disappeared behind barbed wire.”⁴⁷ Land was seized at gunpoint throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps the most famous case is the land where the Sobe Communications Facility now stands. In 1945, the farmer owning the land was shot to death while he attempted to hold off U.S. troops with a bamboo pole. The grandson of the farmer is a famous antiwar landlord named Shoichi Chibana.

By 1953, approximately 14% of Okinawa’s landmass, much of it farmland was acquired through various means of force, by deception or by purchase.⁴⁸ Deception is one of the least know yet surprising tactics made by the U.S. in acquiring land. In the 1950s, U.S. officials promised Okinawan landowners plots of land in Bolivia along with aid and assistance in emigrating in exchange for land on the island. Unfortunately, upon arriving in Bolivia many found their new jungle land holdings to be unsuitable for farming and the promised aid was never delivered. The new colony located north of Santa Cruz referred to, as “Colonia Okinawa” never really developed as many of the settlers succumbed to the hazards of their new climate and died of disease or fled to urban areas in Bolivia, Brazil, or Peru.⁴⁹ Of the 3218 settlers sent to Colonia Okinawa, from the 1950s to early 1960s only 806 remained by the year 2000. Those who remained in the colony have become relatively successful farmers but only after years of hardship.⁵⁰

By 1956, the land debate boiled over when the U.S. developed a new policy for paying Okinawan land owners one low lump sum instead of paying an annual rent. On June 20, 1956 the announcement of this new low payment policy ignited outrage across the island and 160,000 demonstrators took the streets to demonstrate their dissatisfaction known. The U.S. government eventually succumbed to the demands of the landowners

⁴⁷ Johnson, *Blowback*, 52.

⁴⁸ Cooley, *Base Politics*, 146.

⁴⁹ Johnson, *Blowback*, 52.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 53.

and agreed to pay annual rents to the individual owners, but it should be noted that by the early 1960s an estimated 50,000 landowners were driven out through coercion, or were expelled by force accounting for 52,000 acres of the 76,000 acres occupied by the U.S.⁵¹

The occupation and lease of land continued to be a major issue between the base and the Okinawan citizens into the 1960s when activism increased. In 1962, the Okinawan legislative body passed a unanimous vote accusing the United States of practicing colonial rule despite United Nations (UN) provisions against such policies.⁵² By the 1960s, all political parties on Okinawa generally favored reversion back to mainland Japan for governance rather than the American rule established under the Japanese-American Security Agreement. While there seemed to be unanimous agreement on reverting back to Tokyo for governance, there was a disagreement among Okinawan political parties on what should be done with the U.S. military. On the one end of the spectrum, the Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party sought out a plan that kept the U.S. military presence intact at its current level. Those on the opposite end of the spectrum, particularly the Okinawan socialist and communist parties sought a complete withdrawal of the U.S. in entirety.⁵³ Regardless of where Okinawans stood on the base issue, the agreement on reversion was strong.

In 1965, Japanese Prime Minister Sato planned a trip as the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Okinawa since the end of World War II. He hoped this trip would help gain national support in his quest for reversion. To a certain degree this was a successful visit, as he was seen driven to tears and other emotional displays after being met by large crowds of up to 30,000 people and as he toured various sites and World War II memorials on the island.⁵⁴ The political left was less impressed by Sato's gesture and took the opportunity to voice their opinion against a reversion plan that would allow a U.S. military presence. Many leftist organizations including the Reversion Council, the

⁵¹ Cooley, *Base Politics*, 147.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000) 137.

Okinawan Teachers' Association, Okinawan Peoples Party, and various labor unions held a protest rally at a local high school that drew 10,000 people to the streets. A torch lit procession found its way to the hotel where Sato was expected to return in an attempt to "grab him and throw him out."⁵⁵ While the crowd gathered, Sato was dining on an American base at the Fort Bunker Officers Club where he chose to remain until the crowd had died down. While waiting on base, the Prime Minister sent a representative to negotiate with the rally's leaders. Once negotiations and the acceptance of a petition began, the crowd diminished to approximately 1000 people. At 2:30 a.m. the Okinawan police charged the remaining protestors battling for nearly an hour before the streets were cleared. Sato remained in VIP housing on base overnight rather than return to his off base hotel. This act of seeking refuge with the Americans did little to gain him favor with the left. Despite the protest and the fallout from hiding out on the American base, this visit by Sato was seen as a turning point and reversion began to gain legitimacy.⁵⁶

Due in part to his policies on Vietnam, President Nixon preferred to have allies take on a larger role in their own defense and security and as an acknowledgement of Japan's regained strength, and Nixon agreed to sign the reversion treaty.⁵⁷ James Lampert signed the Reversion Treaty on May 15, 1972 on acting on behalf of the Nixon administration. In the end, Japan and the U.S. each got what it desired. Under the treaty, Okinawa went back to the control of the Japanese government, and the U.S. was allowed to keep its bases. The left political actors on Okinawa remained disenfranchised by the treaty, because it did not stipulate the reduction or removal the American presence. However, the treaty did appeal to those who work on the bases, have regular business interests with the base economy, and landowners are still make some profit from the rents collected.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Ibid., 138.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Sarantakes, *Keystone*: 192

⁵⁸ Ibid., 192.

B. MILITARY FRICTION POINTS

The conduct of military combat operations in the Vietnam War, and the day-to-day use of bases by military aircraft and artillery units on Okinawa caused multiple complaints and protests from Okinawan citizens. In the 1960s, Okinawans brought base operations to a standstill on two occasions by protesting the use of Okinawa as staging point for the bombing North Vietnam. From the 1980s–2000s concerns over environmental damage, and noise pollution grew. Also, a large protest following the crash of a military helicopter near a populated city caused Tokyo and the U.S. to propose building a new base in a remote area of Okinawa as well as moving the U.S. Marines located at Futenma to Guam. All of these events have created a culture on Okinawa that has grown weary of having to live with the negative effects of the U.S. military operations that impact their daily lives.

The escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965 brought anti-war activism to the forefront in Okinawa. Many Japanese and Okinawan citizens sympathized with the North Vietnamese given their own experiences with U.S. bombing campaigns on Japanese cities in WWII.⁵⁹ Prime Minister Sato's administration in Tokyo voiced concerns that the left were gaining support in response to American actions in Vietnam, which would be seen as detrimental to both Tokyo and the U.S. Despite these reservations, the mainland Japanese government conceded that the U.S. could use Okinawa as per the security agreement to bomb North Vietnam, but remained troubled by the unilateral actions made by the U.S.⁶⁰ Despite being authorized by the security agreement and with at least the tacit approval of Tokyo, Okinawa was not used extensively to support combat operations over North Vietnam. The bases mostly served as combat support operations focused on activities such as supply, communications, and even rest and recreation.⁶¹ There were a few attempts to launch combat missions to Vietnam from Okinawa, but these were met with great resistance from Okinawans.

⁵⁹ Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 190.

⁶⁰ Schaller, *Altered States*, 191.

⁶¹ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 142.

The first attempt by the U.S. Air Force to send B-52 bombers from Okinawa to Vietnam was in 1965. The negative response from the Okinawans was overwhelming as they mobbed the gates of Kadena Air Force Base in an attempt to stop the operations from occurring. The impact of the protest was large enough that it was three-and-a-half years before the Air Force bombers made a second campaign to strike to Vietnam from Kadena. The second round of bombing only lasted a few weeks as commanders realized their missions and the ability for the bases to operate could be halted or even shut down by local laborers going on strike over the sorties.⁶²

Jet noise and the day-to-day operations of aircraft flying in and out of Okinawa also became a source of contention between the U.S. and Okinawans. In the 1980s, 906 residents of Kadena and Chatan village filed noise pollution complaints and lawsuits from the jet noise created by aircraft operating out of Kadena Air Force Base. Sixteen years after the suits were filed, the Japanese Government agreed to pay ¥1,373 million to those plaintiffs who were still alive.⁶³ While this proved to be expensive for Tokyo, the U.S. continues to fly even in the late evening hours because Japan is not allowed to interfere with base operations under the security treaty.⁶⁴

The American use of depleted uranium rounds in training on Okinawa caused a large environmental protest and made headlines in the U.S. and Japan. An estimated 1,520 depleted uranium shells were fired on Torishima Island from December 1995 to January 1996. This was done despite the fact that American policy stated these rounds could only be used on designated ranges on the mainland of United States.⁶⁵ Fearing backlash from Okinawan citizens, the military began a cleanup campaign in March 1996, but only 192 of the shells were recovered. This deeply embarrassed the Japanese Prime Minister, and the Japanese administration was forced to conduct damage control in the media once the news broke.⁶⁶

⁶² Ibid., 43.

⁶³ Johnson, *Blowback*, 48.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 49.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

A 2004 incident surrounding the crash of a Marine helicopter near a local university on Okinawa brought about a significant protest over the concerns stemming from the hazards of flight operations on the local people. Once it was revealed that the crash was the result of human error and improper maintenance, a large crowd of approximately 30,000 people gathered to demand the closure of the base in Futenma. Tensions over the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) heightened as U.S. military officials sealed off the crash site refusing to allow local investigators access under the protection of the SOFA agreement. As a result of this round of protests the government in Tokyo agreed to relocate 8,000 Marines to Guam by the year 2014, and begin new construction for a helicopter base at Cape Henoko.⁶⁷ It should be noted that at the time of this writing, no movement has been made on new construction or moving the Marines off Okinawa, and the new date for this transfer to has been adjusted to 2020.⁶⁸

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS

The issue of rape and crime perpetrated by U.S. personnel on Okinawan citizens ignited the largest protest seen since the land purchase protests in the 1950s.⁶⁹ By the 1990s, anti-American sentiment still remained strong in the Okinawan political landscape. Crime became highlighted by many of the interest groups with anti-American platforms that arose out of the reversion era. These groups gained an additional boost as they gained support from international NGOs and local labor unions following a particular rape incident in 1995. Adding further fuel to the fire is the lack of cultural awareness by the Pacific Fleet Commander, and the negative social impacts of racist Americans stationed on Okinawa.

The brutal gang rape and murder of a twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. service members in September 1995 set off a series of protests around the island and caused 85,000 Okinawans to go to the streets and call for the removal of U.S.

