

INTERNAL CHALLENGES OF UKRAINIAN SECURITY PROCESS

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ABSTRACT

INTERNAL CHALLENGES OF UKRAINIAN SECURITY PROCESS, by Major Oleksii Denysenko, 89 pages.

The evolving global and regional security environment challenge nations in adopting their security systems. In order to adjust accordingly, countries have to assess these environments and find their best possible solutions. There are different factors that influence this adaptation process, and governments may make wrong steps during their efforts in that area. This thesis researches the Ukrainian way of adaptation to a regional security environment after the Cold War era. For comparison and cross-case analysis purposes, it also studies the same processes in three relatively similar countries that had to implement drastic changes after the Soviet era: Poland, Romania and Kazakhstan. The thesis touches areas of political course, national security strategy evolution, economic capabilities and development processes, and Clausewitz's triad relationships from the angle of government. The factors and challenges that influence Ukrainian security system adaptation include: uncertainty in foreign policy and its frequent change, economic inefficiency, insufficient defense expenditures, and imbalanced relationships in the Clausewitz triad. For further research, this thesis also proposes to study aspects that may influence security system adaptation, such as corruption, bureaucracy, decentralization of power, and Clausewitz's triad relationship between the military and people.

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ACRONYMS

EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout human existence, groups of people, tribes, countries, empires, states and federations had conflicting interests that they could not resolve through dialogue or compromise. Therefore, nations strived to build forces that are capable of protecting their interests through wars, armed conflicts, intimidation, and/or coercion. Armed forces play one of the prominent roles in the contemporary global security environment, and they are still used as an instrument of national power.

While the international security environment is rapidly changing, nations will try to adapt to emerging challenges. In order to reach their goals, countries conduct internal reforms, forge formal and informal partnerships, and occasionally switch sides regionally, as well as globally. This process never ends, and this ever-changing international order keeps the issue of security system adaptation relevant to all sovereign nations. Adopting to a regional or global security environment and trying to build their security capabilities, states face many internal and external challenges. Not all of the adaptation and transformational efforts are successful, but tangible success often enhances a nation's ability to use their military component in pursuit of national interests. There are many examples in modern history of both successful and unsuccessful efforts in using a military component as an instrument of national power.

Today's world shows that a secure environment for a country may be achieved not only by military means. There are other options, which may contribute to a country's security success, such as collective security, and probably in some cases, strict impartial foreign policy. Policy makers should assess many variables when choosing the way of

national security development. This way is not smooth and has many obstacles, challenges, and risks. This way is also especially challenging for new countries that recently appeared on the world political map. Among these countries are those that were part of the Soviet Union, as well as Warsaw Pact states. The peculiar difficulty of security process in these countries takes origin in revolutionary changes in politics, economy, and society that countries had to implement immediately. In addition, lack of experience played a very important role.

Background

After getting its independence in August of 1991, Ukraine inherited from the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics a large, and relative to other eastern and central European countries, a modern armed force, with a total strength of approximately 780,000 personnel. In addition, Ukraine controlled the third largest nuclear capability in the world including intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium- and short-range nuclear assets, as well as strategic aviation platforms capable of nuclear strikes around the globe. However, due to a significant economic recession in Ukraine that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine could not afford such a large military and Ukrainian Parliament *Verkhovna Rada* passed a decree that called for the reduction of the total strength down to 400,000-420,000 thousand personnel by the end of 1991.¹

A few years later in 1994, Ukraine relinquished all nuclear capabilities and signed the Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances with the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, and the US. This is known as the *Budapest Memorandum*. In accordance with this document, Ukraine eliminated all its nuclear weapons, and in return, the country received recognition of its territorial integrity and

assurances from the other signatories that they would not put any economic pressure or use military force against Ukraine if it not decided by the United Nations Security Council.²

By accepting the risk of being without such a persuasive deterrence factor, it is logical that Ukrainian decision makers relied on the international rule of law in its national security policy because of simply not having means to resist aggression with unlimited warfare. For almost a decade after the *Budapest Memorandum*, there was no explicit and implicit risk to Ukrainian security. During this time, the country was suffering from economic an crisis that continued to 1999. Not until 2000 did Ukraine achieve positive numbers in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increase. There were also the same trends related to economic recession in neighboring post-Soviet countries.

The following years came with some concerns for Ukrainian security. The first tangible security issue that could have alerted Ukrainian leadership was the Tuzla Crisis in October of 2003. At the end of September 2003, the Russian Federation began to build a dam in order to create a ground connection with the Ukrainian island Tuzla in the Kerch Gulf which separates the Ukrainian Crimea Peninsula from the Russian Federation. Having the island as a part of its territory, Ukraine had the privilege of controlling Kerch Gulf and taking all appropriate fees from sea vessels that passed the gulf and travelled to the Sea of Azov or the Black Sea. In response to Russian actions, Ukraine concentrated reinforced Border Guard Service forces on the island and conducted a massive military exercise in Crimea. Russia explained its actions as a peaceful project with environmental purposes, but Russia also wanted to question Ukraine's authority over the island.³ The dispute ended with the signing of an agreement between the countries regarding common

use of the Sea of Azov and the island stayed under Ukrainian authority. That dispute showed that there may be a threat to national security, and in particular, to territorial integrity, and that even in the 21st century, the world's superpowers may neglect international agreements that Ukraine relied on, such as the *Budapest Memorandum* where Russia recognized Ukrainian territorial integrity.

The second alerting event that violated the *Budapest Memorandum* was the so-called 'Ukrainian-Russian Gas War' that took place in January 2006, which in some terms continues even today. During that economic dispute between countries, Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, and the latter subsequently shortened gas delivery to twenty other European countries because 80 percent of gas transit capacity to Europe belonged to Ukraine.⁴ That caused displeasure among the European countries and threatened European energy security. Russia uses its gas advantage to Ukraine when the latter is incapable of or reluctant to pay bills, or its policy becomes too Western as it did in 2006, 2009,⁵ and as recently as June 2014.

In the case of the Tuzla Crisis, the Ukrainian government demonstrated a strong point and a vigorous and rapid response. As a result, the dispute over the island did not turn into a violent military conflict. Alternatively, the Russian government either failed to legitimize aggression within its populace, or the country did not have a holistic aggressive government. In other words, the Russian Clausewitz triad was well balanced for this conflict, where branches of power did not really have unity and the people were not expecting the war to happen with a neighboring country.

In the military sector over the ensuing years, numerous Ukrainian government decisions further reduced the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and concurrently

limited equipment upgrades and retention as well as modern capabilities acquisition. Major efforts and resources were directed only to retain part of the existing technical capabilities that the armed forces inherited from the Soviet Union. By the end of 2012, the Armed Forces of Ukraine consisted of 139,000 uniformed members and some 45,000 civilians.⁶ As a possible result of those steps, when the Crimean crisis started, the Ukrainian government, instead of reacting militarily, widely used a diplomatic instrument of national power addressing Russian aggression to intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Research Question

The issue of Ukrainian national security building has many more complexities in its nature than just military force reduction, overreliance on diplomacy, or economic weakness. There are many more challenges that form obstacles on the country's way of national security achievement. The following chapters identify those challenges, as well as their correlation.

One of the countries that had to go through significant change after the Cold War era is Ukraine. In general, the country failed to adapt to the international security environment, since it has ongoing armed conflict in its territory with tangible and worldwide recognized Russian invasion, and in some cases, incursion. The crisis of 2014 in Crimea showed that the Ukrainian government was reluctant to use the military component as a tool for conflict resolution and relied on diplomacy and international rule of law, while simultaneously not being a part of the collective security. Was the Ukrainian military ready to face such a challenge? Were the Ukrainian government's

possible courses of action limited by a lack of military readiness or capability? Did the Ukrainian Armed Forces fail to adapt to the changing regional security environment? What other options did the Ukrainian government have to avoid such a crisis? How could collective security help? What influenced the government's decisions in the state's security policy? The thesis research question is: what internal challenges does Ukraine face while adapting to the international security environment?

Significance of the Research

This thesis has significance in the area of national security studies, especially for emerging nations, nations that decided to significantly change their security system, or nations which are facing drastic transformation in their security policy. It also discovers and emphasizes complexity of internal environment and processes that progress in the countries. The thesis may help to grasp internal difficulties that nations have during the process of security adaptation. It studies factors that influence national decision makers when they make appropriate choices in the area of security. It also contains examples of security system change in four countries that underwent drastic change. The paper may help to achieve the experience in these areas and reveal right and wrong governmental solutions during security processes in respective countries. The countries have implemented those changes in different ways and had some successes as well as failures in their efforts. Some of them more than others. The paper also studies correlations and interdependence of the challenges and the level of such dependence on one another. That allows identifying pitfalls, which appear on the way to security adaptation, and defining primary and secondary challenges that a country may have in different areas.

Delimitations

There are following delimitations apply to this thesis:

1. The thesis studies only the period since the compared countries (Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Kazakhstan) got their independence or political independence from the Soviet Union until the end of 2013. The timeframes studied are: Poland and Romania—from 1989 through 2013, and Kazakhstan and Ukraine—1991 to 2013. However, there are some references to events that occurred in 2014.
2. The thesis focuses only on areas of foreign policy vector change, national security strategy development, economic potential, defense expenditures, as well as Clausewitz's triad relationships of government-military and government-people.
3. The study focuses on identifying only internal challenges to Ukrainian security adaptation. Influence of external factors that affect this process is avoided in this study.

Limitations

This thesis has the following limitations:

1. Literature used for the thesis was in English, Ukrainian, and Russian languages only. This should be a significant limitation because Poland and Romania have their own languages and literature, which were not reviewed. This issue does not concern Kazakhstan to such a big extent, because Kazakhstan has two national languages Russian being one of them.

2. The time allowed for completing this thesis is the other limitation. The paper was written from March through December 2014.
3. This thesis includes only a literature review and is not based on any oral history interviews and surveys.
4. Being a Ukrainian citizen, the author may have biased conclusions and reasoning. However, the thesis is written with efforts to minimize it.

Scope and Assumptions

This thesis covers case studies of four countries that underwent significant change in their security policy. All four—Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Kazakhstan—were either within the Soviet Union or under its direct political influence. Along with security policy changes, these countries had to review their social and economic fields.

In chapter 2, the thesis studies only basic trends, events, facts, and governmental decisions, which from the author's point of view, have and had the biggest impact on the security processes in the respective countries. There is no detailed focus on any addressed area.

