



ALWAYS STRATEGIC: JOINTLY ESSENTIAL LANDPOWER

Colin S. Gray



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JOINTLY ESSENTIAL LANDPOWER**

Colin S. Gray

February 2015

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
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FOREWORD

The strategic quality of Landpower is widely known, but not widely understood. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray explores and explains the meaning of strategic Landpower. He is concerned particularly to argue that, although Landpower today must function in a joint environment, typically it is the dominant element in the team for U.S. national security.

The monograph lays emphasis upon the place of the human domain that leads in the role played by ground forces in strategy. Because of some widespread conceptual misuse, many people are not used to thinking of Landpower as a strategic instrument for American security policy. Dr. Gray aspires to help reduce the popularity of this important misconception. It is necessary for good policy that American Landpower should be considered and debated properly, which is to say in appropriate strategic terms.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

COLIN S. GRAY is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, United Kingdom (UK), and at the Hudson Institute in Croton-on-Hudson, NY, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy, a defense-oriented think tank in the Washington, DC, area. Dr. Gray served for 5 years in the Ronald Reagan administration on the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. A dual citizen of the United States and UK, he has served as an adviser to both the U.S. and British governments. His government work has included studies of nuclear strategy, arms control, maritime strategy, space strategy, and special forces. Dr. Gray has written 27 books, including *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order* (University Press of Kentucky, 2004); *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005); *Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice* (Routledge, 2006); *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Strategy* (Potomac Books, 2009); *National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities* (Potomac Books, 2009); *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford University Press, 2010); *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History*, 2nd Ed. (Routledge, 2011); *Airpower for Strategic Effect* (Air University Press, 2012); *Perspectives on Strategy* (Oxford University Press [OUP] 2013), which is the follow-on to *Strategy Bridge*. The final volume in the Strategy Bridge trilogy, entitled *Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty*, was published by OUP in 2014. Dr. Gray is a graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford.

SUMMARY

American Landpower is a strategic instrument of state policy and needs to be considered as such. The purpose of this monograph is to explore and explain the nature of Landpower, both in general terms and also with particular regard to the American case. Five themes drive through this work. Specifically, it is argued that: (1) Landpower is unique in the character of the quality it brings to the American joint team for national security; (2) the United States has a permanent need for the human quality in Landpower that this element provides inherently; (3) Landpower is always and indeed necessarily strategic in its meaning and implications—it is a quintessentially strategic instrument of state policy and politics; (4) strategic Landpower is unavoidably and beneficially joint in its functioning, and this simply is so much the contemporary character of American strategic Landpower that we should consider jointness integral to its permanent nature; and, (5) notwithstanding the nuclear context since 1945, Landpower retained, indeed retains, most of the strategic utility it has possessed through all of history: this is a prudent judgment resting empirically on the evidence of 70 years' experience.

In short, the strategic Landpower maintained today can safely be assumed to be necessary for security long into the future. No matter how familiar the concept of strategic Landpower is when identified and expressed thus, it is a physical and psychological reality that has persisted to strategic effect through all of the strategic history to which we have access.

ALWAYS STRATEGIC: JOINTLY ESSENTIAL LANDPOWER

As we relearned in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States should not enter a conflict with a strategic plan that amounts to little more than engaging and destroying the enemy order of battle. Lasting strategic success is not a function of enemy units eliminated or targets destroyed. A successful strategic outcome rests, as it has since time immemorial, on winning the contest of wills.

General Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
General James F. Amos, USMC, and
Admiral William H. McRaven, USN¹

As this nation goes forward into a new century one thing remains certain; Landpower will remain central to our strategic success. There is no more unmistakable or unambiguous display of American resolve than the highly visible deployment of Landpower.

General Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
General James F. Amos, USMC, and
Admiral William H. McRaven, USN²

Land operations have a uniquely significant role, in both peacetime and conflict, in addressing human factors. This assertion arises from the recognition that: 1) the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces significantly contribute to the activities central to influencing the “human domain” short of war, such as peacekeeping, comprehensive military engagement, security force assistance, building partner capacity, and stability operations; 2) in conflict, the same forces are those most intimately and closely involved with the human networks—friendly, enemy, and neutral—that comprise the “human domain,” and 3) strategic success most often occurs within the land domain,

especially in the shared space between humans and the land, and potentially in the shared space between humans and the cyberspace domain.

General Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
General James F. Amos, USMC, and
Admiral William H. McRaven, USN³

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Geography is not joint, but warfare has become ever more noticeably so over the course of the past century. That said, even conceded, the idea of Landpower should be clear enough, although it assuredly is not beyond all frontier types of conceptual challenge. My subject is neither confused nor should it be at all confusing, unless, that is, one chooses to make it so. Although there are libraries crammed with studies of warfare on land, writings addressed explicitly and more or less discretely to exploration and explanation of Landpower are not in abundant supply. One explanation for thinness in the literature simply is that few gifted scholars have felt moved to explain what they believe is already common knowledge because it is or ought to be obvious. Landpower is both an empirically verifiable reality and also a conceptual construction. The need for reliable joint cooperative military effort renders the idea of Landpower apparently vulnerable to some erosion of the right to exclusive ownership and command. The constructivist categorization that may seem able to divide up the world into distinctive geographical domains can appear troublingly vulnerable to the political, strategic, and budgetary consequences of technological innovation. When one geographical domain cannot effectively

resist functionally enabling assistance from capabilities designed primarily to exploit other geographies, understandably and predictably interservice rivalries are fostered and may fester. Common sense tends to be an early casualty in the politics of interdomainal military procurement and influence. This monograph has no wish to add fuel to any conflagration enabled by the military, for strategic nonexclusivity in Army competence and authority.

This discussion of strategic Landpower cannot avoid the necessity of identifying a true partnership of the “both and” kind. To be specific, Landpower is both essential for American national security and yet must depend critically upon the strategically enabling potential of other military domains. The somewhat uncomfortable dualism just expressed is generically all too familiar in a subject such as this that appears to make a mockery of distinctive hierarchy in relationships. For the reasons argued subsequently, Landpower unquestionably must be regarded as the premier category of military capability, but several caveats require recognition as potentially substantial hazards to the safety of the logic of the Landpower case. One notable contemporary reason why Landpower lacks sovereign strategic authority is because its effectiveness in deterrence or in combat action could be negated were the United States to be obliged to resort to large-scale nuclear use with a similarly nuclear armed enemy. It is true to claim that one might endeavor to define strategic Landpower in a way so highly permissive as to include the means of nuclear bombardment. However, a bid for such inclusivity in favor of Landpower plainly would not be culturally consistent with now traditional American habits of mind and organization concurring military categorization.⁴ Russians may

well view their long-range nuclear-tipped and land-based missile forces essentially as artillery, but Americans do not and are unlikely to follow suit. However, strange to say, perhaps, the obvious potential menace posed by nuclear weapons to any verdict on combat by conventional Landpower does not serve greatly to demote the relative significance of the Army. It is necessary to appreciate the significance of commonsense boundaries to strategic argument. The case for strategic premiership that is the Army's does not need to rest upon implausible, or worse, arguments claiming an ability to wage any or all combat of any character. To be assessed as critically important, there is no need for Landpower to make implausible acquisitive grabs in a hunt for the ability to cope sufficiently well with any and all categories of challenge.⁵

It is important to recognize that the high concept of strategic Landpower is essential both for what it includes and what it does not. Indeed, the integrity of the concept and the category of capability and implied behavior to which it refers, require clear enough boundaries if they are to function usefully. Although seapower, airpower, and now cyberpower, plainly can be regarded not unfairly as strategic categories that inherently are variably competitive with Landpower, also their legitimate distinctiveness is essential for the generic-like distinctiveness of Landpower. Indeed, given the cumulative accretion of military capabilities with domainal ancestry other than of a landward nature, it is vitally necessary for the conceptual and practical organizational integrity of Landpower that the frontiers demarcating seapower and airpower, for examples, are maintained meaningfully.⁶

The validity of the concept of Landpower is evidenced convincingly by facts "in the field." Although

Landpower is a conceptual construction, it does have historically verifiable empirical markers. Most empires are troubled by some residual persisting uncertainty over the proper frontier of their domains. It is only sensible to recognize that Landpower is a concept that can be interpreted in a way uncomfortably permissive of opportunistic seizure by military organizations whose primary focus is not the land. In truth, historical circumstance, military and strategic culture, and even individual personality, can play a role in the determination of what is and what is not regarded locally as Landpower.

For reasons readily attributable largely to their geography and historical experience, particularly as those potent sources of influence are mediated by culture, many countries have never been in serious danger of being uncertain about the relative seniority granted officially and popularly to their geographically distinctive armed forces. For particularly clear examples, Britain has long regarded its Royal Navy as the Senior Service, while Russia and Germany have never been in serious peril of misunderstanding the ever arguably “luxury” nature of their episodically impressive naval power.⁷ Monarchical and then Imperial France periodically was proved persuadable that its greatness both required and could secure preeminence at sea as well as on land, but typically that belief, or one should say hope, was not well enough founded. The strategic frontier of France was on or about the Rhine, which had to mean that strategic Landpower needed to be the core of concern for French statecraft and strategy. Britain learned in the 17th century to distrust Landpower in the form of a standing army, which meant that it could make a virtue of the strategic necessity of its insularity for the achievement and sustenance of maritime preponderance.

