

UNIFORMED DIPLOMACY: REVIEWING THE ARMY LEADER DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE REGIONAL ALIGNMENT OF
FORCES CONSTRUCT

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by

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ABSTRACT

UNIFORMED DIPLOMACY: REVIEWING THE ARMY LEADER DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE REGIONAL ALIGNMENT OF FORCES CONSTRUCT, by Major Keith William Benedict, 89 pages.

Recent paradigmatic changes within the Department of Defense present the United States Army with both opportunities and challenges. The 2010 National Security Strategy's emphasis on collective security, assured access, and forward presence requires all of the armed services to fulfill global mandates amid declining resources. To meet these objectives, the Army's leadership developed a "Regionally Aligned Forces" construct—whereby units of all types and echelons prepare to provide "tailorable, scalable" forces for "aligned" Geographic Combatant Commands, as required. By focusing units' preparation towards a specific range of possible operations and theaters, the Army presumes it can more precisely conduct unified action to "prevent, shape, and win" conflicts anywhere they might arise. Since 2012, the 2d Heavy Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division piloted this mission set, supporting dozens of deployments throughout Africa Command. Though the "Dagger Brigade" devised innovative means of preparing their junior leaders for these engagements with partnered militaries, the Army has not significantly altered its leader development models in anticipation of wider implementation of the RAF mission. This thesis reviews the 2013 Army Leader Development Strategy in light of the Dagger Brigade's experience to shed light on non-traditional diplomatic preparation that this mission might require.

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ACRONYMS

ABCT	Armored Brigade Combat Team
AFRICOM	Africa Command
ALDS	Army Leader Development Strategy
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
NSS	National Security Strategy
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
RAF	Regional Alignment of Forces
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARAF	United States Army Africa

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In Haig's presence, [Henry] Kissinger referred pointedly to military men as "dumb, stupid animals to be used" as pawns for foreign policy.

— Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, *The Final Days*

These warriors must be proficient in core competencies, training for certainty while educating for uncertainty. We must be capable of conducting strategic operations in tactical environments, combining a warrior ethos with language proficiency, cultural awareness, political sensitivity and the ability to use Information Age technology.

— General Peter Schoomaker, "Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead"

After twelve years of sustained combat, the Army is redefining its role within unified action. With considerable drawdown of troop end-strength on the horizon, the Army's leadership has determined that providing regionally aligned and tailorable forces to combatant commanders would both sustain combat readiness and build partner capacity. In so doing, the Army assesses that it can contribute to assured access and partnered stability abroad—security priorities outlined in the 2011 National Military Strategy. The 2d Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) of the 1st Infantry Division, the "Dagger Brigade," became the first unit aligned with a Geographic Combatant Command (Africa Command, or AFRICOM) and executed dozens of operations within months of this new mission's inception. With relatively little notice—considerably less notice than within the force generation model used through a decade of war—hundreds of junior leaders in Dagger Brigade deployed throughout Africa.

Other operational forces will soon receive their regional alignment orders. Aspects of the Dagger Brigade's experience may appear unique to its duty station and

aligned combatant command. Yet aspects of this particular approach may transcend units and theaters. If so, this new paradigm may necessitate—or its success may in fact depend upon—revising existing leader development programs.

The main purpose of this research is to discern whether regional alignment missions require skills beyond those prescribed within the *Army Leader Development Strategy* (ALDS). The 2013 ALDS outlines the ends, ways, and means for leader development. This document describes complex environments that will require Army leaders to: “understand the security environment and the contributions of all elements of national power; lead effectively when faced with surprise and uncertainty; anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions; and operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding.”¹ Though it recognizes the importance of providing broadening opportunities to ensure that future leaders “develop innovative solutions applicable to difficult situations,” the ALDS does not explicitly address the unique diplomatic skills that the regional alignment of forces (RAF) missions will likely require.²

The Dagger Brigade began deploying to Africa in March of 2013. That unit’s mission, defined in a December 2012 operations order, is to: “conduct security cooperation activities within the AFRICOM [area of responsibility] from 15 March 2013 to 15 June 2014 to develop and protect American interests.”³ Towards those ends, dozens of training teams ranging from a few individuals to battalion-sized elements worked with partnered forces in Africa to conduct joint training exercises and capacity-building operations throughout the continent. Certainly, the majority of the mission pertained to training core military competencies within partnered forces. Yet, as uniformed representatives of the United States Government, these soldiers and leaders also operate

within a realm typically reserved for unconventional forces, foreign area officers, and diplomats with vastly different training and qualifications.

Precedents for these types of operations exist. Army special operations forces traditionally execute security force assistance and foreign internal defense tasks, among others. Many also develop expertise within select theaters based upon the geographic orientation of each Special Forces Group. The National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program also employs a parallel approach, building capacity and relationships in 63 countries around the world.⁴ As seen in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, personnel throughout the interagency also work with civilian and military counterparts to help build governance capabilities, as do many non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations. Additionally, other nations' armed forces are also increasingly collaborating to address both inter- and intra-state security shortcomings.

Whether by design or by chance, some Army leaders attained relevant theater experience prior to assuming strategically significant roles. General Douglas MacArthur, for instance, attributed much of his success in the Philippines to his in-depth understanding of that country, as well as the personal relationships he forged serving there as a junior officer.⁵ Field Marshal William Slim similarly benefitted from intimate knowledge of South and Southeast Asia when he led allied forces in the Third Burma Campaign from 1943-1944. With regionally aligned forces, even junior Army leaders may fulfill strategic requirements identified by United States embassies and resourced through Geographic Combatant Commands. Further, they do so via "mission command" with limited, often distant, oversight from their headquarters. Soldiers deployed in support of a RAF requirement also engage with embassy personnel and foreign

uniformed and civilian leaders while executing their duties. If so, the Army may need to consider the level and specificity of its leaders' training and education to perform decentralized diplomatic engagement.

The United States Army may be assuming considerable risk if it continues to execute the RAF mission without making substantive changes to its leader development strategy. As junior leaders deploy throughout the world, the Army will accept responsibility for the manner in which small teams of soldiers perform their duties. The United States will also assume a measure of responsibility for the resultant performance and behavior of the partnered forces that these teams train. Similar efforts before and during the Cold War era induced mixed results. Some nations that received military equipment and training from the United States, including Egypt and Iraq, among others, later became liabilities or, worse, propagated the security issues the National Security Strategy (NSS) now must address. Culpability for future atrocities or human rights abuses committed by their armies may fall upon the United States, particularly when conventional, RAF deploy under watchful eyes and in an information age.

This topic warrants consideration because it assesses a new development within the Department of Defense (DOD) expected to gain momentum in the coming years. More brigades will soon assume regional alignment of forces missions and thereafter engage with partners around the globe. If the Dagger Brigade has proven that junior leaders in today's Army can responsibly execute this mission, then these lessons learned need to reach the wider force. Alternatively, if the Army has indeed assumed unanticipated strategic risk, then it must revisit how best to prepare its leaders for future requirements.

Before proceeding further, it is important to define key terms and to delineate limitations. This research relies upon Ernest Satow's definition of diplomacy as "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments."⁶ Antithetical to Kissinger's aforementioned relegation of the military to its non-diplomatic purpose, this thesis argues that the RAF construct charges leaders with also wielding the diplomatic and information instruments of national power. Beyond the tactical nature of specific missions or exercises in Africa, these uniformed envoys represent the United States' policies and its values through their words and actions, as observed by diverse military and civilian audiences. As representatives of the United States Government in a digital age, these soldiers become visible manifestations of the Clausewitzian extension of "politics by other means."⁷

Because leader development and diplomacy are both very broad topics, this research is focused in three important ways. First, it will consider the skills needed for junior Army leaders (with less than 10 years of experience) executing RAF missions, not those responsible for initiating or for planning them at the brigade level or higher. Second, it will focus on the non-tactical aspects of these missions. Though each mission addresses unique capacity-building requirements spanning unified action, this research focuses on the social, political, and psychological dynamics involved with key leader, cross-cultural, and civil-military engagements before, during, and after the tactical training. Third, it will assess whether the knowledge, skills, attributes, or competencies outlined in the Army's leader development literature should more directly address the unique diplomatic and information aspects of this mission set.

The remainder of this study is organized into four chapters. Chapter 2 will review existing diplomatic and leader development literature to assess whether the RAF mission surpasses previous conceptions of what types of tasks junior leaders perform. Chapter 3 will then outline the research methodology used for this study and will describe the analytical framework selected. Chapter 4 will then employ that framework to assess the level of training and subsequent performance of junior leaders executing RAF missions. Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the findings of this work and draws implications for those who would seek to implement RAF further and to suggest changes within the Army's leader development doctrine.

¹U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy 2013*, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CAL/repository/ALDS5June%202013Record.pdf> (accessed 6 November 2013), 3.

²Ibid.

³Gus Benton II, Director, U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Center, "2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report," Memorandum (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 October 2013), 2.

⁴U.S. Government Accountability Office, *State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needs for National Guard's Efforts with Foreign Partners*, Report to Congressional Committees, May 2012, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590840.pdf> (accessed 6 November 2013), 5.

⁵Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York, NY: De Capo Press, 1985). Granted, his lack of understanding of China and North Korea arguably contributed to his own cognitive shortcomings in the Korean conflict less than a decade later.

⁶Ernest Mason Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (London: Longmans, Green and Col., 1917), 3.

⁷Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Analyzing the ALDS in light of the RAF paradigm first requires establishing some of the key concepts associated with this particular mission set. In some respects, regional alignment entails a novel use of the Total Force (Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve Components) to serve at the intersection of diplomatic and military affairs at the tactical level. Hence, the nature of diplomacy and the military's concomitant role within it warrant consideration. Next, because regional alignment seeks to build regional capacity as a means of ensuring U.S. access to key partners, markets, and resources, the notion of collective security requires explanation.

Once these concepts are addressed, then an overview of the RAF's strategic context and intent can allow a more detailed discussion of the mission itself. Because this research analyzes the training and education that junior leaders should receive prior to executing these missions, the ALDS provides a useful context for current and future developmental priorities. As a point of comparison, traditional and contemporary diplomatic credentials and capabilities will also be outlined. Once considered, the analysis of the RAF missions to date—as inferred from within the Dagger Brigade experience—can help determine whether future ALDS revisions need to consider the diplomatic aspects of these deployments.

Diplomacy

As Satow's aforementioned definition asserts, diplomacy broadly entails applying intellectual and social acumen to influence foreign relations. Throughout recorded

history, different social groups (whether tribes, ethnicities, nations, states, or nation-states, among other entities) began recognizing the benefits of cooperation. As sovereigns sought to communicate via indirect personal engagement, they gradually developed mechanisms for formal interactions. Whereas international relations theory seeks to ascertain the motive behind state actions, analyzing diplomacy entails reviewing the ways in which such interactions transpire.

Ernest Satow's *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* serves as "the first systematic treatise of its kind in the English language."¹ Satow analyzes the mechanics of international relations based upon historical research and upon his own experience as an emissary for Great Britain. In this 1917 work, he describes the origins of diplomacy, starting with the term's Greek origins for the way in which states folded their official documents. These papers, he asserts, served as the foundation through which a "privilege is conferred," which both empowers and entitles the "diplomatist" (the term for diplomat in the early 20th century).² After his account of the historical emergence of international law, he then discusses the training, decorum, duties, and immunities of those responsible for the mechanics of these interactions.