The thesis studies areas of political, national security strategy development, economic potential, defense expenditures, and Clausewitz's triad relationships of government-military and government-people. These areas are studied in the four countries mentioned. It is assumed that the information found in these areas is sufficient to analyze and answer the research question.

Definitions

Throughout this thesis, the author uses the following terms:

Adaptation to the International Security Environment: process that a country goes through in order to tailor its security policy in response to continuously changing international security environment.

Government: general notion that includes national branches of power that are authorized to run a country and make highest national decisions.

Security Documents: national state level documents accepted by authorized decision makers that define or frame respective national security policy.

The Government: highest body of executive branch of power in Romania and Kazakhstan.

¹ Постанова Верховної Ради України [Decree Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of Ukraine], “Про Концепцію оборони та будівництва Збройних Сил України” [About Defense and Ukrainian Armed Forces Building Concept], No. 1659-12, 11 October 1991, accessed 20 June 2014, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1659-12>.

² Council on Foreign Relations, “Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994,” 5 December 1994, accessed 22 May 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-nonproliferation/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484>.

³ Roman Woronowycz, “Russian-Ukrainian Dispute over Tuzla Escalates,” *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 26 October 2003, accessed 20 June 2014, <http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/2003/430301.shtml>.

⁴ Richard B. Andres and Michael Kofman, “European Energy Security: Reducing Volatility of Ukraine-Russia Natural Gas Pricing Disputes,” *Strategic Forum*, No. 264, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, February 2011, accessed 25 June 2014, <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA545411>, 1.

⁵ Ibid., 6.

⁶ Міністерство оборони України [Ministry of Defense of Ukraine], *Біла книга – 2012* [White Book –2012], Kyiv, 2013, 17.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Political Course of the Countries

This chapter studies four cases of security process development in Ukraine, Poland, Romania and Kazakhstan since the time those countries achieved their independence or political freedom from Soviet Union. Those countries had relatively similar conditions when they started building foundations of democratic society, began developing new security policy and commenced changing economic model. After more than two decades since fall of the Soviet empire, the aforementioned countries have gone through drastic changes and each of them has paved its own pathway of development.

The research is limited to studying areas of political course, national security strategy development, economic potential, defense expenditures, and Clausewitz's triad relationships of government-military and government-people in all four mentioned cases. The study includes basic trends, events, facts, and governmental decisions, which from the author's point of view, have and had the biggest impact on the security processes in Ukraine, Poland, Romania and Kazakhstan. Cross-case analysis of gathered information is conducted in Chapter 4, "Analysis."

Twenty-three years after its 1991 independence, Ukraine still has not decided what external political course to take. The first few years of independence were uncertain when Ukraine did not express any preferences in foreign policy. It took some steps toward the West in 1994 when it joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Program. Since that time, Ukraine has participated in numerous NATO and bilateral military-to-military activities and NATO-led operations with NATO member states. The most significant

contribution of Ukrainian Armed Forces to NATO-led operations was their participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom where Ukraine provided for operation purposes a mechanized brigade consisting of more than 1,600 personnel from 2003 to 2005.

After the ‘Orange Revolution’ that took place at the end of 2004 through the beginning of 2005, the pro-Western president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushenko, declared a new external Euro-Atlantic integration policy, which had the purpose of obtaining NATO membership. Appropriate Presidential decree stated: “strengthening of trust among the states, sequential reduction of a threat of using military force, implementation of Euro Atlantic integration policy, which has its final purpose of obtaining NATO membership, viewed as a foundation for mutual European security system.”¹ However, the president did not have full support within Ukrainian legislative and executive branches and he failed to complete appropriate reforms required by the alliance.

Subsequently in 2010, Ukraine declared a new political course: “Ukraine as an European non-block state conducts open foreign policy and strives to cooperate with all interested partners, simultaneously avoiding its dependence on separate states, unions of states or international structures.”² This course was proclaimed by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, who had significant support in the legislative branch. However, this so-called non-block policy had some hint in Russian preferences when Yanukovich, just after reaching the presidency in 2010, signed the agreement which prolonged Russian naval basing in Crimea from 2017 to 2042. From that time until the end of February 2014, there was no change in the country’s political course. The only exception in foreign policy was the European integration effort in 2013 that was subsequently cancelled by the government.

Since Poland achieved its political independence from the Soviet Union in 1989-1990, the country clearly defined its foreign policy that drastically turned to the West. In its turn, internal policy and ideology switched from communism to parliamentary democracy. All these reforms came to the country with the Polish non-governmental trade union *Solidarność* (Solidarity) headed by charismatic leader Lech Wałęsa.³

The *Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland* as of 1992 absorbed Western priorities in the country's foreign policy and made it clear that the country strived to join NATO,⁴ promote its European integration, and relied on collective defense. Eventually in 1999, Poland received its NATO membership and became a part of Euro Atlantic collective security.

Along with NATO integration, Poland strived to join the EU where it had a powerful partner in Germany as the unofficial Polish 'spokesperson' in European structures.⁵ The country applied for EU membership in 1994. Four years later in 1998, the official integration process was initiated. Following EU invitation for membership in 2002, the country joined the EU in 2004.⁶

Communist dictatorship ended in Romania with the revolution organized by the *Frontul Salvării Naționale* (National Salvation Front) and the execution of Romanian ruler Nicolae Ceaușescu in December of 1989. Later in 1992, the National Salvation Front leader, Ion Iliescu, reformed the group into a political party named the Democratic Salvation Front. However, there were talks that the Iliescu government failed to complete required social and economic reforms.⁷ Therefore, the country did not transform its economy and suffered from economic inefficiency.

Nevertheless, after a few years of democratization, Romania had strict Western-oriented prospect in its foreign policy. The first talks about Romanian NATO membership started during the NATO conference in Madrid in 1997. One of the preconditions for joining the alliance was professionalization of the Romanian Armed Forces. Followed by the 2002 formal invitation for the membership, Romania together with other six countries joined NATO during a Washington ceremony in 2004.⁸ This achievement became possible through transformation of forces and a decrease in the corruption rate. To highlight the significance of this step to the country, during the Washington ceremony, Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase said, “Romania represents an important argument for a strategic alliance and is no longer a country on the margin of security systems.”⁹

NATO membership strengthened Romania’s regional position and opened new prospects for economic development and cooperation with the EU. The process of EU integration began right after the transition from communism to democracy. In 1995, the country had an EU integration department in nearly in every agency.¹⁰ However, the process was very slow due to EU requirements of the economy. Official talks on the accession began in 2000, and Romania managed to follow the integration plan, which had a goal to join the EU in 2007.

After getting its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan appeared between global Asian players such as Russia and China. Since that time, the country tried to balance between these two global powers and the United States.¹¹ Among these three, Kazakhstan prefers and relies more on Russia because they have 300 years of common history and nearly 30 percent of an ethnic Russian population that inhabits the

country. Along with it, Kazakhstan tries to minimize Russian influence and continues to develop economic relations with China, EU, Japan and other central Asian countries. In order to minimize such influence, Kazakhstan even moved its capital from the northern ethnic Russian dominated city Almaty to Astana in 1997.

In 1992, the country signed the Collective Security Treaty, which after a decade, reformed into the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2003. To a certain point, that step extended dependence on Russia since Russia is the dominant nation in the organization. Moreover in 2012, Russia and Kazakhstan established a collective air defense system. Nevertheless, on a relatively smaller scale, Kazakhstan continues its security cooperation with NATO, the United States and the United Nations.

In the economic environment, Kazakhstan became more dependent on Russia by joining the Russian-led Eurasian Union and Customs Union in 2011. Kazakhstan looks at the Customs Union very optimistically, and permanent Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev said, “it is estimated that through the Customs Union, Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus will achieve additional GDP growth of 25%, or more than USD600 billion, by 2030.”¹² To minimize Russian dependence, President Nazarbayev tries to avoid these organizations becoming political.¹³ However, it is still a challenge for the country to become a leading energy-exporting country in Central Asia.

Process of National Security Strategies Development

Development of National Security Strategy in Ukraine

In the post-Soviet era, Ukraine first referred to its security challenges and ways for resolving them in 1997 when the country developed the *National Security Concept (Foundations of the State Policy) of Ukraine*. That concept had in its provisions the three

following threats for Ukrainian security: economic, civic, and institutional instability; internal or external actors that might exploit that weakness; and with the internal or external intervention of these actors, the instability might turn to civil conflicts.¹⁴

According to the Ukrainian National Security Council's vision, which was not included in the *National Security Concept* itself, in order to address these threats, the country had to achieve certain goals. These goals were cost-effective division of labor among armed forces and other security agencies; high level of trust among central, regional, and local governments and power structures; unity of effort between mentioned governments and security agencies; clear command relationships among stakeholders; and strict correspondence between state policy and operational development steps.¹⁵

Although the National Security Council's vision had raised issues that, after decades, are still under discussion and improvement, not all of these ideas were included in the document and transformed into tasks. The *National Security Concept* itself provided only a very general basic framework for a future national security system. Its provisions had only tasks of developing a national security strategy, creation of an administrative system, and the initiation of continuous evaluation of obtained results.¹⁶ Although that document had provisions that encouraged the country to join existing collective security systems or create new ones, it did not specify any of them and the government did not take significant steps in this area.

For more than five years, there were no other documents accepted by the state leadership. Finally, in 2003, Ukrainian Parliament *Verkhovna Rada* (Supreme Council) accepted *Foundations of National Security*. In addition to threats mentioned in the *National Security Concept*, this document had external political threats, such as external

encroachment on national sovereignty and territorial integrity, external territorial claims, regional and local wars especially near the Ukrainian state border.¹⁷ Much attention in the document was focused on possible border conflicts near Ukraine such as Transdnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, with subsequent involvement of Ukraine. *Foundations of National Security* also had a provision that set an external course to EU and NATO integration. That document is still in force. It was amended several times with no major changes, except in 2010 when the NATO integration part was excluded by President Yanukovich.

A year later in 2004, because of strict tasks to governmental agencies in provisions in *Foundations of National Security, Issues Regarding Military Doctrine of Ukraine* was developed and signed by President Leonid Kuchma. Despite the term ‘doctrine’ that document has a different purpose in Ukraine than in some other countries and it is designed to describe the current security environment, to define the role of governmental armed formations in a war or conflict, and to set general principles of force employment. It is something in the between the US *National Security Strategy* and US *Defense Strategic Guidance*. The *Military Doctrine* is still valid although it was amended several times. This document has mainly defensive principles where the Armed Forces of Ukraine, together with other governmental armed formations, may only be employed in response to external aggression or arising conflict around Ukraine.¹⁸ It was also clearly stated that Ukraine did not have any other country that was considered to be an opponent. The doctrine had Western direction of national security system development, but it was changed to ‘non-block’ status in 2012.