The American case has been a mixed one that tracks recognizably with the broad influences of national geography and historical circumstance mentioned earlier. Although American Landpower, inclusively understood, was episodically briefly and deeply impressive in the early-1860s and the late-1910s for obvious reasons of wartime mobilization, there is no doubt that it cannot properly be assessed as being even somewhat equal in national cultural esteem to the military power and systems of Prussia/Germany and Russia. The physical and political geography of America prior to the construction of the Panama Canal in 1914, and the transoceanic immigrant origins of many Americans, meant rather ironically that the truly continental scale of the mature national geography was more than marginally offset in popular appreciation by the practical difficulty of transcontinental mobility. The relatively high national security that geographical insularity on a continental scale provided came naturally at a notable and politically contestable strategic price. Obviously enough, while American Landpower could and periodically did trouble Canadian and Mexican neighbors in North America, continental insularity also meant that the United States lacked easy access to the principal areas of world contention in and about Eurasia.⁸ In short, when the United States decided that it should intervene strategically in a forceful manner in world affairs, it found that command of the sea (and forward bases) across oceanic distances to Europe (and Africa) and Asia was absolutely essential. In addition, in the 1940s, the aerial domain also needed to be commanded before American Landpower could be brought into contact with the enemies of the day.

Contrary to appearances, perhaps, it is not my intention here to challenge the core ideas expressed

so clearly by Generals Raymond Odierno and James Amos and Admiral William McRaven in the epigraphs to this monograph. Rather, I seek to emphasize the distinctiveness, indeed the uniqueness, of the American strategic historical experience. American Landpower has been no less strategic than were German and Russian/Soviet Landpower, but its historical manifestation was nationally different, albeit not conceptually in kind. The strategic meaning of Landpower is the same among states, but geography and history provide individual national contexts for strategic meaning.

THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC LANDPOWER

At present, the Army chooses to define Landpower as “the ability — by threat, force, or occupation — to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”⁹ There is much to recommend in this definition, given its privileging of the idea of control. An admirable vigor pervades the definition, while there is also room for some discretion on the boundary. It may be noticed that, although Landpower is discussed widely almost as a team player alongside other categories of power differentiated by geography or function, there is a sense in which it should be regarded as a *primus inter pares* (first among equals). The Army is not confused about this, but alignment in a common categorization as power, albeit duly modified to fit particular geography (e.g., seapower and airpower), can encourage misunderstanding. If anything, the very concept of Landpower, which unavoidably and indeed necessarily, privileges physical geography, somewhat undermines appreciation of its own full and true case. There is some danger of the

Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces inadvertently diminishing the weight of their argument as a consequence of their combined effort to promote Landpower. The official definition quoted at the beginning of this section is good in that its non-specificity regarding military means allows for useful inclusion of a wide discretion. Nonetheless, as a consequence of the broad geographical categorization, there does remain a somewhat inappropriate implicit commonality. In other words, Landpower appears to be regarded as another geographically identified category, more than marginally comparable to the sea and the air. Landpower risks under appreciation because of the comparability with the sea, air, and now cyber as well, that appears to be suggested by its name as an adjectival modifier of the concept of power.

It has been my first-hand experience for nearly 50 years as a teacher and author on strategy, that it can be challenging to accord Landpower the quality of recognition it merits, because so often it is presented in the historical and conceptual company of other apparently more than marginally like ideas, such as seapower, airpower, and cyberpower. For obvious, and indeed all but self-evident reasons with admirably joint connection, it can be difficult for the Landpower triad of Army, Marine Corps, and Special Forces to be frank, yet also fair as well as honest.

What needs to be gripped and grasped beyond room for argument is the permanent geographical fact which is an enduring practical reality for strategy – that the land matters most for humans. Indeed, we have no geographical choice. The other geographical environments, including the constructed ones now composed of cyberspace, and the functionally awesome domain of nuclear weapons, can be important,

occasionally indeed even conclusively so. But the consequences of threat and action in all geographical contexts ultimately must have strategic and political meaning for and on land. This is hardly news, but exciting analyses pertaining to actual and potential conflict at sea, in the air, in cyberspace, and even concerning the political efforts of nuclear threat, all, finally and determinatively, have meaning for the land and Landpower. This is a matter of nature, but it is a fundamental truth of our human condition that can be hard to find if the distinctive geographies of our whole context are not appreciated correctly.

To claim that the land always matters most because it is the only physical geography that we can inhabit is not to claim, save in a formal sense, that all human conflict must be decided as a direct consequence of happenings on land. However, given that we humans can organize our security only for where we are able to live, on land, it has to follow that extraterritorial behavior needs translation as to its meaning for the strategic narrative on land. In common with physical geography, strategic history inherently is more than joint; it is a unified, at least a collective, whole, albeit sometimes confusing and untidy, as well as incomplete.¹⁰ Strategic history may well appear to repeat itself in parallel narratives, even if, more likely when, the paths of causation contributing to events are notably different. Overall, however, strategic threat, anxiety, and action, no matter the particular military forms taken at the time, have to be expressed recognizably in political and strategic terms readily explicable with reference to an inclusive understanding of Landpower.

I have argued elsewhere that the most potent question in the methodological arsenal of the strategist is

the challenging, and sometimes even offensive appearing, demand for understanding carried by the elementary query, “So what?”¹¹ Given that we can only inhabit and politically organize the land, it must follow that all strategic behavior judged relevant to our situation has to bear upon our Landpower, certainly as this concept currently is officially defined.

The Army’s (*et al.*) definition of Landpower is a permissive one, particularly given the broad inclusivity allowed by the focus upon a desired consequence of American behavior—control. Since it is an eternal truth that we cannot inhabit nonterritorial geography, it has to be the case that military forces of all kinds ultimately can be challenged by the basic, deceptively simple seeming, question deployed earlier. Whether or not ground forces are heavily involved, the single strategic historical narrative that is our human estate should be understandable as Landpower. The other geographical environments may well be militarily, strategically, and then consequentially politically, episodically more important than U.S. land—as in ground—power. But, the single and unified narrative of American strategic history must show effect in or for Landpower. Properly comprehended, as in intelligent understanding of the currently official definition of Landpower, there is no strict requirement for strategic Landpower to be delivered by ground forces. The geopolitical and therefore also the geostrategic context for American international behavior is nearly always about the acquisition of influence at a trans-oceanic distance. It follows that there can be no doubting the strategic necessity for substantial supporting, and occasionally even substitutional, effort on the part of military agents other than ground forces. Strategic Landpower must be a heavily and diversely joint en-

terprise. U.S. ground forces always require military cover and other kinds of support from friendly air assets, much of which in transportation and bombardment roles will need to be of medium and long range. Similarly, the absolute necessity for aerial support is paralleled by the necessity of transoceanic logistic provision, which for purposes other than brief raids still has to be transported by sea.

The core of the strategic argument for the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces is borne by the powerful concept of control.¹² These forces, though primarily the Army, inherently have qualities with high potential strategic value unique and indispensable to the nation. These qualities should be well known, but still there is a plausible case to be made for emphasizing their extraordinary relative importance. It is necessary to differentiate between general and contextually particular truths. Bearing in mind that we are investigating and explaining two heavily interconnected, but nonetheless distinctive, ideas—American strategic Landpower on the one hand, and American ground forces on the other—it soon becomes quite apparent why this vital distinction is simultaneously both important yet ultimately rather trivial in strategic and ultimately political assessment. What follows is a shortlist of ideas that serve to capture most of what needs to be caught in the particular conceptual web that is the prime focus of this monograph.

SOME PRE-THEORY ON STRATEGIC LANDPOWER

1. The case for the strategic relevance of Landpower must vary enormously with the scale and particular character of each individual conflict. Also, given that

the character of future conflict is not reliably predictable, the United States requires of its Landpower that it should be ready enough for overseas deployment on relatively short notice. Obviously, the scale of the problem(s) must largely determine the lead-time required to ready forces for deployment that may have to be of protracted duration.

2. The unpredictability of policy demand for actions by Landpower, and the variety of possible geopolitical and geostrategic contexts, mean that the American approach to strategic Landpower needs to be considerably inclusive. The immediate roles required to be played by U.S. ground forces may be modest. Indeed, it is probable that in many cases the bare fact of their commitment and deployment may well be more significant strategically and politically than is their anticipated tactical effectiveness.

3. "Boots on the ground" carry, or at least imply, a quality of American desire or demand for political control of behavior locally that cannot credibly and effectively be borne by other kinds of military power. Air and missile power certainly can achieve control, indeed, the entire theory, policy, and strategy of nuclear deterrence rests on this belief. However, the quality of behavioral control that ground forces can secure is unique. The presence of those forces carry a message of reassurance or of potentially coercive menace that may be up close and even personal.