Soon after World War II, esteemed British diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson published a similar treatise on his interpretation of the history of diplomacy. Nicolson credits the 1815 Congress of Vienna with the inception of professional diplomacy that we would recognize today. After Vienna, he argues in *Diplomacy*, a growing sense of community among nations, appreciation for the importance of public opinion, and improved means of communication all facilitated a transition of diplomacy from behind closed ("Court") doors.³ He viewed the formulation of policy (the "legislative" aspect of

diplomacy) as the realm of politicians and stressed “the art of negotiating agreements between states” (the “executive” component of diplomacy) remains the charge of trained professionals.⁴

Henry Kissinger’s *Diplomacy*, published in 1994, looks specifically at United States foreign policy in the twentieth century. His conclusions about the preeminence of *raison d’etat* (literally “reason of the state,” or, more commonly, state interests) led him to acknowledge several practicalities for a United States then waffling through a “unipolar moment” after the Cold War. Of relevance to this research, he discusses the *realpolitik* aspects of collective security in a globalized world. Because “the balance of power requires constant tending,” he claims, “America will need partners to preserve equilibrium in several regions of the world, and these partners cannot always be chosen on the basis of moral considerations alone.”⁵ Though his work analyzed foreign policy during a unique moment in American history, his advice seems even more prescient today.

Both Nicolson and Kissinger distinguish between traditional (pre-World War I) and contemporary diplomacy. For both, the “Great War” serves as an inflection point. Nicolson stresses that the widespread impact of that war (“not confined to the soldier”) and its inception—based upon sweeping commitments to foreign powers—served as impetus for revisiting the very foundations of diplomacy.⁶ To Nicolson, President Woodrow Wilson seemed a “prophet” for the type of “open diplomacy” that the modern world required. Kissinger applauds Wilson’s audacity yet challenges the applicability of this liberal approach to a balance-of-power system. Whereas America benefitted from geographic isolation in the nineteenth century—as Europe contended with the “invented

concepts of the nation-state, sovereignty, and the balance of power”—the United States would face challenges applying its idealist notions to a new world order wherein America is only one of the key players in a multi-polar system.⁷

Diplomacy in the United States understandably lagged behind its European counterparts prior to World War I. Certainly, the United States enjoyed certain geographic advantages over its European peers, affording it the opportunity to contract its military at times of peace. Yet the scope and speed of war by the middle of the twentieth century denied the United States the ability to fabricate adequate forces after hostilities began, placing it within the power politics realm familiar to European nations several centuries prior. Since the end of World War I, the United States has remained much more involved internationally. Hence, its use of the military—before, during, after, or even in place of traditional diplomacy—has played an integral role in its affairs in peace and war.

Military Diplomacy

Though strategist Carl von Clausewitz viewed war as an extension of politics and the military as the means through which to pursue political ends not otherwise attainable, he did not explicitly limit the role of the military to armed conflict.⁸ Indeed, professional militaries and their predecessors share a long history of performing diplomatic functions. The Lewis and Clark expedition established the United States’ initial relationships with many tribes in lands acquired via the Louisiana Purchase. Teddy Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet” followed in the centuries-old European tradition of “gunboat diplomacy.” Training exercises and “shows of force” also served as a substitute for engaging other states either in the absence of formal diplomatic relations (with Iran and North Korea, for instance) or when those engagements fail (as with Iraq in 2003).⁹

Even today, the NSS identifies the military as one of the United States’ “four instruments of national power”—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—capable of securing its “enduring” interests.¹⁰ Major Rose Keravuori, an Army Reserve military intelligence officer who has served as a Reserve Defense Attaché in France, describes the “American Way of War” as going well beyond military intervention and decisive battle. She argues that the United States military’s functions (in practice) include diplomacy, deterrence, attaining strategic position, enforcing embargoes, building international coalitions, and applying economic pressure, among others.¹¹

Though often associated with what political scientist Joseph Nye describes as “hard power,” militaries are increasingly employed in more “soft” or “smart” ways.¹² Coined in Nye’s 1990 book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, soft power refers to the means through which states incentivize other states to cooperate without the use of bribery or strong-arm tactics.¹³ Switzerland, for example, wields considerable diplomatic influence, despite its small population and military.¹⁴ While armed conflict or the overt use of forces either to compel or to deter another nation reflects hard power, responding to natural disasters, enabling or providing humanitarian relief, and conducting combined training exercises more closely relate to soft power. More recently, Nye and others have moved towards the use of “smart power”—a combination of hard and soft power to influence other nations.¹⁵ Former NATO Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, is one of several military leaders that recommended this more nuanced approach to the use of power.¹⁶

Chester A. Crocker’s *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, published in 2007, cites that smart power entails the use of “diplomacy,

persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy."¹⁷ In this regard, the NSS—most recently published in 2010—serves as the nexus for the coordination of the United States’ instruments of national power in this fashion.¹⁸ The use of the military in these realms, Keravuori argues, blurs lines between tactics, operations, and strategy. “Civil affairs operations and foreign military training are examples of tactical operations with strategic implications,” she states, making these missions “the military’s version of diplomatic ‘soft power’ . . . a form of diplomatic deterrence.”¹⁹

India, South Africa, Australia, the United Kingdom, and China, among others, have also increased their emphasis on employing armed forces in the name of “defense diplomacy”—a more encompassing term that would include non-uniformed personnel that work for ministries or departments of defense. In fact, the expanding usage of militaries in such “smart power” (non-combat) capacities has led some to call for the formation of new doctrine. Several prominent Australian leaders contend that “military diplomacy” remains vital to easing tensions in the Asia-Pacific Region.²⁰ Yet, deployments can also exacerbate tensions when “diplomacy” appears more like deterrence, coercion, or containment, which is why the doctrine may prove necessary to avoid escalation induced by miscommunicated actions or intentions.²¹ South African Anton du Pleissis stresses that the nature, scope, and utility of defense diplomacy remains underestimated and broadly misunderstood.²²

Collective Security

The theoretical underpinning for regional alignment broadly falls within the realm of collective security. Whereas traditionally the use of the military for diplomatic means

entailed preserving or pursuing unilateral interests, collective security efforts involve coordinating the military actions of a “community” of nations. Wilson’s vision for a “League of Nations” derives, in part, from the liberal principles in Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” In that foundational work, Kant put forth “Three Definitive Articles”: that the “civil constitution of every state should be republican;” that “the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states;” and that “the law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.”²³ The first and third articles are to some extent beyond the bound of what external powers can influence directly—as perhaps the past dozen years can attest. The second, however, pertains directly to relationships and interactions between states.

In some respects, Kant’s proposition elevates John Locke’s notion of the “social contract” that can exist between individuals and their governments. Locke emphasized that getting beyond man’s Hobbesian “nature” requires appealing to his capability for rational thought. An individual can concede their ability and obligation to enforce and uphold the law (serve as judge and jury on their own land) and those not seeking to infringe upon the natural rights of others can then benefit from collectivized (“hard”) power.²⁴ Kant envisaged similar cooperation at the inter-state level, whereby individual nations make concessions to pursue the common (collective) good.²⁵

President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points employed these Kantian and Lockian principles. On the heels of World War I, and hoping to prevent the outbreak of another such catastrophe, Wilson castigated the type of closed-door, secretive agreements that he believed made that war inevitable, calling for “a general association of nations” to fight for “mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and

small states alike.”²⁶ Though the final Treaty of Versailles—which bore little resemblance to Wilsonian principles—was not ratified by the U.S. Senate nor able to avert a second global conflict, his ideals were seemingly revisited after World War II and better reflected in the United Nations Charter. The idea of collective security also permeated throughout the Cold War, whereby those within each bloc developed collaborative defensive means to address emerging military capabilities in the other.

The United States’ use of the military in pursuit of collective security has a long history, but its doctrine and delineation remain nebulous. At the DOD-level, Major Taylor White, a U.S. Marine Corps Joint Doctrine Development Officer, highlights dogmatic shortcomings in his recent piece entitled “Security Cooperation: How it All Fits.” As with the international community, White notes the need for the joint community to address the framework of security cooperation in its forthcoming joint publication.

Security cooperation, he argues:

Focuses strictly on the DOD contribution to foreign assistance and encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build both national and regional defense relationships that promote specific U.S. interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.²⁷

As Western militaries manage budget shortfalls—in the United States and Great Britain, in particular—they are increasingly dependent upon the capabilities of partner forces to ensure that key markets and natural resources remain accessible. DOD views anti-access and area denial, efforts by adversarial states and non-state actors to prevent the U.S. from establishing theater bases of operations and project combat power, as one of the greatest threats to preserving enduring interests abroad. Rather than building capabilities for a grand coalition, it has increasingly assumed a flavor more akin to

mutual interdependence, which has reached nearly unprecedented levels in recent years, particularly in Europe. The actual form of security cooperation between militaries (nation assistance, security assistance, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, etc.) varies, as White highlights.²⁸ Where and how the RAF falls within this umbrella term—and hence its appropriate execution—depends upon the nature of each assigned mission and upon the funding source applied. Regardless, it is clear that RAF is voyaging into relatively uncharted yet geostrategically-important waters.

Regional Alignment of Forces

The paradigm now known as RAF remains in its infancy. The Dagger Brigade’s mission serves as a pilot program for the wider Army effort anticipated to follow. RAF broadly derives from the Army leadership’s assessment for how best to meet security needs in today’s complex operating environment. The May 2010 NSS identifies four “enduring national interests” for the United States:

1. Security: The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
2. Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
3. Values: Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
4. International Order: An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.²⁹

Of note within these interests—as well as the NSS’ alignment of ends, ways, and means towards their preservation—is the emphasis on collective security and prosperity.

Whereas force management after the attacks in September 2001 necessarily focused on providing ground forces to Central Command for contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the broad nature of the 2010 NSS mandate entails “rebalancing” towards other areas, particularly the Asia-Pacific. In light of evolving power dynamics and budgetary constraints, promoting security and stability abroad increasingly relies upon relationships with partner nations to compensate for limited American presence abroad.

As a force provider, the Army seeks to build and sustain units capable of providing “tailorable, scalable” capabilities to the Geographic Combatant Commands. Units need to be “tailorable” in that they can train towards and develop specialized capabilities appropriate to assigned missions and “scalable” from small teams to corps-sized or larger, depending upon the needs of the Geographic Combatant Command or Army Service Component Command. Developing this operational flexibility, Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno believes, will help improve the effectiveness of deployed units (due to their tailored training) and ultimately fulfill the land force component requirements inherent in the 11 “Priority Missions” identified in the Secretary of Defense’s *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* listed in table 1.

Table 1. Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare • Deter and Defeat Aggression • Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges • Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction • Operate Effectively in Cyberspace • Operate Effectively in Space • Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent • Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities • Provide a Stabilizing Presence • Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations • Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, 2012, http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/army_strategic_planning_guidance.pdf (accessed 10 December 2013), 3.

Through a “prevent-shape-win” framework, Army leaders assess regional alignment will enhance relationships and improve units’ familiarity with areas in which they will most likely deploy. The Defense Department divides operations into a total of six phases (Shape, Deter, Seize the Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, and Enable Civil Authority). While the air and maritime components play significant roles and are often the supported efforts in Phases I (Deter), II (Seize Initiative), and even III (Dominate), the land component plays an irreplaceable role in interacting with both civilians and possible adversaries on the ground during Phase 0 (Shape), III, IV (Stabilize), and Enable Civil Authority (V). After Iraq and Afghanistan, apprehension towards combat operations has increased joint emphasis on conflict shaping (or evolution) and, ideally, prevention. Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, the current Commander of Pacific Command, has gone so far as to assert that progression beyond Phase 0 entails “mission failure.”³⁰

Thus, the Chief of Staff of the Army bears responsibility for preparing forces to meet diverse requirements around the world. Traditionally, this led all units to become “generalists” with standardized Mission Essential Tasks that ensured that specific combat capabilities were resident within the total force. However, in light of the specialized requirements resident within the Phase 0 efforts around the globe, the Chief of Staff needed to determine how best to prepare units towards these ends, with minimal influence as to these units ultimate employment, once deployed.