In 2007, the *National Security Strategy of Ukraine* was accepted by pro-western President Viktor Yushchenko after 16 years of Ukrainian independence. The document defined national interests, ways of influencing threats, and had strict Western direction in security system building where the armed forces had to adopt NATO standards.¹⁹ However, in 2012, the government amended the *National Security Strategy of Ukraine*, as well as other security documents, with a major change of ‘non-block’ development course for the security system. The document first raised the issue of energy dependence as a threat to national security. In distinction, previous documents referred only to energy inefficiency. The document was mainly neutral nature where the country had to balance between the EU, Russia, the United States, and China.

If Ukraine needed six years to come up with a basic security course, Poland did the same thing in the three years that followed the Polish democratic turn in 1989. In 1992, the country unambiguously defined its preferences with collective security priorities in *Security Policy and Defense Strategy*, where Poland had to join NATO by 2000.²⁰ Like principles laid down in *National Security Concept (Foundations of the State Policy) of Ukraine*, the Polish parent security document had mainly a defensive perspective, but clear Western direction.

After the country joined NATO, a new *National Security Strategy* was adopted in 2000. There were no major changes to the document in comparison to the strategy of 1992. The main purpose of security system remained the same, which was to provide independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and immunity of the national border. However, the document added new tasks due to NATO requirements for Polish security forces. These tasks obliged Poland to develop expeditionary capabilities.²¹

Poland's third *National Security Strategy* of 2003 was a continuation of previous documents of that kind and was based on the same general principles as the first ones.²² The major difference that distinguished Polish *National Security Strategy* of 2003 from former documents was distinct prioritization of threats. If the old papers had the primary threat of external conventional invasion, the new one yields for the threats of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and international terrorism.²³ It was a consequential improvement after 9/11 events.

In 2007, after Poland joined the EU (in 2004), it accepted a new *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*. That document obliged Poland to develop military expeditionary capability in order to not only contribute to NATO, but also to EU-led operations and retain existing defensive tasks to rebuff external aggression.²⁴ In addition, the strategy reflects a need for long-term military technological progress. However, the country simultaneously relies on collective security.

In distinction to the Polish process of national security strategy development, the Romanian case was slow and drafts of the *National Security Concept* and the *Military Doctrine* of 1994 were ambiguous and unclear and required foreign assistance and consultations provided by the United Kingdom and the United States.²⁵ After several revisions, the *National Security Strategy of Romania* was first officially adopted in 1999. A few major points concerning this document were to protect independence, sovereignty, and, what is more distinguishable, to contribute to global security.²⁶ The latter point obliged them to create limited expeditionary capabilities to support NATO-led operations.

After the 9/11 events, a new *National Security Strategy of Romania* was adopted in 2001. The document emphasized the importance of global collective efforts to fight terrorism. The strategy also yields for a new common approach to a European security system. These changes came because of Romania's efforts to join NATO and the EU²⁷ when due to global fights on terrorism the United States was lobbying NATO enlargement.

After joining NATO in 2004, a new *National Security Strategy of Romania* was introduced in 2005. The strategy obliged them to align security sector to NATO standards and participate in collective security.²⁸ The main security problems were addressed to economic issues because the state had to fulfill EU accession requirements.

After accession to the EU in 2007, Romania had to adjust its national security strategy accordingly. The newly adopted document was not focused on external aggression but highlighted the importance of commitment to international security building. It included these main threats: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and cross-border organized crime.²⁹ In addition to that, it included the importance of further EU integration.

Development of national security policy in Kazakhstan ran a different way than in other countries being studied. In 1992, the country formed its supreme security institution known as the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan headed by the president. Legal security background started to form in 1998 when Kazakh Parliament accepted the National Security Law, the *National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan*.³⁰ The document focused mainly on internal threats, such as rule of law breakdown, political instability, and ethnic tensions. The threat of possible external

aggression was mentioned, but it was not emphasized. The law was amended with minor changes to its point several times throughout next 14 years. From a foreign relations perspective, the law did not have any strict directions of future development and interaction. There was a relatively small chapter that described basic mutually beneficial principles of foreign cooperation.

In 2012, the Kazakh parliament accepted the new National Security Law, the *National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, which also focuses first on internal threats that might come from ethnic tensions and weakening of national identity.³¹ That document also extended to possible informational threats to the country and countermeasures to fight them. The new law is also characterized by the reduction of parliamentary power on making decisions regarding national security issues and limitation of that power to constitutional norms.³² According to the law and the Kazakh Constitution, the president not only remains a major source of power in the country, but the law also strengthens his power. That change was a continuation of presidential authority enlargement since the constitution was changed for the first time in 1995.³³ The law also mentions developing a national security strategy that has not been developed and accepted yet.

Economic Potential and Defense Expenditures

In the Soviet era, Ukraine was an agricultural-industrial republic, which had a mild climate and fertile black soil that allowed the country to be the breadbasket of the Soviet Union. During transition to a free market economy, followed by the collapse of Communism, Ukraine faced drastic economic crises and the country only managed to recover from the downfall of the GDP at the beginning of the 21st century. Not having

sufficient natural energy resources such as gas and oil, Ukraine has to import these resources from its regional partners, mainly from Russia. The major reason for the presence of such a deficit is inefficient energy consumption in whole sectors of the economy beginning with the steel industry and ending with centralized utilities in private houses. That reality goes back to the Soviet Union, when all factories and farms were created in a way of neglecting energy economy, where energy resources were not an issue because of sufficient available sources in the huge Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Ukraine as an independent state did not prioritize economy transformation in that area throughout 23 years of its existence, although that problem was mentioned in national security documents. In addition to the energy problem, the country's agricultural and industrial products are not always able to compete in European and world markets because they do not meet standards required by international organizations. In order to accomplish that task, the economy needs even more investments to improve production and storing processes.

Because of the aforementioned issues, Ukraine has to import 67 percent of its consumed natural gas,³⁴ and a majority of it is supplied by Russia. Moreover, due to product standardization issues, the country has to search for importers of its goods among the countries that do not require strict standards, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Georgia.

One of the greatest strengths of Ukrainian economy is military-industrial complex. By exports of arms, the country is in eight place in the world.³⁵ Ukraine produces armored and wheeled vehicles, aircrafts, military ships, small arms, provides maintenance and produces spare parts for military equipment for other countries

including strategic delivery means. The country inherited this from the Soviet Union, but it also was able to modernize old samples of weapons and develop new ones that can compete on the international market. However, it is hard for the state to compete with other leading countries in that area due to not being a part of any free-trade union, which usually protects their domestic industry or export markets.

As the second largest country on the European continent (if Russia is counted as a European country), Ukraine has a total area of 603.6 thousand square kilometers with a population of 45.4 million people.³⁶ The country's nominal GDP constitutes \$178.3 billion³⁷ (2013 estimate) and the GDP (purchasing power parity) strives to be \$392.5 billion³⁸ (2013 estimate). The GDP has the following percentages in the sectors of the economy: industry-29.6 percent, agriculture-9.9 percent, services-60.5 percent. The labor force constitutes 22.2 million people where 8.0 percent are unemployed. The labor force is employed in the following sectors of the economy: agriculture-5.6 percent, industry-26 percent, services-68.4 percent.³⁹ These numbers demonstrate that the country's economy is balanced by percentages of labor involved in sectors.

Looking at defense expenditures in 2013, Ukraine has spent approximately \$5.3 billion,⁴⁰ which constitute three percent of the country's nominal GDP. Over the years of independence, defense expenses increased slowly in the 1990s, then in the 2000s they increased slightly with the exception of 2009-2011 due to consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008. Looking at these numbers, it is possible to get defense expenditures per member of the armed forces, which would be \$24.7 thousand per person if counting armed forces personnel together with paramilitary forces which is a total of 214.9 thousand personnel.⁴¹

Being in transition from communism to democracy, Poland suffered an economic recession in 1990. The Polish economy had large international debt, worsening social services, and a depressed consumer sector that created “an overwhelming sense of social dissatisfaction and apathy.”⁴² The government succeeded in improving the economy by conducting immediate economic ‘shock-therapy’ that included decreasing governmental control in favor of the market economy itself and downsizing trade relations with Russia and diverting it to the West.⁴³ The economy also faced a trade deficit, which the country successfully periodically overcame by having a favorable currency rate after joining the EU in 2004.⁴⁴

After the world financial crisis of 2008, the Polish economy became the most dynamic one among the EU states. When the EU’s overall economy is still catching up to its pre-crisis level, the Polish economy increased by 16 percent.⁴⁵ That phenomenon became possible because of governmental reforms that were unpopular to the populace that allowed it to create an economy that is a “large internal economy, a business-friendly political class, and the hypercharged potential of a developing country catching up with its western peers.”⁴⁶ These reforms left millions of Poles out of work, but in the long-term perspective, even by 2008, the country’s economy tripled in size.⁴⁷ The severe reforms were focused on lifting price controls, capping government wages, trade liberalization, and making the Polish currency, the zloty, convertible.⁴⁸

In the energy sector, Poland like Ukraine, is dependent on energy imports. For example, the country imports two-thirds of its natural gas supply and 82 percent comes from Russia (2011 estimate).⁴⁹ However, its amount of total annual natural gas supply is significantly smaller than it is in Ukraine. If Ukraine annually consumes 59.3 billion

cubical meters (2011 estimate)⁵⁰ of natural gas, Poland, despite having a larger economy, consumes only 16.4 billion cubical meters.⁵¹

Poland's total area is 312.7 thousand square kilometers (almost two times smaller than Ukraine) with a slightly smaller population that constitutes 38.3 million people.⁵² Despite this, the country's nominal GDP is significantly bigger and equals \$517.7 billion (2013 estimate)⁵³ and its GDP (purchasing power parity) is also drastically higher in comparison and is \$896.8 billion (2013 estimate).⁵⁴ By sectors of the economy, the GDP consists of the following areas: industry-33.3 percent, agriculture-4.0 percent, services-62.7 percent. The labor force consists of 18.2 million people with an unemployment rate of 10.3 percent (2013 estimate). The labor force works in the following sectors of the economy: agriculture-12.9 percent, industry-30.2 percent, services-67 percent.⁵⁵ This data allows a conclusion that the country has a balanced economy where the agricultural sector needs little improvement because the percentage of GDP it brings is three times smaller than the percentage of labor involved in it.

