

BLACK AND BLUE: EXPLAINING THE CONTINUING GAP IN CAREER
PROGRESSION FOR AFRICAN-AMERICAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS ON CULTURE AND DIVERSITY

BY
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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

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Finally, a mere “thank you” is insufficient for my wife and our two daughters. Their support through this challenging journey is the source of my strength and motivation. Words cannot express how much I appreciate their sacrifice in this endeavor. I dedicate this work to them.

ABSTRACT

Since 2009, the Department of Defense has had a marked focus on diversity. Some have speculated that the election of the first African-American President in 2008 is the catalyst for the focus. Others have opined that this focus was inevitable due to shifting demographics in America. “Diversity is a military necessity” is the catch phrase that has been echoed by the Air Force in response to this push. Both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have taken steps to increase a focus on diversity within the service and increased the awareness of all Airmen with respect to diversity issues. The establishment of the Global Diversity Division under the HQ USAF/A1 directorate evidences the importance of diversity. Since 2009, the Air Force has produced a number of strategic governance documents aimed at increasing diversity: a strategic roadmap, an Air Force policy directive, and an Air Force Instruction on diversity. Despite these initial steps and efforts on diversity, current data still reveals an alarming lack of career progression for minority US Air Force officers, particularly African-Americans. Why is that phenomenon still prevalent even after a conscious push from Air Force leaders? This study comprises an examination of the issues and possible reasons for the systematic career progression gap.

This monograph begins with a question: why is the Air Force not meeting its diversity objectives in the officer corps? By examining this question through the lenses of organizational culture, cognitive reasoning, and physical representation, this study illuminates how the Air Force is failing to meet its objectives. In turn, this study includes some considerations to help the Air Force make immediate and long-term lasting improvements.

This thesis consists of six chapters, which are broken out as follows. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the study and outlines essential definitions of diversity and how the Air Force defines its diversity goals. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework from existing academic literature, which forms the foundation for analysis. Chapter 3 focuses on the career progression of African-American officers, as they are the worst performing officer demographic in terms of promotion. Chapter 4 applies the theoretical constructs to the case study through analysis. Finally, Chapter 5 offers recommendations and areas of future research which may help guide Air Force decision makers in their mission to increase diversity. Chapter 6 is an epilogue that gives the author’s unique perspective and experience as one of only 275 black pilots in the Air Force. Of the 64,000 officers in the Air Force, there are approximately 15,000 pilots.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The greatest strength of our Air Force is our Airmen! The greatest strength of our Airmen is their diversity! Each of them comes from a different background, a different family experience and a different social experience. Each brings a different set of skills and a unique perspective to the team. We don't just celebrate diversity... We embrace it!

-General Mark A. Welsh III, Air Force Chief of Staff

Diversity is a military necessity¹. This sentence is included in every official Air Force document which deals with diversity, and indicates diversity is an indispensable, imperative requirement for the United States Air Force. But what is the basis of this assertion? And how has this view manifested itself in action (and results)? The United States has a good record of accomplishment for doing well in conflicts. From the Gulf War in 1991, to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the Air Force has received high marks for its contribution to the nation's defense. In a purely objective sense, the Air Force has done well and is doing well in performing its mission. So, why is diversity a military necessity?

In the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009, section 596, Congress mandated the creation of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC).² The Commission was tasked to "conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior

¹ Air Force Instruction (AFI) 1-1, *Air Force Culture*, 7 August 2012, 11.

² The MLDC is the third deliberative body established by an external authority to find ways to transform the US military into a more inclusive institution. Its predecessors were the Fahy Committee (1949-1950), created by President Harry S. Truman and the Gesell Committee (1962), appointed by President John F. Kennedy. Historians have hailed the Fahy Committee as instrumental in desegregating the Armed Forces and thus paving the way for the nation to move closer to its ideals.

officers.”³ Since the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, diversity has become a focus area for improvement in the Air Force.

However, to average Airmen, there exists a disconnect between this new focus on diversity and the Air Force being able to effectively accomplish its mission.⁴ Airmen need to understand why diversity is important to their organization and mission before they will embrace the importance of diversity as part of their profession. Once the Air Force institutionalizes diversity, it will become more than a buzzword from senior leaders. General Mark Welsh, 20th Chief of Staff of the Air Force stresses the importance of knowing each Airman’s story. The United States Air Force story of how diversity makes the Air Force a better service is equally important!

Definitions

The Air Force defines diversity as a composite of individual characteristics, experiences, and abilities consistent with Air Force core values and the Air Force mission. Air Force diversity includes but is not limited to the following attributes: personal life experiences, geographic background, socioeconomic background, cultural knowledge, educational background, work background, language abilities, physical abilities, philosophical/spiritual perspectives, age, race, ethnicity, and gender.⁵ “Diversity also is further subdivided into demographic, cognitive, behavioral, organizational/structural and global diversity. This concept of diversity is to be tailored as specific circumstances and the law require.”⁶

³ Congress, *2009 National Defense Authorization Act*, Signed into law, 14 Oct 2008.

⁴ Rosen, Stephen Peter, *Winning the next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 199), 20.

⁵ Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-7001, *Diversity*, 20 July 2012, 4.

⁶ Air Force Document (AFD) 121205-014. *United States Air Force Diversity Strategic Roadmap*, Washington DC: Air Force Diversity Office, AF/A1DV, 19 November 2012, 5.

The Air Force has adopted a very broad and comprehensive definition of diversity. When thinking about how to leverage diversity, or what the benefits of diversity are, the Air Force's definition is very useful. However, when trying to measure it, or categorize it through current Air Force structures and systems, it becomes a very difficult task. Economist Scott Page suggests we break diversity into three types. Diversity *within a type*, or **variation**, refers to differences in the amount of some attribute or characteristic, such as length, width, height, circumference, or color.⁷ Next is diversity of **types and kinds**, or *species in biological systems*, referring to differences in kind, such as types of foods in a refrigerator.⁸ Last is diversity of **composition**, which refers to differences in how the types are arranged. Examples include recipes and molecules.⁹ In the Air Force today, it is hard to classify individuals by their ill-defined attributes like personal life experiences, cultural knowledge, and physical abilities. However, what is common is how we classify people according to variation, especially variation we can see such as length of hair, race, and ethnicity. This variation is tangible, common, and a benchmark from which many of the Air Force assessment tools are constructed. Promotion statistics do not reflect personal life experiences, geographic background, socioeconomic background, cultural knowledge, educational background, work background, language abilities, physical abilities, or philosophical/spiritual perspectives. Therefore, this research focuses on diversity *within a type*, or **variation**, which is captured in USAF promotion statistics and is reported as race, gender, and ethnicity.¹⁰

⁷ Page, Scott E., *Diversity and Complexity*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 20-21.

⁸ Page, *Diversity and Complexity*, 20.

⁹ Page, *Diversity and Complexity*, 20.

¹⁰ See Figures 11 & 12, also 16 through 19 for promotion board demographics. AFPC Statistics-Static reports:

http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&service=pZ1pub1&debug=0.

To be clear, there is only one race of people on the Earth, namely the human race. Race data has been collected in the United States since 1790, the year of the first census.¹¹ According to the 2010 US Census, race and ethnicity are based on self-reporting. Race is delineated into several categories. On the 2010 census the US used five race categories (White, Black or African-American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander), plus an additional category of “Some Other Race.”¹² It is important to note racial categories are a socially constructed definition recognized in this country, and not an attempt to define race biologically, anthropologically, or genetically.¹³ Ethnicity is defined as Hispanic or Latino and Not Hispanic or Latino. Hispanic origin can be viewed as the heritage, nationality group, lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person’s parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States. People who identify their origin as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may be any race.¹⁴

What are the Air Force’s diversity objectives based on? The Rand Corporation produced a 2010 study that helped the Air Force focus on what the proper population benchmark should be for the service.¹⁵ Based on the 2010 census data, approximately sixty-seven million

¹¹ Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2, (Accessed 12 January 2013), www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.

¹² Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2, (Accessed 12 January 2013), www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.

¹³ The Census Bureau collects race data in accordance with guidelines provided by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and these data are based on self-identification. The racial categories included in the census questionnaire generally reflect a social definition of race recognized in this country and not an attempt to define race biologically, anthropologically, or genetically. In addition, it is recognized that the categories of the race item include racial and national origin or sociocultural groups. People may choose to report more than one race to indicate their racial mixture, such as “American Indian” and “White.” People who identify their origin as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may be of any race. (<http://www.census.gov/population/race/about/faq.html>), (Accessed 14 April 2013).

¹⁴ Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2, (Accessed 12 January 2013), www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.

¹⁵ RAND Project Air Force presentation on Air Force Diversity, January 2010.

Americans (See Figure 1) were between the ages of 18-34. Of those, approximately eight million met the educational, citizenship, height/weight, and medical standards for entry into the United States Air Force.




Figure 1: Eligible Population (Officers)
Source: HQ USAF A1DV Diversity Update Brief 2012

A racial and ethnic categorization of this group is depicted in Figure 2, and reveals a breakdown as follows: 77 percent White, 6.9 percent African-Americans, 6.2 percent Hispanic, and 9.8 percent Asian/other. From the eligible population the Air Force extrapolates its desire to represent the people it protects by the percentage of people eligible to serve in its officer corps.




Figure 2: Officer Accession
Source: HQ USAF A1DV Diversity Update Brief 2012

Interestingly, the active duty, reserves, and National Guard (total force) of the Air Force closely represent the nation's racial and ethnic percentages as of March 2013.¹⁶ The Air Force officer and enlisted are 74 percent White, 13.6 percent Black, 2.9 percent Asian, 0.6 percent American Indian/Native Alaskan, 1.1 percent Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 3 percent identified as more than one race, while 4.8 percent declined to respond. The United States population at the same time reported 72 percent White, 13 percent Black, 5 percent Asian, 6 percent two or more races, 3 percent declined to respond, 1.1 percent American Indian/Alaskan Native (Figure 3). This tells us that taken together the Air Force has very little problem mirroring the nation's diversity. It is only in the officer corps where this parallel breaks down. African-American officers only account for 5.8 percent of the total officer population, versus 13.6 percent of the total US population. A number of factors may help to explain this phenomenon.

¹⁶ Air Force Demographics, (Accessed 5 March 2013),
<http://www.afpc.af.mil/library/airforcepersonnel demographics.asp>.




Figure 3: Air Force Total Force vs. US Population
Source: HQ USAF A1DV Diversity Update Brief 2012

One factor is accessions. Accessions are the pathways to which an American citizen can obtain a commission as an officer in the US military. For the purpose of scoping this study, this paper primarily deals with line officers on active duty. Another factor that affects the service's ability to reflect society in the officer corps is the highly technical nature of the Air Force mission. Rated/operational versus non-rated operational career fields are an example of the split between technical and non-technical jobs in the Air Force. Further delineation is between the support and non-mission support career fields.

Limitations

Limitations to this study are the lack of detailed statistics or primary sources that are available on black officers. The data presented are not meant to mislead or misrepresent the Air Force. It has been collected and validated in a variety of ways. However, the Air Force Personnel Center systems are the only official source for data on Air

Force personnel. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services (HAF/A1) has the ability to authorize further study and analysis through the Air Force Barrier Analysis Working Group to extract the exact numbers to re-evaluate the findings of this thesis.

Background

Since 2009, the United States Air Force has made a stronger effort towards achieving greater diversity. In September 2009, the Air Force stood up the Air Force Diversity Operations Division on the Headquarters Air Force Staff under the personnel directorate. On 17 September 2009, the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, addressed the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. Admiral Mullen stated, “We, as a military, must represent our country. We must represent the demographics of it. It’s the greatest strength of our country.”¹⁷ By Admiral Mullen’s logic, then, the nation becomes stronger everyday as it grows more racially diverse.