Also, the local deployment of ground forces typically requires a quality of local social and cultural engagement that can be strategically vital for American understanding; such engagement cannot be achieved from altitude or at sea. Needless to say, the potential

benefits of a Landpower — as ground power — commitment have to be assessed in balance with its distinctive hazards. However, the danger and cost involved in being strangers in a strange land, foreigners amid an alien culture, today are quite well understood.¹³ Nonetheless, it remains true to say that there is a quality of political and even cultural commitment inherent in the forward deployment of American ground forces that is not, and cannot be, replicated by other kinds of action, almost regardless of the relative strength in their strategic promise. It must be said that many of the tough lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to age and perish in the 2010s, now that counterinsurgency (COIN) has lost its political, strategic, and military attractions for a while that may last for 10 or 20 years. Although COIN certainly is, indeed ought to be, the most engaging of contact behavior in the human domain, it does not follow that our recent protracted COIN experience should be regarded definitively as the field test for the strategic utility of American Landpower.

4. It should never be forgotten that strategic force is military force considered and assessed for its political consequences. Awesome and possibly shocking though destruction may be when delivered from a considerable distance, one is bound to say that U.S. Navy Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie was definitely persuasive when he wrote:

The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the final power in war. He is Control. He determines who wins. There are those who would dispute this as an absolute, but it is my belief that while other means may critically influence war today, after whatever devastation

and destruction may be inflicted on an enemy, if the strategist is forced to strive for final and ultimate control, he must establish, or must present as an inevitable prospect, a man on the scene with a gun. This is the soldier.¹⁴

Wylie's advice is not a magical elixir for ensuring that military success will be succeeded by strategic benefit. Not infrequently, people forget that strategic history is always flowing in a great stream of time, and that military victory or advantage may not result in the benign political effect that one might carelessly assume to be authoritative.¹⁵ The point needing emphasis here, properly assisted by the wise Rear Admiral, is that strategic effect has to be measured in its, political consequences. The reason why this must be so is because it is only policy, expressing political wishes, that can justify and legitimize the threat or use of strategic Landpower. The nexus between policy and strategy often is considerably closer than some scholars and many citizens assume to be the case. The austere basic elements of the theory of strategy that usually is taught in institutions of higher military education, typically distinguish clearly between strategy's military ways and its political purposes.¹⁶ But, frequently in practice this can prove to be a notionally clear distinction that is not allowed to provide much by way of helpful guidance over practice.¹⁷ Plainly, the potent and attractively inclusive concept of strategic Landpower requires considerable care in its handling, since it brushes, at the very least, against the policy/politics "box" in a PowerPoint slide. This troubling thought now must be considered critically and rigorously if we are to be confident that the conceptual dimension to this analysis does not pose a lethal menace that can-

not be overcome at tolerable cost to the authority that should be allowed to the idea of strategic Landpower.

It is perhaps ironic that such an almost self-evidently useful concept as strategic Landpower should be as vulnerable to ill-considered doubt as it is. This may be a case not unlike that made for genius in war, to the effect that unquestionably extraordinary talent in command tends to be balanced more than somewhat by unattractive personal characteristics. The concept of strategic Landpower has high merit both as theory and in its practical implications. But, there is trouble both with the modifying and defining adjective and with the noun itself. The fact that this trouble is not well founded does not suffice to cancel criticism. In part, the criticism is avoidable, but also in quite good part, it refers to professional matters that are largely discretionary and therefore inherently more than marginally political in an inclusive sense. I need to be unambiguous as to the meaning of leading concepts and descriptors. Most especially, there is a necessity for clarity of meaning, as well as proper use, of principal terms. To those ends, I will explain the meaning of strategic and of Landpower. Many expert defense professionals may well differ from me on my explanations: so be it.

Strategic.

Strategic, the adjective, is misused very widely in its attribution to particular kinds of military forces because of their inherent nature or their presumed potential significance. This is simply wrong. Indeed, it is more than just wrong because it is a conceptual error that has harmful consequences for defense and war planning. In truth and pragmatically, all military

forces, be they great or small in number and assignments, are latently, residually, strategic. Strategy is not effected by inherently strategic acts, but rather by the consequences of tactical and operational level behavior. Those consequences must vary hugely in relative (consequentially strategic) weight from situation to situation. To designate some kinds of forces clearly either as strategic or tactical is a cardinal error in military theory; the fact that states have made this mistake for several generations now does not miraculously expunge the error. Strategy is all about the consequences of tactical behavior. It should not be particularly difficult to understand why it is crucially important to the quality in policy for the military instrument and its behavior to be assessable in terms of the consequences of its actions. If one confuses the intended doing of strategy with tactical practice, then it will not be surprising if one is lost in a no-man's land of confusion. What one would be saying would be that there are strategic, as contrasted with tactical, objectives (or targets, or forces). Strategic does not mean inherently nuclear, long-range, or even exceptionally important.

The fact that the "strategic" adjective is so profusely, and indeed officially misused, does not somehow render it correct, or even just right enough. To summarize pointedly, the U.S. Army, by proper definition, inherently is a strategic instrument. By this, I mean that its potential and actual behavior must have influence, great or small upon the course of strategic history. The Army does not have some strategic, as may be differentiated from tactical, tasks, because that distinction is logically and practicably erroneous. This essential point was made most clearly by Dr. Antulio Echevarria when he explained that "all events in war have weight; even the least can have disproportionate

effects.”¹⁸ Strategy consists of the consequences of tactical behavior. There are no lesser “tactical” duties. In order to grasp fully the meaning and implications of this elementary binary distinction, all that one needs do is to simplify the challenge as being in essence a distinction between cause and consequence. I appreciate that, when the tactical behavior in question appears very slight in the total context and narrative of national military effort, it will be difficult to accept as legitimate the idea that the modest scale of action under consideration nonetheless has some slight strategic meaning. The concept of strategic Landpower is intellectually healthy when it can be regarded as a philosophical and theoretical step in the right direction, though I must confess to being dismayed by the apparent need for the redundancy, since Landpower cannot possibly be other than strategic in its potential, let alone in practice.

Landpower.

Strategy can be problematic both in its design and in its practice when the politics that contribute massively to policy function to create effectively a collectivity of effort toward national security. Landpower can be rendered conceptually and then practicably uncertain for reason of an erosion of distinctiveness. I am troubled about the official definition of Landpower by analogy with the same reason that a thoroughly welcoming ecumenical approach to religion has the potential to dilute the core of what I may believe to be the truth. There is not a real problem here over the integrity of this concept of Landpower, but the Army should scarcely need to be advisedly prudent concerning the need to accommodate potentially

contributing agents from other sovereign domains of strategic endeavor. It is appropriate to recognize and welcome jointly helpful assistance to the Army's predominant Landpower on the part of the navy, air, space, and cyber—not to mention significantly the contribution by way of intrawar deterrence that nuclear armed forces may supply. But it is likely to be deemed important that the most formally licensed contributors to American Landpower should not imperil their military strategic leadership position. It can be challenging to discuss this aspect of the subject because authentically unified strategic argument about what is best for national security can hardly help but be brushed with some of the less wholesome features of inter- and even intraservice politics. Of course, it is only natural for contenders to play hard in support of their home team, but that team may be a geographically distinctive armed service, or a functionally separate element thereof, as contrasted with an entire national strategic effort.

In principle, the Landpower concept is not eroded and possibly diluted by high inclusivity of definition. However, Landpower in practice, which most essentially has to mean land control, can be vulnerable to actual as well as potential weakening by diffusion, as the control function is performed by military agents less committed to the core task of land and population control.¹⁹ It is advisable that a state's army should be reluctant to shed many arguably specialist tasks as a consequence of political pressure, let alone joint good will. One needs to be cautious in explaining the reasons for such restraint in enthusiasm for joint endeavor. Fundamentally, the reason is because of the strong advisability of prudence in performance of the core Landpower mission. The essence of Landpower duty

is control of a particular land area, territory, and what is on it for as long as policy requires. To fulfill this mission, protracted engagement may be necessary, possibly entailing some co-existence, if not necessarily cooperation, with a local population whose political sympathies and leanings cannot be assumed always to be friendly.

It should not be forgotten that what makes Landpower strategic are the consequences of its behavior. There are many diverse ways in which a state can attempt to secure political influence where it most matters in the hearts, but probably more reliably in the minds of adversaries or those currently politically uncommitted. But, undoubtedly there is a uniquely persuasive (and coercive) quality to the local presence of the man on "the scene with the gun," to employ Wylie's telling phrase yet again. It is important that Americans should resist strategic capture by what can be made to appear as attractive alternatives to strategic Landpower. The leading attractions of most relevance here are budgetary economy and a greater prudence in political commitment. In other words, it is usual for there to be several alternative strategic ways in which political ends might be sought. It is important to recognize that the historical contextual reality almost always seems compatible with at least a shortlist of possibly appropriate alternative strategic approaches. That said, perhaps conceded, it is scarcely less significant for American policy to understand fully the nature of strategic Landpower and the reasons for that nature.