In 2013, in the defense sector, Poland spent around \$9.4 billion,⁵⁶ which equals 1.8 percent of the country's nominal GDP. After overcoming Soviet influence, Poland proportionally increased its defense expenditures annually from \$5.2 billion in 1991, with the exception of 2008 and 2013 when the expenses slightly decreased by \$0.9 billion and \$0.1 billion,⁵⁷ respectively. Since the Polish Armed Forces total strength, including paramilitary forces, equals 172.7 thousand,⁵⁸ it is possible to calculate expenditures per member of the armed forces that equal \$54.5 thousand.

The democratic turn in Romania brought more economic challenges to a country that required immediate reforms. Looking at economic reforms implemented by other

East European countries, the Romanian government tried to use the Polish experience as a basis, but used an evolutionary approach to it instead of the original revolutionary “shock-therapy.”⁵⁹ Unlike in Poland, due to political reasons of desiring not to implement unpopular reforms, the Romanian government did not privatize and decentralize the economy. That in turn, led to a trade deficit, continuous hyperinflation, and a GDP downturn in 1990-1993.⁶⁰

The following years from 1993-1996 were characterized by signing an association agreement with the EU that increased trade with the EU and attempted to finish privatization in the country.⁶¹ With moderate success, the country managed to decrease inflation and produce a positive GDP growth rate, but the lack of foreign investments and failure to transform the economy and finish privatization led to new economic challenges of trade and budget deficits as well as external debt growth.⁶² Further economic problems in 1997 caused the GDP to decrease seven percent, and losses in Romanian foreign policy where the country deviated from processes of the EU and NATO enlargements. Such economic difficulties were mostly triggered by failure to sustain economic reform and political disagreements within ruling coalition regarding the reform itself.⁶³

Nevertheless, Romania managed to get economic growth in 2001 of 4.8 percent, and because of that, the country attracted international financial institutions, as well as NATO and EU to reconsider their policies concerning Romania.⁶⁴ As stated before, enlargement of the previously mentioned international organizations resulted in response to the events of 9/11. The following years until the country’s accession to the EU in 2007, Romania showed continuous annual GDP growth.⁶⁵ The world’s financial crisis of 2008 affected the country a bit later than the other countries, having an impact on the GDP

with a downturn of 7.1 percent in 2009, but international financial institutional assistance in 2009 contributed to economy stabilization in 2011.⁶⁶

The Romanian energy sector is different from those sectors in Ukraine and Poland. The country has more energy resources that are concentrated on its territory and it is not that dependent on energy supplies from abroad. For example, Romania imports only 7.49 million ‘tons of energy’ in oil equivalent when Ukraine and Poland have these numbers at 42.17 and 32.09, respectively (2010 estimate).⁶⁷

Possessing territory of 238.4 thousand square kilometers, Romania is comparable to Poland and Ukraine in population density with a total populace of 21.7 million people.⁶⁸ Romania’s nominal GDP is \$188.9 billion (2013 estimate)⁶⁹ and the GDP (purchasing power parity) is also, as in the other two countries, significantly higher than nominal and equals \$371.2 billion (2013 estimate).⁷⁰ Numbers of GDP composition by sectors of the economy for Romania are the following: industry-34.2 percent, agriculture-6.4 percent, services-59.4 percent. The labor force constitutes a little less than 9.5 million people from which 7.3 percent are unemployed. Labor is encompassed in the following sectors of the economy: agriculture-29.9 percent, industry-28.6 percent, services-42.4 percent.⁷¹ For the same reason as in Poland’s case, the Romanian agricultural sector needs some improvement since it still has such a large difference in percentage of labor involved and GDP coming from the agricultural sector.

In the 2013 defense sector, Romania’s expenditures were \$2.5 billion,⁷² which equals 1.3 percent of the country’s nominal GDP. After turning from communism to democracy in 1989-1990, the country’s defense spending went up and down annually with no significant change from \$2.2 billion in 1993.⁷³ Having the Romanian Armed

Forces total strength of 151.3 thousand,⁷⁴ it is possible to calculate expenditures per member of the armed forces that equals \$16.5 thousand.

After the Soviet Union collapse, Kazakhstan inherited “enormous fossil fuel reserves and plentiful supplies of other minerals and metals,” which makes the extractive industry sector a primary engine of the state’s economic system.⁷⁵ In 1992, President Nazarbayev initiated reforms in order to turn the Kazakh economy to a free market model⁷⁶ and his vision of success was in separation of economy and communism ideology.⁷⁷ This idea retains respect to communist ideology, but simultaneously shifting from a Marxist to a liberal economic model where both may coexist. The first steps of the 1992-1993 economic reform in Kazakhstan were about price liberalization and privatization. However, these reforms did not go smoothly because the president had a different vision of the changes than the country’s parliament until 1995, when the constitution was changed, which delegated more power to Nazarbayev.⁷⁸ By 1999, privatization reform was relatively successful in Kazakhstan, which resulted in having 60 percent of the GDP coming from private sector and those indexes were even ahead of relatively successful countries such as Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary.⁷⁹ As a result of these reforms, the country’s GDP stopped decreasing in 1996, with an exception in 1998, and started to grow by 10 percent on average since 2000.⁸⁰

The economic crisis of 2008 affected Kazakh economic growth dramatically. The sectors of the economy that suffered most were the financial sector, housing construction and metallurgy mining, what had an even greater effect was the global oil demand decrease.⁸¹ For a year and a half, the country’s government denied that the global crisis

affected Kazakhstan at all. Subsequently, it had to react as the situation deteriorated and it managed to achieve economic growth in 2009 by a GDP increase of 1.1 percent.⁸²

Being the largest of the compared countries and having a territory of 2,274 thousand square kilometers, Kazakhstan has the lowest population density with a total populace of 17.5 million people.⁸³ The country's nominal GDP is \$231.9 billion (2013 estimate)⁸⁴ and GDP (purchasing power parity) like in other compared states, exceeds its nominal index significantly and is \$395.5 billion (2013 estimate).⁸⁵ The GDP is divided by the sectors of the economy by the following numbers: industry-37.9 percent, agriculture-5.2 percent, services-56.9 percent. The labor force constitutes approximately nine million people with the unemployment rate of 5.3 percent. Labor is encompassed in the following sectors of the economy: agriculture-25.8 percent, industry-11.9 percent, services-62.3 percent.⁸⁶ For the same reason as in Poland and Romania, the Kazakh agricultural sector needs improvements since it has such a large difference of percentage of labor involved and GDP produced. However, these numbers say that the country possesses a strong industrial sector where the largest part comes from energy resources.

Kazakhstan's 2013 defense expenditures were \$2.6 billion,⁸⁷ which equals roughly 1.2 percent of the country's nominal GDP. After obtaining independence in 1991, the country's defense expenditure dynamics have been about increasing expenditures from \$0.39 billion in 1995 with two relatively significant jumps of \$0.5 billion in 2007 and 2012.⁸⁸ Having 70.5 thousand as a total strength of the armed forces,⁸⁹ it is possible to calculate annual expenditures per member of the armed forces, which is \$36.9 thousand.

Clausewitz's Triad Relationships

The idea of looking at Clausewitz's triad as a system was described by Oleksandr Kolisnichenko in his US Army War College thesis "Military Reform in Ukraine." He studied military-people and civil-military relationships, but focused more on the level between Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.⁹⁰ This thesis proposes to look at the strategic level of civil control and government-people relationships. Figure 1 depicts those relationships.




Figure 1. Clausewitz's Triad Relationships Researched in this Thesis

Source: Christopher Bassford, *Tip-Toe Through the Trinity, The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare*, The Clausewitz Homepage, 9 April 2014, accessed 23 November 2014, <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/Trinity8.htm>. Modified by author.

In general, over the years of independence Ukrainian decision makers managed to create solid civil control over the military. All mechanisms of controlling the military were defined in the Ukrainian Constitution, laws and governmental regulatory acts. This control has three main verticals that come through the Ukrainian Parliament (*Verkhovna*

Rada), the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which is an executive body of the Ukrainian government.

In accordance with the constitution, the Ukrainian Parliament has privileges of declaring war and peace, approving total strength of the armed forces, other armed formations and armed forces' employment whether in Ukraine or abroad. The parliament exercises those rights only after the president makes and submits appropriate decisions for approval. Therefore, this vertical focuses more on control over the presidential decisions than on control of the forces.

As mentioned above, the other controlling vertical belongs to the President of Ukraine, who is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He or she also appoints higher military commands including the Minister of Defense, decides on their promotions, and “exercises control of national security and defense areas.”⁹¹ The president uses his or her constitutional right by leading the National Security and Defense Council. The council mainly serves as a coordinating body, which assists the president in making decisions in the security area, but it is also authorized to monitor governmental executive agencies in areas of national security and defense during peace, as well as during war or crises situations.⁹²

The third controlling body is the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which exercises something close to administrative control over the forces mainly through defense budget planning and daily functioning. Therefore, the defense budget follows the same process as budgets of other agencies. The Cabinet of Ministers also has control over the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, as it is a part of the executive branch of power. However, this control must not conflict with other verticals of civil control over the military.

There is not much power for the armed forces to influence governmental decisions. One of the few ways possible is to go through the Minister of Defense, who is a member of the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Security and Defense Council. However in 2014, President Petro Poroshenko, added the Ukrainian Chief of Defense to the National Security and Defense Council due to ongoing crises in eastern Ukraine that followed the Russian incursion.

Ukraine, as a new state, has adopted democratic values into its laws at least on the constitutional level, where according to the country's law, the Ukrainian Constitution, the source of state power belongs to Ukrainian people. People use this power through nationwide elections where they elect by popular vote the Ukrainian Parliament, the president and local councils. Then, elected individuals are supposed to promote the interests of their voters.

