Problems with Interagency Integration in Contemporary Operations
Abstract
An increase in the number of stability and foreign disaster relief operations since the end of the Cold War placed a growing demand on the Department of Defense to integrate operations with outside actors such as the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and agencies within the United States government. New doctrine emphasizes the Army's role as influencing, shaping, preventing, and deterring in an attempt to avoid costly, protracted conflicts. As the United States Army emerges from two prolonged counter insurgency operations, improvements in establishing quick and effective integration with the interagency and other actors is necessary to fulfill the Army's role. Integration however, remains a challenge and often requires time to establish efficient systems. Case studies of the Haitian earthquake in 2010 and the Provincial Reconstruction Team effort in Afghanistan offer an insight into the sources of integration friction. Unclear objectives, poor information sharing, and undefined roles created conflict in civil-military relationships. These issues are due to poor use of existing doctrine to facilitate integrated planning. Past and current doctrine offers guidelines and principles to direct planning. Use of these principles and creating a more integrated Army education system will improve future civil-military relationships in stability and disaster relief operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 04, 2014
- Accession Number
- ADA614166
Entities
People
- Raymond A. Maszarose
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College