Many studies support the idea diversity makes a society or an organization better. Businesses see diversity and inclusion as a force multiplier, which results in greater profits.¹⁸ This is why businesses today invest in diversity. Professor Scott E. Page in *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies* demonstrates the contributions of diversity through models and logic and claims, “Collective ability equals individual ability plus diversity” and “diversity trumps ability.”¹⁹ How does this translate to the United States

¹⁷ Parco, James E., & David A. Levy, *Attitudes Aren't Free: Thinking Deeply about Diversity in the US Armed Forces*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 2010), 385.

¹⁸ Diversity Linked To Increased Sales Revenue And Profits, More Customers, (Accessed 14 December 2012), <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/090331091252.htm>

¹⁹ Page, Scott E., *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies*, (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 2007), XIV.

Air Force? The Air Force mission is to Fly, Fight, and Win...In Air, Space, and Cyberspace. The Air Force should not pursue diversity for diversity's sake. The Air Force should strive for diversity because it yields a marked advantage at creating innovation and productivity, which contributes to national security and winning the nation's wars.

The Air Force has recently produced two policy documents and an Air Force Instruction to articulate how to manage and employ diversity.²⁰ First, the Air Force produced a strategic roadmap. The first volume was released in the fall of 2009, and the second iteration was produced in November 2012.²¹ The Air Force Diversity Strategic Roadmap is the service's action plan for the achieving the diversity objectives of the 2011 Presidential Executive Order (EO) 13583 titled *Establishing A Coordinated Government-Wide Initiative To Promote Diversity And Inclusion In The Federal Workforce*.²² In the fall of 2010, the Air Force issued Policy Directive 36-70.²³ This policy directive provided direction and oversight for Air Force diversity. In October 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force, Chief of Staff, and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force issued a memo to all Airmen titled "Declaration on Diversity."²⁴ Within this memo Air Force leadership stated "diversity throughout our Air Force is a military necessity... Embracing diversity enhances unit cohesion and the Air Force's ability to carry out our mission... We will promote an Air Force culture that embraces diversity and provides the

²⁰ Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-7001, *Diversity*, 20 July 2012.

²¹ Air Force Document (AFD) 121205-014, *United States Air Force Diversity Strategic Roadmap*, Washington DC: Air Force Diversity Office, AF/A1DV, 19 November 2012. <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130220-097.pdf>, (accessed 5 January 2013).

²² Air Force Document (AFD) 121205-014. *United States Air Force Diversity Strategic Roadmap*, 4.

²³ Air Force Policy Directive 36-70, *Diversity*, 20 July 2012.

²⁴ Air Force Document (AFD) 111101-008, *United States Air Force Declaration on Diversity*, <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-111101-008.pdf>, (accessed 5 January 2013).

opportunity for all Airmen to reach their full potential.”²⁵ Lastly, the Air Force produced Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-7001, titled “Air Force Diversity,” in July of 2012.²⁶ With all these structures in place, why has the Air Force not achieved its diversity objectives?

This leads to the significance of this study. The Air Force states very specifically in its diversity governance documents it values diversity. However, what are the organization’s motives for achieving diversity? Scott Page would argue it should seek diversity because of the power diverse perspectives bring to solving complex problems.²⁷ The Air Force believes diversity has value on tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The undertaking of developing senior leaders in the Air Force is a strategic endeavor.²⁸ It takes an average of twenty years to develop an officer from Second Lieutenant to Colonel. Further, it takes 24 years to develop a Lieutenant into a Brigadier General.

However, does diversity truly matter at the tactical level? To a four-ship flight lead of F-22’s, does it matter that her wingmen are black, or from a different part of the country? Arguably, she only cares that each person is trained, proficient, and ready to execute his or her duties. Warheads on foreheads are the objective. Such may be the case for this finite period of time while the sortie is in execution. How about mission planning before the sortie is launched? Are there benefits from diversity here? Lt Gen Darren McDew, Eighteenth Air Force Commander, states there are tremendous benefits from diversity leading up to the execution of a sortie.²⁹ Lt Gen McDew credits not only the make-up of the aircrew,

²⁵ Air Force Document (AFD) 111101-008, *United States Air Force Declaration on Diversity*.

²⁶ Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-7001. *Diversity*, 20 July 2012. <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130128-023.pdf>, (accessed 5 January 2013).

²⁷ Scott E. Page, *The Difference*, 322-324.

²⁸ An Air Force senior leader refers to officers in the rank of O-6/Colonel and above.

²⁹ Lt Gen Darren McDew, (Eighteenth Air Force Commander), interview by author, 14 January 2013.

but also the diversity that all contributing agencies bring (maintenance, aerial port, logistics, flight managers, and weather are a few examples), enabling Air Mobility Command to achieve a takeoff every 90 seconds somewhere in the world. In addition, the Air Force's Declaration on Diversity states "On a tactical level, mission success requires the unique experiences and talents of Airmen of various backgrounds, ethnicities, races, genders, and cultural experiences."³⁰ It is the position offered in this study that the Air Force is not communicating this importance down to the tactical level.

As with any significant effort that deals with racial undertones, a unique, particular potential exists to decrease mission effectiveness, lower morale and discipline, and prejudice good order and discipline if the majority feels diversity fuels inequality. It can degrade the work environment when the majority feels it is not getting fair treatment. In this way, diversity can decrease effectiveness when special treatment of a certain demographic is perceived as reverse discrimination and is just as detrimental as traditional racial discrimination. Discrimination is against the law. It must be handled through Equal Opportunity channels within the military, and it must not be confused with diversity. Differing perspectives on diversity are a welcomed by-product of heterogeneity. They create opportunities for the Air Force to keep the diversity discussion relevant to mission effectiveness in efforts to institutionalize diversity throughout the service. This will be covered further in Chapter 2.

Just as the Air Force must confront the perception of reverse discrimination, the Air Force must continue to acknowledge the reality of the culture of discrimination it has overcome in the past. Some of the Air Force's greatest pioneers and heroes, including General Carl Spaatz,

³⁰ Secretary of the Air Force, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, To All Airmen, *Declaration of Diversity*, 14 October 2011. <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-111101-008.pdf>.

General George Kenney, and General Ira Eaker, did not want blacks fully integrated in the Air Force.³¹ For today's African-American airmen, this presents a conundrum. While these pioneers' contributions to airpower and the US Air Force were exemplary, their personal rejections of inclusion initiatives are difficult to embrace.

The sickness of racism persisted beyond the Air Force's infant years. During the 1970's, the Air Force experienced racial problems across the service. One horrible incident occurred from 22-24 May 1971. During this time, race riots broke out at Travis Air Force Base in California. This violent event, the worst the Air Force has ever seen, resulted in one dead, 30 injured, and 135 arrested. This tragedy reoriented how the Air Force looked at the issue of race in the service.³² These lessons learned are part of Air Force history. In light of events such as this, the Air Force should rely on its lesson-learned organizations (A9 directorates) to help educate the force on similar race related events that highlight low points in our Air Force history. This is one way to create a culture of understanding and inclusion.

Dr. Everett C. Dolman postulates in *The Warrior State: How Military Organizations Structure Politics*, that the military often leads great social, economic, and democratic changes.³³ He discusses President Harry S. Truman's decision in 1948 to integrate the military as one example. Truman's bold decision recast America's perceptions of African-American servicemen. It forced the nation to reconsider the notions of equality and the fairness of a 'separate but equal' standard. Just six years after Truman's dictate, the US Supreme Court overturned its historic Plessy v. Ferguson decision (establishing the 'separate but

³¹ Gropman, Alan L., *The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964*, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 39.

³² Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 216, note 101.

³³ Dolman, Everett C., *The Warrior State: How Military Organization Structures Politics*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 9-13.

equal' doctrine) with the equally historic Brown v. Board of Education case (which declared the former unconstitutional). Ultimately, this case showed that servicemen could lead the way for society; it is now time for the Air Force to lead the way again.

The Air Force must be bold in its leadership and embrace historical shortcomings like these that illuminate a possible cultural phenomenon in the Air Force and may be symptomatic of additional leadership challenges as well. An inability of Air Force leaders at all levels to confront piercing wounds that play into the cognitive health of their subordinates may have hidden but serious detrimental effects. Potentially this is an area where commanders at the lowest levels are falling short.

Evidence

The evidence in support of this research comes primarily from US Air Force documents, statistics, and studies. In the theoretical frameworks chapter, this study looks at Edgar Schein's organizational culture model and explores two diversity theories: implicit bias and critical mass theory. The study's research design is based on examining Schein's concepts of artifacts, values, and basic underlying assumptions and applying them to the Air Force and its pursuit of diversity objectives. The goal will be to identify the Air Force's artifacts, values, and basic underlying assumptions and to determine whether or not they are conducive to constructing an Air Force culture that not only values diversity but takes active steps to achieve it. Ultimately, the research hopes to illuminate factors that will assist the Air Force to reap the benefits of diversity and inclusion.

Schein outlines the characteristics of elite organizations and their organizational culture; the Air Force strives for this type of organizational culture within its ranks. This sets the stage for examining the case study of African-American officers to determine cultural barriers that

may be contributing to their decreased promotion rates. Ultimately, this study will extract lessons that can potentially improve Air Force organizational culture and performance. In addition, it aims to identify measures black officers can take to improve their advancement through the ranks in order to contribute to greater diversity in the senior ranks.

This research also comprises an exploration of two diversity theories: implicit bias and critical mass theory. Implicit bias refers to the attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner.³⁴ Critical mass is a concept that has been applied in a wide variety of contexts and settings, though all applications share a common trait: the notion that relative numbers matter in terms of the dynamics of demographically heterogeneous groups. Critical mass theory is typically credited to Rosabeth Moss Kanter, though she did not employ the term.³⁵ Drude Dahlerup came up with the term “critical mass” then refuted the term and proposed the term “critical acts.”³⁶ These two theories, along with Schein’s model, provide the theoretical foundation for explaining why the Air Force is not achieving its diversity objectives.

Roadmap

This monograph is organized in the following manner: First, the introduction posits the central question: why is the Air Force not achieving its diversity objectives? It also introduces the central message of this paper: *why diversity is important to the Air Force, and why Airmen should take an active role in advancing diversity.*

³⁴ Staats, Cheryl, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review*, http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf, (Accessed 15 January 2013).

³⁵ Kanter, Rosabeth Moss, *Men and Women of the Corporation*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1977)

³⁶ Dahlerup, Drude, *From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics*, (Stockholm University, 1988), 275.

Chapter 2 describes the theoretical framework for the study. It applies Edgar Schein's organizational culture model to the Air Force in an effort to expose how its culture contributes or fails to contribute to diversity. Next, the notion of implicit bias is addressed, followed by an exploration of how this phenomena can influence the cognitive make up of Air Force officers and how it can affect a career progression in the Air Force. Last, this study includes and assessment of critical mass theory and an evaluation of this theory's merit within the Air Force construct.

Chapter 3 explores African-American Air Force officers' career progression. Examining black officers from the rank of O-1/Second Lieutenant through O-10/General highlights the key points in a career and notes shortfalls that illuminate why black officers are promoted at a rate *significantly below* any other demographic or cohort in the officer corps. In addition, this effort highlights areas that contribute to the lack of promotion equality among black officers to try to find potential fixes.

Chapter 4 comprises the primary analysis, taking black officer performance and the theoretical constructs presented to identify an answer to the question of why the Air Force is not meeting its diversity objectives.

Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations. This chapter summarizes the paper, and presents tangible recommendations. These recommendations are presented with full appreciation for the current context in which the Air Force is operating. They consider the fiscal, political, worldwide demand constraints and considerations on the Air Force. These recommendations are intended to be instituted in short order to affect Air Force diversity operations and create lasting institutionalized effects.

Finally, an epilogue will provide the author's personal account of his own Air Force experience. This is offered as a means to give a tangible example to those Airmen who have not seen the *why* behind diversity initiatives. In addition, it provides a personal perspective to

young African-American officers who wonder if the *system* is fair, or perhaps have not been exposed to an Air Force role model. On the other hand, these same officers may wonder if they have what it takes to be successful in the United States Air Force. Open dialogue and introspection are two key requirements for improving Air Force diversity. It must flow from the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff all the way down to the newest Lieutenant. This awareness must take place daily to help our Air Force attract, promote, and retain America's best talent. Let's get to work.

