BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM THE WORLD'S POLICE: UNDERSTANDING THE UNITED STATES ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM'S ROLE IN DEVELOPING FOREIGN POLICE

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Anticipating that the U.S. Army will continue to deploy regionally aligned forces in support of security cooperation and security force assistance missions, this research investigates how a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) should conduct foreign police development. By reviewing police theory, current U.S. Army doctrine, and the lessons learned from the police development efforts in Iraq, a foreign police development model is proposed that focuses on police centric lines of effort instead of traditional military stability lines of effort. The proposed model is tested against a hypothetical scenario, whereby a U.S. Army BCT is deployed to Kenya to support the development of the Kenyan National Police Services. Using a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis to measure the efficacy of the BCT's organic structure in conducting foreign police development, potential solutions to capability gaps are presented in the DOTMLPF framework. This thesis concludes that the U.S. Army BCT is not formally structured or supported by doctrine to conduct foreign police development however, it can achieve a desired end state with significant military and civilian police enablers and an understanding of police theory and the lessons learned from previous police reform efforts.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM - THE WORLD'S POLICE: UNDERSTANDING THE UNITED STATES ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM'S ROLE IN DEVELOPING FOREIGN POLICE, by Major Franklin D. Dennis, 106 pages.

Anticipating that the U.S. Army will continue to deploy regionally aligned forces in support of security cooperation and security force assistance missions, this research investigates how a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) should conduct foreign police development. By reviewing police theory, current U.S. Army doctrine, and the lessons learned from the police development efforts in Iraq, a foreign police development model is proposed that focuses on police centric lines of effort instead of traditional military stability lines of effort. The proposed model is tested against a hypothetical scenario, whereby a U.S. Army BCT is deployed to Kenya to support the development of the Kenyan National Police Services. Using a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis to measure the efficacy of the BCT's organic structure in conducting foreign police development, potential solutions to capability gaps are presented in the DOTMLPF framework. This thesis concludes that the U.S. Army BCT is not formally structured or supported by doctrine to conduct foreign police development however, it can achieve a desired end state with significant military and civilian police enablers and an understanding of police theory and the lessons learned from previous police reform efforts.

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ACRONYMS

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
ASPG	Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013
ATTP	Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures publication
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
BTT	Border Transition Team
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DoJ	United States Department of Justice
DoS	United States Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership (Education), Personnel, Facilities
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
FM	Field Manual
FMSweb	Force Management System website
FSF	Foreign Security Force(s)
IPS	Iraqi Police Services
JP	Joint Publication
KNPS	Kenyan National Police Services
MET	Metropolitan Police Services of London
MTT	Military Transition Team
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act

NSS	National Security Strategy 2010
NYPD	New York City Police Department
PDTT	Police Development Transition Team
PRIC	(Kenyan National) Police Reforms Implementation Committee
PRP	(Kenyan National) Police Reform Programme
PTT	Police Transition Team
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review 2014
RAF	Regionally Aligned Force
SDG	Strategic Defense Guidance 2012
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFAT	Security Force Assistance Team
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TC	Training Circular
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

As America's longest war draws to a close, the United States Army looks to posture itself to support the strategic challenges and opportunities in the years ahead (Department of Defense 2014). In order to support these strategic challenges, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review released a strategy that consisted of three pillars: Protect the Homeland, Build Security Globally, and Project Power and Win Decisively. "Build Security Globally" is described in the QDR as:

> Continuing a strong U.S. commitment to shaping world events is essential to deter and prevent conflict and to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to our shared security. This global engagement is fundamental to U.S. leadership and influence. (Department of Defense 2014, 12)

The 2014 QDR acknowledges the 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance, which states, "Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership" (Department of Defense 2012, 3). The 2010 National Security Strategy states that a key component to the security of the United States is helping our allies and partners "build capacity to fulfill their responsibilities to contribute to regional and global security" (The White House 2010, 22).

To achieve these goals, as well as the other national security objectives, the U.S. Army will meet the needs of the geographic combatant commanders by being a "Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army" (Department of the Army 2013c, 5-6). This strategy is further described as the Army's ability to shape and set theaters for regional commanders who employ Total Army characteristics and capabilities to influence the security environment, build trust, develop relationships and gain access through rotational

forces, multilateral exercises, mil-to-mil engagements, coalition training and other opportunities (Department of the Army 2013c, 5-6). The success of the National Security Strategy, supported by foreign assistance and security cooperation missions, typically encourages a whole-of-government approach using all U.S. Government instruments of national power (White 2014). Critical to the success of security cooperation is the United States Army's Regionally Aligned Force Strategy defined by the 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance as,

> Army units assigned and allocated to combatant commands, as well as units the Army retains control of but identifies to the combatant commands for planning of regional missions. (Department of the Army 2013c, 5)

The Army's ability to fight and win the nation's wars with a decreasing force structure against increasing geographic areas of responsibility presents a dichotomy that the regional alignment strategy attempts to address. Regionally Aligned Forces are tailorable to meet the specific needs of the Combatant Commander and are not limited to the BCT, but may include the full capabilities of the U.S. Army conducting a range of military operations (Department of the Army 2013a). Critical to the success of the regionally aligned force strategy are the capabilities of U.S. partnered nations' security forces (Department of the Army 2013a). Increasing the capacity and capabilities of partnered nations allows the United States to allocate a decreasing force by leveraging the internal security forces of other countries to maintain regional stability. This partnership is conducted, in part, through security force assistance missions.

Security force assistance is a component of a larger security cooperation program (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013). The legal authority for the Department of State to conduct foreign assistance is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Department of the

Army 2013a). Unlike security cooperation, which takes into account a whole-of-government approach, security assistance refers to a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and are funded and authorized by the State Department to be administered by the Department of Defense through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (White 2014). All training and equipping of Foreign Security Forces must be specifically authorized (Department of the Army 2013a). In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President must provide specific authority to the Department of Defense for its role in training and equipping FSF in the form of a directive (Department of the Army 2013a). Absent such a directive, the Department of Defense lacks authority to take the lead in assisting a host nation to train and equip its security forces (Department of the Army 2013a). According to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 1206, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to train and equip foreign military forces for the specific purposes of counter-terrorism and stability operations (Department of the Army 2013a).

The term, *Stability Operations*, addresses a wide range of civil-military missions in a fragile or conflict affected state that range from traditional peacekeeping to combat with well-armed insurgents or criminal elements (Department of the Army 2012b). During the critical and fragile space that exists in pre-hostilities, post-conflict resolution, and the transition to host nation primacy, effective civilian policing is a key component in ensuring public confidence in the stabilization process (Department of the Army 2012b). Additionally the public confidence in the civilian police ensures that large scale military forces do not have to continue to be employed (Wither 2014). As the United States Army positions itself post-Afghanistan in support of the strategies outlined in the 2014 QDR,

developing the capacity of the civilian police of partnered nations could be a critical step to ensuring regional stability.

In failed or collapsing states, military forces are often essential to creating the initial security conditions that allow the civilian components of a stability operation to build a durable peace (Wither 2014). Although civilian police forces have proven to be the critical component to security, the military's principle focus seems to continue to be fighting and winning the nation's wars and not police development or civilian policing. Although a regionally aligned BCT could be deployed to conduct the full spectrum of Stability Operations, foreign civilian police development remains principally a task for the civilian police (Department of the Army 2013a). The United States Army Infantry mission statement is likely to remain, "to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault with fire, close combat, and counterattack" (Department of the Army 2007). Retired U.S. Army Colonel and Army War College professor Dennis E. Keller offers up two points on the U.S. military's inevitable involvement in foreign police development stating:

> The U.S. Government continues to lack the capacity for timely deployment of civilian police trainers in the early phase of stability operations [because] the small but reasonably coherent and well-organized police training and assistance programs conducted by U.S. Agency for International Aid's OPS were ended with congressional passage of Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974.

Keller adds that,

> Employing military personnel to train and advise civilian police is a bad idea, but leaving local populations with no police or subject to incompetent, corrupt, and abusive police is a far worse idea (Keller 2010, VIII).

Problem Statement

As a part of the security force assistance mission, foreign police development is typically conducted by civilian police advisors, and in the case of the United States, is led by the Department of State (Department of the Army 2013a). Although conducting stability operations is a specified, mission-essential task for a Brigade Combat Team (BCT), conducting foreign police development is neither a specified mission-essential task nor listed as a supporting task (Hodge 2014). The U.S. Government's current lack of a civilian capability to respond to a large scale, foreign police development effort, along with the language found within the National Security Policy and strategy documents, means that a BCT could potentially find itself deploying in support of the development of foreign civilian police forces. This thesis investigates the U.S. Army BCT's role in the development of foreign police in anticipation that foreign police development of will continue to be a component of security force assistance, and the U.S. Army will continue to deploy in support of security cooperation missions.

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

The primary research question addressed in this thesis is: How should a U.S. Army BCT conduct foreign police development? In order to answer this question, four supplemental questions are designed to understand the BCT's ability to conduct foreign police development and to develop a research framework. The four questions are:

1. What are the fundamental principles of policing that must be considered when conducting foreign police development?
2. What is the current U.S. Army's doctrine with regard to police development?

3. How is the BCT currently structured in order to conduct foreign police development?
4. What are the key lessons learned from the U.S. Army's efforts in developing the Iraqi Police forces?

Constraints

Although this research addresses police development efforts by the State Department, Justice Department, and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations, it focuses primarily on the U.S. Army's capabilities. It does not include detailed information on the Department of State or the Department of Justice's police development efforts. This constraint is intended to allow greater focus on the U.S. Army's doctrine and capabilities with regard to foreign police development. Additionally, the research focuses primarily on civilian police development, not on the paramilitary, military police, or military security forces within a host-nation. Although data potentially exists in the classified domain, this research remains unclassified and consists of only open source documents and materials.

Definition of Terms

Brigade Combat Team (BCT): The BCT is a modular organization that provides the division, land component commander, or joint task force commander with close combat capabilities. Armored, Infantry and Stryker, Brigade Combat Teams are the basic BCT structures and the smallest combined arms units that can be committed independently (Department of the Army 2010). Although the U.S. Army currently has three specific types of BCTs–Armored, Stryker and Infantry–in this thesis, the term BCT

refers only to the organizational structure and capabilities of the standard Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). The primary difference between these fighting formations is their fighting vehicles, which was not a consideration taken into account for the development of foreign police forces throughout this thesis. Additionally, the term BCT used in this thesis refers only to the organic force structure and capabilities of the IBCT as defined in Department of Defense online database, FMSweb. FMSweb is the U.S. Army's online Force Management website database that contains the organizational structures of every unit within the U.S. Army. Although the organizational structure of BCTs throughout the Army varies slightly, the force structure of the IBCT as defined by FMSweb is the only force structure utilized throughout this thesis, and does not include additional personnel that augment the organic Brigade organizational structure.

Building Partner Capacity: The outcome of comprehensive inter-organizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, rule of law, essential services, governance, economic development, and other critical government functions (Department of the Army 2012a, 4).

Capacity Building: (1) the creation of an enabling environment with appropriate policy and legal frameworks; (2) institutional development, including community participation (of women in particular); and (3) human resources development and strengthening of managerial systems (UN Economic and Social Council 2006).

Capacity Development: Capacity development is the process by which individuals, organizations, institutions, and societies develop abilities to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives (UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration 2006).

Counter Insurgency: the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency (Department of the Army 2006, 1-1).

DOTMLPF Framework: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities. As described in the CJCSI, DOTMLPF is a recommendation for changes to existing joint resources, when such changes are not associated with a new defense acquisition program (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012).

Foreign Security Forces: All organizations and personnel under host nation (HN) control that have a mission of protecting the HN's sovereignty from internal as well as external threats (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013, VII).

Fragile State: A country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. Fragile state refers to the broad spectrum of failed, failing, and recovering states (Department of the Army 2012b).

Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT): The IBCT is the Army's lightest BCT and is organized around dismounted Infantry, capable of airborne or air assault operations. Each of the three types of IBCT (light infantry, air assault, or airborne) has the same basic organization of two combined arms maneuver battalions and one reconnaissance squadron. Organic antitank, military intelligence, artillery, signal, engineer, reconnaissance, and sustainment elements enable the IBCT commander to employ the force in combined arms formations (Department of the Army 2010, 1-10).

Law Enforcement: The generic name for the activities or system of activities by which members of society or designated agencies are responsible for maintaining public order and enforcing the established laws of that society, particularly the activities of

prevention, detection, and investigation of crime and the apprehension of criminals (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2014a).

Operational Environment (OE): is a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011, XV).

Organic: As used in this thesis, the term "organic" refers to the internal organizational structure and capabilities of a U.S. Army unit as defined by FMSweb.

Police Transition Team (PTT): Defined by the U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), police transition teams are service members, normally military or security police, which are tasked with training police officials in general police tactics and techniques, and assisting the police with community policing, cordon and search, weapons cache searches, weapons training, and humanitarian missions. They also conduct other missions such as supporting the investigative and exploitation task forces, assisting police officials with investigations of improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne IEDs, explosions, murders, and assassinations. As used in this thesis, the general term Police Development Transition Team (PDTT) refers to a team comprised of U.S. military and Department of State civilian police advisors that are specifically organized and missioned to assist in the development of host nation police forces (from the U.S. Army CALL website 2014).