In line with this framework, the Army has developed and subsequently refined its Total Force approach to building forces capable of fulfilling a global mandate. The 2012 *Army Strategic Planning Guidance* describes the Chief of Staff of the Army’s vision for a force that is “globally engaged and regionally responsive.”³¹ Execute Order 039-12, issued on 2 December 2011, first put “regionally aligned brigades” on notice, and subsequent orders expanded the concept beyond brigades to include division and corps headquarters and other slice elements.³² The Chief of Staff of the Army’s approved definition for RAF is now:

Those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and apportioned for planning. Aligned forces maintain proficiency in wartime fundamentals, but also possess a regional mission and training focus that includes an understanding of the languages, cultures, geography and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed.³³

In some regards, RAF seems to build upon the example set through the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program. Formalized in 1993, the SPP grew from the former Joint Contact Team Program comprised of active component personnel seeking to build professional connections with militaries of newly independent (former Soviet Union) nations. In part intended to promote “subordination to civilian leadership, respect

for human rights, and a defensively oriented military posture,” the National Guard Bureau program—considered “less provocative” than a U.S. active duty full-time military presence—has expanded into 63 partnerships across all combatant commands.³⁴ Figure 1 shows the active SPPs as of 2013 for AFRICOM, the same combatant command with which the Dagger Brigade now aligns.




Figure 1. National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program-AFRICOM

Source: United States Government Accountability Office, State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needs for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners, Report to Congressional Committees, May 2012, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590840.pdf> (accessed 6 November 2013), 6.

The regional alignment initiative also builds upon the successes of special operations forces to develop individuals and units through tailored preparation. For decades Special Forces Groups have oriented their preparation towards deployment

within specific regional environments (3d Special Forces Group focusing on Africa, for instance), achieving effects similar to those desired for the RAF. Senior defense leaders hope to sustain lessons learned through twelve years of sustained coordination between special operations and conventional forces, and RAF seems yet another opportunity to deepen that cooperation while achieving joint effects requested by Geographic Combatant Commands.

These soldiers deploy with orders that confer them with authority to perform military tasks within the borders of another sovereign nation. Further, similar to the fanfare associated with diplomatic exchanges in the past, the arrival of young men and women in a highly recognizable uniform—with “U.S. Army” embroidered on their uniform—solicits both wanted and unwanted domestic and international attention. Whereas civilian representatives from the Department of State (DOS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), or other members of the government may, at first, appear like professional representatives from anywhere in the world, uniformed servicemen and servicewomen, particularly those from the United States, are highly recognizable.

The Dagger Brigade has solicited and broadly applied the lessons learned from special operations forces and the SPP to introduce active, conventional forces into future defense diplomacy forays. Whether this employment of conventional forces—considered too “provocative” two decades ago—averts provocation remains to be seen, as do the qualifications of those executing the missions. The pilot program with the Dagger Brigade, AFRICOM forecasted, would entail 108 activities in 34 African countries during first six months of employment.³⁵ With these forecasted requirements in mind, the

preparation of Dagger Brigade leaders to perform in this ambiguous environment assumes strategic relevance.

Army Leader Traits and Development

The United States Army prides itself on its leader development regimen. It defines leadership in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (or ADRP 6-22) *Army Leadership* as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”³⁶ Former Training and Doctrine Command Commander Robert Cone notes in a recent *Military Review* article, that “when faced with unforeseen situations, we count on smart and adaptable leaders to ensure that the ‘Army we have’ can be rapidly transformed into the ‘Army we need’.”³⁷ Indeed, because mid- and senior-level uniformed leaders are homegrown, the Army depends upon its own investment in human capital to ensure that its formations remain properly led in any environment. Thus, the 2012 *Army Strategic Planning Guidance* cites “Develop leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century” as one of its four strategic imperatives.³⁸

Rather than relying upon “on-the-job training,” the Army has developed a structured leader development program to build and to validate leaders for increased authority and responsibility. The ALDS provides the strategic priorities and outlines the ends, ways, and means for developing leaders for “an Army of preparation.”³⁹ Published in June 2013, the ALDS’ stated mission is to ensure that the Army acquires and retains “competent, committed leaders of character with the skills and attributes necessary to meet the challenges of the 21st century.”⁴⁰ Such challenges include facing “an

increasingly complex, uncertain, competitive, rapidly changing, and transparent operating environment characterized by security challenges that cross borders.”⁴¹

Regarding desired ends, the ALDS stresses the Army Leadership Requirements Model. As figure 2 depicts below, this model aligns development practices towards a common set of valued “attributes” and “competencies.” While it identifies specific leadership “levels”—direct, organizational, and strategic—ADPR 6-22 deems the Army Leadership Requirements Model as “common to all cohorts,” regardless of rank of duty position.⁴²




Figure 2. Army Leadership Requirements Model

Source: United States Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy 2013*, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CAL/repository/ALDS5June%202013Record.pdf> (accessed 6 November 2013), 7.

Attributes are those internal characteristics that leaders should “be” and “know,” while competencies are “skilled and learnable behaviors the Army expects leaders to have and employ.” The former seems to relate primarily to character—arguably more difficult to influence—while the latter pertains more to concrete, trainable and assessable skills. Regardless, Army leader development doctrine rests upon the notion that such knowledge, skills, and attributes manifest through a “balanced combination of institutional schooling, self-development, realistic training, and professional experience.”⁴³

The development of leaders towards those ends is a shared responsibility between the institutional Army, the operating force, and the individual. The Army identifies three “domains” within which leader development occurs, each of which contributes to the three “pillars” of leader development (training, education, and experience). Within the institutional domain (Professional Military Education, schools, training centers, etc.), greater emphasis is placed on military education. The operational domain (units) then focuses principally on training to apply and to enhance leader skills built within the institutional domain.⁴⁴ Through reflection, within the self-development domain, the individual then acquires experience that can inform his or her approach to future leadership challenges.⁴⁵ The Army has developed progressive means through which leaders routinely revisit the institutional domain, but the relationship between each of these domains (and the pillars) remains symbiotic.

While the ALDS highlights the importance of developing future leaders for the complex environments they will encounter, it does little to specify the amount of resources allocated towards this training. Though it places considerable emphasis on

analyzing and prioritizing leader development initiatives, it attempts to weight near-term (Fiscal Year 2013-2014) and mid-range (Fiscal Year 2015-2019) requirements.⁴⁶ That said, it highlights several novel ways of advancing its three lines of effort (corresponding with the three pillars) towards established benchmarks within each domain. As General Cone's article highlights, striking a balance between depth and breadth remains a challenge. He argues that the contemporary operational environment "requires the capability to provide some future Army leaders opportunities to acquire expert skills, while sending others, particularly those marked for senior level leadership, along paths that expose them to as many experiences as possible."⁴⁷

The quality of leader development assumes additional importance as the Army inculcates its leaders with and applies a "mission command" philosophy. Mission command is "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."⁴⁸ Based loosely on the German concept of *Auftragstaktik*, mission command seeks to leverage opportunities identified and exploited by junior leaders to operate within the commander's intent to achieve a desired endstate. Through decentralized execution, Army doctrine argues, more efficient and effective means of accomplishing missions arise than could possibly be envisaged during planning. Further, it acknowledges the impact of other actors on the modern battlefield, chiefly adversarial forces, to disrupt anticipated timing and manner of execution.

Mission command relies upon mutual trust between leaders. Through realistic training, commanders gain confidence in their junior leaders' abilities to assume "prudent

risk” and exercise disciplined initiative within their commander’s intent. Because the situation on the ground will change, as the inherent subjectivity of military forecasting is reconciled with objective reality, junior leaders will need to make decisions based upon their evolving situational understanding. The quality of the development of those leaders—within the institutional, operational, or self-development domains—can influence the degree of trust attained and, more importantly, the capability of those leaders to operate independently in instances where the higher headquarters cannot anticipate or directly influence the situation on the ground.

Diplomat Traits and Development

Little international consensus exists for diplomatic skills or requisite training or education. Sir Nicolson stressed that diplomats should possess “trained powers of observation, long experience and sound judgment.”⁴⁹ More specifically, as table 2 lists, he cites that the “Ideal Diplomatist” exhibits truthfulness, precision (acute mental and social skills), calmness, good temper, patience, modesty, and loyalty (to the nation of origin). This also requires social and cultural understanding that can help diplomats gain the confidence and liking of those “executing authority” in the host country.⁵⁰ Sir Satow, on the other hand, questions to what extent certain diplomatic skills can, in fact, be “ascertained by means of written examinations,” arguing that many desirable traits are more innate or derived directly from one’s classical education.⁵¹ Further, he cautions against the “amateur diplomatist,” whom he deemed too anxious to achieve results in short order.⁵²

The United States DOS, as the lead agency for American diplomatic affairs, has identified attributes it seeks in its entry-level and career Foreign Service Officers (FSOs).

As seen in table 2 below, going beyond the largely interpersonal skills that Nicolson highlights, the State Department recruits prospective FSOs based upon their qualifications spanning “13 Dimensions.” In concert, these dimensions emphasize highly developed analytical and managerial skills, assessed through both written and oral examinations that target tangible and intangible capabilities or attributes, respectively. The focus on research and analytic acumen perhaps reflects a corresponding emphasis on identifying what needs to be done (correctly framing the diplomatic problem), rather than prioritizing the means through which to conduct affairs—similar to Nicholson’s division between policy and diplomacy. While the 13 Dimensions guide the DOS recruiting process, six “Core Precepts” (leadership skills, managerial skills, interpersonal skills, communication and foreign language skills, intellectual skills, and substantive knowledge) serve as guidelines for evaluations and for determining the tenure and promotability of FSOs.⁵³ Contrarily, despite the emphasis on entry-level qualifications and performance measures for attaining leadership positions, many senior diplomats (ambassadors) do not necessarily come from within the FSO cohort. Instead, as Satow notes, they receive their positions for other, often political reasons.

Table 2. Selection of Desired Diplomat Attributes		
Sir Ernest Satow	Sir Harold Nicolson	United States' Foreign Service Officer Qualifications
Good Temper	Truthfulness	Composure
Good Health	Precision	Cultural Adaptability
Good Looks	Calmness	Experience and Motivation
Rather More than Average Intelligence	Good Temper	Information Integration and Analysis
Straightforward Character	Patience	Initiative and Leadership
Mind Trained by Study of the Best Literature and History	Modesty	Judgment
Capacity to Judge Evidence	Loyalty	Objectivity and Integrity
Educated Gentleman		Oral Communication
		Planning and Organizing
		Quantitative Analysis
		Resourcefulness
		Working with Others
		Written Communication

Sources: Ernest Mason Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (London, England: Longmans, Green and Col., 1917), 198; Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1988), 55-67; U.S. Department of State, "United States' Foreign Service Officer Qualifications: 13 Dimensions," http://www.careers.state.gov/uploads/4c/e8/4ce8ce99d45087fc22dbd582ebab88f7/3.0.0_FSO_13_dimensions.pdf (accessed 6 November 2013).

In its inaugural 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), DOS and USAID outline a need to adapt their approach to the "diplomatic landscape" of the 21st century. Modeled partly after DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review, the QDDR provides a joint vision for preparing individuals and institutions to execute future diplomatic missions. Their combined efforts, the authors attest, amount to the "civilian force" comparable to DOD's uniformed force that requires similar "jointness" to further United States' interests abroad. Interestingly, the QDDR minimally addresses collaboration and coordination between the civilian and military efforts, perhaps due to

its seeming intent to reassert diplomacy's primacy. It even seems to minimize the role for the military in conflict prevention and humanitarian response, though RAF missions are requested by and coordinated with DOS.

