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**UNDERSTANDING COUNTERINSURGENCY
IN DEMOCRATIC SETTINGS: COUNTERINSURGENCY
SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN KASHMIR AND NEPAL**

by

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March 2014

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SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN KASHMIR AND NEPAL**

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ABSTRACT

This analysis examines India's ongoing counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Kashmir and the Nepalese campaign against the Maoists from 1996 to 2006. Both COIN efforts have encountered extensive ethnic mobilization and problematic border relations and have experienced failures and successes of varying degrees at different times. To find a better COIN approach in complex environments, this thesis applies the basic framework of an integrated set of political, socio-economic, and security elements of COIN strategies. While the enemy-centric COIN approach was only able to contain the insurgency during the 1990s, recent success in Kashmir after 2000 has been achieved through a mixed approach that integrates all available national means, such as political, economic, and information programs, with its military efforts. For its part, the Nepalese COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006 overemphasized the enemy-centric approach and failed to defeat the insurgency because it did not integrate all available national resources. This thesis finds that the mixed approach must be balanced and blended with other important factors, such as information operations, diplomatic measures, and international aspects, because no developing countries operate in isolation. They are deeply influenced by their global strategic position, external players, and the strategic interests of their neighbors. Thus, the insights gained here are intended to support further analysis of the larger scope of the COIN campaign in India and Nepal to find an approach that is even more effective.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APF	Armed Police Force
BJP	Bharatiye Janata Party
CCOMPOSA	Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia
COAS	Chief of the Army Staff
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
CPN (M)	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPN (Masal)	Communist Party of Nepal (Masal)
CPN (Mashal)	Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal)
CPN (UC)	Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre)
CPN (UML)	Communist Party of Nepal (United-Marxist-Leninists)
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ICG	International Crisis Group
INC	Indian National Congress
INSEC	Informal Service Center
IPCA	Institute of Peace and Conflicts Studies
ISDP	Internal Security and Development Programs
ISI	InterService Intelligence
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LOC	Line of Control
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MC	Muslim Conference
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
NA	Nepal Army
NC	Nepali Congress
NDA	National Democratic Alliance

PLA	People's Liberation Army
POTA	Prevention of the Terrorist Act
RIM	Revolutionary International Movement
RNA	Royal Nepalese Army
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SATP	South Asia Terrorist Portal
SPA	Seven Party Alliance
UCPN (M)	Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
UPF	United People's Front
WHAM	Winning the Hearts and Minds

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I. THESIS PROPOSAL

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The theoretical literature on counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns is a fairly new field reflecting scholarly insights into the various insurgencies and experiences of governments and populations. The field, however, lacks an understanding of the more complex cases due to the simplistic division between the population-centric approach based on winning hearts and minds (WHAM) and the enemy-centric approach based on aggressive security operations. Recognizing this, some scholars, such as David Kilcullen, have suggested that neither the population-centric nor the enemy-centric approach alone can fully explain COIN success or failure.¹ For instance, an analysis of the insurgencies in developing countries that have experienced extensive ethnic mobilizations and problematic border relations presents examples of the limited nature of such approaches.

This thesis seeks to examine the problematic nature of a divided COIN strategy and the problems it presents. While scholars or policy makers often show a preference for one strategy over the other, over time both strategies have been shown to be problematic. The question addressed in this thesis is whether the division of the field of COIN into enemy-centric and population-centric approaches undermines COIN efforts in developing countries. This thesis explores the application aspects of the two approaches by examining the state's COIN efforts and their results in insurgencies in Kashmir and Nepal.

The COIN efforts against the Kashmir insurgency in India and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal have both experienced failure and success at various junctures. The two regions also present international border complexities, which need to be taken into account in COIN efforts. In 1989, Kashmir, a state in northern India that had faced consolidation challenges since 1947, confronted an unusual form of unrest when Kashmiri Muslims started an armed struggle for independence from India. Prior to this,

¹ David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1–2.

consolidation efforts failed, primarily at the governmental level. The internal security situation reached a new urgency when the daughter of India's Home Minister was abducted on December 8, 1989, followed by a violent confrontation.² India mobilized its army to fight the insurgency and began to rely on the armed forces to control the security setting for the following decades. After 1998, the Indian COIN strategy shifted from an aggressive military response to a mixed approach that included continuing massive military deployment—Operation Parakram³—along with people-oriented programs such as socio-economic development and political dialogue—Operation Sadbhavana.⁴ While the campaign is still ongoing, this thesis will examine the success or failures of the mixed approach, which some have argued has led to increased levels of COIN success.

In the same decade, Nepal also experienced an insurgency, a violent Maoist movement that began in 1996 as a byproduct of political and ideological disagreements with a recently restored democracy in 1990.⁵ The elected government of the Nepali Congress Party (NCP) immediately mobilized a police force to combat the insurgency. In 2001, with increasing insurgent threats, the parliament declared a state of emergency, allowing the Nepalese Army to mobilize against the insurgency along with the police forces.⁶ King Gyanendra, taking this opportunity to move against his democratic opponents, suspended the constitution and assumed direct authority as the head of state in February 2005. In 2006, a decade after the insurgency began, a nationwide mass movement organized by all opposition political parties with the active involvement of Maoist cadres successfully overthrew the existing monarchical government, replacing the

² Arif Jamal, *Shadow War: Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir* (New York: Melvillehouse, 2009), 47.

³ S. Paul Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia," *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008), 84.

⁴ Arpita Anant, "COIN and Op Sadbhavana in Jammu and Kashmir," *IDSA, Occasional Paper* no. 19 (New Delhi: Institutes of Defense Studies and Analyses, 2011), 16–20, accessed July 27, 2013, <http://www.idsa.in/occasionalpapers/CounterinsurgencyandOpSadbhavanainJammuandKashmir>.

⁵ Deepak Thapa, "Making the Maoist Insurgency," in *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace*, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 45–48.

⁶ Timothy R. Kreuttner, "The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Small Wars Journal* (April 13, 2009), accessed July 27, 2013, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-maoist-insurgency-in-nepal-and-us-counterinsurgency-doctrine>.

government with representatives from all opposition political parties, including Maoists, and promulgating an interim constitution, effectively bringing the insurgency to an end. Eventually, the Maoists (Nepal Communist Party-Maoist) joined main-stream politics and successfully enforced its most important agendas, such as abolition of the monarchy, election of a constituent assembly, and the provision of federalism in Nepal.⁷

Although the insurgency's end and the Maoists' participation in the political process were hailed as a success, the ten-year-long armed conflict in Nepal had claimed more than 13,000 lives and destroyed billions of dollars' worth of infrastructure.⁸ Meanwhile, reconciliation efforts between the Maoists and others have produced a deadlock in the political process. At the present time, Nepal continues to struggle with developing its constitution and consolidating its government. This thesis will examine COIN efforts against the Maoists, who eventually became part of the political process. Continued consolidation and reconciliation problems raise the question of how we can measure success in Nepal. This thesis will provide a comparison between the Nepalese state strategy and the Indian government strategy in Kashmir. This analysis will make an important contribution to the COIN field.

B. IMPORTANCE

In the post-1990 world, with the end of the Cold War, insurgencies present unprecedented threats that have been countered in different ways. Insurgencies are a critical threat to the nation state because they seek to fundamentally change the prevailing national political or social order through the use of violence and political disturbance.⁹ With changes in communication and support structures due to globalization, the insurgency threat is predicted to continue. We need winning strategies with critical

⁷ Santosh B. Poudyal, "Explaining the Success of the Nepal Communist Party Maoist (NCP-M): A Comparison of the Maoists Insurgencies in the 21st Century" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 1, accessed July 27, 2013, http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/4953/10Dec_Poudyal.pdf?sequence=1.

⁸ Ibid., 62.

⁹ Nepal Army, *Field Manual for Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School* (Directorate General of Military Training, Army HQ: Army Publication, 2011), 11–13.

components that will “facilitate the quickest path to overcoming the insurgencies or negotiating a political solution.”¹⁰ According to Kilcullen’s COIN approach, “a successful COIN campaign should both aggressively tackle the insurgency and protect the population.”¹¹ Therefore, it is an important field of study for governments and scholars.

The cases of Kashmir and Nepal are important because a careful comparison of them will assist us in advancing COIN approaches in the developing world, where poverty plays a large role in breeding support for insurgents. These two countries are undergoing unprecedented changes that consist of simultaneous democratization, consolidation, and economic growth in the globalizing world. The Indian COIN campaign in Kashmir is an important case study because it is a long-lasting insurgency in a democratic setting involving ethnic and religious minorities. As the world increasingly democratizes, such cases will highlight the importance of negotiations along with the use of military force in border disputed areas. The Nepal case is also critical because it illustrates a COIN strategy in a developing country that is also democratizing, a particularly challenging phase according to the theoretical literature.¹²

Can we consider the Nepalese case to be a success, or did a focused military approach produce irreparable damage to reconciliation efforts, which are now being fought out in the formation of a constituent assembly? Do we consider the Kashmir case to be successful in the past decade with the decline in violence, or is this a lull in the cycle of violence that is associated with groups in Pakistan? And very importantly, how do these cases contribute to our understanding of COIN approaches?

This thesis will begin by analyzing these two COIN approaches: population-centric and enemy-centric. The case of Kashmir, for instance, which currently appears to

¹⁰ Nathan Ray Springer, “Stabilizing the Debate between Population Centric and Enemy Centric Counterinsurgency: Success Demands a Balanced Approach” (Art of War Papers, Command and General Staff College, Kansas, 2012), 1.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Jack L. Snyder, *Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 2–3.

be in the midst of a population-centric approach, presents complexities due to conditions in Pakistan as well as, very importantly, a large presence of the military. Therefore, can we categorize it as a single approach? The Nepalese COIN, considered successful due to the end of a long, violent, Maoist insurgency and insurgent participation in the political process, has yet to be consolidated in the civil government. What then leads to the successful end of an insurgency? The importance of this study lies in advancing an understanding of what feeds insurgencies in the developing world and whether the current divisions, as defined in COIN studies, can solve the problem.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis presents its argument by applying a comparative method to the two cases of insurgency in Kashmir and Nepal with the purpose of understanding the effectiveness of divided COIN studies: the population-centric school and the enemy-centric school. The population-centric approach employs non-military activities to gain popular support and relies on the military only to protect the population from insurgent threats.¹³ The enemy-centric approach focuses on aggressive military operations to deal with the enemy by concentrating military efforts on destroying the insurgents' will and capability.¹⁴ Every insurgency and countering effort occurs within different circumstances and political settings. This consideration demands critical thinking and decision making among policy-makers. Therefore, this thesis addresses the question of what COIN approach is better for dealing with insurgencies in economically developing and democratic settings. It examines the two cases of India and Nepal: what has led to the current Indian success in Kashmir, and what led to the failure of Nepal's COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006, affecting consolidation at the national level.

The primary hypothesis for this thesis is that neither the population-centric nor the enemy-centric approach alone is better for dealing with insurgencies in economically

¹³ Mark Moyar, "The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin," *Small Wars Journal, Orbis Operations* (June 29, 2011), 5, accessed August 1, 2013, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-third-way-of-coin-defeating-the-taliban-in-sangin>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

developing democratic settings. Instead, a mixed approach of integrating national resources in support of the population and against an insurgency achieves a better outcome. The secondary hypothesis is that international aspects also need to be considered when mixing these approaches because no developing countries operate in isolation; they are deeply influenced by their global strategic position, external players, and strategic interests of their neighbors. In the case of Nepal and India, this includes players such as China, Pakistan, and the U.S. Therefore, the singular area-focused approach, the enemy or the population centric, does not take all the variables into account.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature relevant for this thesis includes theories of COIN, the Indian government's strategy in the Kashmir insurgency, the Nepalese government's strategy in addressing the Maoist insurgency, and various scholarly works on insurgencies in Kashmir and Nepal. This section provides an overview of this literature primarily focusing on COIN theory and practice and the application of different COIN approaches in Kashmir and Nepal. First, I define COIN and its enemy-centric and population-centric approaches based on theories. Second, I focus on the literature written about the Kashmir and Nepal COIN campaigns with a purpose of understanding how these two COIN approaches were applied and understood in their specific cases by the state as well as by South Asian scholars. The purpose of this section is to highlight the problems in strategy used in the region due to the ground realities of economic challenges and democratic consolidation, as well as the involvement of international players.

1. Defining COIN

COIN theorists argue that the ultimate objective in any COIN campaign is the same as any conventional war "to compel our enemy to do our will," considering COIN as a form of warfare.¹⁵ To attain this objective, the state has to mobilize its available

¹⁵ John Western, *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 4.

resources against threats. COIN, in this context, can be explained in its simplest form as the government's response to insurgency movements. According to the U.S. government's *Counterinsurgency Guide*, COIN consists of the "comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain an insurgency and address its root causes."¹⁶ Thus, COIN can be defined as an integrated set of political, socio-economic, security, and information operations aimed at defeating violence, preventing recurrences of such violence, and resolving the root causes of an insurgency.¹⁷

While combating the insurgency, some theorists argue, counterinsurgents must focus on attacking the insurgents' center of gravity; others claim protecting one's own center of gravity is more important.¹⁸ These theorists explain that insurgent fighters and the population are both critical in any COIN environment.¹⁹ According to Moore, among the COIN campaigns conducted during the last century, "nearly 40 percent succeeded in either suppressing the insurgents to a point that proved manageable for security forces or ending the insurgency altogether."²⁰ These explanations establish the two basic ways of defeating insurgency on which COIN theorists are divided: the enemy-centric school and the population-centric school.²¹

2. Enemy-Centric Approach

Some theorists and policy-makers consider the enemy-centric approach the key to defeating insurgency. According to Mark Moyar, to discourage the population from supporting an insurgency movement, counterinsurgents have to focus primarily on

¹⁶ U.S. Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, "Counterinsurgency Guide," 12, January 2009, accessed August 2, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf>.

¹⁷ Richard Scott Moore, "The Basics of Counterinsurgency," *Small Wars Journal*, 24, accessed August 2, 2013, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moorecoinpaper.pdf>.

¹⁸ Jack D. Kem, "Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005), 19–23, accessed August 14, 2013, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a550354.pdf>.

¹⁹ Moyar, "The Third Way of COIN," 5.

²⁰ Moore, "The Basics of Counterinsurgency," 13–14.

²¹ Austin Long, *Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 9; Colin H. Kahl, "COIN of the Realm: Is There a Failure of Counterinsurgency?" *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 6 (November/December 2007), 169–176.

aggressive military action against the insurgents' will and capability.²² He argues that the main task of the military is to destroy insurgent fighters first in order to defeat the insurgency; a supporting task is to prevent the population from supporting the insurgency through a limited campaign of WHAM, such as military-civic action.²³ The U.S. COIN guide summarizes this approach as: "First defeat the enemy, and all else will follow."²⁴ The recent victory of the Sri Lankan government against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) after a long period of conflict is considered a successful example of this approach.

Many scholars view offensive military operations against the insurgency as largely wasteful because they do not enhance legitimacy and cannot decisively address the socio-economic and political demands of the insurgency.²⁵ According to Moore, among various past COIN campaigns, "this approach resulted in repressive and authoritarian regimes, many installed by military coup...Counterinsurgency became an exercise in continuous suppression."²⁶ He also states that this approach demands a massive military force as well as the willingness to use extreme measures against the insurgents that fight from the population base. The coercive response of counterinsurgents is likely to lead to the death and casualty of many unarmed and neutral populations and to internal displacement, which favors insurgents in gaining popular support for their struggle.²⁷ This model involves predominantly the use of military force for domination or suppression of insurgents, so there are few scholars arguing in favor of the enemy-centric approach.

Nonetheless, some military officers claim that this approach is successful. Colonel C. E. Callwell, with his personal experience in many insurgencies, argues that the enemy-centric approach is effective for defeating insurgents by killing, wounding, or capturing

²² Moyar, "The Third Way of COIN," 5.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ U.S. Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, "Counterinsurgency Guide," 14.

²⁵ Moyar, "The Third Way of COIN," 5.

²⁶ Moore, "The Basics of Counterinsurgency," 14.

²⁷ Moyar, "The Third Way of COIN," 5.

them.²⁸ He further expresses the belief that the counterstrokes strategy conducted by highly mobile military columns is the most effective way of conducting a war against irregulars.²⁹ Colonel Gentil states, “Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy. There are flaws and limitations.”³⁰ Galula, one of the popular proponents of the population-centric approach, supports the case conditionally: an “insurgent cannot remain clandestine, engaging only in harassing attacks and terrorism indefinitely. Instead, the successful insurgents must eventually switchover to a conventional force and defeat the national government through conventional means.”³¹ According to Cox, if this is the case and can successfully be identified, counterinsurgents can launch a full-swing military offensive to destroy the insurgency.³² According to these scholars, the U.S. battle against Western Native American tribes, the British second Boer war in South Africa, French fighting in Algeria in 1841, and the Sri Lankan battle against the LTTE are some examples that better illustrate the enemy-centric approach in a successful COIN.³³

3. Population-Centric Approach

The roots of the present population-centric approach can be found in selected COIN literature by scholars such as David Galula, Robert Thompson, and Frank Kitson. A French military officer, Galula is well recognized in military education and training in COIN operations for his contribution to the field of COIN.³⁴ His background in fighting

²⁸ C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 129–136.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Gian Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” the Official Home Page of the United States Army, Dec 29, 2009, accessed July 29, 2013, <http://www.army.mil/article/32362/a-strategy-of-tactics-population-centric-coin-and-the-army/>.

³¹ Dan G. Cox and Thomas Bruscino, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol?” *SAMS Monograph Series* (Three Monographs from the Schools of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011), 3.

³² Ibid.

³³ Deepak Aneel Boyini, “Explaining Success and Failure: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and India” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 2010), 2–3, accessed August 1, 2013, http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/5038/10Dec_Boyini.pdf?sequence=1.

³⁴ Cox and Bruscino, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency,” 2.

insurgent movements in Algeria provides him with a unique insight into COIN operations. He argues that the government must work with the population to execute projects that win the hearts and minds of the people in order to gain legitimacy, which then prevents the population from aiding the insurgents.³⁵ Similarly, from their direct participation in successful COIN campaigns in Malaya, Vietnam, Burma, and Kenya, British theorists and COIN experts Thompson and Kitson stress that winning the hearts and minds of the population is the key to success in isolating insurgent fighters from the popular base and gaining the population's support.³⁶ The British COIN campaign in Malaya against a Maoist insurgency in the 1950s is an example of a successful population-centric approach, a "Hearts and Minds" campaign.

Other scholars, including Moyar, also argue that the population-centric approach mainly focuses on gaining popular support through non-military activities that address the "population's social, political, and economic grievances."³⁷ He further explains that the key to defeating an insurgency is to establish the government's legitimacy through people-oriented programs, such as socio-economic development, people-friendly military operations, and information operations. According to this model, the use of military operations is also considered valid as a minimum necessary force, but only for protecting the population and government activities when necessary.³⁸ Gentile's work complements this view; people are always the focus as the center of gravity, and they have to be protected. Thus, to be successful, this effort requires a major investment in time and resources because, in nature, this is almost the process of nation building.³⁹ The U.S. COIN guide summarizes this strategy as: "First protect and support the population, and all else will follow."⁴⁰

³⁵ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), viii-ix.

³⁶ Boyini, "Explaining Success and Failure," 7.

³⁷ Moyar, "The Third Way of COIN," 5.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics," 6; the U.S. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Manual*, A-5.

⁴⁰ U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, "Counterinsurgency Guide," 14.

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., one of the proponents of the population-centric approach, claims that “the American army was so conventionally minded and hidebound that it was unable to see a better way of population-centric COIN.”⁴¹ From the current U.S. COIN doctrine to its tactics, however, the U.S. response to COIN is focused extensively on the population-centric approach, such as the COIN campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴² Similarly, John Nagl, one of the most recognized proponents of this strategy, claims that “protecting the population was the key to success in any counterinsurgency campaign” and the army has to shift away from its “over-reliance on firepower to win wars.”⁴³ Like Krepinevich and Nagl, Cox and Thomas contend that a “successful COIN can only be achieved through population engagement, stability operations, and the creation of a functional state.”⁴⁴

In the literature on COIN theories and practices as discussed previously, scholars are divided into two main groups in explaining the success or failure of a COIN campaign. The population-centric group deals with people’s grievances to gain popular support and establish the government’s legitimacy and effectiveness by controlling the state’s institutions as the main efforts. As supporting efforts, this group also focuses on using limited coercive action to protect the population and other governmental activities from insurgent threats. Second, the enemy-centric group focuses mainly on fighting against insurgents to destroy their organization, will, and capability in order to defeat them physically. This group also advocates a limited WHAM campaign as a supporting focus.

This basic division between population-centric and enemy-centric approaches, however, presents problems in explaining the success or failure of a COIN campaign against insurgencies in economically developing countries with various complexities,

⁴¹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 164–168.

⁴² Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics,” 7.

⁴³ Cox and Brusino, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency,” 2.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

such as countries with transitional democratic settings, extensive ethnic mobilizations, border problems, and international factors. The two COIN campaigns of Kashmir and Nepal present such complexities.

4. Indian COIN Strategy in the Kashmir Insurgency

There are two distinct divisions in the Indian strategic thinking community when studying the Indian COIN approach in Kashmir. Some argue that Indian COIN efforts are guided by the population-centric approach, while others perceive the COIN in Kashmir as an enemy-centric approach. Scholars such as K.A. Muthanna, Rahul K. Bhonsle, Arpita Anant, David P. Fidler, and V.G. Patankar represent the population-centric work on Kashmir insurgency.⁴⁵ These scholars claim that the current Indian COIN response in Kashmir is clearly guided by the population-centric approach that considers population as the center of gravity. They also contend that there is a visible change in the attitudes of people towards security forces and various governmental projects.⁴⁶ Similarly, according to the Government of India's *Ministry of Home Affairs' Annual Report 2012–13*, despite a few violent incidents, people have started participating in well-established political processes and socio-economic development. This is illustrated by its normalizing state and local-election participation after 2002, the return of tourism, the growth of businesses, and an increased Indian center-state involvement on long-term and short-term projects.⁴⁷

Similarly, the Indian army's recent doctrine for sub-conventional operations (2006) stresses that the army must follow the philosophy of an "Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove," which indicates that the Indian Army's traditional military-oriented approach is

⁴⁵ Anant, "COIN and Op Sadbhavana in Jammu and Kashmir," 6–8.

⁴⁶ South Asian Terrorist Portal Database, "Jammu and Kashmir Assessment-Year 2012," accessed August 6, 2013, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/assessment2012.htm>.

⁴⁷ Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, "Annual Report 2012–2013," 6, accessed July 29, 2013, [http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR\(E\)1213.pdf](http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR(E)1213.pdf).

no longer adequate to deal with the Kashmiri insurgency.⁴⁸ The doctrine emphasizes that the conduct of COIN operations must concur with the doctrinal pattern of the people-centric approach, which highlights the need for maintaining political primacy, a multi-pronged thrust by all elements of national power, a WHAM campaign by keeping the population as the center of gravity, showing deep respect for human rights, increasing information operations, and carefully safeguarding the laws of the land.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the use of minimum necessary force is also supported by the doctrine. The doctrine states that all actions of the security forces must have a civil face and be directed towards strengthening the hands of civil authorities. As argued by Sahukar, this is an essential element of the people-centric COIN and a justifiable means against the insurgency with heavily foreign-backed, hardcore terrorists while giving a fair opportunity to others to cease violence, surrender, and join the moderate main-stream politics of the nation.⁵⁰ These doctrinal aspects are considered critical measures in creating a safe and secure environment for other government, political, and socio-economic initiatives supporting the population and neutralizing insurgent threats in Kashmir.

The second school is represented by scholars who advocate for the enemy-centric approach. According to them, the Indian COIN efforts against the Kashmiri insurgency supported by jihadis with active Pakistani support are focused on a strong military presence in Kashmir. The main proponents of this perspective are practitioners, security analysts, and researchers. Indian Army Brigadier General Amritpal Singh, who has extensive professional experience in the COIN field and is also a researcher, argues that “a conventional bias of the Indian army that is still dominant in the psyche of the army’s

⁴⁸ Behram A Sahukar, “The Indian Approach to COIN Operations,” 36, accessed August 8, 2013, <http://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=http%3A%2F%2Finsurgencyresearchgroup.files.wordpress.com%2F2008%2F03%2Fthe-indian-approach-to-counterinsurgency-operations-v2.doc>. (According to the author, information is drawn from the annual report of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1999–2006.)