CHAPTER 2

The Threefold Order: Implicit Bias, Organizational Culture, and Critical Mass

Man is a compound of soul, mind, and body, three modes of force which must be expended, controlled, and maintained in war.

—Colonel J.F.C. Fuller

Military theorist J.F.C. Fuller, in his book titled *The Foundations of the Science of War*, offers a method of examination for warfare. He asserts that knowledge is based on the universal inference of a threefold order.¹ Fuller quotes the Greek philosopher Protagoras in believing “Man is the measure of all things.”² From this concept of man, Fuller expresses how knowledge is gained through our minds, toned by our souls, and expressed by our bodies.³ Fuller’s threefold nature of man methodology will guide this chapter and provide the framework with which we examine diversity in the Air Force.

First, the theory of implicit bias will be explained. Following this explanation of the theory we will examine its application to the Air Force. This will represent the mind, as Fuller explains the brain of man is the controlling organ.⁴ Next, this study explores well-known author Edgar Schein’s model on organizational culture within the context of the Air Force. Organizational Culture is considered the soul of man, the essence of who he is. Fuller expresses the soul is the target of continual bombardment of impressions which can change man, his mind, and his character.⁵ Lastly, the theory of critical mass and the numerical presence of being physically present will represent the body. Also referred to as tokenism, how does this fit with the issue of diversity in the Air Force? The mind, body, and soul of man are the three forces at work

¹ Fuller, J. F. C., *The Foundations of the Science of War*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1993), 49.

² Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*, 54.

³ Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*, 54.

⁴ Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*, 56.

⁵ Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*, 57.

in the mental, physical, and moral spheres and are always active within the United States Air Force.

Implicit Bias

Over the past thirty years, cognitive and social psychologists have demonstrated that human beings think and act in ways that are often not rational.⁶ As Americans, we suffer from a long list of biases that often times have nothing to do with race, gender, or ethnicity. Within the Air Force, biases exist between pilots and non-pilots, between operators and maintenance, between operators and mission support, and between officers and enlisted. Bias is a reality, and it exists in our daily lives. At times, bias manifests itself explicitly, while at other times only implicitly.

A field of study, which combines social and cognitive psychology with cognitive neuroscience, has been named *implicit social cognition* (ISC). This field focuses on mental processes that affect social judgments but operate without conscious awareness or conscious control.⁷ More commonly, it has become known as “Implicit Bias.” By definition, implicit bias is comprised of attitudes and stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner.⁸ As we unpack implicit bias some key attributes of bias in general must be defined. Implicit or Unconscious bias: these biases are activated unconsciously, involuntarily, and/or without one’s awareness or intentional control.⁹ Bias: “denotes a displacement of people’s responses along a continuum of possible judgments.”¹⁰ This bias may skew toward

⁶ Kang, J., Bennett, M., Carbado, D., Casey, P., Dasgupta, N., Faigman, D., et al., *Implicit Bias in the Courtroom*, (UCLA Law Review, 2012), 59(5), 1128.

⁷ Kang & Lane, *Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law*, (UCLA Law Review, 2010), 58(2), 467.

⁸ Kang, J., Bennett, M., Carbado, D., Casey, P., Dasgupta, N., Faigman, D., et al., *Implicit Bias in the Courtroom*, (UCLA Law Review, 2012), 59(5), 1124-1186.

⁹ Kang, J., Bennett, M., Carbado, D., Casey, P., Dasgupta, N., Faigman, D., et al. *Implicit Bias in the Courtroom*, (UCLA Law Review, 2012) 59(5), 1124-1186.

¹⁰ Greenwald & Krieger, *Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations*, (California Law Review, 2006), 950.

either a favorable or an unfavorable assessment.¹¹ Automatically Activated / Involuntary: Implicit biases can activate without intention and/or without being explicitly controlled (i.e., not deliberate).¹² Pervasiveness: Substantial research has established that implicit attitudes and stereotypes are robust and pervasive.¹³ Research shows that everyone is susceptible to implicit biases.¹⁴ It is a cognitive process, and all are susceptible to this phenomenon. Once these key attributes of bias are understood, it is helpful to unpack key concepts around the science of implicit bias.

Schemas are “templates of knowledge that help us to organize specific examples into broader categories.”¹⁵ Essentially these are mental shortcuts that allow us to quickly assign objects, processes, and people into categories.¹⁶ For example, people may be placed into categories based on traits such as age, race, and gender. Once these categories have been assigned, any meanings that we carry associated with that category then become associated with the object, process, or person in question.¹⁷ The chronic accessibility of racial schemas allows them to shape social interactions.¹⁸

¹¹ Greenwald & Krieger, *Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations*, (California Law Review, 2006).

¹² Blair I.V., *The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice*, (Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(3), 2002), 242-261.

¹³ Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Kang, et al., 2012; Kang & Lane, 2010; Nosek, Smyth, et al., 2007.

¹⁴ Kang, J. *Memorandum on Implicit Bias*, 2008.

¹⁵ Kang, J. *Memorandum on Implicit Bias*, 2008.

¹⁶ Kang, J. *Implicit Bias: A Primer for the Courts*: Prepared for the National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America’s State Courts, 2009.

¹⁷ Staats, Cheryl, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review*.

http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf, 11, (Accessed 15 January 2013).

¹⁸ Kang, J., *Trojan Horses of Race*, (Harvard Law Review, 118(5), 2005), 1489-1593.

Stereotypes are beliefs that are mentally associated with a given category.¹⁹ For example, Asians are often stereotyped as being good at math, and the elderly are often stereotyped as being frail. As another example, USAF fighter pilots are often stereotyped as being highly confident and decisive, whereas mobility pilots are often stereotyped as being airline pilots in military flight suits. These associations, both positive and negative, are routinized enough that they generally are automatically accessed.²⁰ The important thing to remember is that stereotypes are not necessarily accurate, and may even reflect associations that we would consciously reject.²¹

Attitudes are another key concept to implicit bias. Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines attitude as "a mental position with regard to a fact or state."²² Attitudes are evaluative feelings, such as having a positive or negative feeling towards something or someone.²³ In the Air Force, positive or negative perceptions of attitude play an important role in the everyday execution of jobs. We in the military often associate attitude with morale of a person or unit. The Air Force takes aims to measure this, by way of climate surveys, to give Commanders feedback on the state of attitudes within their units.

Lastly, ingroups and outgroups are means of categorization. For example, as soon as we see someone, we automatically categorize him or her as either "one of us," (that is, a member of our ingroup), or different

¹⁹ Blair, I.V., *The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice*, (Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(3), 2002), 242-261; Greenwald & Krieger, *Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations*, (California Law Review, 94(4), 2006), 945-967.

²⁰ Rudman, L.A., *Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Implicit Bias*, (Social Justice Research, 17(2), 2004), 129-142.

²¹ Reskin, B., *Unconsciousness Raising*, (Regional Review, 14(3), 2005), 32-37.

²² Merriam-Webster Online, "attitude," (accessed 23 Mar 13), <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attitude>.

²³ Greenwald & Krieger, *Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations*, (California Law Review, 94(4), 2006). 945-967; Kang, J., *Implicit Bias: A Primer for the Courts*: Prepared for the National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America's State Courts, 2009.

from ourselves, meaning a member of our outgroup.²⁴ Making this simple “us vs. them” distinction is an automatic process that happens within seconds of meeting someone.²⁵ Right or wrong, ingroup bias leads to relative favoritism compared to outgroup members.²⁶ Think about this in the context of the Air Force. Air Force members identify themselves outwardly by way of rank insignia, which is used to denote officer versus enlisted and hierarchy within the two categories. Another distinction is by Air Force specialty code badges which identify the ingroup of our specific job in the Air Force. By doing this, Air Force members extrapolate characteristics about themselves to other ingroup members, assuming that they are more alike compared to outgroup members.²⁷ By favoring ingroup members, we tend to grant them a measure of our trust and regard them in a positive light.²⁸ Ingroup favoritism surfaces often on different measures of implicit bias like the implicit association test (IAT) discussed later.²⁹

As we apply implicit bias to the Air Force it is important to distinguish between explicit and implicit bias. Explicit biases “can be concurrently detected and reported.”³⁰ Conversely, implicit biases are processes that occur without introspective awareness.³¹ In addition,

²⁴ Staats, Cheryl, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review*. http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf. 11. (Accessed 15 January 2013).

²⁵ Reskin, B., *Unconsciousness Raising*, (Regional Review, 14(3), 2005), 32-37.

²⁶ Greenwald & Krieger, *Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations*, (California Law Review, 94(4), 2006), 945-967.

²⁷ Reskin, B., *Unconsciousness Raising*, (Regional Review, 14(3), 2005), 32-37.

²⁸ Reskin, B., *Unconsciousness Raising*, (Regional Review, 14(3), 2005), 32-37.

²⁹ Greenwald, A.G., McGee, D.E., & Schwartz, J.L.K., *Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test*, (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1998).

³⁰ Amodio, D.M. & Mendoza, S.A., *Implicit Intergroup Bias: Cognitive, Affective, and Motivational Underpinnings*. In B. Gawronski & B.K. Payne (Eds.), *Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition*, (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2010), 355.

³¹ Staats, Cheryl, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review*. http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf. 14. (Accessed 15 January 2013).

explicit attitudes tend to be associated with responses that individuals can control. Instruments such as feeling thermometers, semantic differentials, and other forms of direct questioning can measure explicit attitudes. It is important to note that implicit associations arise outside of the conscious awareness; as such, they do not necessarily align with an individual's openly held beliefs or even reflect stances one would explicitly endorse.³² These implicit biases may manifest themselves in explicit, ineffectual policy decisions towards people who are not in the ingroup.

Due to the nature of the Air Force, the complex work environment, and the multifaceted nature of being an Air Force Officer, the role of cognitive saturation is important to touch on briefly. "Anything that taxes our attention, multiple demands, complex tasks, time pressure, increases the likelihood of our stereotyping."³³ Research shows that stereotypes activated during cognitive saturation are more likely to be applied to individuals in question.³⁴

In addition, research shows that groups that are cognitively overloaded tend to have more bias.³⁵ Finally, conditions like lack of attention being paid to a task, time constraints, cognitive load, and ambiguity are conducive to implicit bias.³⁶ All these conditions are present in the daily lives of supervising commanders at all levels within the Air Force.

³² Graham, S. & Loney, B., *Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes about Adolescent Offenders*, (Law and Human Behavior, 28(5), 2004), 483-504.

³³ Reskin, B., *Unconsciousness Raising*, (Regional Review, 14(3), 2005), 34.

³⁴ Gilbert, D.T. & Hixson, J.G., *The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs*, (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(4), 1991), 509-517.

³⁵ Payne, B.K., *Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping*, (Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15(6), 2006), 287-291.

³⁶ Bertrand, M., Chugh, D., & Mullainathan, S., *Implicit Discrimination*, (The American Economic Review, 95(2), 2005), 94-98.

Implicit Association Test

Measuring of illicit bias is not an easy task. Legal scholar Jerry Kangas classifies the challenge of learning people's implicit biases as a two-part "willing and able" problem.³⁷ In the Air Force this can be true as well. In order to be politically correct or to maintain the standard of respect the organization demands, people are often unwilling to share their true feelings. For example, it is not an easy task for a lieutenant who went to a historically black college or university to convey to her first supervisor in the Air Force that this is the first setting where she has to work with non-African-Americans. Likewise, it is difficult for the majority member to express that he or she grew up in a town or a home that did not have any Asian people, and that there is discomfort with working with those type of people for the first time.

