No Tail for the Strategic Dog: Marginalization of Logistics during Operation Torch, Invasion of North Africa
Abstract
Operation Torch, invasion of North Africa, was the United States military's first major offensive campaign in the European Theater during World War II. It demonstrated the consequences of an Army marginalizing logistics. The operation included an amphibious assault, followed by a ground attack to seize Tunisia. Three factors limited its success. By marginalizing logisticians, leaders failed to achieve unity of effort in conducting operations. The negative bias towards logisticians influenced planners and senior leaders who controlled the troop basis to reduce allocations and minimize the inclusion of service units in operations. Finally, because planners and senior leaders did not value logisticians' interpretation of data, which constricted tactics and strategy, they excluded them from planning efforts. As a result, during both the amphibious assault and subsequent attack on Tunis, United States forces lacked necessary equipment and services to sustain operations. This exclusion resulted in the early culmination of Allied forces 16 miles short of Tunis. After the operation, Army leaders made changes to achieve victory and win the war. The Army needs logisticians to anticipate strategic requirements and overcome constraints and shortfalls. The Army needs service units to sustain its combat forces.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 22, 2014
- Accession Number
- ADA612046
Entities
People
- Richard J. Matson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College