⁶⁷ Cooley, *Base Politics*, 158.

⁶⁸ Gaynor Dumat-Oldolano, "Admiral Gives New Date For Marine Move to Guam," *Marine Corps Times*, March 7, 2013, <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20130307/NEWS/303070304/Admiral-gives-new-date-Marine-move-Guam>.

⁶⁹ Glosserman, "Anti-Americanism in Japan," 38.

bases.⁷⁰ This event is significant in size and support, because for the first time, Okinawans gained sympathy and support from citizens on mainland Japan and anti-base NGOs from other Asian nations. The murder also resulted in the voluntary retirement of Admiral Richard C. Macke, the commander of U.S. Pacific Forces (PACOM), after he made insensitive comments on how the accused could have just purchased a girl for the price of the car they rented.⁷¹

The two main newspapers on the island that have anti-base historical roots in their publications, both ran extensive coverage on the 1995 rape incident. In the two months that followed the rape, the *Okinawa Times* ran 348 stories related to the case and the SOFA details that kept the accused from local prosecution. Of the 348 stories only ten actually covered the facts of the case while the remainder focused on demands for change in the American presence.⁷² Initially the story did not get much coverage in mainland Japan, but after the story made headlines in the U.S. particularly the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* mainland sources then wrote 400 stories raising national awareness.⁷³

As previously stated, NGOs also played a major role in the national dialogue following the murder case. The Okinawan Women Against Military Violence attended United Nations functions where it partnered with similar groups and anti-base NGOs from Korea and the Philippines. The women against violence NGO also united multiple Okinawan groups who were focusing on single issues to unite in one cause with international clout. These now united NGO's provided support then Governor Ota Masahide who ran a campaign to pass a referendum to remove the bases from Okinawa in their entirety.⁷⁴

The governor of Okinawa, Ota Masahide was unable to pass an anti-base referendum calling for the removal of American personnel by popular vote; despite receiving backing from various national and international NGO's and the media. The

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Johnson, *Blowback*, 37.

⁷² Cooley, *Base Politics*, 154.

⁷³ Ibid., 155.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 155.

referendum was broadly worded leaving it to be all encompassing on basing issues in order for it to gain the largest possible appeal in order to challenge the mainland's authority on the basing issue. The referendum failed despite what appeared to be overwhelmingly vocal support. Instead of having the expected large turnout of voters, an unusually low turnout of only 53% of eligible voters made their way out to vote on the ballot. The low turnout is attributed to a no show campaign organized by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other pro-base factions such as private land lords who collect rents from the bases, local businessmen, a base workers group, and members of the self-defense force.⁷⁵

Ultimately, Governor, Ota was voted out of office and a Tokyo-backed LDP candidate Inamine Keichi took the seat in 1998 by running on a campaign that accused Ota of placing the anti-base movement before Okinawa's economy. In the end, Inamine's promises of economic reform combined with incentives from Tokyo proved to be more powerful than social concerns in gaining the vote of the young people facing a high unemployment rate.⁷⁶ The three murderers were charged, tried, and convicted in Japanese court. They were dishonorably discharged from the military, and were sent to Japanese prison for terms ranging from six-and-a-half years to seven years, based on their involvement.⁷⁷

D. CONCLUSION

After examining anti-Americanism in Okinawa following WWII, we see that this sentiment stems from economic, military, and social friction points. Of the three the longest and deepest-rooted sentiment involves the economic impacts of land acquisition. Conflict began immediately following World War II as farmers defended their lands, and carried into the 1950s when people protested over the low lump sum purchases from the American government. Anger stemming from acquisition of land and military presence

⁷⁵ Ibid., 156.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 157.

⁷⁷ Michael A. Lev, "3 Gis Convicted In Okinawa Rape Japanese Court Sentences Each To At Least 6 1/2 Years," *Chicago Tribune*, March 7 1996, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-03-07/news/9603070150_1_marine-pfc-okinawa-sentence.

also spilled over into the reversion of Okinawa back to the Japanese government in the 1960s forcing the visiting Japanese Prime Minister to take refuge on an American military base. The economic friction points are likely to continue so long as the American presence remains. The vague nature of the security agreement that allows the U.S. to operate on the island until the security situation is resolved will keep the U.S. in Okinawa so long as the Japanese government and the U.S. remains concerned over an expanding China and North Korean nuclear threat.

Military operations on the base during Vietnam sparked protest twice, causing the Air Force to cease operations. Later, in the 1980s-2000s the impact of day-to-day routines of military operations and their effects on people and environment will also be a source of protest. These activities prompted some of the and smallest protests and shortest in duration but also some of the most severe as citizens crowded the main gates and a threat of labor strikes nearly brought the base to a standstill. With the current security situation in Asia, it will be interesting to see if this sentiment resurfaces or if it will remain dormant as a tradeoff for American protection. We will see in later chapters that how the U.S. uses its base in theater and what equipment it operates will have a large impact in anti-American sentiment in Germany and Turkey. While this friction point appears cause the smallest protest in duration in Okinawa, it will be echoed again in other regions making this one of the more universal.

There appears to be an overarching sentiment that citizens should be safe from American personnel, and this notion has broader appeal, as it seems to negatively affect the lives of the average citizen more so than economics, and military operations. Social issues involving crime committed by base personnel particularly the 1995 rape and murder caused the largest wave of protest on Okinawa since WWII. The reason for the massive turnout and public outrage in the media is largely due to sympathy gained from not only mainland Japan but from anti-base NGOs operating in other countries. This supports the notion that social friction points can gain a larger appeal than economics and military activity. The Okinawan government attempted to harness this issue and its broad appeal to citizens in order to unite those opposed to the American presence, but failed to pass the base removal referendum once the populace considered the economic impacts.

Social friction points seem to affect the population at large and garner greater support across boundaries. Crimes committed by American personnel and other acts deemed offensive to the social conscience are extremely serious, and should be considered in location where American personnel are likely to have a lot of contact with the local population.

III. GERMANY

West Germany in the 1970s and early 1980s presents us with another example of protest against military personnel and bases overseas. Germany is an interesting case study in that the economic and social effects of the U.S. military presence played a lesser role in creating conflict. Instead, much of the hostilities were a response to U.S. military activities and in particular the placement of U.S. Intermediate-range Theater Nuclear Forces (INF) missiles on German soil in order to protect NATO. To understand how the placement of nuclear weapons could cause such criticism and violence, one must also understand that Germany was experiencing political turmoil as a result of being a divided country caught between the influences of NATO and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. This chapter will examine the German political climate, and how the decision to place INF missiles in Germany brought the Peace Movement and the leftist terror groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) together and focused their efforts on the U.S. military.

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS

There is little evidence to show that the presence of military personnel had a negative effect on the German economy. Evidence points to the contrary by showing that certain aspects of the peace treaty following WWII allowed for economic prosperity. Many attribute economic success to Germany relinquishing control of its security policies to the United States.⁷⁸ With Germany unable to pursue security policies, it left them with cheap defense solutions, which came from the United States, and allowed Germany to focus on better integration and economic achievements with the rest of Europe.⁷⁹ By the time reunification occurred, Germany was established as a democratic federal state that was “economically integrated, solidly anchored in the European community, and preoccupied with internal and regional problems of reconstruction and development, to

⁷⁸ Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5 (1990), 96, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044603>.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

which traditional military power has no relevance whatsoever.”⁸⁰ That is not to say that everything was perfect in Germany, after all, it was a nation divided, but economically speaking Germany fared far better than Okinawa following WWII.

B. MILITARY FRICTION POINTS

NATO’s decision to place INF missiles in Europe was initially thought to be a resounding success and a display of NATO solidarity against the Warsaw Pact, but it proved to be anything but a success in German domestic politics. A brief look at the INF decision will show that the planners and decision makers failed to take into consideration the internal politics of Germany and ignored elite driven social movements and terror attacks that already occurring. Anti-nuclear protests were staged in West Germany the 1950s well before the NATO missile plans surfaced in 1979, and violence against U.S. military service members in West Germany certainly existed before this period with extremist groups such as the RAF, and the Revolutionäre Zelle (RZ) bombing U.S. targets in the 1970s.⁸¹

In February 1978, a High Level Group (HLG) meeting consisting of NATO alliance members was held in Los Alamos New Mexico. This was the third of such meetings, but this was the most important as it was the first occasion that alliance members came to a consensus that a modernization of NATO capabilities was required.⁸² The exact language stated that NATO needed “an evolutionary upward adjustment” in long-range theater nuclear forces with the capability of striking targets in the Soviet Union.⁸³ The request for new technology or upward adjustment was sought to counter the placement of Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the European theater. Initially, members of the Carter Administration and the DoD were uneasy with the idea of enhancing NATO’s capabilities and felt the HLG was getting ahead of itself. The Carter administration called for a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM-38) to determine the

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ J.F. Pilat, “European terrorism and the Euromissiles,” 66.

⁸² Raymond L. Garthoff, “The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 98, no. 2 (1983): 202, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149415>.

⁸³ Ibid., 202.

best course of action.⁸⁴ After conducting the review, and after personally traveling to Europe to test the international political climate, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, found that the U.S. did not have the incentive or the military need for more a more robust nuclear missile requirement for NATO, but agreed to proceed so long as the enhancement in capabilities met “European political-military concerns.”⁸⁵

PRM-38 determined that the best way to enhance long-range capabilities was to use ground launch cruise missiles, or sea-based cruise missiles from submarines and war ships. The third option was the newly developed intermediate range Pershing II ballistic missile. Many NATO countries indicated that they preferred a land-based system to a sea-based system because the land-based was “politically more ‘visible’ and demonstrative of resolve.”⁸⁶ The final decision on whether or not to pursue a new nuclear capability on European soil was made at the presidential level in January 1979 when President Carter met with French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, British Prime Minister James Callaghan, and German Chancellor Schmidt.⁸⁷ Chancellor Schmidt accepted the placing of missiles on German soil with two stipulations; first, Germany could not be the only country in continental Europe to have INF in their borders. Second, there must be an effort to negotiate arms limitations to respond to West German constituents that might oppose missile deployment.⁸⁸ In his own memoirs, President Carter referred to Schmidt as “contentious” on the issue.⁸⁹ Though Carter does not state the specifics on why the German Chancellor would be contentious, this thesis would posit that this is a reflection of Germany’s internal political climate.