“Ukraine is distinguished by its regional and political diversity, which prevents any single force from monopolizing power.”⁹³ Therefore, the Ukrainian government and parliament as well as the president do not have holistic popular support throughout the country, especially in the areas of language and external foreign policy. Ukrainian diversity includes following ethnical groups: Ukrainians, Russians, Belarusians, Jews, Tatars, Armenians, Azeri, and others. Among these, Ukrainians and Russians constitute the biggest groups of 72 percent and 22 percent respectively, where the others comprise less than six percent altogether.⁹⁴ The geographical majority of the ethnic Russian population live in eastern Ukraine and in Crimea. It is hard to take into account mentioned numbers, because they are not precise and people's self-identification changes over time,⁹⁵ mainly because of the governmental policy. There is also no clear distinction

between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians or Ukrainian and Russian speaking citizens. Many ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians support Ukrainian identity and are active proponents of the independent Ukrainian state. Some people from the Russian minority are active supporters of the Russian state and pro-Russian, anti-western foreign policy. According to personal observations and media sources reviewed one of the reasons for this is that these people did not totally reject anti-Western ideology and Russian imperial values. A big influence here comes from the contemporary Russian information policy towards Ukraine, and especially towards ethnic Russians that populate the eastern regions and Crimea. Although that factor is external, it is also considered as internal and deserves attention. The second reason for that phenomenon is that these regions have close economic and family relations with Russia. There was also the Ukrainian internal political contribution to the issue of further ideological dichotomy. It concerns political confrontation of pro-Western and pro-Russian political forces that struggled for the power after the 1990s, when they speculated with ethnic, cultural, language, and foreign policy issues during their pre-election campaigns.

Being at the same transition from communism to democracy as Ukraine, Poland had to establish democratic civil control over the military. The appropriate decision came with amendments to the *Law on Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland* in late 1991. According to those changes, control over the Polish Armed Forces went to the president, who became the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and got “the authority to determine their main directions of development, but on the recommendation of the Minister of Defense.”⁹⁶ Further decisions in this area came from an old, twice-amended ‘communist’ constitution as well as in the final Polish Constitution of 1997.⁹⁷ According

to this document, the president became the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and he or she “exercises command over the Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defense,” where the authority of the former is defined in a military statute.⁹⁸ He is also authorized to assign higher military commanders down to service commanders.

Another vertical of minimal control over the military belongs to the Polish parliamentary chamber of Sejm. Unlike in Ukraine, the Polish Parliament only has the authority of declaring war and peace. War can only be declared if there is external aggression or if there is a requirement under international agreement, such as the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5.

In accordance with the constitution, the third and the most influential vertical of military control is under the Polish Council of Ministers, a country’s body on top of the executive branch of power. It is authorized to exercise control over the field of national defense as well as to ensure Polish external security. The main distinction of that system is that the Council of Ministers defines total strength of the military personnel.

The control structure over the military described above allows establishing an effective relationship from the military to the government. The armed forces can influence the government through the Council of Ministers, which has constitutional authority. That link may be implemented through the Minister of National Defense, who is a part of the council.

According to Polish law, “Supreme power in the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation” where the nation shall exercise this power directly or through representatives.⁹⁹ The constitution also defines that both chambers of the Polish Parliament Sejm and Senate as well as the president, are subject to national universal

elections. The president, later approved by the Sejm, appoints the head of the Council of Ministers, who in turn, forms the council.

Looking at the ethnic composition of the Polish population, it is possible to state that Poland is a homogenous country and is not ethnically diverse where the minority comprise less than 500 thousand people or 1.23 percent of the population.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the minorities are territorially dispersed throughout the country and live in municipalities.¹⁰¹ Therefore, Poland unlike Ukraine, does not have ethnical division within the society. However, in the 1990s, Polish society was characterized by political passiveness where two-thirds of the electorate did not see themselves as supporters of any political party.¹⁰² Along with that, there were some divisions within the society about issues of religiosity, economic liberalism, and attitude to the communist past.¹⁰³ It is possible to assume that those divisions were not significant and not overwhelmingly decisive for government-society relationship because of general political inactiveness of the population.

Post-communist Romanian civil control over the military came into force after adaptation of a new constitution in 1991.¹⁰⁴ The present Romanian Constitution appeared in 2003 after amendments to the Constitution of 1991. The constitution defines three verticals of control over the military.¹⁰⁵

The first vertical of control belongs to Parliament. According to article 73 of the constitution, Parliament has the authority of declaring the state of war and partial or total mobilization of the armed forces. In addition, according to article 118 of the same document, Parliament accepts laws that define structures of national defense system and the military.

The second vertical of civilian control over the military belongs to the President of Romania. The constitution's article 92 entitles him or her as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as a leader of the Supreme Council of National Defense.¹⁰⁶ This same article also gives him or her the authority of declaring states of mobilizations, but this right should be subject to, and in some cases, must have subsequent approval by the Romanian Parliament. Along with these privileges, the president, is authorized to promote general officers. Moreover, being the leader of the Supreme Council of National Defense, the president has authority over that council, which unitarily organizes and coordinates activities regarding country's defense and security.¹⁰⁷

The third vertical of control belongs to the government, a body of Romanian executive power, which consists of the prime minister, ministers, and other members according to Romanian laws. The government is authorized to make decisions in the military field, but the constitution does not specify them, except mentioning: "[governmental] decisions of a military character shall be conveyed only to the institutions concerned."¹⁰⁸ However, academic works say that the government and Parliament accept documents regarding defense activities as well as the defense budget as a part of state budget.¹⁰⁹

Like Ukraine and unlike in Poland, the above described control structure over the military does not show an unambiguous link in the government-military relationship. It seems that the military does not have sufficient influence to the government due to being relatively far from decision makers in the administrative chain. Possible ways of

influencing the government are through the Minister of National Defense, who is a member of the government and the Supreme Council of Defense.

The result of democratic changes within the country comes from the Romanian Constitution that states: “The national sovereignty shall reside within the Romanian people.”¹¹⁰ The role of the people here is relatively the same as in Ukraine and Poland, where people exercise power through the representatives that are popularly elected. Subsequently, representatives are supposed to promote interests of their electorate, as an example a senator (a member of parliamentary chamber of senate) represents around 160,000 Romanians and a deputy (a member of parliamentary chamber of representatives) represents 70,000 people.¹¹¹

Ethnically, the country is not drastically divided among different nationalities. Romanians comprise the absolute majority of the population and constitute 89 percent of the country’s citizens. The second largest group belongs to Hungarians who form 7.1 percent of the population. Other nationalities, such as Roma, Germans, Ukrainians, and others have less than four percent.¹¹² Romanian democratization at the end of the 20th century, even fueled ethnic tensions between ethnic Romanians and Hungarians, especially in 1990 in the province of Transylvania, which has a high concentration of ethnic Hungarians.¹¹³ However, subsequent tensions were peaceful, but did not go away from the domestic political scene or from external bilateral disputes with Hungary.¹¹⁴ The disputes resulted in the signing of a bilateral Romanian-Hungarian treaty in 1995 under pressure on Romania from the EU side. Ethnic Hungarians received more rights and Romanian President, Ion Iliescu, explained it as a desire of getting the EU and NATO memberships.¹¹⁵

Like Ukraine and unlike Poland and Romania, Kazakhstan had to establish completely new civil-military relationships, because Kazakh, like the Ukrainian military before the countries received their independence, were parts of the huge Soviet military machine, when Poland and Romania had separate military structures. Since the Kazakh Constitution, which was adopted in 1995, states that the republic of Kazakhstan is a democratic state,¹¹⁶ the country had to establish democratic civil control over the military. According to this document, Kazakh civil control over the military has three pillars.

The first pillar and the most influential one, belongs to the president. According to the constitution's article 44, he is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and has the authority to assign higher military command and promote them. In case of aggression, he also has the right to declare a state of war and mobilization without parliamentary approval, but must immediately inform Parliament. At first glance, it seems that the Kazakh President has relatively the same authorities as presidents in the other researched countries. However, the distinction comes from the Kazakh President's constitutional rights of legislative authority in certain cases.

The second vertical of civil control belongs to Parliament, which has a privilege of declaring war and peace, as well as making decisions on the country's defense and security execution. However, the president has the same authority of war proclamation, and in certain cases, may take legislative authority. The third vertical of control belongs to the government, the country's body of executive power. The government has a right of defining direction of national defense and security policy and administering ministerial activities, as well as consolidating the state budget, which is subject to approval by

Parliament.¹¹⁷ From the military side, it seems that there is a good potential influence on the government in terms of having constructive feedback. The procedure of influencing government goes through the government (executive body), which as written above, exercises authority of the state's defense and security policy prioritization.

As in other researched countries, the Kazakh population influences government by electing the president and Parliament, participating in nationwide referendums. Then those institutional subjects should represent the populace. However, there is some constitutional distinction where the president has more constitutional authority over all three branches of power, especially "The First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan," who may be elected unlimited times.¹¹⁸

The Kazakh population is multiethnic and is composed of several dozen ethnical groups.¹¹⁹ As in Ukraine, Kazakhstan has two major groups of ethnic Kazakhs, who constitute almost 59 percent, and Russians who represent a little less than 26 percent of Kazakh citizens. Nevertheless, other ethnic minorities comprise 15 percent of the population, where each of them has no more than three percent of the citizenship.¹²⁰ At first glance, the percentage of the Kazakh population is not that large like the respective nationalities in the other researched countries, but there is a tendency to its significant increase since the Soviet 'empire' collapsed, when in the 1989 census there were only 41.1 percent of ethnic Kazakh people living in the Kazakh Socialistic Republic.¹²¹ One of the causes of this trend relates to governmental policy regarding national identity building that is reflected in Kazakh laws such as the *National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan*.¹²² As mentioned previously, the *National Security of the Republic of*

Kazakhstan places emphasis on the threat of ethnic tensions and strict provisions about strengthening the national identity.

This chapter studied four cases of security process development in Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Kazakhstan. After more than two decades since the fall of the Soviet Union the aforementioned countries have gone through drastic changes and each of them had its own specific way of development. Reviewed literature in researched areas of all four cases showed basic trends, events and governmental decisions that were taken by respective countries. The information gathered is considered to be sufficient for doing analysis. Chapter 4, “Analysis,” contains cross-case analysis and gives the answer to the research question.

¹ Указ Президента України від [Decree of President of Ukraine], *Питання воєнної доктрини України* [Issues Regarding Military Doctrine of Ukraine], No. 702/2005, 21 April 2005, accessed 25 June 2014, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/702/2005>.

² Закон України від [Law of Ukraine], *Про засади внутрішньої і зовнішньої політики* [Foundations of Internal and Foreign Policy], No. 2411-VI, 1 July 2010, accessed 25 June 2014, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411-17>.

