Strategic Dissonance: British Middle East Command in World War II

Abstract

This paper examines the causes and effects of dissonance between the British strategic command and the British Middle East Command during the summer of 1941. Relying on historical research, this paper finds that multiple conflicts spread across an immense geographic area complicated the operational response and contributed to the strategic misunderstanding of the operational challenges. Further, the strategic interjections into the operational sphere, choosing tactical operations against the advice of the military commander, resulted in failure to win the most important campaign. The victorious campaigns, undertaken against the advice of the military commander, proved to have no strategic value, and may have ultimately cost the British forces far more than any possible benefit they could provide.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 22, 2014
Accession Number
ADA612008

Entities

People

  • Gamble L. Monney

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Africa
  • Aircrafts
  • Combat Operations
  • East Africa
  • Geographic Regions
  • Middle East
  • Military Commanders
  • Military Operations
  • Military Training
  • New York
  • Second World War
  • Terrain
  • Treaties
  • United States
  • United States Strategic Command
  • War
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.