Art of War Papers: An Exit Strategy not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned from the British Emergency in South Arabia, 1963-67
Abstract
The British Army is often praised for a particular skill in small wars or counter-insurgencies (COIN). Some attribute this to the special challenge of maintaining order across a global empire with a relatively small force; others cite the intellectual inheritance of great British military theorists and an inherent flexibility present within a small army used to adaptation. Recent scholarship has challenged this view, suggesting that the UK s record of success in COIN is inconsistent and ignores many failures. When thinking about the British record, and the validity of British ideas on how best to fight and win at COIN, it is useful to examine a less well-known conflict the war in South Arabia (better known as the Aden Emergency). Although the war was part of the decolonization of the British Empire in the 1960s, the South Arabian conflict has much in common with recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan: challenging terrain and people; intricate local politics; a de facto nation-building task; an externally-sponsored insurgency with safe havens in a neighboring state; finally, an unexpected major change in strategy-in this case to unilateral withdrawal (an exit strategy). This thesis examines the relationship between strategy, operational art and intelligence in the context of the British government s controversial decision in February 1966 to reverse its course by adopting an exit strategy with a public timeline. One of the unintended consequences of this decision was to cripple the ability of the withdrawing military to collect intelligence from the local populace. As a result of the shift in strategy, UK forces were more vulnerable and the British government less able to achieve the limited objectives of its new policy and strategy. Consequently, British forces became increasingly blind and faced greater violence from the insurgents with their intelligence organization simply overwhelmed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2014
- Accession Number
- ADA609695
Entities
People
- Stephen A. Campbell
Organizations
- Air Command and Staff College