The "able" challenge of measuring implicit bias has to do with a person's inability to recognize his or her own biases. Nosek and colleagues report these reasons why implicit measures of self-reports differ. First, they point out "the individual is unaware of the implicitly measured associations and uses introspection to generate a unique explicit response."³⁸ Secondly, Nosek and his colleagues point out that when an "individual is aware of the implicitly measured associations, but genuinely rejects them as not conforming to his or her belief system and so reports a distinct explicit response; or the individual is aware of the implicit associations, but chooses to report an alternative explicit response due to social concern about the acceptability of such a response."³⁹ This sums up why self-reporting differs.

³⁷ Kang, J., *Implicit Bias: A Primer for the Courts*: (Prepared for the National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America's State Courts, 2009), 2.

³⁸ Nosek, B.A., Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M.R., *The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review*, (In J.A. Bargh (Ed.), *Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes*, New York, NY. Psychology Press, 2007), 282.

³⁹ Nosek, B.A., Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M.R., *The Implicit Association Test at Age 7*, 282.

This type of testing displays people's vulnerabilities, and as such, researchers have developed numerous instruments and techniques designed to measure cognitions implicitly. These advances help to assess and measure constructs and thinking that may be suppressed due to what is considered socially acceptable. One of the most widely used tools is the Implicit Association Test (IAT).⁴⁰ This test measures the relative strength of associations between pairs of concepts.⁴¹

The IAT operates "on the assumption that if an attitude object evokes a particular evaluation (*positive or negative*), it will facilitate responses to other evaluatively congruent and co-occurring stimuli."⁴² Simply put, this test asks respondents to sort concepts and measures any time differences between schema-consistent pairs and schema-inconsistent pairs.⁴³ As a response latency measure, the IAT operates on the supposition that when the two concepts are highly associated, the sorting task will be easier and thus require less time than when the concepts are not as highly associated.⁴⁴ This difference in mean response latency is known as the IAT effect.⁴⁵ The time differentials of the IAT effect have been found to be statistically significant and not simply due to random chance.⁴⁶ The IAT effect reveals the role of both automatic and controlled processing: the strength of an automatic

⁴⁰ Project Implicit; Implicit Association Test. (Accessed 17 January 2013), <https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/>.

⁴¹ Greenwald, A.G., McGee, D.E., & Schwartz, J.L.K., *Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test*, (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1998).

⁴² Dasgupta, N., & Greenwald, A.G., *On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals*, (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(5), 2001), 801.

⁴³ Kang, et al., *Implicit Bias in the Courtroom*, (UCLA Law Review, 59(5), 2012).

⁴⁴ Greenwald, A.G., & Nosek, B.A., *Health of the Implicit Association Test at Age 3*, (Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie, 48(2), 2001) 85-93.

⁴⁵ Amodio, D.M., & Mendoza, S.A., *Implicit Intergroup Bias: Cognitive, Affective, and Motivational Underpinnings*. In B. Gawronski & B.K. Payne (Eds.), *Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition*, (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2010).

⁴⁶ Kang, J., *Implicit Bias: A Primer for the Courts*: Prepared for the National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America's State Courts, 2009.

association and the challenge associated with sorting a bias-inconsistent pair.⁴⁷ Some studies have found IAT results to be generally stable over time.⁴⁸

Implicit Association Test Finding On Race

One of the most well-known versions of the IAT is the Black/White IAT, which examines the speed with which individuals categorize white and black faces with positive and negative words. Faster reaction times occur when pairing white faces with positive words and black faces with negative terms suggests the presence of implicit pro-white/anti-black bias. Considerable research has indicated that most Americans, regardless of race, display a pro-white/anti-black bias on this IAT,⁴⁹ even in children as young as six years old.⁵⁰

The documented presence of pro-white bias even among nonwhites has intrigued researchers who study ingroup/outgroup dynamics. Dasgupta sheds light on the internal conflict that may help explain this unusual finding when she writes, “In the case of individuals who belong to disadvantaged or subordinate groups... the desire to protect self-esteem should lead to ingroup favoritism and outgroup bias, but the desire to maintain current social arrangements leads to predictions of

⁴⁷ Amodio, D. M., & Mendoza, S.A., *Implicit Intergroup Bias: Cognitive, Affective, and Motivational Underpinnings*. In B. Grawronski & B.K. Payne (Eds.), *Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition* (pp. 353-374), New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2010).

⁴⁸ Cunningham, W.A. et al., *Implicit Attitude Measures: Consistency, Stability, and Convergent Validity*, (*Psychological Science*, 12(2), 2001), 163-170; Egloff, B., Schwerdtfeger, A., & Schmukle, S.C., *Temporal Stability of the Implicit Association Test-Axiety*, (*Journal of Personality Assessment*, 84(1), 2005), 82-88.

⁴⁹ Dovidio, J.F. et al., *Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction*, (*Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(1), 2002), 62-68; Greenwald, et al., 1998; Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 2009; McConnell & Liebold, 2001; Nosek, et al., 2002).

⁵⁰ Baron, A.S., & Banaji, M.R., *The development of Implicit Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations From Ages 6 and 10 and Adulthood*, (*Psychological Science*, 17(1), 2006) 53-58.

outgroup favoritism.”⁵¹ This leads Dasgupta to question whether there are two separate sources of implicit attitudes; one that focuses on one’s group membership, and another that seeks to maintain current social hierarchies.⁵² Several studies lean towards the latter explanation, citing the presence of implicit outgroup favoritism (or, in some cases, less ingroup favoritism) for a dominant outgroup over one’s own subordinated ingroup.⁵³

Implicit bias has notable effects on behavior. Regardless of how they are measured, researchers agree that implicit biases have real-world effects on behavior.⁵⁴ These effects have been shown to manifest themselves in several different forms, including interpersonal interactions. For example, McConnell and Liebold found that as white participants’ IAT scores reflected relatively more positive attitudes towards whites than blacks; social interactions (measured by focusing on 13 specific behaviors) with a white experimenter were more positive than interactions with a black experimenter.⁵⁵ In this study, larger IAT effect scores “predicted greater speaking time, more smiling, more extemporaneous social comments, fewer speech errors, and fewer speech hesitations in interactions with the white (vs black) experimenter.”⁵⁶

⁵¹ Dasgupta, N., *Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations*, (Social Justice Research, 17(2), 2004), 148.

⁵² Dasgupta, N., *Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations*.

⁵³ Ashburn-Nardo, L., Knowles, M.L., & Monteith, M.J., *Black Americans’ Implicit Racial Associations and their Implications for Intergroup Judgment*, Social Cognition, 21(1), 2003), 61-87; Nosek, et al., 2002; Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002.

⁵⁴ Dasgupta, N., *Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations*, (Social Justice Research, 17(2), 2004); Kang, et al., 2012; Rooth, 2007.

⁵⁵ Staats, Cheryl, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review*.

http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf, 27-28, (Accessed 15 January 2013).

⁵⁶ (McConnell, A.R., & Liebold, J.M., *Relations among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Attitudes*, (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37(5), 2001), 439.

Another study by Dovidio et al. found that white individuals with higher levels of racial bias blinked more and maintained less visual contact with black interviewers than white ones.⁵⁷ Several studies look at interracial interactions and behaviors with a focus on friendliness to examine how implicit biases can affect behavior.⁵⁸ Perceptions of friendliness are often but not necessarily entirely assessed through nonverbal body language, such as having an open vs. closed posture or degree of eye contact maintained.⁵⁹ These behaviors are insightful because individuals are often relatively unaware of such actions and thereby unlikely to attempt to control or correct these behaviors.⁶⁰

In one study, Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner established that the implicit biases of white participants significantly predicted the degree of nonverbal friendliness they displayed towards their black partners in an experimental setting.⁶¹ This result echoes earlier work by Fazio et al. that found that white students who possessed more negative attitudes towards blacks were less friendly and less interested during their interactions with a black experimenter.⁶²

Having established that implicit biases affect individuals' behaviors, the next logical step is to consider the ramifications of those behaviors. Indeed, implicit biases have a tremendous impact on

⁵⁷ Dovidio, J.F., et al., *On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes*, (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1997), 33, 510-540.

⁵⁸ Dasgupta, N., *Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations*, (Social Justice Research, 17(2), 2004), 143-169; Dovidio, et al., 2002; Fazio, et al., 1995; Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & Hoppel, 2003).

⁵⁹ Staats, Cheryl, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review*.

http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf, 27-28, (Accessed 15 January 2013).

⁶⁰ Dasgupta, N., *Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations*, (Social Justice Research, 17(2), 2004), 143-169.

⁶¹ Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L., *Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction*, (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(1), 2002), 62-68.

⁶² Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J., *Variability in Automatic Activation as an Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona Fide Pipeline?* (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(6), 1995), 1013-1027.

numerous social situations. In the words of Rudman, “biases that we do not acknowledge but that persist, unchallenged, in the recesses of our minds, undoubtedly shape our society.”⁶³ In the analysis chapter, this study will look to see where implicit bias can have influence on the career progression of black officers and diversity in the Air Force. However, with this body of research being relatively new, we will explore some popular critiques of this science.

Critiques of Implicit Bias Research and the Implicit Association Test

This study presents an objective approach to a very sensitive area with respect to diversity. As such, it is important to present critiques to implicit bias and the Implicit Association Test. The first critique is with the scientific validity of implicit bias research, characterizing it as “motivated by junk scientists and their lawyer accomplices who manipulate data, misinterpret results, and exaggerate findings in order to snicker society into politically correct wealth transfers.”⁶⁴ Another critique comes from the indirect nature of testing in the science. Some researchers stress that any concept being studied relying on participants’ performance in another assignment, such as the sorting procedure in the Implicit Association Test, calls into question its results.⁶⁵ While many question, and remain unsatisfied with the results of scientific tests of validity, a meta-analysis by Greenwald and colleagues provide convincing evidence to support the science of implicit bias; below are three common positions.⁶⁶

⁶³ Rudman, L. A., *Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Implicit Bias*, (Social Justice Research, 17(2), 2004), 130.

⁶⁴ Kang, J., & Lane, K., *Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law*, (UCLA Law Review, 58(2), 2010), 504-505.

⁶⁵ Nosek, B. A., & Riskind, R. G., *Policy Implications of Implicit Social Cognition*, (Social Issues and Policy Review, 6(1), 2012), 113-147.

⁶⁶ Staats, Cheryl, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review*.

http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf, 66, (Accessed 15 January 2013).

First, studies indicate that implicit biases are “hardwired.” This stance asserts that implicit biases are immutable; therefore, we are unable to change them in any way.⁶⁷ The counter to this is that studies show the creation of new associations, while not easy, is generally regarded as a feasible task.⁶⁸ Second, researchers state that implicit biases are rational. This stance leads many to contend that because implicit biases reflect reality, it is rational to act on them accordingly.⁶⁹ The counter to this line of logic is that the rational state depends totally on the individuals’ perception of reality.⁷⁰

Finally, critics argue that there are unclear or limited policy impacts.⁷¹ Implicit bias research has also been subject to criticism because its connection to social policy is not immediately evident. Policies generally aim at addressing behaviors rather than individuals’ thoughts, though one’s actions and mental processes are certainly interconnected.⁷² However, Nosek and Riskind assert that implicit and explicit biases should be accounted for when crafting and implementing policy, because often policies are formulated under the erroneous

⁶⁷ Blair, I.V., *The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice*, (Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(3), 2002), 242-261; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Devine, 1989; Kang, 2009; Kang & Lane, 2010).

⁶⁸ Blair, I.V., *The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice*, (Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(3), 2002), 242-261; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Devine, 1989; Kang, 2009; Kang & Lane, 2010).

⁶⁹ Kang, J., & Lane, K., *Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law*, (UCLA Law Review, 58(2), 2010), 465-520.

⁷⁰ Staats, Cheryl, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review*. http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf, 66, (Accessed 15 January 2013).

⁷¹ Staats, Cheryl, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review*. http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf, 66, (Accessed 15 January 2013).

