The Effects of U.S. National Security Strategy on Force Structure and the National Industrial Base: 1945-1960
Abstract
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower both began their first terms in office having to guide the military, the economy and national security policy through the waning months of an unexpected war and into an era of dubious peace. The Truman administration's policymaking in these areas was often simple but marked with turbulence, inconsistencies and inaccuracies. As a result, military force structure and the national industrial support base underwent significant expansions and contractions in response to global security events, often at a pace too slow to meet impending threats effectively at their outset. In contrast, the Eisenhower administration's approach to policy in these areas was comparatively more organized and consistent, but too complex for a realistic military adaptation to its views. The result was an expanded, yet more stable, defense-spending framework, but a force structure biased toward the use of nuclear weapons and unrealistic in meeting the likely nature of future threats to national interests. Furthermore, the technological requirements demanded by Eisenhower's New Look approach far exceeded the capabilities organic to the standing military at the time and set the stage for a deeply interwoven and inextricable relationship between the military and industry that remains to this day.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 22, 2014
- Accession Number
- ADA611963
Entities
People
- Joseph P. Dzvonik
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College