⁴⁹ Indian Army, *Doctrine on Sub-Conventional Operations-2006* (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defense-Army, 2006), 41–56.

⁵⁰ Sahukar, “The Indian Approach,” 36.

thinkers,” is mainly due to the army’s deployment from a conventional role to a COIN role on a rotational basis.⁵¹ Similarly, Police Inspector General, K. P. S. Gill, who successfully led the COIN campaign against the Punjab insurgency in the early 1990s, is a well-recognized security analyst. Under his leadership, the state police were militarized and given military roles in the Punjab campaign that led to speedy operations against insurgents; this was also referred to as the Gill doctrine.⁵²

Other proponents of the enemy-centric approach include Rajesh Rajgopalan, a noted security scholar who argues that the paramilitary force, the Rashtriya Rifles, a dedicated COIN force that integrates an army ethos, equipment, and training to conduct COIN has achieved some success in Kashmir.⁵³ Sameer Lalwani agrees with his perspective by stating, “A closer look reveals that the Indian approach may be better characterized as a strategy of attrition, with the deployment of raw state coercion and an enemy-centric campaign to suffocate an insurgency through a saturation of forces.”⁵⁴ This author further explains that “when the Indian military has been deployed, it operates under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which includes the power of the security forces to make preventive arrests, search premises without warrant, and shoot and kill civilians.”⁵⁵

While explaining the COIN approach in the Kashmir insurgency, these experts view the strong coercive response against violent insurgents and cross-border jihadis with active Pakistani support as the main reason for the current success of the Indian COIN strategy. Citing various significant military efforts to reduce violence, control cross-

⁵¹ Amrit Pal Singh, “Countering Insurgency in South Asia: Three Approaches,” *Small Wars Journal* (September 23, 2011), accessed December 8, 2013, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/countering-insurgency-in-south-asia-three-approaches>.

⁵² Sameer Lalwani, “Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem,” *CTC SENTINEL* 4, issue 10 (October 2011), Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, accessed August 2, 2013, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss107.pdf>.

⁵³ Rajesh Rajgopalan, “Innovations in Counterinsurgency: The Indian Army’s Rashtriya Rifles,” *Contemporary South Asia* 13, no. 1 (March, 2004), 25–37, accessed September 12, 2013, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0958493042000209852?journalCode=ccsa20#preview>.

⁵⁴ Lalwani, “Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency.”

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

border infiltration, re-energize political and economic activities, and conduct WHAM operations, these scholars advocate strongly for aggressive security operations against the insurgents in Kashmir.

In the literature on the Indian COIN in Kashmir noted previously, we see two distinct divisions in the Indian strategic community: the population-centric group and the enemy-centric group. These groups place their own claim behind the current success of the Kashmir COIN as key. Despite the Indian military's initial success in preventing insurgents from launching large-scale guerrilla warfare and limiting terror acts during the 1990s, the Indian government seemed ineffective in winning popular support. The public continued to confront the security forces, reject the elections of 1996, and provide support to the insurgency. After 1998, the state had to adopt a new approach. Some important literature on what occurred in the past decades sheds light on the changed strategy. As stated by the South Asian Terrorist Portal Database, the gradually declining trend of insurgent violence, increasing popular participation in the political process, improving economic growth, and returning tourism have been observed in Kashmir since 2003.⁵⁶ India adopted a WHAM campaign along with aggressive military deployment in Kashmir, which has contributed to the current change in the security situation.⁵⁷ The Indian military remains in Kashmir. This case thus provides the opportunity to explore whether the change in the Indian COIN approach from the enemy-centric to the mixed approach has led to the current success in Kashmir.

5. Nepalese COIN Strategy against the Maoist Insurgency

In Nepal's COIN campaign against the Maoist insurgency, many studies have been done by various international and national scholars, such as Mahendra Lawoti and Anup Pahari, Deepak Thapa, Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone and Suman Pradhan, and Timothy R. Kreuttner. These scholars argue that Nepal's COIN effort was focused on a heavy military response against the Maoist insurgency, and the Nepalese

⁵⁶ South Asian Terrorism Portal, "Annual Casualties and Assessment—Kashmir," accessed July 13, 2013, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

government and security forces did not address people's grievances.⁵⁸ According to Lawoti and Pahari, when Nepal security forces captured and killed a large number of Maoist cadres, leaders, and sympathizers who were suspected of being Maoists, this attempt to repress the insurgency further escalated the violence, which eventually led to failure of the campaign.⁵⁹ Also, Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan, a noted researcher, policy maker, and journalist (respectively), contend that "the army and police's excessively brutal security response alienated many, making it difficult for the state to win over the hearts and minds of the general population."⁶⁰ According to these scholars, Nepal's military-oriented efforts against the insurgency led to a massive escalation of the fighting and a rapidly increased number of battle deaths that made the population turn away from supporting the government and security forces.⁶¹

Other proponents include Deepak Thapa, a noted journalist and editor, who describes how the state's neglect of many of its people combined with political instability and a military-oriented response to the Maoist insurgency led to Nepal's COIN failure.⁶² According to Kreuttner, "the Nepalese government and security forces failed to balance their military approach with social and political issues, which contributed to the state's inability to restore effective governance."⁶³ Similarly, as John Mackinlay argues, "The vital ground was the population, but the government and security forces opted for a military campaign that helped to drive the uncommitted communities into the arms of the insurgents."⁶⁴ As these scholars claim, the Nepal case illustrates that the Nepalese government's overemphasized military approach, directed toward eliminating the

⁵⁸ R.C. Poudyal, "Nepal Army and COIN against the Maoist Insurgency" (master's thesis, Tribhuvan University, Nepal, 2012), 5.

⁵⁹ Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century* (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2010), 305–309.

⁶⁰ Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone and Suman Pradhan, *Nepal in Transition: from People's War to Fragile Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 20–23.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Deepak Thapa, *A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency 1996 to 2003* (Kathmandu: the Printhouse, 2003), 135.

⁶³ Kreuttner, "The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 5.

⁶⁴ John Mackinlay, "Nepal's Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era," *The RUSI Journal*, 152, no. 3 (June 18, 2007), 42–46, accessed July 30, 2013, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840701470384>.

insurgency, became unsuccessful in establishing the government's legitimacy and effectiveness in controlling the state's institutions.

According to this literature on Nepal's COIN, as noted earlier, although the Maoists ended their violent efforts and joined the political process, the government's constant emphasis on a military option throughout the campaign ought to be seen as a failure.⁶⁵ This excessive security operation made people lose faith in the state. The Maoist insurgents took advantage of this weakness of the government and successfully gained popular support. At the same time, they actively pursued armed action against the security forces, keeping a political option open.⁶⁶ As a result, they easily got the upper hand in political negotiations, achieved a safe landing, and joined mainstream politics. Eventually, this party became the largest political player in Nepalese politics.⁶⁷ Nepal is currently at a critical juncture, where "the process of constitution drafting and political transition is deadlocked in a final tussle between Monarchists, Democrats, and the Communists," as argued by Sharma.⁶⁸ According to the Institute of Peace and Conflicts Studies (IPCS) review's failed state index, the ranking assigned to Nepal in 2013 is worse than its ranking in 2005 when Nepal was in the middle of the COIN campaign.⁶⁹ As these scholars argue, Nepal's case shows that the COIN strategy requires not only focus on military efforts, which can be counterproductive, but on other aspects to achieve success.

⁶⁵ Poudyal, "Explaining the Success," 1–3.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Manish Thapa, "Role of Civil Society and Political Party in Current Nation/State Building Process in Nepal," National Seminar on New Dynamics of Development: Challenges and Prospects (Lalitpur, Nepal: Nepal Administrative Staff College, November 12–13, 2008), 1–14, accessed August 21, 2013, http://www.fesnepal.org/reports/2008/seminar_reports/Paper_cets/paper_thapa.pdf.

⁶⁸ Yelisha Sharma, "Nepal and the Failed States Index," Institute of Peace and Conflicts Studies Database, Articles 30, Review #4059 (July 2013), accessed September 2, 2013, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database/nepal-and-the-failed-states-index-4059.html>.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

6. Why a Third Way: A Mixed Approach?

Neither the population-centric approach nor the enemy-centric approach sufficiently explains what is going on in Nepal and Kashmir. As Galula and Paget point out, the mixed approach is more likely to lead to success of the COIN campaign—depending on various complexities, such as the state of democratic consolidation, extensive ethnic mobilization, border problems, and international factors.⁷⁰ Kilcullen further supports this argument that successful counterinsurgencies adopt a mixed approach integrating all appropriate national means to aggressively pursue the enemy, win over the population, and protect them from insurgent threats and collateral damage.⁷¹ Scholars such as Cox and Bruscano, Moyar, Moore, Springer, and Gentile talk about the mixed approach. The two COIN cases of Nepal and Kashmir allow us to understand these various arguments on the mixed approach.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis will use the comparative method to analyze and explain the increased levels of success of the Indian COIN approach in Kashmir and the failure of Nepal's COIN approach against Maoists and, specifically, what led to the current Indian success in Kashmir and Nepal's failure at home. In this thesis, I compare and analyze COIN strategies of the mixed Indian approach against the Kashmiri insurgency and Nepal's enemy-centric approach against its Maoist insurgency as independent variables, which lead to variations in the outcome of the COIN campaigns.

Another independent variable in this research is a COIN strategy with a purely population-centric approach. This will, however, not be analyzed and compared here because there really have not been any cases where a purely population-centric approach was used throughout the campaign. For example, even in the British COIN campaign in Malaya—considered one of the most successful population-centric COIN strategies—the aggressive military operation 'Search and Destroy' was used to weaken armed elements

⁷⁰ Boyini, "Explaining Success and Failure," 9.

⁷¹ Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 1.

of insurgency, combined with an effective population re-settlement program WHAM that took away the insurgents' base of support.⁷² In any COIN environment there is always, by definition and execution, organized and purposeful use of violence by both insurgents and counterinsurgents. More or less, and either earlier, later or throughout the campaign, coercion has to play a role to successfully settle the conflict along with other elements, such as political, economic, and people-oriented programs.⁷³ Moreover, depending on the specific circumstances—for example, the state of economically challenged democratic settings, widespread ethnic mobilization, extensive external and internal support to the insurgency, border problems, and international factors—a purely population-centric approach is less likely to serve the purpose of counterinsurgents, as illustrated by various historical cases.⁷⁴ Thus, it is not worth investigating this category of case.

When analyzing the dependent variable, the outcome of the COIN campaign is defined by the degree of success in eliminating the armed insurgent threat.⁷⁵ There are mainly two conditions for this outcome: First, the degree to which people consider the government legitimate and effective in controlling social, political, and economic institutions that meet the needs of the population include adequate mechanisms to address grievances.⁷⁶ Second, the degree of marginalization of insurgents to the point at which they are destroyed, reduced to irrelevance in numbers and capability, or co-opted into government mechanisms.⁷⁷

The degree of success and failure of these two conditions is measured by success of the political and electoral process, economic growth, violent incidents, individual freedom, establishment and improvement of infrastructure, rehabilitation of the displaced population, the effective functioning of basic popular services, and the restoration of

⁷² Gian, "A Strategy of Tactics," 8–9.

⁷³ Cox and Bruscano, "Population-Centric Counterinsurgency," 8.

⁷⁴ Boyini, "Explaining Success and Failure," 9.

⁷⁵ U.S. Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, "Counterinsurgency Guide," 4.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

urban facilities.⁷⁸ This thesis attempts to explain how the mixed approach of the Indian COIN in Kashmir has contributed to the current success as compared to Nepal's failure from 1996 to 2006. For this research purpose, I will use primary as well as secondary sources.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is organized into five chapters. The introductory chapter includes the research question with a contextualized background (identifying importance, problems, and hypotheses), a literature review, and methodology. Chapter II discusses the insurgency and COIN in Kashmir, explaining the background of the Kashmir insurgency, underlying factors sustaining the insurgency, the present state of the insurgency, and the Indian COIN approach in Kashmir. To measure current success in Kashmir, the insurgency situation and the impact of the Indian COIN approach will be analyzed. This chapter will divide the Indian COIN campaigns into two periods—from 1989 to 1998, and from 1998 to the present—in order to evaluate the increased level of success in Kashmir.

Chapter III focuses on the insurgency and COIN in Nepal, explaining the background of the Maoist insurgency, analysis of the insurgency and Nepalese COIN approach. To measure the outcome of the COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006, Nepal's COIN approach will be analyzed here. This chapter will divide the Nepalese security operations of the COIN campaign into two periods—from 1995 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2006—in order to evaluate the increased level of success in Kashmir. In Chapter IV, this thesis does a comparative analysis of the Indian and Nepalese COIN campaigns, also explaining the post-1998 success of the Kashmir COIN, the failure of Nepal's COIN effort, and lessons learned from these campaigns. This analysis will be useful for understanding the importance of the mixed approach for better success of the COIN campaigns. The final chapter will conclude the thesis with some findings and policy

⁷⁸ John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," *RAND Counterinsurgency Study 5* (2008), 61, accessed August 28, 2013, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.5.pdf.

recommendations. The thesis attempts to highlight how correctly adopting COIN strategies will influence the degree of success or failure of COIN campaigns. This analysis will be useful for understanding the importance of the mixed approach for better success of the COIN campaigns.

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II. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN KASHMIR

In order to explain and analyze the insurgency and the Indian COIN campaign in Kashmir, it is essential to understand the core issues that led to the insurgency's birth, growth, and sustainment, and the Indian COIN efforts in different periods of time in Kashmir. Kashmir is the most contentious issue that has strained the relation between India and Pakistan since their partition in 1947 as it is widely considered by Pakistanis as an unfinished agenda of the partition. India and Pakistan have already fought three full-scale wars over Kashmir in 1947, 1965, and 1971 and one localized war in 1999. They have also been engaged in a nuclear capability race since the 1970s.⁷⁹

In addition, on the domestic front in India, from 1989 to the present, some among the Kashmiri people have been engaged in an insurgency against the Indian central and state government in Kashmir. A movement of Kashmiri Muslims, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), launched a guerrilla rebellion against the Indian rulers aimed at liberating Kashmir from India and reuniting it with Pakistani-controlled Kashmir as a single independent state from 1989.⁸⁰ Besides local Kashmiri insurgents, Islamic fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries from the Middle East assist Kashmiri insurgents. This insurgency continues to evolve primarily with Pakistani support to insurgents.⁸¹ Therefore, the Kashmir insurgency is complex and consists of multiple players, such as India, Pakistan, and segments of the Kashmiri Muslim population.

In response, since 1990, India mobilized and maintained a large military presence to fight the insurgency in Kashmir and control the terrorists' infiltration and exfiltration across the Line of Control (LOC). India has also adopted a WHAM campaign with

⁷⁹ Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, *India Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 14–19.

⁸⁰ Raju G.C. Thomas, "India's Security Environment, Towards the Year 2000," Conference Paper on the U.S. War College's Strategic Studies Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (July 1996), 3, accessed July 18, 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub118.pdf>.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

massive security operations, political process, and socio-economic development programs. These efforts against the Kashmiri insurgency have experienced failure and success at various junctures and the campaign is an ongoing one.

This chapter analyzes the roots, growth, and sustainment of the insurgency and the Indian government's COIN efforts against it. The focus of this chapter will be on the Indian government's COIN strategy from 1989 to the present in order to measure the recent Indian success in the economically challenged, democratizing setting of Kashmir. The insurgency in Kashmir is linked with territorial dispute, extensive ethnic mobilization, and active external support. This research will illustrate that the mixed COIN approach of integrating all appropriate national resources to aggressively pursue the enemy, win over the population, and protect them from insurgents' violence and collateral damage is more likely to lead to success in the COIN campaign in such a complex situation. This is unlike the situation in Nepal, where the Nepalese government overemphasized the militarist approach throughout the campaign against the Maoists, which I will demonstrate in the next chapter. Here, I compare the Indian approach in different phases of the Kashmiri insurgency to some elements of COIN theories and the approaches taken in Nepal, which outline some essential prerequisites for the success of the counterinsurgency campaign. These elements include adherence to political methods of addressing the people's grievances, overall socio-economic development in the insurgency-affected region, and an effective security operation to defeat the armed elements of insurgency and protect the population from violence. An analysis of these aspects will identify whether the Indian mixed COIN approach has led to the current success in Kashmir, or whether this success is due to the change in the role of Pakistan and international actors on the issue of Kashmir.

A. BACKGROUND OF THE INSURGENCY IN KASHMIR

The insurgency in Kashmir dates back to the mid-to late-1980s, but it is rooted in pre-1947 British India. The insurgency has claimed over 50,000 lives and led to the internal displacement of about 200,000 Kashmiri Hindus and some neutral Muslims.⁸² In order to gain a better understanding of this issue, it is essential to begin with the brief pre-partition history of British India, which provides the background of political and social discontent among the majority Muslim population against the Hindu rule in Kashmir. Second, an understanding of the history of denial of democratic rights and institutions to the people of Kashmir and social imbalance in post-partitioned Kashmir is also required. The third important factor is to know why and how Kashmir strained relations between India and Pakistan, and why Pakistan played an actively supportive role in this insurgency. Last, the analysis of the Kashmiri insurgency attempts to present the complexity of the Kashmiri insurgency, from the grassroots level to the international level that India has been fighting for more than two decades.

1. Pre-Partition India and Internal Politics in Kashmir

During the British rule in India, an inadequate political and social system under a Hindu Maharaja's administration led to dissatisfaction among the Muslim population. At the time, Jammu and Kashmir were home to a number of ethnic and religious groups with a population that was 77 percent Muslim, 20 percent Hindu, and 3 percent others (mostly Sikh and Buddhist).⁸³ The Muslim majority in Kashmir had been ruled by minority Hindu kings for a century from 1846 to 1947. The majority population viewed the government of the Maharaja and the Hindu minority population as oppressing the majority because the Hindu minority population owned most of the land, controlled the education system, and occupied a significant number of seats in the state's civil

⁸² Paul Medhurst, *Global Terrorism* (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction, 2002), 285–289.

⁸³ Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 15–16.

administration and military.⁸⁴ As claimed by Bakaya and Bhatti, while a very few Muslims were educated and given access to government jobs, most Muslims remained uneducated and underemployed by the state.⁸⁵ According to them, it is possible that the Muslim population experienced social discrimination under Hindu rulers because many Kashmiri Muslims were Hindus before they were forced to convert to Islam during Afghan Rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁸⁶

The unequal treatment of the Muslim majority under Hindu rule would become the foundation for the separatist movement. The movement first appeared in 1932, when Mohammed Sheikh Abdullah, a Kashmiri Muslim leader, started a peaceful movement, All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (MC), for social and political change in Kashmir. Ultimately, MC gave a space for the people's dissatisfaction and frustration to surface in Kashmir.⁸⁷ From the 1930s to the mid-1940s, the political movement in Kashmir gained momentum, changing its course from the Muslim Conference (MC) in 1931 to a Muslim and non-Muslim alliance named the National Conference (NC) in 1939 and the Quit Kashmir Movement targeted against the Maharaja in 1946.⁸⁸ This movement was an initiative of NC for a revolutionary overthrow of the Maharaja's regime, which became a landmark in the history of political mobilization against the state in Kashmir. All these efforts from the 1930s to 1940s solely focused on the issue of political and social imbalance in Kashmir.

2. Kashmir during Partition

During the partition in 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, was asked to choose one side between India and Pakistan, but he remained undecided. Following the

⁸⁴ Ibid., 16–19.

⁸⁵ Priyanka Bakaaya and Sumeet Bhatti, "Kashmir Conflict: A Study of What Led to the Insurgency in Kashmir Valley and Proposed Future Solutions," accessed October 13, 2013 <http://www.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Kashmir%20Conflict%20-%20A%20Study%20of%20What%20Led%20to%20the%20Insurgency%20in%20Kashmir%20Valley.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict*, 20.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 19–20.

partition, Kashmir became an independent nation with an understanding that it would soon decide whether to join secular India or Muslim Pakistan due to the democratic movement led by the NC.⁸⁹ Having close trade and transport links with Pakistan's North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), and Western Punjab, the Maharaja signed the—Standstill Agreement—with the government of Pakistan.⁹⁰

The Standstill Agreement did not last long before Muslim rebels from Kashmir and Pakistani army members disguised as tribesmen started to revolt against the Maharaja from Poonch, Muzaffarabad, and Mirpur. The situation in Kashmir became hostile and the uprising was initially successful in capturing the territory, including the capital of Srinagar, which directly threatened the Maharaja's government.⁹¹ This uprising resulted in violence committed against the Hindu minority living in Jammu and Kashmir and the government of the Maharaja. He became unable to regain control, which forced him to request military assistance from India. The Maharaja sent Sheikh Abdullah to New Delhi seeking Indian military assistance because Abdullah was a politically elected leader, who represented the people of Kashmir. Without an official request for accession, India refused to provide military assistance. Therefore, the Maharaja signed the Statement of Accession with India. Immediately, India deployed its military to Kashmir. The Indian army alongside the local Kashmiris fought against the invaders.⁹²

3. Indian Role in Kashmir

The first war in 1948–49 left the state of Jammu and Kashmir divided between India and Pakistan as Indian occupied Kashmir (IOK) and Pakistani Occupied Kashmir (POK). IOK became one of the states of the Indian Union under Indian Constitution, Article 370⁹³ and POK was called *Azad Kashmir* (Free Kashmir) under Pakistani control.

⁸⁹ Ganguly and Kapur, *India Pakistan, and the Bomb*, 10–11.

⁹⁰ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India and Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 16.

⁹¹ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 17.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict*, 45.

As Bose states, India and Pakistan have made their position clear since then “to make possession of Kashmir the cornerstone of their respective identities as states.”⁹⁴

In the post-partition history of Kashmir, one of the most important factors supporting the growth of the insurgency is the history of denial of democratic rights and institutions to the Kashmiri people due to a combination of political control from New Delhi, incompetent handling of the domestic situation by the state government of Kashmir, and an increased level of awareness among the population from education and media exposure.⁹⁵ First, Kashmir had acceded to the Indian union only with regards to defense, foreign affairs, and communications portfolios as all other princely states, and the special status of Kashmir was well recognized in the Indian Constitution.⁹⁶ As Bose argues, over time, Kashmiri autonomy granted under the Indian Constitution was eroded as the Indian government consistently began pursuing more centralized authoritarian policies toward Kashmir and imposing heavy-handed antiterrorism laws, manipulating election results, and gradually centralizing power in Delhi, which resulted in the increasing deinstitutionalization of Kashmiri politics.⁹⁷ The elected governments of Kashmir had little legitimacy with the Kashmiri public.

Second, due to the blessing from New Delhi, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, a close ally of the center, monopolized the power and politics of the state. He never allowed any opposition party to enter into Kashmiri politics.⁹⁸ This trend continued throughout the period of the 1950s to the 1980s. The state government run by Abdullah’s Jammu Kashmir National Conference party became highly corrupt and ineffective at addressing the genuine grievances of the population.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 8.

⁹⁵ Sumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay,” *International Security* 21, no. 6 (Fall, 1996): 1–20, accessed July 18, 2013, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sumit.htm>.

⁹⁶ Ganguly and Kapur, *India Pakistan, and the Bomb*, 10.

⁹⁷ Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict*, 30–38.

