Village Stability Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Special Operations Approach
Abstract
Post-war Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains a volatile nation of competing factions and unresolved conflicts. DRC's weak central government, poor economy, and limited combat power prevent a swift solution to a conflict fueled by ethnic marginalization, armed groups, and international interference. The U.S. Army has successfully employed Special Operations Forces (SOF) to support stability efforts in similar environments. From 1961 to 1971, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program in Vietnam focused on reconciling the Montagnard minority to support the South Vietnamese government against a Viet Cong insurgency. Building on the lessons from that conflict, Army planners developed a bottom-up solution in Afghanistan to support the overall counterinsurgency effort. From 2010 to the present, SOF in Afghanistan have employed Village Stability Operations (VSO) focused on the rural populations in areas critical to the Taliban insurgency. This research explores the results and principles of the CIDG and VSO programs to determine the validity of a similar approach in DRC. It concludes that a VSO model, discerningly employed, provides an opportunity to promote lasting stability, specifically where other efforts have failed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 12, 2014
- Accession Number
- ADA613509
Entities
People
- Chad P. Lewis
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College