Regionally Aligned Forces: Regionally Aligned Forces are the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army's vision for providing combatant commanders with versatile, responsive, and consistently available Army forces. Regionally Aligned Forces will meet combatant commanders' requirements for units and capabilities to support

operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities (Department of the Army 2013a). Additionally, Regionally Aligned Forces are not limited to a specific type of organization, and may include the full capabilities found within the U.S. Army from individual Soldiers to a BCT, in order to address the specific requests of the geographic combatant commander (Department of the Army 2013a).

Rule of Law: A principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and are consistent with international human rights law (U.S. Department of State Security Sector Reform 2014).

Security Assistance Programs: A group of programs, authorized under Title 22 authorities, by which the United States provides defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. All Security Assistance programs are subject to the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State to best serve U.S. foreign policy interests; however, DoD or Department of State (DoS) both administer the programs. Those Security Assistance programs that are administered by DoD are a subset of Security Cooperation (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2014).

Security Cooperation: Activities undertaken by DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives. SFA is a subset of SC activities that develop and sustain HN FSF capabilities (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013, VII).

Security Force Assistance (SFA): The set of Department of Defense (DoD) activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and supporting institutions (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013, VII).

Security Sector Reform: The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (Department of the Army 2008b, 6-77).

Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) Framework: Although originally developed as a business strategy tool, the SWOT analysis is an effective model in understanding an organization's current performance, measured through strengths and weaknesses, as well as its future, measured through opportunities and threats (Humphrey 2005).

Assumptions

In order to frame and focus the research required for this thesis the following critical assumptions are made that:

1. There will not be a dynamic shift or significant change in the U.S. Army's current support to regional alignment strategy, security assistance, and security cooperation. This critical assumption is necessary as it frames the U.S. Army's support to the previously stated policy direction and guidance as it relates to a potential foreign police development mission.
2. The U.S. Army will be required to conduct foreign police development efforts similarly to previous efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of security

cooperation. This assumption is necessary as it establishes the theoretical precedent by which the thesis is examined.

3. Security cooperation and capacity building will continue to be a significant aspect of the regional alignment strategy efforts. This assumption is important as it reinforces the requirement to understand the U.S. Army's role in supporting the direction and guidance found within the national policy documents.
4. There will not be considerable changes to the Kenyan National Police Services (KNPS), introduced in chapter 4 as the hypothetical police force used in the proposed police model. This assumption is critical because it is the current KNPS assessment found within the Police Reform Programme (PRP) of 2011 that is used to test the proposed police model.
5. There will not be a considerable change in the current force structure of the IBCT. This assumption is critical because the current force structure of the IBCT is being assessed throughout the thesis and any significant change would be outside the scope of the research undertaken to support the thesis.

Significance

As the U.S. Army postures to adopt a Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) strategy, it is critical that there is a basic understanding of the range of military operations to which a RAF BCT could potentially respond. Additionally, it is essential for the leadership and staff of a BCT to understand the basic definitions and expectations of conducting a foreign police development mission. This thesis is significant to not only the military professional, but to the civilian governmental and non-governmental organizations that

support the Department of Defense while conducting stability operations, as it frames the expected capabilities of the U.S. Army BCT's ability to conduct foreign police development. Lastly, it is important to investigate the BCT's capabilities in order to frame an understanding for the Combatant Commander that will potentially employ this fighting force as a part of a greater security cooperation or regional alignment strategy.

Summary

This chapter provides an introduction and background to the problem statement, and addresses areas critical to understanding the thesis. In order to achieve the goals described in the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States must leverage the capabilities of partnered nations. Through developing the capacity and capability of a partnered nation's internal security forces, the United States is able to apply a decreasing defense force to a larger global area. The internal security and stability of key strategic partners is critical not only to U.S. national interests, but also to regional and global security and is fundamental to the Regionally Aligned Forces strategy.

Conducting stability operations is a specified task for the BCT. Although foreign police development is not a specified mission-essential task for a BCT, support to foreign civilian law enforcement and security reform are critical tasks within stability operations. Successfully conducting support to civilian law enforcement and security reform is critical in the transition from military to host-nation primacy during stability operations, as this transition demonstrates to the local populace that a functioning government exists. In a collapsing state situation, a regionally aligned BCT can regain control and security through direct military intervention, creating that critical time and space for civilian

police to regain primacy. Building host-nation capacity is fundamental to the success of stability operations (Department of the Army 2012b), and understanding how a BCT should conduct police development is essential in accomplishing this task.

In order to understand how a BCT should develop the capabilities and capacity of a foreign police force, there must be a basic understanding of policing as well as an understanding of the organic force structure, capabilities, and doctrine of the BCT. Additionally, investigating the United States government's development of the Iraqi Police Services can provide a useful reference for previous police reform efforts. The focus of the literature review found in the next chapter is to answer the primary research question: How should a BCT develop a foreign civilian police force?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

> The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.
>
> —Sir Robert Peel, 1829

In order to understand how a BCT should assist in the development of a foreign police force, there must first be a basic understanding of universal policing principles and the various types of police forces. It is critical that the BCT's leadership and staff recognize the fundamental differences between stability, security, and policing, and understand the type of police they will develop. Next, there must be an analysis of U.S. Army doctrine as it pertains specifically to the development of foreign police forces. This analysis includes a review of the U.S. Army BCT's organizational structure. An analysis of the United States government's development of the Iraqi Police Services provides an example of a recent police development effort and highlights the critical lessons learned.

Fundamentals of Policing

Fundamental concepts of policing predate written history, and are extensive and vast considering the amount of material that currently exists on the subject. In an attempt to distill this, it is important that the leadership and staff of the BCT understand the distinction between security and policing. Unlike the term security, which is defined as "a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 324), the term policing describes a relationship that exists between a policing force, the people that it protects, and the laws that the people agree to adhere (Wakefield and Fleming,

2009). Security is a product of policing, and "its antonym, *insecurity*, drives policing, crime-control, anti-terrorism, and corporate security production" (Wakefield and Fleming 2009, 284). The distinguishing feature of policing is "the exercise of authority, in the name of the state, over the civil population" (Wakefield and Fleming 2009, 233). At the most general level, policing may be described as "practices aimed at the regulation and control of a society and its members, especially with respect to matters of health, order, law, and safety" (Gregory 2009, 544).

There is also a distinction between general security and formal policing. General security is often described as *social cohesion*, and represents the informal means to deal with disruptive behavior as enforced by the elders of a family or tribe (Villiers 2009). Conversely, formal policing is defined by the desire or need for a sovereign power to maintain control over a larger community that is no longer contained by the social cohesive bonds of the family or tribe (Villiers 2009).

Furthermore, the term police and policing have different meanings in that the actual police may not be the agency that is conducting the policing. Several agencies and personnel can perform security duties, but are not necessarily the recognized police force. The act of policing is done "by many agencies, only one of which, usually the publicly supported and paid police, is what is normally referred to as *the police*" (Haberfeld 2009, 9). In some cases, the accepted security force may in fact be an unofficial group that opposes the recognized uniformed police force. This distinction is important as "the uniformed police represent the sovereign power that they are protecting" (Villiers 2009, 15), and may in fact represent a corrupt government. Maintaining peace and public order can be conducted by security forces, but the goal of the uniformed police is to "prevent

crime, maintain order and deliver a variety of services that the communities have come to expect" (Wakefield and Fleming 2009, 234).

Another important concept that the BCT leadership and staff must understand is the distinction between stability policing and community policing. Community policing is a policing approach that uses a partnership between the police and the community they serve to most effectively address crime (U.S. Agency for International Aid 2005). The police adapt strategies for combating crime by consulting and cooperating with the communities they protect, and mobilizing the public to work with the police to prevent crime (U.S. Agency for International Aid 2005). Ultimately, the concept of community policing strives for "a mutual problem-solving methodology as the fundamental strategy of policing" (U.S. Agency for International Aid 2005, V).

There is a distinction between stability police and community police (Keller, 2010). Author Dennis Keller offers a comparison between the two types of police in the following table taken from, "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capability Gap."

Table 1. Characteristics of Stability Policing and Community Policing

Stability Policing:	Community-Based Policing:
•Paramilitary police force to deal with high end threats	• Partnership between police and local community
Capable of:	Capable of:
• Complex investigations of criminal and terrorist groups	• Police consultation with community
• Special weapons and tactics to arrest heavily armed criminals or terrorists	• Adaptation of police tactics to requirements of community
• Crowd and riot control of major civil disturbances	• Mobilization of community to help prevent crime
• Intelligence collection on high-end threats	• Adoption of mutual problem solving methodology

Source: Dennis E. Keller, "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to fill the U.S. Capability Gap" (Pksoi Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, August 2010), http://www.strategicstudies institute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1013.pdf (accessed 7 April 2014), 27. This table describes the differences between Stability Policing and Community Based Policing, whereby Stability Police are paramilitary and security focused and Community Police are focused on the relationship with the population.

It is the transition from the stability police force to the local community-based police force that allows for the sustainability of the security sector in stability operations (Keller 2010). Although the military is typically better suited to support stability policing operations, it is not inherently suited to support community policing (Keller 2010).

A critical component of community policing that the BCT leadership and staff should understand is the concept of policing by consent. Although consent-based policing, "by its nature, is oxymoronic in that policing is an inherently conflict ridden, potentially coercive mode of governance," legitimizing the police is the critical step in transitioning from security to civilian police primacy (Wakefield and Fleming 2009, 52).

Policing by its nature is coercive, and the legitimacy of the police will always be in conflict with the people. Because of this dichotomy, the public's perception of what the police are doing is more powerful than what they are actually doing (Wakefield and Fleming 2009). "Policing by consent, when the police enjoy a very high degree of legitimacy, is thus an ideal to aspire to" (Wakefield and Fleming 2009, 53). Controlling the population through coercive security measures alone may establish security, but it will not fit the definition of policing, as involuntary control violates the fundamental trust between the people, the laws they accept, and the police (Gehrand 2000). The public's acceptance of the laws of the state gives the police actual *authority* as "no police department can control crime and disorder without the consent and voluntary compliance by the public" (Gehrand 2000, 111). This relationship between the police and the people is the essence of democratic policing.

Democratic Policing

The modern concept of policing by consent emerged as a result of the Metropolitan Reform Act of 1829 (Alderson 1998). As the founder of the Metropolitan Police Force (MET) of Great Britain, Sir Robert Peel established nine principles of policing that are commonly accepted as the foundation for modern democratic police services (Gaunt 2010). Peel's principles of policing have characterized many advanced democratic police systems since that time, and ultimately formed the foundation for the Metropolitan Police Services of England and Wales (Alderson 1998). Sir Robert Peel's nine principles of policing are:

1. The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder.
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon the public approval of police actions.
3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observation of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.
4. The degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.
5. Police seek and preserve public favor, not by catering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.
6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice, and warning is found to be insufficient.
7. Police should maintain a relationship at all times with the public to give reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public, and the public are the police; the police are merely members of the public, who are paid to give full-time attention to duties that are incumbent upon all citizens in the interest of community welfare and existence.
8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions, and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it (Alderson 1998, 38).

The Peelian Principles are an example of the timelessness of police principles for a liberal, democratic, and civilized society, and are seen throughout police theory as the foundation for modern policing (Alderson 1998). These principles form a fundamental system of values that are essentially a contract of trust with the civilian establishment that the police are sworn to protect. This contract between the police and the public is the essence of community policing, as it the public who ultimately determines the effectiveness of the police (Alderson 1998).

One of the most prolific and internationally renowned authorities on criminal justice and policing, author David Bayley, describes four "norms" in his seminal study for the U.S. Department of Justice, "Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It." Bayley's "norms," which are widely accepted and cited as critical to democratic police reform, are as follows,

1. Police must give top operational priority to servicing the needs of individual citizens and private groups, as the most dramatic contribution police can make to democracy is to become responsive to the needs of individual citizens.

2. Police must be accountable to the law rather than to the government in that police actions in a democracy must therefore be governed by the rule of law rather than by directions given arbitrarily by particular regimes and their members.

3. Police must protect human rights, especially those that are required for the sort of unfettered political activity that is the hallmark of democracy. These activities are freedom of speech, association, and movement; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile; and impartiality in the administration of law.

4. Police should be transparent in their activities, and police activity must be open to observation and regularly reported to outsiders. (Bayley 2001, 13-14).

Similarities to the language found in Bayley's study and Peel's principles are found throughout most modern civilian police organizations. For example, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) mission statement is:

> To enhance the quality of life in our city by working in partnership with the community and in accordance with constitutional rights to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide for a safe environment. (New York Police Department 2014)

Furthermore, the NYPD continues to describe its core values and pledges "in partnership with the community" to protect citizens, prevent crime, maintain higher standards through integrity, and value human life through dignity and respect for each individual (New York Police Department 2014).

Like the NYPD, London's Metropolitan Police Force describes accomplishing its mission by striving to "treat everyone fairly; be open and honest; work in partnership; and change to improve." (Metropolitan Police Services 2014). Additionally the Metropolitan Police Service mission statement seeks to achieve the elements found within the language of Peel's principles stating that their goals are:

> Making London safe for all the people we serve. We will make places safer, cut crime and the fear of crime, and uphold the law. Our vision is to make London the safest major city in the world. (Metropolitan Police Services 2014)

Describing their relationship with the public in terms of respect, fairness, impartiality, and transparency, the NYPD and the MET recognize that their mission to prevent crime, uphold the law, and maintain public order is fundamentally based on the concepts of community policing. This language, which is similar to Bayley's "norms"

and Peel's principles, is echoed in most modern and democratic police organizations throughout the world.