⁹⁸ Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency,”

Third, in the 1970 and 1980s, due to the policies of both the Kashmiri National Conference and Indian central government, the educational institutions, literacy rates, and access to mass media flourished in Kashmir, which resulted in the freedom of speech and great political awareness among Kashmiris.⁹⁹ The overall literacy rate in Jammu and Kashmir increased more than 43 percent, the third-fastest growth rate in the nation.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, the rapid spread of Muslim schools, *madrassas*, throughout Kashmir increased the sentiments of Islamic activism. This was due to the Soviet-Afghan war taking place in the region, which provided large resources to the Muslim fundamentalists. This will be discussed in the next section. These developments coupled with rising unemployment and declining economic prosperity created a more politically conscious younger generation, who had a better understanding of the social and political situations that affected their lives.¹⁰¹ This factor ultimately dragged them towards violent groups. Thus, the combination of political mobilization and institutional decay in Kashmir, as discussed earlier, gave motivation to organize the mass protests against the Indian policy in Kashmir.¹⁰²

During the 1980s, the already developed discontent and frustration among the Kashmiri people became even more exacerbated when the Indian government led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi began pursuing more centralized and repressive policies against the issue of separatists' demands and also against those opposing the centralizing authority in Delhi.¹⁰³ New Delhi's manipulation of the election results of 1983 and 1987 in order to suppress the separatist movement of Kashmiri Muslims and prevent them from gaining power and the people's support placed the Kashmiris under violent confrontation, and this produced mistrust in Kashmir towards New Delhi's authority.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Ganguly and Kapur, *India Pakistan, and the Bomb*, 16.

¹⁰⁰ Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency."

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Ganguly and Kapur, *India Pakistan, and the Bomb*, 16.

¹⁰³ Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency," 96.

¹⁰⁴ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 90–91.

Subsequently, the mass protests and popular mobilization supporting militancy increased in the valley.

The final turning point happened on December 8, 1989, when the daughter of the Indian Minister of Home Affairs, Dr. Rubiya Sayeed, was kidnapped by members of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) as she was leaving the government hospital in Srinagar.¹⁰⁵ Following this incident, New Delhi promulgated and implemented the Terrorists and Destructive Activities Prevention Acts to crack down on the anti-Indian movement, which granted the local law enforcement agencies the right to search and detain pro-secessionist groups.¹⁰⁶ From 1988 to 1989, the police regularly put down strikes, protests, and violence organized by local youths and secessionists. Day by day, the situation experienced further lawlessness that ultimately beefed up the spiral of violence. As a result, the majority of young Kashmiris started joining the militancy.¹⁰⁷

As the confrontation continued, other armed groups joined the movement, and the clash between security forces and insurgent groups expanded throughout Kashmir rapidly. Among other militant groups operating in the beginning were the prominent JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).¹⁰⁸ By early 1990, the situation in Kashmir turned from local terrorism to growing insurgency.¹⁰⁹ To fight insurgency, India enforced the Kashmir Disturbed Act of 1990, which essentially put Kashmir under presidential rule.¹¹⁰ The Indian Army and police forces were then free to conduct unrestrained COIN operations and use all available means necessary to regain control.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency," 76.

¹⁰⁶ Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 84–90.

¹⁰⁷ Saheen Akhtar, *Uprising in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir* (Islamabad: Institute of Foreign Studies, 1991), 49–69.

¹⁰⁸ Tamar Mitts, "Targeting and Spatial Spread of Insurgent Violence: A Study of Jammu and Kashmir," 1–40, accessed August 29, 2013, tamarmitts.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/senior-honors-thesisnyu.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ Jamal, *Shadow War: Untold Story*, 47.

¹¹⁰ Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Cross Fire* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2003), 154–156.

¹¹¹ Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 112.

4. Pakistani Role in Kashmir

According to Patankar, the insurgency in Kashmir was not started by Pakistan, but by “the insurgency entangled in Pakistani efforts to continue its long-standing attempts to wrest Kashmir from India.”¹¹² Apart from Indian misrule and undemocratic and inefficient Kashmiri politics, Pakistan from the beginning of the partition continuously attempted to take control over Kashmir by using all state and non-state means available as well as international actors. In 1964, Pakistan attempted to ignite internal rebellion against Indian occupation in Kashmir through Operation Gibraltar that was followed by Operation Grand Slam, but Kashmiri separatist groups did not support them, and Pakistan became completely unsuccessful. Later in the 1980s, the change in Pakistani politics and society during General Zia ul-Haq’s administration primarily altered the type of violence in Kashmir. Mainly there are two aspects, which are important to note here.

First, Pakistan became one of the major channels for open and secret international military aid, including arms and funding to Afghani Mujahidin to fight against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.¹¹³ The military aid was coming from the U.S. China, and various Arab countries through Pakistan. With active Pakistani support, trained, armed, and experienced Mujahidin fighters were shifted to Kashmir to support the insurgency after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.¹¹⁴ In addition, foreign fighters began arriving in Kashmir from other countries of the Middle East to assist the insurgents’ struggle against Indian rule.¹¹⁵ Foreign jihadi fighters brought unique strength to bolster

¹¹² V.G. Patankar, “Insurgency, Proxy War, and Terrorism in Kashmir,” in *India and Counterinsurgency*, eds. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2009), 65.

¹¹³ Ganguly and Kapur, *India Pakistan, and the Bomb*, 16.

¹¹⁴ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 110–118.

¹¹⁵ Prakash Singh, *Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail* (New Delhi: Rupa & Company, 2001), 184–185.

local insurgents in Kashmir.¹¹⁶ According to Jamal, there were about 2,500 Pakistani-backed insurgents operating in Kashmir at any time after 1993.¹¹⁷

Second, according to Jamal, additional safe and secure training camps were established on the Pakistani side of Kashmir, and Pakistan also began to arm and train Kashmiri youth who crossed the LOC for training to fight insurgency operations against India. These youths were given continuous moral and material support as well as intelligence in the mid-1980s and 1990s. The pro-Kashmiri independence group, JKLF, is one of the organizations that was initially trained and supported by Pakistan. This later became a pro-Pakistani group in the 1980s. This group conducted a violent movement for Kashmiri independence and was responsible for much of the violence in Kashmir prior to the outbreak of the Islamist insurgency in 1989.¹¹⁸ JKLF also engaged in hijacking aircraft and in the kidnapping and killing of diplomats and politicians within and outside Kashmir. Militants in Kashmir relied continuously on training and support provided from Pakistan and the Kashmiri diaspora.

Even after the insurgency broke out in Kashmir, Pakistan's initiative to take advantage of the Kashmiri uprising and deteriorated security situation played a crucial role in growing and sustaining the insurgency in Kashmir. Various scholars contend that Pakistan openly supported Kashmiri separatists with extensive financial and material support.¹¹⁹ According to Byman, "Pakistan, one of the most generous sponsors of insurgent groups in the 1990s, provided tens of millions of dollars to its favored movements."¹²⁰ The external assistance by the Kashmiri diaspora living in Europe and America and some Islamic charities were directly lobbied on the Kashmiri's behalf by

¹¹⁶ Peter Chalk, "Pakistan Role in Insurgency," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 1 (September 2001), accessed August 12, 2013, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2001/09/01/JIR.html>.

¹¹⁷ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 46–49.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Matthew J. Van Wagenen, "An Analysis of the Indian Government's COIN Campaign in Jammu and Kashmir" (master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004), 53, accessed August 20, 2013, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada428962>.

¹²⁰ Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Moments* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 17.

Pakistan.¹²¹ The cost to fund this insurgency was estimated to be \$125 million to \$250 million per year and was provided through Pakistan.¹²²

Various scholars such as T.V. Paul and Peter Chalk argue that the strategy of Pakistan in Kashmir is a low-cost, high-gain option, which has been considered as a means of balancing the asymmetries between the two countries in the Kashmiri theatre.¹²³ As the recent RAND Corporation report argues, “the use of militant groups, including the Taliban, has remained an important instrument for Pakistan’s security forces in its regional strategy.”¹²⁴ Pakistani influence and support to the Kashmiri insurgency, therefore, has become very critical in sustaining the insurgency. Pakistan has used the insurgency as a subversive ‘proxy war’ strategy against Indian rule in Kashmir.¹²⁵

5. Analysis of the Kashmiri Insurgency

According to these contextual reviews as mentioned previously, the Kashmiri insurgency has evolved in an economically developing democratic setting that has extensive ethnic and religious mobilization, problematic border relations with Pakistan, and active external support. After partition, India continuously attempted to bring Kashmir under the control of the center although that was not the mandate promised to the Kashmiri people by the Nehru administration. Economically, while the center poured some resources into Kashmir, the lack of focus on distribution created immense discontent among the majority population. The center’s and the state’s policies of the liberalization of education and mass media in the 1970s changed the awareness level of the Kashmiris and helped to raise their already surfaced frustration and dissatisfaction.

¹²¹ Huntington P Samuel, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of the New World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 274.

¹²² Chalk, “Pakistan Role in Insurgency,” 3.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, “Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis,” monograph (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 97.

Thus, the birth of the Kashmiri insurgency was caused mainly by the Indian internal mismanagement of Kashmiri politics.

As far as the growth and sustainment of the insurgency in Kashmir is concerned, there are not only internal factors, but also regional and international factors playing a significant role. There are conflicting interests among the players, such as India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri population. For both the nuclear states, India and Pakistan, giving up on Kashmir is unacceptable because of their political and security interests. The Kashmiris themselves lack a common stance on the issue of the status of Kashmir: whether to support independence or statehood under Indian union, or to become part of Pakistan. The insurgency in Kashmir, therefore, is one of the most complex and complicated insurgencies from the individual to the international level. First, in human terms, the Kashmir conflict has already cost the lives of an estimated 40,000 to 80,000 people and made refugees of 400,000.¹²⁶ Due to the impact of this conflict, the long-standing integrated sense of Kashmiriyat (Kashmiriness), the ethno-national, and social consciousness, and the cultural values of the Kashmiri identity have been fading away.¹²⁷

Second, the Kashmiri population lacks the common stance regarding the identity of Kashmir, which has played an important role in sustaining the insurgency in Kashmir. The rival Muslim insurgent groups are also divided on their political preferences and they very often fight among themselves on the issue of accession into Pakistan or independence from India.¹²⁸ The minority population from other religious communities, such as Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and some moderate Muslims, are in favor of maintaining the current Indian center-state political structure. They consider that Kashmir can be politically and economically developed and stable under a secular participatory democratic, economically emerging, and militarily growing India. But, they are continuously targeted and forced to flee from Kashmir by terrorists.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Medhurst, *Global Terrorism*, 286–289.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Wagenen, “An Analysis of the Indian Government’s COIN,” 11.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 17.

Third, from the regional point of view, a country without Kashmir is in no way acceptable for both India and Pakistan and that has also fueled sustaining the insurgency in Kashmir. The Indian stance is that Kashmir is an integral part of its inclusive democratic and secular nation state. It believes that the loss of its only Muslim-majority region, Kashmir, could instigate other states to demand autonomy, thus destroying a long-practiced, constitutionally secular India.¹³⁰ Pakistan holds Kashmir on the top of its national political agenda. It perceives that a Pakistan without Kashmir is territorially and ideologically incomplete. There are strong stances among the Pakistani military community, extremist Islamic groups, and politicians on the Kashmir issue.¹³¹ These Indian and Pakistani stances on Kashmir have also added energy to the Kashmiri population not taking either side but struggling for independence in Kashmir. In addition, there has been continuous fighting between Pakistani proxies and Indian security forces for more than two decades.

Fourth, from the international perspective, Kashmir is likely to remain among the most dangerous existing conflicts in the modern world.¹³² India and Pakistan have already fought four wars since their independence in 1947. After the successful test of nuclear weapons in May 1998, both of them are now nuclear capable and focused to achieve the catastrophic defeat of one another. In this context, the prevailing condition of the Pakistani state and military, which are connected with the armed militancy in Kashmir and the extremist Islamic terrorist groups within Pakistan, is more alarming and likely to lead to future crises over Kashmir. Arriving at a common solution to such a complex insurgency that addresses interests of all the key actors as noted previously is extremely troublesome.

On the other hand, the rise of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was not only due to political exclusion, bad governance, and socio-economic-cultural inequalities that prevailed in the 1990s, but also to the continuation of the radical leftist movement of

¹³⁰ Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 128–130.

¹³¹ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 128–129.

¹³² Wagenen, “An Analysis of the Indian COIN,” 11.

Nepal since 1949. The Maoist insurgency was a completely internal security problem, which ended in 2006 when a nationwide mass movement was organized by the Maoists along with all opposition political parties. This movement led to a comprehensive peace agreement, the negotiated political settlement that accommodated the most important demands of the Maoist insurgents. The next chapter will illustrate this.

B. INDIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN KASHMIR

The Indian government has been involved in various COIN campaigns since its partition in 1947. The Kashmir insurgency is one of the most complex, longest, and most serious internal security problems as discussed earlier, one which contains conflicting interests among multiple players, such as India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people. These interests include the independence of Kashmir by the majority of Kashmiri Muslims, preservation of a secular nation fought for by India, and unification of the Muslim state claimed by Pakistan. Kashmir also presents international border complexity with Pakistan, on which India and Pakistan have already fought four conventional wars.

Since 1989, India has mobilized its security forces to fight the insurgency and maintain internal peace and security in Kashmir. This ongoing COIN campaign has experienced failure and success at various junctures. While analyzing the level of success, some variables of the mixed approach, which are considered to be the essential prerequisites for the success of the COIN campaign, will be evaluated. These variables include effective security operations to defeat the armed elements of insurgency and protect the population from violence along with a WHAM campaign, a political way of addressing the people's grievances, and the overall socio-economic development in the insurgency-affected region. In order to measure the level of success, the COIN campaign is divided into the phases: the first phase from 1989 to 2000 and the second phase from 2001 to 2013. The campaign is divided into two phases because after 2001, the Indian COIN strategy shifted from a singular approach, an aggressive military response, to a mixed approach that included continuing massive military deployment along with people-oriented programs, such as a campaign to win hearts and minds, socio-economic development programs, dialogue with local groups, and a legitimate political process.

1. First Phase (From 1989 to 2000)

a. Security Operations

Indian COIN strategy from 1989 to 2000 in Kashmir was a singular—military only—approach to counter the separatist insurgency operating with strong Pakistani support. The Indian government mobilized the Indian military of roughly 300,000 to conduct a full-scale COIN campaign battling dozens of insurgent groups across Kashmir.¹³³ The majority of Kashmiri people blamed India for doing too little, too late, and for generally ignoring the Kashmiri politics and problems. Also, the Indian military with this massive strength was criticized widely by its own people and government officials for being unable to bring insurgency to an end in Kashmir in the 1990s. Two significant factors, internal and external, demanded the strong military response to the insurgency in this phase.

First, the internal factor was the security situation in Kashmir in the 1990s, which was marked by the complete breakdown of civil authority and the loss of control of a large part of the Kashmir valley to separatist Muslim insurgents.¹³⁴ According to Sahukar, the local state police force was subverted and ineffective. The central police and paramilitary forces inserted into Kashmir had little sympathy for the Kashmiris. The central police force was not even trained and equipped to control mass demonstrations and counter well-equipped and experienced jihadi fighters. Human rights abuses and the indiscriminate use of force coupled with wide-spread arrests and allegations of torture isolated the population and encouraged the militancy.¹³⁵ In addition to these flaws, New Delhi's frequent political interference in state affairs, widespread corruption of the state administration, an almost non-existent economic agenda of center and state, and India's

¹³³ Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 122.

¹³⁴ William Scott Latimer, "What Can the United States Learn from India to Counter Terrorism?" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 66–69, accessed August 23, 2013, http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/1659/04Mar_Latimer.pdf?sequence=1.

¹³⁵ Behram A Sahukar, "The Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations 2008," 25–27, accessed August 23, 2013, <http://insurgencyresearchgroup.wordpress.com/2008/03/06/the-indian-approach-to-coin/>.

firm stance against the religious separatist demands caused even more deterioration in the situation in Kashmir.

Second, the external factor was Pakistan's role in Kashmir, which provided extensive external support to the Kashmiri insurgents through InterService Intelligence (ISI).¹³⁶ Pakistan established safe and secure training camps in many areas in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, which started to provide the extensive material, training, and intelligence support to Kashmiri insurgents. Foreign jihadi fighters also joined the armed struggle through Pakistan. At any time after 1993, there were about 2,500 Pakistani-backed insurgents operating in Kashmir.¹³⁷ Their financial support was provided by the Kashmiri diaspora living outside the country and some Islamic charities, which were directly lobbied on the Kashmiri's behalf by Pakistan.¹³⁸ These active external supports to the insurgency posed a real danger to the security and law and order situation of Kashmir. Kashmiri authority and Indian security forces could not protect Hindus living in the Muslim-dominated Srinagar Valley. They were terrorized, targeted, and ultimately forced to leave Kashmir by the terrorists.¹³⁹ Pakistan's influence on the Kashmiri violence, thus, became more apparent and evolved as a subversive 'proxy war' with India throughout the 1990s. This external factor forced the Indian government to respond to the insurgency militarily in Kashmir.

In the mid-1990s, the Indian security forces' COIN operations effectively neutralized the insurgents' overall capability by reducing their violent attacks in Kashmir. One of the most successful tactics employed by the Indian military during this period was the use of captured or surrendered militants to identify other key terrorist personnel, hideouts, plans, and weapon caches.¹⁴⁰ By 1996, most of the Kashmiri insurgent guerrilla operations were largely neutralized as was witnessed by their fragmentation into a

¹³⁶ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 46–49.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Samuel, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 274.

¹³⁹ N.C. Asthana and Nirmal Anjali, *Terrorism, Insurgencies and COIN Operations* (Jaipur, India: Pointer Publisher, 2001), 89–91.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

number of new factions. Their tactics shifted dramatically from regular direct attacks on the Indian security forces to the limited terror acts against the Kashmiri minorities. These terror acts later proliferated rapidly all over India.¹⁴¹ According to Indian Army sources, there were 177 different organizations in 1992, which later, coalesced into 31 major groups by 2002.¹⁴² According to the South Asian Terrorist Portal Database, the annual casualty rate from the preceding three years was nearly 3,000; by the end of 1996, totals had fallen to 2,372.¹⁴³

As argued by various scholars, the effective operations by Indian security forces in the mid-1990s is also considered as a viable reason for the Kargil War of 1999, which helped the insurgency to be revived in Kashmir. As Ganguly argues, “with the defeat of the guerrillas in Kashmir in 1996, Pakistan feared that the insurgency was slowly dissipating over time, with most Kashmiris losing their will to continue the insurgency. Therefore, Pakistan needed to show its determination and support to the Kashmiri insurgents who were still fighting and hoped to inspire passive Kashmiris to renew aspirations of self-determination.”¹⁴⁴ Equally, the international pressure and support for the Kashmiris were losing energy, with many external support groups and Islamic governments beginning to believe the insurgency was lost.¹⁴⁵ As Ganguly and Kapur claim, “It was the very success of India’s counterinsurgency strategy that promoted Pakistan’s decision makers to pursue a limited probe in the Kargil region of Kashmir in 1999.”¹⁴⁶ Thus, a major obstacle for India during this period was the continuous Pakistani support to the insurgents and involvement of foreign jihadi fighters and their religious fervor that made winning the COIN campaign very difficult by military means.

¹⁴¹ Latimer, “What Can the United States Learn,” 70–72.

¹⁴² Sudhir S. Bloeria, *Pakistan’s Insurgency Versus India’s Security: Tackling Militancy in Kashmir* (Delhi: Manas Publication, 2000), 180–185.

¹⁴³ South Asian Terrorism Portal, “Annual Casualties—Kashmir,” accessed August 13, 2013, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm.

¹⁴⁴ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 121–122.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ganguly and Kapur, *India Pakistan, and the Bomb*, 27.

b. Political Process

For the first time after the insurgency broke out, New Delhi attempted to re-energize the political process by holding state and local assembly elections in 1996. Though insurgents boycotted the election and threatened voters, officials, and individuals not to participate in the election, the National Conference (NC) led by Farooq Abdullah, Delhi's close and long ally, won the election.¹⁴⁷ In the local assembly, one of the surrendered insurgents, Muhammad Yousef Parray, was elected and started working closely with the Indian security forces. This step encouraged other militants to denounce the violence and join the mainstream society as well. As a result, both the Indian army and Kashmiri insurgents agreed to form the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and use it as mediation institution for further interactions.¹⁴⁸

Due to the lack of political and socio-economic programs, however, the reform and integration of the captured and surrendered insurgents into main-stream society did not gain the expected momentum. Farooq Abdullah and the newly elected local leaders failed to fulfill their promises made in the election campaign and left all parties unsatisfied. In response, New Delhi promptly suspended the power transferred to the state-elected body just after the 1996 election along with the proposal to withdraw the Indian military from Kashmir.¹⁴⁹ Thus, Kashmir throughout the 1990s remained under New Delhi's rule without any local political representatives in the state administration.

The Indian government's diplomatic efforts to solve the Kashmiri insurgency in the 1990s can also be characterized as nonexistent, except for very few bilateral engagements. The proxy war in Kashmir changed significantly when Indian Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif established a number of confidence-building measures meant to lower tensions over Kashmir in the

¹⁴⁷ Amin Masoodi, "Kuka Parray's Killing - A Setback to the Peace Process," IPCS Terrorism Project (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2003), 1, accessed August 19, 2013, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism-in-jammu-kashmir/kuka-parrays-killing-a-setback-to-the-peace-process-1162.html>.

¹⁴⁸ K Santhanam and Sudhir Saxena, "Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery" (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2003), 215–223.

¹⁴⁹ Wagenen, "An Analysis of the Indian Government's COIN," 9.

late 1990s.¹⁵⁰ These confidence-building measures led to a general sense in the region that the Indian and Pakistani politicians, if they were seriously involved in negotiation, would find a peaceful settlement bilaterally. It was expected to be one of the most important developments towards major concessions on both sides, but it could not be implemented due to the Pakistani incursion into Kargil in 1999. According to the Crises Group Report, “If implemented, the deal would have most likely entailed Indian and Pakistani recognition of the Line of Control as the permanent border.”¹⁵¹

c. Socio-Economic Programs

During the 1990s, the Indian economic focus to address the socio-economic grievances of Kashmiri people was least prioritized. Many Indian scholars claim that, although India was trying to improve the Kashmiri economy by expanding health care, the transportation system, education, and the media, the lack of any long-term development plan and strategy, including the high unemployment rate and economic disparities among Kashmiris, did not produce any positive outcome because of lack of organized focus on a development strategy at the local level. Instead, this contributed to dissatisfaction and the growth of radical Islamic insurgents.¹⁵²

Another important pillar of the Kashmiri economy is domestic and international tourism. The impact of the violent activities of insurgents and COIN operations in the 1990s could clearly be seen in the tourism industry, which suffered immensely. The arrival of tourist had declined substantially since the late 1990s when militancy gained momentum. According to Sharma, “The number of tourists visiting the state per year had gone down from around 7,000,000 in the pre-militancy days to a few thousands in the following years. It is estimated that the state lost 27 million tourists from 1989–2002

¹⁵⁰ Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 112–14.

¹⁵¹ International Crisis Group, Asia Report no. 35, “Kashmir: Confrontation and Miscalculation” (Islamabad/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), 2, accessed August 18, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/kashmir/Kashmir%20Confrontation%20and%20Miscalculation.ashxf>.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 71.

leading to tourism revenue loss of \$3.6 billion.”¹⁵³ Tourism was one of the main sources of state economy as it provided employment opportunities for Kashmiri people and revenue for the state; thus, its reduction was a great loss for the Kashmiri economy.

d. Analysis of the First Phase COIN

In the 1990s, the Indian COIN strategy largely favored a military solution over the political resolution of the insurgency and socio-economic development in the region. The military’s initial success in preventing insurgents from launching state-wide large-scale guerrilla warfare and limiting only to terror acts during the 1990s was notable; the Indian COIN campaign as a whole, however, seemed ineffective in winning popular support, respecting human rights, and continuing economic development. Initially, the Indian COIN approach against Kashmiri separatist insurgents was criticized as, “repression and reprisal targeted not just against armed militants but frequently also against disloyal civilian communities that aided and sheltered the rebels.”¹⁵⁴ As a result, the insurgency rapidly intensified and the neutral population stopped supporting the government. The cases of human rights abuse by the security forces also made a huge gap in the state and damaged the civil-military relations. Protecting human rights and preventing the population from supporting insurgents proved to be most challenging for the Indian COIN campaign in Kashmir.

