DoD Acquisition - To Compete or Not Compete: The Placebo of Competition

Abstract

Commercial markets abound with examples of competitive forces providing reduced costs and increased innovation. However, the defense market is materially different from commercial markets in many ways, and thus does not respond in the same way to competition. This analysis examines a series of outcomes in both competitive and sole-source acquisition programs, using a statistical model that builds on a game theory framework developed by Todd Harrison, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. The results show that the Department of Defense may actually incur increased costs from competition. Competition in defense acquisition may not reduce costs, but may like a placebo create a powerful perception of cost control.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2014
Accession Number
ADA609347

Entities

People

  • William J. Levenson

Organizations

  • Defense Acquisition University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Acquisition
  • Commerce
  • Competition
  • Contracts
  • Cost Estimates
  • Cost Overruns
  • Defense Industry
  • Department Of Defense
  • Fixed Price Contracts
  • Game Theory
  • Governments
  • Law
  • Manufacturing
  • Military Acquisition
  • Procurement
  • Production
  • Standards

Readers

  • Government Contracting/Procurement.
  • Systems Analysis and Design