The Prolonged Downfall of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

Abstract

This monograph seeks to identify contributing factors, other than continued Soviet aid, that led to the prolonged survival of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Government between the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and its final collapse in 1992. It will discuss three key factors that gave the DRA a marked advantage over the mujahedeen. The negotiated settlement of the Geneva Accords that led to the Soviets withdrawal, the fragmentation of the mujahedeen alliance following the withdrawal, and the DRA policy of National Reconciliation. It will conclude with a comparison of the effects of these factors on both the DRA and mujahedeen, using the economist Max Weber's theory on the source of legitimate domination by bureaucracies.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 22, 2014
Accession Number
ADA611956

Entities

People

  • Gary P. Mcdonald

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Afghanistan
  • Afghanistan Conflict
  • Agreements
  • Civil War
  • Economic Systems
  • Foreign Aid
  • Geography
  • Governments
  • Insurgency
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Political Systems
  • Sociopolitics
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • Urban Areas

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • East Asian Political and Security Studies within the Soviet Union
  • International Relations and Conflict Resolution
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.