⁷² Nosek, B. A., & Riskind, R. G., *Policy Implications of Implicit Social Cognition*, (Social Issues and Policy Review, 6(1), 2012), 113-147.

assumption that people's behaviors are the result of completely conscious and intentional actions.⁷³

This is an area where this study will examine the impacts of this science within the constructs of the United States Air Force. Applications for the Air Force include assimilation of new lieutenants into their first Air Force unit, followed by indoctrination into the unit and Air Force culture. Next, implicit bias could potentially play a role in performance reports, selection for special projects, and jobs, which have lasting impacts on an officer's career. Finally, implicit bias could influence programs like initial skills training, Introductory Flight Screening, Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training, or technical schools. It further could play into distinction in professional military education programs, where outstanding performance is rewarded for superior achievement amongst peer groups.

Organizational Culture

Well-known organizational culture expert Edgar Schein makes three assertions with respect to leadership and culture. First, leaders as entrepreneurs are the main architects of culture. Second, after cultures are formed, they (leaders) influence what kind of leadership is possible. Third, Schein asserts that if elements of culture become dysfunctional, leadership can and must do something to speed up cultural change.⁷⁴

In an interview with Major General A.J. Stewart, Air Force Personnel Center Commander, he recalled that in his Squadron Officer School (SOS) class 86B, only two African-American pilots were in the class of approximately 800.⁷⁵ In the 27 years since Maj Gen Stewart's

⁷³ Nosek, B. A., & Riskind, R. G., *Policy Implications of Implicit Social Cognition*, (Social Issues and Policy Review, 6(1), 2012), 113-147.

⁷⁴ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010), XI.

⁷⁵ Maj Gen A. J. Stewart, (Air Force Personnel Center Commander), interview by author, 20 March 2013.

SOS experience, there has not been much change in black pilot representation. In fact, today African-Americans still make up only about 2 percent of the pilot population (see figure 4: for rated officer demographics as of December 2011).⁷⁶ However, he goes on to state that in 32 years of service this is the first time he has noticed that efforts have been made to change the culture of the Air Force with respect to diversity.⁷⁷ *Diversity is a military necessity* is the phrase from the Secretary the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force aimed at changing the culture of the service.




Figure 4: Rated Officer Demographics
HQ USAF A1DV Diversity Metric Review 2013

Air Force Instruction 1-1 entitled Air Force Culture outlines how the Air Force mission and its responsibility to the nation require its

⁷⁶ As of April 2012, there were 3,764 black officers out of 63,395 (5.9 percent); 266 Active Duty black pilots out of 15,252 (1.7 percent); 74 Active Duty black navigators (CSOs) out of 2,462 (3 percent); 91 ANG black pilots out of 4,220 (2.2 percent); 18 ANG black navigators out of 608 (3 percent); 77 AFRC black pilots out of 3,604 (2.1 percent); 11 AFRC black navigators out of 422 (2.6 percent).

⁷⁷ Maj Gen Stewart, interview.

members to adhere to a higher standard than is expected in civilian life.⁷⁸ This regulation describes the manner in which all Airmen will carry themselves at all times. Section 1.8 of this instruction is titled Diversity. The first line states “diversity is a military necessity.” It goes on to illuminate the power of diversity and how “Air Force capabilities and war fighting skills are enhanced by diversity among its personnel. At its core, such diversity provides our total force an aggregation of strengths, perspectives, and capabilities that transcends individual contributions.”⁷⁹ In essence, diversity makes the Air Force better, in order to Fly, Fight, and Win...In Air, Space, and Cyberspace.

This mirrors the statement from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in the service’s core instruction and regulation, and undoubtedly shows the leadership involvement and commitment that Schein describes. Schein espouses culture as an abstract concept. He claims that culture should be observable and increase our understanding of a set of events that are otherwise mysterious or not well understood.⁸⁰ As such, Schein defines culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”⁸¹

Schein asserts that his definition of culture is always striving towards patterning and integration, despite the fact that groups within the culture have a history of experience, which hinders them from fully internalizing the culture. The Air Force demonstrates this. An example is the subculture of the service’s space professionals and their recent

⁷⁸ Air Force Instruction (AFI) 1-1, *Air Force Culture*, 7 August 2012, 1.

⁷⁹ Air Force Instruction (AFI) 1-1, *Air Force Culture*, 11.

⁸⁰ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 14.

⁸¹ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 18.

prohibition from wearing flight suits.⁸² In an effort to standardize uniform wear across the command and save money in a resource constrained environment, Air Force Space Command Commander, General William Shelton ceased the wearing of flight suits, the green flight jacket and the A-2 Leather Jackets. This measure saved approximately \$670,000 per year. General Shelton said, “We want to create synergy among all personnel across the command... When personnel wear the same uniform, it has a unifying effect toward mission accomplishment. Standardization among the entire command prevents the perception of a 'haves' and 'have nots' situation; the very meaning of the word 'uniform' should drive us toward standardization.”⁸³

Another example is when the Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Mark Welsh ordered a morale and wellness inspection in all of the service’s units to take down openly displayed offensive material.⁸⁴ If offensive material was displayed this would be an obvious example of the subculture within that unit accepting this type of behavior. However, this behavior would not be in line with where the leadership of the Air Force understands the culture to be and the direction it wants it to go.

Schein’s two points about culture are particularly relevant to this study: (1) the process of socialization or acculturation and (2) how culture is inferred.⁸⁵ Regarding socialization, Schein explains that once culture is established, it is then passed on to new generations of group members. Schein concludes that what is taught to new members is only the surface level of the source elements of culture. “What is at the heart

⁸² Associated Press, “AFSC: No flight suits, leather jackets for you,” *Air Force Times*, 14 April 2012, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/04/ap-air-force-space-command-no-flight-suits-leather-jackets-non-flying-operations-041412/>, (Accessed 5 March 2013).

⁸³ AFSPC Public Affairs, “Eliminating the wear of the flight suit in Air Force Space Command,” 13 April 2012, <http://www.afspc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123297976>, (Accessed 5 January 2013).

⁸⁴ Air Force Print News, “CSAF directs Air Force-wide inspection,” 5 December 2012, <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123328720>, (Accessed 5 January 2013).

⁸⁵ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 19.

of culture will not be revealed in the rules of behavior taught to newcomers. It will only be revealed to members as they gain permanent status and are allowed into the inner circles of the group where group secrets then are shared.”⁸⁶ To elaborate this point, Schein informs us that established culture is a form of social control and can be the basis of explicitly manipulating members into perceiving, thinking, and feeling in certain ways.⁸⁷

The second point is that culture cannot be only inferred from behavior. Schein argues that the formation of shared assumptions deal with how we perceive, think, and feel about things. “We cannot rely on overt behavior alone because it is always determined both by the cultural predisposition (the perceptions, thoughts, and feelings that are patterned) and by the situational contingencies that arise from the immediate external environment.”⁸⁸ This logic is built off the notion of empirical cognition, but it is evidenced in terms of the character of the organization. Put another way, there are times when one cannot “judge a book by its cover.” Schein expands on this idea when he offers insights into these “levels” of culture.

By levels of culture, Schein describes the degree to which it is visible to the outside observer. If you think of levels of culture as a pyramid, they would be seen as depicted in Figure 5. Artifacts deal with surface level culture. Schein asserts, “This includes all the phenomena that you would see, hear, and feel when you encounter a new group with an unfamiliar culture.”⁸⁹ In the Air Force this would be comprised of things like the Airmen’s battle dress uniforms, flight suits, and service dress.

⁸⁶ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 19.

⁸⁷ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 19-20.

⁸⁸ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 20.

⁸⁹ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 23.




Figure 5: Schein's Levels of Culture
Source: Author's Depiction of Schein's Levels of Culture

This also includes observed behavior like the wear of mustaches for male officers. The wearing of mustaches is perfectly within the rules and regulations of the Air Force, but culturally it is not the norm. Another example would be acceptable behavior at a unit function. Schein makes the point that while this level of culture is easy to observe, it is difficult to decipher. It is important to understand with artifacts that people may be able to articulate what they observe, but cannot communicate the meaning of what they see. In order to be able to discern meaning, a deeper level of analysis is needed.

Schein proposes espoused beliefs and values are the ideals, goals, values, aspirations, ideologies, and rationalizations of an organization.⁹⁰ In the Air Force, we express these as our core values of Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do. Likewise, in the Air Force's diversity documents, the Air Force's senior leaders articulate the importance and strength of diversity. This is a belief that the executive level has internalized. However, until as Schein describes, the group acts on this belief, and has a shared perception of the success of

⁹⁰ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 24.

diversity, it will not become a shared value or belief. Ultimately, diversity will never turn into a shared assumption (as long as the acts still yield results). Schein also warns that “only those beliefs and values that can be empirically tested and continue to work reliably in solving the group’s problems will become transformed into assumptions.”⁹¹

In residence PME is an area in the Air Force where results from diversity should be accentuated. One strategy is through social validation, which means that certain beliefs and values are conformed only by the shared social experiences of a group. An example of this is in an SOS seminar, recognizing each member’s contribution has a direct impact to the success of the collective whole, is due in part to his or her diverse perspective (Air Force Specialty Code, gender, race, ethnicity, etc.) that is brought to bear in each task. In the end, all the members of that flight walk away from the course with a stronger belief in the power of diversity. Each of those individuals may see that diversity is valued at SOS, and look for areas where diversity is valued throughout the Air Force. Outside of the PME environment, it becomes more difficult to understand what the culture is in the larger Air Force. Understanding culture on this scale through espoused beliefs and values sometimes can be inadequate. For a deeper understanding of culture, and to help provide a full picture of what culture is in the Air Force, basic underlying assumptions help to fill in this final piece of the puzzle.

Basic Underlying Assumptions

Basic underlying assumptions are the unconscious, taken for granted beliefs and values.⁹² These are the drivers that determine behavior, perception, thoughts, and feelings within an organization. On a macro level, the United States Air Force core values of Integrity, Service, and Excellence fit this definition. The core values are the set of

⁹¹ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 26.

⁹² Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 24.

basic assumptions that define what Airmen pay attention to. It also defines service in the Air Force, and what way to behave as a member of the organization.⁹³ “The power of culture comes about through the fact that assumptions are shared and therefore, mutually reinforced.”⁹⁴

Schein explains the pyramid of culture well when he says: “the essence of culture lies in the pattern of basic underlying assumptions, and after you understand those, you can easily understand the other more surface levels and deal appropriately with them.”⁹⁵ How well does the Air Force embrace this idea of basic underlying assumptions for priorities other than the core values? This study investigates how well the Air Force embraces diversity as one such additional underlying assumption.

Critical Mass

Continuing with the JFC Fuller framework, consider now the body, representing the physical dimension. Here it is appropriate to discuss critical mass theory. Critical mass theory has its origins in nuclear physics. The logic is based on the premise that nuclear reactions can be a contained process. When enough uranium is assembled, an unstoppable chain reaction of nuclear fission multiplying upon itself produces an impact far beyond the quantity of the original material.⁹⁶

This process is then applied to group dynamics, which reveals that a qualitative shift will take place when women (or minorities) exceed a proportion of about 30 percent in an organization.⁹⁷ This “tipping point” in ratio of minority to majority population is said to be the point at which

⁹³ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 29.

⁹⁴ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 31.

⁹⁵ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 32.

⁹⁶ Norris, Pippa, & Lovenduski, Joni, *Blair’s Babes: Critical Mass Theory, Gender, and Legislative Life*, Harvard Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series, October 2001, 2.

