



What is Microsoft EMET and why should I care?



Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE 22 OCT 2014		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE What is Microsoft EMET and why should I care?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Dormann /William				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 17	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

This material is based upon work funded and supported by DC3 under Contract No. FA8721-05-C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Department of Defense.

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DM-0001799

ROP Mitigations

EMET 4.0 provides application-specific ROP mitigations

- LoadLibrary
- MemProt
- Caller
- SimExecFlow
- StackPivot

LoadLibrary

Extra checking when loading a library.

- e.g. don't allow loading from a UNC path

Memprot

Check memory protection functions like VirtualProtect to make sure they are not doing things like marking stack as executable.

Caller

Before critical API functions called, disassemble backwards to verify that target function is called.

- Don't allow return into function ("Return" of ROP)

SimExecFlow

Forward execution simulation to verify normal program execution flow.

StackPivot

When entering a critical function, make sure that stack pointer is within bounds of the stack.

EMET 5.0 New Features

EMET 5.0 includes additional exploit mitigations

- Attack Surface Reduction
- EAF+
- Deep Hooks Enabled

Attack Surface Reduction

Reducing attack surface critical to prevention of exploitation.

Examples:

- Only allow Java in Intranet IE zone.
- Don't allow Flash in Microsoft Word

EAF

Export Address Filtering

To perform useful functionality, shellcode usually needs to call exported functions.

e.g. `kernel32!WinExec()`

EAF blocks access to Export Address Table (EAT) based on calling address.

EAF+

Export Address Filtering +

- Added KERNELBASE export protection
- Integrity checks on stack registers and stack limits
- Prevent memory operations for export tables when they originate from suspicious modules.

EAF+ In Action




Image Credit: <http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/02/25/announcing-emet-5-0-technical-preview.aspx>

Deep hooks

Protection of high-level functions applied towards lower-level function as well.

Microsoft has been working with vendors to make sure to ensure deep hooks compatibility.

Use EMET to stay safe

The only way to safely run applications on Windows is to use EMET!

- Minimize risk of delayed patching
- Protect against known vulnerabilities
- Protect against 0day vulnerabilities
- Protect against future vulnerabilities

EMET Recommend Configuration

System Status

- **DEP** **Application Opt Out**
- **SEHOP** **Application Opt Out**
- **ASLR** **Always On***

Import **Popular Software.xml**

Add every application you care about

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