In the spring of 1979, the HLG had made its final decision to deploy both ground launched cruise missiles and the U.S. Army’s Pershing II missile. The U.S. suggested a

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 203.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 204.

⁸⁹ Ibid. 203.

range between 200–600 missiles total.⁹⁰ More than this amount would be deemed too aggressive, and less would be considered too weak in terms of maintaining the détente with the Soviet Union.⁹¹ Ultimately, the Carter administration authorized 572 missiles in order to match the Soviet capabilities and achieve the political goal of displaying alliance unity.⁹² In July 1979, package of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles was agreed upon and the campaign to gain political approval from all NATO countries began.⁹³ It is at this point that political opposition on the national level began to surface. Italy agreed to accept some of the missiles, while the Netherlands and Belgium were “contingently prepared to do so but with reservations and political uncertainty.”⁹⁴ Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev denounced the new missile plan and proposed a reduction in Soviet assets in theater if the new NATO missiles did not go forward.⁹⁵ In a rare move, the Soviets also launched an extensive media campaign in Western Europe with high-level officials giving interviews and statements to the western press. In these interviews, the Soviet officials claimed that a nuclear balance already existed and the deployment of the missiles was not necessary, and was in fact a provocation. The Soviet campaign ultimately failed, due in part by a counter campaign from the United States, but it did cast doubt in the minds of western public over NATO’s motives.⁹⁶ Despite waning political support, the U.S. conducted a “concerted campaign to ensure a full deployment decision and commitment...coupled with agreement to pursue the arms control approach.”⁹⁷

By the summer of 1981, public unrest over the missile deployment began to spread across Europe. Under the organization of what was to become known as the Peace Movement, an estimated 1 million people participated in demonstrations throughout

⁹⁰ Ibid., 205.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 206.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 207.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 207.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

Europe and in the vicinity of Bonn.⁹⁸ The Peace Movement embodied a wide range of political ideologies and interests. Members ranged from communists, to religious clergy both Catholic and Protestant, pacifists, socialists and social democrats, feminists, extreme leftists, West German peace research institutes, and disaffected youth.⁹⁹ Once the INF plans went forward, these groups became united behind a single cause. Initially the Peace Movement lacked the support of political parties in the West German government, but once the Green Party got involved in the nuclear arms debate, the Peace Movement gained political representation in what became an anti-system party.¹⁰⁰ A petition known as the Krefeld Appeal was sent to the German Chancellor containing over 1.5 million signatures calling for the retraction of the INF missile plan is an example of the Peace Movements new found unity and broad base support.¹⁰¹

On a political level, the Peace Movement was clearly anti-NATO and anti-American, but it is important to note that most members of the Peace Movement also held “strong anti-Soviet sentiments.”¹⁰² Both the Peace Movement and the Green Party received funding and support from Moscow and East Germany, but on the whole they were “no more enamored of Soviet society than they are of American.”¹⁰³ Members of the movement desired a new security arrangement, but were divided on how the new security framework should look. Some sought a new framework that would unite all of Europe as a third major power in the Cold War, while others had nationalist goals and desired a “demilitarized, neutral, reunited Germany.”¹⁰⁴ In either case, these sentiments within the Peace Movement reflected in German Society as a whole. Polls show that positive support for the U.S. and its policies fell when President Reagan took office. By

⁹⁸ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “Western Europe: Cycles, Crisis, and the Nuclear Revolution,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 469, (1983): 94, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1044538>.

⁹⁹ Pilat, “European terrorism and the Euromissiles,” 65.

¹⁰⁰ Boutwell, “Politics and the Peace Movement in West Germany,” 81.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹⁰² Wifred von Bredow, “The Peace Movement in the Federal Republic of Germany: Composition and Objectives,” *Armed Forces & Society* 9, no. 33 (1982): 46, <https://afs.sagepub.com/content/9/1/33>.

¹⁰³ Boutwell, “Politics and the Peace Movement in West Germany,” 84.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 85.

1983, “some 61 percent of German respondents believed that the United States, like the USSR, was a country intervened in the internal affairs of smaller countries.”¹⁰⁵

The INF issue also drew the attention of the extremist groups in Germany who were already critical of NATO and Europe’s subordination to the U.S. through the alliance. The extreme left felt that the U.S. was a global imperialist power that used NATO as its military arm. The extreme right used saw the U.S. and NATO presence as unnecessary with the declining threat of Soviet invasion. One of the right’s slogans was “foreign troops go home.”¹⁰⁶ The left had already been active attacking U.S. personnel in the early 1970s well before the HLG’s missile decision in 1979. The RAF had bombed the Officers’ Club in Frankfurt and the U.S. Army Europe Headquarters in Heideberg in 1972.¹⁰⁷ Between the two events, four people were killed and 18 were injured.¹⁰⁸ It should be noted, that the RAF did not attack military personnel again until the end of the 1970s. The Revolutionäre Zelle (RZ) and the Bewegung 2 Juni also attacked U.S. targets before the INF deal in the mid-1970s. The RZ bombed the U.S. Army’s V. Corps headquarters and the Officers’ Club at Rhein/Main Airbase in 1976. In 1978, the RZ attacked a U.S. military barracks at Karlstadt.¹⁰⁹ These attacks caused casualties, but they were considered sporadic and were “never systematic until the movement opposed the INF missiles in the 1980s.”¹¹⁰

Seizing the opportunity and momentum created by the Peace Movement, leftist extremist organizations like the RAF began taking advantage of the spreading anti-NATO and anti-American sentiment by actively recruiting new members to their cause. Prior to the INF debate, the RAF’s support and numbers were low following a successful West German counterterrorism campaign in the 1970s but the missiles gave the

¹⁰⁵ Harald Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Origins of Estrangement: The Peace Movement and the Changed image of America in West Germany,” *International Security* 12, no. 1 (1987): 57 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538917>.

¹⁰⁶ Pilat, “European Terrorism and the Euromissiles,” 64.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

organization new vigor and its leadership an opportunity in seizing the growing tide of European and German nationalist tendencies.¹¹¹

The RAF acted on the anti-American and anti-NATO sentiment early on, and in June of 1979 the RAF attempted to assassinate General Alexander Haig who was serving as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. The RAF had planned to detonate a bomb on the bridge going to NATO headquarters in Brussels while the General's car passed over it. Fortunately for the General, the bomb detonated after his car had safely passed over the bridge and he was uninjured.¹¹² In 1980, the RAF planned to strike multiple targets in Germany where the Peace Movement had its largest support base. These targets included Ramstein Air Force Base, and the Hammond Barracks, however these plans were interrupted and never came to fruition.¹¹³

In the summer of 1981, the RAF and other terror groups had enough support in Germany to launch multiple attacks on NATO personnel and U.S. The first attack was the August 31, 1981 bombing at Ramstein Air Base that injured 20 service members and civilian workers. A second attack that summer occurred when the RAF attempted to kill the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army in Europe General Fredrick Kroesen. The RAF fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and fired several shots into the General's armored car while he was traveling with his wife. Again, fortunately for the General the RPG detonated on the truck of the car shattering the rear window that only caused minor injuries to the General and his wife. The very next day, the leftist terrorist group the Revolutionare Zelle (RZ) placed bombs on the train tracks that entered the Rhein-Main Air Base in support of demonstrators who were protesting the plans to enlarge runways at the airfield.¹¹⁴ In 1982, other terrorist groups with anti-NATO and anti-American leanings including the Schwarzer block and Antifa began targeting the cars of service members with arson attacks by placing bombs under the seats. Extreme right groups attempted to employ similar tactics and are accredited for targeting cars belonging to U.S.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 66.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 67.

personnel in Buzbach, Darmstadt, and Frankfurt. No deaths came as a result of these bombs, but one service member was seriously injured.¹¹⁵ For whatever reason, luck or planning, these attacks on military members and NATO targets proved to be largely unsuccessful, and with the exception of the attack on the generals, they were not very spectacular. Even though they were unsuccessful, the violence certainly did not sit well with the leadership of the Peace Movement.

The Peace Movement became concerned at the violence being conducted by members acting on the periphery on the movement following the RPG attack on General Kroesen.¹¹⁶ The more moderate Peace Movement members realized these anti-NATO and anti-American attacks would create a security situation that would prohibit them from voicing the peaceful message and using peaceful methods.¹¹⁷ The Peace Movement leadership felt compelled to set the proper tone by staging demonstrations that were largely passive reflecting the notions of the movement's mainstream members.¹¹⁸ Despite security apprehensions by European governments, a large-scale peace protest was planned on the weekend of Easter Sunday 1983. These demonstrations were carried out in a more "carnival atmosphere, with a profusion of music, flowers, and balloons."¹¹⁹ The only instances of hostilities were minor instances of tear gas being used to disperse protestors. On Good Friday, hundreds of protestors in Neu-Ulm Bavaria blocked the road to the U.S. Army's Wiley Barracks. German police responded with tear gas and dogs to disperse the crowd. In the end, only two people were arrested and the dogs injured two.¹²⁰

The INF missiles were eventually deployed to Europe and by the mid-1980s the Peace Movement had lost its momentum.¹²¹ The missiles were what gave the Peace Movement its large moderate support base and, once the missiles were deployed the

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid., 68

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid., 69.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid. 70.

incentive for moderates to maintain the protest was lost.¹²² Moreover, the dual track plans to deploy the missiles and open talks with the Soviet Union over arms control appeared to be working. One of the Peace Movement's last major appearances occurred when President Regan and then General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik in 1986. The Peace Movement organized a march consisting of 150,000 Germans to demand the removal of all intermediate-range missiles from Europe, but this would be one of their last major protests as talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union continued.¹²³

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS

There was certainly a social aspect to the INF debate with both the Peace Movement and the radical fringes entering fray, but it is important to keep in mind that these movements gained support from a reaction to U.S. military and NATO security policy. In Germany, we do not see the level of disregard or racism that was seen in Okinawa. The U.S. Navy's PACOM Commander's comments regarding the purchase of girl in Okinawa is indicative of the social attitudes that caused so much social upheaval on Okinawa. Racism and lack up cultural understanding do not seem to play as significant a role in Germany.