The continuous Pakistani support to insurgents, including foreign jihadi fighters, and their religious fervor also worsened the situation in Kashmir. The Indian government could not initiate any political process to listen to and address the people’s legitimate grievances through extensive participatory elections. As a result, the public continued to confront the security forces, rejected the elections of 1996 and beyond, and provided support to the insurgency. Although the security forces were relatively successful in controlling insurgents, this singular area-focused military approach did not contribute to

¹⁵³ Rajni Sharma, Vinod Kumar Sharma and Var Inder Singh Waris, “Impact of Peace and Disturbance in Tourism and Horticulture in Jammu and Kashmir,” *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications* 2, Issue 6 (June 2012), 1–6, accessed September 3, 2013, http://www.ijsrp.org/research_paper_jun2012/ijsrp-June-2012-96.pdf.

¹⁵⁴ Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict*, 3.

the overall improvement of the situation in Kashmir, such as the political process and socio-economic programs. Such programs are very essential for the state and security forces in addressing the people's concerns with a view to winning popular support. At this stage, Nepal also used a similar repressive strategy to counter the Maoist threat continuously, which pushed the neutral population over to the insurgents' side. The next chapter will explain this in detail.

2. Phase II (From 2000 to the Present)

a. Security Operations

From the late 1990s, India actively started to employ the Indian army in a large-scale WHAM campaign, Operation Sadbhavna, which was aimed solely at winning the support of the Kashmiri people and providing security from terrorist threats through effective security operations and socio-economic development. These efforts included the improvement of living conditions and educational standards of the locals by establishing schools, computer learning centers, and vocational training centers; funding scholarship programs for brilliant and economically disadvantaged students; organizing health camps and medical treatment centers in remote areas; constructing and repairing bridges and damaged houses; assisting farmers by providing pumps for irrigation; provisioning drinking water; adopting orphaned children; providing veterinary coverage for farm livestock; offering assistance in the provision of radios, television sets, and computers; and organizing educational tours for college and university students to other parts of India, etc.¹⁵⁵ With this wide participation in public affairs, the visible change in the attitude of people towards the security forces and the governmental projects emerged in Kashmir after 2006–2007, as stated by Anant.¹⁵⁶ Operation Sadbhavna projected a people-friendly approach and proved to be one of the effective tools to gradually change the resentful attitude of the people toward the security forces and the government. To some extent, this process also contributed to isolating armed elements from the

¹⁵⁵ Anant, "COIN and Op Sadbhavna," 16–20.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

population base, which helped the government to conduct all due elections from the local to state level.

Since the Unified Headquarters (UHQ) became operational in the late 1990s, operations of the Army, police, and the paramilitary forces have been coordinated. The unified command and control system was initiated in 1993, but became fully functional in 1999 after the Kargil War. In order to exercise effective command and control and monitor routine updates of the security situation, the Chief Minister chairs the meetings of the UHQ with senior representatives of the state government, army, central armed police forces, and other security agencies.¹⁵⁷ Besides the monitoring function, the UHQ started being more effective in operational mobilization. It helped greatly to coordinate and control the security forces' small- and large-scale offensive operations, minimize the collateral damage, and provide humanitarian support to the needy population. This largely enhanced the surveillance of the LOC and targeting capability, which proved to be effective in monitoring and countering militants' infiltration and exfiltration along the LOC.

The massive Indian military operational deployment after the 2001 suicide attack on the Indian Parliament followed by another suicide attack targeting the families of soldiers dramatically altered the security situation in Kashmir. In response to these attacks, India mobilized massive military concentrations along the LOC in Operation Parakram. Immediately, Pakistan also reacted with its military deployment and maintained the combat readiness posture. This was South Asia's largest-ever militarized standoff along the LOC throughout 2002, indicating that war was probable at any time.¹⁵⁸ Along with the force deployment, "India also focused on fencing the entire 470 miles of the LOC, and deploying surveillance radars, ground sensors, thermal imaging devices, night vision devices, and early warning detectors to form the coordinated surveillance system, which superimposed the already developed COIN grid system," as

¹⁵⁷ Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 2012–2013, 6, accessed August 13, 2013, [http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR\(E\)1213.pdf](http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR(E)1213.pdf).

¹⁵⁸ S. Paul Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia," *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008), 84.

Sahukar claims.¹⁵⁹ These physical improvements appeared to be a strong obstacle for Pakistan-based terrorists in continuing their infiltration and support to the Kashmiri insurgency. Also, the mass military concentration and maintenance of the operational readiness posture along the LOC demonstrated the Indian willingness to launch immediate limited incursion anytime into Pakistani territory, if terrorists backed by Pakistan continued attacks on Indian interests anywhere in India.

Indian security forces formulated a COIN doctrine, organized special and joint training, and modernized the police forces during the early 2000s. The Indian army doctrine of 2004 was replaced by the doctrine for the sub-conventional operations in 2006. With this change, the Indian security forces started following the doctrinal pattern of people-centric operations along with effective security operations, which emphasized the minimum use of force, enhancement of civil-military relations, and implementing a campaign of winning the hearts and minds of the people.¹⁶⁰ Subsequently, theater and Corps battle schools were also set up in Kashmir, which were aimed at providing pre-induction training to units coming from the conventional to an insurgency role.¹⁶¹ The counterinsurgency and jungle warfare school in Mizoram also started to conduct special training, which stressed that winning popular support and respecting human rights in COIN operations is crucial to winning the fight. In an attempt to foster cooperation and share experiences with other countries, India organized joint COIN exercises with the U.S., Russia, China, and many other countries.¹⁶² Side by side, India also started to modernize, expand, train, and re-equip the local police, central reserve police force, border security force, and Rashtriya Rifles with the latest weapons and equipment. This effort improved the inter-operability among various types of security agencies deployed to deal with the insurgency in Kashmir.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ Sahukar, "The Indian Approach," 25.

¹⁶⁰ Sahukar, "The Indian Approach," 36.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid., 34.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 29.

These wide-ranging changes in the pattern of the Indian security operations in Kashmir, as noted, helped gradually to limit the terrorist violence throughout the 2000s and brought fatalities to a new and dramatic low, with just 183 killed in 2011. As claimed by Kapur, after the crisis in 2002, when India adopted the doctrine of Cold Start, the deployment of the massive force along the border, “terrorist-related incidents fell by 22 percent from 2004 to 2005 with civilian deaths falling 21 percent and security personnel deaths falling 33 percent. In 2006, terrorist incidents declined an additional 16 percent, killing 30 percent fewer civilian and 20 percent fewer security forces than the previous years. Estimated instances of militant infiltration into Indian territory from Pakistan declined only 4 percent from 2005.”¹⁶⁴ These trends showed the distinct improvement in the security situation in Kashmir. The year 2010 had been considered as the most peaceful year in over two decades of insurgency in the state, with only 375 terrorism-related fatalities.¹⁶⁵ In October 2012, as Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde states, “There is marked improvement in the security situation in the State (J&K).”¹⁶⁶

Similarly, Lt. Gen. G.K. Sinha, the governor of Kashmir, states, “In 2007, the reduction of casualties has been brought down by 55 percent from 2006, and the strength of the insurgents has been reduced to about 1800 from 3400 in the past few years.”¹⁶⁷ The leadership of the insurgent groups has also been hit hard by successful security forces operations.¹⁶⁸ This is reinforced by the Indian government’s annual report for 2012–2013, which says there was a noticeable decline in the number of terrorist incidents and casualties of civilians and security forces personnel compared to previous years.¹⁶⁹ The incidents of terrorist violence declined from “499 in 2009 to 488 in 2010 and 340 in

¹⁶⁴ Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability,” 85.

¹⁶⁵ South Asia Terrorist Portal Database, “Jammu and Kashmir Assessment - Year 2012” accessed September 7, 2013, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/assessment2012.htm>.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Sahukar, “The Indian Approach,” 25.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, “Annual Report 2012–13,” 6, accessed September 6, 2013, [http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR\(E\)1213.pdf](http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR(E)1213.pdf).

2011 to 192 in 2012.”¹⁷⁰ The year 2012 witnessed a “35.29 percent decrease in the number of terrorist incidents and 54.54 percent and 51.61 percent decrease in civilians and Security Forces (SFs) fatalities respectively as compared to the year 2011.”¹⁷¹ Seventy-two terrorists were also neutralized during 2012, and the valley seemed comparatively free of major law and order problems, including civil disturbances during the year.¹⁷²

In addition to the planned and coordinated Indian COIN operations, the Pakistani involvement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and counterinsurgency operations within Pakistan also made a difference in the insurgency movement in Kashmir. After September 11, 2001, Pakistan along with U.S.-led coalition forces began fighting against the Taliban, which they had previously used to fight the former USSR forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The change in its stand, after decades of using the mujahidin as a national tool against former Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and Indian- controlled Kashmir, generated immense unease and distrust between the state and some of these terrorist groups operating in and from Pakistan to Afghanistan and Kashmir.¹⁷³ Some of these terrorist groups were also involved in sectarian and jihadi movements in Pakistan, which were now becoming the most serious security challenges for Pakistani internal security.¹⁷⁴

The deployment of the Pakistani military to deal with the insurgencies in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) that include Swat and six neighboring districts and areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK) also diverted their interest from supporting the terrorists’ infiltration into Kashmir.¹⁷⁵ The Pakistani army and paramilitary forces (the Frontier

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 5–7.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Riaz Mohammed Khan, *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 209–211.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Khan, *Afghanistan and Pakistan*, 136–138.

Corps) were unable to regain control of the situation in Swat Valley and Waziristan in the initial phase of the operations in the 2000s.¹⁷⁶ As a result, the Pakistani military sustained significant losses and faced challenges in maintaining security in some tribal areas.¹⁷⁷ Also, these COIN operations led to the displacement of over two million people elsewhere in Pakistan.¹⁷⁸ Apart from the radical threat in the tribal areas along the porous Durand line with Afghanistan, continuing violence in other parts of the country and the internal problem in Baluchistan also demanded extended military operations. Therefore, the overstretched engagement of the Pakistani military and ISI in various sectors made them less likely to continue extensive support for the Kashmiri insurgency as they had in the 1990s. As various security experts argue, Pakistan also realized that the seriousness of the insurgent threat to its internal security was very difficult to manage, and the involvement in supporting the insurgency against its neighbor could be counterproductive for the country.¹⁷⁹

b. Political Process

In the past decade, India reinitiated the political process by successfully holding state and local elections, which are held regularly when due. According to the Indian Home Ministry's Annual Reports of 2002 through 2009, "even though over 800 people were killed by terrorists in the Kashmir State Assembly elections of 2002, an average of over 43 percent voter turnout in three phases of the elections in Kashmir was recorded."¹⁸⁰ There was an average of "48 percent voter turnout in 63-urban-civic-body elections in 2005. In 2006 by-elections to the state legislature, over 70 percent voted. In the insurgency affected areas of Srinagar, over 80 percent of the registered voters cast their vote."¹⁸¹ In the 2008 state assembly election, "participation in the Assembly

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Muhamed Amir, "Pakistan Security Report 2009" (Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2010), 29.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Sahukar, "The Indian Approach," 26. (According to author, figures compiled from annual reports of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs from 1999 to 2006.)

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

Elections raised 63 percent of registered voters. The 2011 Panchayet (village local self-government institutions) elections recorded a 79 percent voter turnout.”¹⁸² People’s turnout in the electoral process indicated that the Indian COIN effort had led to an increased level of popular participation in the government’s political process in Kashmir. The elected political bodies of the state could now initiate a process to listen to and address the local people’s grievances.

The Bharatiye Janata Party (BJP)-led national coalition government with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) from 1998 to 2004 saw the initiation of the democratic political culture in Kashmir. Although most observers expected that the BJP-led government would take a hardline approach against the Muslim separatist insurgency in Kashmir, the government was the first non-Congress government in the center that started working closely with the NC party, which had remained central to the politics of Kashmir since the partition. With the long history of political manipulation and mismanagement of election results, Congress’s close ally, the NC, not only enjoyed the power and popularity, but also gradually eroded its legitimacy and created a political vacuum in Kashmir.¹⁸³

As Chowdhary and Rao argue, the decision of the NC to join sides with the BJP-led coalition in 1999 harmed the NC’s politics in Kashmir because the impression of BJP among Kashmiris, with regard to the enactment of the Prevention of the Terrorist Act and the Gujarat violence, was not positive. This step became the major source of embarrassment to the image of the party, which subsequently helped other opposition political parties to raise the issues and gain their positions in Kashmiri politics. In the election of 2002, the NC downgraded itself from a hegemonic actor to the opposition

¹⁸² South Asian Terrorist Portal Database, “Jammu and Kashmir Assessment-Year 2012.”

¹⁸³ Rekha Chowdhary and V Nagendra Rao, “National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir from Hegemonic to Competitive Politics,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, no. 14/15 (April 3–16, 2004), 1521–1527, accessed December 2, 2013, https://www.academia.edu/807902/National_Conference_of_Jammu_and_Kashmir_From_Hegemonic_to_Competitive_Politics.

party in Kashmiri politics for the first time, which initiated the culture of competitive politics in Kashmir.¹⁸⁴

The Indian government of the BJP-NDA alliance also initiated talks with several political parties in Kashmir with the support of the state government. Later, they were allowed to visit Pakistan for talks with Pakistani officials.¹⁸⁵ At the same time, the center offered direct talks with separatist groups in Kashmir if they would agree to give up violence. Two round-table meetings were held with various groups in 2002 and 2003, though no real breakthrough was achieved.¹⁸⁶ Both India and Pakistan also initiated several notable peace initiatives and confidence-building measures, such as the Lahore Declaration and the exchange of visits of high delegations to bring down the level of mistrust between them. As a result, they agreed to establish the ceasefire agreement of 2003 after a massive military standoff along the LOC, which is still continuing.¹⁸⁷

A regional forum, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit of 2004 also helped, to some extent, to create an environment for bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan.¹⁸⁸ As Khan argues, during this SAARC summit, “the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers met privately and agreed to form a peace process to encompass all issues affecting relations between the two neighbors.”¹⁸⁹ After the summit, Pakistan and India finally agreed to pursue a dialogue on the Kashmir issue, by setting a timetable for future dialogues. Following this, in April 2005 the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was started, which re-united many families on either side of the LOC and encouraged people-to-people contact across the LOC.¹⁹⁰ In 2006,

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Wagenen, “An Analysis of the Indian COIN,” 10–13.

¹⁸⁶ Latimer, “What can the United States Learn,” 69–70.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Wagenen, “An Analysis of the Indian COIN,” 10.

¹⁸⁹ Feroz Hassan Khan, *Eating Grass, the Making of the Pakistani Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 226.

¹⁹⁰ Latimer, “What Can the United States Learn,” 69.

India and Pakistan set up a joint Anti-terror Mechanism.¹⁹¹ Bilateral diplomatic initiatives are ongoing at the state and national levels even after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2008, but not as extensively as in previous years.

In addition to the Indian-Pakistani bilateral diplomatic engagement on the Kashmir issue, the U.S. declaration of the GWOT in Afghanistan against Al Qaida after September 2001 also brought diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the insurgent movements in Kashmir. Pakistan, by virtue of its geographic position and certain choices made by its leadership, became a frontline state in the GWOT. The U.S. also considered Pakistan as one of its very important non-NATO partners to fight the GWOT. This U.S.-Pakistani partnership forced the Pakistani leadership to ban the terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan. As a result, ISI closed its training camps in Afghanistan and then closed some of its Kashmir offices as well.¹⁹² Besides restrictions on Pakistan-based terrorists, Pakistan also directed a wave of highly publicized arrests of many militant organizations, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).¹⁹³ This process could not be continued.

India blamed Pakistan for not being able to punish most of the arrested terrorists and releasing them shortly after their arrest. Subsequently, this blame turned out to be true when the banned terrorists quickly reorganized under different names and continued their activities freely within Pakistan and across the LOC. The Pakistani state stance against terrorist organizations, however, for the first time decreased cross-border infiltration, which was observed during 2002,¹⁹⁴ and this also brought India and Pakistan diplomatically closer than before, which later helped to initiate various confidence-building measures between them.

¹⁹¹ Wagenen, "An Analysis of the Indian COIN," 10–11.

¹⁹² Latimer, "What Can the United States Learn," 75.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

c. Socio-Economic Programs

After 2000, the central government of India continuously supported the state government in its efforts to bring about all-round long-term planning for economic development and to provide avenues for gainful employment of the people. In the last decade, “Indian governments planned for 67 Projects for Kashmir. Out of these projects, 33 projects were completed, and the remaining 34 projects are at various stages of implementation.”¹⁹⁵ According to Sahukar, “the central government announced the reconstruction plan for Kashmir involving an outlay of approximately \$5.3bn in 2004 to expand the economic infrastructure, such as power generation, construction of roads, education, health, tourism, agriculture, and basic services.”¹⁹⁶ In addition, \$1.3bn has been earmarked to extend the existing railway network from Jammu to Srinagar in the Kashmir Valley.¹⁹⁷ As stated by the annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs, India, “the Indian government released Indian currency 32,009 Crore in 2013 for further economic developments in Kashmir.”¹⁹⁸ With these center-funded programs, the elected state legislatures now have the power to prioritize programs, such as building roads, schools, and health centers, and creating jobs; it is very difficult, however, to manage in a short time the immense suffering of the population from the conflict over two decades.

During the 2000s, the gradually improved security scenario also resulted in dramatic increases in the arrival of tourists, from an estimated over “500,000 in 2001, over 800,000 in 2005 and to over 900,000 in 2010, one million in 2011 and 1.5 million in 2012, which indicates the increasing arrivals, approximately 50 percent after 2000.”¹⁹⁹ Significantly, on November 6, 2012, “the United Kingdom’s High Commissioner to New Delhi, Sir James Bevan, lifting UK’s nearly two-decade-old advisory to its nationals to avoid traveling to Srinagar, Jammu and Ladakh, in a letter to Chief Minister Omar

¹⁹⁵ The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2012–13.

¹⁹⁶ Sahukar, “The Indian Approach,” 33.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2012–13.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 1–2.

Abdullah, observed: “The improvement in the security situation has led us (the UK) to lift the advisory against UK citizens travelling to both the cities of Jammu and Srinagar and travel to these two cities on the Jammu-Srinagar highway.”²⁰⁰ As stated by the SATP database, the Jammu and Kashmir tourism sector accounts for 5.92 percent of India’s GDP.²⁰¹ Therefore, the returning tourism in Kashmir is important for the state economy as it provides employment opportunities for locals and revenue for the state, which now has increased.

d. Analysis of the Second Phase COIN

In this phase, India changed its COIN approach from solely a military response to a more integrated way in dealing with the insurgency. This COIN response was a combination of the political process to address the people’s grievances through the routine conduct of local and state elections to form their own government; the diplomatic process to initiate negotiation within and outside the country; socio-economic programs to create employment opportunities, collect revenue for the state, and prioritize and initiate the long-term development programs; effective security operations based on the doctrinal pattern to win the hearts and minds of the people and defeat insurgent fighters in Kashmir; and massive military deployment along the LOC to deter Pakistan and block infiltration and exfiltration through the LOC. As a result, the gradually declining trend of insurgent violence, increasing popular participation in the political process, improving economic growth, and returning tourism have been witnessed in Kashmir since 2000.²⁰²

Meanwhile, the over-extended deployment of Pakistani military and ISI in COIN operations within Pakistan and the policy to fight the GWOT along with Western powers in recent decades, to some extent, diverted their focus and interest from the Kashmiri front. This has also created immense unease and distrust between the Pakistani state and extremist Islamic terrorist groups. Due to these factors, there is a declining terrorist influx into Kashmir as compared to the decade of the 1990s. In this phase, the regional

²⁰⁰ South Asia Terrorism Portal Database, “Jammu and Kashmir Assessment-Year 2013.”

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

cooperation, bilateral diplomatic engagement, and U.S. diplomatic pressure on Pakistani leadership also brought India and Pakistan diplomatically closer, which led to the initiation of some important steps with a view to soothing the crisis over Kashmir as well as renouncing insurgent violence in Kashmir. In the Nepalese case, the government failed to address legitimate grievances of the people by mobilizing all available national means, and it solely focused on the military solution over the insurgency. The government deployed the Nepal army (NA) in addition to the police and armed police force from 2001 to 2006. At this stage, the security forces could not decisively defeat the Maoist insurgency, but achieved some degree of tactical success. This will be explained in detail in the next chapter.

C. CONCLUSION

Kashmiri Muslims started an armed struggle for independence from India, which began in the late 1980s. This has become one of the most serious and complex internal security problems for India. The insurgency is still ongoing in Kashmir. The origin of this insurgency is linked with a history of the denial of democratic rights and institutions to the Kashmiri people. This situation may be attributed to a combination of New Delhi's centralized political control and mismanagement of political institutions, the state government's incompetent handling of the domestic situation and highly corrupt administration, and the increased level of awareness among Kashmiri youth from exposure to higher education and mass media. These factors helped the frustration and dissatisfaction of the Kashmiri people to emerge, which ultimately led to the armed movement.

Besides the local Kashmiri insurgents, the jihadi fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries from the Middle East by way of Pakistan have participated in the insurgency in Kashmir since the 1990s, a unique aspect of this insurgency. This insurgency continued to evolve primarily with Pakistani support, the lifeline for the insurgents in Kashmir, as Pakistan perceives Kashmir as the unfinished agenda of the partition. The insurgents received arms, equipment, funds, training, and moral support from Pakistan. Therefore, the Kashmir insurgency is complex and deep-rooted, and it

shares conflicting interests of multiple players, such as India, Pakistan, and Kashmiri Muslims.

The Indian COIN approach has been developed over decades of its experience in fighting insurgency and terrorism based on various demands. The Indian COIN in Kashmir is one of these efforts, which has been fought against the Kashmiri Muslim separatist insurgents. It has experienced both failure and success at various junctures. In 1990, India mobilized the Indian army, paramilitary, and police force to fight the insurgency and began to rely on them to control the security setting for the following decades. The Indian COIN strategy in Kashmir in the 1990s largely favored a military solution over the political resolution of the insurgency as the security situation in Kashmir was completely out of control in the late 1980s. At that time, the Indian army not only had to deal with the separatist insurgents within Kashmir, but also to deter terrorists' infiltration as well as the Pakistani army and its active support of insurgents. Because of the deteriorated security situation and all-out support from Pakistan to the insurgents, India was not able to initiate an effective political and diplomatic process and socio-economic program in the 1990s.

Although Indian security forces achieved initial success in defeating the insurgents' attempt to transition into state-wide large-scale guerrilla warfare, and in limiting them to terror acts as the only mean to gain internal and external support, the Indian government appeared ineffective in winning popular support, respecting human rights, continuing socio-economic development, and initiating political and diplomatic processes in the 1990s. The public continuously confronted the security forces, rejected the elections of 1996 and beyond, and provided support to the insurgency. Due to these setbacks, India reached the point where it had to change the COIN strategy to win the people's support for the COIN efforts and deter Pakistan from supporting terrorists by continuing massive military deployment—Operation Parakram—and launching a people-oriented campaign—Operation Sadbhavana—along with political and diplomatic processes, and socio-economic development programs.

From the late 1990s, the Indian COIN strategy has shifted from an aggressive military response to a mixed approach that has included massive military deployment

along with other security forces operations, a political process to address the people's legitimate grievances, and a program for socio-economic development. This change in the COIN strategy has led to increased levels of COIN success in Kashmir. First, there is progressively increasing voter turnout in all elections after 2002. Now, the political institutions, from local to state levels, elected by the Kashmiri people are in place and functional. Their representatives are in a position to listen and address their grievances. The Indian and the state government are engaged in negotiations with the parties concerned. The recent elections for the Kashmiri state legislature, however, play only a small role in prompting change, particularly in terms of the demilitarization of the state and addressing grievances because of continued violence in Kashmir and Pakistan's proxy war strategy.

Second, the dramatic increases in the arrival of tourists, improvements in economic growth, and the center's long-term and short-term investment in various employment projects and development programs are positive indications of socio-economic development in Kashmir. The state legislatures now have the power to prioritize programs and carry out important construction, such as building roads, schools, and health centers and creating jobs. The immense suffering of a population from over two decades of fighting, however, cannot be treated in a short period of time with the limited availability of funds and resources. To support the Kashmiri economy, the central government must release more funds than it does to other states, and it must also become involved in more long-term state development projects.