³ Peter D. Stachura, *Poland in the Twentieth Century* (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 135.

⁴ Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces* (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 20.

⁵ Karl Kordell, *Poland and the European Union* (London: Routledge, 2000), 165.

⁶ IHS Jane's, “External Affairs, Poland,” *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe and the Baltic States*, 14 February 2014, 10.

⁷ Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution* (Florence, KY: Gordon and Breach, 2000), 80.

⁸ IHS Jane's, "External Affairs, Romania," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans*, 7 May 2014, 7.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ IHS Jane's, "External Affairs, Kazakhstan," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS*, 19 February 2014, 1.

¹² Ibid., 9.

¹³ Ibid.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The thesis research question is: what internal challenges does Ukraine face while adapting to the changing international security environment? To answer that question research was conducted by analyzing certain areas of Ukrainian security process during the years that followed the achievement of the country's independence in 1991. These areas touch general decisions which were made by state level policymakers in choosing political course and national security strategy development. Along with these areas, the research analyzed economic potential, defense expenditures, and Clausewitz's triad relationships from the angle of government. Through research and analysis of these areas, some results were found and specific internal challenges in national security adaptation that Ukraine faced and faces now were discovered.

In order to answer the research question, qualitative research methodology was used. Multiple case study analysis, described by John W. Creswell in *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design*, best fits the thesis purpose. To ensure the research is more productive, cross-case analysis¹ was used where the same areas mentioned relating to security processes were studied in three other countries: Kazakhstan, Poland, and Romania. For that purpose, different sources that have the information were researched, which helped find the answers to the research question. Mentioned sources include but are not limited to official governmental documents (laws, decrees etc.), statements and testimonies of governmental authorities, publications, articles, educational research projects, etcetera. In addition, personal observations and recollections are used in the thesis.

The reason Kazakhstan, Poland, and Romania were chosen for cross-case analysis and comparison, is that all of them were under relatively the same conditions and circumstances as Ukraine when the Soviet Union collapsed. First, Poland and Romania were under significant influence of the Soviet Union before it collapsed due to being under the post-World War II Soviet area of control that followed the signing of the Warsaw Pact. Kazakhstan, as well as Ukraine, were part of the fallen empire. Second, the countries had to recover from the communist regime and rebuilt their political systems, social environment, and economy. However, these countries had some differences in size, population, culture, and resources, which was taken into account during the research and analysis. All of the chosen countries have taken their own paths of development as well as security system adaptation after beginning at almost the same time and simultaneously having same conditions. They have gone through long and hard paths for their security system adaptation to the changing international security environment.

The analysis includes the search for past and future challenges for Ukraine during its security process development in areas that were researched: the political course, national security strategy process, economic potential, defense expenditures, and Clausewitz's triad relationships. Next, how these challenges affect Ukraine and how the country faces and responds to them is analyzed. Subsequently, how the same challenges influence the security process in the other three countries, the other countries reactions, what decisions they make, and how successful or unsuccessful they are in dealing with the challenges was analyzed. After separate analysis of the challenges in all countries, embedded analysis² of the same challenges in cases of all countries was conducted and a comparison was made of which case is more successful in dealing with a particular

challenge. The comparison studies similarities and differences in the respective countries. However, the thesis is focused on the Ukrainian case since the country is the subject of the research question, but studies the same variables in the other countries.

Recommendations for further study are provided in chapter 5. Those recommendations include proposals of researching other aspects, different from those studied in this research, that may have influence on the national security process in Ukraine, and the may include challenges that the country faced or faces. Use of the same methodology for further research is recommended.




Figure 2. Research Methodology Used in this Thesis

Source: Created by author.

Figure 2 shows the research methodology that was used in this thesis. This methodology allows making conclusions and assessments through comparative studies of relatively similar cases. The findings, which come as a result of following this research methodology are analyzed and compared later. This methodology also allows identifying possible solutions to problems and pitfalls discussed in this thesis which may be addressed during further academic works.

¹ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska), 75.

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine are good examples of the fact that the country failed to adapt to the international security environment. During the adaptation to this environment over the last two decades, Ukraine had certain internal challenges that probably contributed to the mentioned failures. The following analysis should identify challenges that Ukraine faced and faces during its adaptation to the international security environment since it achieved independence in 1991.

This chapter will identify challenges which Ukraine has in each of discussed areas of the security process in Chapter 2, “Literature Review.” Those areas include political course, process of national security strategy, economic potential and defense expenditures as well as Clausewitz’ triad relationships. After finding those challenges in the Ukrainian case, the analysis identifies if each specific challenge is applicable for other researched cases of Poland, Romania and Kazakhstan. Subsequently, analysis compares successes and failures of different cases in dealing with a particular challenge. Arguments used in this Chapter are based on the information gathered in Chapter 2, “Literature Review.”

Challenge of Continuous Foreign Policy Vector Change

The first challenge that comes from the research of the political course is continuous change in Ukrainian foreign policy. Analyzing Ukraine’s foreign political course since 1991, it is possible to state that the country changed its foreign vector several times between the West and Russia. Those changes were made because of a

continuous struggle between pro-Western and pro-Russian political camps that came into play in the 2000s. Those political ‘battles’ were not appropriate for the 1990s, when the population was not very politically active. One possible reason could be the lack of democratic tradition and lack of political awareness of the population at that time, when it could not quickly switch from the Soviet ideology, where people did not influence the government through mechanisms that are accepted in the democratic societies.

The first drastic change in the foreign policy came after the Orange Revolution in 2004-2005, when pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko, found himself in the presidential seat of power. However, his Euro-Atlantic integration programs that appeared in country’s laws, as well as presidential and governmental decrees did not have sufficient results due to a continuing political struggle that ultimately resulted in parliamentary coalition collapse, early elections, and continuous confrontations between institutions of state power. Even the Orange Revolution’s political forces that united for the revolution had internal disputes and did not have unity of effort. Similar significant, but diametrically opposed changes in foreign policy came in 2010 when pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych was elected. Foreign policy turned to the so called ‘non-block’ policy, and appropriate parliamentary and governmental decisions were made. Unlike Yushchenko, by the time Yanukovych was elected president, he had his coalition in the Parliament. That helped him to establish loyalty to his government through the legislative branch. The next change came with the revolution of 2014 and subsequent Russian aggression that resulted in the Crimean annexation and war in Eastern Ukraine. Newly elected President Petro Poroshenko signed the Association Agreement with the EU that again requires drastic changes in domestic and foreign policy.

The mentioned changes have huge negative impacts on Ukrainian ability to adapt to the international security environment. The country had to change priorities in its approach to security, especially since it applied for NATO membership and then switched to 'non-block' principles. Those changes touched not only legislation, but the various agencies' organizational structures and measures that had already been taken by those agencies, mainly concerning a collective security approach. As an example of these efforts, it is possible to mention that Ukrainian agencies received Euro-Atlantic integration departments that were created for that purpose, which were subsequently dismissed after the 'non-block' shift. The shift also had negative impacts on the Ukrainian regional and global reputation, when Western states and international organizations saw the country as an unreliable partner, which may change its strategic direction even in the short term.

Unlike Ukraine, Poland showed solid, consistent pro-Western political course and adopted a collective security approach with reliance on NATO. Those decisions had an advantage over the Ukrainian case, primarily because of their early initiation. Poland accepted the course of Euro-Atlantic integration and strictly followed its implementation where it had success by the end of 1990s. Also, Poland is characterized by political stability and consistency in its foreign policy with regards to economic and democratic reforms, as well as Euro-Atlantic integration.

The Romanian case is close to the Polish case, but there was a main distinction concerning a delay in the Western integration process. The delay was characterized by relatively late governmental decisions regarding EU and NATO integration that did not transform into solid and clear steps until 1995 and 1997 respectively. Those delays where

mainly caused by economic issues and EU requirements for Romanian economic reforms in particular.

Kazakhstan's foreign policy course was characterized by stability, where the institutions of power had unity in their policy, especially since 1995 when their constitution was adopted and most power shifted to the president. Kazakhstan was also consistent in its security policy, where it became a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization almost from the very beginning of the country's existence. However, the country tries to balance between regional and global relationships and minimize dependence on the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and Customs Union.

Unclear Security Reform and Weak Execution Mechanisms

After analysis of the *National Security Strategy of Ukraine* and other laws in the field of security through the prism of ends, ways, and means, it is possible to conclude that almost all the documents mentioned in chapter 2 have unclear ends and ways. If one looks at the *National Security Concept of Ukraine* of 1997, it is hard to identify clearly stated ends. For example, the provision of joining some collective security systems or creating new ones¹ does not say anything specific and if there is no specific end it is hard to find appropriate ways to achieve the ends. The concept also does not have any implementation control mechanisms when it mentions security documents development. Despite clear provisions about EU and NATO integration in 2003's law of *Foundations of National Security*, that document also has unclear ends. In particular, that uncertainty is in the provisions about military reform continuation that should increase armed forces' efficiency in dealing with real and potential threats² without describing the nature of that

reform. The positive impact of that document is that it defined execution control. As a result, a task of developing *Military Doctrine* and *National Security Strategy* were accomplished, and the documents were developed and accepted relatively quickly, in 2004 and 2007 respectively.

Only the *National Security Strategy of Ukraine* of 2012 had ends and ways for foreign relations that were specifically defined. Unlike in previous strategy and laws, the 2012 strategy clearly defined the country's strategic approach to different regions and countries even with the references to specific agreements. However, the strategy has some rough points, such as when it states that the armed forces should be reformed by downsizing, while simultaneously increasing their capabilities, and also where the military should be capable of defending the country, even taking into account its 'non-block' status. This idea of downsizing and simultaneously being strong to defend while not being a part of any collective security looks overly ambitious for Ukraine.

The outline of the foreign policy vector, as well as the first documents in the field of security appeared in Ukraine with some delay after six years of independence. Along with it, mentioned here disadvantages of unclear ends and ways and weak execution mechanisms had even greater negative effect on Ukrainian adaptation to security environment, when they were combined with continuous foreign policy change. The country lost valuable time, and efforts by different agencies became useless. Moreover, those documents seem to have formal character and seem to take the approach of 'having a document just for a document.'