D. CONCLUSION

The cases of Okinawa and West Germany are similar in that the activity of the U.S. military brought about a series of protests that united a broad spectrum of interests groups and won the support of moderates. The placement of U.S. military equipment and how it was used to affect policy brought out large numbers to protest in both countries. The major differing factors between these two case studies is that the duration of conflict in Germany was shorter than Okinawa, and the Peace Movement in Germany also attracted violent extremists and terrorist organizations that operated on the periphery by using the popularity and support of the Peace Movement to further their extremist causes.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Mueller and Risse-Kappen, "Origins of Estrangement," 52.

Incidents of violence and protests against military personnel were not a new phenomenon in West Germany before the INF debate, but these previous attempts were sporadic and did not become systematic until the missile crisis began.¹²⁴ The violence and the level of protest increased and decreased in unison with public support of the Peace Movement. It should be noted that the Peace Movement leadership were able to control the violence by taking control of their protests as exemplified in the Easter Protests of 1983, but the violence ultimately tapered off along with the Peace Movement once the missiles were deployed and the moderate base no longer saw the benefits of opposition. The RAF continued to operate until 1992 when the RAF issued a cease-fire statement to the media indicating its defeat as a result “ideological fatigue, strategic confusion, and organizational isolation.”¹²⁵ The Peace Movement subsided in the 1980s but the Green Party which formed in 1980 remains in German Politics occupying 64 seats of the total 622 in Germany’s Bundestag legislative body.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Pilat, “European Terrorism and the Euromissiles,” 65.

¹²⁵ Dennis A. Pluchinsky, “Germany’s Red Army Faction: An Obituary,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 16, no. 2 (1993): 135, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576109308435925>.

¹²⁶ Parties and Elections in Europe, accessed March 21, 2014, <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/germany.html>.

IV. TURKEY

Turkish protest and violence against the U.S. military is much like that of Germany where the majority of conflict arises from issues over of American military activity and how U.S. forces use locations inside the sovereign territory of Turkey to carry out U.S. missions. Economic friction points appear to play a lesser role due Turkey's overall financial gain from entering NATO, and there is little evidence that social issues such as crime and racism directly result in large scale protest like those seen in Okinawa. This chapter will focus on incidents of military activity ranging from the Cold War to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq that caused the Turkish people to protest U.S. military violations of Turkey's sovereignty. Incidents that were seen as violations of sovereignty include the famous shoot down of an American U2 in 1960, the events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the crash of another reconnaissance plane in 1965. The U.S. Arms embargo of 1974 following Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, the U.S. lead invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the apprehension of Turkish Special Forces Officers in the Iraq city of Sulaymaniya also sparked protest as the Turkish people began to doubt the true intentions of the U.S. Like Germany, both leftists and nationalists who use popular anti-American notions to carry out their agendas harness the anti-American sentiment. Unlike anti-Americanism elsewhere, Turkish anti-Americanism is used domestically between the political left and right ideologies and with the exception of a few occasions, rarely is violence directed at U.S. personnel.¹²⁷ The explanation for this lack of direction toward American residents in Turkey is not exactly clear as it may be the result of the complex war between ideologies that dominated Turkish politics in the 1970s to the 1980s, or it may be as Aylin Güney puts it "that even the most ardent anti-Americanists knew that Turkey had volunteered for NATO membership and opted for the western bloc—it was not a foreign imposition."¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Aylin Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no 3 (2008) 475, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200802021632>.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS

Like Germany, there is little evidence showing the U.S. military had a negative impact on the economic livelihood of Turkish citizens. Turkey's participation in the Korean War in 1950 and its acceptance to NATO in 1952 solidified the relationship between Turkey and the United States.¹²⁹ Following this welcoming to NATO, Turkey and the U.S. signed several agreements allowing U.S. military units to use Turkish land and develop facilities in what became known as "Joint Defense Installations."¹³⁰ Over 30 installations with 5,000 U.S. personnel were established to carry out missions that varied from routine supply operations to sophisticated intelligence gathering. During the height of the Cold War, the governing Turkish Democratic Party, looking to strengthen its position with the U.S., also signed a deal authorizing the placement of nuclear missiles on Turkish soil in hopes that it would help gain access to more U.S. funding and aid during a rough economic period.¹³¹ Overall, it appears the Turkish-U.S. alliance proved to be economically beneficial to Turkish citizens.

B. MILITARY FRICTION POINTS

The first indication of strained U.S.-Turkish relations came in 1960s over issues involving U.S. violations of Turkish sovereignty that coincided with the rise of the political left. Much like the increase in political activism seen in Okinawa in the years surrounding the Vietnam War, Turkey also saw a rise political interest among university students, leftist, and liberal intellectuals.¹³² In 1961, intellectuals formed the Turkish Labor party (TLP) advocating socialism through a parliamentary democracy.¹³³ The party never gained more than 3% of the popular vote, but the TLP and its sympathizers were visible in raising concerns over American imperialism spreading under the guise of

¹²⁹ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Friends No More?: The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal* 64, no. 1 (2010): 52.

¹³⁰ Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," 472.

¹³¹ Nur Bilge Criss, "A short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," 474.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 477.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

NATO and the Joint Defense Installations.¹³⁴ Around the same time, three major events involving the U.S. military strained Turkish relations based on what were seen as violations of Turkish sovereignty. The Soviet grounding of an American U2 reconnaissance aircraft in 1960, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the crash of an American RB-57 reconnaissance aircraft into the Black Sea in 1965 gave the left and other political activists the opportunity to increase the friction between Turkey and the U.S. military.

In the late 1950s, the U.S. started to use the NATO air base in Incirlik Turkey to stage reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union using a secret high altitude surveillance plane known as the U-2.¹³⁵ In May 1960, a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers stationed out of Incirlik flew deep into Soviet territory and was shot down. The shoot down caused an international incident and involved Turkey in one of the most famous events of the Cold War.¹³⁶ The Turkish press reported that the Turkish government had no involvement in the issue. On May 8, 1960, the Turkish Foreign ministry made an announcement stating that Turkey “had never given permission for a U.S. airplane to make reconnaissance flights from its soil and that Turkey bore no responsibility for flights outside its airspace.”¹³⁷ The results were still damning as the Soviet government under Nikita Khrushchev walked out on the Big Four Summit in Paris, causing President Eisenhower to call off any further missions over Soviet Territory.¹³⁸ The Soviet Union also sent a diplomatic message to Turkey criticizing their role in the incident by allowing a third party to use Turkish territory for intelligence collection purposes.¹³⁹ Turkish media and politicians criticized the U.S. for the timing of

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Michael M. Gunter, “The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray,” *World Affairs* 167, no. 3 (2005) 116, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672717>.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Nur Bilge Criss, “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” 473.

¹³⁸ Michael M. Gunter, “The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray,” 117.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

the flights so close to the Big Four Summit but stopped short of questioning the overall validity of the U-2 missions.¹⁴⁰

Two years after the U-2 incident, Turkey was used as a bargaining chip during the Cuban missile crisis without involvement or knowledge of the Turkish government. In 1959, Turkey authorized the placement of U.S. intermediate range Jupiter (SM-78) ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads on Turkish soil.¹⁴¹ During the crisis in 1962, Turkey became the center of negotiations between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev without any representation from the Turkish government in Ankara. The two leaders struck a secret deal where the U.S. agreed to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and in turn, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the missiles from Cuba. In 1964, the Soviet embassy in Ankara leaked the details of the U.S.-Soviet agreement, which was adamantly denied by both the U.S. and Turkish governments. The leftists however, believed the story to be true and used this to promote anti-American sentiments.¹⁴² Even though Turkey was no doubt safer once the missiles left the country, the Turkish government felt slighted. After all, the Turkish government had invested a lot of money in the defense infrastructure with the expectation that more aid would come with the missile program. The withdrawal of the missiles made the Turkish public question the alliance with the U.S. and U.S. commitments. The crisis also made the public aware that unilateral decision in Washington could not only affect the safety of Turkish citizens but also their existence.¹⁴³

In 1965, while Turkey was still dealing with the realizations made in the events surrounding the Cuban missile crisis, another event involving a U.S. spy plane occurred when a RB-57 operated by the U.S. Air Force crashed into the Black Sea. The Soviet Union notified Turkey of the event, but the U.S. decided it would act unilaterally to recover the aircraft's remains. The Turkish government felt that the incident was a Turkish affair and sent Turkish navy and intelligence assets to recover the wreckage. A

¹⁴⁰ Michael M Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray," 117.

¹⁴¹ Nur Bilge Criss, "A short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," 474.

¹⁴² Aylin Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," 472.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

U.S. destroyer attempted to force its way into the Black Sea by passing through the Dardanelles while ignoring Turkish inquiries and warnings. The ship was eventually stopped near Istanbul by the intervention of the Turkish navy. The Turkish navy recovered the wreckage and the flight data computer concluding that the plane was travelling west from over the Soviet border when it exceeded the planes maximum altitude limits and fell apart.¹⁴⁴ Following this incident, Turkey banned all reconnaissance flights from Turkish soil and attempted to gain control over U.S. activity and the NATO installations.¹⁴⁵

In the 1960s, issues concerning Turkey's involvement in NATO came to the attention of the Turkish public. In 1963, the TLP leaked the secret bilateral agreement between Turkey and the U.S. When certain details of the agreement were revealed, there was public outcry causing the Turkish government to renegotiate the terms of the agreement because some of the clauses were what the left considered violations of sovereignty. The radicals took the opportunity to protest and requested a complete withdraw from NATO altogether. There was a core belief among the left that Turkey had no sovereignty over its own land, and that the U.S. was an imperial power occupying 35 million square meters of Turkish soil. As a result of this occupation, the left argued that the U.S. was able to control Turkish foreign and domestic policy. The TLP used invented and embellished anti-American propaganda to cast suspicion of the U.S. military. Examples of TLP propaganda include using the U.S. Peace Corps for spying on Turkish citizens, and claiming that Turkish citizens were being deliberately poisoned by U.S. wheat imports.¹⁴⁶

TLP activities increased by the mid-1960s and anti-American and anti-NATO slogans became customary at universities and public events.¹⁴⁷ On April 19, 1966 the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk traveled to Turkey to attend Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) meetings. When he arrived, the political science debate club from

¹⁴⁴ Nur Bilge Criss, "A short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," 473.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 474.