⁹⁷ Dahlerup, Drude. “From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics.” *Scandinavian Political Studies* 11, no. 4 (1988): 275-98. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1988.tb00372.x

true organizational change can occur. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, who is credited as being the first to write on this theory, says that having more women (minorities) on boards increases the comfort level and thus allows them to contribute their differing views and perceptions with more confidence. She further classifies this by saying minority members with increased numbers “begin to become individuals differentiated from one another,” and “minority members are potentially allies, can form coalitions, and can affect the culture of the group.”⁹⁸ Drude Dahlerup has three relevant critiques of critical mass theory. First, she claims that because human beings do not behave like particles the analogy to nuclear physics is flawed. She suggests replacing “*critical mass*” with a concept of “*critical act*.” She defines a critical act as one that will change the position of the minority considerably and lead to future changes in the organization.⁹⁹

Dahlerup’s second critique began with the question: What does it mean to make a difference? To help quantify what making a difference meant with regard to the number of women present in politics she came up with six aspects of change. They are as follows: (1) changes in the reaction to women politicians; (2) changes in the performance and efficiency of the women politicians; (3) changes in the social climate of political life (the political culture); (4) changes in the political discourse; (5) changes in policy (the political decisions); and (6) increase in the power of women (the empowerment of women).¹⁰⁰

The third critique by Dahlerup surfaced after her study of women in parliamentary politics in the Nordic countries. She realized after

⁹⁸ Kanter, Rosabeth Moss., “Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women.” *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 5 (1977): 965. doi:10.1086/226425.

⁹⁹ Dahlerup, Drude, *The Theory of ‘Critical Mass’ Revisited*, (Paper prepared for the annual meeting of American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C, 1-4 September 2005), 3.

¹⁰⁰ Dahlerup, Drude, *The Theory of ‘Critical Mass’ Revisited*, 4.

women reached 30 percent representation she was unable to substantiate that this was indeed the “critical mass” and suggested that critical acts be used in its place.¹⁰¹ The study found that it is impossible to isolate the effect of just increasing the proportion of women from what happens outside the parliament in this period.¹⁰²

Critical mass theory has application to the United States Air Force as well. At the Air Force Academy, a white paper by the Behavioral Science Department built off critical mass theory to justify increased diversity for educational outcomes. Critical mass was used to argue how diverse the cadet wing should be in order to enrich the educational experience. Though the research does not quantify a numerical value of diversity, it concludes that the number must be higher than token levels.¹⁰³

This can be applied to the Air Force at many levels in many ways. In the case of command, whether at the squadron, group, or wing levels, critical mass comes into play as a factor in any one of these situations. The makeup of senior leader ranks and their staffs can be subject to this theory of critical mass, as in who the Air Force is sending to represent the service on Joint, Combatant Command, Interagency, and Cabinet level staffs.

¹⁰¹ Dahlerup, Drude, *The Theory of ‘Critical Mass’ Revisited*, 4.

¹⁰² Dahlerup, Drude, *The Theory of ‘Critical Mass’ Revisited*, 4.

¹⁰³ Scott, Wilbur, J., & Cooney, Richard T., *Diversity and Educational Outcomes in Higher Education: Implications for USAFA in Light of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions*, (Department of Behavior Science and Leadership, USAF Academy, 12 November 2004), 27.




Figure 6: USAF Squadron, Group, and Wing Commanders
Source: HQ USAF A1DV Diversity Metric Review 2013




Figure 7: USAF Flying Squadron, Group, and Wing Commanders
Source: HQ USAF A1DV Diversity Metric Review 2013

An additional study that relates critical mass to the Air Force was a study on critical mass and the board room. This study conducted interviews of 40 respondents who served on public boards all with excellent credentials.¹⁰⁴ This study returned two key applicable themes that apply to this study. First, the subjects and those like them who they observed were comfortable with their role as a pioneer, the first and (at least for a while) only woman or minority on a particular board. All felt that they were thoroughly qualified for their respective positions. All respondents felt they were taken seriously, and were able to contribute almost immediately in the boardroom setting. Even when a minority of one, all felt that they were effective directors on the board.¹⁰⁵

Second, the respondents, many of whom were the first, believe that even though diversity was a factor in merely every female or minority director's appointment, and sometimes explicitly so, the individual brought valuable specific knowledge or skills to the board room beyond his or her gender or skin color. In the Air Force because of our hierarchical structure, and role of rank, this helps dissipate some of the issues around critical mass. In addition, our multiple qualifications and outward artifacts that display Air Force member's credentials help dissipate the effects of critical mass as well. Things such as being a distinguished graduate, attending, and graduating from the United States Air Force Weapons School and completion of professional military education help to establish credibility and worth regardless of the numerical imbalance. Even with the structures, it begs the question: How much is the right amount of diversity? If we follow Dahlerup, then how do we find or create critical acts and articulate the difference they are making in the organization? This is the paramount problem facing

¹⁰⁴ Broome, Lissa Lamkin, Conley, John M., & Krawiec, Kimberly, "Does Critical Mass Matter? Views From the Boardroom," (Seattle Law Review, Vol. 34:1049, 2011) 1057–1080.

¹⁰⁵ Broome, Lissa Lamkin, Conley, John M., & Krawiec, Kimberly, "Does Critical Mass Matter? Views From the Boardroom," 1060.

the Air Force as it tries to define what its diversity objectives are and how to institutionalize those concepts within the service.

CHAPTER 3

African-American Career Progression

They say, 'You should be disgusted with this American society—this so-called democracy. You are black and here somebody is always going to remind you of that. You can only progress so far in any field that you choose before somebody puts his feet on your neck for no other reason than that you are a second-class citizen and you should be disgusted with the treatment you get her.'

"I say, hell, I'm not disgusted—I'm a citizen of the United States of America and I'm no second-class citizen either and no man here is, unless he thinks like one and reasons like one and performs like one. This is my country and I believe in her and I believe in her flag and I'll defend her and I'll fight for her and I'll serve her and I'll contribute to her welfare whenever and however I can.

"If she has any ills, I'll stand by her until in God's given time, through her wisdom and her consideration for the welfare of the entire nation, she will put them right.

—Colonel Daniel "Chappie" James
(5 April 1968, the day after the assassination of
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.)

In this chapter, African-American officer career progression in the United States Air Force is outlined. Structurally, it breaks down how officers progress from the rank of O-1/2nd Lieutenant through O-10/General officer. It does not explain each nuance of the Air Force officer development system, but it seeks to establish a general understanding of the framework of a typical USAF officer career path. As a case study this chapter illuminates black officer's plight through the Air Force promotion system. First described are two brief historical vignettes that are unique to African-Americans, yet shared by all Americans. Examining the lives of Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis Sr. (US Army retired) and General Benjamin O. Davis Jr. (USAF retired) the first black General Officer in the military and the first black General officer in the Air Force, one can see the significance of excellence in duty performance, the power of a role model, and achievement despite the circumstances. Next, key milestones are identified that over time have

proven to result in advancement to the most senior ranks of the Air Force.¹

**America's First Black General:
Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis Sr.**

US military heroes do not belong to any demographic. They are the extraordinary men and women who have answered a higher calling by choosing to serve their country, and they carry only one true distinction, Americans! However, there is no denying the pride many people feel when history records the accomplishments of someone like them. This, along with many other reasons is why it is important to illuminate highlights of Black history as they relate to the Air Force, as this sets the stage for understanding some of the obstacles African-Americans had to deal with in the military.

Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Benjamin O. Davis Sr., United States Army, was the first black general in the United States. His promotion to General officer was a great milestone in American history. Historically, only a small percentage of Americans have ever belonged to the professional military and blacks have constituted a minute percentage of this minority.² Between 1865 and 1940 there were never more than three black officers in the US Army at any one time. For 39 of those years Benjamin Oliver Davis was one of them.

Benjamin O. Davis was born 28 May 1880. He attended Lucretia Mott Elementary School and then went on to attend M Street High School, in Washington, DC. There he met Robert H. Harrison, a veteran of the Civil War. This is also when Davis began his interest in the military.³ During his time at M Street High School Benjamin O. Davis

¹ Senior ranks here refer to officers in the rank of O-6/Colonel and above.

² Fletcher, Marvin. *America's First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., 1880-1970*, (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 1.

³ Fletcher, *America's First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., 1880-1970*, 8-9.

became a member of the high school cadet corps. While a cadet, Davis impressed his drill instructor Major Arthur Brooks, a commanding officer of the 1st Separate Battalion, Washington D.C. National Guard. In 1898, Major Brooks offered Davis a chance to compete for a commission in his Battalion. Davis was successful, and was elected as a 2nd Lieutenant in Delta Company of the 1st Separate Battalion.

Davis's career started in the Spanish-American war. From 1898 to 1901, he served as an officer in the volunteers, an enlisted man in the regulars, and ultimately a commissioned officer in the regular Army. In 1901, Benjamin O. Davis and John E. Green were two successful black candidates for commission.⁴ Both men passed their exams and earned commissions as 2nd Lieutenants in the US Army. Davis' first assignment was to the 10th Calvary. 2nd Lieutenant Davis spent four years as a gold bar lieutenant; in 1905 Davis was promoted to First Lieutenant. Following his promotion, he was stationed at Wilberforce University as a Professor of Military Science and Tactics. Over the next few years, Davis held posts in Wyoming and Narco, Arizona. In December 1915, Davis was promoted to Captain at age 37. In the next three years from 1917 to 1920, Davis would serve as a supply officer, Commander of the 3rd and 1st Squadrons. During this period, he would advance to the rank of Major in August 1917. Next, he would be temporarily promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the National Guard. Davis was then assigned to Tuskegee University as a Professor of Military Science and Tactics from 1920 to 1924. In 1920, the Army promoted Davis to the permanent rank of Lieutenant Colonel. This was a great milestone, one that he shared with the other black man that passed the commissioning exam with him back in 1901, Lieutenant Colonel John Green.

⁴ Fletcher, *America's First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., 1880-1970*, 27.

Lieutenant Colonel John Green retired in November 1929. Benjamin O. Davis was then the only black officer in the Army at 52 years of age. In March 1930 Davis was promoted to full Colonel and became the highest ranking black officer in American history. In 1938, Colonel Davis became Commander of the 369th New York National Guard. In 1940, this unit changed to the 369th Anti-Aircraft Regiment. This change stood as a symbol and demonstrated blacks could serve in all branches of the military.

On 26 October 1940, Colonel Davis was announced for promotion to Brigadier General. He would go on to lead the 4th Brigade, 2nd Cavalry Division. On 14 July 1948, Brig Gen Benjamin O. Davis Sr. officially retired from the Army after 50 years of service. The appointment of Benjamin O. Davis to Brigadier General demonstrated that blacks could rise to high positions of authority and responsibility within the United States military. This helped set the foundation for integration of the armed forces, and was the first major break in the wall of segregated America.

Brig Gen Davis in his mind was always an Army officer first, then a black man. For the black community, he was first of all black and then an Army officer. These two viewpoints led to different approaches to the situation of racism in America. Davis at times took positions that did not please the larger black community. However, his life stands as a testament to what blacks could achieve in the military. Brig Gen Davis had three children, Olive, Elnora, and Benjamin O. Davis Jr. His only son would grow up to carry on his legacy of military service.

**America's First Black Air Force General Officer:
General Benjamin O. Davis Jr.**

Benjamin O. Davis Jr. was born in 18 December 1912. He grew up an Army brat, in the footsteps of his father, Brig Gen Benjamin O. Davis Sr. His early education was split between Tuskegee, AL, Washington, DC

and Cleveland, OH, following his father around on different Army assignments. Davis Jr. graduated from Cleveland's Central High School in June of 1929 at the age of 16.⁵ During the summer of 1926, at the tender age of 13, he paid \$5 to get a ride with the famed Barnstormers, at Bolling AFB in Washington D.C. From the feelings he experienced on takeoff, and soaring high above Washington D.C. among the clouds, he gained the love and determination to become an aviator.⁶

Benjamin O. Davis Jr. would go on to apply to the United States Military Academy. Davis Jr. received a nomination from Representative Oscar DePriest and a principal appointment to West Point in February 1931. However, Davis was not able to pass the English history and European history part of the entrance exam. In his autobiography, Davis describes how mortified he was to tell his father he had failed the exams and would not get into West Point. However, the following year he studied hard, and retested and earned an appointment and admission to West Point. Benjamin O. Davis Jr. reported for duty on 1 July 1932.