Strategic Landpower at its core comprises the ground combat forces of the state. In theory at least, recognition of strategic jointness should not confuse or mislead. What matters most for the discussion

here is that the geo-strategically unique context of war, certainly of conflict, should be fully and accurately understood. No matter how great or small may need to be the assistance to, and support of, American land combat forces by other forces at and from the sea, the air, in space, and in cyberspace, such help will be needed. It is my contention that Landpower with the tactical character of forces built and trained to conduct ground warfare in its several forms must remain and be regarded authoritatively as essential. What is unique about military Landpower is its ability to persist in contested territory in the quest for control. Of course, the measure of control sought over adversarial behavior may not always be attainable at a cost the American political system finds tolerable, given the contemporary definition of national interest. But, the case for strategic Landpower cannot rest upon confident expectation of prudence in the policy that American politics determines.

The “strategic” in the concept of strategic Landpower must rest in practice on the quality of values and assessments that are made. However, there is and can be nothing in the strategic Landpower concept itself that guarantees against misuse or even just bad luck. The value of this concept lies most essentially in its direction of attention to the overarching mission of control of land and what and who is on it. If the concept of strategic Landpower is deemed unduly inclusive, too permissive of assistance by ancillary military (*et al.*) agents other than ground combat and combat support forces, then it may be necessary to substitute a more exclusive official understanding of Landpower for the current one. Attractive though it certainly is in its corralling of any and all sources of influence over happenings on the ground, there is little doubt

that the concept in probable effect comprises a charter for possible dilution of effort. When interpreted with good will, intelligently regarding the occasional peril in ill-conceived or clumsily executed "jointery," there is no significant cause for alarm. However, conceptual formulae with unpoliced frontiers are likely to promote interservice and interfunctional strife that would be strategically unhelpful. Today's concept of strategic Landpower is vitally important to the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Forces, but it could benefit from some enhanced clarity as to the unique strategic purpose of military Landpower.

WHY STRATEGIC LANDPOWER IS UNIQUE? WHAT IS DIFFERENT ABOUT IT?

In order to understand fully Landpower, it is essential to grasp what is unique about it. Indeed, the differences in nature, not only in character, from other geographically distinguishable domains should be so obvious as to be in little need of identification, let alone emphasis here. Nonetheless, there is a shortage of full and proper appreciation of Landpower relative to military power designed to function in and from the other geographies.

I will make a modest effort to explain just why Landpower is and has to be of prime strategic importance. However, the argument here would be defeated in grisly strategic practice were nuclear deterrence to suffer a brief lapse at the wrong moment in super and great power relations. There is an extremely potent and persuasive case to be made on behalf of Landpower, but it does have limits. Unless one were to attempt to accept an extreme liberality of inclusiveness, it is neither relevant nor helpful to attempt to stretch

conceptually the Landpower domain so as to render it as embracing nuclear-armed forces of intercontinental range. In other words, although Landpower would be a vitally significant participant in any conflict process that might be concluded with nuclear warfare conducted on a large scale, once a substantial nuclear “exchange” was either imminent or actually extant in process, Landpower most likely would lose relative significance. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to argue that the bilateral conduct of nuclear warfare on a large scale probably would render the prosecution of further strategic efforts problematic in the extreme. If this is granted as a strong probability, the strategic quality of Landpower could well prove of little importance. Large-scale nuclear employment certainly is a relevant concern for theorists (and practitioners) of strategic Landpower, but it is one that need not, and hence should not, hinder progress in this analysis. I choose not to allow the hopefully distant possibility of a large scale American nuclear exchange either with Russia or China to obstruct the path toward proper understanding of strategic Landpower. It is sufficient for our purpose here simply to note the grim but most likely rather distant prospect of nuclear warfare and move on. This is a classic “What if . . .” of future strategic history that cannot be permitted to control and thereby shape our understanding of today and tomorrow. What follows in this section is written unavoidably in the knowledge of nuclear possibilities, but such happenings are judged to reside in the mercifully bare short list of game-changing possibilities that ought not to detain attention further in this monograph.

The question of greatest moment for analysis and explanation here is the one posed in the title to this section: rephrased a little from the section title, we

must ask “What is different about strategic Landpower; how and why is it unique?”

The Land Matters Most.

We are a species able to live only upon the land. This means that all our cultural, economic, political, and strategic business has to be conducted with territorial reference and context. Even global maritime trade makes sense only with reference to its territorial origins and destination. Maritime logistics are essential to globalization, but that is solely a transportation narrative; the demand and the supply both require territorial definition. It is all too commonplace for writers today to be so bedazzled by contemporary diversity in logistics, and by the sheer variety of adaptive geographical exploitation expressed in military arsenals, that the enduring most senior significance of territoriality appears to be lost. The character of commerce and of warfare is ever changing, but we have been, and must remain, land animals. It has to follow that political organizations and their military agents must understand security concerns and anxieties ultimately and unavoidably in territorial terms; and those terms always need relation to safety in and of the political home, the homeland, which is a most telling concept in its implications.

Landpower Is about Proximity for Control.

From time to time, the United States asks more of its armed forces than the securing of some influence over foreign decisionmaking. In addition, what is required is a physical control that possibly, indeed probably, will have to be achieved coercively. It is relative-

ly rare for us to need the ability to control behavior in this nonpermissive way, but it does occur. There are threats as well as actual violent behavior that must be opposed, stopped, and even punished. While plainly hostile behavior certainly can be harassed and possibly halted by a wide variety of measures, the quality of control achievable by the “man on the scene with the gun” has a definitive quality unmatched by other agencies. This is not to suggest that the local presence of Landpower itself can resolve political problems that may also be significantly cultural, but the local and potentially enduring presence of our soldiers assuredly alters the local context within which new decisions by foreign agencies will have to be made.

The virtual occupation of foreign lands by means of menace (and more) from altitude, or from over the horizon at sea, is not the strategic or moral equivalent to the occupation, if necessary the seizure, of foreign territory, and presence in the closest of proximity to foreign nationals. The down-side to the proximity and human contact achieved by a Landpower presence is too obvious to need much comment here. Obviously, it can be difficult in the extreme for the United States to distinguish between a local presence and possibly military (and policing for public order) effort that is sufficient, and one that is too much. It is a problem endemic in warfare that, notwithstanding rather naively optimistic theory and policy that was authoritative through most of the 1960s, competitive effort in a violent conflict cannot be controlled predictably and reliably. At least this is true if we are determined to prevail strategically and politically.²⁰

In summation, the dynamics of a conflict can begin to take the lead over policy and its politics, meaning that the former will serve the latter, rather than vice

versa, as should be the case. Plainly, the high potential strategic value of a local deployment of American Landpower is likely to stimulate—for a while, at least—greater effort on the part of local opposition. What is certain is that the forward deployment of this Landpower will raise the political stakes significantly for an administration with American voters (and parents and other loved ones). This high quality of personal political commitment will be both of almost inestimable positive value for the quality of American political commitment, but also inevitably will comprise a major creation of policy-political vulnerability. All countries care more about the safety of their own soldiers than they do about casualties among foreigners, including allies. This is inevitable and indeed usually quite proper. It is exactly the very quality of care felt by Americans about the forward deployment into probable military action of their soldiers that renders strategic Landpower so potent a commitment, stamped though it is, and indeed should be, with acute policy concerns on the domestic front.²¹

Strategic Landpower and the Importance of the Human Domain.

The grand concept of strategic Landpower can appear so elevated and abstract that it appears to resist understanding in human terms. General Charles Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps, went some way, possibly even too far, toward proper appreciation of the individual human contribution to great enterprises of state with his idea of the “strategic corporal.”²² To many commentators, this concept seemed extravagant: after all, what could be the strategic meaning of behavior by a corporal? Surely strategy was discussed and decided

by people of high rank. In fact, as noted already in this monograph, corporals do strategy—they have some strategic effect whether or not they are aware of it at the time or even in some retrospect. Although strategy certainly is designed, decided, and implemented as direction at a high level of command, as, if not more, important is the fact that strategy actually is done in the only zone of behavior possible, which is the tactical. Strategy bereft of tactics and operations essentially is meaningless aspiration. Strategy and its strategist author conceive and plan what will be attempted, and it may well be sensible to extend the idea of strategy so as to include command.²³ However, the strategist as conceptualizer, planner, and commander is envisaging the consequences of his adversarial direction of tactical and operational performances. The entire process that results in strategically significant behavior is inherently and essentially human. Landpower really is about soldiers. They are supported and enabled to be effective by particular technologies and logistics, but they do not “serve” equipment, rather the equipment serves them. The technical performance of machinery is of the highest relative importance to military professionals who must perform their duty at sea, in the air, and in cyberspace. The landward domain, in contrast, finds military equipment both essential and important, but not usually critically so.