Police Organizational Models

Equally critical for the leadership and staff of the BCT is a basic understanding of the various types of police force organizations. Although the principles of democratic policing are generally universal, the organizational model of policing varies significantly from country to country and depends on a variety of social, political, cultural, and historical factors. According to the Encyclopedia for Police Sciences, modern police forces are categorized into three basic organizational models: centralized, coordinated, and fragmented (Bailey 1995).

Centralized police, or national police, are found in both democratic and nondemocratic nations. The concept traces its roots to Roman police administration, whereby the central government created an organization to maintain public order and welfare. This type of policing is typically administered centrally, supervised, and coordinated by the central government through a minister of interior. Additionally, countries with a centralized police force may have a paramilitary force that conducts national security tasks, typically within the manner described by Keller's definition of stability policing previously discussed (Keller 2010). This paramilitary organization may or may not be organized under the ministry of interior or department of defense. One of the best known examples of a centralized police force is the French National Police and Gendarmerie, both of which are organized and administered by the national government of France, which conduct both traditional police functions and military security (Bailey 1995).

The second police organizational model is the coordinated system. Coordinated police forces are characterized by a shared or cooperative effort between the central government and various local communities to provide police services. The most notable example of this model is the police services of England and Wales. The principle elements in the coordinated system are a national level political directorate (Home Office), where the authority for each police force specifically originates (city council, local government), and the police chief executive of each force (Chief Constable or Chief of Police). An example of the coordinated police system within England and Wales is the relationship between the City of London Police, whose authority comes from the City Council of London, and the London Metropolitan Police, whose police authority comes directly from the Home Office. Typically, coordinated police forces share budgets and funds that directly contribute to the relationship between national and local authorities. In countries with a coordinated police force, there is usually a clear distinction between the police and military defense forces (Bailey 1995).

The third model of police organization is the fragmented system. It is exemplified by local communities asserting their own individual, legal rights to home rule, or the political belief that local governments should have the authority and responsibility to provide certain governmental and social services to the community that they serve. This system is found in only a few countries, most notably of which is the United States. The fragmented police system is typically tied to the history of the country, as is the case with the United States, where the distinction between central (Federal) and local (States) jurisdiction and authority is clearly separated by the U.S. constitution. In this system, it is important to note that this fragmentation is further categorized into Federal, State,

County, or Municipal jurisdictions, all of which are independently funded with their own organizational rules and procedures. Additionally, in the United States' fragmented system, the Posse Comitatus relationship between the Federal government and State governments prevents the Federal government from using the military to execute civilian police duties unless approved by Congress in extremis and typically only for short duration stability purposes like maintaining public order (Bailey 1995).

Within each system of policing, there exist several specialized policing units, organizations, and personnel. These specialized units are usually separated from regular patrol officers, "beat cops," or public order police by additional funding, education, training, expertise, and authority. Additionally, specialized policing units are typically found within internal departments of the larger police force by focusing on criminal investigations, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, homicide, forensics, and internal affairs (Andrade 1985).

In some countries, an internal security police force may exist. This internal security police force is often considered "secret police" or a political police organization that is typically found within oppressive regimes. This may or may not be the case for all internal police forces, some of which serve more as intelligence agencies whose jurisdictional authority comes from recognized laws (Andrade 1985). It is important to note that in most cases, these secret police are typically political in nature and are normally viewed negatively by the public.

It is critical that the BCT leadership and staff understand the type of police force that they are in partnership with, especially as it relates to the cultural, historical, and social relationship with the people. Typically, these factors lead to determining the type

of police force that currently exists and could potentially be the origin of the issues at hand. By understanding the rationale behind the current type of police force organizational structure, educated changes can be made rather than simply defaulting or reinforcing the status quo.

U.S. Army Foreign Police Development Doctrine

As result of the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army underwent a significant doctrinal transformation concerning the development, mentoring, and advising of the security forces of other nations. Most notably, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency (COIN) manual, Department of the Army, was revised and released in December of 2006 to address the expanding role of the U.S. Army in countering the growing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite doctrinal changes and the importance placed on police training and reform as evidenced through the efforts in developing the Iraqi and Afghan police services, police development remains one of the most neglected tasks for the U.S. Army (Keller 2010).

U.S. Army doctrine specifically addresses the critical requirement for developing host-nation security forces during a counterinsurgency, stating, "The primary frontline COIN force is often the police–not the military," and "supporting the police is essential" (Department of the Army 2006, 155). Given the critical nature of police development, U.S. Army doctrine is surprisingly scant, and states throughout several publications that civilian police are the suggested primary providers of police-specific training. The section specifically addressing host-nation police within the counterinsurgency manual is relatively brief, and represents less than two pages of the entire 282-page manual (Department of the Army 2006). Of particular note for the BCT staff and leadership,

Chapter 6 of Department of the Army provides a table that outlines the basic staff functions required to train host nation security forces (table 2).

Table 2. Staff Functions Required When Training Host-Nation Security Forces

- **Financial manager** for managing the significant monetary resources required for training, equipping, and building security forces. A separate internal auditor may be required as a check to ensure host-nation resources are safeguarded and effectively managed.
- **Staff judge advocate** with specific specialties and a robust capability for contract law, military justice, and the law of land warfare.
- **Construction engineer** management to oversee and manage the construction of security forces infrastructure, such as the following:
  - Bases, ranges, and training areas.
  - Depots and logistic facilities.
  - Police stations.
- **Political-military advisors** to ensure development of security forces is integrated with development of civilian ministries and capabilities.
- **Public affairs**, with a focused capability to build the populace's confidence in the host-nation security forces and to develop the host-nation forces' public affairs capability.
- **Force protection and focused intelligence staff** to address the challenge of and threats to the relatively small teams that may be embedded with host-nation security forces and not co-located with U.S. or multinational forces.
- **Materiel management** until such a capability is developed in the host-nation forces. The equipping and supplying of new security forces is critical to their development and employment. It may not be able to wait until the host-nation develops that capability.
- **Health affairs**, since most developing countries have poor health care systems. Host-nation personnel are more likely to stay in new units and fight when they believe that they will be properly treated if wounded. Additionally, disease is a significant threat that must be addressed with preventive medicine and robust care.
- **Security assistance** (IMET) to manage the external training efforts and foreign military sales, and to employ well-developed procedures for purchasing weapons, equipment, goods, and services. In counterinsurgencies, these functions are probably performed by higher headquarters staff elements rather than a stand-alone office (such as an office of military cooperation). U.S. security assistance programs normally try to sell U.S.-manufactured equipment. The organization responsible for equipping host-nation forces should not be constrained to purchase U.S. equipment. It requires the flexibility to procure equipment where time, cost, and quality are appropriate for host-nation needs.
- **Civilian law enforcement**. Staff officers with a civilian law enforcement background or actual civilian law enforcement personnel can play a vitally important role in advising the commander. Traditionally officers from the Reserve Components have done this.

Source: U.S Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 2006) 6-5. This figure is taken from the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual and depicts the staff positions that the U.S. Army suggests in order to train host-nation security forces. Of note, the field manual suggests that the staff be comprised of officers with a civilian law enforcement background or actual civilian law enforcement personnel.

Although Department of the Army provides direction for developing foreign police forces within a COIN environment, it is minimal. In order for the leadership and staff of the BCT to gain a deeper understanding of U.S. Army police development, additional publications must be reviewed. A list of additional U.S. Army doctrinal publications reviewed for police development specific guidance is provided in table 3.

Table 3. U.S. Army Doctrinal Publications Reviewed

Publication	Title	Date
FM 3-07	Stability Operations	Oct-08
FM 3-07.1	Security Force Assistance	May-09
FM 3-07.10	Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces	Sep-09
FM 3-07.31	Peace Operations Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations (with Change 1)	Oct-03
FM 3-19.4	Military Police Leaders' Handbook (including change 1)	Mar-02
FM 3-21.10	The Infantry Rifle Company	Jul-06
FM 3-21.20	The Infantry Battalion	Dec-06
FM 3-22	Army Support to Security Cooperation	Jan-13
FM 3-24	Counterinsurgency	Dec-06
FM 3-24.2	Tactics in Counterinsurgency	Apr-09
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	Aug-13
TC 7-98-1	Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package	Jun-97
ATTP 3-39.10	Law and Order Operations	Jun-11

Source: Created by author. This table depicts the U.S. Army doctrinal publications reviewed with specific regard to the development of foreign and host-nation police forces capability and capacity. Although not exhaustive, this list represents doctrine reviewed that contained information specifically addressing host-nation police development.

With specific regard to police development, like the counterinsurgency field manual, there is surprising little depth found within the other U.S. Army doctrinal publications reviewed. There is, however, considerable mention to its importance in stability operations. Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, reinforces the importance of civilian police development required by the military supporting law enforcement and police reform, stating that "integral to establishing civil control is the support military forces provide to law enforcement and policing operations" (Department of the Army

2008b, 3-6). Given the significance placed on police development by U.S. Army doctrine, it surprisingly states that "the preferred providers of civilian law enforcement services are civilian police, augmented as required by military and paramilitary police units with stability policing capabilities" (Department of the Army 2008b, 3-7). These statements are particularly powerful within doctrine as they imply that the BCT should not be principally involved in law enforcement operations, and draws a distinction between civilian community policing skills and stability policing capabilities. Additionally, U.S. Army doctrine states that military forces may be required to perform these services on an "interim basis until the situation permits the transition of this function to civilian agencies or organizations" (Department of the Army 2008b, 3-7). Again, the language found within U.S. Army doctrine describes conditions for the BCT leadership and staff that although they may be required to assist civilian police, the function should only be seen as interim, and the primary responsibility rest with civilian police advisors. This position held within U.S. Army doctrine is a direct contradiction to the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the lead agency for police development was (and is currently) a military headquarters.

The *Security Force Assistance* field manual acknowledges the requirement and potential for a BCT to assist foreign civilian police development and provides additional depth and guidance on how to conduct these types of operations (Department of the Army 2009a). Although the publication reinforces the position that the development of host-nation police forces is the role of civilian police and not the U.S. Army, it provides the BCT leadership and staff examples of additional staff augmentation that is required

during each phase of a foreign security force (FSF) development mission as well as a sample troop-to-task organization (figure 1).



Figure 1. Sample Troop-to-Task for a Battalion Conducting Security Force Assistance

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1 May 2009) 4-11. This figure depicts a sample troop-to-task model for a U.S. Army BCT subordinate battalion conducting security force assistance. Within the troop-to-task, the battalion retains the capability to conduct independent full spectrum operations while simultaneously supporting Military Transition Teams (MTT), Border Transition Teams (BTT), and Police Transition Teams (PTT) with special staff enablers and civilian advisors.

Further contradictions are found within U.S. Army doctrine regarding expectations, and the emphasis placed on conducting foreign police development. The Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package, which is a training circular published by the U.S. Army Infantry School, specifically states that "Infantry Brigades do not play a large role in security assistance; therefore, no further information on this activity is included (Department of the Army 1997, 2-88)." Interestingly, the training support package draws a distinction between peace enforcement operations and peacekeeping operations by describing peace enforcement "through the presence of armed conflict, and not peace," and further states, "Conflict, violence, disorder, and even chaos describe the environment surrounding peace enforcement operations (Department of the Army 1997, 2-125)." This distinction is important in that it reinforces the difference between stability policing and community policing. Although the training circular (TC) has a section on Military Police support to law and order, it provides no performance measures and simply states that Military Police are responsible for a wide variety of tasks (Department of the Army 1997). It is important to acknowledge that although the training support package was last published in 1997, BCTs have been involved in security assistance missions since the attacks of September 11, 2001. The publication date however, highlights the need for updated doctrine and the reluctance found within current doctrine for conducting foreign police development missions.

Although written primarily as a manual for Military Police, the *Law and Order Operations* manual (Department of the Army 2011) presents the BCT leadership and staff with the most comprehensive U.S. Army doctrinal approach to developing foreign police. Chapter 7, *Building Host Nation Police Capacity and Capability* provides the BCT

leadership and staff with basic considerations for conducting host nation police development. Like previously discussed doctrinal sources, this manual acknowledges the lead role for police assistance is typically delegated to the U.S. State Department through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, as well as the requirement for interagency and NGO support to develop the host-nation police forces (Department of the Army 2011). Like the other doctrinal publications reviewed, the *Law and Order Operations* manual provides little direction on how to accomplish a police development mission in an immature, hostile, or non-permissive environment, where civilian assistance may not be possible due to security reasons. The focus of the doctrine is primarily on the reconstitution of host-nation police forces after major combat operations, and provides the only U.S. Army doctrinal assessment for basic police organizational considerations.

The basic considerations for building host-nation police capacity and capabilities found within the *Law and Order Operations* manual place emphasis on the critical requirement for establishing rule of law in order to build a functioning host-nation criminal justice system (Department of the Army 2011). As previously discussed through the review of police theory, there must be a functioning justice system for the police to enforce rule of law (Department of the Army 2011). Reinforcing Keller's distinction between stability police and community police, the need for a clear delineation from civil police authority and the role of the military in achieving stability is expressed in the publication by delineating security tasks, such as checkpoints, and policing tasks, such as criminal investigations (Department of the Army 2011). The manual also echoes other U.S. Army doctrinal publications by recommending that the advisory staff contain trained

military or civilian law enforcement personnel "with appropriate background and experience to make informed assessments" (Department of the Army 2011, 7-1, 7-6).