Third, the distinct signs of improvement in the internal security situation with the steep and continuous decline in trends of violent activities and the presence of insurgents, infiltration of terrorists across the LOC, displacement of other religious groups, and the overall casualty rate have been observed in Kashmir since the 2000s. The security operations have also provided the suitable environment to conduct local and state elections, expand the economic development programs from the center to local levels, and increase the tourist flow. These efforts overall have shown progress in winning the hearts and minds of the people and in reducing the insurgent threats as compared to the COIN efforts of the 1990s.

Currents events are demonstrating that India understands the need for the mixed approach to control and gradually improve the overall situation in Kashmir. Moreover, due to U.S. diplomatic pressure, Pakistan has changed its strategy from supporting terrorist groups to outlawing them, which has played, to some extent, a positive role in Kashmir in recent years. Pakistan's focus, which has shifted from the Kashmir front to the Afghani border and other insurgency affected areas, also demanded more military and ISI presence in these areas, and this also has created the distrust between the state and some of the terrorist organizations operating there. These developments have helped to divert their interests from Kashmiri insurgency to other sectors within Pakistan.

After explaining and analyzing the level of achievement of the Indian COIN approaches in Kashmir during the period from 1989 to 2000 and the period from 2001 to 2012, the mixed COIN approach in the later phase led to recent success in Kashmir. Therefore, the mixed COIN approach offers promise in dealing with the complex insurgency in the economically developing democratic setting of Indian Kashmir, which is linked with territorial dispute, extensive ethnic mobilization, and active external support. If India solely used an economic development and political approach, it would likely be ineffective because security and the political process with development are inseparably connected with each other. For example, India was able to resume its legitimate political and economic processes only after the effective security response to the insurgency since 2000. The socio-politico-economic institutions in Kashmir in the early 1990s had become completely ineffective at keeping the insurgency under control. After mobilization of its military, India achieved initial success in controlling the insurgents' attempt to transition into state-wide large-scale guerrilla warfare and in limiting them to terror acts. Thus, the military aspect of the mixed approach is also necessary to control or defeat armed elements of the insurgency, or force them to the negotiating table.

On the other hand, as we will see in the next chapter, the Nepalese government used the enemy-centric approach throughout the campaign from 1996 to 2006, which was directed at eliminating the insurgency. It did not attempt to address the genuine demands of the people and win their support for the state's initiative. Unlike the COIN campaign

in Kashmir, the Nepalese COIN campaign was unsuccessful in establishing the government's legitimacy and effectiveness, controlling the state's political, economic, and social institutions, and gaining popular support. Instead, the insurgents, through a nationwide mass movement, achieved a safe landing and gained the upper hand in political negotiations with opposition political parties under Indian mediation and overthrew the existing government in 2006.

III. MAOIST INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN NEPAL

In order to understand the Maoist insurgency and the success and failure of the Nepalese COIN campaign, it is essential to understand the core issues that led to the insurgency's birth, growth, and end, and to the failure of the government's COIN efforts from 1996 to 2006. The violent insurgency of the Unified Communist party of Nepal (Maoists)²⁰³ (hereafter referred to as the Maoists) began formally with the declaration of the People's War on February 13, 1996. The Maoist insurgency is considered one of the most radical movements that Nepal has ever faced in its nearly two-and-a-half centuries of existence. This insurgency matured and fought against a transitional democratic government in Nepal from 1996 to 2006. In the initial stage, the Maoists started by attacking small police posts and landlords in remote and less-developed districts of western Nepal. Subsequently, the group expanded its movement all over the country and into almost every sectors of Nepalese life. The ten years of campaigning claimed over 14,000 lives, destroyed billions of dollars' worth of infrastructure, and displaced tens of thousands of people.²⁰⁴

During the initial stage of the insurgency, the government adopted a law and order approach to address the problem with heavy-handed police response, which proved to be counterproductive.²⁰⁵ This was followed by deployment of the Nepalese army (then the Royal Nepal Army, RNA), whose efforts resulted in tactical effect rather than the strategic upper hand. During ten years of fighting, the Maoists carefully used both political and military means and ultimately decided to end the insurgency with the negotiated political settlement (comprehensive peace agreement) between the Maoists

²⁰³ The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was previously named 'the communist party of Nepal (Maoist)' until this party formally unified with other small communist parties in January 2009. Then, it changed its name to the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).

²⁰⁴ Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 310.

²⁰⁵ Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), *Human Rights Yearbook 1999* (Kathmandu: INSEC, 2000), 20.

and the government of Nepal in 2006. This agreement brought the major demands of the Maoists on board, such as abolishment of the centuries-old monarchy and an election to the constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.

In this chapter, I will illustrate how the Maoist insurgency flourished in the economically and politically weak transitional democratic setting of Nepal based on the extensive mobilization of socio-economically marginalized and politically excluded lower castes, *Dalits* (Untouchable or oppressed castes), women, and ethnic groups. The Maoists' strategy balanced both the people's support and armed struggle in keeping their political options open. The main focus of this chapter will be on the Nepalese COIN strategy from 1996 to 2006. By doing so, this thesis emphasizes that the COIN strategy requires not only the enemy-centric approach, which can be counterproductive, but also more than this to achieve success. In this chapter, I will attempt to show that an overemphasized military response was the predominant component of the Nepalese COIN approach, which contributed to the failure of the then king-led government under the democratic constitution of 1990. This is unlike the situation in Kashmir in the later phase of the campaign, when India used the integrated approach and achieved some level of success in Kashmir (as explained in the previous chapter). More extensive comparison will be provided in the following chapter. In this chapter, I will compare the Nepalese COIN approach in different phases of the Maoist insurgency to some elements of COIN theories and the approach taken in Kashmir, which outlines some essential prerequisites for the success of the campaign. These elements included effective security operations to defeat the armed elements of insurgency, adherence to political methods of addressing the people's grievances, and overall socio-economic development in an insurgency-affected region. An analysis of these aspects will identify whether the Nepalese enemy-centric COIN approach led to the failure of the government's COIN campaign in Nepal. This chapter discussion will also consider how these countermeasures compare to those used in Kashmir.

A. BACKGROUND OF THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL

The Maoist insurgency endured in Nepal for more than a decade and posed a challenging threat to national security from 1996 to 2006. In order to gain a better understanding of the Maoist insurgency, it is essential to begin with the history of the communist movement in Nepal, which allows us to understand the birth and growth of the radical elements that became the Maoists group later. This radical Maoist strategy always believed in armed rebellion to seize state power, but its ambitions were contained in the past. Second, it is equally important to know that the rise of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in the 1990s was a continuation of the communist movement of Nepal, which emerged in 1949. This movement became increasingly successful in the twenty-first century after the demise of the Soviet regime and the acceptance of the Chinese regime toward economic liberalization. Last, it is also essential to understand the causes of the Maoist insurgency that gave them a solid foundation to organize, fight, and search for a peaceful settlement.

1. Communist Movement in Nepal (From 1949 to 1990)

The foundation of the communist movement in Nepal goes back to 1949, when Puspa Lal Shrestha and his four associates formed the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in Calcutta, India.²⁰⁶ In the 1950s, the party solely focused on radical land reforms, the abrogation of the 1950 Treaty with India, and opposition to the United States. The CPN faced failure while campaigning for election based on this political agenda; it secured only four seats out of 109 in the first-ever parliamentary election conducted in 1959.²⁰⁷ In 1960, the CPN suffered an ideological split along Chinese-Soviet lines when there was a question raised on the issue of supporting a royal takeover in December 1960. As a result, the pro-Russian faction led by Keshar Jung Rayamajhi declared support for King

²⁰⁶ Dipak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003* (Kathmandu, Nepal: The Printhouse, 2003), 20.

²⁰⁷ Avidit Acharya, "The Moist Insurgency in Nepal and the Political Economy of Violence," *Working Papers Series* (May 11, 2010), 5, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, accessed November 25, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1603750.

Mahendra's coup while the pro-Chinese faction led by Puspa Lal opposed the royal coup and remained relatively quiet in politics until the 1970s.²⁰⁸ During the 1960s and 1970s, the communist movement in Nepal also developed radical factions that were influenced by Mao's Cultural Revolution in China and the Naxalites movement of India. In Nepal, there is a long history of splitting of the communists when some ideological or contextual differences or better opportunities arise. According to Thapa, there are more than a dozen splits in the Communist Party of Nepal, since its establishment in 1949.²⁰⁹

Following the Chinese line, a young communist party leader, Mohan Bikram Singh, concentrated his efforts on establishing a base for left-wing activists in the remote mid-western hill districts of Rolpa, Rukum, and Pyuthan. Later, Singh became the general secretary and, according to Thapa and Sijapati, "proposed training guerrillas, proletarianising party cadre, creating separate base areas, taking actions against local cheats, and initiating an agrarian uprising."²¹⁰ His proposal was adopted by the party without any change. (Later, the same course was adopted by the Maoists in the mid-1990s.) According to Acharya, "Singh's strategy was to take advantage of local grievances, particularly the decline in living standards, which the inhabitants of these districts reportedly ascribed to the government's suppression of Hashish production in the 1970s."²¹¹ Due to this close association with rural villagers, Singh successfully won 700 out of 703 votes in the Thawang village of Rolpa against the king-led Panchayet system in the referendum of 1980. (Later, the Maoists also used this village as their first base.) But, Singh's 1989 campaign came to an end with the result of the referendum being in favor of the king's party-less system.²¹²

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Manish Thapa, "Evolution of Maoism in Nepal: Understanding the Maoist Insurgency from Wider Perspective," Panorama, Global On line Publication, accessed November 27, 2013, <http://www.tigweb.org/youth-media/panorama/article.html?ContentID=6491&start=5656>.

²¹⁰ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 25.

²¹¹ Acharya, "The Moist Insurgency in Nepal," 5.

²¹² Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 25.

After the referendum and victory of the party-less Panchayet system in 1980, a second and third split occurred due to the pro-China CPN faction. This was caused by disagreements between radicals and moderates on whether the party should participate in the election under the king's party-less system.²¹³ Nirmal Lama was in favor of taking part in Panchayeti elections, whereas Mohan Bikram Singh preferred boycotting the election. As a result, the CPN's fourth convention broke up into Lama and Singh factions in 1983. Singh set up his party under the name of CPN (Masal), which became one of the founding organizations of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM).²¹⁴ Another split happened in 1985 after the fifth convention, leading to Singh's CPN (Masal) and Mohan Baidya's CPN (Mashal). Baidya's Mashal adopted the doctrine of a violent movement to instigate a mass uprising against the state. (Later, the Maoists adopted this as their core strategy, and Baidya remained as one of the top leaders of the CPN-Maoist).²¹⁵

Second, following in the footsteps of the Naxalites movement of India, the CPN (Marxist-Leninist) carried out killings of local land owners in the eastern Jhapa district of Nepal during the early 1970s, also known as the Jhapa Uprising.²¹⁶ Although this uprising was limited to a single district, it was the first armed communist rebellion in the history of Nepal. This uprising was immediately suppressed by the then Panchayet government, a party-less system under direct rule of the monarch.²¹⁷

2. Rise of the Maoist Movement in Nepal (From 1990 to 2006)

The Nepalese communists could be generally categorized into two groups until the end of the Panchayet system. One group was ready to follow a democratic system and the other believed in seizure of power through armed insurgency. In the late-1980s, the Democratic Party, the Nepali Congress (NC), and the leftist coalition (seven small

²¹³ Acharya, "The Moist Insurgency in Nepal," 5.

²¹⁴ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 25.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 26–27.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

communist parties, which descended from the original CPN) jointly organized the people's democratic mass movement to overthrow the absolute monarchy. After restoration of the democracy in 1990, the leftist coalition ran under the banner of the CPN (UML-United Marxist-Leninist) and emerged as the second-largest party from the general election of 1991, when NC became the largest party.²¹⁸ After the restoration of the democracy, the Unity Center (UC) led by Prachanda, the top Maoist leader and later Prime Minister re-united the cadres of radical groups again to form a subversive revolutionary organization. Meanwhile, Nirmal Lama and Baburam Bhattarai organized the United People's Front (UPF) as an open political wing, which was formerly a Singh-led Masal faction that participated in the general election. The UC (later the Maoists) took part in the first democratic elections under the umbrella of the UPF and won nine seats in the representative assembly.²¹⁹

The mid-term parliamentary elections of November 1994 resulted in a hung parliament that further led to a power-centric rivalry among major political parties. Thus, they were pre-occupied with their own political survival rather than addressing the people's needs. According to Thapa, "The Maoists seemed betrayed by the failed promise of democracy, and felt powerless even though they were hardly a fringe political party represented in the national parliament."²²⁰ In 1994, the Maoists under the UPF abandoned their legislative seats and their leaders went underground. The split in the UC in 1994 gave a birth to the Prachanda-led Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) that adopted a plan for a people's war.²²¹ It started its propaganda and armed actions in the least developed and remote districts of Rolpa in mid-western Nepal. The rest of the UC, who were still supporting the parliamentary election, remained under the leadership of Nirmal Lama.²²²

²¹⁸ Acharya, "The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 6.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 6.

²²⁰ Thapa, "Evolution of Maoism in Nepal," 3.

²²¹ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 20–27.

²²² Basu and Riaz, *Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), 126.

In February 1996, the leader of the UPF, Nepal, and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai submitted the 40-point demands to the NC-led government with an ultimatum, which was related to nationalism, socio-economic and political inequalities, and the people's democracy. Out of 40 demands, 7 were related to nationalism, 13 to politics, 13 to socio-economic issues, and 7 socio-cultural issues.²²³ Among these demands, the Maoists incorporated all ten causes responsible for social discrimination and inequality that had already been identified by the Informal Sector Service Center.²²⁴ The demands also encompassed the issue of declaring Nepal a secular state and some utopian ideals, such as employment for all.²²⁵ These demands outlined what the Maoists perceived as the political, economic, and social problems in Nepal, with desired outcomes to address each. But the NC-led government criticized this as a form of extremism and "Political Conspiracies"²²⁶ and did not respond to any of the demands. However, four days prior to the ultimatum, Bhattarai also joined the Prachanda-led Maoist movement. Then, in February 1996, they declared the People's War, claiming that only a communist state could solve the country's various problems.

Though the Maoists who started the armed rebellion in 1996 were in favor of an armed insurgency since the initiation of the leftist movement, they used its political front only to forward the demands to the government as a formality because these demands could not possibly be addressed within the given time. The Maoists started the armed insurgency even before reaching the deadline.²²⁷ Deepak Thapa reinforces this view that the demands were just a distraction because the Maoists had already decided to launch an

²²³ Harka Gurung, "Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency" (Paper presented at National Dialogue Conference on ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal People, Kathmandu, January 19–20, 2005), 4.

²²⁴ INSEC, *Human Rights Year Book 2004*, ed. Arjun Karki and David Sedon (Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2003), 117.

²²⁵ Poudyal, "Explaining the Success," 63.

²²⁶ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 72–73.

²²⁷ Deepak Thapa, "The Making of the Maoist Insurgency," in *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace*, eds., Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 37–57.

armed rebellion.²²⁸ Thapa provides an analysis of the government's failure to address economic, political, and social issues prevailing in the country after the re-establishment of the democracy in 1990, which served as the favorable condition to start the rebellion. Despite an unfavorable international environment, the Maoists grabbed this situation as the right moment to wage the armed insurgency in Nepal, but this was the outcome of a rational and careful calculation of the need for the revolution to have radical change in Nepal.

The Maoist insurgency as a whole was made up of mainly five elements. First, Thomas Marks recognizes the Maoists' mass line as a counter-state parallel mechanism, "organizing an alternative society through the construction of clandestine infrastructure. Local socio-economic grievances and aspirations are too addressed by cadres, who then connect solutions to the political mechanism to the party."²²⁹ This element was mainly focused on the Dalit and indigenous community of the mid-western region at the start. Second, a United Front of various individuals and groups who shared a common interest, but not necessarily the ultimate objective of the Maoists, provided strength to the cause. The third element is the armed element that operated illegally and clandestinely, which was very important to maintain the security of the organization and leadership from both inside and outside threats.²³⁰ Moreover, it was equally significant to destroy the state's security organs, oppositions, and better-off people through violence. Political warfare was another important element of the Maoist movement. This was the decision-making platform focused mainly on organizing non-violent political activity and negotiation when and where needed. Last, international action was the outside forum for the Maoist cause, and which attempted to influence other nations not to support the state. These were the RIM and the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South

²²⁸ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 53.

²²⁹ Thomas A. Marks, "Insurgency in Nepal" (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, December 2003), 6, accessed November 28, 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/year.cfm?show=pubs-list&year=2003&q=121>.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 6–7.

Asia (CCOMPOSA), both of which share the same political ideology.²³¹ Without analyzing these factors of the insurgency campaign, the Nepalese government failed to balance their military efforts with socio-political issues and to recognize the population as vital. This will be explained in detail later in this chapter.

3. Analysis of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

The various theories that explain the causes of armed conflicts are generally diverse. Every conflict, however, has its peculiar characteristics and its own unique causes that are governed by its own socio-politico-economic set-up. According to various scholars, such as Kumar and Thapa, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal can be analyzed as the inevitable consequences of the country's severe economic, political, and social circumstances that particularly developed after the 1990 restoration of democracy.²³² Additionally, other scholars view factors such as poverty, ethnicity, geographical difficulties, unemployment, lack of education, lack of natural resources, a traditional Hindu caste system, and social oppression as the principle causes that explain the insurgency in Nepal. Above all, the root causes of the people's dissatisfaction are economic, socio-cultural, and political circumstances, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

a. Economic Inequality

Economically, modern Nepal has been unsuccessful in development. Although the economic indicators (e.g., expansion of and improvements in road construction, banking institutions, domestic air and road connectivity, access to the educational establishment, mass media exposure, etc.) showed progress in the infrastructure and service sectors during the 1990s, Nepal remained trapped in extreme poverty as it is “one of the poorest countries in the world with per capita income U.S. \$290 in 2006, the

²³¹ Timothy R. Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996–2008: Implications for U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Kansas, 2009), 16–24, accessed November 28, 2013, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA505200>.

²³² Dhurba Kumar, “Proximate Causes of Conflict in Nepal,” *Contributions to Nepalese Studies* 32, no. 1 (2005): 51–92; Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 53.

lowest in South Asia.”²³³ Lawoti claims, “Over 40 percent of medium and large landowners in the hills were classified as poor in 1996.”²³⁴ According to one government source, around 40 percent of the people were unable to access basic human needs, which remained unchanged between the 1970s and 1990s. Instead, the number of poor nearly doubled in 1996.²³⁵

Similarly, despite the expansion in infrastructure and services, a large segment of the population, mainly people living in remote rural areas, continued to be ignored because of the increase in the population and city-based development. Only better-off sections and urban populations benefitted from this.²³⁶ After the change in the political system, there were some promising results. The gross domestic product grew by 7.9 percent, and 4 percent of this growth came from the tourism sector alone. However, this growth did not continue due to political instability, bad governance, and widespread corruption. The growth rate started decelerating immediately.²³⁷

In addition, challenges associated with the rugged hilly terrain, geographical isolation, environment, climate, and a lack of roads profoundly influenced development, which largely shaped opportunities in remote rural areas.²³⁸ The city and plains area-based improvements and expansion in infrastructure and services even widened the gap between the rural and urban population. The geographical divide between developed urban and underdeveloped rural areas, and between plains and hills/mountainous areas, also supported the Maoist insurgency. As a result, the rebellion started in the remote, isolated, and underdeveloped hilly districts (Rolpa and Rukum of mid-western Nepal)

²³³ Lawoti and Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal*, 7.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 8–9.

²³⁸ Steven R. Letch, “War in Shangri-La, The Information Dimension of Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 30–32, accessed September 19, 2013, http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/1955/05Sep_Letch.pdf?sequence=1.

and expanded its influence and activities in 32 hilly districts immediately. Until 2000, the main cities and terai (southern plain) districts were considered unaffected.²³⁹

b. Socio-Cultural Inequality

Ethnic discrimination, the Hindu caste system, and inequality were also significant factors that had a direct bearing on the intensity of the conflict. On the one hand, the constitution of 1990 labeled Nepal as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and democratic state in which all citizens are equal irrespective of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe, or ideology.²⁴⁰ The statute also gave all communities the right to establish civil society organizations based on ethnic and caste identity to preserve and promote their languages, scripts, and cultures, to educate children in their mother tongues, and to practice their own religion.²⁴¹ On the other hand, this new political system booked some contradictions on the issues, such as declaring Nepal as a Hindu kingdom, prohibiting women to pass citizenship on to their children, and preserving traditional practices. Minority and ethnic groups, women, and *Dalits* were not happy with these declarations.

Although these constitutional arrangements were not discriminatory in spirit, maintaining the traditional practices of the hills-based higher caste Hindu and the Nepali language as a national language became quite dominant in the society, which was considered as the cause of great disparity between other ethnic communities and *Madhesis* (people living in the southern plains, Madhes in Nepal).²⁴² As argued by Lawoti and Pahari, “Nepal not only faced class inequality, but extreme socio-cultural inequality also existed among numerous linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial, caste, and regional groups.”²⁴³ They claim that there are about sixty ethnic groups in the country and the presence of these groups even decreased in some institutions as compared to the

²³⁹ Gurung, “Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency,” 13.

²⁴⁰ Krishna B. Bhattachan, “Nepal: from Absolute Monarchy to Democracy and Back — The Need for Inclusive Democracy,” *The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy* 1, no. 4 (July 2005), accessed November 26, 2013, http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/newsletter/vol1_no4_nepal.htm.

²⁴¹ Lawoti and Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal*, 310.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

pre-democratic era before 1990.²⁴⁴ The state machinery, such as bureaucracy, politics, military, and judiciary, is also dominated by the higher caste elites. *Janajatis* (lower caste indigenous people) and *Dalits* from the hills and terai were the most deprived section of the society and became the main attractions for the recruits of the Maoist insurgency. According to Thapa, *Brahman* (the highest caste of Hindu, the priests, scholars, and philosophers) and *Chhetris* (the second highest caste of Hindu, the kings, warriors, rulers, and administrators) together constitute only 29 percent of the population but they dominated almost all sectors before democracy and this policy of exclusion continued even after the change of 1990.²⁴⁵

According to Lawoti, the unitary, centralized, and non-inclusive state structure also remained largely unchanged and unchallenged.²⁴⁶ With the increased level of ethnic, gender, and lower-caste grievances, as many commentators and scholars have identified, the political parties and the successive governments dominated by higher-caste elites did not seriously focus on representing and articulating the demands of these marginalized and oppressed segments of the population. The state left these groups under-represented at the policy making level, and with little access to power, they lacked inclusiveness in almost every sector of the state.²⁴⁷

The denial of power and wealth had been a source of constant dissatisfaction. This is linked to modern values of equality and human rights as well as to basic economic needs of the lower-castes. With ongoing modernization of the national economy, many low-grade jobs of *Dalits* and lower-castes, particularly on farms, were replaced or abolished, which resulted in the lack of opportunities to earn a living.²⁴⁸ However, grievances from the agricultural sector were not limited to the lower caste and *Dalits*

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 20–27.

²⁴⁶ Lawoti and Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal*, 10.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ James D. Fearon., *Economic Development, Insurgency, and Civil War, Institutions and Economic Performance*, ed. Elhanan Helpman (New York: Harvard University Press, May 17, 2007).

only; the agricultural policy also failed to abolish the semi-feudal structure of agriculture in Nepal.²⁴⁹

The Maoist insurgency gained momentum with extensive popular support. The social inequalities experienced by the lower castes, *Dalits*, ethnic groups, and women provided a fertile ground for the Maoists to organize and conduct their rebellion. According to the official data up to 2004, the highest casualties (32 percent) among the Maoists were the *Janajatis* and *Dalits* from the western hills,²⁵⁰ and women and *Dalits* made up 30–40 percent of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA).²⁵¹ The larger percentage of participants was from the untouchable castes, such as *Kami*, *Sarki*, *Damai*, etc., and indigenous communities, such as *Rai*, *Limbu*, *Gurung*, *Magar*, *Tamang*, etc., who provided the Maoists with sanctuary, recruits, and other support to fight against the state.²⁵² The participation of women as fighters was a completely new and unique phenomenon in Nepal

c. Political Exclusion and Bad Governance

A political grievance was another prominently identified cause of the conflict in Nepal. The Constitution of 1990 was drafted after the people’s democratic mass movement arose against the party-less Panchayet regime and established Nepal as a parliamentary multi-party democratic country. The change increased the blossoming awareness of individual rights and freedom that provided the population with opportunities to express their discontents and grievances. Although the history of the CPN dates back to 1949, one of the radical communist movements, the Maoist insurgency came into existence after this political change.²⁵³ While Nepal had benefited

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ INSEC, *Human Rights Year Book-2004*, ed. K Gautam (Kathmandu: INSEC, 2004), 135.