The key reason why the land domain is unique and different is because so much of significance that occurs on it is subject to human discretion. A critically important enabler of this human discretion is the rich variety of geography—human and natural—and the wide scope of possibilities that render thought and behavior difficult to predict, given the pertinent opportunities and hindrances. Of course, there are moral

qualities common in importance across domains; courage, determination, fortitude, integrity, honesty, and so forth. However, the geo-physics of the domains other than the land that require extremes of dependence upon the competitive quality of technology (e.g., ships, aircraft, and computers), routinely need to ask less of the military personnel committed to their use and exploitation than do the forces that express and perform as strategic Landpower. The abstraction that is the concept of Landpower always descends in practice to the behavior of people in uniform, no matter how technologically advanced their equipment.

The historical record shows that troops require armament good enough or sufficiently adaptable to meet the demands of their tactical and operational requirements. Superior technology may be exploited in order to secure tactical advantage, but only rarely is a technical lead in weaponry the most plausible reason explaining satisfactorily military success in battle. For example, American success in its deployment and employment of Landpower in both the world wars of the 20th century owed relatively little to technological advantage. To understand what happened strategically in 1918 and then in 1944-45, one needs to look a long way beyond, and behind, the quality of rival equipment in widespread American use.²⁴ In land warfare, sheer quantity (of many kinds) can have a quality all its own. Also, decisions as to how weapons will be used, and the highly variable facts concerning the measure of human determination that soldiers will choose to show under extreme pressure, must fuel uncertainty over relative adversarial performance. Accepting the risk of overstatement, one should endorse the quite common assumption that performance in war depends more upon the ways in which weapons

are used than upon the competitive combat quality of the weapons themselves – within reason, I must hasten to add, because this can be a dangerous idea to endorse uncritically and too readily. To lay emphasis, as we should, upon the superior significance of the human terrain that is the core of Landpower is not to suggest or even imply that dimensions other than the human do not matter in landward conflict.²⁵ But it is unmistakably clear about the primary importance of people.²⁶ Strategic Landpower is dominated in historical practice today, as it always has been in the past, by the human domain.

Presence and Politics.

More often than not in the irregular style of conflict of the 21st century, the strategic value of U.S. Landpower as local presence can be of greater significance than its military worth in the armed struggle. There is a quality of credibility to forward human commitment not reachable with alternative ways and means. This is not to deny that American forward local presence may be akin to a two-edged sword. As a hate object for the focus of hostile attention, the Western soldier on the ground in physically and culturally alien terrain is an adversarial gift as a target to the insurgent. But, if we prove able to raise our game in the field of cultural tolerance—especially given the fact that we will be the foreigners, the Other in local terms to some degree—there is no doubt that the forward deployment of our most highly valued asset, people, carries a message of seriousness of political intent that is universally persuasive.

The point may seem almost too obvious to be worthy of mention, but it is important that we do not forget that our military behavior is always about politics.

In the 2000s, we learned and re-learned a great deal about the domestic politics of Afghan and Iraqi societies, not infrequently as a damaging consequence of our mistakes. This can be perilously easy to overstate, but when we intervene in a hugely foreign country, unless our struggle unavoidably has to be overwhelmingly, not even only primarily, military in nature, we are bound to become intimate, if relatively ignorant, players in local political struggles.²⁷ Military readers should not be dismissive of the point just registered, because all military endeavor, with its strategic effect, ultimately has to be about political effect. There can be no military or strategic consequences that do not have implications, direct or indirect, for a political narrative. This is not merely an argument, rather is it a definitional truth blessed by an abundance of evidential material, as well as by the philosophical authority of Carl von Clausewitz.²⁸ If this were not so, then military performance, successful or otherwise in a battlefield sense, would have to be bereft of meaning.

Military deployment and employment is instrumental for political purpose, or even for cultural purpose that will have political meaning. I am suggesting that the forward deployment of strategic Landpower must have unusually intense and probably complicating consequences for the course of local political events, not least because our knowledge and understanding of the informal structures of power in many foreign societies is weak or even near absent altogether. When we join the local fight(s) of others, notwithstanding the seriousness of our own policy purpose, we become active players in violent struggles that have rules and procedures we are unlikely to comprehend adequately for a while. I write this not in order to argue a case against foreign intervention, but rather only

to suggest that the very nature of the human domain most characteristic of Landpower all but guarantees that we will need to pay a price in errors committed if we are to be effective in the human domain particular to an alien foreign society. Admittedly, there is much in tactics, and even possibly in operational art, substantially common as sound military practice across frontiers and cultures. But, even the humble corporal, who would be “strategic” in a positive sense, needs to be careful to give the least local offense consistent with reasonable understanding of his duty.

Contrary to appearances, possibly, what I have just written is not intended as a warning against foreign intervention; indeed, if anything, it is an argument generically supportive of the thesis that Landpower is, by its very nature, near certain to have a uniquely strategic effect when forward deployed into an active theater. There is a Janus-like quality unique to Landpower among the whole range of military domains, meaning that this particular, most essentially human kind of military power, has unequalled potential to yield to us either, even both, extraordinary strategic advantage and unusually costly and possibly embarrassing unsuccessful strategic returns. The deployment of our soldiers into harm’s way far abroad should never be treated merely as a routine matter for policy and strategy.

Strategic Landpower and Political Territoriality.

Because of the enduring nature of the human domain, every actual, as well as plausibly probable, potential conflict has some territorial definition. Whether particular tracts of land are sought as objects to own legally and politically, or are very desirable for their instrumental value when controlled, there is always

a territorial dimension to strategic history.²⁹ In its very nature, Landpower inherently and necessarily is about land and the resources that exist both in and on it. While seapower, airpower, cyberpower, and nuclear weapons may have deterrent or coercive merit as instruments of strategic influence, Landpower is unique, and indeed essential, as the strategic agent capable of securing and sustaining the political control of territory and its assets.³⁰ Necessarily as well as obviously, Landpower also is probably uniquely capable of discouraging, defeating, and punishing adversaries on land. This argument does not ignore the strategic utility derivative from joint efforts in support of the narrative on territorial security, but neither is it confused as to who or what must be in the lead for control that lasts on the ground.

It is my contention that, as land animals, humans must and do care most about the land (among all environments). This elementary, indeed simply elemental, truism explains why Landpower has to be regarded as the most vitally strategic of all among the military contenders for highest priority in relative strategic importance. Moreover, it should not escape notice that, even when behavior at sea, in the air, and in cyberspace looms large and perhaps ominously in public consciousness of threat, the anxiety thus produced is translated reflectively into acute concern over landward security. This is unavoidable because all terrestrial concerns need due conversion into analyses and arguments that bear upon our inalienably territorial approach to, and understanding of, national security. Joint military action in and from geographies other than the land occasionally will promote concern or even, in extremis, alarm, but there will always be some territorial reference or implication that cannot plausibly be denied for long.

This monograph now turns to address the joint context within which Landpower must function strategically.

JOINTLY ESSENTIAL, BUT ALSO ESSENTIALLY JOINT

Strategic Landpower is a team accomplishment, with ground forces providing the most defining of characteristic capabilities and behaviors. Specifically, the strategic merit in Landpower derives particularly from the unique ability of ground forces to secure and exploit territorial control of natural and human geography. If the United States needs to send coercive signals, either in warning or in the form of limited but pain-causing actions, then often it will be sufficient to confine our coercive behavior to the sky, the sea, and these days probably also to cyberspace. But, if the putative inimical menace or harmful deeds that are our reason for anxiety or hurt are politically intolerable, then a need may be determined for the effecting of change in the local context.³¹ When a situation is perceived as requiring alteration of a nonmarginal kind and is certain to be resisted, with at least some force applied locally, then the political case for the deployment of strategic Landpower will be a strong one. Usually, it will be more than slightly challenging politically for a President to decide to place American boots on foreign ground; this is as it should be because the commitment of Americans to war, or at the least to a warlike prospect, should never be undertaken casually and lightly.

It may be worth emphasizing the fact that the whole context of contemporary warfare is intrinsically and therefore essentially joint in character. Indeed,

the character of warfare is now so substantially and necessarily permanently joint that it is appropriate to understand the jointness of the environments for conflict as being so stable as to merit its being understood as an integral feature in the nature of modern conflict. In other words, it is not plausible to anticipate scenarios for future armed conflict wherein American ground forces would not need or want to function in ways enabled by joint effort by a suitable mix of contributions from forces at sea, in the air, in space, and in cyberspace. Even if and when American ground forces are overwhelmingly of particular military and strategic significance, there would be need for support of various kinds provided by military, and also probably some civilian, elements designed to operate in or on geography other than the land.

It is not an important demotion of American Landpower to acknowledge that it is not, and cannot be, synonymous with ground power alone. Co-existing with the world's premier navy and air force may be a budgetary nuisance from time to time, but it is nonetheless a crucially valuable enabler of success for U.S. Landpower. After all, it should not be unduly challenging to the intellect both to grasp the distinction between Landpower and ground forces (or power), and also to recognize the supportive importance of contributions from the extra-territorial geographical environments. Similarly, it ought not to be outstandingly difficult to explain that the most essential mission for American Landpower is the occasional vital need to send American boots to hit foreign ground at times and also in places not always reliably anticipatable long in advance.