The *Law and Order Operations* manual includes a sample training strategy for developing host-nation police forces that focuses primarily on increasing capacity but does not provide much depth in capability development (Department of the Army 2011). The section addressing police training highlights the importance of "police management training at all levels to reinforce and support what is being trained at the police station and basic officer levels" (Department of the Army 2011, 7-14). The section of the Law and Order Operations manual addressing host-nation police development concludes by highlighting the importance of training the key supporting staff functions of the host-nation police force such as Human Resource Management, Supply and Logistics, Automation and Communications, and Police Administration. Like the Security Force Assistance manual, the Law and Order Operations manual states that these critical staff positions do not have to be law enforcement personnel or require any specific police training (Department of the Army 2011). Additionally, the manual acknowledges the requirement for civilian police advisors to augment the advisory staff, describing them as being "comprised of veteran police officers from across the United States who come with a wide range of experience and education" and "when combined with military police operating in the field, form a strong training force." (Department of the Army 2011, 7-18). This expertise is key, as it is not only repeated throughout doctrine, it is described as a critical requirement for developing host-nation police.

There is a considerable amount of additional information on the foreign police development efforts of the U.S. Department of State, Justice, and several other civilian

organizations. This section of the literature review focused primarily on the U.S. Army's doctrine concerning police development in order to establish the doctrinal expectations of the BCT. With this doctrinal foundation, the next section explores the organizational structure of the BCT in order to determine if it supports the doctrine and theory previously reviewed.

BCT Organizational Structure

The BCT is the basic deployable unit of maneuver for the U.S. Army (Department of the Army 2010). Within the U.S. Army, there are three types of BCTs: the Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), and the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). The primary difference between these three units is the principle fighting vehicle (Department of the Army 2010). The ABCT is structured around the M1 Abrams main battle tank and the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle. The SBCT is also a mechanized infantry force that is structured around the Stryker combat vehicle. The IBCT is a light infantry fighting force that has no organic vehicle platform and operates primarily dismounted (Department of the Army 2010).

Each BCT's organizational structure differs slightly. For the purposes of this thesis, the organizational structure of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) headquarters is used as a general depiction of the capabilities of a typical U.S. Army BCT headquarters deployed in an advisory role without its principle fighting vehicles. This research relies on the Department of Army's force management website known as FMSweb as the authoritative source for the structural organization of the IBCT. FMSweb provides access to Army requirements and authorization documents for personnel and equipment for Army units and Army elements of joint organizations for the current year

through the first program year. It contains the organizational structures for virtually every formation within the Army. FMSweb is the authoritative source for Army force structure information, and is used within this thesis to determine the basic structure of the BCT. In this thesis, the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division is used as a common example of a light infantry BCT headquarters staff. A by rank breakdown of the 1/10 IBCT's headquarters can be found at Appendix A of this thesis.

Of the 126 authorized positions found within the BCT's headquarters, only three positions are specifically coded for Military Police personnel: one 31A00 Military Police captain, who serves as the Brigade's provost marshal, and two additional staff sergeants that make up the provost marshal's staff (Department of the Army 2014b). The two staff sergeants represent a 31B30, Military Police generalist, and a 31E30, Internment and Resettlement specialist. According to the Military Police Operations field manual, the three Brigade military police staff members "provide the minimum-essential military police capabilities to support BCT operations" (Department of the Army 2013b, 2-7). As of 2014, the once-organic, 42-personnel Military Police platoon is no longer a part of the force structure of the active duty BCT (Department of the Army 2014b).

During stability operations, additional staff personnel and sections are typically task-organized to the BCT for the specific purposes of addressing their military occupational skill set. In the case of the Military Police, there is no doctrinal template for the specific size or composition of the Military Police support package for a BCT; "based on an analysis of the mission variables, the BCTs will be task-organized with required military police capabilities to meet mission requirements" (Department of the Army

2013b, 4-1). Additionally, the BCT may be provided with contracted civilian law enforcement advisors.

If there is a doctrinal expectation that the BCT deploys to assist foreign police development as a part of security force assistance, the absence of police-specific skills or organic police staff constitutes a significant capability gap. Although external enabler-support would be required to provide assistance, it is more than likely that these enablers would join the BCT in theater. This presents a challenge for the leadership and staff of the BCT to plan in advance for the execution of a police development mission without input from police subject matter experts. Without this critical input, the BCT staff and leadership would be required to conduct additional planning while simultaneously conducting their mission.

Police Development Efforts in Iraq

The disconnection between the doctrinal expectations and the force structure available for the BCT is an example of a critical issue that affected the U.S. Army's efforts in developing the Iraqi Police Services (IPS). Although there are several accounts of the United States' efforts in developing the IPS, two themes consistently reoccur throughout the reviewed literature. Despite billions of dollars and hundreds of American lives, the failures of developing the IPS are best described as:

1. Interagency and governmental fragmentation caused by a lack of coordination, synchronization, understanding, and resources, which resulted in disagreements on strategic objectives with no clearly defined end state for the Iraqi Police Services (Byrd 2010; Keller 2010; Ladwig 2013).

2. Attempting to resolve capability deficiencies through rapid capacity expansion resulting in an unstainable and inexperienced Iraqi police force (Byrd 2010; Keller 2010; Ladwig 2013).

The U.S. intervention in Iraq from 2003 to 2010 was the largest law enforcement and police training effort since the U.S. intervention in Vietnam (Keller 2010). In order to address the U.S. Government's lack of a deployable civilian stability police force to train the IPS, the Department of Defense transferred over $1.5 billion to the Department of State to provide contracted law enforcement trainers to fill this gap (Ladwig 2013). These contractors augmented the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), which was created by the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I) to address the development of the IPS, and to assist in the development of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (Ladwig 2013). These civilian police contractors served at every echelon of CPATT from tactical Police Transition Teams (PTT) at station and individual police office level to provincial and ministerial level advisory teams. This outsourcing of police expertise caused considerable friction between the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice, all of which had different objectives or end states for the IPS (Byrd 2010). These divergent views typically meant that the training provided by the U.S. did not meet the missions performed, frequently with deadly results (Ladwig 2013).

The largest interagency and governmental disconnection was ultimately with the Iraqi Police themselves (Ladwig 2013). The lack of coordination, consultation, or input from Iraqi leaders regarding key decisions for police training and structure made the efforts of the DoS and DoD futile (Ladwig 2013). Without consulting the Iraqi leadership, the DoD and DoS planned, resourced, and trained the Iraqi Police in a

vacuum that was ultimately unsustainable and in many cases unnecessary (Byrd 2010). This lack of involvement and synchronization is what ultimately doomed the State Department's large-scale effort to transition the IPS from a stability police force to a community police force (Ladwig 2013).

Secondly, there was an unbalanced approach that facilitated the gross waste of billions of dollars in an attempt to address capability deficiencies through rapid capacity expansion (Pfaff 2008). The rapid capacity growth of the Iraqi Police from 2005-2008 resulted in a large number of Iraqi Police that were trained in security and stability tasks but were inexperienced and ineffective in conducting community policing tasks. As a result, some were co-opted by corrupt or sectarian activities, while others quit or were killed in the line of duty (Pfaff 2008).

In the development of foreign police forces,

> Slow is smooth and smooth is fast. The goal of foreign police development (a self-sustaining and functional police force) is achieved more rapidly and more efficiently when the creation and subsequent development is slow and deliberate, as opposed to hasty and disorganized, which requires large course corrections during the process. (Byrd 2010, 2)

The disconnection between the objectives of U.S. Army and the Department of State-led Coalition Provisional Authority, which dissolved former Iraqi security organizations in May 2003, added to the Department of Defense's position that the rapid recruiting, hiring, and training of hundreds of thousands of police was critical to facilitating the conditions for U.S. withdrawal from Iraq (Byrd 2010). This created unrealistic expectations for the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, and resulted in overly ambitious hiring programs in 2003, such as "30,000 in 30 days" and "60,000 in 60 days" (Byrd 2010). These programs and the aggressive hiring strategy resolved short-term

unemployment issues, but essentially destroyed any hope to establish and develop a self-sustaining Iraqi Police Services (Byrd 2010).

Like previously reviewed police theory, the U.S. Government's inability to change the organizational culture of the IPS, ultimately led to their inability to perform effectively, especially in a counterinsurgency environment. This organizational culture change takes considerable time, which was not provided to the Iraqi Police in advance of the U.S. withdrawal of 2010. The rapid expansion did not allow the Iraqi logistical system to mature, which led to an overreliance on U.S. provided logistical support. The inability to sustain a rapidly grown and underdeveloped police force severely undermined the U.S. Government's objectives in developing the IPS. Critically the fundamental error and the principle strategic reason for the rapid capacity growth was that "the Pentagon's chief measure [of performance] for Iraq in 2004 was the number of ISF [Iraqi Security Force] personnel completing training" (Byrd 2010, 10). This resulted in little emphasis on the quality of the police officer, and an overreliance on the quantity of police officers generated (Byrd 2010).

Although current U.S. Army doctrine does not contradict the critical police development issues from Iraq, in some interpretations, it may reinforce the mistakes that were made. By not clearly articulating the differences between capacity and capability development as a measure of performance, and consistently stating that police development is a job for civilian police and not the military, U.S. Army doctrine does not address or correct the two key issues that hampered the police development efforts in Iraq. Provided with the guidance and language found in current U.S. Army doctrine, a BCT could draw similar conclusions and duplicate similar mistakes as the police

development units in Iraq. Additionally the expectations and end states must be clearly defined and synchronized as a part of a larger Security Cooperation mission. Understanding the mistakes made during the development of the Iraqi Police Services will hopefully enlighten future police development operations potentially conducted by a BCT.

SWOT and DOTMLPF Frameworks

The U.S. Army uses several different mnemonic acronyms that serve as analysis frameworks when conducting assessments or making recommendations. This section of the literary review briefly describes two of these frameworks used in an analysis of the research conducted in chapter 4 of this thesis. The two analysis frameworks are SWOT and DOTMLPF.

Developed in the 1960s by an independent management consultant, Albert Humphrey, the SWOT analysis (or matrix) is an analysis tool used to determine the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities or Threats of an organization, person, or product (Humphrey 2005). Within the SWOT analysis, an organization's strengths are described as factors that give the organization a marked advantage. Conversely, weaknesses are described as those factors that give the organization a marked disadvantage. Opportunities are described as factors that will help the organization exploit one (or more) of its advantages or strengths. Lastly, threats are described in the SWOT analysis framework as internal or external factors that would cause a potential negative impact for the organization (Humphrey 2005). For the purposes of this thesis, the SWOT analysis framework is used to test the efficacy of the BCT's organic force structure in addressing a potential police development mission.

The acronym DOTMLPF stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership (Education), Personnel, and Facilities (Army Capabilities Integration Center 2014). The Army Capabilities Integration Center uses the acronym DOTMLPF as "a problem-solving construct for assessing current capabilities and managing change" (Army Capabilities Integration Center 2014). As described in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 2012, DOTMLPF is used to make recommendations for changes to existing joint resources, when such changes are not associated with a new defense acquisition program (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012). The DOTMLPF framework is used as a way to determine if there is a non-material solution to an existing capability gap (Army Capabilities Integration Center 2014). For the purposes of this thesis, the DOTMLPF framework is used to identify potential solutions for capability gaps identified during the SWOT analysis of the BCT's ability to develop foreign police.

Summary

In order to understand how a U.S. Army BCT should develop the police of a foreign country, one must understand basic police theory and focus primarily on the distinction between stability policing and community policing. In stability operations, the people determine the true efficacy of the civilian police (Guant 2010). Within U.S. Army doctrine there exists a dichotomy whereby there is strong emphasis placed on the importance of civilian police development, but very little police development specific doctrine. Additionally, the doctrine that exists suggests that police development should be primarily a task for civilian law enforcement specialist and provides no clear direction for U.S. Army forces on how to accomplish police development tasks outside of initial assessments. The Security Force Assistance and Law and Order Operations manuals

provide the most doctrinal guidance for the development of foreign police, and should probably be the primary source of information for the BCT leadership and staff with regard to developing the capacity and capabilities of host-nation police.

An analysis of the BCT's personnel structure determined that the BCT has limited to no organic police-specific capability. The three Military Police personnel found within the Brigade's staff do not provide the BCT with the necessary capability required to conduct a large scale police advisory mission. Therefore, the BCT must require and rely on external police expertise if there are no personnel on the brigade staff with a civilian law enforcement background.

The critical lessons learned from police development efforts in Iraq highlight potential failures in future police development missions. These lessons were essentially that the U.S. Government was not internally synchronized amongst agencies, as well as external synchronization with multinational and Iraqi police senior official with regard to the strategic end state and objectives for the IPS. Additionally, the U.S. Army and Department of State attempted to address capability deficiencies through rapid capacity expansion, which led to a largely ineffective IPS.

Lastly, a brief overview of the acronyms SWOT and DOTMLPF establish the literary context for the utilization of these frameworks in the analysis conducted in chapter four of this thesis. Using these analysis frameworks, the efficacy of the BCT is tested and potential solutions to capability gaps are made.