¹⁴⁶ Aylin Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," 474.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

Ankara University held a protest meeting to oppose CENTO and NATO on grounds of their violations on Turkish independence. A Turkish trade union also organized a protest on behalf of Turkish citizens employed on the military base. These protests proved to be pivotal because this was the first time that students and laborers went beyond just holding meetings and took to the streets shouting anti-American propaganda. The right also became vocal in 1966 by staging demonstrations to counter the now visible left in order to “condemn communism.”¹⁴⁸ This only further entrenched the left who reacted with more protests to “condemn the United States.”¹⁴⁹ Physical altercations between the Turkish right and left movements began to occur as the divisions intensified.

Tensions escalated in 1968 when the U.S. Navy’s 6th fleet made a port visit to Istanbul. University students protested by physically throwing U.S. sailors into the Bosphorus, and a riot between the left and right ensued with the U.S. at the center of the hostilities. Turkish security forces became involved and a student was killed.¹⁵⁰ Following the incident, the U.S. limited the visibility of its military presence and reduced port visits by the 6th Fleet. This was also a defining moment Turkish domestic politics as the left now felt that Turkey was ready for a revolution, and the right mobilized to fight them.¹⁵¹

The TLP lost the political elections in 1969, which disillusioned many who hoped for reform in the parliamentary system. As a result, members of the left began a campaign of terror and violence aimed the presence of the American military by attacking U.S. bases.¹⁵² That same year, the car belonging to U.S. Ambassador Robert Komer was burned by the left activists who thought Komer to be a CIA agent attempting to infiltrate the left. In 1970 and 1971, several U.S. military personnel were kidnapped and held briefly before being released. The opinion among U.S. leaders at the time was

¹⁴⁸ Nur Bilge Criss, “A short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” 477.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Aylin Güney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 474.

that although the anti-American demonstrators were a minority, they had considerable influence in the press and among university students.¹⁵³

Ultimately, it would be a U.S. lead arms embargo following Turkey's 1974 intervention in Cyprus that would lead to a collapse in U.S.-Turkish relations. The embargo that lasted three years was considered by Turkish citizens to be an intrusion in Turkey's domestic affairs. The embargo only further fueled anti-American sentiments, even as limitations were beginning to be lifted as early as 1974. As a result of the embargo, the Turkish government shut down all U.S. military facilities including air bases, navy support facilities, radar stations and intelligence collection sites.¹⁵⁴ Turkey had lost all confidence in the U.S., and further denied the U.S. access to Turkish soil in 1979 to rescue hostages in Tehran during the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Relations did not begin to heal until after the Cold War ended, but this would be short lived lasting only until the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003.

In 2003, when the opening stages of the Iraq war began, Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) famously denied the U.S. access to Turkish soil to conduct missions into northern Iraq in support of the war effort. The AKP did not think it would get parliamentary approval to support the U.S. without a UN security resolution specifically authorizing the use of force in Iraq.¹⁵⁵ As tensions between the U.S. and Turkey increased, an event on July 4, 2003 triggered a major crisis between the two nations. On this day, U.S. forces apprehended 11 Turkish Special Forces officers in the northern Iraq city of Sulaymaniya. These soldiers were hooded and taken into custody for questioning and accused to attempting to assassinate a Kurdish politician. The fallout from this event was immense as even the strongest supporters of the U.S.-Turkish alliance became alienated.¹⁵⁶ This action added fuel to the conspiracy theories that the U.S. was going to establish an independent Kurdish state in Iraq which would result in

¹⁵³ Aylin Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," 475.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Aylin Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," 479.

¹⁵⁶ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Friends No More?: The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey," 58.

territorial loss for Turkey, and create a new neighbor with deep-rooted animosity towards Turkey. By 2007, the number of Turks that held a favorable view of the United States fell to 9% of those polled. This number is even lower than the Palestinians who in the same poll had a 13% favorable opinion of the U.S. In another 2008 survey, 40% of Turkish citizens polled saw the U.S. as an enemy while only 18% saw it as an ally.¹⁵⁷

Despite these low approval numbers and with Turkish citizens being generally suspicious of U.S. intentions, and despite public outrage fueled by the Sulaymaniya scandal and the Abu Ghraib prison incident, there have not been significant attacks on U.S. personnel since the Iraq war began. Rather than physical altercations against U.S. personnel, the outrage has been limited to media portrayals of U.S. soldiers in books and film. A famous Turkish book titled *Metal Storm* depicts a war between Turkey and the U.S. in the near future. The plot involves a U.S. invasion of Turkey from Iraq followed by an occupation of major Turkish cities. The book concludes after a Turkish agent detonates a bomb in Washington D.C. *Metal Storm* became an instant success selling 500,000 copies in 18 months and ran ten editions.¹⁵⁸ Turkish readers received the book as a realistic scenario that “satisfied the psychological mood and desire of Turks to vent their feelings against American policies in their part of the world.”¹⁵⁹

A 2006 movie titled *The Valley of Wolves: Iraq* was the biggest budget Turkish film ever made with an estimated budget of \$10 million. The film portrays American soldiers chewing gum and killing innocent people at an Iraqi wedding. The film also features a Jewish-American doctor who harvests organs from prisoners at Abu Ghraib in order to sell them in Israel and the United States. The hero of the film takes revenge for the Sulaymaniya arrest of the Turkish Special Forces members and single handedly brings peace to Iraq. *The Valley of Wolves* was extremely successful in Turkey, drawing an audience of 1.2 million people in the first three days. The wife of the Turkish Prime Minister, Emine Erdoğan screened the film and stated, “I feel so proud of them all.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 59.

¹⁵⁸ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Friends No More?” 61.

¹⁵⁹ Aylin Güney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 483.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

Similarly, the head of the Turkish parliament Bülent Arinç praised the film for its realism. U.S. officials largely ignored the film and saw no significance but some expressed concern about the support the film received from high-ranking Turkish officials.¹⁶¹ There may be some degree of accuracy to Aylin Güney’s remark that media satisfies the psychological mood of the Turk’s, because despite the skepticism and the less than favorable views of Americans in polls, there has been no real documented activity directed at American service members or civilians living in Turkey.

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS

In the 1950s, not only were American troops arriving in Turkey, so too was American pop culture. Adding to support the influx of American culture was Prime Minister Adnan Menderes policy to create “a little America” in Turkey.¹⁶² Despite the sudden arrival of American troops and their culture, there was little public resistance or opposing sentiment.¹⁶³ By the 1960s–1970s, anti-American sentiment was strong but this appears to be a result of American policy and the appearance of American colonialism rather than cultural misunderstandings or crime caused by Americans. Similarly, the low opinion polls of American following the opening stages in the war in Iraq seem to stem more from policy rather than interaction with American service members. Tensions appear to be based on the questionability of U.S. intentions and the strength of the alliance. There is little evidence to show that crime or racist acts committed by U.S. personnel have added to hostilities like they have in Okinawa.

D. CONCLUSION

In terms of duration, the conflict over military friction points in Turkey runs almost as long as the situation in Okinawa beginning in the 1960s, but the actual amount of violence and protest is lower. Today, anti-Americanism in Turkey cuts across all sections of Turkish society. Global polls reveal that Turkey is a place where Americans

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

have the lowest favorability.¹⁶⁴ Anti-American sentiment spans the political spectrum from the far left, to the religious right and the secularists.¹⁶⁵ Much of this animosity was originated during the Cold War over disagreements over military activity and how the U.S. should be allowed to use Turkish soil to carry out missions against the Soviet Union. Concerns over violations of Turkish sovereignty were exacerbated during the Cuban missile crisis when the U.S. negotiated the withdrawal of nuclear missiles based in Turkey without Turkish representation. By the 1960s, leftist activists and members of the TLP used anti-American propaganda to gain support for their cause which ignited some altercations against U.S. personnel as seen in the 6th fleet incident. With the exception of 6th fleet, and some kidnappings of U.S. personnel, the violence was mostly targeted between the Turkish left and members of the Turkish right who feared the spread of communism. This nuance makes Turkey unique in that anti-Americanism was used by the elites to direct hostility between Turkish citizens and not against U.S. service members.

By the start of the Iraq war, Turkish public opinion of Americans was at an all-time low. Concerns over how the Bush administration declared war without a UN resolution coupled with the Sulaymaniya incident and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal helped to ignite public indignation. Despite this widespread animosity and the negative portrayal of American servicemen in popular media, there have not been any significant attacks on U.S. military personnel stationed in Turkey. Public sentiment in Turkey is thought to have improved with the election of President Obama and the end of hostilities in Iraq but the anti-American trend has not been significantly reversed.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Aylin Güney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 484.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Friends No More?: 66.

V. BAHRAIN

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the nature of the political protests in Bahrain in order to determine the conditions under which the Bahraini people either took to the streets in large protests, or carried out violent acts against their government. Bahrain has a long history of protest going back to the early 1900s. Economic, military, and social friction points play a role in the protest between the Bahraini citizens and the monarchy at varying degrees. Economic concerns united the Sunni and Shia citizens in 1938 and 1954 in order to protest labor interests. Social friction points make up the causes for the majority of the protests. The largest example of this type of protest is the Arab Spring in 2011. Bahrain is also unique, because unlike Okinawa, Germany, and Turkey, there is little evidence based on outward protest to show that Bahraini people disapprove of Bahrain's military involvement in regional conflicts, or its close relationship with the U.S. The current predominant Bahraini opposition movement, Al Wifaq, has not directed hostility at the U.S. does not seem harbor ill will at this juncture. This chapter will summarize the economic, military and social conflicts throughout Bahrain's history and will conclude with the events surrounding the Arab Spring.