Logistics are always of critical importance to national security, and there are excellent reasons why logistical competence long has had to be strongly

characteristic of what one might choose controversially to term American ways of war.³² Bluntly stated, if the American military establishment was not competent in its ability to meet the logistic needs of its forces, the country simply could not fight, at least it could not do so for very long. American geopolitics in several senses quite literally mandated the logistical marvels that have been displayed from the 18th to the 21st centuries. Whatever else may have been less than competitively excellent about American Landpower through more than 2 centuries, challenges to supply and movement almost invariably have been met exceedingly well.³³ An important reason for this generally satisfactory strategic condition simply has been, and remains, American alertness to the implications of raw distance. Not only does the American homeland comprise and consist of territory continental in scale, but global geopolitics located the United States both comfortably and uncomfortably at oceanic distances from the territorial heartland of world politics and strategic history that is and remains Eurasia–Africa.³⁴

The joint dependencies that critically help to enable U.S. Landpower to be strategic are not discretionary, rather they are unavoidable reflections of the facts of physical, political, military, and therefore strategic geography. While the dominant ground-force agencies in U.S. Landpower—the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Forces—may own and thereby control with maximum authority and legitimacy, specialized capabilities in fire support, transportation, communications, and intelligence, such particular ancillary aids do not serve significantly to menace the broad meaning or nature of Landpower. Often arguably, it may appear to matter which armed service is primarily responsible for troop conveyance and logistical

sustenance of both inter- and intra-theater kinds. But understanding of the nature of strategic Landpower should not be confused by the color of uniform the supportive personnel wear in performing essential joint duty. This is not to attempt to argue foolishly that political ownership of some particular tasking areas does not matter. The military tribes and sub-tribes, despite their essential joint commonality, do each have military cultures that fall short of a perfect match with those most prevalent among “client” Landpower combatants on the ground. Experience of and in distinctive combat roles and duties feeds expectations of support from domains other than the ground that are not surrendered lightly to those whose military culture is likely to be somewhat alien. The most obvious, albeit extreme, example of this phenomenon is the persisting successful determination of the U.S. Marine Corps to own and provide its essential close air support from its own ranks.³⁵ Marine aircrew are Marines first and aircrew somewhat later. Joint interdependencies endure and are necessary, but they cannot serve entirely to obscure the significance of the facts of geophysics. In other words, each geographical (or at least functional, as with cyber power) domain has to be respected for its unique qualities.

The narrative of strategic Landpower primarily must be one dominated by the course of local events for ground forces. But, notwithstanding military urgency on the ground, provision of joint support from the air requires a permissiveness of weather conditions that will not always be present reliably when and where it is most needed. Even assuming goodwill, honest intention, and strong determination, the facts of diverse geography may reveal rhythms in feasibility that complicate strategic life for the smooth conduct of joint enterprises.

It is well and necessary to remember that a critically important enabling task for joint endeavor is performed by nuclear-armed elements of the forces. These forces, specialized and deployed militarily triadically for potential employment from land, air, and sea (primarily submarines), can play a vital if typically undepreciated role as a deterrent preventive that enables U.S. Landpower to function successfully strategically. Ever since the mid-1950s, American theorists have argued about the extended deterrent worth of nuclear weapons.³⁶ For our purpose here, suffice it to say that strategic Landpower not infrequently must carry some risk of triggering a great deal more war than the country would like. I must hasten to explain that the nuclear peril may be vitally necessary in order to discourage nuclear escalation on the part of an adversary, while the latent menace in our nuclear posture should help critically to persuade enemies to desist from doing us harm. We can argue about the risks, dangers, and potential benefits of nuclear armament, but there is unlikely to be any clear and definitive strategic conclusion. However, suffice it to say that the U.S. nuclear arsenal serves essentially as a joint enabler for the strategically significant employment of our Landpower. Of course there are risks, "Those that live by the sword . . ." and so forth. Nonetheless, when the American public is invited by rival advocacy groups to endorse and adopt either a version of "minimum deterrence" or the principal alternative—which is close to steady state with our existing nuclear posture—it should be encouraged to recognize that in an increasingly nuclear-armed world, joint performance by Landpower must have nuclear deterrence as a literally vital strategic enabler.³⁷

As the concluding issue for this section, it is important to ask whether or not strategic Landpower should be thought of as a category of military power that is approaching its “sell by” date. Not infrequently, the forward deployment of Landpower, if not actually obsolescent as a purposeful strategic act in statecraft, nonetheless has been recognized as so extraordinary a behavior as to merit policy characterization as a “last resort.” In his recent book, *Reconsidering the American Way of War*, Echevarria claimed plausibly, that “[a]s the air campaign illustrated [over Kosovo in 1999], the post-Cold War environment did not necessarily suggest that war itself is a last resort for policy, only that the use of land power might be.”³⁸ In the decade of COIN and related behavior, the 2000s, the U.S. Government rediscovered the unique virtues of Landpower as ground power in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, if only in the numerically austere forms deemed appropriate by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.³⁹

American Landpower committed geopolitically forward substantially in COIN mode is inherently hazardous; in good part, the peril reposes in the inexorable and potentially strategically weakening effect of the foreign, indeed alien, features of the societies and cultures with which we engage. However, although there are lessons to be learned that should encourage us to be cautious about our ability to help distant friends and allies resist and defeat insurgency, it would be a grave error in policy and strategy were the country to reject any and all missions intended to thwart irregular insurgents. The American body politic should remember clearly enough that COIN was rejected by the armed forces almost mindlessly as a consequence of denial of the Vietnam experience,

only to discover that the strategic need for a quality of Landpower able to cope with this kind of conflict, alas, had not disappeared. There was much about the U.S. strategic performance in and over Vietnam that did serve as an invaluable basket of negative lessons, but in vital addition, the country could learn much of positive worth from its protracted adventure there; a like judgment applies quite clearly to our lengthy experience(s) in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s (and a little beyond).

The joint essentiality both of and for Landpower is not in doubt. We know that policy and strategy are driven not only by objective happenings abroad, but also by distinctly subjective political, strategic, and some astrategic sentiments here at home in the United States. Because Landpower is so human in personal, moral, and tangible ways, it is almost uniquely vulnerable to wild swings in what currently is fashionable in “correct” political opinion. When we want American action to be taken, the most seriously committing of possible behaviors is to dispatch some of our human military assets. The fact of “our lives” on the line carries a message of moral as well as political and military seriousness that is unmistakable. All too obviously, of course, the forward commitment of our soldiers unavoidably is also to offer a hostage to strategic fortune. Fashions in political and strategic aspiration and belief come and go, and assuredly will come again. But the future of U.S. politics and policy on security is certain to continue to register as necessary and often dominant role for strategic American Landpower.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This monograph identifies and advances a five-point argument that, in toto, comprises the core of the case for the healthy maintenance of substantial strategic Landpower. This is not, and cannot be, an original thesis, because it reflects appreciation registered by thought and in action over the course of 2 1/2 millennia. That said, it is noticeable how readily people forget, or perhaps just fail fully to recognize the heart of the matter with respect to Landpower. In good part, I suspect rather ironically, a principal reason for some contemporary failure of understanding is only an overfamiliarity with our subject here. Apparently, it is challenging to attempt to have deep and hopefully authoritative thoughts about a concept that in many pragmatic ways is and can be treated all but casually day to day. In this monograph, I have sought to step around both the pressing tactical and technical issues of the day, and also to avoid insofar as I was able the dominant policy-political issues that bear directly upon the Army's future. Instead, I have striven to explore the very nature of strategic Landpower both as it is today and as it should remain tomorrow.

1. Landpower is unique and irreplaceable. One of the better terse explanations of the nature of Landpower was provided recently by Brigadier (Ret.) Allan Mallinson of the British Army, when he wrote in *The Times* (London): "Only ground troops can 'smell the battlefield,' discriminate and consolidate."⁴⁰ It is important to understand and appreciate the enduring fact that, among all the variety of armed forces, it is only ground troops that systematically make person-to-person contact with people—foes, friends, and temporarily bystanding neutrals. Only in land warfare is

contact, even personal contact, made, exploited, and maintained often to the point of a definitive conclusion. Context and narrative may be gained and appreciated from a distance, via photographs, electronic surveillance, or even the old-fashioned printed page, but Mallinson penetrates to the heart of the matter when he cited the opportunity and ability to “smell the battlefield.”

There should be no doubt that the danger for a democracy is unique when it decides to deploy its soldiers to foreign lands. However, some of the uniquely politically entangling dangers that can attend foreign deployment may have incomparably high merit also. They provide exactly the personally empirical sources of comprehension that will only be the product of first-hand exposure to foreign cultural patterns and traits. Also, often it is important for the American Soldier not to fade too discreetly into the local natural or man-made landscape. U.S. political commitment of concern for an ally's security typically requires some visible and tangible strengthening evidence by way of the human domain in the form of its soldiers.

Also, of course, it ought never to be forgotten that Landpower by its nature must exert itself upon and within a geography that nearly always includes a foreign population. The vitally important idea of understanding the human domain necessarily pervades all aspects of the mission set for Landpower.