With the information provided in the literature review, the next chapter of this thesis describes the research methodology used to generate answers to the primary and supplemental research questions, and introduces a proposed police development model

for the BCT. Through the research approach, the answers to the primary and supplemental questions emerge.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

> The global war on terrorism has demonstrated that the Army must continuously assess and adapt its capabilities in order to successfully operate in challenging and diverse environments, defeat ever-adapting threat forces, and effectively partner with various joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) organizations.
>
> — MG David E. Quantock, *ARMY, 2011*

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology used to answer the primary research question of how a regionally aligned U.S. Army BCT should conduct foreign police development. This chapter is divided into three sections. Section One, research approach, describes the research framework and methods used to answer the supplemental research questions and determine the evaluation criteria utilized in the analysis of data. Section Two utilizes police theory and U.S. Army doctrine analyzed in the literature review to propose a police development model that assesses the BCT's ability to conduct foreign police development. The efficacy of the BCT's capabilities is subsequently evaluated through a Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, and Threats analysis. Additionally, the DOTMLPF framework is used to propose potential solutions to capability gaps. Lastly, Section Three, data sources, describes the primary sources for data collected during the research, paying specific regard to the assessment of the Kenyan Police Services found within the Police Reform Programme 2011-2013, which is used in the hypothetical scenario to validate the proposed model.

Research Approach

The method used throughout the research is a qualitative approach designed to understand and develop an answer to the primary research question. In structuring the research plan, a six-step research framework (figure 2) emerged for answering the supplemental research questions supporting the primary research question.



Figure 2. Research Framework

Source: Created by author. This figure depicts the research framework developed to answer the research questions. The framework establishes a theoretical and doctrinal foundation for the proposed police development model.

In step one of the research framework, an analytical review of policing theory and concepts establishes a theoretical foundation, which is used to develop the proposed police development model. Through understanding policing theory and concepts, universally accepted fundamentals of modern policing emerge. These concepts and an understanding of stability policing, community policing, and democratic policing, establish the theoretical foundation for foreign police development for the leadership and staff of the BCT.

In step two of the research framework, an analysis of the BCT's force structure establishes the data required to understand the basic capabilities of the BCT as applied specifically to foreign police development. A review of current U.S. Army police development doctrine is conducted in order to understand the expectations of the BCT deployed to execute a foreign police development mission.

The third step of the research framework examines the lessons learned from the police development efforts in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 through a review of existing literature. The purpose of this review is to understand the critical issues that were identified and emerged as a result of Iraqi Police development efforts. This review establishes a historical precedent for previous police development efforts and highlights issues that could potentially affect police development efforts in future operating environments. By using a historical review of police development efforts in Iraq, the gap between police theory, organizational structure, doctrine, and the capabilities of the BCT's ability to develop foreign police services emerges. The answers to the supplemental research questions form the basis for the proposed BCT Foreign Police Development Model, figure 3.

The BCT Foreign Police Development Model



Figure 3. BCT Foreign Police Development Model

Source: Created by author. A proposed framework for a BCT to conduct foreign police development that uses fundamental policing principles as lines of effort instead of traditional stability lines of effort.

The fifth step of the research framework is the development of a proposed policing model that addresses the gaps found in the literary review. The proposed policing model differs from traditional U.S. Army doctrine which currently states that civilian police development efforts are handed to civilian police agencies in the earliest

(Department of the Army 2008b, 3-7) by addressing the organic capabilities of the BCT. In this model, an assessment of the current police force is conducted by or provided to the BCT in Step 1. Through this assessment, the critical issues of the foreign police force are identified in Step 2. These critical issues are then placed against the Four Police Development Pillars in Step 3. These Police Development Pillars are based on existing police development theory and the lessons learned from the police development efforts in Iraq. The Four Police Development Pillars are as follows:

1. Institutions. This pillar addresses the organizational structure of the police force as well as the governance and the Rule of Law of the country, nation, or population that the police force is supporting. This pillar includes the judicial system of the host country as well as any political, social, or anthropological issues directly relating to the police.

2. Accountability. This pillar addresses police ethics, equality, corruption, transparency, and human rights. This pillar also includes social and anthropological issues but only as they are directly related to understanding cultural ethics, equality, corruption, transparency and human rights.

3. Professionalism. This pillar addresses police officer education, training, promotions, hiring, and termination. This pillar includes political, social, and anthropological issues relating directly to the professionalism of the police force.

4. Systems. This pillar addresses the physical property and infrastructure of the police force to include all equipment, weapons, vehicles, and facilities.

Each pillar of the model is essentially a line of effort for the BCT that "links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose, and cause and effect to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions" (Department of the

Army 2012, 4-5). Comparing the issues identified in Step 2 against the pillars, defined as lines of effort, demonstrate the relationship of individual issues, and how to achieve the described end state.

In order to assess the efficacy of the BCT's capabilities, the specific issues identified through the assessment conducted in step 2 are placed against the identified policing pillar in step 3 and are analyzed in step 4 through a Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis framework. Through utilizing the SWOT analysis framework the efficacy of the BCT's capabilities emerge. (table 4).

Table 4. BCT Police Development Pillar SWOT Analysis

		POLICE DEVELOPMENT PILLARS			
		INSTITUTIONS	ACCOUNTABILITY	PROFESSIONALISM	SYSTEMS
BCT CAPABILITIES	STRENGTHS				
	WEAKNESSES				
	OPPORTUNITIES				
	THREATS				

Source: Created by author. This table depicts the SWOT analysis model used to determine the efficacy of the BCT's organic force structure and capabilities in addressing the issues identified in step 2 of the analysis framework.

In the SWOT analysis model depicted, the efficacy of the BCT's organic force structure and capabilities, as defined by FMSweb, is assessed against the ability to address the issues defined in each police development pillar. Through this analysis, the leadership and staff of the BCT can identify shortfalls and specific areas that they cannot organically address. Solutions for the identified gaps are assessed utilizing the

DOTMLPF framework. Although DOTMLPF is used by the Department of Defense for joint acquisitions process, the framework is used to assess the issues identified during the SWOT analysis to propose solutions for the BCT (table 5).

Table 5. BCT DOTMLPF Analysis

		DOTMLPF ANALYSIS RECOMMENDATIONS						
		DOCTRINE	ORGANIZATION	TRAINING	MATERIAL	LEADERSHIP	PERSONNEL	FACILITIES
ISSUE IDENTIFIED	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUE							

Source: Created by author. A framework used by the DoD during the joint acquisitions process, the DOTMLPF framework is used in this thesis to describe potential solutions to the issues identified during the SWOT analysis.

In the DOTMLPF analysis framework, the capability gaps and issues identified during the SWOT analysis are placed against the DOTMLPF domains in order to propose potential solutions. If the solution is addressed by the BCT's organic capabilities, then the Brigade executes the police development line of effort until it can successfully transition the task to the host-nation police services. If the DOTMLPF analysis determines recommendations that are not within the BCT's organic capabilities and requires an external solution, then the BCT must outsource the requirement. This outsourcing could potentially come in the form of an external DoD agency such as additional military police support, or in most cases, a civilian State Department or Non-Governmental Organization. The goal of the police development model is that the BCT continues to

assess the foreign police service, through the proposed policing pillars as lines of effort, until all of the issues are successfully transitioned to the host-nation police force or transitioned to a civilian agency due to the lack of organic capability or DOTMLPF solution.

Data Sources

The specific data utilized to describe and understand the organic capabilities of the BCT is defined using the U.S. Department of the Army's website, FMSweb. The data provided by FMSweb establishes the capabilities of the BCT and this baseline capability is then assessed against the metrics established in the conceptual police development model utilizing the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis framework. Although the research conducted is focused on answering the primary research question, considerable effort is placed toward understanding the Police Services of Kenya as the hypothetical framework against which the capabilities of the BCT are tested in the analysis of chapter 4. The data provided directly from the Kenyan Police Strategic Reform Programme contributes the information used in the SWOT assessment found in table 4, which describes how the BCT's organic force structure addresses the issues found within the Kenyan Police Strategic Reform Programme discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis.

Summary

This chapter describes and outlines the research methodology used to in order to answer the primary research question: How should a U.S. Army BCT develop foreign police? Through a six-step research framework that investigates U.S. Army doctrine, the

BCT's organic force structure, and the police development efforts in Iraq, a proposed police development model addresses the efficacy of the BCT's capabilities by creating police-specific lines of effort described as police development pillars. The pillars are then analyzed against the current BCT's force structure and U.S. Army doctrine utilizing a SWOT analysis to determine if the BCT possess the organic capabilities to address the issues identified. Lastly, the DOTMLPF framework is utilized to develop potential solutions for how the BCT should address their capability gaps and shortfalls in order to conduct foreign police development.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

In order to conduct the analysis required to answer the primary research question, a hypothetical scenario is used whereby an AFRICOM regionally-aligned BCT is deployed to support the civilian police of an African nation. A pledge made by U.S. President Barack Obama to Kenyan President Kenyatta, in the wake of the West Gate Mall attacks in September of 2013, provides for a unique opportunity to explore a scenario to further support the government of Kenya where the U.S. has conducted previous military-to-military and security cooperation missions (Holland and Mason 2013). The analysis framework used to validate the proposed police development model is depicted in figure 4.



Figure 4. Analysis Framework

Source: Created by author. This framework is utilized to validate the proposed police development model against a hypothetical scenario.

In step one of the analysis framework, an introduction to the Kenyan National Police Services (KNPS) establishes the hypothetical scenario used to place a BCT into a civilian police development mission within Kenya. In step two, an analysis of the Kenyan Police Reform Programme (PRP) of 2011-2013, determines the critical issues currently affecting the KNPS and is used as the basis of information for the assessment of the host-nation police found in the police development model. In step three, the critical issues outlined in the PRP are placed within the police development pillars of the model defined in chapter 3 of this thesis. The BCT's ability to affect the issues is assessed, utilizing the SWOT analysis from the police development model in step three of the analysis framework. Lastly, in step four, potential solutions to the issues identified during the SWOT analysis are explored utilizing the DOTMLPF framework as depicted in the proposed police development model.

Background

On 21 September 2013, fifteen gunmen associated with the terrorist group Al-Shabaab conducted an attack in the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The Kenyan National Police Services responded to the attack, which ultimately led to a 48-hour siege resulting in seventy-two people killed, including sixty-one civilians, six Kenyan soldiers, and five of the attackers. Additionally, five American citizens were injured in the siege (Holland and Mason 2013). At the time of this research, the direct cause of the attack is still under investigation. Before the siege was fully underway, U.S. President Barak Obama called the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta to offer United States support in combating terrorist attacks within Kenya (Holland and Mason 2013). President Obama, as well as Republican Representative Peter King of New York, a

member of the House Intelligence Committee, stated that the Westgate Mall attack further demonstrated the growing influence of al Qaeda linked groups in Africa. (Bell 2013). Echoing these sentiments, journalist Paul Hidalgo stated in his Foreign Affairs article, "Kenya's Worst Enemy: Nairobi's Losing Battle Against Militant Islam," that "Kenya is on its way to becoming the world's next hotbed of extremism as a result of al Shabaab's active and growing presence there" (Hidalgo 2014).

As the threat of Al Shabaab grows, the Government of Kenya continues to also fight a mounting internal insurgency against the Mungiki, a militant group of the Kikuyu tribe (Makau Mutua 2013). As a result of the 2008 elections, the Mungiki group has grown to a considerable size, estimated to be over a million people concentrated around extremely poor population centers within urban areas throughout Kenyan (Goffard 2011). The Mungiki represent a growing issue for the KNPS as they provide security for impoverished and disenfranchised people within extremely poor areas, and demonstrate the Kenyan government's failure to provide these basic and essential services. In 2008, the Mungiki effectively shut down Nairobi after the death of their leader's wife, widely believed to have occurred at the hands of the Kenyan secret police, known as the *Quay Quay* (Goffard 2011). The post-election violence and heavy-handed response by the Kenyan Police created a public outcry for justice and equality, which led to the Kenyan National Task Force on Police Reform of 2009, also known as the Ransley Task Force (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011).

The Kenyan Army has seen considerable growth in capacity and capability within the last ten years. The United States has had successful military-to-military relationships with the Kenyan Army through training and equipping, which has led to the successful

defeat of the Somalia-based Al Shabaab terrorist group during Operation Linda Nchi. The Kenyan Army is viewed by most African nations, as well as the United States, to be politically neutral; and unlike neighboring African countries, the Kenyan Army has not attempted a coup of the Kenyan Government (Kron and Gettleman 2011). That being said, the Kenyan Army's capabilities are still relatively limited, and for the purposes of this hypothetical scenario would assist in reestablishing initial security, but would not be able to assume the role of the civilian police.

Hypothetical Scenario

Suppose that Al Shabaab initiates further terrorist attacks that spur fear among the population of the KNPS's inability to provide security. Couple this fear with the aggressive messaging and insurgent activities of the Mungiki, and a resurgence of sentiment from the 2008 post-election backlash against the KNPS. These two events could cause the KNPS to dissolve, leaving the Kenyan Army to reestablish initial security. President Kenyatta could call upon President Obama to honor his pledge from the Westgate Mall attacks, and specifically ask for United States' support in reforming the KNPS. Because the security of Kenya is critical to the stability of Africa and the region, President Obama may request that AFRICOM's regionally aligned BCT deploy to Kenya to develop the KNPS, and relieve the Kenyan Army of a task that they cannot achieve. This BCT would then be required to reestablish the KNPS, and develop them into an acceptable police force, capable of securing the people of Kenya and providing the basic community police skills described in police theory as essential in a democratic society.