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS

To say that the nature of the protests in Bahrain is purely sectarian overlooks Bahrain's history as a cosmopolitan center with a thriving middle class that includes both Sunni and Shia citizens. The existence of this middle class is due largely to Bahrain's geographic location making it an urban society and a center for commerce in the gulf region.¹⁶⁷ The lack of water and grazing land also prevented Bahrain from the "parochial tribalism of the other countries on the Arabian peninsula."¹⁶⁸ By the nineteenth century, Bahrain was the largest trading center in the Gulf with heavy influences from the Arab, Persian, and Indian cultures that did business on the island.¹⁶⁹ These geographic and

¹⁶⁷ Stephen Zunes, "Bahrain's Arrested Revolution" *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2013) 151, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/arabstudquar.35.2.0149>.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

ethnic influences “reinforced traditions of cosmopolitanism, tolerance and pluralism.”¹⁷⁰ At two points in Bahrain’s history, economic friction points actually unite the two sects in protesting against the monarchy. Sunni and Shia laborers came together in the 1938 to conduct labor strikes for better working conditions at the Bahrain Petroleum Company’s (BAPCO) oil fields shortly following the discovery of oil on the island. In 1954, taxi drivers went on strike to protest new insurance regulations and demanded a trade union. The taxi protest lead the creation of the Cooperative Compensation Society, and other nonsectarian groups that intended to bring both Sunni and Shia businessmen together over shared interests.

Oil was discovered in Bahrain in 1932, which lead to the creation of BAPCO and the development oil drills and refineries.¹⁷¹ By 1938, labor strikes from both Sunni and Shia oil field workers became a regular occurrence. In a bit of foreshadowing, the al-Khalifa family relied on support from foreign governments, India in this case, to help suppress opposition movements.¹⁷² On November 1, 1938, a petition was created by five prominent figures from both the Sunni and Shia sects. Among their demands were calls for legislative, judicial, and education reforms. Economically, the petition requested the establishment of trade unions and the hiring preferences for Bahraini nationals over foreign labor.¹⁷³ British officials also attributed the overall decline of the economic situation resulting from a decline in the pearl market, and the dissatisfaction with police services as additional causes for bringing the Sunni and Shia sects together.¹⁷⁴

The British advisor to the King, Sir Charles Belgrave, developed a plan to divide the Sunni and Shia alliance. Belgrave neutralized the Shia by agreeing to some of the judicial and legislative reforms that effectively removed the Shia from the alliance. Later in 1938, Belgrave and the al-Khalifa’s intended to put an end to the opposition by arresting the remaining Sunni reformers. What Belgrave and the al-Khalifas failed to

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Falah al-Mdaires, “Schism and Political Protest in Bahrain,” *Digest of Middle East Studies* Spring, (2002) 21, doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.2002.tb00440.x.

¹⁷² Ibid., 23.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 24.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

realize, was the discovery of oil created a labor class, which was not sectarian—based. This realization would be immediately apparent following the arrest of the Sunni reformers. After the arrest, both Sunni and Shia laborers went on a general strike at BAPCO raising the same demands previously made in the petition.¹⁷⁵ Belgrave’s attempt at divide and rule had failed because he did not understand that the strikes were economic and that economics would be enough to unite both sects. This coherence would also occur later in labor strikes in 1943, which made improvements to the social situation for both sects.¹⁷⁶

Economics would also play a major role in a strike held by taxi drivers in 1954. On September 24th, taxi drivers went on strike over the government’s decision to force all taxi drivers to purchase insurance from British companies at a high rate. The drivers went on strike demanding the repeal of this mandate, the creation of a taxi driver labor union, and a cancelation of the bridge toll on the bridge that connected Manamah to Muharrarraq. A local newspaper called *Sawt al-Bahrain*, which was created by intellectuals from both sects, picked up the taxi drivers’ cause. They used the taxi strike to promote a unification of the two sects and pressured the government to allow the creation of the Cooperative Compensation Society (CCS), which promoted the business interests of both sects.¹⁷⁷

The leadership of the CCS went on to create the Higher Executive Committee (HEC) consisting of four prominent members from each sect. The HEC called for legislative reform and the formation of trade unions. On November 17, 1954 the HEC used the celebration of the Prophet’s birth to rally thousands of people into signing a petition to allow the HEC to present their concerns to the Government. The government refused, causing a massive general strike in December 1954, with an estimated 90% of the public participating.¹⁷⁸ The British began to fear the strike would spread to other areas including Kuwait and Qatar, and ultimately negotiated with the HEC after the general

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 24.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 25

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 26.

strike. The HEC became known as the Committee for National Unity (CNU) and negotiated the creation of the Bahraini Labor Union.

The CNU was successful in promoting other strikes and social protests, which united the two sects in a struggle for autonomy from Britain. Following a strike over British control of Egypt in 1956, the leaders of the CNU were tried and exiled to the British crown colony Saint Helena Island. This exile and crackdown on the CNU caused the creation of underground Marxist and nationalist political groups including the Arab Nationalist Movement, and the Bahraini Liberation Front.¹⁷⁹

Despite the large strikes and turmoil caused by economic concerns, and even though the oil supplies are running out, Bahrain's economy remains strong today. Oil refining and the extraction of natural gas, as well as aluminum processing, light manufacturing, ship building and commerce all play major roles in replacing the income lost with the drying oil wells. Bahrain has a per capita income of \$26,000, which puts it on the same economic footing as Greece. Literacy is estimated to be at 90% and the life expectancy is comparable to most of Europe. This combined with its less restrictive laws that attract tourists from around the Gulf, makes Bahrain one of the better-off nations in the Middle East in terms of economically.¹⁸⁰

B. MILITARY FICTION POINTS

Where the military is concerned, there appears to be little in the way of conflict. In the other cases discussed in this thesis, citizens were concerned about their sovereign territory being used to carry out wars or actions against neighboring countries. Bahrain is somewhat unique in that it appears to be the only exception in our case studies where there is a lack of protest stemming from the military friction point. Bahrain is currently home of NAVCENT and the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet Headquarters. The command is housed at the 100-acre Naval Support Activity-Bahrain with approximately 5,000 assigned personnel.¹⁸¹ Throughout multiple conflicts, Bahrain has been a strong ally to

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 27.

¹⁸⁰ Stephen Zunes, "Bahrain's Arrested Revolution" *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2013) 151.

¹⁸¹ U.S. Library of Congress, *Bahrain: Reform*, 23.

the U.S. Bahrain played a key role in the Gulf War, and more recently in Operations Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In the 1991 Gulf War, Bahrain played host to 1,300 U.S. personnel during the containment phase of the conflict, and once the war commenced, Bahraini pilots flew combat missions over Iraq. As a consequence for their participation, Iraq fired nine scud missiles at Bahrain, three of which actually landed on the island. This makes Bahrain unique again in that it is the only country in the case study to actually receive direct action as a result of its support of the United States. Despite this fact, Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for the UN weapons inspectors from 1991–1998, as well as the Multi-National force in charge of the embargo on Iraq from 1991–2003.¹⁸²

Bahrain and the UAE are the only two Gulf countries to deploy forces to Afghanistan in support of OEF. Bahrain allowed the U.S. to fly combat missions from Shaykh Isa Air Base for both OEF and OIF as well as host 4000 troops on their way to Afghanistan. Bahrain also made a public display of deploying its warship named *Subha* in order to protect U.S. ships in the gulf, and sent troops and equipment to Kuwait to support the efforts in Iraq.¹⁸³

With the exceptions of the tensions between the government in Iraq and Bahrain over the support of the opposition, there seems to be little attention given to U.S. military activity in Bahrain. While U.S.-Bahraini relations may be strained over the unrest, the “defense cooperation has not suffered significantly.”¹⁸⁴ So despite the U.S. voicing concerns over the crackdown, the government has not made moves against the U.S. military in retaliation. Similarly, leaders of al-Wifaq indicate that should the Shiite opposition gain more control in the government, “defense relations will not be at risk.”¹⁸⁵ Whether or not this is just an attempt by al-Wifaq to placate the United States, remains to be seen. For the time being the Navy has no plan to relocate this facility. In July 2011, NACENT issued a statement refuting a British release claiming that the Navy was

¹⁸² Ibid., 24.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 25.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 23.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 21.

looking to relocate its facilities to either the UAE or Qatar.¹⁸⁶ Since there appears to be no ill will from either side on Bahrain's security alliance with the U.S., the Navy seems content on remaining so long as the status quo goes unchanged.

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS

Despite the strong standing of the overall Bahraini economy, social conflict between the Shia and the al-Khalifa monarchy remains persistent. These tensions are primarily due to the lack of Shia political representation in the government, coupled with human rights violations, and discrimination against the Shia majority. Bahraini society can be divided into three main categories. First are the Shia majority, which makes up the labor class, and second are the Sunni minority who are members of many levels of society. The third and highest social category in the hierarchy is the Sunni al-Khalifa monarchy, which has ruled the island since 1783.¹⁸⁷ After conquering the island, the al-Khalifas claimed the lands as personal property "on the foundation of victorious rights."¹⁸⁸ They have governed the island ever since. Conflicts between the Shia and the Sunni monarchy are the strongest social friction point in Bahrain's society. This section will focus on the role of the sectarian divide in the general strike of 1922, the attempts by the British government to exploit sectarianism throughout the 1950s–1960s, and will briefly highlight the events surrounding the Arab Spring in 2011.

As early as the 1920s, foreigners took notice of the sectarian divide in Bahrain. The British political representative in Bahrain, Lieutenant Trevor, commented on the Shia grievances by stating, "They have no refuge...their properties are subject to plunder, and their selves liable to maltreatment at any moment...They suffered from slavery order and they are not acceptable in heading any institution."¹⁸⁹ In February 1922, a general strike was held in the Manamah Bazaar that resulted in a protest demonstration against "the practices of an oppressing authority."¹⁹⁰ The protest was enough to motivate British

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 24.

¹⁸⁷ Falah al-Mdaires, "Schism and Political Protest in Bahrain," 21.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 22.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

political representatives to abdicate Isa bin Ali in 1923 and replace him with his son Sheikh Hamad. Along with the abdication, Britain also pressured the monarchy to create a new customs, police, and judicial system in order to appease the Shia protestors.¹⁹¹ This was the earliest start of British interventions that would last until the 1960s.