The letter from Benjamin O. Davis Sr. congratulating his son is a powerful example of how monumental his acceptance was not only for the Davis family, but for black Americans across the country.

Now just understand that I am very happy. I feel you have the makings of a good cadet and officer. Just have patience, concentrate all you have got and who knows you may lead your class, or certainly, at least make the [Army Corps of] Engineers. If you do that you have the world waiting for you. Remember twelve million people [the black population of the United States] will be pulling for you with all we have. Let me have your notice and any other official papers you receive. I will put them with some of my own. Somebody, some day, may wish to write something about us and we will have the original papers. Two hours before I found your letter I was talking to a group of colored reserve officers. I was asked if I thought a young colored man could

⁵ Davis, Benjamin O. *Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American: An Autobiography*, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 13.

⁶ Davis, *Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American: An Autobiography*, 14.

get into West Point. I told them I felt that when a colored person passed the exam, he would be admitted, that I knew one young man who I was sure had passed and would go to West Point July 1. So you see how I felt about you. When I got your letter I felt like shouting. I shall save this letter of yours. To me it is great... I am indeed proud of you, am honored to be,

Your loving Dad⁷

Benjamin O. Davis Jr. went on to graduate from West Point. Over the course of those four years he had to endure many trials and tribulations, the worst of all being silenced the whole time he was a cadet.⁸ Davis Jr. was only the 4th black to graduate from West Point. Henry O. Flipper, class of 1877 was the first black graduate of West Point, followed by John Hanks Alexander 1887, Charles Young class of 1889, and finally Ben Davis Jr. class of 1936. Davis Jr. graduated #35 of 276 cadets, and was the first black man to graduate in the 20th century.

While at West Point, Davis applied for the US Army Air Corps. He was rejected because no black units existed or were planned for the Air Corps. Instead, he became an Infantry officer assigned to Fort Benning and the 24th Infantry Regiment. His next assignment was as the Professor of Military Tactics at Tuskegee University, like his father.⁹ Coincidentally, His next assignment was to be the Aide to Brig Gen Benjamin O. Davis Sr., his father, who in 1940 pinned on the rank of 1-star. During his tour serving with his father President Roosevelt created a black flying unit. It would become known as the Tuskegee experiment, and Captain Benjamin O. Davis Jr. would be assigned to the first class. Davis Jr. was the first black officer to solo an Army Air Corps aircraft. In March of 1942 he earned his wings and was one of five blacks to

⁷ Davis, *Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American: An Autobiography*, 22.

⁸ Davis, *Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American: An Autobiography*, 21.

⁹ These were the only assignments black officers could have because they were not allowed to command white troops.

complete the course. In July of 1942, Benjamin Davis Jr. was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and was made commander of the all black 99th Pursuit Squadron. This is the first unit of the famed Tuskegee Airmen. Colonel Davis would lead these aviators through WWII and achieve an amazing combat record.

In August of 1949, Colonel Davis attended Air War College. This was the first time in his 13-year career he had ever associated with his white peers. He felt it was a great honor to be selected for Air War College. Colonel Davis knew the rich tradition of Air University, and he knew the Air Force only sent its best officers to service schools. He was determined to perform and live up to the high standards. President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981, in July 1948. The Air Force would lead the way being the first service to end segregation completely. Colonel Davis reflected on this event during his time at Air War College, and felt the Air Force had created a new way of life for itself and all its members—white and black.¹⁰

Colonel Benjamin Davis Jr. would leave Air War College for the Pentagon where he worked in the Directorate of Operations. He considered his job as the Chief of the Fighter Branch his most important during his staff tour. He was responsible for supervising the fighter program of the US Air Force worldwide. From the Pentagon, Colonel Ben Davis Jr. would go on to the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) and would become the Commander of the 51st Fighter Wing. There Colonel Davis would fly F-86 Sabers. He considered the F-86 the Cadillac of the Air Force. On 27 October 1954, President Eisenhower nominated Colonel Davis for the rank of Brigadier General. From 1 to 3 stars Lt Gen Davis was a beloved Airman, who established a superior record of performance in service to his country. Lt Gen Davis retired from the Air Force on 1 February 1970. In 1987, the Office of Air Force History published a work

¹⁰ Davis, *Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American: An Autobiography*, 168.

titled *Makers of the United States Air Force*. Dr. Alan Gropman the author of the chapter on General Davis wrote, “General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., can claim a larger measure of credit for inaugurating this critical reform [integration] than can any other person. None of his many achievements holds for him the satisfaction of moving the United States Air Force to racial integration. For that pioneering accomplishment, America stands in his debt.”¹¹ The last crowning achievement in his career is when the President of the United States advanced Benjamin O. Davis Jr. to the rank of General on 9 December 1998.

“From the Past, the Future” is the motto of Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. This motto suggests by knowing the past, one can use that knowledge to inform the future. The same applies with Air Force officers of which, African-American officers are a subset. Highlighting the lives and military careers of Brig Gen Benjamin O. Davis Sr. and General Benjamin O. Davis Jr. gives a brief snapshot of the rich context from which African-American officers come from.

These two stories are not alone; among some of the other notable firsts in the United States Air Force by African-Americans include the first class of blacks to graduate from the United States Air Force Academy. The class of 1963 graduated three African-Americans as second lieutenants. Isaac S. Payne, Roger B. Sims, and Charles “Chuck” V. Bush earned their commission in the Air Force in June of 1963. Chuck Bush, was the first to cross the stage, and affectionately became known to many as BG-1 (black graduate number one). He passed away in November 2012 after losing a bout with cancer. BG-1 will always be remembered, as a spirited individual who championed diversity, loved his US Air Force and the United States of America.

In September 1975, General Daniel “Chappie” James pinned on the rank of 4-star General. This Tuskegee University graduate was the

¹¹ Davis, *Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American: An Autobiography*, 415.

first African-American to achieve the rank of General in the US Air Force. The first African-American female to achieve General Officer rank, is Major General (Maj Gen) Marcelite Harris. As of May 2013, there are 16 African-American General officers and General Officer selects in the active duty Air Force. See figure 8 for a listing of their names and position's. These are stories and facts about African-American military heroes that need to be celebrated as a way to inform the broader Air Force community. This further goes to inform society at large, especially the black community about the opportunities in the US armed forces.

Gen	EDWARD A. RICE JR.	HQ AETC/CC (Commander, Air Education and Training Command)
Gen	LARRY O. SPENCER	HQ AF/VC (Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force)
Lt Gen	RONNIE D. HAWKINS JR.	DISA/DD (Director, Defense Information Systems Agency)
Lt Gen	DARREN W. MCDEW	18 AF/CC (Commander, 18th Air Force)
Maj Gen	EDWARD L. BOLTON JR.	SAF/FMB (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget)
Maj Gen	CHARLES Q. BROWN JR.	DCFACC (Deputy Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command)
Maj Gen	RICHARD M. CLARK	OMC-E (Defense Attaché, Cairo, Egypt)
Maj Gen	SAMUEL A. R. GREAVES	Deputy Director, Missile Defense Agency
Maj Gen	ALFRED J. STEWART	AFPC/CC (Commander, Air Force Personnel Center)
Maj Gen	EVERETT H. THOMAS	AFGSC/VC (Vice Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command)
Brig Gen	MARK ANTHONY BROWN	HQ AFMC/FM (Comptroller, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command)
Brig Gen	ANTHONY J. COTTON	45 SW/CC (Commander, 45th Space Wing)
Brig Gen	CEDRIC D. GEORGE	WRLAC/CC (Commander, Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex)
Brig Gen	ALLEN J. JAMERSON	HQ HAF/A7S (Director of Security Forces, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support)
Brig Gen	JAMES C. JOHNSON	USAFRICOM/J4 (Director for Logistics, U.S. Africa Command)
Brig Gen (s)	BRIAN S. ROBINSON	19 AW/CC (Commander, 19th Airlift Wing)

Figure 8: Current African-American General Officers
Source: HQ USAF A1/DPG

Officer Development

Due to the scope of this study, there is little focus on the recruiting and accessions process for black officers. For the purpose of this study it is important to understand the pathways which officers are assessed: through the United States Air Force Academy (USafa), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Training School (OTS). To be an officer one must have a bachelor's degree and pass the physical requirements of either commissioning source.




Figure 9: Pipeline of US population to military senior leaders.
Source: MLDC Final Report

Each year the Air Force commissions between 4,400 and 4,500 new 2nd Lieutenants from the various commissioning sources.¹² Of that number, approximately 7 percent are African-American. After two years as a 2nd Lieutenant, almost all are promoted to 1st Lieutenant (unless there is a reduction in force, force shaping, or quality measure).¹³ They will then meet their Captain's promotion process on the two-year anniversary of their promotion to 1st Lieutenant. In 2010, the Air Force reinstituted the Captain's central selection board for the line of the Air Force, due to the change in the promotion opportunity from 100 to 95 percent. In May 2013, the Air Force reversed this policy and returned the promotion opportunity to 100 percent, and the approval authority is the unit commander.

For the first time in 2011 and 2012, the Air Force posted Captains' promotion data on its personnel website. In 2011, 140 black officers were selected at a rate of 84.8 percent, when the board average was 95

¹² AFPC strength report November 2012.

¹³ Air Force Pamphlet 36-2506, *You and Your Promotions- The Air Force Officer Promotion Program*, 1 September 1997.

percent. In 2012, 126 black officers were selected at a rate of 85.1 percent compared to the board average of 92.9 percent. This shows not only the smaller number of black officers being promoted to Captain; it also shows the rate at which this demographic lags behind the average is a negative indicator in black officer career progression.

Once an officer pins on Captain there are a number of milestones that each officer must meet in order to be competitive for promotion to the next rank. Some of these milestones include completing professional military education, and building a record that makes one competitive for promotion. Some of these milestones include: Professional Military Education, advanced academic education, functional advancement, attaining the position of instructor pilot or evaluator pilot, and graduating from the USAF Weapons School. Figure 10 shows what the Air Force calls a Force Development Ribbon Chart (FDRC). It highlights key milestones for Developmental Teams to see which officers are meeting the developmental gates or not.

IDE/SDE Candidate / Select *When appropriate*		Rank First Name Last Name Current Duty Title Current Unit		AFSC: 11/12M				
Year Group: 4 Yr Pt (2008)								
2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Scheduler	Training	ASST FLT/CC	FLT/CC	SQ/CCE	WG/CCE	IDE (1 st Look)		
				3849 for MAF DT				
				O-4 BOARD				
SOS-RES (SOT Top Three)	FLT/CC	Notes: _____						
MVS (Phase)		_____						
Special Programs (MCC, Phasos, Mentor, AFJCC, STANQUIL, AOC, etc. Camps)		_____						
CCE (Level)		_____						
AAD (School/ Sponsor)	FSU MBA	_____						
IDE - COR		_____						
IDE - RES		_____						
STAFF		_____						
DT Vector		_____						
2009: 2010: 2011:		Last 3 OPR Bottom Lines						

Figure 10: Force Development Ribbon Chart
Source: HQ AMC A1

At the majors promotion board this is the first time the Air Force promotion system makes a quality cut. Each year, approximately the top 20 percent of officers promoted are identified as intermediate developmental education (IDE) selects.¹⁴ Once identified as a select this means within a three-year window of opportunity the Air Force will ensure that these identified Majors attend IDE, provided there are no quality factors.¹⁵

CY 2011 LAF MAJ Central Selection Board

Promotion Zone	CON	SEL	Rate
In Primary Zone	2611	2331	89.3%
Above Primary Zone	415	19	4.6%

Demographics	In Primary Zone			Above Primary Zone			Below Primary Zone		
	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate
American Indian/Alaskan	11	11	100.0%	3	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%
Asian	60	53	88.3%	17	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%
Black/African American	128	102	79.7%	45	1	2.2%	0	0	0.0%
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	10	8	80.0%	3	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%
White	2159	1942	89.9%	307	17	5.5%	0	0	0.0%
Two or More Races	60	51	85.0%	10	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%
Declined to Respond	183	164	89.6%	30	1	3.3%	0	0	0.0%
Hispanic/Latino	141	120	85.1%	36	2	5.6%	0	0	0.0%
Not Hispanic/Latino	2320	2074	89.4%	369	16	4.3%	0	0	0.0%
Declined to Respond	150	137	91.3%	10	1	10.0%	0	0	0.0%
Men	2301	2050	89.1%	375	18	4.8%	0	0	0.0%
Women	310	281	90.6%	40	1	2.5%	0	0	0.0%
MAJCOM	2216	1960	88.4%	348	16	4.6%	0	0	0.0%

Figure 11: CY 2011 LAF Major Central Selection Board Results
Source: HQ AFPC Promotion Statistics

¹⁴ Air Force Instruction 36-2301, *Developmental Education*, 16 July 2010, describes Developmental Education (DE) as an array of educational opportunities. DE is comprised of professional and specialized education programs, research and doctrinal studies, fellowships, and graduate-level studies. DE spans a member's entire career and provides the knowledge and abilities needed to develop, employ, and command air, space and cyberspace forces.