The Kenyan National Police Services

Developing the KNPS provides a potential foreign police development mission for a BCT that is regionally aligned with AFRICOM. For the purposes of this analysis, the KNPS are used to test the efficacy of the proposed police model developed in chapter 3 of this thesis. The information used in the assessment comes directly from the Kenyan Police Reform Programme (PRP) 2011-2013 and is used in the proposed police development model to analyze the BCT's capabilities against the SWOT analysis framework. It is critical to understand and review the PRP in order to identify the critical issues that a BCT must address in the development of the KNPS.

The Kenyan Police Reform Programme 2011-2013

The Kenyan Police Reform Programme (PRP) 2011-2013 is a document that resulted from investigations against the KNPS that occurred after the 2008 presidential elections. During these elections, the KNPS were seen by the public to be brutal, corrupt, and partisan (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011). As a result, the Kenyan government tasked the Ransley Task Force to investigate the KNPS, and determine objectives to correct the identified issues. The results of the investigation informed the Kenyan Police Reform Programme 2011-2013, which is the Government of Kenya's plan to reform the KNPS in accordance with their newly ratified constitution (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011).

The PRP outlines an action plan that addresses five objectives supporting the overall goal (end state) to "transform the police force into an effective, efficient, and trusted police service" (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011, 1). Each of the supporting objectives has multiple supporting strategies, or specific areas of

emphasis that require focused improvement. Several of the *objective strategies* are mutually supportive of the greater overall goal, and are further identified in the PRP as *outputs* (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011).

The issues facing the reform of the KNPS are broken down into five objectives, which encompass the findings of the initial 2009 Ransley Task Force on Police Reform and the findings of the finalized PRP (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011). The five objectives of the PRP are:

Objective 1. Establish the legal and policy framework governing police in Kenya.

Objective 2. Establish empowered and sustainable institutional structures for policing services.

Objective 3. Enhance professionalism, integrity, and accountability of the police services.

Objective 4. Strengthen operational preparedness, logistical capacity, and capability.

Objective 5. Support the activities of the reforms co-ordination secretariat (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011, 6-14).

The objective strategies outlined in the PRP are aligned into the four police development pillars of the model as lines of effort for the BCT. Figure 5 represents the four police development pillars found in the proposed police development model developed in chapter 3 of this thesis.



Figure 5. Police Development Pillars

Source. Created by author. This figure represents the four Police Development Pillars of the proposed police development model as described in chapter 3 of this thesis. The four Police Development Pillars are the lines of effort for the BCT conducting foreign police development.

Utilizing the Police Development Pillars as lines of effort, the BCT's leadership and staff could categorize the objectives outlined in the PRP as depicted in table 6.

Table 6. Comparative Analysis of the Police Development Pillars and the Kenyan Police Reform Programme Objectives

	Kenyan Police Reform Programme Objectives				
Police Pillar	OBJ 1: Establish legal and policy framework governing policing in Kenya	OBJ 2: Establish empowered and sustainable institutional structures for policing services	OBJ 3: Enhance professional integrity and accountability of police services	OBJ 4: Strengthen operational preparedness and logistical capacity and capability	OBJ 5: Support the programme implementation secretariat
Institutions. Organizational structure, governance, rule of law, and the Judicial system of the host country as well as any political, social, or anthropological issues directly relating to the police.	X	X			X
Accountability. Police ethics, equality, corruption, transparency and human rights.	X	X	X		X
Professionalism. Police officer education, training, promotions, hiring, and termination.	X	X	X	X	X
Systems. Physical property and infrastructure of the police force to include all equipment, weapons, vehicles, and facilities.				X	X

Source. Created by author. This figure depicts the objectives identified within the Kenyan PRP and demonstrates where the BCT's police development pillars (lines of effort) address the objective.

As depicted in table 5, the proposed police development pillars address all of the reform objectives stated within the PRP. Although the definitions of police development pillars align with the objectives of the PRP, an analysis of the BCT's ability to address these objectives must be conducted in order to determine how the BCT could support each objective.

Brigade Combat Team SWOT Analysis

This section of the analysis addresses each objective outlined in the Kenyan Police Reform Programme against the BCT's organic organizational structure utilizing the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis framework. Through this analysis, the BCT's ability–or inability–to effectively accomplish the

objectives emerges within its current force structure and the doctrinal expectations as defined in chapter 2 of this thesis.

The first PRP objective that the BCT must address is "the establishment of the legal and policy framework governing policing in Kenya" (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011, 6). The enactment of five critical bills of legislation is required in order to provide the legal basis for most of the anticipated reforms in the police (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011). In order to accomplish this, the BCT must look at its organic capability to determine the following in addressing Objective 1:

Strengths. The BCT has within its organic organizational structure one (1) Brigade Judge Advocate in the rank of Major (O4) (Department of the Army 2014b). This Major's primary responsibility is to provide legal advice to the brigade's commander. Additionally, the BCT has a Captain (O3) "Operational Law Judge Advocate," whose primary role is to provide operational law expertise to the commander (Department of the Army 2014b). The brigade's legal staff also contains a paralegal Noncommissioned Officer (Department of the Army 2014b). These three personnel make up the brigade's organic Judge Advocate staff, and could provide assistance in understanding police reform legislation as described in the PRP.

Weaknesses. The three Judge Advocate personnel found within the BCT's staff are not necessarily trained to address foreign legislation and therefore, could be in a position whereby they are recommending decisions to the brigade commander based upon U.S. interpretations of host nation laws.

Opportunities. The brigade's Judge Advocate staff could enable the working groups or staff cells working within the Police Pillars addressed by the legislation found in Objective 1 of the PRP.

Threats. The Judge Advocate staff of the BCT is limited, consisting of only three personnel. Its principle role is to administer the brigade, not necessarily the host-nation that the brigade is developing. This could place a significant strain on the Judge Advocate staff members' capabilities, or detract from its legal support to the brigade.

The second objective that the BCT must address within the PRP is "establishing empowered and sustainable institutional structures for policing services within Kenya" (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011, 7). The PRP describes these structures in two key outputs. The first output is centered on the establishment of the regulatory and policy framework for the National Police Services. Broadly speaking, the goal of this output is to develop strategic planning initiatives for the KNPS, establishing milestones and objectives for subordinate agencies, and monitoring the progress through the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (similar to an inspector general) (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011). The second output is to strengthen community policing and partnership. Broadly speaking, this output addresses the need to establish strategic and operational guidance to subordinates to effectively train and advance community policing strategies (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011). In order to address the second objective of the PRP, the BCT must look at its organic capability in order to determine the following:

Strengths. Generally, the brigade's organic staff could address the establishment of specific milestones and objectives for the KNPS in close consultation with the Kenyan

police leadership. The current operations and planning cells of the BCT could organize themselves into working groups and cells to address the police pillars in Objective 2, and work the outputs as end states for the lines of effort in consultation of the Kenyan police leadership. Enabled by an objective, the brigade staff is trained to understand the operational environment and utilizing a problem-solving framework to address the mission.

Weaknesses. The BCT possess no organic organizational capability that specifically addresses the theory and application of community-oriented policing (Department of the Army 2014b). Additionally, the brigade's organic staff officers are not specifically trained on community policing theory and practices. Although the Brigade Provost Marshal, Captain (O3), is a Military Police officer by branch, the staff officer's individual training and knowledge may not include any formal instruction, training, or experience with community policing, or host-nation police development. Additionally, as indicated in chapter 3 of this thesis, current U.S. Army doctrine does not address community policing principles and theory with sufficient detail to provide guidance on how to advise the host-nation on the practical application of community policing.

Opportunities. A potential opportunity for the BCT is leveraging the subordinate company-level leadership to assist in monitoring and reporting the execution of the PRP objective milestones. This independent, outside perspective is a valuable tool in combating corruption, and ensuring support to the Independent Policing Oversight Authority. The company-level, subordinate leadership of the brigade is enabled to provide the security space for the developing police force to grow in a less hostile or

threatening environment, leading to the successful implementation of the identified objectives.

Threats. The absence of any formal training or exposure to community policing practices and theory present a considerable threat to a potential police development mission for the BCT. As demonstrated by a review of the lessons learned through the police development efforts in Iraq, the lack of understanding of policing principles and theory arguably led to the unsynchronized and disconnected objectives of the Department of Defense and the Department of State, as well as the rapid capacity growth of an incapable Iraqi Police Services. Without a focus on police-specific theory and experienced understanding of community policing, a similar fate is expected for future host-nation police development missions (Byrd 2010; Ladwig 2013).

The third objective stated in the PRP is "enhancing the professionalism, integrity, and accountability of the police services within Kenya" (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011, 9). This objective has three critical outputs that are specifically designed to counter the Kenyan people's damaged trust and confidence in the KNPS because of the 2008 elections. The first output is the development, establishment, and implementation of a police code of conduct. The second is the establishment of internal accountability mechanisms. The third output calls for the development, validation, and implementation of a new police-training curriculum (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011). In order to accomplish these outputs the BCT must look at its organic capability to determine the following:

Strengths. The BCT possesses the staff to construct and assist in the execution of general training goals and events. The amount of professional knowledge found

throughout the brigade with regard to training management and oversight could ensure that the training events were planned, resourced, and synchronized, especially those events that are not police-specific and share similarities to military training like marksmanship and driving. Additionally, the brigade staff could assist in the development and execution of more esoteric training like ethics, values, and human rights.

Weaknesses. Although the BCT's staff possesses the requisite skills to plan and execute training, without the institutional knowledge of policing required to develop a new police-specific training program, the BCT staff may find difficulty in supporting the development of the curriculum. Additionally, the 15-month new recruit training period and 21-month graduate level training period suggested by the PRP may not be supportable due to the length of time that the BCT is deployed to support the police development mission (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011).

Opportunities. Again, the subordinate leadership of the brigade provides an opportunity to develop the personal relationships required to execute a robust training strategy, and provide on-the-ground assessments necessary to test and adjust the training as required.

Threats. As stated in the analysis of the previous objective, the absence of any formal training or exposure to policing theory, practices, and application presents a threat to the BCT's ability to develop foreign police. During the police development efforts in Iraq, the rapid growth of IPS, coupled with an extremely short training curriculum by Western standards of only eight weeks, created an undertrained and ineffective security force (Byrd 2010). After almost six years of "on the job training," it was an unrealistic

expectation that the Iraqi Police Services would be able to operate autonomously after the United States left Iraq in 2010 (Byrd 2010). As seen by recent events, the Iraqi Police still struggle to effectively police their communities (Parker and Rasheed 2014). Without this basic understanding of policing and training application perspective, the BCT could again follow a similar path of least resistance creating an overwhelming number of security guards instead of an effective community police force when conducting its next foreign police development mission.

The fourth objective that the BCT must address is "strengthening the operational preparedness, logistical capacity, and capability of the Kenyan Police Services" (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011, 12). The PRP describes this objective with outputs in two groups, enhancing the logistical support for the police, and the development and implementation of the evaluation for performance and performance management systems (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011). In order to accomplish this, the BCT must look at its organic capability to determining the following:

Strengths. Similarly to the Staff Judge Advocate, the BCT has an organic Human Resources staff and Logistics support staff within the brigade's headquarters as well as subordinate echelons at battalion and company levels (Department of the Army 2014b). With regard to human resource management, the senior BCT human resource manager is the brigade's Adjutant (S1) in the rank of Major (O4) (Department of the Army 2014b). Additionally, the brigade Human Resources staff has eight subordinate personnel to provide human resource expertise to the brigade (Department of the Army 2014b). Regarding logistical support, the brigade staff has a Major (O4) as the senior logistician

and ten subordinate staff personnel that provide logistical expertise to the Brigade (Department of the Army 2014b).

Weaknesses. As with the Staff Judge Advocate, the human resources and logistical staff personnel exist at all echelons of the brigade within the organizational structure to provide support to the brigade, and not necessarily to the host-nation in an advisory role. The human resource staff and logistical staff, like other specialized staff personnel, do not necessarily receive additional training on host-nation advising, as their principle role within the staff is focused on support to the brigade. Although their experience with the U.S. Army's personnel management and logistical systems is beneficial, these skills are highly technical and specific to U.S. programs, and may not provide the context necessary to address the specific issues of the host-nation's requirements.

Opportunities. Although it is likely that the brigade's organic human resource and logistic support personnel will not conduct actual advisory work, the addition of these critical personnel to working groups, meetings, and functional cells of the BCT provides an opportunity for the advisors to receive technical advice. Leveraging the professional knowledge of these critical staff personnel could enlighten the advisors' perspective as well as provide direction and guidance from their experience with the U.S. Army systems.

Threats. If the BCT leadership decides to utilize its organic human resource and logistical support personnel in an advisory capacity, they would risk the performance and execution of this critical support to the brigade. Logistics and human resource management require technical skills and extensive knowledge of the systems that are

being utilized. The lack of training for human resources and logistical personnel for police advisory-specific missions could have a negative impact on the execution of the objectives. Additionally, the BCT has a limited number of trained human resource and logistics personnel to support the brigade, let alone advise the host-nation (Department of the Army 2014b).