²⁵¹ Mandira Sharma and Dinesh Prasain, *Gender Dimensions of the People’s War: Some Reflections on the Experiences of Rural Women*, ed. M Hutt (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 154.

²⁵² Chitra K. Tiwari, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Internal Dimensions,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 187 (January 1, 2001), accessed December 5, 2013, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper187>.

²⁵³ Acharya, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 6.

politically from the third wave of democracy, the system became unable to address the people's aspirations.²⁵⁴

Although the form of political system changed several times in Nepalese history, the ordinary Nepalese people observed no positive and qualitative change in their living standards. Nepalese politics had been reflected as no more than a power struggle among major political parties.²⁵⁵ As a result, people continuously faced several negative consequences such as bad governance, increased corruption, unemployment, price increases in basic needs, harsh conditions of poverty, etc. Due to the corruption, budgets were unequally distributed and inefficiently spent, contributing to almost non-existent efforts at eliminating poverty and creating employment opportunities.²⁵⁶ A decentralization policy was adopted to end malfunctions of the state, but the policy was only manifested on paper.²⁵⁷

With this new political development in the country, the Nepalese people as a whole had positive expectations, which were to a large extent unfulfilled.²⁵⁸ After 1990, three competitive national elections were held in the years 1991, 1994, and 1999, respectively. Within a period of eight years, Nepal witnessed the rise and fall of six coalition governments and five different prime ministers, which caused severe political instability in Nepal.²⁵⁹ The elected governments placed very little effort into expanding the state in the vast remote areas, which contributed to the major political parties' failure to consolidate their political achievements after 1990.²⁶⁰ According to Maharjan, inter-party and intra-party power struggles for the numerical equation in the parliament greatly threatened the political stability in Nepal. As a result, people's dissatisfactions and

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 53–55.

²⁵⁶ Acharya, "The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 6.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Kumar, "Proximate Causes of Conflict in Nepal," 54–60.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Panch N. Maharjan, *Domestic Conflict and Governability in Nepal*, ed. Dhurba Kumar (Kathmandu: Center for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2000), 163–196.

concerns started to manifest as demands and political campaigns just two years after the establishment of the new political system.²⁶¹

The majority of scholars believe that failure to deliver as per the Nepalese people's aspirations of economic development and good governance by the newly established democracy in 1990 set off the Maoists' armed struggle in Nepal. Seddon and Hussain reinforce this view, noting that the, "failure of development and of governance created the pre-conditions, such as poverty, inequality, social discrimination and lack of social justice and democracy for widespread discontent, and ultimately for the Maoist insurgency."²⁶² Quoting Lund and Mehler's model, which divides the root causes of conflict into four main areas, Manish Thapa explains: "First, imbalance of political, social, economic, and cultural opportunities; second, illegitimate, undemocratic, and inefficient governance; third, absence of opportunities for the peaceful reconciliation of group interests and for bridging dividing lines between groups; last, absence of an active and organized civil society." Nearly all of these causes mentioned were present in Nepal in the 1990s.²⁶³

In Kashmir, there are also some similarities with Nepal in the rise of the insurgency, such as political manipulation, bad governance, less-focused economic development, and slow democratic transition. Both countries were lacking the effective political and economic lines of operations in their COIN strategies to address these legitimate grievances of the people as well as weaknesses of the state. More extensive analysis will be provided in the following chapter.

B. NEPALESE COIN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MAOIST INSURGENCY

The Maoist insurgency was the most serious domestic security threat that Nepal had encountered in the nearly two-and-a-half centuries of its modern history. Since 1995,

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Sedan David and Hussain Karim, "The Consequences of Conflict: Livelihoods and Development in Nepal," *Working Paper 185* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002), viii, accessed December 5, 2013, <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2682.pdf>.

²⁶³ Thapa, "Evolution of Maoism in Nepal," 9.

Nepal has mobilized its security forces to fight the insurgency and maintain internal peace and security. The COIN campaign experienced failure in 2006 when the Maoists successfully overthrew the monarchy-led government of Nepal by reaching a comprehensive peace agreement with other parliamentary parties. While analyzing the failure of the Nepalese COIN campaign, some elements of the mixed approach, which are considered to be the essential prerequisites for the success of the COIN campaign, will be evaluated and also compared to the Indian COIN campaign Kashmir. These elements include effective security operations to defeat the armed elements of insurgency and protect the population, political methods of addressing the people's grievances, and overall socio-economic development in the insurgency-affected region.

1. Security Operations

In order to analyze the effectiveness of the security forces operations of the COIN campaign, the insurgency period is divided into the two phases, the first phase from 1995 to 2000 (police-led operations) and the second phase from 2001 to 2006 (army-led operations).

a. First Phase (From 1995 to 2001—Complete Failure of the Police Operations)

For the first time, in 1995 the NC-led government responded to the Maoists with a violent police action, namely 'Operation Romeo', which was explained to parliament by the then Home Minister as—a special security program. As argued by Thapa, the Maoists began the Sija (Sisne to Jaljale) campaign in Rolpa and Rukum to launch politico-ideological preparation in September 1995; they started clashes with local leaders and cadres of NC, UML, and the Rastri Prajantra party.²⁶⁴ To counter these activities, "Police teams had been dispatched to eight village development committees, 70 persons had been arrested before the security operation and 117 since then, and a number of guns and khukuris (Nepalese Knives) had been recovered from houses."²⁶⁵ It was said that the

²⁶⁴ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 71.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

police action was taken against the anti-monarchy and anti-democracy movements. At the same time, all village chairmen elected on the UPF were arrested, nearly 6,000 locals left the village, and other supporters, including hundreds of ordinary citizens, were arrested without any warrants and tortured. As a result, the affected population started viewing the government as the enemy, which further prepared the favorable condition for armed movement.²⁶⁶

Until 1998, the government responded to the Maoists threat with oppressive police operations while the Maoists continued to conduct guerrilla attacks against people and local opposition political leaders and their cadres to expand their base of support in other regions of the country.²⁶⁷ As Lawoti claims, “People followed the Maoists dictates because of fear—the mobile Maoist army or militia could visit any time to take ‘actions,’ which could include minor punishment, public humiliation through garlanding with shoes and shaving of heads, torture even death.”²⁶⁸ The Maoists also kidnapped police and government officers, better-off people, local teachers, and media persons who were opposing their movements, and forced them to leave the village. They also confiscated their property and land for the party use. The Maoist insurgents continued their violent attacks on police posts in districts of Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot of mid-western Nepal, Gorkha in Western Nepal, and Sindhuli in Eastern Nepal. Eventually, the Maoists became successful in displacing the state, its agencies, and the opposition political supporters from rural areas.²⁶⁹

The Nepalese people did not react to this type of behavior of the Maoists for a long time because the successive governments of Nepal had marginalized the rural populations politically and economically. Also, the government lacked a comprehensive civil-military campaign plan to fight insurgency and protect the population and state

²⁶⁶ Ibid, 71–72.

²⁶⁷ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 85–87.

²⁶⁸ Lawoti and Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal*, 15.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 14–15.

agencies from violence and aggressive behaviors. The police response from the very beginning was even more repressive than that of the Maoists.

In 1998, the police conducted Operation Kilo Sierra Two, which proved to be counter-productive due to the indiscriminate violence of police personnel against the population in the name of suppressing the Maoist extremism. According to a fact stated by several human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, “The police in many places have killed more innocent civilians than guerrillas.”²⁷⁰ This operation pushed many innocent people to support the Maoists. As Lawoti argues, “the state not only failed to repress the insurgency, but its counter-insurgency activities fuelled the insurgency because of the haphazard deployment of force. Further, the Maoist rebellion grew rapidly owing to the irresponsible response of the state.”²⁷¹ Because it failed to distinguish the rebels from the population and attacked both together, the COIN campaign became extremely painful for the local people.

In 1999, the government formed the High-level Committee under NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba to provide suggestions to solve the Maoist problems.²⁷² This committee concluded that the spread of Maoist violence was not due to any failure of democracy, but due to the weakness of the state’s management and administration and to frequent change in the government. It was again unable to identify the root causes of the insurgency. The committee also was not able to recognize that the use of excessive force by the state was increasing the people’s support for the Maoist movements²⁷³

In early November 2000, the NC-led government under Prime Minister G.P. Koirala wanted to end the violence and bring the Maoists into main-stream politics through dialogue, but this effort failed due to the Maoists’ betrayal. Because the strategy and fighting strength of the Maoists were overwhelming, they were able to launch attacks

²⁷⁰ Chitra K. Tiwari, “Nepal: Maoist Insurgency,” *South Asia Monitor*, no. 31 (March 1, 2001), South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, accessed November 28, 2013, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam31.pdf>.

²⁷¹ Lawoti and Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal*, 22.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 73.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

against under-manned and ill-equipped policemen in remote posts until that time.²⁷⁴ Afterward, the Maoists increased their attacks and displaced government infrastructure and police outposts in various parts of the country. As a result, the death toll rose dramatically, such that 70 police died in one bloody week.²⁷⁵ It was seen as a turning point in their armed approach that they attacked with large human waves of fighters outnumbering police.

The Maoists' terrorist activities and connected trend of organized crimes appeared to be increasing within the state. To handle criminal activities and to tackle the insurgency, the government perceived an immediate need for an Armed Police Force (APF) with modern weaponry. Subsequently, the APF was established on October, 24, 2001.²⁷⁶ As stated by Tiwari, "The amount allocated for the purchase of modern arms was U.S. \$4.72 million, nearly twice the allocation for development."²⁷⁷ The APF made slow progress in regard to the operational demands, but again focused only on a repressive response against the insurgency and also fuelled the Maoists through indiscriminate killings and human rights violations.

b. Analysis of the First Phase Security Operations

During this phase from 1995 to 2000, the government of Nepal justified oppressive policies in the name of suppressing the insurgency but offered no alternatives to address the basic inequalities of the local people. This contributed to the escalation of the conflict from the mid-western region to the rest of the country. To fight the rebels effectively, the government made a decision to increase the daily allowance and added some other incentives for the police force working in the Maoist-affected areas, specifically the police team could kill or capture more rebels.²⁷⁸ This approach, famously

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Thomas A. Marks, "Insurgency in Nepal" (December 2003) Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, accessed November 28, 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/year.cfm?show=pubs-list&year=2003&q=121>.

²⁷⁷ Tiwari, "Nepal: Maoist Insurgency."

²⁷⁸ Poudyal, "Nepal Army and COIN," 19.

known as Target Out (kill them), led the police to use unlawful and indiscriminate actions to prove that the Maoists were active in their area. For example, when the Romeo Operation (1995), Kilo Shera-2 and Jungle Search Operations (1998-99) and Silent Kilo Shera-3, Delta and Chakrabihu Operations (2000-May 2001) were launched, the police forces actually killed more innocent civilians than the terrorists, which caused further resentment and feeling of revenge.²⁷⁹ These operations proved to be ineffective in controlling the rebel activities or gaining local support, as stated by several human rights organizations, including Amnesty International.²⁸⁰ As argued by Tiwari, “These police operations have applied the policy of encircle and kill, a policy similar to that of Chiang Kai-shek’s campaign to exterminate Communists in China in the 1930s.”²⁸¹ The government therefore did not recognize the importance of the people as the center of gravity of the campaign in the insurgency-affected areas.

The government, however, launched the Integrated Security and Development Program (ISDP) in 2001 to win the hearts and minds of the people through development and security measures in tandem. According to Tiwari, “The government has allocated U.S. \$2.6 million to a development package called the basket fund,”²⁸² but which was even less than the budget of a newly formed APF. Along with this initiative, the government also deployed the NA to provide protection to district headquarters of the Maoist-affected districts, such as Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, Gorkha, and Sindhuli. While the idea of development was the right step, it could not progress as expected due to weak governance, delayed execution, and lack of sufficient resources. The Maoists also easily blocked the government’s efforts in remote parts of these districts under their control.²⁸³ As claimed by Thapa, “it is worth recounting some of the points listed as the reasons that played a role in the complexity of this [Maoist] problem as it dealt with

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Tiwari, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Internal Dimensions.”

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Timothy R. Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” *Small Wars Journal* (April 13, 2009), accessed November 28, 2013, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-maoist-insurgency-in-nepal-and-us-counterinsurgency-doctrine>.

matters other than the purely political.”²⁸⁴ In the case of Kashmir, the Indian government and Kashmiri authorities also used the same heavy-handed security response against the separatist insurgency with very a limited WHAM campaign in the 1990s. This approach resulted in the failure of the campaign, as in Nepal. More extensive analysis will be provided in the following chapter.

c. Second Phase (From 2001 to 2006—Tactical Success of the Army-Led Operations)

In June 2001, the royal family was massacred by Prince Dipendra. Before he was also fatally shot himself, Prince Dipendra killed the king leaving the throne to his uncle, King Gyanendra. The Nepalese people were shocked by this, leading to further destabilization, which was furthered by a vague investigation report and some conspiracy theories.²⁸⁵ The Maoists took this as an opportunity to further speed up their political and armed actions.

Following this incident, the Nepalese government became flexible to deal with the Maoists by negotiation. As a result, the Maoists and the government agreed to hold their first peace talks in August and declared a ceasefire in June 2001. By November, they had failed to agree on key issues, and immediately the Maoists resumed attacks by launching an attack on the army barracks of an infantry company deployed in Dang, mid-western Nepal.

The Maoist attack on the army barracks forced the parliament to declare a state of emergency to mobilize NA for the first time in a COIN campaign within the country; this curtailed some of the citizens’ fundamental rights and declared the Maoists a terrorist organization.²⁸⁶ The Maoists movement was addressed under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Bill, which was passed in April, 2001.

²⁸⁴ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 73.

²⁸⁵ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 116–118.

²⁸⁶ Timothy R. Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996–2008: Implications for U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Kansas, 2009), 10, accessed November 28, 2013, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA505200>.

According to Thapa, “The government banned the Maoists and its fraternal organizations, and harsh penalties were announced for anyone suspected of helping the rebels, Deuba [PM] also declared that there would be no further talking until the rebels disarmed.”²⁸⁷ This demonstrated that the Nepalese government wanted to deal with the insurgency by a more aggressive approach, seeking military resolution of a political problem.

In February 2002, the NA received another setback when the Maoists completely overran the army’s forward operating base at Mangal Sen in far-western Nepal and slaughtered all military personnel deployed there.²⁸⁸ The Maoists were also able to seize all military weapons and equipment. This was the district HQ of the Achham, where all the administrative offices were located, and this operating base would provide security to staff and infrastructure as well. This successful Maoist attacks on a military post raised the two serious concerns.²⁸⁹ First, it raised questions about the NA’s readiness and its capability to fight against the insurgency as the army had been closely observing the situation for more than five years. In this context, the army could not claim to be surprised and unprepared because there was enough time to learn the Maoists’ tactics and evaluate their strengths and weaknesses.²⁹⁰ The government, the population, and other political parties had expected a lot after the deployment of the army against the Maoists.

Second, as a result of the successful attack on the military base, the Maoists were now better equipped with modern arms, and their morale had received a boost, which greatly contributed to their enhanced strength and capabilities.²⁹¹ Now armed with automatic weapons, guns, and mortars, the motivated rebels were ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause and even sharpened their fighting skills. By contrary, the army suffered serious casualties, a huge blow to morale and significant damage to its

²⁸⁷ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 123.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 136.

²⁸⁹ Rhoderick Chalmers, “State Power and the Security Sector: Ideologies and Interests,” in *Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace*, ed. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 59–60.

²⁹⁰ Chalmers, “State Power and the Security Sector,” 59–60.

²⁹¹ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 136.

credibility.²⁹² From the very beginning, this forced the NA to indiscriminately use force against the suspects, supporters, and family members of known Maoists. Thus, the militarist approach adversely affected the general population, instead of protecting them from the Maoists. According to Chalmers, “A successful counterinsurgency would depend on close cooperation from ordinary people, but soldiers [NA] were widely seen as, at best aloof and detached from their fellow countrymen.”²⁹³

In the lately drafted NA’s civil-military campaign plan of 2002, the NA’s general concept of operations for COIN ascertains the value of civil-military cooperation and combined efforts of national resources against the Maoist insurgency.²⁹⁴ The campaign plan identifies the following important tasks: offensive operations against the Maoists’ bases; securing the road and air lines of communication; conducting search and destroy and counter-smuggling operations along the border and in national parks and wild life reserves; securing district administrative infrastructure and staff, collecting and sharing intelligence; implementing information operations, and development projects, according to Letch.²⁹⁵ Political parties, the government, bureaucrats, and the local administration, however, did not recognize the importance of the comprehensive campaign plan to defeat the insurgency and gain support from the affected people with various lines of operations. As argued by Chalmers, the army was not satisfied with the successive governments, which it viewed as mismanaging the army, and “it blamed political leaders for the failure to develop a coherent civil-military counterinsurgency campaign and felt that it had to shoulder the brunt of the task without adequate political support.”²⁹⁶ Without any support from local political leaders and cadres as well as lacking reliable and credible intelligence, the units and sub-units of NA deployed in forward operating bases had to

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Chalmers, “State Power and the Security Sector,” 59–60.

²⁹⁴ Letch, “War in Shangri-La,” 56.

²⁹⁵ Letch, “War in Shangri-La,” 56.

²⁹⁶ Chalmers, “State Power and the Security Sector,” 62.

focus only on the military-led tactical operations rather than on incorporating a campaign to win hearts and minds.²⁹⁷

In 2002–2003, an already bad internal security and political situation grew worse when the NC split into two rival factions on the issue of forming the government and dealing the Maoist rebellion. At the same time, the UML also refused to lead the government as well. This political development forced the king to disband parliament and appoint a new government under his direct control, using the extraordinary powers granted to him by the constitution of Nepal.²⁹⁸ This political turmoil, however, did not affect the NA's efforts against the rebels in 2002. Instead, the RNA-led operations achieved some initial advances against the Maoists; it was noted that there was a sharp increase in the level of violence as well.²⁹⁹ The greater firepower of the NA along with APF and police helped to launch more effective security operations than before, which forced the Maoists to adjust their tactics from constant engagements and to propose a cease-fire. The government agreed to announce another ceasefire and the peace talks started, but again ended inconclusively. According to Chalmers, the NA viewed the 2003 ceasefire as, "a cunning Maoist ploy to escape from successful military pressure."³⁰⁰ The army believed that the cease fire would give the Maoists time and space to regroup, refresh, and prepare for further offensive actions.

In 2004, the NA drafted the COIN doctrine with help from Indian, U.S., and British military advisors, but it was too little and too late.³⁰¹ According to the NA's COIN manual, the insurgency should be dealt with both through effective security operations to destroy the insurgent fighters and campaign aimed at winning the hearts and minds campaigns of the people. The latter are intended to gain popular support through economic development programs, psychological operations, and military-civic actions.

²⁹⁷ Letch, "War in Shangri-La," 56.

²⁹⁸ Marks, "Insurgency in Nepal," 21.

²⁹⁹ Chalmers, "State Power and the Security Sector," 62–63.

³⁰⁰ Chalmers, "State Power and the Security Sector," 62.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

As stated by Chalmers, “COAS Pyar Jung Thapa publicly instructed his personnel that the people involved in the Maobadi [Nepali term for Maoists] terrorist activities are our own people who have been misled and have taken the wrong path...(our) mission is not to totally eliminate them but to disarm them.”³⁰² The only state institution actively involved in COIN, however, was the NA, which was not trained, equipped, or resourced well for population-centric operations and community policing. Instead the NA was trained conventionally for full-on fighting in war. Because it lacked preparations for the different lines of operations by other machineries of the state to defeat the insurgency and gain people’s support, the NA had to focus primarily on military operations, which contributed very little to winning back people’s support.³⁰³

By 2005, the king-led government continued its support to increase the strength and to arm the NA with modern sophisticated weapons, equipment, vehicles, and aircraft, an effort which had already been initiated and approved by the previous NC-led government. The strength of the army increased from 45,000 within only one division when the Maoists attacked in 2001 to 72,000 in 2004,³⁰⁴ and the APF and police were also expanded in small numbers. International assistance also helped to train, organize, and arm the security forces to fight effectively against the Maoists. Foreign assistance in terms of weapons, vehicles, equipment, aircraft, and training to the security forces from India, China, UK, and the U.S. played a major role in strengthening its capability to fight against the rebels.³⁰⁵ The foreign assistance was not sufficient to prevent a Maoist victory; it, however definitely helped the military to hold the rebels at a military stalemate.³⁰⁶

According to Mehta and Lawoti, “The NA, with these improvements, began to claim that it was winning the war. In May 2005, the Royal Government claimed that it

³⁰² Ibid., 36–37

³⁰³ Ibid., 37.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 56.

³⁰⁵ Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 38–43.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 43.

had broken the back of the Maoists and killed 600 of them since February, captured 350 guns and 13,700 bullets.”³⁰⁷ They further stated, from the end of ceasefire in August 2003 to September 2005, 4,546 Maoists were killed and 2,889 surrendered.³⁰⁸ This subsequent rise in casualties after the deployment of the NA led to the decline in recruitments by the Maoists. They also became unable to capture any military installations and district HQs even after they overran them. Meanwhile, they suffered a big defeat in Khara in April 2005. The NA had succeeded in proving to the rebels that it was almost impossible to defeat the army by direct confrontation, which forced the Maoists to quit their military options for some time and seek a peace settlement with the government.³⁰⁹ The Nepalese security forces, however, were considered as one of the world’s worst human rights abusers, as argued by Letch. He notes, “Nepal continued to commit numerous serious abuses through 2005,” such as arbitrary and maximum use of lethal weapons, disappearances, and abuse and torture of detainees, suspects, and supporters.³¹⁰

The Maoists also realized that if they remained strictly focused on the people’s war, they would miss opportunities to find a political solution through peace negotiation and the movement would be drawn out.³¹¹ They ended the strategic stalemate in 2005 with a political agreement with the major opposition political parties, the Seven Party Alliances (SPA), who were not satisfied with the king’s direct control of the state. Interestingly, the negotiations and agreement were mediated by the close neighbor, India. Later, the SPA, with active involvement of the Maoists, organized a mass protest against the king and ultimately forced him to give up direct rule and reinstate the parliament in April 2006.³¹²

³⁰⁷ Ashok K. Mehta and Mahendra Lawoti, “Military Dimensions of the People’s War: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Nepal,” in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century*, ed. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge, 2010), 178.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Letch, “War in Shangri-La,” 57.

³¹¹ Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 22.

³¹² Ibid.

d. Analysis of the Second Phase Security Operations

During this phase, being the most important element of national power, the NA was actively involved against the Maoists insurgents. Due to limited political directions from the frequently changed government, bureaucratic assistance, judicial support, and good will of the people, the NA was obliged to operate in isolation to protect the population from being forced to surrender to communist rule.³¹³ The late-mobilizing NA, however, faced several setbacks during the campaign. The NA had insufficient personnel and equipment, inadequate training, and poor intelligence during the initial phase of its involvement.³¹⁴ The army was organized, trained, and armed according to the conventional set-up and was given primarily ceremonial roles during the decades under Panchayet regimes. According to Thomas Marks, “As matters worked out, the RNA [now NA] was the only element of the government which actually fulfilled its role,” at the local level.³¹⁵

While NA was not successful in decisively suppressing and defeating the Maoist insurgency strategically, however, it did succeed tactically in constraining them from launching major military actions against the security forces in remote rural areas. As a result, the Maoist leadership started shifting their violent movement toward gathering support from the opposition political parties and other ethnic minorities. This made them successful in creating an environment to mobilize nationwide mass movements along with other political parties against the state, through Indian support. Eventually, the existing government of Nepal was overthrown and replaced by the new coalition government of the Maoists and opposition parties. The government’s COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006 to defeat the insurgency had failed, and the Maoists became the main political players in Nepalese politics.