To conduct future diplomatic and development affairs, the QDDR outlines a need for a workforce that is “innovative, entrepreneurial, collaborative, agile, and capable of taking and managing risk.” It stresses a need for increased diversity (more reflective of the population) and emphasizes expertise, arguing that diverse requirements often lead to too many “generalists.” It also acknowledges its limited capacity to build human capital (compared to DOD's institutional pillar, in particular) and seeks opportunities to leverage outside expertise through fellowships, exchanges, and short-term hiring options for niche requirements, as both DOS and DOD did during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.

The Foreign Service Institute serves as the premier schoolhouse for training FSOs. Similar to the institutional domain for the Army, though explicitly focused on training rather than educating, the Foreign Service Institute offers a broad leadership and policy curriculum in addition to language and tradecraft instruction. The QDDR acknowledges its training shortcomings, even highlighting the strengths of DOD's “approach to training and continuing education” that provides “the space, the time, and the incentives” to make continuing education an integral critical part a career.⁵⁴ Going forward, the QDDR seeks to develop entrepreneurship so that DOS and USAID personnel can “find creative ways to continue to develop new partnerships, to advance multilateral and regional initiatives, to create whole-of-government solutions through better engagement and coordination with other U.S. government agencies, and to become more effective operators in the field.”⁵⁵

Conclusions

Though no definitive list of diplomat attributes and competencies exists, the diplomatic nature of RAF missions and the qualifications of those charged with executing them warrant further consideration. If these young men and women are performing a diplomatic function when they deploy, then there may be characteristics desired in professional diplomats in general or FSOs in particular that pertain. Under mission command, it is entirely possible that junior leaders will need to recognize and exploit opportunities on the ground. A better understanding of contemporary diplomacy may help Army leaders recognize the second- and third-order diplomatic effects of their actions (or inactions) can mitigate the risk inherent with defense diplomacy. The next Chapter will analyze the experiences of the Dagger Brigade along these lines to identify risks and to offer insights that might enhance future implementation of the RAF construct.

¹Lawrence B. Evans, review of *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, by Ernest Satow, *The American Political Science Review* 11, no. 4 (November 1917): 779-780, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1946871.pdf> (accessed 5 March 2014).

²Satow, 3.

³Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1988).

⁴Ibid.

⁵Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 810-811.

⁶Nicholson.

⁷Kissinger, 24-25. In some respects, this assertion remains even more true today than in 1994, particularly with the rise of China, India, and other global powers.

⁸Clausewitz, 87.

⁹KA Muthanna, “Military Diplomacy,” *Journal of Defence Studies*, 2013, http://www.ndc.gov.bd/elibrary/webroot/earticle/1031/Perspectives-Military_Diplomacy.pdf (accessed 11 December 2013). Granted, in these instances, the military had to “have the capability and wherewithal to act; and the decision makers the will to call the enemy’s bluff, if required.”

¹⁰The White House, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 25 August 2013).

¹¹Rose Keravuori, “Lost in Translation: The American Way of War,” *Small Wars Journal* (November 2011), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/11797> (accessed 11 November 2013).

¹²In addition to his numerous publications and his serving as the former Dean of the John F. Kenney School of Government at Harvard University, Nye also chaired the National Intelligence Council (1993-1994) and served as a senior official in the DOS and DOD during the Carter and Clinton administrations.

¹³Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990).

¹⁴This pertains to the “constructivist” theories of international relations, whereby nations have alternative means of influencing others’ through acquired meaning.

¹⁵Joseph Nye, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” *Foreign Affairs* (July 2009), 160-163, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart> (accessed 10 March 2014).

¹⁶James Stavridis, “A Navy Admiral’s Thoughts on Global Security, TED Talk, June 2012, http://www.ted.com/talks/james_stavridis_how_nato_s_supreme_commander_thinks_about_global_security (accessed 7 May 2014).

¹⁷Chester A. Crocker, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 13.

¹⁸U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 (JP 5-0), *Joint Operation Planning*, 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed 20 August 2013), xii.

¹⁹Keravuori.

²⁰Rory Medcalf, “Can Military Diplomacy Keep the Peace in 2013?” *The Diplomat*, 5 January 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/can-military-diplomacy-keep-the-peace-in-2013/> (accessed 5 March 2014).

²¹The Economist, “Military Diplomacy: Not so Warm and Fuzzy,” *The Economist*, 9 June 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21556604> (accessed 5 March 2014).

²²Anton du Plessis, “Defence Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with Specific Reference to South Africa,” *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 30, no. 2, <http://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-193140720/defence-diplomacy-conceptual-and-practical-dimensions> (accessed 5 March 2014).

²³Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” *Essays and Treaties on Moral, Political, and Various Philosophical Subjects*, 1798, in *International Relations: Traditions and Contemporary Changes*, ed. Scott Handler (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2011), 79-83.

²⁴John Locke, “Of the State of Nature, Of the State of War, and Of the Ends of Political Society and Government,” *The Second Treatise of Government*, 1690, in *International Relations: Traditions and Contemporary Changes*, ed. Scott Handler (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2011), 72-78.

²⁵Kant.

²⁶Woodrow Wilson, “Fourteen Points for Peace,” Speech, 8 January 1918, <http://ww12.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30716> (accessed 6 May 2014).

²⁷Taylor P. White, “Security Cooperation: How it All Fits,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (1st Quarter 2014): 106-107.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹The White House, 17.

³⁰Guest Speaker, Command and General Staff College, December 2013.

³¹U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, 2012, http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/army_strategic_planning_guidance.pdf (accessed 10 December 2013), 4.

³²General Raymond Odierno, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Execute Order (EXORD) 039-12, *Regionally Aligned Brigades* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, December 2011), 2

³³U.S. Department of the Army, “CSA Approved Definition” (PowerPoint Presentation, U.S. Army G-3/5/7, Washington, DC, 8 August 2012).

³⁴U.S. Government Accountability Office, 5.

³⁵U.S. Department of the Army, “Regional Alignment of Forces” (Briefing to Army Service Component Commands, 18 October 2012).

³⁶U.S. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 2012), 1-1.

³⁷Robert W. Cone, “The Future Army: Preparation and Readiness,” *Military Review* (July-August 2013): 5.

³⁸U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, 6.

³⁹U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy*, 3.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 6.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 3. To prevail, the ALDS argues, Army leaders need to “fluidly harmonize capabilities across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations,” 4.

⁴²U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, 2-4.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 1-5.

⁴⁴Kevin Kreie, “Improving Leader Development in the Operational Domain,” *Military Review* (March-April 2014): 61-65. Army Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Kreie cites a “serious shortfall” of leader development within the operational domain.

⁴⁵U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy*.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

⁴⁷Cone, 6.

⁴⁸U.S. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 2012), 2-10.

⁴⁹Nicolson, 10.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 55-56.

⁵¹Satow, 116.

⁵²*Ibid.*

⁵³U.S. Department of State, “Decision Criteria for Tenure and Promotion in the Foreign Service,” 16 April 2013.

⁵⁴U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf>, 173 (accessed 5 March 2014).

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 172.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

As argued in the conclusion of the last chapter, the regional alignment of U.S. Army forces with Geographic Combatant Commands may call upon junior leaders to perform roles traditionally associated with uniquely trained special operations forces, attachés, or even diplomats. Determining whether this is the case—in order to assess whether the mission’s execution entails unanticipated risk—requires careful consideration of albeit limited data about the mission’s first test unit.

This thesis will employ Alexander George’s “structured, focused comparison” methodology to glean initial observations from the Dagger Brigade’s RAF experience in AFRICOM.¹ The limited “n-value” of 1) the number of organizations conducting RAF missions and 2) the number of actual deployments completed—as well as the contemporary nature of the mission construct itself—makes the structured, focused approach most appropriate. Using a series of research questions to guide and standardize data collection provides “structure” to the analysis. Further, given the limited availability of both quantitative and qualitative data in general, applying a “focus” to the research ensures that the salient points can be induced scientifically.

According to George, conducting analysis in this manner overcomes the shortcomings of traditional case study research, if it follows three main premises. First, it must clarify the “universe”—or a “class” or “subclass” of events. Second, it should define the objective of the research and the strategy employed. Finally, it should identify “variables of interest” that clearly connect with the research focus.²

In an effort to adhere to these prescriptions, this thesis will analyze only those missions performed by the Dagger Brigade since its assumption of regional alignment orders in June 2013.

The objective of this research is to determine whether the Army needs to revisit its leader development strategy as it seeks to prepare future units for similar responsibilities worldwide. Certainly, the novelty of this mission's approach warrants analyses from varying perspectives. Assessing the diplomatic nature of their execution, however, can inform both policymakers and Army leaders as to how best to prepare, educate, train, and employ its future leaders through mission command. More importantly, it can spur questions about the future of military diplomacy and its risks.

Six questions will help guide the presentation of facts and analysis that follow in Chapter 4:

1. Is AFRICOM's employment of the Dagger Brigade unique?
2. Are RAF leaders wielding more than the military instrument of national power?
3. Did Dagger Brigade tailor its leader development approach?
4. Were Dagger Brigade leaders adequately prepared?
5. Has the Army revised its leader development strategy since the inception of the RAF construct?
6. Should it further revise the 2013 ALDS?

Several different types of sources will be engaged to analyze the Dagger Brigade's preparation, execution, and assessment of RAF missions. First, it will review directives from AFRICOM to understand the intent for each mission reviewed. Second,

the training and preparation directed by the Dagger Brigade will help identify emphases and risks in light of the limited time available to prepare individual soldiers. Third, the after action reviews and research conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned and other outside agencies will be considered. Answering these questions—ideally from multiple perspectives—will then provide a foundation upon which initial conclusions about the preparedness of U.S. Army soldiers to execute RAF missions can be deduced.

¹Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

²*Ibid.*, 69.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION OF FACTS AND ANALYSIS

Novel Requirements?

Assessing the ALDS's sufficiency for preparing junior leaders for careers supporting combatant requests requires first determining what the missions themselves entail. More specifically, the novelty of the RAF construct and the requirements it places on Dagger Brigade's junior leaders deserve delineation.

The mission for the Dagger Brigade has evolved to include a significant scope and range of activities. Even the concept itself has progressed from only aligning brigades (Regionally Aligned Brigades or RABs) with combatant commands to aligning higher headquarters (corps and division-sized) and enabling units at every echelon. Initially, the Dagger Brigade understood that it would strictly conduct theater security cooperation missions—executing principally security force assistance tasks to enhance collective security. However, the range of requirements that the Dagger Brigade filled quickly evolved to include “any task seen suitable” by the AFRICOM Commander.¹ By January 2013, the Brigade's leadership understood that they needed to prepare their units to execute “a variety of military to military engagements designed to improve certain aspects of an African nation's military from the senior officer/[non-commissioned officer] to the Soldier level.”²

Since April 2013, the Dagger Brigade has supported AFRICOM within the authorities and limitations established by Congress, DOS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They have provided the AFRICOM Commander, General David Rodriguez, with “Army capabilities that are responsive to all priority requirements, including

operational missions, theater security cooperation activities, and bilateral and multilateral military exercises.”³ Though Army forces—primarily special operations forces (special forces, civil affairs, etc.)—operated in Africa well before AFRICOM became operational, the frequency, duration, and size of those deployments has increased markedly, from 172 total missions in 2008 to 546 security activities in 2013.⁴ Thus the scale of conventional Army operations, almost entirely filled by the Dagger Brigade, is unprecedented.