Along with Britain's attempts to intervene economically, it also attempted to apply its colonial "divide and rule" practices. A gentleman named Sir Charles Belgrave, who served as a British advisor to the al-Khalifa court from the 1950s–1960s, made deliberate attempts divide Sunni and Shia sects socially in the interest of maintaining the economic a status quo. A blatant example of this attempt by Belgrave and the Khalifa's is the clashes that occurred between the sects during an Ashura procession in 1953. It is believed that a high-ranking police official, an al-Khalifa family member, was placed in charge of a group of intelligence officers who were ordered to throw bottles at the Shia marching in an Ashura procession. Following the attack on the procession, they traveled to Muharraq to "lead Sunni fanatics in attacking Shia residences."¹⁹² Staged events like this became emblematic of clashes from 1953–1954, wherein Belgrave, "pretended to be the defender of Shia and their rights, while Salman bin Hamad al-Kahlifa pretended to be the defender of the Sunni and their rights."¹⁹³

The division between the two sects grew between the 1970s–1990s. This was due in large part by the desire of the West to "maintain the status quo to ensure a secure the flow of oil resources from the region."¹⁹⁴ Today, Shia citizens still make up the majority of Bahrain's population, but the exact numbers are difficult to assess. Adding to the trouble of counting Sunni versus Shia in Bahrain was the government's policy to grant citizenship to "10,000 Sunni families from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, and Pakistan to work in the military and security forces."¹⁹⁵ It should also be noted that Shia are not allowed to enlist in the Bahraini military due to the monarchy questioning their

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid., 25.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 25.

¹⁹⁴ Steven Wright, "Fixing the Kingdom: Political Evolution and Socio-Economic changes in Bahrain," *Center for International Regional Studies*, 2010, 9.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

loyalty. Shia citizens see the granting citizenship to foreigners as Sunni attempts to change the population demographic to their favor.¹⁹⁶ To add further injury, Bahraini Shia face higher unemployment and as a result of these citizenship grants, they are seeing good jobs and salaries going to non-Bahrainis.¹⁹⁷ Tensions between the sects remained high from the 1970s to the 1990s, and peaked in 1994–1998, when anti-government violence from Shiite citizens was a daily occurrence.¹⁹⁸

In 1999, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa ascended the throne and began implementing social and political reforms. To symbolize the new attitude of the monarchy, he changed his title to “Amir” which implies more accountability to his people, and he established a referendum in 2002 to create a new constitution, and a National Assembly (parliament).¹⁹⁹ The Shiite criticized these reforms because they gave an equal distribution of seats to both sects, and the Shia wanted an electoral process that would allow them to translate their numbers as a majority into political strength.²⁰⁰ Elections into the Bahraini Council of Representatives (COR) are held every four years and these elections are highly contested by the Shia citizens who perceive that the government is consistently rigging the outcomes with the intention on blocking a Shia majority in the COR.²⁰¹

Political parties are outlawed in Bahrain, so political societies are created to fill a party role come election time.²⁰² The largest Shia political party is the Al-Wifaq National Islamic Society. A Shia cleric, named Shaykh Ali al-Salman is considered the core leader of the opposition protest movement. Due to his status as a cleric, he does not participate as a candidate in COR elections. He is known to be visible with Shia protestors and sustained a minor injury by Bahraini Security Forces during a protest in June 2012.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ U.S. Library of Congress, *Bahrain: Reform*, 2.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 3.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

Another major al-Wifaq personality is a Shiite cleric named Isa Qasim who is in his late seventies. Isa Qasim is considered “fiery” and is generally “resistant to many proposals to settle the crisis.”²⁰³

Another Shia party with influence is the Al-Haq Movement. Unlike al-Wifaq, Al-Haq will not settle on reform, instead their goal is a complete regime change away from a monarchy. This hard line has made Al-Haq illegal in Bahrain and therefore it has a smaller membership base than Al-Wifaq.²⁰⁴ Al-Haq leaders are also said to have ties with Iran and with other Islamist movements in the Middle East. Leaders of Al-Haq include Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace and Hassan Mushaima.²⁰⁵

The 2010 National Assembly elections held in October brought each of the Shiite political societies to the forefront and laid the foundation for the uprising in 2011. Al-Wifaq ran some candidates in the election while Al-Haq boycotted over claims of government gerrymandering. Just before the election, 23 Shiite leaders were arrested on charges of attempting to overthrow the government. A total of 160 Shiite citizens were arrested that month under a new anti-terrorism law that gave the government broad arresting powers. Dr Alsingace was arrested in August, and a popular Shiite cleric Ayatollah Hussein Mirza al-Najati had his Bahraini citizenship revoked.²⁰⁶ Observers believe that the government crackdown was an attempt to drive Shiite voters to al-Haq thereby keeping them from voting in the election due to al-Haq’s boycott. While this may have worked, it caused an increase in demonstrations in Shiite neighborhoods as well as a bombing of four police cars.²⁰⁷ Once the Arab Spring swept across Egypt, it spread to Bahrain and emboldened the Shia opposition.

On February 14, 2011, Bahraini motivated by the events that overthrew Hosni Mubarak in Egypt took to the streets. After a few days of minor protests and clashes with Bahraini security forces, a crowd of predominantly Shia demonstrators converged on a

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 4.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 5.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

traffic circle known as Pearl Roundabout. The protestors demanded more power to the COR, and the halt of the alleged gerrymandering that kept the Shia from achieving a majority in the COR. Shiite protestors also demanded more jobs and opportunities, and an end to their second-class citizenship and their label as “untrustworthy.”²⁰⁸

On February 17, security forces forcibly removed demonstrators from the roundabout with rubber bullets, and teargas. Four demonstrators were killed during the raid and others died shortly after. The Bahraini government claimed that it did this to prevent the situation from entering a “sectarian abyss,” and a civil war.²⁰⁹ At the same time, Britain closed its embassy in Bahrain and stopped all arms imports into the country.²¹⁰

The U.S. urged the Bahraini government to pull back from clashes with the Shia protestors who then reclaimed the roundabout on February 19. ²¹¹ On February 22, the largest of the protests occurred as Shiite citizens blocked roads for miles around the roundabout. In order to take pressure off the situation, King Hamad pardoned and released 308 prisoners, and allowed Al-Haq’s leader Hassan Mushaima to return from exile. The King also relieved two family members who held posts in offices that affect jobs and quality of life on the island.²¹²

In March, Crown Prince Salman opened dialogue and promised reforms that would allow the parliament to have full authority and a government that met the will of the people with fair district boundaries and voting measures.²¹³ These appeals were seen as too little too late, to the many protestors who shifted to Al-Haq. The people no longer wanted reform; instead they wanted an overthrow. Al-Wifaq remained moderate and was

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 7.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid., 8.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

hopeful that dialogue would bring change, but even still refused to enter formal talks with the King.²¹⁴

With the Kingdom at a standstill and with no formal dialogue, the protests escalated. Protestors blocked the entrances to the financial district, causing the government to fear a heavy impact on the islands economy.²¹⁵ The government appealed to the GCC for assistance. Many are aware that Saudi Arabia spearheaded the request by sending 1,200 armored troops over the causeway, but few realize that the UAE sent 600 police forces, and Kuwait sent Naval Units to help secure the island.²¹⁶ The government with its borders now secured, used its forces to clear and destroy the Pearl Roundabout on March 18, 2011. Many Shia hardliners were once again arrested including Mushaima. Following the incident, Shia members of the judiciary, members of the council, and other government positions either left their jobs temporarily or quit altogether.

In the months following the GCC crackdown, the King initiated the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) to investigate the allegations violence and torture. The BICI presented its report on November 23, 2011. The five-member commission determined that 35 deaths are attributed to the unrest between February 14 and April 15 2011.²¹⁷ Security Forces killed a total of 13 people in clashes. Of these 13, wounds inflicted from a shotgun killed seven; five were killed by “another type of firearm”; and one was beaten to death.²¹⁸ Five people died as the result of torture; three while in the custody of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), one after being released to the hospital by Bahrain’s National Security Agency, and one death occurred four days after the individual was released from MOI custody.²¹⁹ The report also mentions that demonstrators killed three police officers, and one officer was accidentally killed by the

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 9.

²¹⁷ Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, M. Cherif Bassiouni, and Nigel S. Rodley. *Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry*. Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011, 219.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 223.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

Bahraini Defense Force (BDF).²²⁰ The report appeared to have been thorough in investigating the allegations of death and torture on both sides of the conflict, and was headed by Dr. Cherif Bassiouni a renowned legal expert. Despite the appearance of openness, many Shia leaders accused the document and Bassiouni of being bias “in favor of exonerating top government officials.”²²¹

Since 2011, events in Bahrain have been largely at an impasse. On February 14, 2012, one year after the uprising started, protestors attempted to retake the Pearl Roundabout but were stopped by Bahraini security forces. The largest demonstration to date was the one on March 9, 2012 to protest the anniversary of the GCC intervention. The March protest was also meant to highlight the Formula One race held annually in Bahrain. Protests also increased in the days leading up to the race. The race was still held amid international concerns and a low spectator turnout.²²² After a clashes turned deadly in September and October of 2012, the Bahraini government banned all rallies and demonstrations.²²³

Despite the ban on protests, the potential for violence remains. In June 2012, bomb-making materials were found in several locations around the island, and in November 2012 five explosions killed two non-Bahrainis.²²⁴ Violence continued into 2013 with a car bomb attack outside a mosque in a Sunni neighborhood during the holy month of Ramadan.²²⁵ In 2014, the situation has continued in similar fashion to 2013. The use of car bombs remains regular in 2014 beginning with the explosion of a car bomb on April 7, 2014 in the largely expat populated area of Manama during the 2014 Bahrain Formula One Grand Prix.²²⁶ While no one was injured in the April 7th incident,

²²⁰ Ibid., 220.

²²¹ U.S. Library of Congress, *Bahrain: Reform*, 10.

²²² Ibid., 14.

²²³ Ibid., 15.

²²⁴ Ibid., 16.

²²⁵ Farishta Saeed, “Bahrain Jails Four for Car Bomb Outside Mosque,” *Chicago Tribune*, November 10, 2013, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-bahrain-court-20131110,0,5596996.story>.

²²⁶ “Blast Rocks Bahrain During Grand Prix,” *Aljazeera*, April 7 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/blast-rocks-bahrain-during-grand-prix-201447675399917.html>

two people were killed and a third was severely wounded by later car explosion only 12 days later on April 19th.²²⁷

The lack of progress is attributed to both sides that appear to be stifled by hardliners. Within the government, al-Khalifa family members and Sunni leaders who felt the plan was too “conciliatory” struck down many attempts including a March 2012 plan to appease the opposition.²²⁸ Similarly, many blame the opposition for being unwilling to negotiate after the crackdown and GCC intervention. The Bahraini government, its moderate political societies, and the United States should be concerned with the increase in the formation of anti-compromise factions who are looking to bring the collapse of the regime by waging protests and taking part in activities that are intended to collapse the Bahraini economy.²²⁹ This lack of progress and the entrenchment of Shia toward regime change should cause concern for Bahraini and U.S. policy makers. The social friction point does not seem to be going away.

