The Inadequacy of Definition and the Utility of a Theory of Hybrid Conflict: Is the "Hybrid Threat" New?
Abstract
The US has formally identified "hybrid threats" as the likely future threat it will face. Descriptions and definitions abound that address form and function of a hybrid threat, but do not address logic. The resulting lack of understanding leaves military professionals without a practical method of understanding hybrid organizations and warfare. A remedy to this situation is in producing a theory of hybrid warfare with universal applicability. The monograph develops and presents a theory that builds upon the existing literature of modern combat and hybrid warfare. It proposes that hybrid warfare occurs when a combatant bases its optimized force structure on the combination of available resources -- both conventional and unconventional -- in a unique cultural context to produce specific, synergistic effects against conventionally-based opponents. The monograph relies on analyses of two case studies; through which historical trends emerge that confirm seven principles and a theory of hybrid warfare. Those principles concern the presence of: specific ideology, existential threat, capability overmatch, unique context, defensive tactics, strategies of attrition and combinations of conventional, unconventional, criminal, and terrorist elements. Two case studies validate the resultant theory -- Israel-Lebanon 2006 War and the Soviet Partisan movement of 1941-1945. The monograph includes recommendations for application and research.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA611608
Entities
People
- Timothy B. Mcculloh
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College