Beyond the structural novelty of the RAF paradigm, Dagger Brigade has performed a wide array of mission types, sometimes with minimal preparation time. Certainly, Dagger Brigade units primarily fulfilled theater security cooperation requirements, training partnered forces in functions spanning the six warfighting functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, protection, sustainment, and mission command). As anticipated, however, Dagger units also responded to needs that required junior leaders to apply practices spanning the range of military operations, from training and equipping Niger’s armed forces, to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Mali, to bolstering security at the U.S. Embassy in South Sudan, among dozens of other tasks.

Aspects of the Dagger Brigade’s mission also required quick response capabilities. The brigade’s leadership typically benefits from early warning of missions and frequent guidance from AFRICOM. United States Army Africa (USARAF), the Army Service Component Command within AFRICOM, maintains a “Master Activities Tracker” for all activities within its area of responsibility. Most requirements are anticipated at least a year in advance, enabling iterative communication and cooperation between USARAF and the Dagger Brigade, leading to more shared understanding of both

the mission's requirements and the requisite preparation for those units designated to fulfill them. Still other requirements do arise within the fiscal and calendar years, leading USARAF and the Dagger Brigade to expedite predeployment and other training to meet opportunity demands.

The recurring requirement to provide the East Africa Response Force out of Djibouti, in particular, challenges Dagger Brigade's junior leaders to respond to dynamic situations. For the battalion-sized element entrusted with that mission—similar to the United States Marine Corps' Africa-focused Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response—lead times from notification to mission execution are far shorter. According to one East Africa Response Force Commander, within four days of arriving in Africa, he and 45 other soldiers found themselves “working with local forces and U.S. Embassy staff to stiffen protection at the American diplomatic compound as violence intensified across the country.”⁵ Thus, Dagger Brigade leaders not only must focus on known and anticipated requirements, but also must develop the capacity to apply their training and education to meet even unforeseeable security needs.

Perhaps the greatest change to the type of deployments that Dagger Brigade has conducted over the past year pertains to their decentralized execution. In Iraq and Afghanistan, squad- and platoon-level leaders (those with less than 10 years of experience) operated as part of much larger forces led by those with considerably more experience and, often, more advanced professional and civilian education. Though no “typical” RAF deployment exists, given the unique context towards which each mission is tailored, USARAF points out that the deployments usually consist of between five and 12 soldiers and are in the partner country between five days and three weeks.⁶ These

operations are admittedly “leader-heavy,” given the qualifications required to train or certify partner forces. Not all of these deployments, however, include leaders with more than 15 years of total Army experience, placing more junior leaders in direct contact with local civilian and military leaders with minimal supervision.

In sum, the aggregate novelty of the scope, range, and speed of operations for which Dagger Brigade must prepare places unique requirements on its leaders, particularly the junior leaders charged with their decentralized execution. The unique aspects of this approach have led the Army to devise “business rules” involving its implementation.⁷ To some extent, the novelty of this approach flows from necessity. As General Odierno stated in one of his articles announcing RAF, “Anyone following defense news knows that it’s not business as usual these days...The regionally aligned forces concept represents an innovative and expanded approach to our ongoing Army security cooperation mission and force management process.”⁸

Diplomatic Requirements?

Given the unique aspects of this particular approach to pursuing national enduring interests via enhanced collective security, the diplomatic nature of the missions themselves warrants examination. Missions executed by the Dagger Brigade are inherently diplomatic, overtly serving as Clausewitzian extensions of “politics by other means” far beyond legacy peacetime thresholds.

First, RAF purposefully entails military involvement in foreign countries prior to the onset of armed conflict. Whereas a more clear delineation once existed between military and diplomatic engagement, as with peace and war, that demarcation is now far more obscure. As depicted in figure 3 below, while Dagger Brigade and its RAF

successors must train to respond across the range of military operations (from peace to war), Geographic Combatant Commanders now envisage employing regionally aligned forces to fulfill requirements principally “left” of (or prior to) the “Event Line.” Doing so, defense planners presume, will allow ground forces to respond from a “Warm Start” based upon existing relationships and partnerships and hence mitigate fallout induced by unanticipated (or unforeseeable) events, preventing escalation to the point of major operations and campaigns. Part of this entails enabling partner nations to develop their own capacity to respond to regional security issues, even “right” of (or after) that “Event Line.”⁹ Far more, however, pertains to improving interoperability between armed forces, principally through sustained relations.




Figure 3. Regionally Aligned Forces Overview: Why?

Source: Army G-3/5/7, “RAF Slides for Department of State Officer Professional Development,” 21 March 2013.

Second, regionally aligned forces are explicitly tasked with developing military-to-military relationships with their counterparts. The Army Capabilities Integration Center—responsible for “Adapting the Army” for future conflicts—cites that the future force will need to “build relationships that prevent strategic miscalculations.”¹⁰ Dagger Brigade leadership similarly cites that the purpose of their operations is to “build long lasting relationships that promote specific U.S. interests and develop African partnered land forces military capabilities for self defense and/or regional stability to help establish a secure environment.”¹¹

Granted, key leader engagement, or KLE, is not a new concept for current Army leaders. In Iraq and Afghanistan, leaders even below the platoon-level met routinely with local military and civilian leaders. Yet they did so commensurate with their own level of responsibility and under the routine direction of their immediate supervisor. Platoon-level leaders, for instance, rarely interacted with partner cabinet-level officials, certainly not without more senior U.S. military leaders present. For the Dagger Brigade, however, junior leaders operate in a highly decentralized manner, reporting directly to the U.S. Chief of Mission (ambassador or his or her deputy) and even engaging directly with senior-level leaders in partner nations.

Third, these deployments are intended to influence the nations to which they embark. General Cone even suggests that “engagement” become a seventh warfighting function, given the revelation from Iraq and Afghanistan that the Army has much to learn regarding how best to influence others, including local civilians that land forces seek to protect.¹² Given the relatively small size of DOS and other agencies that promote and embody U.S. interests within sub-Saharan nations, conventional Army forces deployed

therein—and wearing a highly recognizable uniform with “U.S. Army” on their uniform—wield an unprecedented amount of diplomatic influence. Further, in the absence of other more senior U.S. military officials, even informal encounters between junior Army leaders and local civilians can lead to varying interpretations of U.S. policy in the region. Mr. Jeffrey Miller, a former Foreign Area Officer and current Africa Regional Manager for the Defense Institution Reform Initiative with 30 years of experience in Africa, asserts that for deployed RAF units, “Anything that comes out of their mouth becomes policy.”¹³

Despite the risks involved with empowering junior Army leaders to wield diplomatic influence, the novelty of RAF again flows from necessity to some extent. Even if doing so would be in the United States’ interest, many of the countries in Africa do not necessarily desire larger delegations or deployments. One battalion commander in Dagger Brigade even asserts that most nations do not want a large U.S. footprint, leaving the task of demonstrating United States policy or influencing the local population towards its interests depends upon these decentralized, uniformed leaders.¹⁴

The United States is not alone in extending its diplomatic and information instruments of national power through military engagement. Indeed, the expansion of defense diplomacy in recent years suggests that deploying units will enter an increasingly competitive diplomatic space. Dagger Brigade units frequently identified delegations from other foreign militaries working within the partnered country. Within only a few months of performing missions in Africa, Dagger Brigade soldiers encountered forces from other countries providing equipment and training to the partner force.¹⁵ Such encounters amplified one early conclusion that RAF units need better situational

awareness of other foreign forces operating within supported nations to avoid placing Army personnel in situations that “could provoke an international incident.”¹⁶

Novel Preparation?

With the unique challenges of wielding diplomatic, informational, and military influence in sub-Saharan Africa identified, it then seems appropriate to determine whether Dagger Brigade tailored its preparation accordingly.

Assessing the quality of Dagger Brigade’s internal efforts to prepare its junior leaders for AFRICOM requirements begins first with outlining the unit’s doctrinal purpose. Organically, as an ABCT, the Dagger Brigade is a balanced combined arms unit that executes operations with “shock and speed.” As figure 4 shows below, the Dagger Brigade is comprised of two combined arms battalions (each consisting of two armor, two mechanized infantry companies, an attached forward support company, and a headquarters company), one cavalry squadron (with three cavalry troops, an attached forward support company, and a headquarters troop), one field artillery battalion (with two artillery batteries, an attached forward support company, and a headquarters battery), a support battalion (with one distribution, one maintenance, and one medical support company), a special troops battalion (with military intelligence, signal, and engineer companies), and a brigade headquarters company. In total, an organic ABCT includes over 4,600 soldiers spanning dozens of occupational specialties.




Figure 4. Armored Brigade Combat Team Composition

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-90.6 (FM 3-90.6) *Brigade Combat Team* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 2010), 1-7.

With that intended composition, the doctrinal mission for an ABCT (formerly referred to as a Heavy Brigade Combat Team or HBCT) is:

To fight and win engagements and battles in support of operational and strategic objectives. The HBCT seizes enemy territory, destroys the enemy's armed forces, and eliminates his means of civil population control. The HBCT conducts sustained and large-scale actions in [decisive action] throughout the depth of the [area of operations]. Its combination of firepower, tactical mobility, and organic reconnaissance assets make it invaluable to a higher headquarters commander in combat.¹⁷

The explicit design for speed and shock leaves the ABCT with unique capabilities and limitations. Its capabilities, among others, include increased firepower, tactical mobility, and protection compared to other types of brigade combat teams (infantry and Stryker), enhanced situational awareness due to the volume of mission command systems inside its

motorized and armored vehicles, and necessarily robust organic sustainment capabilities, among others. However, those same strengths incur some challenges, including its 1) limited capability to conduct “forced entry or early entry operations,” 2) not being “rapidly deployable,” and 3) high usage rate of supplies, particularly fuel, ammunition, and spare parts.¹⁸

Doctrinally, as an ABCT, the Dagger Brigade is responsible for training towards its Mission Essential Task List—a series of tasks standardized across all like units and designated by the Headquarters of the Department of the Army. Table 3 shows the standardized Mission Essential Task List for an ABCT.¹⁹ Each of these tasks are further broken down into a series of discrete individual and collective tasks, and commanders have the ability to choose how they prepare their units based upon available time, resources, and knowledge of known or anticipated missions they might receive.

Table 3. Standardized Mission Essential Task List for an ABCT

- Conduct Mission Command
- Conduct Offensive Operations
- Conduct Defensive Operations
- Conduct Security Operations
- Conduct Area Security
- Conduct Stability Operations
- Provide Fire Support
- Conduct Civil Support Operations

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, “Standardized Mission Essential Task List for an ABCT,” Army Training Network Online, <https://atn.army.mil> (accessed 25 April 2014).

To some extent, the ABCT seems like a wholly inappropriate type of unit to serve as a “sourcing solution” for AFRICOM requirements. Limited armored forces operate within AFRICOM, at least compared to other combatant commands, Europe and the Middle East in particular. Further, the reflexivity required of the East African Response Force and the small-scale and austere nature of RAF deployments seems to exploit the inherent limitations of the ABCT. Yet the presence of armored, mechanized, cavalry reconnaissance, dismounted infantry, and brigade-level enabling capabilities spanning the warfighting functions provides the greatest breadth of specialties to fulfill AFRICOM requirements. Additionally, the 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley share a recent history of preparing units for security force assistance missions in support of counterinsurgency operations in Central Command.