The fifth and final objective that the PRP outlines is the efficient coordination and implementation of the reforms outlined within the programme (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011). This objective is primarily prescriptive in nature, and is specifically addressed at the execution of the reform plan with exclusive guidance to the Government of Kenya. The two outputs described are extensions of previous objectives, and address the recruitment, training, and deployment of future police officers as well as salaries, housing, and logistical preparedness of the police (Kenyan Police Reforms Implementation Committee 2011). The BCT's ability to affect this objective is addressed under the previous objective-SWOT analysis.

Lastly, it should be noted that the BCT has an organic Civil Affairs team comprised of one Captain (O3) and one Sergeant First Class (E7). Additionally, the BCT has one Information Operations Sergeant First Class (E7). These individuals bring unique capabilities to the BCT while conducting an advisory mission. However, their achievements could be limited due to the number of staff, depending upon the parameters of the mission. Regardless, these personnel will undoubtedly be an asset to the BCT during its advisory mission. Additionally, the BCT has a considerable intelligence capability that will assist in the development of the host-nation police force.

With an understanding of the areas that a BCT can influence within the PRP, assessing potential solutions using the DOTMLPF framework allows the BCT leadership and staff the opportunity to determine whether organic solutions are possible, given the organizational structure of the brigade and the current doctrine that exists. The DOTMLPF framework is used to determine potential solutions to the issues discovered in the SWOT analysis.

DOTMLPF Analysis

The DOTMLPF analysis is found within security force assistance doctrine, and although it is used as a technique to assess a foreign security force, DOTMLPF is used in this section of the research analysis to describe potential solutions for the capability gaps identified during the SWOT analysis (Department of the Army 2009a).

Doctrine. In addition to expressing the significance of assisting foreign police development, U.S. Army doctrine should provide a description of the distinction between the concepts of stability policing and community policing. These two concepts of policing are vastly different, and could shape the entire manner in which the leadership and staff of a BCT approaches a potential police development mission. Additionally, U.S. Army doctrine should provide a description of the different types of police organizations and structures that a BCT could be required to work with. By understanding these basic organizational structures and reasons for their existence, the BCT leadership and staff could gain a deeper appreciation for the issues currently affecting the host-nation police force to create solutions without significant organizational changes. Lastly, U.S. Army doctrine should reinforce current SFA doctrine by utilizing the lessons learned from the police development efforts in Iraq. By highlighting the critical issues that affected the

Iraqi Police Services, future police development missions can draw upon best practice for future police development missions. These doctrinal additions and changes may assist the BCT in the hypothetical scenario or future police development efforts.

Organization. The organizational structure of the BCT is principally designed as a war fighting formation (Department of the Army 2010). With regard to the police advisory mission found in the hypothetical scenario, the BCT would not be required to fundamentally change its organizational structure, but would require additional military police or civilian police support to enable the mission. Although U.S. Army doctrine discusses a potential troop-to-task organization for a BCT conducting SFA, this organization does not fundamentally change the structure of the BCT and requires additional external advisory assistance (Department of the Army 2009a). Augmented with police enablers, the BCT's current organizational structure could support the hypothetical police advisory mission.

Training. Personnel assigned to a BCT with a requirement to advise and develop host-nation police forces should receive basic, police-specific training. Most civilian police academies within the United States average nineteen weeks of training for basic patrol officers (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2014). In comparison, the advanced individual training (AIT) portion of the one-station unit training (OSUT) program for a U.S. Army Military Police, basic enlisted soldier is eight weeks out of an overall 17-week program (USAMPS 2011). BCT soldiers are not expected to train as long as civilian police officers in law enforcement or policing skills; however, a BCT soldier deployed to develop a host-nation's police would benefit by more training, especially for personnel in

advisory roles when additional, external police advisors are not expected to augment the BCT.

Material. Although the BCT may be required to assist in the procurement, distribution, storage, maintenance, and sustainment of the host-nation's organizational equipment, there are no material solutions required of the BCT in order to address the capability gaps found within the SWOT analysis.

Leadership and Education. The leadership and staff of the BCT should familiarize themselves with basic policing fundamentals as well as a basic understanding of the criminal justice system of the host-nation. As previously discussed in the training section of this framework, it is an unrealistic expectation that leadership, staff, and soldiers of a BCT would conduct a 19-week training program; however, basic education on police fundamentals and organizational structures could enhance potential advisors' knowledge and capabilities. Additionally, leader development that is focused on organizational change, ethics, and criminal justice could assist the understanding of the issues facing potential foreign police advisors.

Personnel. U.S. Army doctrine acknowledges that a BCT conducting a SFA mission may require additional enabling support staff to assist during an advisory mission (Department of the Army 2009a). Additionally, SFA doctrine provides descriptions for various primary brigade staff that might be used to advise host-nation security forces (Department of the Army 2009a). In 2014, the Military Police platoon that was once organic to the BCT was removed from the BCT's force structure (Department of the Army 2014b). This reduction of police-specific capability essentially means that the BCT must receive external police support in order to conduct a police development mission.

This police support may come from Military Police or may come from civilian police advisors. The addition of these police-specific enablers should occur as early as possible in order for the BCT leadership and staff to incorporate them into the training and planning for the police development mission. Without these personnel, it will be difficult for the BCT to achieve the objectives outlined in the PRP.

Facilities. It is not envisioned that the BCT would require any additional facilities to assist in the development of host-nation police forces. However, with regard to the host-nation police forces' facilities, the BCT may be required to assist in the resourcing and construction of facilities such as training academies, police stations, arms rooms, and motor pools, which would be required by the host-nation police to conduct operations. In this respect, the BCT may have to provide additional assistance to the host-nation police force to establish these new facilities to address the capability gaps found within the SWOT analysis.

Summary

In this chapter, the research methodology designed in chapter 3 is used to analyze the BCT's organic capabilities against a hypothetical civilian police development mission in Kenya. This chapter uses a series of actual events to establish a hypothetical scenario whereby an AFRICOM regionally-aligned BCT deploys to Kenya in support of the development of the Kenyan National Police Services. The police development model proposed in chapter 3 is tested by using the data provided in the Kenyan Police Reform Programme. The evaluation analysis demonstrated that issues found in the Police Reform Program aligned with the proposed police development pillars of the model.

The SWOT analysis section of this chapter analyzed the BCT's organic capability to address the issues found within the Police Development Pillars, and determined the principle weakness is the absence of law enforcement specialists in the organizational structure of the BCT conducting a potential police development mission. Although U.S. Army doctrine determines a way that a BCT could potentially task-organize to conduct an SFA mission, the absence of police-specific knowledge within the BCT presents a weakness and a potential threat for the BCT advising host-nation police. The chapter concludes by using the DOTMLPF framework to make potential recommendations to capability gaps and issues resulting from the SWOT analysis. With the information provided in this analysis, the following chapter provides additional insights and recommendations in order to address the primary and supplemental research questions of this thesis.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

> The President must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it most certainly is not designed to build a civilian society.
>
> —Condoleezza Rice, *Foreign Affairs*

Introduction

U.S. Army doctrine states that an effective civilian police force is critical in stability operations, and the host-nation police are the preferred internal security force (Department of the Army 2006). As efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the transition of responsibility for security to the host-nation police is an essential element to the United States' exit strategy (Byrd 2010). Additionally, the ad-hoc nature at which previous police advisory efforts were conducted demonstrate that the U.S. Government lacks a dedicated police development force, and should develop solutions to future large-scale police development operations (Ladwig 2013). Although U.S. civilian agencies do not have the capability to conduct large-scale police development missions, U.S. Army doctrine maintains and reinforces the position that the primary responsibility for training host-nation police forces remains with civilian police agencies (Ladwig 2013; Department of the Army 2008b).

Perhaps the former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's comments about the nature of the military versus the police sheds light on the discrepancy (Rice 2000). The military is trained to conduct combat operations through the deliberate application of violence whereas police are principally trained to maintain peace and deescalate violence

(Coleman 2011). Is it reasonable then to expect that a U.S. Army BCT, whose principle mission is combat, to be able to advise and develop the civilian police force of a foreign country?

The purpose of this research was to determine how a BCT should develop a foreign police force. In order to answer this question, a qualitative research approach was designed to answer supplemental questions, and develop a proposed police development model for the BCT. The proposed police development model was tested utilizing a hypothetical scenario whereby a BCT deploys to Kenya in order to support the development of the Kenyan National Police Services. As a part of the police development model, a SWOT analysis assessed the BCT's ability to address the issues found within the Kenyan Police Reform Programme, and determined that the most significant weakness of the BCT conducting a police development mission is the lack of police-specific personnel within the brigade.

Conclusions

Answered simply, a U.S. Army BCT should expect to conduct a foreign police development mission with significant assistance from military police and civilian law enforcement specialists. According to the analysis conducted, a U.S. Army BCT cannot effectively conduct a foreign civilian police development mission without the addition of either military or civilian police personnel to provide the necessary law enforcement expertise required to develop a foreign police force. This position is reinforced by the answers to the supplemental research questions.

For the first supplemental question, a review of police theory concludes that it is important for the leadership and staff of a BCT to understand the distinction between the

concepts of stability policing and community policing. Stability policing by its nature is paramilitary and primarily focused on public order and security, not on achieving the type of relationship most commonly associated with modern democratic police agencies (Keller 2010). By contrast, community policing is primarily focused on the relationship between the police and the population, as it is the public's acceptance of the laws of the state that actually give the police the authority they require to protect the people (Gehrand 2000). In boarder context, an understanding of community policing is further reinforced by the concepts of consent based policing and ultimately, democratic policing, which are the goals of police reform (Wakefield and Fleming 2009). As such, the BCT leadership and staff should shape the expected goals and end states of a potential police development mission to focus on efforts that seek to legitimize the police as community police, not security guards. The BCT leadership and staff should be reminded "the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it" (Alderson quoting Peel 1998).

Ultimately, police reform by its nature is an organizational and cultural change (Bayley 2009). The BCT leadership and staff should understand the basic organizational police structures, as they may potentially be a direct result of the culture and history of the police force and host-nation. Understanding these concepts and organizational structures may enlighten the BCT leadership and staff in a future police development mission.

In addressing the second supplemental research question, a review of U.S. Army doctrine determined that although the importance of civilian police development is consistently stressed as a critical component to stability operations, U.S. Army doctrine

states that civilian police should primarily conduct the mission. Additionally, there is surprisingly little doctrine that explains how the U.S. Army should conduct foreign police development. Ultimately, Chapter 7 of the Law and Order Operations manual (Department of the Army 2011) presents the BCT leadership and staff with the most comprehensive U.S. Army doctrinal approach to developing foreign police. This publication, coupled with the Security Force Assistance field manual (Department of the Army 2009a), provides the BCT leadership and staff with the only suggested techniques in conducting a potential police development mission. Both of these publications, as well as the other doctrinal publications reviewed, reinforce the position that foreign police development is typically conducted by military and civilian police agencies, and that their law enforcement expertise is required to properly conduct the mission.

In accordance with the U.S. Army's force management system website FMSweb, an analysis of the BCT's organic force structure answered the third supplemental research question by determining that the BCT lacks the necessary police expertise required to conduct foreign police development (Department of the Army 2014b). Although the BCT has a small, organic provost marshal staff, these three personnel do not provide the necessary manpower or expertise to conduct a large-scale police development mission. Additionally, the removal of the BCT's once organic Military Police platoon greatly diminished the BCT's ability to provide the host-nation police force with police-specific mentorship. Without a more robust police skill set to draw from, the BCT will not be able to provide the technical expertise required to develop a foreign police force, given its current organic force structure.

It is important to reiterate that for the purposes of this thesis, the general term "BCT" applies to the organizational structure of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team. Although a separate analysis of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team or Armored Brigade Combat Team would likely yield similar conclusions with regard to the lack of police expertise found within the organic staff, the organizational structure of these fighting formations differ outside of the principle fighting vehicle, and should be taken into consideration when conducting future analysis.

Through an analysis of the lessons learned from the U.S. Government's police development efforts in Iraq, the answers to the fourth supplemental question emerge. Ultimately, the critical issues that affected the development of the Iraqi Police Services were interagency and governmental fragmentation caused by a lack of coordination, synchronization, understanding, and resources, which resulted in disagreements on strategic objectives with no clearly defined end state for the Iraqi Police Services. Additionally, the U.S. Government's attempt to resolve capability deficiencies through rapid capacity expansion resulted in an unsustainable and inexperienced Iraqi police force (Byrd 2010; Keller 2010; Ladwig 2013). In order to not repeat the same mistakes, an understanding of these lessons is essential for the leadership and staff of a BCT that may conduct a future foreign police development mission.

Recommendations

Although it is debated that the U.S. Army does not possess the necessary skills or expertise to conduct foreign civilian police development, the reality is that the U.S. Government does not possess the ability to conduct large-scale police development missions, and must, therefore, rely on the military to fill this gap (Keller 2010; Ladwig

2013). Given the U.S. Army's regional alignment strategy, it is expected that the U.S. Army could assist in the development and reform of the civilian police of a failed or collapsed state. Additionally, the U.S. Army could be deployed to develop the police of a partnered nation with police-specific enabler support. Although a BCT can achieve many of the objectives found within the definition of stability policing, true democratic police reform will require a force that possesses police-specific skills.