While Ukraine defined its foreign policy vector after 12 years of independence (law of *Foundations of National Security* of 2003), Poland needed only three years for

this purpose when it set a goal of obtaining NATO membership in the 1992 *Security Policy and Defense Strategy*. However, it would be not fair to state that the country made this decision exactly in 1992. Poland also made many steps towards the West even earlier when it was reforming its economy and increasing trade relations with the Western European countries and the mentioned document only proves the consistency of the Polish government.

The Romanian case shows relatively the same beginning of the security process as described in Ukraine. Up to 1999 the country did not have its own strategy and the drafted documents were unclear. After talks about possible future Romanian membership in NATO, which happened in 1997, the country adapted new unambiguous security strategies where it included NATO concerns, such as fighting terrorism and weapons of mass destruction counter proliferation. The results of those efforts along with economic reforms made it possible for Romania to become a NATO member and probably assisted the country with its further efforts of integration into the EU.

Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan not only had some delays with its security documents development, but also did not define in those documents a clear foreign policy direction and the attitude toward regional and global players. Instead, the documents had an emphasis on internal threats. Although there was no formal national security strategy, Kazakhstan became a member of Collective Security Treaty Organization. Looking at this outcome, it is possible to conclude that national security documents may not be needed for collective security purposes.

Economic Inefficiency and Insufficient Defense Budget

For comparative purposes and better visualization of the differences between the compared countries it is possible to build a table that reflects general data on these countries gathered in chapter 2. Table 1 reflects main geographical, economic, demographic and defense expenditures information. It also shows the countries' current membership in economic and political-security international organizations.

Table 1. General Data on Compared Countries				
Country	Ukraine	Poland	Romania	Kazakhstan
Population, million	45.4	38.3	21.7	17.5
Territory, thousand sq. km	603.7	312.7	238.4	2,274
GDP Nominal, \$ billion	178.3	517.7	188.9	231.9
Military strength, thousand	214.9	172.7	151.3	70.5
Defense Expenditures, \$ billion	5.4	9.4	2.5	2.6
Expenses per member of forces, \$ thousand	24.7	54.5	16.5	36.9
Membership in IGOs	None	NATO, EU	NATO, EU	Customs Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization

Source: Created by author based on the information discussed in chapter 2.

The military power of any nation depends on the country's economic capabilities. Bigger economies with greater means can afford to create, retain, and develop military capabilities, and increase defense potential. In general, eastern European post-communist countries "have been reluctant to prioritize defense reform at a time when they have been concerned with apparently more pressing demands of democratization and economic transition."³ Having significant economic difficulties over the past two decades, Ukraine possibly could not afford to increase defense expenditures throughout the years of independence. That challenge is one of the most decisive to Ukrainian ability to adapt to the international security environment, since the country's well-being directly depends on economic potential. Therefore, that challenge prevented Ukrainian ability to increase military potential, and the country took means-based approach by balancing the state's budget between different sectors and absorbing into the military sector only what was left over. It is possible to state that the main question was: what can the country do in the defense area with limited resources, rather than how many resources does the country need to achieve its end state?

That issue directly linked with the above challenge about uncertain ends and ways in security documents, and along with them even has a multiplying effect. As it was discussed above, it is possible to add to that challenge frequent foreign policy changes. Moreover, continuous change in foreign policy affects the economic sector and slows reforms. Having all that simultaneously, the interdependencies of these challenges bring a lot of confusion and frustration to the security process in Ukraine.

The Republic of Poland is the most successful country in the economic sector among comparative countries in this thesis. The country managed to triple its economy,

and even had economic growth during the financial crisis of 2008. All that was possible, because of the strong governmental decisions that came after the democratic turn, and some support from the outside, for example, the German lobby during European integration probably for required reforms in particular. These so-called strong governmental decisions were characterized by political strength in taking responsibility for completing timely required reforms, even if these reforms were unpopular and had delayed successes in second and third order effects. Having insufficient energy resources and reliance on foreign imports only adds a credit to the economy. However, economic success was not followed by increased proportional defense expenditures. This expansion did not even double when the defense expenditures increased from \$5.4 to \$9.4 billion in 2013. The possible reason for it was Poland's participation in collective security, by relying on NATO's Article 5 and recent Western countries' trends of defense expenditures reduction. Along with it, it is possible to assume that Poland with its consistent security policy did not require additional resources for achieving end state in security area.

In the economic field, the Romanian case is similar to the Ukrainian case in the 1990s when both countries had an economic downturn and did not have unity in political effort towards reforms. In later years, the Romanian economic sector was directly linked to NATO and EU integration, where the country had to implement certain reforms in order to achieve its integration goals. After reaching those end states, the Romanian economy became relatively stable and showed positive GDP growth rate, although smaller than the Polish growth rate with the exception of the years that followed the 2008 global financial crisis. The indicator of not having a comparably efficient economy may

be the fact that the country possesses some energy resources. However, if one compares Romanian GDP increase and dynamics of defense expenditures, he or she would see that there was no significant change in the latter parameter throughout the researched period of time; defense expenditures changed little over 23 years. That trend, like in the Polish case, was probably caused by the country's reliance on NATO's Article 5 and/or a different prioritization of national resources.

Kazakhstan, like Poland, showed a positive dynamic in economic growth, but with a certain delay until 1996 when President Nazarbayev managed to create a unity of political will in the country. However, the Kazakh economy differs from Ukrainian and Polish economies, and to some extent from the Romanian economy, in the availability of energy resources that comprise a large part of the economy. Along with the economic growth, defense expenditures significantly increased in comparison with expenditures that country had in the 1990s. While increasing defense spending, the country also benefits from being in the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

It is possible to consider that the probability of Russian interference into any of the researched countries' economic reforms was very low. This is especially true in the beginning of 1990s, when Russia was distracted by internal political instability and severe economic challenges. However, due to centuries of common interest, Russia has more interest in Ukraine and to some extent Kazakhstan, where Poland and Romania are best viewed as a secondary echelon of Russian ambition. One more negative factor for Ukraine in the economic field could be the fact that the country was more integrated into the Soviet Union than Poland and Romania, and therefore it was harder to shift to a liberalized economic model.

One of the indexes, which can identify or reflect the intensity of defense expenditures, is the amount that the country annually spends per each member of the armed forces. The bigger index among researched countries is in Poland where it equals \$54.5 thousand. Second is Kazakhstan with \$36.9 thousand, third is Ukraine with \$24.7 thousand, and Romania completes the list with \$16.5 thousand. That index may reflect the quality of the military force and it may show the country's real attitude towards the military sector, where Poland is the absolute leader. It is possible to assume that Polish forces are better paid, equipped and trained than other countries, which are also members of collective security organizations with the exception of Ukraine.

The three researched countries are involved in collective security and do not spend relatively large percentages of their respective GDPs on defense. Comparing all three, Poland, Romania, and Kazakhstan spend from 1.2 percent to 1.8 percent of their GDPs. Ukraine has the largest input of 3.0 percent. It seems logical to have bigger expenditures for the country that is not a part of any security treaty. However, due to an inefficient economy, that percentage does not provide more resources than it does, for example, in Poland. That indicates that an economic inefficiency is a challenge for security capabilities development. Moreover, energy inefficiency should play one of the prominent roles. It is very well seen when we compare sizes of economies and their energy consumption, where Ukraine consumes more than three times natural gas than Poland does, and yet has a smaller economy and roughly equal population. That aspect of energy inefficiency nowadays is well known by the Ukrainian population, especially because of continuous gas disputes with Russia.

Broken Relationships in Clausewitz's Triad

Having Clausewitz's triad of government, people, and armed services, it is possible to look at it as a prospective model of success in creating a stable and capable security system. According to Clausewitz, successful war is possible when there is a balance in relationships among these three aspects of government, people, and armed services. This hypothesis may also be transformed into national security building or continuous adaptation to the international security environment. The thesis examines government-military and government-people relationships.

Analysis of the Ukrainian Clausewitz's triad relationships from the angle of government show that there are broken links between government-military and government-people. Civil control over the military is very strong and does not give much authority to the military. From the government side, there are three verticals of control, which exist separately. It seems that there is no clear mechanism which makes them collaborate together with unity of effort in the areas of defense reform or development. This is especially true when the Cabinet of Ministers controls the daily functioning and budgeting of the military and the president and Parliament do not execute and control these aspects. Therefore, the role of the armed forces looks underestimated, because the Cabinet of Ministers often see the Ministry of Defense as one of the other dozen ministries, which are under its control. Moreover, the requests of the Ministry of Defense have to approach decision makers through multiple layers of bureaucracy, because of being far from real authority. Those requests are often rejected even before they get to a body that makes a decision.

As mentioned in chapter 2 the, government-people relationship is also broken because of ideological divisions in Ukrainian between pro-Western and pro-Russian ideologies. The reason for it is that the clash of ideologies prevented the country from adopting a consistent foreign policy, because of weak political will and the country had to change its foreign political vector several times, possibly due to political speculation of the foreign policy vector during pre-election promises. Therefore, ideological diversity, which is also influenced and ignited from the outside, plays an important negative role, even in security documents development, this impact was amplified by a lack of political will. That, in turn, spoils security reform. However, it is hard to distinguish the relationship between ideology and ethnical affiliation. That issue requires additional research.

Polish government-military relationships look more optimistic than Ukrainian ones. There are only two verticals of civilian control over the military, which establish clear relations and they belong to the President, the government, and the Council of Ministers. Both power institutions have strict authorities over the military, and the defense institution directly reports to both branches of power. However, all of the authority is vested in the executive branch of national power and the legislators may only declare war and peace. The issue of ethnical or ideological tensions is not applicable to Poland because of having a homogeneous population with only a little more than one percent of ethnic minorities and probably pro-Western ideological society.

The Romanian case shares similarities with the Ukrainian control system over the military. The Romanian Parliament makes decisions on military structures, the president exercises control and the government deals with the budget and daily functioning.

However, the president exercises much of the vertical control through the Supreme Council of National Defense. This structure looks to have the same issues as Ukraine with the relationship between military and government. The Ministry of National Defense probably has the same problems with the state's defense decision process, because of being removed from the hierarchy of decision makers. There are also some ethnic issues in the country, but those do not have significant influence on government-people relationships, because of the relatively small percentage of ethnic minorities and a lack of ideological division because of the pro-Western preferences of largest ethnical groups.