To balance regional alignment responsibilities with the necessity of worldwide availability, the Dagger Brigade reviewed its doctrinal capabilities and tailored its approach to meet novel demands. Progressing through a training regimen reflective of those executed prior to deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, the brigade’s leadership certified junior leaders to conduct “combined arms maneuver” and “wide area security.” That same progression for non-RAF designated units, however, consumes the vast majority of available training time. Hence, the Dagger Brigade needed to think creatively about how to balance proficiency in combat skills (both to teach partners and to fulfill AFRICOM requirements spanning the range of military operations) with tailored preparation for conducting small-unit operations inside Africa, as depicted in figure 5 below.




Figure 5. Balancing Regional Alignment and Global Availability

Source: Jeffery Broadwater, "Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) Mission Preparation Lessons Learned" (PowerPoint Presentation, April 2013).

With assistance from the 162d Infantry Regiment at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and from Kansas State University in nearby Manhattan, Kansas, the brigade created "Dagger University," a one-week course executed monthly for all deploying soldiers. This program covered unique aspects of working in Africa, as taught by Foreign Area Officers and other subject matter experts, including expatriates from the partner nations then studying at Kansas State University. Granted, some of that time was dedicated to specific military and administrative aspects of the deployment like the threat briefing and a class on the "Law of Land Warfare" as applied to each deployment's circumstances. The 162d Infantry Regiment—a unit that "trains Advisor Skills, Combat Skills, and Security Force Assistance Skills to provide Army and Joint Force Commanders with trained personnel and units to build partner nation security capacity"—provides experience and expertise

with training for security assistance missions.²⁰ Trainers from that unit facilitated classes on United States Foreign Policy in Africa, on the functioning of embassies, and on teaching military skills through an interpreter, as required.²¹ At the end of “Dagger U” training, team leaders participated in a culminating exercise to practice introducing themselves to their African and demonstrating respect in that particular culture.

Somewhat surprisingly, the Army leadership did not, and still does not, consider extensive culture, regional expertise, and language capability as an inherent component of the RAF construct. Certainly, the Army continues to stress cultural awareness and situational understanding in general, and the Dagger Brigade has incorporated this lesson learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. The brigade did, however, develop baseline cultural understanding via instruction from the 162d Infantry Brigade, the Leader Development for the Enhancement of Sustained Peace (LDESP in figure 5) from the Naval Post-Graduate School, on-line language training (Headstart), other training at Dagger University, and lectures and face-to-face dialogue with country experts and residents available through the Kansas State University Africa Studies Program.²²

The depth and quality of preparation for specific deployments, however, depended partly upon the amount of time available. Before assuming the RAF mission for AFRICOM, in line with predeployment requirements for supporting CENTCOM missions, the Dagger Brigade needed to demonstrate proficiency in their directed Mission Essential Task List tasks during a Combat Training Center rotation in February and March of 2013. Prior to the execution of that validating rotation, however, USARAF had not yet provided any additional training requirements for units deploying into that

region.²³ Formal RAF-specific training requirements from U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) also did not exist until as late as February 2014.

Ironically, the availability of these regionally aligned forces has noticeably increased the Army's responsiveness to fulfilling unscheduled AFRICOM requirements, somewhat facilitating shorter lead times. According to a recent compilation of lessons learned within US Army Africa (USARAF), the traditional "Request for Forces" process only initiated a unit's theater-specific preparation. With the source for forces and requisite preparation resident within one aligned brigade, units now fulfill requirements within weeks of the need's identification.²⁴ However, this presents AFRICOM planners with a potential moral hazard. The ready availability of aligned units may lead to the overemployment or, worse, misapplication of those forces.²⁵

Certainly, checks are in place to prevent this from occurring for previously unanticipated demands. FORSCOM has delineated minimum requirements for combatant commands seeking to support "unplanned" theater security cooperation mission: 60 days minimum for company or larger deployments and 45 days for deployments of platoon-sized elements or smaller.²⁶ Yet for demands that are anticipated in the ASCC annual task order, forces can now be used to fulfill requirements within weeks of notification.

Despite the challenges inherent within this new type of mission and the challenges its junior leaders face, the Dagger Brigade has made a concerted effort to tailor its approach. Though baseline preparation is similar to other units training to the entire range of military operations, once a specific mission requirement is identified, Dagger Brigade's receive a "modest" amount of cultural familiarization, while "Aspiring to high

[language, regional expertise, and cultural] proficiencies does not appear to be significantly impactful.”²⁷

Effective Preparation?

The next question then pertains to whether the Dagger Brigade’s preparation proved adequate for the junior leaders that fulfilled AFRICOM requirements. Though only initial after action reviews and other lessons learned collections exist within the first year of RAF’s implementation, initial observations yield some indicators of the utility of Dagger Brigade’s preparation and perhaps the potential for applying some of its practices Army-wide.

Two primary documents, one prepared by the United States Army Irregular Warfare Center and the other by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, provide a baseline assessment of Dagger Brigade’s operations in AFRICOM as of October 2013 and March 2014, respectively. The Irregular Warfare Center’s document, “2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report,” considered the regional expertise that deploying leaders acquired through Dagger University sufficient, even suggesting that other units seek to emulate its partnerships with the 162d Infantry Brigade, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, and local universities and subject matter experts.²⁸ The report also concludes that leaders demonstrated sufficient flexibility and adaptability in adjusting to dynamic situations and evolving requirements.²⁹ This proved particularly necessary given the inevitability of “unanticipated situations” that junior leaders faced and limited means of communicating with their higher headquarters, once deployed. Despite diplomatic sensitivities inherent within these missions, the Brigade’s leadership deemed that mastery of standardized mission essential tasks remains “the most

important feature of preparing RAF units to conduct security cooperation missions,” emphasizing validation at a training center even more than attainment of specific country expertise.³⁰

The Center for Army Lessons Learned report reinforces the Irregular Warfare Group’s conclusions about the criticality of the Dagger Brigade’s proficiency in its core military tasks. Citing the fact that many soldiers in partner forces have as much combat experience as a “typical” U.S. soldier, this report concludes that core competencies in combat skills remain critical to fulfilling AFRICOM requirements.³¹ This report also stresses that extensive language and regional expertise is neither required nor realistic, given the hundreds of languages and cultures within USARAF’s area of responsibility. It acknowledges that “a small amount of cultural awareness can go a long way toward building positive influence with locals[,] and ignorance can do a lot of damage even in a short visit.”³² To bridge the divide, the report stresses the need for RAF units to practice working with an interpreter. Despite overall de-emphasis on cultural expertise, however, the report recommends that the Army’s Human Resources Command consider aligning those with language skills or life experience within a particular theater receive assignment to “the appropriate RAF unit.”³³

To date, the Dagger Brigade has filled the vast majority of AFRICOM’s requests for forces without any strategic shortcomings. Indeed, it fulfilled all of the missions requested by AFRICOM for which it possessed the requisite expertise and which the SPP or special operations forces could not resource. In some instances, USARAF identified requirements for enabler capabilities not resident within an ABCT. Other sourcing options ultimately filled these unique requirements, reinforcing the adjustment of the

original RAB concept to aligning forces and enablers at all echelons to meet low-density, specialty demands.

Dagger University and other initiatives within the brigade, as well as frequent communication between the brigade and USARAF, have mitigated the risk of tactical missteps of strategic significance. That said, these missions in AFRICOM benefit from several advantages that may preclude a final determination that enhanced cultural, language, or diplomatic training is not necessary for the wider force. First, American and other interests within Africa are less vital than in some other regions, specifically Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Second, most sub-Saharan African armed forces and governments are among the least developed in the world, which leads them to be particularly receptive to assistance, especially from the United States. Third, the Dagger Brigade benefits from a political context that, on the heels of Afghanistan and Iraq, leaves the United States less likely to conduct operations “right” of the “Event Line.” Absent these advantages, further tests of the RAF concept, as well as their ability to produce gains from a “Warm Start” remain unassessed at this point.

The enduring impact of RAF deployments in AFRICOM remains elusive and will likely remain so for quite some time. Army and joint doctrine delineates between measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. The former determines how well assigned tasks are performed, while the latter deduces the appropriateness of the tasks themselves in bringing about the desired endstate.³⁴ Though initial measures of performance suggest that the Dagger Brigade has fulfilled its assigned missions, neither USARAF nor DOS have fully developed measure of effectiveness criteria for these deployments.³⁵ Thus far each mission’s after action review and trip report serves as the

primary means of inferring the impact of RAF deployments—as captured by each deployment’s leadership. Beyond the inherent biases of existing self-reporting mechanisms, future annual assessments may capture “aggregate effectiveness across the spectrum of regions, countries, and goals.”³⁶ But, at this point, such data and holistic responses from partner nations to RAF deployments have yet to be published. In many respects, it may be incumbent upon embassies in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility to identify mission requirements and to provide longer-term assessments and qualitative feedback on the preparation of RAF leaders.

Army-Wide Leader Development Adjustments?

The Army leadership intends to apply the RAF concept beyond the Dagger Brigade. Given the novelty of the approach and its intended Army-wide application, it seems appropriate to determine how the Army has revised its leader development program in anticipation of, or in response to, such novel requirements. Reviewing the evolution of the Army’s principal leader development strategy document, the ALDS, and the guidance published by its primary operational force provider, FORSCOM, provides some indicators of the extent to which the leader development paradigm has changed.

The Army has indeed revised the ALDS since the inception of the RAF construct, though perhaps not explicitly as a direct result of its implementation. The first ALDS, published in 2009, captured many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan yet preceded the inception of RAF. Acknowledging the complexity of the operating environment at the time of its publication and the resultant “unbalanced” leader development program—oriented towards performing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—the 2009 ALDS emphasized three paradigmatic shifts: accounting

for complexity over time, preparing for decentralized execution, and properly framing “ill-structured problems.”³⁷ That strategic document sought to realign ends, ways, and means to prepare leaders for an “uncertain and complex future security environment.”³⁸ It also alluded to a need for increased emphasis on what later became “mission command” and on inculcating the import of cultural awareness and situational understanding throughout the Army.

FORSCOM, the Army’s largest command and responsible for providing Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve Army forces to combatant commanders, published its own leader development guidance in 2012, presumably informed by the 2009 ALDS. Surprisingly, though that document lists leader development as one of nine “imperatives” for FORSCOM units, it only dedicates one paragraph to expounding upon the Army-wide strategy. General David Rodriguez, then the FORSCOM Commander (before assuming command of AFRICOM in April 2013), emphasized that units must approximate training “as closely as possible to the complex and uncertain environments of the future...ensuring that subordinate leaders are ‘well-rounded,’ challenged, and allowed to maximize professional development, education and experiential opportunities.”³⁹

Leader development doctrine and guidance has noticeably expanded since the announcement of the RAF construct in early 2012. The Army’s increased emphasis on leader development writ large derives, in part, from hard-fought lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and from an improved understanding of the requirement to provide well-informed and experienced junior leaders for a contemporary combat zone. It also reflects an increasing need for leaders with mental agility and critical and creative thinking

skills—after almost a decade of necessarily preparing leaders solely for operations in the Central Command area of responsibility—to accomplish myriad missions amid geopolitical uncertainty and tactical complexity.