Determining the nature and scope of police development missions will ultimately determine the type of force package that the U.S. Government commits to the host-nation. The analysis conducted in the research shows that a BCT may not be the best force for a police development mission. An alternative to the BCT could be a military police brigade employed to conduct police development in the same manner as operations previously conducted by military police transition teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Depending on the nature of the environment, another potential option could be a BCT augmented with an attached Military Police support package tailored specifically to the type of police development mission or issues discovered during the assessment of the host-nation police force.

This thesis focused primarily on the BCT's ability to conduct foreign police development. Future research regarding police development could explore the U.S. Army Military Police Corps' ability to conduct foreign police development as well as review the performance of previous Military Police advisory efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, future research could focus on the U.S. Government's ability to conduct large-scale police reform missions and investigate the utility of a civilian stability police

force, similar to those found in European nations that conduct foreign police development operations throughout the world.

In order to achieve the goals outlined in the national strategic policy letters and strategies, the United States must be committed to assisting partnered nations in ensuring their security. Part of this security assistance may be developing the civilian police of a partnered nation. Understanding the fundamentals of policing and the experiences from the previous police development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan will hopefully ensure that the United States is prepared for the next stabilization and reconstruction operation wherever it may be (Ladwig 2013).

APPENDIX A

1/10 IBCT HQ COMMAND AND STAFF BREAKDOWN

The following tables depict a detailed breakdown of the authorized positions found within the headquarters of the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division and are used within the thesis to represent a generic BCT staff. Furthermore, these tables are used in the SWOT analysis conducted for the BCT's force structure. It is important to acknowledge that the organizational structure of the headquarters for the IBCT, SBCT, and ABCT differ, but that for the purposes of this thesis, the organizational structure of the IBCT was used to represent a generic BCT conducting a police development mission.

1/10 IBCT Headquarters Field Grade Officer Breakdown

Grade / Rank	Position Code	Position Code Title	Authorized Quantity
O6 / COL	02C00	INFANTRY/ARMOR/FIELD	1
O5 / LTC	11A00	INFANTRY	1
O4 / MAJ	11A00	INFANTRY	1
O4 / MAJ	12A00	ENGINEER	1
O4 / MAJ	15B00	AVIATION COMBINED ARM	1
O4 / MAJ	25A00	SIGNAL, GENERAL	1
O4 / MAJ	27A00	JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL	1
O4 / MAJ	30A00	INFORMATION OPERATION	1
O4 / MAJ	35D00	ALL SOURCE INTEL	1
O4 / MAJ	42H00	SENIOR HUMAN RESOURCE	1
O4 / MAJ	46A00	PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GENERAL	1
O4 / MAJ	56A00	CHAPLAIN	1
O4 / MAJ	62B00	FIELD SURGEON	1
O4 / MAJ	90A00	LOGISTICS	1

Source. Created by author from information provided by FMSweb. This table depicts the breakdown of field grade officers found within the headquarters of 1/10 IBCT, by rank, position code, position code title, and authorized quantity. Of note, there are no field grade staff positions with any inherent police or law enforcement skills or knowledge.

1/10 IBCT Headquarters Company Grade Officer Breakdown

Grade / Rank	Position Code	Position Code Title	Authorized Quantity
O3 / CPT	01A00	OFFICER GENERALIST	1
O3 / CPT	02A00	COMBAT ARMS GENERALIST	1
O3 / CPT	11A00	INFANTRY	3
O3 / CPT	12A00	ENGINEER	1
O3 / CPT	14A00	AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY	1
O3 / CPT	15B00	AVIATION COMBINED ARM	1
O3 / CPT	27A00	JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL	2
O3 / CPT	29A00	ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFF	1
O3 / CPT	31A00	MILITARY POLICE	1
O3 / CPT	35D00	ALL SOURCE INTELLIGEN	2
O3 / CPT	35F00	HUMAN INTELLIGENCE	1
O3 / CPT	35G00	SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE	1
O3 / CPT	36A00	FINANCIAL MANAGER	1
O3 / CPT	38A00	CIVIL AFFAIRS	1
O3 / CPT	53A00	INFORMATION SYSTEMS	1
O3 / CPT	57A00	SIMULATIONS OPERATION	1
O3 / CPT	70H67	HEALTH SERVICES PLANS	1
O3 / CPT	74A00	CBRNE	1
O3 / CPT	90A00	LOGISTICS	1
O3 / CPT	90A92	LOGISTICS	1
O2 / LT	02B00	INFANTRY/ARMOR	1
O2 / LT	42B00	HUMAN RESOURCES OFF	1

Source. Created by author from information provided by FMSweb. This table depicts the breakdown of company grade officers found within the headquarters of 1/10 IBCT, by rank, position code, position code title, and authorized quantity. Of note, there is only one MP officer on the Brigade's staff.

1/10 IBCT Headquarters Warrant Officer Breakdown

Grade / Rank	Position Code	Position Code Title	Authorized Quantity
W4 / CW4	150U0	UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYS	1
W3 / CW3	153AI	ROTARY WING AVIATOR	1
W3 / CW3	255S0	INFORMATION PROTECTION	1
W2 / CW2	125D0	GEOSPATIAL ENGINEERING	1
W2 / CW2	140A0	COMMAND AND CONTROL	1
W2 / CW2	255A0	INFORMATION SERVICES	1
W2 / CW2	255N0	NETWORK MANAGEMENT TECH	1
W2 / CW2	290A0	ELECTRONIC WARFARE TECH	1
W2 / CW2	350F0	ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE	1
W2 / CW2	351M0	HUMAN INTELLIGENCE	1
W2 / CW2	420A0	HUMAN RESOURCES TECH	1
W2 / CW2	882A0	MOBILITY OFFICER	1
W2 / CW2	920A0	PROPERTY ACCOUNTING TECH	1
W2 / CW2	922A0	FOOD SERVICE TECH	1

Source. Created by author from information provided by FMSweb. This table depicts the breakdown of warrant officers found within the headquarters of 1/10 IBCT, by rank, position code, position code title, and authorized quantity. Of note, there are no warrant officer staff positions with any inherent police or law enforcement skills or knowledge.

1/10 IBCT Headquarters Senior Noncommissioned Officer Breakdown

Grade / Rank	Position Code	Position Code Title	Authorized Quantity
E9 / CSM	00T6O	COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR	1
E9 / SGM	11Z6O	INFANTRY SENIOR SERGEANT	1
E8 / MSG	19Z5M	ARMOR SENIOR SERGEANT	1
E8 / MSG	25U5O	SIGNAL SUPPORT SYSTEM	1
E8 / MSG	29E5O	ELECTRONIC WARFARE SPEC	1
E8 / MSG	35X5O	INTELLIGENCE SENIOR	1
E8 / MSG	42A5O	HUMAN RESOURCES SPEC	1
E8 / MSG	92G5O	FOOD SERVICE SPEC	1
E8 / MSG	92Y5O	UNIT SUPPLY SPEC	1

Source. Created by author from information provided by FMSweb. This table depicts the breakdown of senior noncommissioned officers found within the headquarters of 1/10 IBCT, by rank, position code, position code title, and authorized quantity. Of note, there are no senior NCO staff positions with any inherent police or law enforcement skills or knowledge.

1/10 IBCT Headquarters Sergeants First Class Breakdown

Grade / Rank	Position Code	Position Code Title	Authorized Quantity
E7 / SFC	11B4O	INFANTRYMAN	3
E7 / SFC	12B4O	COMBAT ENGINEER	1
E7 / SFC	12Y4O	GEOSPATIAL ENGINEER	1
E7 / SFC	19K4O	M1 ARMOR CREWMAN	1
E7 / SFC	25B4O	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	2
E7 / SFC	25D4O	CYBER NETWORK DEFENDER	1
E7 / SFC	25E4O	ELECTROMAGNETIC SPEC	1
E7 / SFC	25W4O	TELECOMMUNICATIONS OP	1
E7 / SFC	27D4O	PARALEGAL SPEC	1
E7 / SFC	29E4O	ELECTRONIC WARFARE SP	1
E7 / SFC	36B4O	FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	1
E7 / SFC	37F4O	PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS	1
E7 / SFC	38B4O	CIVIL AFFAIRS SPEC	1
E7 / SFC	68W4O	HEALTH CARE SPEC	1
E7 / SFC	74D4O	CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,	1
E7 / SFC	88N4O	TRANSPORTATION MANAGE	1
E7 / SFC	92Y4O	UNIT SUPPLY SPEC	1

Source. Created by author from information provided by FMSweb. This table depicts the breakdown of sergeants first class found within the headquarters of 1/10 IBCT, by rank, position code, position code title, and authorized quantity. Of note, there are no sergeant first class staff positions with any inherent police or law enforcement skills or knowledge.

1/10 IBCT Headquarters Staff Sergeants Breakdown

Grade / Rank	Position Code	Position Code Title	Authorized Quantity
E6 / SSG	11B3O	INFANTRYMAN	1
E6 / SSG	12B3O	COMBAT ENGINEER	1
E6 / SSG	15P3O	AVIATION OPERATIONS	1
E6 / SSG	15Q3O	AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL	1
E6 / SSG	19D3O	CAVALRY SCOUT	1
E6 / SSG	25D3O	CYBER NETWORK DEFENDER	3
E6 / SSG	25E3O	ELECTROMAGNETIC SPEC	1
E6 / SSG	25N3O	NODAL NETWORK SYSTEMS	1
E6 / SSG	25Q3O	MULTICHANNEL TRANS	1
E6 / SSG	25S3O	SATELLITE COMMS	1
E6 / SSG	31B3O	MILITARY POLICE	1
E6 / SSG	31E3O	INTERNMENT/RESETTLEMENT	1
E6 / SSG	35F3O	INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	1
E6 / SSG	42A3O	HUMAN RESOURCES SPEC	1
E6 / SSG	46Q3O	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPEC	1
E6 / SSG	56M3O	CHAPLAIN ASSISTANT	1
E6 / SSG	92Y3O	UNIT SUPPLY SPECIALIS	1

Source. Created by author from information provided by FMSweb. This table depicts the breakdown of staff sergeants found within the headquarters of 1/10 IBCT, by rank, position code, position code title, and authorized quantity. Of note, there are two Military Police Staff Sergeants on the Brigade Staff that augment the Military Police captain to form the Brigade's Provost Marshal Staff.

1/10 IBCT Headquarters Sergeants Breakdown

Grade / Rank	Position Code	Position Code Title	Authorized Quantity
E5 / SGT	11B2O	INFANTRYMAN	1
E5 / SGT	12Y2O	GEOSPATIAL ENGINEER	1
E5 / SGT	14G2O	AIR DEFENSE BATTLE	1
E5 / SGT	25B2O	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	2
E5 / SGT	25L2O	CABLE SYSTEMS INSTALL	1
E5 / SGT	29E2O	ELECTRONIC WARFARE SP	1
E5 / SGT	35F2O	INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	1
E5 / SGT	35G2O	GEOSPATIAL INTEL	1
E5 / SGT	35L2O	COUNTER INTEL	1
E5 / SGT	35M2L	HUMAN INTEL	1
E5 / SGT	42A2O	HUMAN RESOURCES SPEC	2
E5 / SGT	46Q2O	PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPEC	1
E5 / SGT	46R2O	PUBLIC AFFAIRS BROADCAST	1
E5 / SGT	92Y2O	UNIT SUPPLY SPEC	1

Source. Created by author from information provided by FMSweb. This table depicts the breakdown of sergeants found within the headquarters of 1/10 IBCT, by rank, position code, position code title, and authorized quantity. Of note, there are no sergeant staff positions with any inherent police or law enforcement skills or knowledge.

1/10 IBCT Headquarters Lower Enlisted Personnel Breakdown

Grade / Rank	Position Code	Position Code Title	Authorized Quantity
E4 / SPC	12Y1O	GEOSPATIAL ENGINEER	1
E4 / SPC	14G1O	AIR DEFENSE BATTLE	1
E4 / SPC	15P1O	AVIATION OPERATIONS SP	1
E4 / SPC	19D1O	CAVALRY SCOUT	1
E4 / SPC	25B1O	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	2
E4 / SPC	25L1O	CABLE SYSTEMS INSTALL	1
E4 / SPC	25U1O	SIGNAL SUPPORT SYSTEM	2
E4 / SPC	35F1O	INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	2
E4 / SPC	35G1O	GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGEN	1
E4 / SPC	42A1O	HUMAN RESOURCES SPEC	3
E4 / SPC	92Y1O	UNIT SUPPLY SPEC	2
E3 / PFC	12Y1O	GEOSPATIAL ENGINEER	1
E3 / PFC	14G1O	AIR DEFENSE BATTLE MA	1
E3 / PFC	25B1O	INFORMATION TECHNOLOG	1
E3 / PFC	25L1O	CABLE SYSTEMS INSTALL	1
E3 / PFC	25U1O	SIGNAL SUPPORT SYSTEM	2
E3 / PFC	35F1O	INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	1
E3 / PFC	42A1O	HUMAN RESOURCES SPEC	3
E3 / PFC	92Y1O	UNIT SUPPLY SPEC	1

Source. Created by author from information provided by FMSweb. This table depicts the breakdown of lower enlisted personnel found within the headquarters of 1/10 IBCT, by rank, position code, position code title, and authorized quantity. Of note, there are no staff positions for lower enlisted that require any inherent police or law enforcement skills or knowledge.

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