On the other hand, the Indian military in Kashmir after 2000 started to conduct better planned, organized, and co-ordinated security operations against insurgents and

³¹³ Poudyal, “Nepal Army and COIN,” 41.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Marks, “Insurgency in Nepal,” 18.

intruders as well as winning the hearts and minds campaign to support the local population. This enabled the Indian military to effectively contain the insurgency, prevented a large-scale guerrilla campaign from developing in Kashmir, and forced insurgents to limit themselves to terrorist activities only. Effective COIN operations have also provided the favorable security situation for the Indian government to initiate political and economic process in Kashmir. More extensive analysis on this will be provided in the following chapter.

2. Political Process

Politically, the government of Nepal failed to address the roots of internal political, social, and economic causes of the Maoist insurgency when Nepal had experienced 15 different governments from 1990 to April 2006.³¹⁶ Political instability made democratic transition difficult and prevented the government from acting appropriately against the insurgency. The political parties and politicians could never rise above their individual and party interests. Their self-interest was the state's routine business as illustrated by rampant corruption, exclusiveness, and non-transparent practices. Petty differences based on individual interests also kept the politicians far from reaching consensus on how to deal with the Maoist insurgency as a serious internal threat.³¹⁷ According to Marks, "Not only did governments change with startling rapidity, on average one per year, but governance was only possible due to the formation of various intra-and even inter-party coalitions."³¹⁸

The political parties and the successive governments of Nepal also failed to develop a coherent COIN strategy to fight the insurgency. According to Yubaraj Grimire, they "never developed a clear understanding as to the proper use of military force, instead

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Marks, "Insurgency in Nepal," 18–20.

³¹⁸ Ibid, 18.

the state adopted a reactive policy.”³¹⁹ The government and the security forces’ efforts adopted the enemy-centric approach without recognizing the importance of the popular support that pushed the neutral population toward the Maoists’ control. This strategy lacked the appropriate lines of operations as well as instruments to address the political, social, and economic problems. An overly militaristic COIN strategy only attempted to contain the Maoist insurgency, but it was unable to gain popular support.³²⁰

As Kreuttner observes, “State withdrawal from insurgency areas only made it more difficult for the government to gain popular support from the population.”³²¹ In addition, the government’s choice of a singular focus on a military solution, such as the initial police repression with extensive human right violations, formation of the APF and continuation of repression, and an over-emphasized dependency on NA’s efforts in the later phase, drove the population far from the state. This situation was exploited well by the insurgents. The introduction of the ISDP, with military deployment to district HQs, however, was a first right step by the government to address the socio-economic issues. Even so, the state’s execution was again weak and eventually blocked by the Maoists. During the whole campaign, no government regime recognized the importance of winning hearts and minds to gain popular support as the center of gravity for the counterinsurgents as well as the insurgents. On the other hand, the Maoists successfully used popular support throughout the campaign.

Another important aspect of the successful COIN strategy of any government is the unity of efforts or the integrated interagency efforts, which emphasize the necessity of the combined responses of all national resources at every level to achieve the set end state. In the case of the Nepalese COIN campaign, this was the main problem from the strategic and operational levels to the tactical level. According to Lawoti, “The RNA

³¹⁹ Yubaraj Ghimire, “The Many Dimensions of Nepali Insurgency,” in *Building a CATR Research Agenda, Proceedings of the Third Annual International Symposium of the Center of Asian Terrorism Research (CATR)*, ed. Caroline Ziemke (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2006), ii-8, *IDA Paper P-4163* (March 1–3).

³²⁰ Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 26.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

[now NA] was deployed late because of mistrust between the king and the political parties as well as suspicion between the political parties and the RNA.”³²² Also, the NA’s officers accused the parties of marginalizing the army as compared to the police, claiming that “the political party governments instead of democratizing the army, considered the army anti-democratic.”³²³ In a deepening rivalry between the army and police, they accused each other of serving the monarchy or serving the political parties, respectively. Moreover, the constitution of 1990 prevented the mobilization of the army in domestic security conflicts without an emergency declaration. The king and parties were not in favor of imposing the emergency, which led to the formation of the APF as a new security organization to fight against the already matured Maoist threat.³²⁴

Due to the lack of unity of efforts at every level, the government faced problems of reliable and credible operational intelligence on counterinsurgents and strategic intelligence for appropriate decision making and policy formulation. At the tactical level, the security forces had to rely on captured insurgents or local agents. Also, there was a problem in intelligence sharing among various agencies due to mistrust among them. By contrast, the Maoists enjoyed intelligence advantages at all levels as compared to the government and security forces. In the later phases of the campaign, however, a unified command integrating all security agencies under the NA’s command and control was established, and it started operating, but not as effectively as expected.

Political parties and the Nepalese government also failed to understand the real intention of the ceasefire requested by the Maoist leadership. The Maoists always managed every ceasefire to their benefit as they used these periods for recruitment, collection of donations, strengthening the organization by forming different fronts, and preparation and planning for further violent attacks.³²⁵ For instance, during the first

³²² Lawoti and Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal*, 22.

³²³ Chalmers, “State Power and the Security Sector,” 60.

³²⁴ Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 36.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*

ceasefire in 2001, the Maoists expanded their bases from 14 to 57 districts.³²⁶ Immediately after the peace talks, they were able to attack the NA barracks in Dang for the first time. During the second ceasefire, the Maoist leadership rigorously expanded and strengthened their organization from 57 to 72 districts and then throughout the country during the final ceasefire. During and after all ceasefires, the Maoist leadership was successful in building public relations, accumulating funds, and getting the release of most of the cadres from jails.³²⁷

The royal takeover of the government, suspension of civil liberties, and increased military deployment in 2005 did more to harm than good the government's COIN efforts. More importantly, the king's action opened up a three-front political contest among the king-led government, the major political parties, and the Maoist insurgents.³²⁸ The political power of the country was distributed among them. First, the king and his supporters controlled the state resources and security forces. Second, the main-stream political parties with strong international support entertained marginal public support, and lastly, the Maoists with their various organizations and fighters controlled rural Nepal.³²⁹ Meanwhile, international support to the Nepalese government was diminished as the U.S., UK, and India completely halted transferring lethal weapons, equipment, and other military and economic assistance to Nepal.³³⁰ This change directly affected the operational efficiency of the security forces on the ground. India also withdrew from a summit of the SAARC scheduled for February 2005.³³¹ With these conditions, the state now started facing political, economic, and security difficulties at the same time.

India initiated the negotiation process between the major opposition political parties and the Maoists in New Delhi. India facilitated reaching an agreement among

³²⁶ Prem Sahi, "Prachanda: The Mastermind behind the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate College, 2010), 34–39, accessed November 23, 2013, http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/5055/10Dec_Shahi.pdf?sequence=1.

³²⁷ Sahi, "Prachanda: The Mastermind," 34–39,

³²⁸ Letch, "War in Shangri-La," 63.

³²⁹ Sahi, "Prachanda: The Mastermind," 40.

³³⁰ Kreuttner, "The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 39.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

these groups to jointly mobilize the nation-wide mass movements against the government of Nepal. As a result, the king-led government was overthrown and a new government of the Maoists and opposition political parties was formed. The then government's COIN campaign became a complete failure in defeating the Maoist insurgency. Without support from the Indian government, the opposition political parties and ethnic communities of Nepal, the Maoists would not have been able to achieve this "safe landing" and gain the upper hand in the political negotiations, as argued by many domestic and external scholars and strategists.

3. Socio-Economic Development

After the reestablishment of democracy, the government of Nepal never tried to address grievances of the marginalized population through the socio-economic development programs. Nepal was and still is among the poorest countries of the world. In 1990s, the Nepalese economy was very fragile because of the lack of farsighted economic engagement, "inefficiencies, waste, and widespread corruption."³³² This already disturbed economy had been affected heavily by the Maoist insurgency. Along with the decrease in agricultural production, as Thapa claims, "The bleak economy situation and reduction in growth has been attributed" to the mass displacement and migration of farmers from conflict-affected areas.³³³ The Maoists targeted "industries, mainly foreign investment, and joint venture companies in the manufacturing sectors."³³⁴ Moreover, the government infrastructures were also heavily destroyed by them. Nepal was left with no major industries and tourism business for earning foreign currency; the economic condition of the country was declining each day. No economic program had been implemented effectively in the remote areas where majority populations were living in acute poverty.³³⁵

³³² Devendra Raj Pandey, "The Legacy of Nepal's Development," in *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace*, ed. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 86.

³³³ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 142.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Pandey, "The Legacy of Nepal's Development," 86–96.

Both the government and the international partners were unable to activate the available national resources and energy to formulate a long-term development strategy during the period from 1990 to 2006, due to Nepal's domestic mismanagement and contradictions in the international aid system.³³⁶ According to Pandey, internal factors are, "the long neglected causes of failed development—the exclusionary nature of the Nepalese state and its patrimonial character also explain the outbreak of violent conflict in the mid-1990s."³³⁷ Also, the government had to allocate more budget to manage unplanned extra security expenditures rather than development programs. As Thapa states, "Aid agencies have been equally affected as their programs and projects on the ground have been compromised by the insurgency and surrounding conflicts."³³⁸ Regardless of the amount Nepal receives in foreign aid, these funds had not been utilized properly. Insecurity and uncertainty from the insurgency and COIN operations combined with the administrative burdens and corruption-related problems caused a sharp decline in outsiders' and insiders' investment in Nepal. Even worse, Nepalese capital started moving rapidly out of the country.³³⁹

Another important pillar of the national economy is the tourism sector. During the insurgency period, this sector was badly affected by declining tourist arrivals to Nepal. Due to the insecurity caused by the Maoist insurgency, its general strikes, and the state's security operations nationwide, the tourism industry suffered a "negative growth rate of almost 7 percent."³⁴⁰ This decline also put pressure on the banking sector, which cut off the flow of the loans to impacted tourism businesses. According to Thapa, "tourism brought in more than U.S.\$ 160 million a year and provided employment to more than 200,000 people."³⁴¹ Thus, the state faced a huge revenue loss as well as jobs reduction for the people. The state was not in the position to guarantee the safety and security of the

³³⁶ Ibid., 95.

³³⁷ Pandey, "The Legacy of Nepal's Development," 86–96.

³³⁸ Thapa and Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege*, 148.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 166–147.

³⁴¹ Ibid., 142–143.

foreign tourists visiting Nepal or to promote the tourism industry. These economic problems hampered the development process, which provided a favorable environment for the Maoist insurgency.

4. Analysis of the Government's Overall Approach

The reasons for the government being unable to combat the Maoists were mainly political instability, repressive tactics, and the failure to solve socio-economic issues of marginalized groups in the initial period of the insurgency. In the later stage, the failure to establish a democratic government with recognized legitimacy prevented Nepal's movement in the international arena. Political instability created by the self-centric nature of the political parties contributed to the governance crises.³⁴² The successive governments largely suffered from the mistrust and suspicion among parties, king, and military. Partitions within the parties led to ineffective and unresponsive behavior in addressing state affairs. The government suffered from widespread corruption, abuse of a power, a culture of impunity, and a politicized administration, which increased dissatisfaction among common citizens. Also, the successive governments were unable to expand the state's presence, improve the economy, or address social inequalities that existed in the countryside where the Maoists easily penetrated into the population, exploited the people's grievances, and later extensively enjoyed their support.³⁴³

The Nepalese COIN campaign lacked a coherent and comprehensive strategy and the resourceful and well-trained security forces to deal with rebellion. The government, from the very beginning, focused on a military resolution to a political problem. The security forces operated against the organized insurgency without well-designed COIN doctrine, training, and rules of engagement. The state was extremely weak in early warning and early countermeasures in remote areas.

³⁴² Mahendra Lawoti, "Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century*, ed. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge, 2010), 20–22.

³⁴³ Thapa, "Making of the Maoist Insurgency," 52–55.

With these weaknesses, the NA was successful in some rural areas tactically in constraining the insurgents from launching major military actions against the security forces in the later phase. The Maoist leadership, however, started shifting their violent movement toward gathering support from the opposition political parties and other ethnic minorities of Nepal, as well from the Indian government. This made them successful in creating an environment in which to mobilize nationwide mass movements along with other political parties against the state. Eventually, the existing government of Nepal was overthrown and replaced by the new coalition government of the Maoists and opposition parties. Therefore, I argue that the government's COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006, intended to defeat the insurgency, failed, and this allowed the Maoists to become one of the major political players in Nepalese politics. The government could not control these movements in any way because the government's own COIN approach was not focused on dealing with insurgency by gaining popular support and addressing their legitimate demands. It also lacked the different lines of operations of a comprehensive COIN campaign, such as diplomatic, economic and intelligence aspects in the later phase of the campaign.

In Kashmir, the Indian government changed its COIN strategy from the enemy-centric approach to the mixed approach after 2000. This changed approach has made the Indian security forces effective in conducting the intelligence-led COIN operations and a campaign to win hearts and minds based on the doctrinal pattern under the well-coordinated unified command system. Politically, local- and state-level elections have been successfully conducted since 2002, which has helped to encourage local people to choose their own representatives in center, state, and local bodies. The diplomatic initiatives and negotiations have equally played an important role in deescalating tensions as well as finding common confidence-building measures. Meanwhile, long-term as well as short-term socio-economic development projects have become one of the key elements of the COIN strategy in Kashmir. More extensive analysis of this approach will be provided in the following chapter.

C. CONCLUSION

In 1990, internal political pressure, as well as the people's movement, led to the end of the party-less Panchayet system that had existed for three decades. The multi-party democracy was re-established under the aegis of a new constitution of Nepal. Even though the state's main responsibility was to promote and protect the lives and property of its people and improve their well-being based on the principles of a free society, its political leaders seemed to be extremely corrupt, self-centered, and dominated by the same elites of the past regimes. Thus, the successive governments failed to address the long-neglected aspirations of the politically excluded and socio-economically disadvantaged Nepalese people, which ultimately provided the Maoists a favorable pretext for their movement, starting from agitations to armed rebellion against the state in Nepal.³⁴⁴ In Kashmir, the Indian government in the 1990s solely focused on a military response to insurgency and failed to address legitimate grievances of the Kashmiri people. The mixed COIN approach integrating security, political, socio-economic, and diplomatic measures that was adopted after 2000 (and continues to the present), however, has led to recent success in Kashmir. The campaign is an ongoing one.

The start of the Maoist insurgency, however, was not only the result of emerging political instability and economic and socio-cultural inequalities after 1990, as discussed earlier, but also, represented a continuation of a generation of radical cadres with the communist ideology of class struggle.³⁴⁵ Influenced by both the Chinese Maoist and Indian Naxalite movements, they were in favor of launching an armed rebellion as an extension of their political struggle against the elite domination of the politico-economic life of the country. This was their goal that had never been achieved in the past.³⁴⁶ Since the 1990s, the Maoists have claimed this motivation and adopted the violent way of getting hold of state power.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁴ Thapa, "Making of the Maoist Insurgency," 55.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Acharya, "The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 4–6.

The Maoist leadership easily exploited their constitutionally guaranteed freedom and rights in the post-democratic period to organize politically as well as militarily and started an armed movement to achieve their political objectives.³⁴⁸ A key to the Maoists' success was their ability to mobilize dissatisfied classes, lower castes, *Dalits*, women, and ethnic groups in the 1990s. At the later stage, the insurgents' ability to establish successful political engagements with domestic and external factors, such as the democratic parties who were opposing the undemocratic rule of the monarch in Nepal and the regional power of India, were key as well.³⁴⁹ Thus, the Maoists' ideological ground, dynamic leadership, and selective use of violence, along with weak state response, contributed to their success.

The government had completely failed to recognize the gravity of the problem of geographically neglected areas. Instead, the rebels were able to give the impression to the general public that they truly represented the interests, needs, and aspirations of the geographically isolated, poor, rural population who had been excluded from economic, political, and social opportunities mainly because of their location in geographically remote and backward areas.³⁵⁰

The NA only used information warfare on a limited scale, not as a force multiplier as it should be conducted from the government level. The state forces operated with a lack of intelligence and unity of effort. Due to these deficiencies, the police and military operations often could not distinguish the Maoists from the civilians and so would strike both together. That mistake pushed people toward the insurgents' cause and contributed to the growth of the rebellion in the country.

In the early stage of COIN operations, security forces under the lead role of the NA faced numerous setbacks. Moreover, the government did not address the country's core socio-economic problems, even with the army's tactical military success in the later

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Lawoti, "Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 20–22.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

phase.³⁵¹ Politically, the division between the parliamentary parties and the king after his coup in 2005 led to further repressive responses and divisions that created domestic and international opposition. Subsequently, the government lacked internal as well as external support and finally dropped a victory into the hands of the Maoists in 2006.³⁵² As a result, the existing king-led government was overthrown and then formed a new coalition government with the Maoists and other opposition political parties. The Nepalese constitution drafted after the People's Movement in 1990 was replaced by the interim constitution of Nepal. Hence, the Nepalese COIN approach was completely lost. The government was inefficient and unable to mobilize all elements of national power to defeat the insurgency and to win popular and diplomatic support.

After analyzing the Nepalese COIN campaign, we can see that the COIN strategy needs more than an enemy-centric approach to be successful. The government must be able to formulate a comprehensive civil-military campaign plan to include political process and socio-economic programs, information and intelligence support, and military lines of operations. These factors would help to defeat insurgent fighters and win the hearts and minds of the people so that they stop providing insurgents with their support, but were almost non-existent in the case of Nepal. Instead, the government adopted the enemy-centric approach throughout the campaign to address the socio-politico-economic causes of insurgency in Nepal.³⁵³ As we have seen, though, the mixed COIN approach is better at dealing with a complex insurgency in an economically challenged democratic setting such as Nepal. An example is that of the Indian government in Kashmir changing its COIN strategy from an enemy-centric approach after 2000 to the mixed approach of integrating all national instruments that has led to an increased level of success. More extensive analysis of this result will be provided in the following chapter.

³⁵¹ Kreuttner, "The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 50–51.

³⁵² Lawoti, "Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 22–23.

³⁵³ Ibid.

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Insurgencies are serious internal threats for India and Nepal. The Indian COIN campaign against the separatist Kashmiri insurgency from 1990 to the present, and the Nepalese COIN campaign against the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2006, have both experienced failure and success of various degrees at different times. The two cases are similar and comparable because, along with violence, both cases also experienced extensive ethnic mobilization and external support for the insurgency.

This chapter compares and analyzes the factors that led to the recent success of the Indian COIN approach against the Kashmiri insurgency and failure of the Nepalese COIN approach against the Maoists. I will examine the COIN model, the Mixed Approach, which was developed based on the analysis of the essential prerequisites for the success of COIN campaigns. These fundamentals include adherence to the political methods of addressing the people's grievances and diplomatic initiatives, a strategy for overall socio-economic development in the insurgency-affected region, and effective security operations to defeat the armed elements of insurgency. Similarly, protecting the population from insurgent violence along with a campaign to win the hearts and minds and to cultivate relations with international actors are also considered as supporting elements for successful COIN operations. Based on the findings of this comparative analysis, the chapter also offers some lessons.

A. EXPLAINING THE FAILURE AND SUCCESS OF THE INDIAN COIN CAMPAIGN IN KASHMIR

1. Enemy-Centric COIN Approach in the 1990s and Its Outcome

In 1990, India mobilized its army along with other security forces to fight the insurgency in Kashmir and began to rely on the armed forces to control the security setting. In this phase, Indian COIN strategy largely favored a military solution over a political resolution to the insurgency because the Indian security forces not only had to deal with the separatist insurgents within Kashmir, but also had to deter Pakistan and block terrorist infiltration from the Pakistani side of the LOC. Without effective military

operations, it would not have been possible to contain the Islamic separatist insurgency that had the active support of Pakistan, the involvement of Islamic jihadi fighters, and their religious fervor. Eventually, the Indian army became effective at bringing the situation under their control. Additionally, the Indian security forces achieved some initial success in Kashmir by preventing the insurgents' attempts to launch large-scale guerrilla warfare and limiting them to terror acts as a way to gain internal and external attention.³⁵⁴ The Indian government, however, became ineffective at winning popular support because it failed to respect human rights, promote socio-economic development, or initiate a political and diplomatic process in the 1990s. The public continued to confront the security forces, reject the elections of 1996 and beyond, and provide support to the insurgency.

Politically, throughout the 1990s Kashmir remained under the President's rule. The Indian government could not initiate a political process to listen to and address the people's legitimate grievances through a participatory process in state government and local bodies. New Delhi's close ally, Farooq Abdullah of the National Conference, however, won the state election of 1996 with minimal voter participation, and the Indian government promptly suspended the power transfer to the state. New Delhi blamed the state government for not improving the deteriorated situation in Kashmir. In fact, the Kashmiri state administration was weak due to political manipulation from the center, continued political unrest after the mid-1980s, and armed rebellion after the 1990s, which largely made the internal security situation chaotic. The Indian government's diplomatic efforts to solve the Kashmiri insurgency in this phase were also non-existent except for a few bilateral engagements. For example, the Indian Prime Minister, Atal B. Vajpayee, and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, established a number of confidence-building measures to lower tensions over Kashmir in the late 1990s, but these measures ended without any progress due to the Kargil conflict. Moreover, the relations between the state and the center remained uneasy in the 1990s.

³⁵⁴ Wagenen, "An Analysis of the Indian Government's COIN," 11.

With regard to socio-economic development, the Indian focus on addressing these grievances of the Kashmiri people received the lowest priority during the 1990s. Lacking long-term development projects funded by the center, Kashmir suffered from a high unemployment rate and economic disparities among the population, which contributed to the radical Islamic insurgents gaining momentum. The resulting violent activities of insurgents and COIN operations immensely affected the tourism industry, which had been one of the main sectors creating employment opportunities for people and revenue for the state. Moreover, the government was not even in a position to provide immediate response to victims of the severe violence because the security situation in Kashmir was not under control of the security forces. There were mass mobilizations and violent activities of the insurgent at the same time. Overall, India was unable to plan and initiate appropriate socio-economic development programs or address the people's immediate concerns. As a result, the public continuously confronted the security forces, rejected the elections of 1996 and beyond, and provided support to the insurgency. Thus, this singular area-focused, military-only approach could not contribute to the overall improvement of the situation in Kashmir in the 1990s.

2. Mixed COIN Approach in the 2000s and Its Outcome

Due to the above-mentioned setbacks in the Indian COIN strategy of the 1990s, India reached the point where it had to change the COIN strategy to win the people's support, defeat insurgent fighters within Kashmir, deter Pakistan from launching conventional war, and block terrorists from infiltrating and exfiltrating along the LOC. Since then, India has maintained a continuing massive military deployment (Cold Start Strategy) along the LOC and launched a people-oriented campaign (Operation Sadbhavana) within Kashmir.

When recent success in Kashmir is examined, we see that what drives this success are effective security operations, political process, socio-economic development programs, and other people-focused activities. Militarily, the intelligence-led security operations based on the doctrinal pattern by better-trained and equipped security forces under a well-coordinated unified command system, has been able to degrade the

insurgents' fighting capacity in the 2000s. The Indian security forces operations include a campaign to win hearts and minds in urban and rural areas, deployment of the military along the LOC, and COIN operations to defeat the insurgent fighters in affected regions. As a result, this response has now marginalized the insurgents to the point that they are limited only to some terrorist activities. They can no longer launch large-scale guerrilla operations against the state and Indian security forces. The massive military presence along the LOC has also helped to prevent conventional war by deterring Pakistan and to block the infiltration and exfiltration of terrorists through the LOC. The various security forces deployed in the grid system under the unified command network and intelligence provided by all-weather surveillance radar and human intelligence appear to be effective in launching the coordinated and planned operations with less collateral damage and fewer human rights violations.

Politically, the election process that resumed after 2001 has allowed the people to choose their own representatives for the state and local bodies with a view to gaining legitimacy. The state government has now been in place and is functional. Also, diplomatic initiatives, such as the U.S. pressure on Pakistan to ban its terrorist organizations, to end the Kargil conflict, and to deescalate the tension caused by the military crisis of 2001 and 2002, have helped to re-initiate the negotiation process and find common confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan. The Kashmiri people now have started considering the state government formed through the democratic process as legitimate and effective in controlling social, political, and economic institutions, as discussed in Chapter II. Elected representatives from the Kashmiri people are now in a position to raise concerns about the people's grievances and to address these issues at different levels through various political mechanisms. This legitimate political process was completely non-existent during the 1980s and the 1990s in Kashmir.