Both the 2013 ALDS and the 2014 FORSCOM leader development guidance reflect this increase in emphasis and scope. The foreword for the ALDS, signed by the Army’s senior leadership, emphasizes the strategic inflection point that justifies a “renew[ed] emphasis on developing Army leaders to meet the security challenges of tomorrow.”⁴⁰ Compared to its 2009 predecessor, the 2013 strategy stresses the criticality of both leader development and talent management, the former serving as the proximate means of acquiring knowledge, skills, and attributes relevant to tomorrow’s challenges, and the latter pertaining to their appropriate cultivation and application. It also acknowledges that both “a period of austerity” and the ongoing transition to aligning Army forces to support combatant commands as further impetus for future leaders’ ability to “recognize that problems do not have predetermined solutions.”⁴¹ Beyond that reference to the RAF construct, the ALDS does not explicitly expand upon what those deployments would likely entail. Instead, it appears primarily focused on ongoing efforts to address “toxic leadership” through enhanced (360 degree) assessments of leaders, improving stewardship of the profession (balancing organizational short- and long-term interests), and building trust to enable mission command.⁴²

Rather than folding leader development into general training guidance, FORSCOM appears to have used the transition to RAF to issue more explicit guidance for leader development in 2014. Anticipating that junior leaders that will “face an operational environment that is increasingly chaotic and fueled by the speed of the

information age,” FORSCOM Commander General Daniel Allyn calls upon division-level leaders to “prioritize leader development by maximizing subordinates’ professional development, education, and experiential opportunities.”⁴³ Fulfilling its assigned mission, he assesses, is “dependent upon our collective effectiveness at operationalizing the Army Leader Development Strategy,”⁴⁴ including the necessity of managing the innate and acquired talents within the force. Again, though the FORSCOM guidance refers to the transition to RAF spanning the range of military operations, it minimally describes what these missions might entail, rather emphasizing mission command and incorporating leader development into “everything we do.”⁴⁵

Over the past two years, the Army’s senior leaders have placed far greater emphasis on the development of its leaders. The same strategic inflection point that led to the inception of RAF appears to have similarly precipitated the increased emphasis on the tenets of mission command and on building and retaining the talent to allow junior leaders to exercise “disciplined” initiative. Yet the degree to which the specific and unique requirements that RAF will place on junior leaders influences how the Army builds and retains that talent remains to be seen.

Diplomat Education and Attributes Adequately Addressed?

Given the Army’s traditional mission and its perceived need to prepare for the full range of military operations, it seems understandable that its leader development doctrine focuses principally on preparing to conduct decentralized operations on today’s multi-dimensional battlefield. Still referencing the “battlefield” as the principal theater of operations, however, as in the 2014 FORSCOM guidance, seems to imply that the Army

will be unable to avoid the major campaigns and operations that proactive engagement, and hence RAF, is intended to prevent.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review that in addition to protecting the homeland and projecting power to win decisively, our armed forces must “build security globally, in order to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges.”⁴⁶ Though many other departments and agencies contribute to this whole-of-government security strategy, the RAF serves as the proximate means through which the Army intends to pursue that approach. It then seems appropriate to assess to what extent the Army has amassed the requisite ways and means to fulfill its uniquely diplomatic mandate. If conventional Army units will now deploy around the globe in an effort to forge or deepen relationships, are its leaders adequately equipped with the skills that such uniformed diplomacy would require?

The Army unequivocally invests substantial resources into training its leaders. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*, claims “leader competence develops from a balanced combination of institutional schooling, self development, realistic training, and professional experience.”⁴⁷ Unlike many other industries or government agencies, the Army maintains a surplus of leaders at many ranks, allowing officers and non-commissioned officers to revisit the institutional domain to attend schooling designed to prepare them for increasing levels of responsibility. Within the operational domain, the Army similarly invests enormous resources into simulations and into creating situational training exercises, wherein leaders can attempt to apply doctrine and training to anticipated operational environments. As the 2013 ALDS highlights, the

Army rightly has attained a competitive advantage regarding the quality of its leaders, as compared with peer armed forces around the globe. It continues to excel at training leaders towards certain, albeit complex, tasks and scenarios.

Despite its competitive advantage within the institutional and operational domains, however, the Army faces considerable challenges regarding the individual or self-development domain. A noticeable disparity exists between junior Army leaders and those of other departments or agencies charged with advancing United States interests abroad at times of peace, specifically regarding education—that which former Chief of Staff of the Army General Schoomaker deemed best prepares leaders for uncertainty.

In the Army, not even all junior officers attain a baccalaureate degree prior to receiving their commission. Though graduates of the Reserve Officer Training Corps and the United States Military Academy at West Point must complete their undergraduate education prior to becoming officers, those that receive their commission through Fort Benning's Officer Candidate School have, at times, only needed an associate degree to begin their training. These officers can initially serve on active duty as an officer at that educational level, but must attain a bachelor's degree prior to being "appointed to a grade above the grade of first lieutenant."⁴⁸ While the current policy requires all junior officers to have a bachelors degree prior to commissioning, the fact remains that this has not always been the case and, more importantly, that very few officers attend graduate schooling prior to assuming leadership positions. Further, though officers are encouraged to obtain an advanced degree, it is not an explicit requirement for promotion. For instance, over twenty percent (13 out of 63) of the officers selected to command infantry

battalions by the Fiscal Year 2014 Command Selection Board do not possess a Masters Degree of any type.⁴⁹

The educational range of non-commissioned officers is even more mixed. Upon enlistment, new soldiers are only required to have completed high school or be in receipt of their general equivalency diploma, though even that has, at times, been waived. Certainly, many have bachelor's degree or even an advanced degree, but they are not institutionally required to attain these credentials, rather, broadly encouraged to pursue further education, often at their own expense.

By comparison, most FSOs possess considerably more education than junior Army leaders that will lead future RAF efforts. According to the State Department website, most candidates applying to become an FSO already possess a bachelor's degree or equivalent certification, and over three quarters of those actually hired have earned advanced degrees, “typically in public administration, international relations, history, or law.”⁵⁰ The Foreign Service also screens its candidates based upon their ability to converse with representatives from other countries. Officer candidates that pass the oral exam may receive bonus points to improve their position by taking telephonic language tests that assess speaking proficiency. Further, the Foreign Service trains officers based upon job skills or languages required for assignments and provides monetary (“Step”) incentives for advanced education, accelerating career progression for those in possession of advanced degrees.⁵¹

FSOs within USAID similarly possess, on average, greater education credentials upon initial entry into public service. USAID stresses that competitive applicants have a graduate degree or some combination of a bachelor's degree and relevant work

experience in developing nations or within economically deprived communities within the United States. In fact, most USAID FSO assignments require a graduate or advanced degree (MS, MA, PhD, JD, MD). Even more tellingly, attaining tenure in USAID (and DOS) within the five-year probation period requires foreign language proficiency.⁵²

Even comparing the training, education, and experience levels of junior Army leaders with those traditionally charged with security force assistance and with engaging with partners “left” of a crisis reveals disparities. Special operations forces and civil affairs soldiers are hand-selected, usually based upon a pool of applicants with at least two years of active duty experience, undergo a rigorous selection process, and receive advanced training. While commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq necessarily narrowed most special operations forces units’ preparation towards those theaters, Special Forces Groups are traditionally regionally oriented, and most operators spend much of their career working within a particular combatant command. National Guardsmen working in foreign countries through the SPP similarly benefit from a narrowed focus and continuity of mission, as well as the fact that they tend to be older than their counterparts within the active duty force and bring additional skills from their primary vocation or profession. Finally, attachés are also hand-selected, receive more extensive language and cultural training than the remainder of the Army, and typically have at least 10 years of experience prior to engaging with their counterparts as a Defense Attaché or Senior Defense Official.

Given the significant educational disparity between those traditionally charged with advancing United States interests in times of peace and those now responsible for fulfilling combatant command requirements via RAF, the Army’s leader development

strategy pursues many of the attributes that Satow, Nicolson, and others sought in diplomats. The Army's increased emphasis on developing skills like empathy, building trust, interpersonal tact, and "extending influence beyond the chain of command," can lead to more successful engagement with partner forces. Indeed, many similarities exist between the State Department's "13 Dimensions" and the Army Leadership Requirements Model, perhaps bridging some of the gaps between those initially hired into the Foreign Service and into the Army, respectively, through a career of training and education.

On the other hand, Robert Blackwill, a retired diplomat with over four decades of experience, lists first in his "Ideal Qualities of a Successful Diplomat" that those seeking to pursue American interests abroad must "Possess an abiding interest in and passion for the art and craft of diplomacy and international relations."⁵³ If that passion is necessary for Army leaders to perform as successful uniformed diplomats while in the course of fulfilling their military tasks, then the Army may need to look closely at how it identifies and selects those intended to execute missions where geopolitical context and interests are far more contentious.

Conclusions

This chapter presented facts and offered analysis based upon the six questions outlined in Chapter 3 in an effort to infer whether the United States Army should revisit its ALDS in light of the RAF approach it began implementing in 2013. Clearly, RAF expands the scope, range, and speed of operations, placing demands upon junior leaders traditionally reserved for special operations forces (question 1). It also overtly deploys those young men and women into an increasingly competitive defense diplomacy space,

wherein their presence and their every action inform partners' and potential opponents' interpretations of U.S policy and intentions (question 2).

The uniquely broad and diplomatic mandate within which these leaders operate deserves equally novel preparation. Dagger Brigade, the only Active Army unit currently fully aligned with a combatant command, has leveraged available resources and developed innovative solutions to enhance their junior leaders' mental preparation for these missions, though such preparation only receives a fraction of that unit's limited discretionary training time (question 3). Initial indicators suggest that the degree of that regional, cultural, and language preparation appears adequate for missions executed to date, though the enduring impact of those missions and their second- and third-order effects are not yet measurable (question 4).

Over the past five years, the Army has placed a premium on developing leaders capable of executing decentralized operations at a time of inordinate uncertainty. The 2013 ALDS, like the 2009 version that preceded it, serves as the framework document to align ends, ways, and means towards providing leaders capable of exercising disciplined initiative (question 5). While broadening experiences and educational opportunities have expanded over the past decade, those that benefit from them still prove to be the exception, not the rule. Hence, the current strategy fails to recognize that the new standard for operating within a competitive, military-diplomatic space warrants education and traits traditionally found only within the Foreign Service, those previously entrusted with wielding the diplomatic instrument of national power (question 6). Thus, if the Army recognizes that it must prepare its warrior-diplomats for uncertain times, it needs to

revisit the ALDS to place far greater emphasis on education both before and after leader accession and promotion.

¹Jeffery D. Broadwater, "Government Accountability Office Discussion Question Responses (GAO Engagement Code 351742), Memorandum of Response, Headquarters, 2d Armored Brigade, 1st Infantry Division" (Fort Riley, KS, 3 January 2013), 1.

²Ibid.

³Benton, 2.

⁴John Vandiver, "Crisis Response Force Adds Firepower to U.S. Base in Africa," *Stars and Stripes*, 14 April 2014, <http://www.stripes.com/news/crisis-response-force-adds-firepower-to-us-base-in-africa-1.277535> (accessed 25 April 2014).

⁵Paul McLeary, "In Shift to Africa, U.S. Troops Find Complicated Relationships," *Air Force Times*, 19 April 2014, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20140419/NEWS08/304190034/In-shift-Africa-U-S-troops-find-complicated-relationships> (accessed 25 April 2014).

⁶Thomas H. Roe, "Center for Army Lessons Learned Interim Report on Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) in U.S. Army Africa (USARAF)," Memorandum, Center for Army Lessons Learned (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 March 2014), 6-7.

⁷James Schultz, "Increasing the Army's Contribution to Global Force Commitment: A U.S. Army Forces Command Approach," White Paper, Center for Army Lessons Learned (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 October 2012), 3-4.

⁸Ray Odierno, "Regionally Aligned Forces: A New Model for Building Partnerships," Army Live: The Official Blog for the United States Army, 22 March 2012, <http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/>. (accessed 25 April 2014).