2. The human domain is an inclusive concept of timeless worth. Armed conflicts do not appear on our policy and strategy horizons in a standard pattern. That said, as it needs to be, what is standard in and about conflict of all kinds is the dominant importance of the human domain. From the most civilian of do-

mestic politics through to the sharp end of war in its warfare, the human element always is of decisive importance. Even when the possibility of war seems to be related to the balance, or more likely the perceived imbalance, of military strengths between competing arsenals, one finds that human impulse and sentiment tend to dominate cool analytics. The relative significance of the human domain may appear to have diminished with the ever higher levels of technological prowess that characterize international strategic competition, but such a conclusion is inappropriate.

Sometimes we may fool ourselves into believing that we have achieved the ability to peer into the future with reliable understanding. Such belief is as easy to understand as, alas, it is always false.⁴¹ What we do know about the future with complete reliability is that it will be dominated by the free will exercised by often unpredictable individuals. Civilizations, cultures, nations, tribes, and other groups, may well be anticipated to move strategic history along in earnest pursuit of particularly favored narratives, but social science for crowd psychology does not carry high and convincing promise of predictive utility. Athenian historian and (unsuccessful) general Thucydides identified “fear, honor, and interest” as comprising in the barest of inclusive summary form the leading motivations in statecraft. It so happens that what he wrote nearly 2,500 years ago is as true, certainly it is as plausible, today as it was then. Of course, tactical details are nearly always changing, but at the very elevated level of the motives behind and within the politics that produce the policy that needs and sometimes finds expression in strategy, it is not close to self-evident that our human domain today is very different from that of the Ancient Greeks. Similarly, when we consider tactics in

the great stream of time we soon discover that revolutions in weaponry have not and probably cannot result in revolution in the personal peril attending, and anxiety concerning, combat.

On the readily accessible historical evidence, the human domain that rules in strategic Landpower in several senses would appear to be all but permanent. Changes in the human military condition have been hugely transformative in appearance, but are far less impressive when we enquire about the nature of conflict through the ages. The particulars of anxiety, fear, ambition, and contingent opportunity vary in rich detail from situation to situation, but as Clausewitz explained in the most summary of forms: "Four elements make up the climate of war: danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance."⁴² He proceeds immediately and deeply into the human domain by arguing that:

If we consider them [the "four elements" immediately above] together, it becomes evident how much fortitude of mind and character are needed to make progress in these impeding elements with safety and success. According to circumstance, reporters and historians of war use such terms as energy, firmness, staunchness, emotional balance, and strength of character. These products of a heroic nature could almost be treated as one and the same force-strength of will—which adjusts itself to circumstances: but though closely linked, they are not identical.⁴³

It seems unmistakable to this author that Thucydides and Clausewitz were writing about a phenomenon of armed conflict common to both of them.

3. Landpower is always strategic. The permanent nature of Landpower as a strategic instrument and asset does not mean that always it is so regarded. Mili-

tary behavior, the activity or passivity of one's Army, cannot help but have strategic meaning. There is no reason in abstract logic or empirical fact why Landpower's strategic quality should be questionable. Given that strategy is about the consequences of behavior, pre-planned and intended or not, there is nothing extraordinary about the claim that Landpower has to be regarded as a strategic asset. Indeed, this author is somewhat surprised that many people appear to be mentally disturbed in their occasional strategic thinking by the suggestion that Landpower needs to be thought of as an inherently strategic tool of state. However, it is one thing to win a philosophical argument on logical merit, but it is quite another to ensure that that conceptual success influences attitudes and alters relevant behavior.

A significant part of the challenge facing the idea and the practice of strategic Landpower lies in what might be termed the technology overlay that in appearance, at least, seems often to demote the relative importance of "the man on the scene with the gun." It can be difficult to explain to audiences, even to those containing military specialists, that the outcome to armed conflict and its warfare typically is not determined as a consequence of competition in technological sophistication. For a contemporary hypothetical example of argument, we can be sure that there will be no reliable causal connection between a military's sophistication in available computers and its prospects of achieving military and strategic advantage. The reason for this apparently unreasonable argument is because strategic performance and its meaning is influenced by so many variables that even a clear advantage in communication technology is unlikely to be able to compensate for the ill effects of decisions

in command and tactical performance that prove to be seriously flawed. In short, technically wonderful computers cannot rescue a strategic adventure that seeks to achieve what is politically, culturally, and possibly even militarily unachievable. This argument is employed here not for the foolish purpose of casting doubt on the military and strategic value of excellence in digital communication, but rather to insist that there is far more to war and warfare than high technology. Regarded prudently as an enabler for strategically and operationally sensible endeavors, there is everything to be said in praise of reliable advanced computers.

Whatever its reactive technical state when competitively regarded, Landpower unavoidably is always a strategic instrument. If this fact is not understood, is disregarded, or is rejected, then the Landpower at issue is likely to be misused as a consequence. The worth of Landpower as a potential strategic asset must vary widely according to the constraints and opportunities allowed by historical circumstance, and somewhat in keeping with the quality in threat and competitively in combat displayed and demonstrated by the soldiers. Due recognition as a strategic asset does not mean automatically and in truth miraculously that our strategic Landpower must be strategically successful in coercive pursuit of policy ends that ought to be politically prudent.

4. Strategic landpower is always a joint instrument. Some competition between service organizations and functions is both inevitable and even desirable. It is not unusual for there to be reasonable sounding and looking grounds for approaching a mission in quite radically alternative ways. The tool bag of different military capabilities, human and techni-

cal, typically can offer a range of choice. Provided the core human function of Landpower is not sidelined when it really needs to be the central prop for an effort, the feasibility of discretion over ways and means is thoroughly desirable. Certainly, there should be no automaticity of Landpower response to a range of scenario needs that do appear to require local American presence on the ground in question. In point of fact, there are situations when the politics of forward deployment for U.S. ground forces appear to argue in favor of only minimal evidence of presence—in which case, American military assistance from altitude and probably from beyond the horizon at sea is most appropriate.

The central purpose of this monograph is to help ensure that whatever U.S. politics and policy decide is the most suitable strategic response to some local or regional crisis, at least there should be no misunderstanding of the benefits, as well as the probable costs, of Landpower. It is beyond the scope of this monograph to explore and explain the complex connections among politics, policy, and strategy. But, it is important to recognize that Landpower inevitably engages closely either with local politics, or with the consequences of those politics, in ways that are not possible for other instruments of our military power. The strategic function most essentially being about the consequences of military behavior is not itself political in nature, but it cannot help being all about politics nonetheless.

Although the use of Landpower is an exercise in strategy and not in politics, the landward element in our joint ventures ensures that we will engage in contact with local political conditions. Our Sailors and armies in effect can remain convincingly in America

in some important senses (e.g., in American “forts” as operating bases), even when their behavior has local effect “in country.” The Soldier can be isolated to a degree from local human contact, but we need to remember that personal as well as reputational contact in the human domain of conflict is literally the most distinguishing of the characteristics potentially uniquely valuable about Landpower. American policy does not always desire or require foreign contact and true local engagement in its strategic commitments, but when it does, it is necessary that the merit as well as the possible cost of forward deployable Landpower is well enough understood.

5. The case for strategic Landpower is as old as strategic history. Finally, it should be appreciated that the case for strategic Landpower is really as ancient as all of strategic history in the great stream of time. Landpower, one might attempt to argue, is no longer the instrument of final argument of state power, now that nuclear weapons have become permanent elements in some national arsenals.⁴⁴ However, the nuclear era was not a decade old before there was quite general recognition that, although the strategic utility of those weapons was high, it was also limited in domain. Indeed, contrary to many expectations fueled by the unsatisfying course and disappointing outcome of the war in Korea from 1950 to 1953, neither conceptual exploration nor subsequent technical innovation served helpfully to render nuclear weapons practically useful as a strategic instrument.

As a necessary consequence of the practical limitations inhibiting the military and strategic value of nuclear weapons, the United States found itself needing to employ its Landpower as in the days of yore,

at least with a pretense of nuclear innocence. In other words, the permanent addition of nuclear weapons to state arsenals, possibly surprisingly, has had only a modest effect upon the strategic utility of Landpower. Of course, Landpower potentially would be sharply disciplined in its use were it to be employed as threat or in battle against another nuclear weapon state.

However, Landpower retains much of its strategic utility, even in a political context influenced by anxieties about nuclear risks and danger. The nuclear dimension to the American joint narrative of military power for strategic effect is real and occasionally, albeit only rarely, immediately important. As a general rule, it is appropriate to consider America's nuclear arsenal being a joint team player whose usual, though essential, duty is to keep the nuclear weapons of other states off the political field of play. With only the blessedly lonely exception of nuclear weaponry, the whole narrative of strategic history is one demonstrating conclusively the essential continuity in the strategic and political meaning and relative value of Landpower.