Economically, the long-term as well as short-term socio-economic development projects along with an immediate response to the people's needs have contributed to local support for the security forces and the state. With center-funded development projects, an increase in revenue from tourism, and an increase in economic growth, the elected state legislatures now have the power to create jobs and prioritize programs based on local

requirements, such as building roads, schools, and health centers. All these changes in Kashmir are positive indicators of socio-economic progress in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s.

Overall, the mixed COIN approach has led to the increased level of success in Kashmir in the 2000s. The degree of success now can be measured from witnessing the people's increased participation in the political and electoral process since 2002, economic growth with returning tourism, decline in violent incidents and infiltration of terrorists through the LOC, establishment and improvement of state and local infrastructure, rehabilitation of some of the displaced population, functioning of basic popular services, and restoration of some of the urban facilities, which are examined in Chapter II.³⁵⁵ The Indian COIN in Kashmir, therefore, shows that the COIN strategy requires not only focused military efforts or people-focused efforts, but an integration of these efforts to achieve an increased level of success.

B. EXPLAINING THE FAILURE OF THE NEPALESE COIN CAMPAIGN FROM 1996 TO 2006

In the Nepalese COIN campaign against the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2006, both the elected party-led and the king-led governments of Nepal strictly followed the enemy-centric, military-only approach to dealing with the insurgency. The resulting security response included repressive police tactics that employed extensive human rights violations in the beginning. This response also led to the formation of APF and continued repression after 2000, and overemphasized dependence on NA's efforts in the later phase, which drove the population far from the state. This backlash was well-exploited by the insurgents. The strategy of "capture and kill" further escalated the violence when a large number of the neutral population were targeted as suspected Maoists and treated like Maoist cadres, leaders, and sympathizers.

³⁵⁵ John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," *RAND Counterinsurgency Study 5* (2008), 61, accessed August 28, 2013, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.5.pdf.

The successive governments of Nepal failed to develop a coherent COIN strategy and civil-military campaign plan to fight against the Maoist insurgency by balancing the military approach with social, economic, and political aspects. This contributed to the state's inability to restore effective governance. The center of gravity of the campaign, the population, was largely ignored by the security forces and the state agencies. Limited political direction from very unstable governments, frequent change in the government, lack of public confidence, insufficient personnel and equipment, inadequate training, and poor intelligence led to the failure of the campaign. NA developed a civil-military campaign plan and COIN doctrine focusing on both the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches with a view to defeating the insurgent fighters as well as to gaining popular support. It was too late, however, to implement and limited in terms of resources and space. Tactically, the NA was able to gain success against the Maoists in some areas, but the state did not attempt to understand the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the people by employing different lines of operations.³⁵⁶

Politically, the successive governments failed to address political and socio-economic issues. During this period, Nepal was passing through the critical phase of democratic transition from the decades' long party-less system under the monarch to a multi-party democratic system. Meanwhile, the state had to fulfill the long-rooted political and socio-economic aspirations of the marginalized population, promote and protect the lives and properties of the people, and improve their well-being based on the principles of a free and open society. The successive governments and the state administration seemed to be extremely corrupt, self-centered, and dominated by the same elites of royal regimes. The royal takeover of the government in 2005, suspension of civil liberties, and increased military operations did even more harm politically to the government's COIN efforts.

As far as socio-economic development is concerned, the successive governments became unable to formulate any national development strategy or initiate any productive socio-economic development projects that would address the legitimate demands of the

³⁵⁶ Ibid., 37.

people living in the remote areas where a majority of the population was under acute poverty.³⁵⁷ The Nepalese economy was very fragile because of the lack of farsighted economic engagement, inefficiencies, waste, and widespread corruption.³⁵⁸ Due to the Maoists' destructive activities, the state was unable to provide security to the industries run by foreign investment or to joint venture companies and development programs funded by the international aid system. The trend of increases in security expenditure and emergency rescue and response also limited what the government could allocate from the budget to socio-economic development programs. With no major industries for earning foreign currency, a deteriorating tourism industry due to insecurity, and a decrease in agricultural production due to the mass displacement and migration of farmers, the economic growth of the country declined heavily. Thus, all these factors contributed to the government forming a weak development strategy during the period from 1990 to 2006.³⁵⁹

One can still argue that the Nepalese COIN campaign against the Maoist insurgency had succeeded in forcing the insurgents to discard their military option for a negotiated political process. The Maoists' choice to search for a political settlement, however, was not due to pressure from the NA and negotiation with the government. Rather, it was due to the Maoist leadership's clear understanding of the prevailing domestic political and external environment. For example, the royal takeover of the government in 2005 made the main-stream political parties stand in strong opposition to the government. These parties were supported by the international community as well as regional powers. Immediately after the take-over, India along with the U.S. and UK completely halted military and economic assistance to the Nepalese government and the security forces. Also, the increased military deployment along with the declaration of a state of emergency suspended civil liberties that made people lose faith in the government. This did even more harm and further eroded popular support. Neither did

³⁵⁷ Pandey, "The Legacy of Nepal's Development," 86–96.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 86.

³⁵⁹ Pandey, "The Legacy of Nepal's Development," 95.

the government attempt to open dialogue with opposition parties. It also failed to take the initiative to keep the confidence of international and regional powers. So, the economically weak royal government now lost support from the people, main-stream political parties, and the international community, but the government still continued the aggressive military operations against the Maoists.

The Maoist leadership took advantage of the internal political turmoil, people's dissatisfaction with the state, and the external environment to overthrow the government and hold state power through a negotiated political process. The leadership intelligently switched its military strategy to a balanced politico-military approach. The Maoists were more effective in gaining the people's support than the government of Nepal. They created a covert alternative society to address the local socio-economic grievances and used both persuasion and coercion to gain people's support for the rebellion. At the same time, the Maoists established good relations with the Indian government, which played a major role in mediation between the Maoists and other opposition political parties to act jointly against the Nepalese government. Based on this, the Maoists and other opposition political parties organized a nationwide mass movement. The state's security forces under the COIN mechanism failed to tackle this situation.

The Nepalese COIN campaign failed to eliminate insurgents or reduce their numbers and capability. Instead, the existing government was overthrown, and a new government was formed with the Maoists and the other opposition political parties. The Nepalese government executing the COIN campaign became completely illegitimate and ineffective in controlling social, political, and economic institutions of the state with the collapse of the government. The democratic constitution of 1991 was also replaced by an interim constitution. The COIN campaign envisaged under the legal provision of the constitution of 1991 ended without any success. In addition, the new government placed many barriers on the various issues related to the NA through the comprehensive peace agreement. For example, there were restrictions on the military's size and structure, the purchase of arms and equipment from outside, new recruitment, mobilization and deployment, and so on. Therefore, I argue that the Nepalese COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006, which overemphasized a militarist approach, failed to defeat the Maoist

insurgency because it did not integrate all other available national instruments with the military effort in its COIN strategy. The Nepalese case shows that the COIN strategy requires not only focused military efforts, which can be counterproductive, but also more than this to achieve success.

On the other hand, the Maoists joined mainstream politics, easily managed to get the upper hand in political negotiations, and successfully enforced their most important agendas such as abolition of monarchy, election of constituent assembly, and provision for federalism in the interim constitution. They became successful in keeping their armed elements supplied with equipment intact in cantonments under the party's political control. During this period, Nepal was a state with two armies.

The analysis of the effectiveness of the Indian and Nepalese COIN approaches has to be done in the context of the domestic conditions and geopolitical environment. Domestically, both countries responded to the insurgencies in their own ways. India as an economically and militarily emerging and politically more stable country has definitely mobilized more resources in fighting insurgency in the later stage of the COIN campaign. As a result, it has achieved an increased level of success. On the other hand, Nepal is economically weak and militarily less capable than India. Furthermore, it has been in a phase of political transformation from the decades of monarchical rule to democracy. As a result, it could afford fewer resources to fight the insurgency, which handed the victory over to the Maoists. The main important aspect in defeating insurgency is to adopt an appropriate COIN strategy that integrates all available national resources with strong political will and commitment. Regardless of available national means, that political will and commitment was lacking in the case of Nepal as compared to the Indian case of Kashmir. As Moore argues, "The strategy must be planned and executed as a fully integrated combination of continuing actions, rebuilt structures, and transformed beliefs that eventually lead to lasting stability."³⁶⁰

³⁶⁰ Moore, "The Basics of Counterinsurgency," 24.

Geopolitically, the long-festering Kashmir issue has its origin in the partition of British India in 1948, over which India and Pakistan had already fought three wars. This bitter and hostile relationship has now turned the region into a nuclear flashpoint. In 1989, the Kashmir conflict took on a new dimension when the Kashmiris started an armed struggle to become independent from India. Therefore, the Kashmir conflict is complex and contains conflicting interests of various players: India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people. All of them have been fighting for a variety of causes; these are independence of Kashmir by the separatist Kashmiri, preservation of a secular nation fought for by India, and unification of the Muslim state claimed by Pakistan. A country without Kashmir is in no way acceptable for both India and Pakistan. The campaign is still ongoing.

By contrast, the Maoist insurgency of Nepal did not receive any official support from or establish any link with its neighboring countries initially, even though Nepal is situated between India and China. The Maoists represented a typical homegrown insurgency, which in due time found India as a safe haven from which to get access to the illegal arms market and to organize meetings, get training, and receive treatment for their injured cadres during the conflict. More importantly, in the later stage of the conflict, the Indian government's role in mediation between the opposition political parties and the Maoists contributed significantly to the Maoists' interests. As a result, the Maoists and other political parties were successful in organizing a nationwide mass movement to overthrow the existing government of Nepal and replace it with a new coalition government. Thus, the evaluation of any COIN campaign has to be done from domestic as well as geopolitical perspectives.

C. LESSONS FROM COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The key common factors that contributed to the failure of the Indian COIN in the 1990s in Kashmir and the ultimate failure of the Nepalese COIN against the Maoist insurgency are as follows: the lack of a comprehensive COIN strategy and civil-military campaign plan (no use of different lines of operations, for example, political, socio-economic, and information); limited capability of the security forces (in terms of

resources, doctrine, training, tactics, intelligence, and coordination among various agencies involved in the campaign); the weakness of the political institutions and poor governance; and the use of repressive tactics without initiating any political and socio-economic process to address the legitimate grievances of the people.

Even though the Indian security forces in Kashmir seemed effective in causing maximum damage to the insurgents in the 1990s, the Indian COIN based on the enemy-centric approach could not achieve overall success in this phase as the public continuously confronted the security forces, rejected the elections of 1996 and beyond, and provided support to the insurgency. Similarly, Nepal was also unable to achieve success in the 1990s by considering insurgency only as a law and order problem. To find the solution to this problem, the Nepalese government adopted only an enemy-centric approach of police/military repressive operations throughout the campaign. Thus, as we have seen, a successful COIN campaign should be integrated with political, socio-economic, and security measures and aimed at defeating violence, preventing recurrences of such violence, and resolving the root causes of an insurgency.³⁶¹

Factors that have led to the increased level of success in Kashmir now are effective security operations, legitimate political practices, and socio-economic development programs. In the second phase, the Indian army and other security forces with modern weapons and equipment, better COIN training, a well-established unified command system, timely and credible intelligence, and sound doctrinal guidance have been effective at reducing the insurgents' violence and terrorist infiltration along the LOC. Similarly, the political and socio-economic process has also played a vital role in gaining popular support and the people's participation in the state's legitimate process.

In the case of Nepal, the government from the national level and the local administration grew unable and ineffective to initiate a political and socio-economic process to address the genuine grievances of marginalized citizens. The security forces were weak in terms of training, resources, intelligence, and political guidance, as well as

³⁶¹ Moore, "The Basics of Counterinsurgency," 3.

overall COIN strategy. But it was ultimately the security forces' continued use of repressive tactics that led to lose the people's support. The NA's late and meager efforts to use both the enemy-centric and limited people-centric approaches were able to achieve tactical success, but could not avert strategic failure.

The comparison between the Indian and Nepalese COIN approaches reveals that counterinsurgency campaigns in developing countries with extensive ethnic mobilizations and problematic border relations should not rely heavily on an enemy-centric approach. By ignoring political and socio-economic programs, counterinsurgency efforts are more likely to end up in failure or continue for longer periods of time. Depending upon these complexities, neither the population-centric nor the enemy-centric approach alone can fully defeat an insurgency.³⁶² Thus, I argue that the mixed approach of integrating all national resources in support of the population and against an insurgency is better for dealing with the insurgent threats. The combined approach can focus on defeating the insurgent fighters by military efforts, and at the same time, address the people's legitimate grievances in order to gain their support by the politico-socio-economic process. While adopting the combined approach, a government must also consider international factors for a better outcome.

In summary, I have observed from the cases of Kashmir and Nepal that the early application of an enemy-centric approach can be effective in causing maximum damage to armed insurgents but cannot lead to a complete success over insurgency. If the COIN strategy also encompasses the campaign to win hearts and minds in order to provide an immediate response to the affected people, it will help to create a favorable environment for a large-scale population-centric approach that includes the political and socio-economic activities necessary to address the legitimate demands of the people. But, if the militaristic strategy is continued for a longer period of time, it may result in maximum collateral damage, human rights violations, and ultimately a loss of legitimacy for the campaign. Ultimately, the militaristic approach is likely to result in a backlash that directs popular support to the insurgents. Most importantly, it does not help to achieve a

³⁶² Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 1–2.

complete victory. This is clearly reflected in both the cases examined in this research. This leads to the conclusion that the simplistic division of the COIN approach between the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches undermines COIN efforts in economically developing democratic countries, especially those dealing with issues of ethnic tensions and border disputes with neighboring countries.

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V. CONCLUSION

This thesis explored the application aspects of the COIN campaigns in Kashmir and Nepal by explaining, comparing, and analyzing the insurgencies, the COIN approaches, and the outcomes. With an aim of finding a better approach to counter insurgency, the following question was posed at the beginning of the research: what approach leads to the successful end of insurgencies in economically developing democratic countries that are linked with extensive ethnic mobilization and problematic border relations? To answer the question, the separate case studies of the Kashmiri and Nepalese COIN campaigns were examined and analyzed. The findings of these case studies support the argument that a mixed approach of integrating national resources is more effective for dealing with insurgencies in such complex situations. Both the campaigns in Indian Kashmir and Nepal have shared such complexities and also have experienced failures and successes of varying degree at different times.

In both cases during the 1990s, the insurgencies matured over time in terms of their capability and size. Their growth could be attributed to the lack of an effective population-centric strategy, legitimate political process, and economic development to address the population's need and isolate insurgents from the local populace. The Indian and Nepalese governments predominantly handled insurgencies with the enemy-centric approach that contributed to an increase in clashes between the security forces and insurgents, human rights violations, collateral damage, and public suffering. As insurgencies in both countries continued, the rebels gained improved fighting experience, capability, and popular support from the rural population. This vulnerable segment of the population could be convinced to support the insurgents because the government failed to maintain a presence or provide basic administration in rural areas, and political leaders and government officials were often corrupt. As a result, people living in rural areas had lost confidence in a government that had not addressed their long-term economic deprivation, illiteracy, and unemployment. Furthermore, the militaries in Kashmir and Nepal in the 1990s, which should have protected the public, lacked an effective COIN strategy, doctrine and training, unified/integrated command, operations-friendly arms and

equipment, reliable and credible intelligence, and national-level information operations. Thus, this paper finds that the COIN approaches of both countries in the 1990s failed to counter the insurgencies and gain their peoples' support effectively.

Analysis of the Indian COIN campaign in Kashmir reveals that the mixed COIN approach implemented after 2001 has contributed to an increased level of success against the Kashmiri separatist insurgency in terms of gaining the people's support and reducing the insurgent threats. By contrast, the militaristic approach of the Nepalese COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006 resulted in failure. In this most recent phase, the Indian government shifted its COIN strategy from a solely military approach to a mixed approach by integrating other available national means such as political, economic, and military. Their efforts have resulted in the increased level of success in Kashmir in several respects.

First, the Indian government has resumed the political process to address the people's grievances through the routine conduct of democratic elections at the local and state level. There has been progressively increasing voter turnout and participation of opposition political parties in all scheduled elections since 2002. Currently, the political institutions from local to state levels are in place and functioning with elected representatives. They can at least listen to the people's legitimate grievances, a practice that was completely non-existent during the period from the mid-1980s to 2001. Diplomatically, the proxy war in Kashmir was changed when the Indian Prime Minister, Atal B. Vajpayee, and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, established a number of confidence-building measures to lower tensions over Kashmir in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. These measures had direct consequences on the Kashmiri insurgency. Furthermore, improved relations with the United States also worked to reduce tension during the Kargil conflict and the military crisis in 2001–2002. Similarly, U.S. pressure on the Pakistani government to ban the terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan in the early 2000s also had a positive impact on the Kashmiri situation, although this could not be continued.

Second, from the economic perspective, the arrival of tourists has resumed and dramatically increased due to improved domestic security. Reviving this industry has

contributed to increased revenue collection for the state. Also, there has been a gradual increase in economic growth because of the long-term and short-term investment in various employment projects and development programs from the central and state governments. The state legislatures now have the power to create jobs and prioritize and initiate long-term development programs and important construction projects, such as building roads, schools, and health centers. These developments have been significant in Kashmir since 2001, following the very slow pace in previous decades.

Lastly, the Indian security operations based on the doctrinal pattern with a well-trained force, modern arms and equipment, better coordination, and credible intelligence have now become relatively more effective in gaining local support and containing insurgent fighters in Kashmir. Meanwhile, massive military deployment along the LOC has also helped to prevent conventional war by deterring Pakistan and blocking the infiltration and exfiltration of terrorists. Due to these efforts, there have been distinct signs of improvement in the internal security situation in Kashmir from 2001 to the present. Among these improvements are steep and continuous decline in violent activities and insurgents' capacity, in infiltration by terrorists from the LOC, in the displacement of certain religious groups, and in the overall casualty rate. Security operations have also provided a suitable environment in which to conduct local and state elections, expand the economic development programs from the central to the local levels, and increase the tourist flow. These efforts overall have shown positive indications in winning the people's support and reducing insurgent threats as compared to the COIN efforts of the 1990s.

The countries launching COIN campaigns against complex insurgencies need to understand the limitations of the population-centric and the enemy-centric COIN approaches. Once an insurgency has matured, it will be very challenging to fully suppress it militarily or with other people-oriented programs or development approaches alone. For example, the Kashmiri separatist insurgency, in particular, has been continuing their armed struggle for more than three decades under the massive military response of the Indian army. The internal security situation seems now improved but the insurgency is still ongoing. Furthermore, it is very difficult to predict now what will happen after

NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan. For example, after the former USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the trend of insurgent violence in Kashmir increased tremendously with the flow of Mujahidin and jihadi terrorists into Kashmir from Afghanistan.

To defeat such a complex separatist insurgency, however, the Indian COIN strategy in Kashmir must be able to reduce the insurgents' capacity by deterring Pakistan from actively supporting Kashmiri separatist groups and blocking infiltration along the LOC, and through effective security operations by other forces within Kashmir. Meanwhile, continuing the legitimate political process and long-and short-term socio-economic development programs are also equally important to address the people's socio-politico-economic grievances. These programs will help to ensure popular support. Additionally, India should be flexible about negotiating with Pakistani as well as Kashmiri political representatives, by exercising maximum diplomatic strength with sincerity and seriousness. It is certain that the insurgency in Kashmir will continue unless and until Pakistan stops its support for separatist groups and withdraws its claims on Kashmir as a part of Pakistan. Therefore, this complex insurgency demands far more than strong military or population-focused efforts to achieve complete victory.

In Nepal, despite the NA's tactical success and limited people-oriented programs of the government during the later phase of the COIN efforts, the Nepalese enemy-centric COIN approach as a whole was not successful in decisively defeating the Maoists. Due to the government's complete inability to mobilize other elements of national power along with the military to suppress the insurgents and gain popular support, the Maoist insurgents were able to effectively mobilize the rural population against the state. The excessive security operation made people lose faith in the state, which enabled the Maoists to gather popular support by creating an alternative society to address the local socio-economic grievances of the people. As Mackinlay observes, "The vital ground was the population, but the government and security forces opted for a military campaign that helped to drive the uncommitted communities into the arms of the insurgents."³⁶³ Also,

³⁶³ Mackinlay, "Nepal's Transition," 42-46.

the insurgents shifted their violent movement toward gathering political support from other opposition political parties, ethnic groups, and regional powers such as India. These efforts enabled the Maoists to find a common approach, a politico-military option to fight against the government by actively pursuing armed action against the security forces and keeping a political option open.

The Indian government also played a vital role in mediation between the Maoists and other political parties. As a result, they became successful in organizing a nationwide mass movement against the government. Eventually, the existing government of Nepal was overthrown and replaced by the new coalition government of the Maoists and opposition parties. With the collapse of the government, its COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006 ended in a failure to defeat the insurgency. This failure was due to the then Nepalese government's overemphasizing only an enemy-centric approach. The government not only failed to defeat the Maoist insurgency, but it also failed to establish its own legitimacy and effectiveness in controlling the state's institutions under the existing constitution. Later, the democratic constitution of 1990 was also replaced by the interim constitution.

This research does not particularly focus on the reasons why Nepal is now passing through a critical juncture, where the process of constitution drafting and major political transition is in a deadlock even after the insurgency ended and the Maoists participated in the main-stream political process. Nor does this thesis examine why the Maoists have failed to become successful from the result of the second election of the constituent assembly in 2013, even after remaining at the center of power from 2008 to 2013. During this period, however, the Maoists were successful in bringing about major political changes in Nepal, such as transitioning from a Hindu kingdom to a secular republic, from a unitary system to a federal system, and from the election of the constituent assembly to drafting the new constitution. This discussion merely highlights a research gap for interested scholars to investigate.

In summary, a state seeking to defeat insurgency tends either to adopt the population-centric approach that deals with the people's grievances to gain their support and establish the government's legitimacy and effectiveness by controlling the state's

institutions, or the enemy-centric approach to destroy insurgent fighters first in order to defeat the insurgency later. The first approach of addressing the people's grievances through people-oriented political and socio-economic programs often becomes ineffective because these actions cannot be executed effectively in isolation when armed insurgents are active in the area. Without effective security arrangements, the state is unlikely to prevent insurgents from blocking the state's political process and development programs and from blocking the people's participation in these activities. The Nepalese case illustrates this. The second approach focuses on professional and effective military operations to control the insurgents first and ultimately to destroy them in order to defeat insurgency. This works when the insurgency is in the infant stage, or if the state has an effective and integrated COIN strategy. This strategy must also be executed by highly professional, well-trained and equipped forces under good coordination and credible intelligence. While this approach alone may defeat an insurgency, it is rarely effective in isolation. Thus, I argue that a combination of these two approaches, with consideration of regional and international factors, is essential for dealing with the insurgency and population at the same time.

Finally, while the ideas, analyses, and arguments of this paper are possibly useful tools to inform the Indian COIN approach against the Kashmiri separatist insurgency and Nepalese COIN approach against the Maoist insurgency and to propose some effective steps, they cannot envisage decisive victory in the campaign. Any strategy or policy should be combined with the strong political will and commitment to execute it by proficient, well-trained, and disciplined teams in the field. The ultimate victory in the Indian COIN campaign in Kashmir will rest partly in the hands of the Indian political leaders and government's agencies and in how they approach the overall Kashmir conflict in the future, formulate strategy and policy, and plan and implement them. Ultimately, though, victory needs to be measured in terms of popular support from the Kashmiri people for the Indian and Kashmiri authorities. Moreover, the role of Pakistan in the issue of Kashmir also needs to be considered. While the end of the Maoist insurgency in 2006 and the Maoists' participation in the political process are now welcomed as a success, Nepal is still struggling to draft its constitution and consolidate

its government. Thus, ultimate success in Nepal will depend on the political leaders, including the Maoists, drafting the new constitution of the Federal Republic of Nepal with consensus, as it was one of the main demands of the Maoists who fought the violent insurgency for ten years.

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