⁹U.S. Department of the Army, "RAF Slides for Department of State Officer Professional Development" (G-3/5/7, PowerPoint Presentation, 21 March 2013).

¹⁰U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center, "Top 10 Insights on the U.S. Army in Transition," http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/Top-10-Insights-On-The-US-Army-In-Transition_OCT2013.pdf (accessed 22 April 2014).

¹¹Benton, 2.

¹²Gary Sheftick, "TRADOC: Strategic Landpower Concept to Change Doctrine," Army Homepage, 16 January 2014, http://www.army.mil/article/118432/TRADOC__Strategic_Landpower_concept_to_change_doctrine/ (accessed 15 March 2014).

¹³Jeffrey Miller, “Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI): Building Defense Institutional Capacity” (Briefing to select Command and General Staff Students, 22 April 2014).

¹⁴David S. Cloud, “U.S. Military Presence in Africa Growing in Small Ways,” *Los Angeles Times*, 7 March 2014, <http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-usmil-africa-20140308,0,4469091.story#axzz2vRKctOoJ> (accessed 20 April 2014).

¹⁵Benton, 18-19.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁷U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-90.6 *Brigade Combat Team* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 2010), 1-9.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 1-10.

¹⁹U.S. Department of the Army, “HQDA Standardized METL,” Army Training Network, <https://atn.army.mil/fso/default.aspx> (accessed 25 April 2014).

²⁰U.S. Army 162d Infantry Regiment, “Mission,” 162d Infantry Regiment Homepage, http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/Transition_team/index.html (accessed 25 April 2014).

²¹Broadwater.

²²Benton, 3.

²³Broadwater.

²⁴Roe.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 6. One USARAF officer purports that through RAF “we’ve stumbled upon the most efficient process.”

²⁶Schultz, 3-4.

²⁷Roe, 6-7.

²⁸Benton, 6.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 9.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 13.

³¹Roe, 6.

³²*Ibid.*, 7.

³³*Ibid.*, 7.

³⁴Jack D. Kem, *Planning for Action* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Command and General Staff College, 2012), 236-237.

³⁵Roe, 9.

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy 2009*, http://cgsc.edu/ALDS/ArmyLdrDevStrategy_20091125.pdf (accessed 20 March 2014), 4.

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹David A. Rodriguez, “Forces Command (FORSCOM) Training and Leader Development Guidance (FCTLDG)–Fiscal Years 2012-2013 (FY12-13),” Memorandum (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Forces Command, 6 February 2012), 2.

⁴⁰U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy 2013*, 1.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 5.

⁴²George E. Reed, “Toxic Leadership,” *Military Review* (July-August 2004): 67-71, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/Toxic_Leadership.pdf (accessed 5 May 2014).

⁴³Daniel B. Allyn, “FORSCOM Leader Development Guidance,” Memorandum (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Forces Command, January 2014), 1.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 6.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁶Chuck Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed 4 April 2014), V.

⁴⁷U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, 1-5.

⁴⁸ U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1205, § 12205 – “Commissioned Officers: Appointment; Educational Requirement,” Cornell University Legal Information Institute, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/12205> (accessed 5 May 2014).

⁴⁹U.S. Army Human Resources Command, “FY15 LTC CSL Analysis,” Report on Fiscal Year 2015 Infantry Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection List, 19 February 2014.

⁵⁰U.S. Department of State, “Does the Foreign Service Look More Favorably on Individuals with Advanced Degrees or Foreign Language Skills?” Frequently Asked Questions, <http://careers.state.gov/faqs/faqs-wiki/does-the-foreign-service-look-more-favorably-on-individuals-with-advanced-degrees-or-foreign-language-skills->. (accessed 15 April 2014).

⁵¹U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Service Officer Benefits,” <http://careers.state.gov/work/benefits/fso-benefits> (accessed 13 May 2014). FSOs advance through “Steps” (which impact pay) based upon a combination of education and experience, but attaining an advanced degree can result in either advancement in Steps (pay) or in “Class,” in concert with the requisite experience.

⁵²U.S. Agency for International Development, “Foreign Service,” <http://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/careers/foreign-service> (accessed 20 April 2014).

⁵³Robert D. Blackwill, “Ideal Qualities of a Successful Diplomat,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Article Online, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23506/ideal_qualities_of_a_successful_diplomat.html (accessed 20 April 2014).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This research sought to discern whether the United States Army's current leader development strategy, as outlined in the 2013 ALDS, is sufficient for the anticipated alignment of all Active Duty Army units with Geographic Combatant Commands. Using the Dagger Brigade's experience in AFRICOM, it considered whether junior military leaders now wield more than the military instrument of national power when deployed abroad at times of peace and in an information age.

Chapter 1 framed the scope and intent of the research. Chapter 2 then reviewed literature pertaining to diplomacy, the military's role within diplomacy, collective security, mission command, leadership development, and desirable diplomat attributes. Using the structured, focused comparison methodology outlined in Chapter 3, facts and analysis presented in Chapter 4 sequentially addressed questions pertaining to the novelty and the diplomatic nature of RAF deployments, the adequacy of Dagger Brigade leaders' preparation, and the perceived sufficiency of the 2013 ALDS.

The RAF proof of concept with Dagger Brigade has yielded considerable success. It continues to provide a uniquely responsive sourcing solution for the many complex security challenges on the African continent. Indeed, within four months of assuming the EARF mission, one battalion of 600 soldiers trained over 2,000 troops from about 25 different countries.¹ The perceived success of the Dagger Brigade in AFRICOM does not warrant RAF's wholesale application throughout the Army, however, without further

consideration of the challenges, opportunities, threats, and risk that arise from its execution.

The United States Army is quickly wading into diplomatic waters. While it has always served as one of the ways through which the nation can pursue politics abroad, the ongoing transition to proactive engagement marks an inflection point for the Army's fundamental peacetime role. Rather than employing conventional Army units principally to deter or, if necessary, to win the Nation's wars, Army leaders now must prepare their forces to fill Geographic Combatant Command requirements spanning the range of military operations but focused on preventing or at least stemming the tide of armed conflict.

The concept of RAF as a strategy makes tremendous sense. As leaders reconcile with preparing their forces for virtually any type of operation within dynamic situations, focusing geographically seems one logical way of scoping those responsibilities and preparation. It then makes it possible for the Army to improve its ways given the limited means available to achieve stated national or military ends. By orienting regionally, similar to Special Forces Groups, the remainder of the Army can and should become more familiar and more honed towards operating within likely or anticipated operating environments, though thus far cultural and language expertise remain underemphasized, even discounted.

While the RAF strategy could prove viable, it entails considerable risk if the true means of its proper execution do not emerge—leaders capable of persevering through uncertainty. Right now, the Active Army's RAF efforts remain somewhat confined within AFRICOM—an arguably less politically charged and strategically vital region—

and in comparatively shallow diplomatic waters. Current missions also benefit from a cohort of leaders with an unprecedented amount of deployment and combat experience. Going forward, the Army will need to build leaders' capacity to operate in uncertain times and within highly dynamic environments. The mission command philosophy affords these leaders autonomy to operate with disciplined initiative, but it also knowingly embarks junior leaders on these diplomatic missions with limited oversight. As former Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker declared over a decade ago, future warriors will need to "be proficient in core competencies, training for certainty while educating for uncertainty."² Though he was referring primarily to special operations forces at the time, the increasing cooperation between special operations and conventional forces and the onset of RAF make his assertions increasingly pertinent to the remainder of the Army.

As Anthony DiBella highlights in a 2010 *Joint Forces Quarterly* article, learning organizations need to direct resources and processes toward achieving organizational missions via strategies. Though the military issues a number of strategy documents, several of which informed this research, DiBella asserts these strategies rarely explicitly address the "set of skills, competencies, and knowledge the military needs to implement its strategies."³ The Army has more clearly delineated the attributes and competencies that it deems necessary for the contemporary operating environment, particularly since 2009 when it first published a coherent leader development strategy. The 2013 strategy further enumerates those desired qualities, including many attributes that Satow, Nicolson, Blackwill, and others consider vital for those engaged in diplomacy.

Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the current strategy pertains to its “ways” for talent management and for emphasizing the leader education. As issues become more contentious, in Africa or elsewhere, regional experience and expertise will become far more valuable, as MacArthur and Slim learned and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey’s recent call for “Asia-Pacific Hands” implies. If DOD and the Army seek to implement a preventative medicine-like approach to security, it will take specialized officers with knowledge of local security organs and an understanding of how they interact with other parts of the international body. Those in the Foreign Service that traditionally wielded diplomatic power in times of peace are recruited and validated to serve in specific positions, and they are expected to have a passion for understanding international relations. Until the ALDS creates a more definitive roadmap for how the Army will cultivate similar passion and close the education gap with its diplomatic counterparts, it runs the risk of becoming the readily available “amateur diplomatist” Satow lamented, too anxious to “achieve results” (as per the ALRM) in short order.⁴

Recommendations

Several recommendations follow from these conclusions. First, many aspects of the RAF warrant further research. This research limited its focus to one particular conceptual aspect of the new approach in light of limited data available. As the Dagger Brigade transitions its responsibilities to another brigade, more data should become available, ideally including feedback from or assessments conducted by DOS, DOD, AFRICOM, supported embassies, and the brigade itself. Areas for consideration could include the informational aspect of these deployments, any measurable difference between those with significant or more limited regional or cultural expertise, and

feedback or reflections from partner militaries and the civilian population, among others. Comparative analysis of the preparation of Army leader and that of other entities serving abroad, including the Peace Corps, might also provide valuable insights.

Second, if the Army is serious about fully implementing the RAF, then it needs to demonstrate commensurate seriousness with how it acquires, develops, and manages talent. If pursuing unit-level regional depth to compensate for operational breadth is necessary, then that depth needs to be properly cultivated. It can partly address this through accessions, specifically changing its narrative (“Join the Army, See the World”) to inspire those with global perspectives or at proclivities to choose to serve. It also should consider providing further incentives for higher education, even instituting increased requirements for mid-grade officer and enlisted leaders.

Third, retaining and applying warrior-diplomat talent would require significant changes within the Army’s personnel system. Beyond significantly expanding educational and broadening opportunities—ideally where soldiers engage with civilian counterparts from the interagency and from inter- or non-governmental organizations—the Army needs to move well beyond its current manning timelines. Leaders should apply for and know their next assignments well before they attend professional military education, and their educational experience should focus on “how to think,” not “what to think,” within geographic parameters, perhaps even pursuing understanding with officers from their aligned region within the same classroom.

Finally, the Army needs to avoid overconfidence. It does benefit from tremendously experienced junior leaders, but that experience was acquired within relatively limited confines. If the Army would not allow a FSO to assume command of an

infantry company in the midst of a firefight, then it too should tread softly as it deploys into countries where wars of words and ideas are exist are on the brink of escalation.

Fortunately, it will take several years to implement the policy Army-wide, affording the organization additional time to ensure that those soon embarked upon soldier-diplomat missions do so with adequate cognitive preparation. Perhaps at no point in recent history has the line between peace and war, and soldier and diplomat, become so obscured. Avoiding Kissinger-esque relegation and living up to Schoomaker's vision will require the Army to recall General Sir William Butler's declaration that, "The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards."⁵

¹Vandiver.

²Peter J. Schoomaker, "Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead," Statement by Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, 1 February 1998, <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=651> (accessed 20 April 2014).

³Anthony J. DiBella, "Can the Army Become a Learning Organization?" *Joint Forces Quarterly* 56 (1st Quarter 2010): 122.

⁴Ibid.

⁵William Francis Butler, *Charles George Gordon* (England, 1901), 85.

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