The Kazakh case has some similarities with the Polish structure where the Ministry of Defense may interact with the government, which is authorized to make decisions in the defense policy and budgeting. That is how the military may effectively arrange appropriate required requests. The president and parliament also have rights to command and to organize defense execution respectfully. However, the president has significant influence on the parliament and the government. Looking at the government-people relationships, Kazakhstan is even more ethnically and ideologically diverse than Ukraine. Nevertheless, the government throughout the years of independence took important steps related to Kazakh national identity-strengthening that have reflections in their constitution and security documents. Those steps made it possible to increase the percentage of ethnic Kazakh population within the country. Anyway, there is no controversy in the society regarding the foreign security vector because of their Russia-oriented policy, because of the unfeasible pro-Western, and in particular pro-European, alternative mainly due to geographic reasons.

All four researched countries have civil control over the military with appropriate constitutional foundations. Poland, and to some extent Kazakhstan, have better government-military relationships than Romania and Ukraine because of being closer to the decision makers in the power hierarchy. In turn, Ukraine, and probably Romania, has a less effective relationship due to having not 100 percent clear mechanisms of collaboration among branches of state power in the area of defense.

All the compared countries have been through a hard democratic process at least at the constitutional level. Some have more success than others. Some are still building a democratic society. The issue of popular support of governments in the field of national security is not a challenge for Poland, Romania, and to some extent Kazakhstan. Ukraine looks much more affected than others, and the country lost a lot of time that could have been spent on reforms with national identity strengthening as it was implied in Kazakhstan.

Analysis Summary

In order to visualize the analysis conducted, it is possible to summarize the main outcomes of this chapter by building a comparative table. Table 2 illustrates how the challenges of national security adaptation and development discussed above affect all four researched countries: Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Kazakhstan. The plus (+) symbol indicates that a particular country faces or faced a particular challenge, and the challenge negatively affected the country's ability to adapt to the international security environment. A minus symbol (-) shows that a particular country is not affected by a particular challenge, or the country somehow managed to overcome the negative impact.

A zero (0) represents that a particular challenge has had a moderate effect on a particular country.

Table 2. Effect of Major Discovered Challenges on the Countries' Security Process				
Country Challenge	Ukraine	Poland	Romania	Kazakhstan
Changing foreign policy vector	+	-	-	-
Unclear ends and ways in security documents	+	-	-	+
Ineffective government-military relations	+	-	+	-
Inefficient economy/insufficient defense spending	+	-	+	0

Source: Created by author based on the analysis process.

As the focus of this thesis was on Ukraine, it is not a surprise that Ukraine has negative effects in all categories. Each challenge discussed in this thesis affects Ukraine, and therefore the country gets pluses in every category. Each challenge has a negative effect on the country's security process adaptation.

The table also shows that Poland has only minuses in every category, because the discovered challenges do not exist to any great extent in the country, or their negative effect was minimized by governmental decisions. Looking at the challenges it is possible

to claim that the country did not have significant change in the foreign policy vector, described clear ends and ways in its security documents, has more efficient government-military relations, and managed to increase the size of the economy and defense expenditures.

The Romanian case indicates that the country does not have issues with foreign policy vector change, although it had some uncertainty in the early 1990s. Romanian security documents were aligned with Euro-Atlantic integration. The country gets two minuses in some issues in civil-military relations, as well as economic difficulties.

Kazakhstan has the fewest significant challenges of the four countries compared. The challenges seem to affect Kazakhstan in different ways than the other countries. Foreign policy vector change is not applicable for Kazakhstan, mainly because of their autocratic form of government and absence of any significant political competition. Government-military relationships are more efficient than in Ukraine and Romania because of the vertical connections of civil-military control described in earlier chapters. Kazakhstan gets the only zero in the column for economic inefficiency and defense expenditures. Although the country shows a positive GDP trend and increasing defense expenditures, it is heavily dependent on the energy sector and is therefore vulnerable to global energy resources price fluctuations.

This chapter's analysis identified challenges that Ukraine faces during its security process. It also showed how specific challenges were addressed by other researched countries. After analyzing four cases, it is possible to state that among researched countries Poland has had the greatest success in its security process.

The following chapter will focus on interdependence of the challenges in the Ukrainian case. It studies relationships between discovered problems and identifies which challenges have the greater negative impact on Ukrainian security process. It also provides recommendations and proposes areas for further research.

¹ Decree of Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of Ukraine, *National Security Concept (Foundations of the State Policy) of Ukraine*, No. 3/97.

² Law of Ukraine, *Foundations of National Security*, No. 964-IV.

³ Forster, Edmunds, and Cottey, 1.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

After conducting research in the areas of political course, national security strategy development, economic potential, and Clausewitz's triad relationships, it is possible to answer the research question: what challenges does Ukraine face while adapting to the international security environment? This thesis has identified the following answers to this question: frequent foreign policy vector change, uncertain security reform with unclear ends and ways, economic inefficiency with scarce resources on defense, imbalanced Clausewitz triad relationships of government-military and government people. All these challenges have direct interdependence with each other and only multiply the negative effect on the country's ability to adopt to the international security environment.

The challenge that seems to have had the greatest impact on Ukrainian security processes is continuous foreign policy vector change. That challenge prevented the country from setting a strong, consistent foreign policy course and exercising firm political will. Moreover, the lack of political will, and perhaps even political weakness, may also be related to the ethnic diversity and/or ideological division of the Ukrainian population. However, the factor of ideological divergence, as well as its influence on the political processes in Ukraine and the relationship, if any, between ideology and ethnicity require additional research and detailed analysis. Also, as the Kazakh case seems to indicate, appropriate governmental decisions and good leadership could minimize that challenge in some ways, but the specific methods for ensuring that political decisions are

aligned to mitigate potential problems stemming from ideological or ethnic divisions cannot be identified without additional study.

Continuous uncertainty in foreign policy leads to security reforms that are characterized by unclear ends and ways. That happens because it is not feasible to define an end state when there is some uncertainty in the country's approach to the international security environment. Moreover, having security documents with unclear ends and ways and a concurrently struggling economy with scarce resources, Ukraine could not allocate, and perhaps could not even determine, means which could be aligned with security sector development. The challenge of inefficient government-military relationships may also be a consequence of unclear defense reform, because there are no significant motivations or incentives to improve some aspects of the defense system (from either the governmental or the military sides).

The interdependence of these challenges is not limited to direct one-way cause and effect relationships. There are also relationships that effect challenges backwards, especially when economic inefficiency is analyzed. Continuous foreign policy vector change does not allow the country to join and benefit from free trade union, such as EU. On the other hand, the economic factor prevents the country in fulfilling the economic requirements of such organizations. Third, scarce resources make it difficult to not only develop the defense sector, but also even to retain the existing military capabilities. Figure 3 reflects the relationships between major challenges discovered in this thesis by showing their dependency among each other.




Figure 3. Interdependence of Major Discovered Challenges

Source: Created by author based on the analysis process.

Findings and Recommendations

After analyzing the challenges that Ukraine faces during its security process, it is possible to propose solutions for these problems. It seems useful to choose a definitive foreign policy vector and declare Euro-Atlantic integration. It may bring the benefits of collective security as well as economic development. This is especially true when the country has scarce resources and a struggling economy.

In the economic area, the country would be required to implement needed reforms and may create a positive environment for foreign direct investments from the EU, third countries, and/or multinational corporations. Moreover, the issue of energy efficiency requires immediate reforms. In addition, energy sources require diversification in order to overcome direct dependency on Russian natural gas.

Along with consistent foreign policy, it would be useful to tailor security documents accordingly. Those documents should have clear ends and ways, and may be aligned with Euro-Atlantic organizations' policies. It would also be efficient to establish strict execution mechanisms, which could provide timely and qualitative supervision of security documents implementation.

If the latter is achieved, it would also be useful to make some changes in the civil-military relationship. The analyzed problem shows that the defense sector is too far from the country's decision makers, and as a result, it is difficult for the military to provide fruitful feedback about defense system functioning or to initiate a request for a required change. The nature of such reforms requires additional study.

Recommendations for Further Research

As a recommendation for further research, it is possible to look at the areas of corruption, bureaucracy, centralized decision-making, and Clausewitz's triad relationship between military and people. All these aspects may have an effect on the country's ability to adapt to the international security environment. Moreover, they may also be interdependent with each other and with those presented by this thesis. Further research may also show that some challenges may be more important or more difficult to resolve than others.

The issue of corruption is common in post-communist countries. It may have a negative influence on security reforms and resources spent on defense, as well as on all Clausewitz's triad relationships, particularly government-people relationships, and to some extent, military-people. It also could have a negative impact on all possible

challenges, but the main question about corruption is the degree of impact on the formulation of security policy and the implementation of security reforms.

Bureaucracy is also an issue in post-communist (and especially in post-Soviet) countries. This issue may have a negative effect on security reforms by slowing down the processes, complicating procedures and destroying the motivation of the people involved in those processes. However, the actual impact on the security adaptation process cannot be determined without further study.

The centralized decision-making model likely also has some effects on security adaptation, but perhaps not as great an influence as other challenges. The issue that seems most worthy of additional research is determining the appropriate level of authority for each level of leadership, or the limits of decentralization for various fields of decision-making.

The Clausewitz triad relationship of military-people may also have an effect on security adaptation. The people's attitude to the military is important, primarily because the population of the country may or may not accept the amount of resources that are spent on the military. However, this particular relationship could also depend on government interaction with the people in order to establish a balance, or repair a broken link.

The last recommendation for further research concerns the relationship between ethnicity and ideology mentioned in this thesis. As the analysis seems to indicate, those factors may have an influence on the political environment and political course of Ukraine. Further research could center on the degree of influence of these factors, as well as which one of them has comparatively more influence. Moreover, it would be useful to

analyze what role government may play in shaping or minimizing the negative impact of those factors.

Closing Remarks

The research in this thesis is limited to the study of major events, trends and governmental decisions in national security areas which were made by respective governments of Ukraine, Poland, Romania and Kazakhstan. However, gathered information and conducted cross-case analysis answered the research question to identify challenges that Ukraine faces during adaptation to the modern international security environment. It also allowed conclusions and recommendations as well as identifying interdependence of discovered challenges. The thesis also proposes areas for further research.

Although starting in relatively similar conditions, the researched countries have chosen different ways of security process development. Some of them had greater success than others in dealing with national security problems. Some of them did not face challenges unique to Ukraine. The ones which managed to achieve greater successes in security areas may be good examples for others which had less impressive results. However, as this thesis discovered, a specific country may have different internal conditions and factors that might not allow using previously successful patterns adopted by other countries.

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