D. CONCLUSION

A brief examination in the nature of protest in Bahrain reveals that the current situation of unrest is the result of social tensions based on unemployment, and unequal Shiite representation within the Bahraini government. To say that the nature of the protest is purely sectarian would be far too simple a statement. True, the uprising appears to be divided between the sects, but the research indicates that theological differences are not at the heart of the struggle. The evidence suggests that much of the conflict stems from economic and social friction points.

In the early part of the 1900s to the 1950s, the two sects actually united against the monarchy over economic concerns that lead to the abdication of the king in 1923. Fearing that the two sides would become too powerful in their opposition, the Bahraini monarchy along with British advisors successfully divided the sects under divide and rule

²²⁷ “Two killed in Bahrain Car Explosion,” *BBC News*, April 19, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27086763.

²²⁸ U.S. Library of Congress, *Bahrain: Reform*, 16.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

style practices. The government and foreign investors favored the status quo with the divided sects because it reduced turmoil and allowed for the predictable flow of oil and other resources from the region.

There has been little evidence to show that Bahrain's alignment with the U.S. has caused a significant protest from the Shiite and Sunni citizens. This makes Bahrain unique in these case studies in that this is the only country that did not protest against the activities of the U.S. military in the region. Bahrain was a major ally in the Gulf War, OEF, and OIF. Bahraini air bases and ports were used to conduct combat missions as well as serve as a staging point for men and materiel to enter the region. Both the government and the leaders of the opposition movement have expressed support for the U.S. defense structure.²³⁰

Social tensions grew throughout the 1900s, peaking in the mid-1990s. When King Hamad came to power in 1999, he attempted to implement some reform and representation while still maintaining his absolute authority. Election cycles in the early 2000s were plagued by accusations of corruption, and gerrymandering that kept the Shiite community from achieving a majority in the government. Opposition leaders seized upon the momentum from the Arab Spring in 2011 to motivate the Shiite community into a large-scale protest. The protest was met with strong resistance and a crackdown from the Bahraini government and its GCC allies. The resulting deaths and allegations of torture on the part of the government have led many moderate Shia to harden their resolve and shift from a reform movement to a complete overthrow of the regime. The situation remains at a stalemate with the government unwilling to give into sweeping reform demands, and the Shiite unwilling to accept a deal that falls short of a democracy that represents the Shiite political majority. With approximately 5,000 personnel stationed at NAVCENT and its supporting facilities, the U.S. military needs to remain vigilant in monitoring the opposition movement and the government for signs of increased conflict.

²³⁰ Ibid., 23.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. FINDINGS

After reviewing each of the case studies, we have seen the three main categories of friction points ignite some level of protest or violence. The country with greatest amount of prolonged protest activity against the U.S. military is Okinawa. This is to be expected since Okinawa meets the criteria for all three friction points. The remaining countries have one or two friction points as indicated in Table 1.

	Economic	Military	Social
Okinawa	X	X	X
Germany		X	
Turkey		X	
Bahrain	X		X

Table 1. Friction Point Matrix

In Okinawa, the American acquisition of land led to largest protests of up to 160,000 citizens, making economics a significant friction point. U.S. military attempts to use Okinawa for combat operations during the Vietnam War lead to short but intense periods of protests. The hazards of continual military activity on the safety of Okinawan citizens who live near the base and the effects of these operations on the environment have led low levels to protests that continue to this day. The rape case in 1995 brought 85,000 from across Okinawan society to the streets to call for the removal of U.S. bases. The rape case made the social friction point one that can unite broad classes in society under one cause. Racist attitudes or indifference by U.S. personnel as evidenced by the

Pacific Fleet Commander's comments toward Okinawans is an area worth further research in order to see to what extent racism had on U.S. policy.

Germany has one of the shortest durations of protest, stemming from the U.S. and NATO decision to place nuclear weapons on German soil. Like Okinawa, the protest had little effect on U.S. policy and the missiles were still placed on the German border. Germany is unique however, in that it had some of the more spectacular acts of violence due to the hijacking of the anti-nuclear protests by radical elements on the fringe of the Peace Movement. Economic trigger points are not seen, due in large part by post WWII agreements that left Germany to focus on its economy and political role in Europe without having to spend money on defense which was supplied by the U.S. The levels of racism and social conflict seen in Okinawa are not present in Germany. Further study may be needed to better understand why Americans interacted differently with Germany than it did with Japan following WWII.

In Turkey, anti-Americanism became a central theme in Turkish politics, but the actual acts of protests and violence directed at Americans was rather limited to some kidnappings and the physical altercations that occurred during the 6th Fleet port visit. Protests erupted from military friction points stemming from what were seen as U.S. military violations of Turkish sovereignty during the Cold War. These trigger points include the scandals involving U.S. spy planes flying missions into Russia from Turkish soil as well as the deal made between the U.S. and the Soviet Union without Turkey's consent during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkey became the most anti-American country in the world according to opinion polls. The low approval rating is attributed to questions concerning the true intentions of the U.S. following the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, as well as the Sulaymaniya incident. There is little evidence to show that economics or social friction points played a significant role in causing protest.

The nature of the current protest in Bahrain is centered on social friction points and the hostility is directed at the Bahraini government. Research indicates that early on, economic friction points could actually unite the Sunni and Shia sects in coordinating general strikes for better labor conditions and job opportunities. These strikes even led to

the abdication of the king in 1922. In terms of military friction points, the U.S. military staged multiple operations and flew combat missions out of Bahrain in the Gulf War, OEF, and OIF. Bahrain was also one of the few GCC nations to contribute troops to these campaigns. Bahrain is unique in our case studies in that it is the only country where military activities did not lead to a significant amount of protest. Social protests have a history of being large in Bahrain with the largest and most violent occurring during the Arab Spring in 2011. Today, large protests have been largely eliminated, but some still continue as seen by the protests marking the anniversary of the Arab Spring and the GCC crackdown. The annual Formula One Race also continues to spark protests as Shia citizens attempt to use the race as a platform bring international attention to their cause.

B. LESSONS LEARNED

The research confirms the second hypothesis that tensions between the U.S. military and Bahraini citizens do not exist because the leadership of the opposition has not directed hostilities in towards the United States. Although the current unrest in Bahrain has not directed its focus on the U.S. military, there are still lessons to be learned from the case studies. Okinawa has taught us that economic friction points ignited by the U.S. can bring about the largest protest. The same was seen in Bahrain in the early 1920s when the Sunni and Shia sects united against the monarchy. Economics affect society across the board regardless of class or interests. Okinawa also indicates to us that social friction points such as crime committed by U.S. service members can draw large sections of society together, especially if NGOs and the media support the cause.

Germany taught us that even a nonviolent protest movement is vulnerable to extremism and violence by radicals acting on its fringes. Had it not been for the leadership of the German Peace Movement redirecting the nature of the movement's activities by the time of the 1983 Easter Sunday protests; the radicals could have taken the country over the edge into a more violent situation. With the unrest in Bahrain at a stalemate and with the trenches between the government and the Shia getting deeper, there is a higher likelihood of radicals entering with the scene. The strength of the

moderate leaders like al-Wifaq in Bahrain is essential to keeping the fringes from hijacking the opposition.

Turkey is unique in that anti-Americanism was used to cause turmoil within Turkish national politics. This factor could certainly come up in Bahrain. Although anti-American sentiments are rarely seen in Bahrain, it is possible that the presence of the U.S. may be used as a political agenda by the opposition movement to attract more support, or to influence the U.S. into changing its policies in supporting the monarchy. The moderate leaders of al-Wifaq have expressed that the country's relationship with the U.S. military will not change if the opposition gains power in the government, but if al-Haq continues to attract more hardliners; there is no guarantee that the current harmonious relationship will remain.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the lessons learned from each case study and their potential to affect us in Bahrain, this thesis proposes four recommendations:

1) Commanders and policy makers should monitor al-Wifaq and other opposition movements closely. The silence of Al-Wifaq following the recent car bombs should be concerning. The silence of the moderate opposition leaders means one of two things. It could mean that al-Wifaq is at a minimum giving tacit support to car bombs as a legitimate form of protest, or it could mean that al-Wifaq's leadership is losing control of its fringes and they are choosing more radical options to break the current impasse. If al-Wifaq's membership or influence declines, the people could possibly be moving to more radical groups.

2) Commanders need to abstain from making decisions that will make drastic changes in the Bahraini economy. Closing or reducing the size of the current base will cause changes in the local sectors of the economy that rely heavily on American consumers or contracts. Okinawa taught us that economic concerns can unite all levels of society regardless of social class.

3) Commanders need to continue policies that promote good order and discipline. This is essential in keeping social friction points from igniting. An incident of rape like the one in Okinawa can also have a uniting effect among the social classes. Should the elites decide to direct focus on an incident such as this, the two sects could unite against Americans no matter what sect the victim was in.

4) Special attention is needed to security in the days surrounding the Formula One race. The race can provide an international stage to bring members to the opposition's cause. Not only would an attack or large protests be visible, but also it would discredit the monarchy on the world stage while it hosts an event to help improve its image.

D. IMPLICATIONS

The fact that Bahrain appears to be at a stalemate should not bring a sense of comfort and security to commanders and policy makers. Bahrain is unique in that the U.S. military has not yet caused one of the three friction points to ignite, but that does not mean the situation is not volatile. Previous experiences with protests or violence in forward basing show us that anyone of these points poised to spark a significant protest or violence. Commanders need to be aware of the size and duration of protest that economic, military and social friction points can cause. We also need to be aware that anti-Americanism can play a role in internal politics to help draw undecided citizens into the conflict. Finally, commanders and policy makers also need to maintain an awareness of the opposition's fringe actors as well as the strength and influence of the moderate leadership. If the impasse between the opposition and al-Khalifa monarchy continues, the U.S. may eventually find itself at the center of protest or other hostilities.

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