ENDNOTES

1. General Raymond T. Odierno, USA, General James F. Amos, USMC, and Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, "Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills," *Strategic Landpower White Paper*, no date, p. 7.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

4. I recognize the fact that the concept of (national) strategic culture is much contested. For good examples of careful challenges to the idea of strategic culture, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, "American Strategic Culture: Problems and Prospects," Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, eds., *The Changing Character of*

War, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011, Chap. 23; and Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014, Chap. 2. Echevarria makes some plausible critical points, but I believe that, on balance, the concept of strategic culture deserves to be saved from comprehensive scholarly slaughter, always provided its perils are recognized, understood, and explained.

5. Suitably skeptical comment upon the likelihood of there being a continentalist bias in American culture because of the national geography (which changed radically in the 19th century, of course) is offered usefully in Echevarria, *Reconsidering the American Way of War*, p. 39.

6. I have addressed the much contested subject of strategic orientation in respect of attitudes toward the national geography in my books, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History*, 2nd Ed., Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012, Chap. 19; and *Perspectives on Strategy*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, Chap. 4.

7. See Holger H. Herwig, *"Luxury Fleet": The Imperial German Navy, 1888–1918*, London, UK: George Allen and Unwin, 1980; and Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, *The Sea in Soviet Strategy*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983.

8. For an outstanding geopolitical and geostrategic analysis that is more than merely an impressive period piece, see Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, 1942, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007. Spykman is too little read these days, so to help correct this condition, see Colin S. Gray, "Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, forthcoming.

9. *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3–1, Unified Land Operations*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012, Glossary-4.

10. See Colin S. Gray, *Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014, Chap. 3.

11. Gray, *Perspectives on Strategy*.

12. Odierno, Amos, and McRaven.

13. In his writings critical of America's protracted efforts to achieve counterinsurgent success in Iraq and Afghanistan, former U.S. Army colonel Gian Gentile plausibly expresses doubts about the ability of protracted Western military and other efforts to cope well enough with the pressures, anxieties, and often confusing loyalties encountered in very alien societies. See Gian Gentile, *Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency*, New York: The New Press, 2013. Ironically enough, Stanley McChrystal offers fairly persuasive evidence in support of the thesis that COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan required a level of cultural and political understanding that may be beyond attainment by foreign soldiers in strategically useful numbers. Even in the rare cases of foreigners with adequate cultural comprehension, the practicalities of local deal making and breaking is apt to frustrate attempts to achieve what we consider to be positive strategic effect. See Stanley McChrystal's very detailed memoir, *My Share of the Task*, New York: Penguin, 2013.

14. J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*, 1967; Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989, p. 72.

15. See Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, New York: Free Press, 1986.

16. See Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008.

17. Hew Strachan has offered the following cautionary words on the relationship between policy and military action:

Generals who have fought actual wars have found that the presumption that war is a continuation of policy – axiomatic for Huntingdon and reemphasized through a one-sided and selective reading of Clausewitz – has created as many problems as it has solved. Policy, as Clausewitz acknowledged, can be an alien element in war.

"Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War," *Survival*, Vol. 52, No. 5, October–November 2010, p. 165.

18. Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality: A Revolution in Military Theory," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 15, Spring 1997, p. 36.

19. The importance of control as the object in war is central to Wylie, *Military Strategy*, and is the principal contribution of the book to strategic theory.

20. The bundle of ideas that emerged in the mid-1950s and matured a decade later on the broad subject area of a desirable flexibility of response in strategy led probably inevitably to the placing of undue faith in the willingness of adversaries to respond, or not, with reliable predictability to American threats and limited military-punitive actions. The whole array of ideas pertaining to limited war in the nuclear age that was triggered initially by reaction to, and reflection on, the war in Korea, fuelled a notably flawed belief that strategic orchestration was possible by clever Americans. The happy, but actually uncomfortably close, outcome to the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 served to feed the fire of strategic self-confidence imprudently. The allegedly new pseudo-scientific strategy of crisis management was born. This strategic confidence died as a direct result of the Vietnam experience. See Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010, Chap. 17; and Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014, Chap. 13. An exceptionally useful truly contemporary analysis by a leading strategic theorist of the period is Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

21. In all countries, though particularly in popular democracies, political stability on the home front is an essential requirement that has to underpin, and indeed enable, strategic effectiveness abroad. This point was registered with outstanding clarity in Philip A. Crowl, "The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers," Harry R. Borowski, ed., *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987*, Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1988, pp. 377–388.

22. Charles Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War," *Marines Magazine*, Vol. 18, May 1999, pp. 28–34. For an Australian view, not to be outbid by the U.S. Marine Corps, see David Schmidtchen, *The Rise of the Strategic Private: Technology, Control and Change in a Networked-Enabled Military*, Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 2006. Given the widespread popular acknowledgement of the significance of Krulak's argument, it was somewhat ungracious of Schmidtchen not to mention his thesis, which had been aired half a decade earlier.

23. See Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010, Chap. 6.

24. Echevarria, *Reconsidering the American Way of War*, pp. 41–42, is plausible in the modesty of his claims concerning the competitive quality of American military equipment, especially for the warfare waged against Germany.

25. I explore the subject of technological sophistication and combat effectiveness in my *Perspectives on Strategy*, Chap. 5, "Technology: Magic Bullets?"

26. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 85, 104, 339.

27. Such unavoidable involvement in foreign domestic politics and their cultural antagonisms are all but thematic in the better of the recent studies of the American and British strategic experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s. See McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*; Jonathon Bailey, Richard Iron, and Hew Strachan, eds., *British Generals in Blair's Wars*, Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2013; and Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

28. Clausewitz, *On War*. The pervasive significance of politics is emphasized in Colin S. Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, forthcoming in 2015.

29. Worded thus, it is easy enough to note the corresponding fit with Thucydides' theory of the three primary motives in statecraft being "fear, honor, and interest." Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, Robert B. Strassler, ed., New York: Free Press 1996, p. 43. His "fear, honor, and interest" covers more than adequately the reasons behind Vladimir Putin's actively aggressive statecraft and strategy. The Greek general and theorist-historian would have understood Russian policy toward Ukraine with scant need for education in our contemporary detail.

30. The clearest, indeed almost certainly the definitive, strategic explanation for this is provided with admirer economy in Wylie's *Military Strategy*.

31. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966, remains the most impressive theoretical study of coercion in contemporary statecraft. In addition, there is some lasting value in the analyses presented in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998. See particularly Freedman's Chap. 1, "Strategic Coercion."

32. Thomas M. Kane, *Military Logistics and Strategic Performance*, London, UK: Frank Cass, 2001; and Echevarria, *Reconsidering the American Way of War*, are both eloquent on the importance of logistics to strategy. In addition it is well worth noting the judgment of professional military logistician Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, USN (Ret.), who wrote explaining that "logistics is the bridge between the national economy and the tactical operation of the combat forces." See Henry Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965, p. 19.

33. In his outstanding biography of Dwight Eisenhower, author Jean Edward Smith observes that:

In terms of logistics and supply the maneuvers [U.S. Army in Louisiana, 1941] helped put in place the wartime coordination that distinguished the United States Army in every theater. Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Lutes, who handled the supply effort of [Patton's] Third Army, became the Army's chief of distribution during World War II and was ulti-

mately promoted to lieutenant general. Lutes ensured that American forces always had more of everything than they might possibly need.

Ironically, perhaps, Eisenhower himself was not known for his logistical skills. See Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace*, New York: Random House, 2012, p. 171.

34. The basic texts are Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 1942, New York: W. W. Norton, 1962; Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of World Power*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942; and Nicholas John Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*, 1944, New York: Archon Books, 1969. Notable studies of a more recent vintage include: Ciro E. Zoppo and Charles Zorgbibe, eds., *On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear*, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985; and Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*, New York: Random House, 2012.

35. In his fairly frank biography, former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had this to say about the USMC:

But an important reason the Marines deployed to Helmand was that while Marine Commandant Jim Conway was eager to get his Marines off their duffs in western Iraq and into the fight in Afghanistan, he also insisted that all the Marines deployed to a single 'area of responsibility'—one battlespace—with Marine air cover and logistics. Only Helmand fit Conway's conditions. The Marines were determined to keep operational control of their forces away from the senior U.S. commander in Tabul and in the hands of a Marine lieutenant general at Central Command in Tampa. The Marines performed with courage, brilliance, and considerable success on the ground, but their higher leadership put their own parochial service concerns above the requirements of the overall Afghan mission.

Robert Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014, p. 340.

36. See Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*, Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2004, pp. 34-36; and Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

37. For a sensible contribution to the “minimum deterrence” debate, see Keith B. Payne (Study Director), *Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance: A Prudent Alternative to Minimum Deterrence*, Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2014.

38. Echevarria, *Reconsidering the American Way of War*, p. 149.

39. See Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir*, New York: Sentinel, 2011, for the full story from the then-Secretary’s perspective.

40. Allan Mallinson, “The British need to head back east of Suez,” *The Times* (London), August 23, 2014, p. 28.

41. For reasons explained in Gray, *Strategy and Defence Planning*, pp. 17-20.

42. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 104.

43. *Ibid.*

44. It should not be forgotten that there is often a nuclear context to a local or regional crisis, whether or not nuclear weapon states have sought explicitly to extend nuclear deterrence as cover for the strategic behavior and misbehavior of allies, friends, and perhaps bold neutrals.

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