¹⁵ Quality factors refer to anything that would cause an officer to be officially removed from attending DE by a senior rater.

CY 2012 LAF MAJ Central Selection Board									
Promotion Zone	CON	SEL	Rate						
In Primary Zone	2574	2287	88.9%						
Above Primary Zone	399	30	7.5%						
Demographics	In Primary Zone			Above Primary Zone			Below Primary Zone		
	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate
American Indian/Alaskan	9	9	100.0%	1	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%
Asian	94	80	85.1%	15	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%
Black/African American	135	111	82.2%	36	3	8.3%	0	0	0.0%
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	11	11	100.0%	3	0	0.0%	0	0	0.0%
White	2120	1903	89.8%	310	24	7.7%	0	0	0.0%
Two or More Races	52	43	82.7%	8	1	12.5%	0	0	0.0%
Declined to Respond	153	130	85.0%	26	2	7.7%	0	0	0.0%
Hispanic/Latino	159	137	86.2%	33	3	9.1%	0	0	0.0%
Not Hispanic/Latino	1893	1682	88.9%	351	25	7.1%	0	0	0.0%
Declined to Respond	522	468	89.7%	15	2	13.3%	0	0	0.0%
Men	2239	1982	88.5%	365	28	7.7%	0	0	0.0%
Women	335	305	91.0%	34	2	5.9%	0	0	0.0%
MAJCOM	2207	1948	88.3%	348	28	8.0%	0	0	0.0%

Figure 12: CY 2012 LAF Major Central Selection Board Results
Source: HQ AFPC Promotion Statistics




Figure 13: Mobility Air Force's of IDE Selection
Source: HQ AMC A1 Spread the Word Brief 2012

IDE select versus candidate is an important distinction to illuminate.¹⁶ It is the first time in an officer's career since their commissioning source the Air Force highlights or tags their official single

¹⁶ About 29 percent were nominated from those eligible; Of those nominated, 24 percent were designated for school (75 percent were Selects; 25 percent were Candidates). ***Of those eligible, 7 percent were designated***

page record snapshot with such a distinction¹⁷. This action in turn will continue to be a factor throughout their career. Once the rank of Major is obtained, the Air Force looks for officers to continue to broaden and develop depth and breadth to expand their worth to the Air Force. The Air Force produces career path pyramids, which offer officers a generic diagram of the things officers are expected to do be competitive for promotion. See Figure 14: for an example of a generic officer career path. Below is Figure 15: which is a career pyramid for a Maintenance officer. The pyramid for the Maintenance officer shows the general milestones that need to be accomplished in order to reach the rank of three-star general.




Figure 14: Generic Officer Career Path Guide
Source: AFI 36-2640, 16 December 2008

¹⁷ SURF stands for Single Unit Retrieval Format; it allows unit Commanders and authorized personnel to access information on all officers O-5 and below.




Figure 15: Maintenance Officer (21A) Career Path Guide
Source: 21A Development Team

Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel is the first opportunity Air Force officers have to be promoted early. There are two chances to be promoted “below the zone.” Two years and one year early are the two opportunities before an officer meets their primary in the zone promotion opportunity for Lt Col. Generally, the Air Force promotes about 3.2 percent of the officers eligible below the zone each year. The in the zone rate is between 70 to 75 percent.

Again, the mark of below the zone promotion automatically designates the individual promoted as a Senior Developmental Education (SDE) school select. Of the promotion board approximately the top 10 percent of officers selected for promotion are identified as SDE selects. SDE is the senior professional military education school for officers. This identifies the officers which have the high potential to be Senior Leaders in the Air Force.¹⁸ The same process is followed for promotion to Colonel. In-residence professional military education and successful

¹⁸ Senior Leader refers to an officer in the grade of O-6/Colonel and above.

squadron command or equivalent levels of responsibility are the primary indicators of promotion to O-6. There are two opportunities for officers to be promoted below the zone to colonel.

Below in Figures 16 through 19, you can see the past two years of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel's promotion boards. For the 2011 Lieutenant Colonels board, 66 African-American officers were promoted in the zone at 68.8 percent, and only 2 were promoted below the zone at 1.1 percent, compared to the board average of 75.2 percent in the promotion zone and 3.4 percent below the promotion zone. For the 2012 Lieutenant Colonel Board the data does not improve. 55 African-American officers were promoted in the zone at 61.8 percent, and only 5 were promoted below the zone at 2.1 percent, compared to the board average of 75.4 percent in the promotion zone and 3.4 percent below the promotion zone. This clearly illustrates the gap between black officers and the rest of the officer corps in terms of promotion.

CY 2011 LAF LTC Central Selection Board									
Promotion Zone	CON	SEL	Rate						
In Primary Zone	1318	992	75.3%						
Above Primary Zone	1636	17	1.0%						
Below Primary Zone	3285	112	3.4%						
Demographics	In Primary Zone			Above Primary Zone			Below Primary Zone		
	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate
American Indian/Alaskan	8	5	62.5%	9	0	0.0%	11	0	0.0%
Asian	30	24	80.0%	48	0	0.0%	62	2	3.2%
Black/African American	96	66	68.8%	110	1	0.9%	182	2	1.1%
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	4	2	50.0%	3	0	0.0%	6	0	0.0%
White	1081	825	76.3%	1342	15	1.1%	2776	103	3.7%
Two or More Races	13	10	76.9%	14	0	0.0%	42	1	2.4%
Declined to Respond	86	60	69.8%	110	1	0.9%	206	4	1.9%
Hispanic/Latino	82	60	73.2%	102	2	2.0%	177	4	2.3%
Not Hispanic/Latino	1216	918	75.5%	1505	15	1.0%	3062	107	3.5%
Declined to Respond	20	14	70.0%	29	0	0.0%	46	1	2.2%
Men	1183	887	75.0%	1523	17	1.1%	2955	101	3.4%
Women	135	105	77.8%	113	0	0.0%	330	11	3.3%
MAJCOM	650	425	65.4%	1098	12	1.1%	2040	52	2.5%

Figure 16: CY 2011 LAF Lt Col Central Selection Board Results

CY 2012 LAF LTC Central Selection Board									
Promotion Zone	CON	SEL	Rate						
In Primary Zone	1453	1096	75.4%						
Above Primary Zone	1405	17	1.2%						
Below Primary Zone	3604	123	3.4%						
Demographics	In Primary Zone			Above Primary Zone			Below Primary Zone		
	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate
American Indian/Alaskan	5	4	80.0%	9	0	0.0%	19	0	0.0%
Asian	27	20	74.1%	39	0	0.0%	60	1	1.7%
Black/African American	89	55	61.8%	105	1	1.0%	237	5	2.1%
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	2	2	100.0%	4	1	25.0%	10	0	0.0%
White	1221	938	76.8%	1135	13	1.1%	2993	111	3.7%
Two or More Races	17	13	76.5%	13	0	0.0%	52	0	0.0%
Declined to Respond	92	64	69.6%	100	2	2.0%	233	6	2.6%
Hispanic/Latino	87	67	77.0%	80	0	0.0%	200	3	1.5%
Not Hispanic/Latino	1347	1019	75.6%	1298	17	1.3%	3333	118	3.5%
Declined to Respond	19	10	52.6%	27	0	0.0%	71	2	2.8%
Men	1300	980	75.4%	1299	17	1.3%	3241	112	3.5%
Women	153	116	75.8%	106	0	0.0%	363	11	3.0%
MAJCOM	743	478	64.3%	966	12	1.2%	2279	52	2.3%

Figure 17: CY 2012 LAF Lt Col Central Selection Board Results
Source: HQ AFPC Promotion Statistics

For the 2011 Colonel's board 16 African-American officers were promoted in the promotion zone at 47.1 percent. Only 3 were promoted below the zone at 2.8 percent, compared to the board average of 45.7 percent in the promotion zone, and 3.7 percent below the promotion zone. For the 2012 Colonel's board 20 African-American officers were promoted in the promotion zone at 40 percent. Only 1 was promoted below the zone at 1.2 percent, compared to the board average of 46 percent in the promotion zone, and 3.7 percent below the promotion zone.

CY 2011 LAF COL Central Selection Board

Promotion Zone	CON	SEL	Rate
In Primary Zone	934	427	45.7%
Above Primary Zone	861	10	1.2%
Below Primary Zone	2107	77	3.7%

Demographics	In Primary Zone			Above Primary Zone			Below Primary Zone		
	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate
American Indian/Alaskan	1	0	0.0%	1	0	0.0%	6	0	0.0%
Asian	19	9	47.4%	9	0	0.0%	31	2	6.5%
Black/African American	34	16	47.1%	42	0	0.0%	109	3	2.8%
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	4	3	75.0%	1	0	0.0%	3	0	0.0%
White	841	382	45.4%	766	9	1.2%	1878	68	3.6%
Two or More Races	7	3	42.9%	9	1	11.1%	13	0	0.0%
Declined to Respond	28	14	50.0%	33	0	0.0%	67	4	6.0%
Hispanic/Latino	39	21	53.8%	27	0	0.0%	87	3	3.4%
Not Hispanic/Latino	881	399	45.3%	824	10	1.2%	1991	73	3.7%
Declined to Respond	14	7	50.0%	10	0	0.0%	29	1	3.4%
Men	851	385	45.2%	813	9	1.1%	1929	71	3.7%
Women	83	42	50.6%	48	1	2.1%	178	6	3.4%
MAJCOM	596	244	40.9%	576	5	0.9%	1444	52	3.6%

Figure 18: CY 2011 LAF Cols Central Selection Board Results
Source: HQ AFPC Promotion Statistics

CY 2012 LAF COL Central Selection Board

Promotion Zone	CON	SEL	Rate
In Primary Zone	921	424	46.0%
Above Primary Zone	827	7	0.8%
Below Primary Zone	2049	76	3.7%

Demographics	In Primary Zone			Above Primary Zone			Below Primary Zone		
	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate	CON	SEL	Rate
American Indian/Alaskan	1	1	100.0%	1	0	0.0%	12	0	0.0%
Asian	19	5	26.3%	16	0	0.0%	32	1	3.1%
Black/African American	50	20	40.0%	35	0	0.0%	85	1	1.2%
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	2	2	100.0%	1	0	0.0%	3	1	33.3%
White	817	383	46.9%	742	7	0.9%	1813	70	3.9%
Two or More Races	5	2	40.0%	5	0	0.0%	17	3	17.6%
Declined to Respond	27	11	40.7%	27	0	0.0%	87	0	0.0%
Hispanic/Latino	39	16	41.0%	27	1	3.7%	86	0	0.0%
Not Hispanic/Latino	868	405	46.7%	789	6	0.8%	1929	76	3.9%
Declined to Respond	14	3	21.4%	11	0	0.0%	34	0	0.0%
Men	855	389	45.5%	777	5	0.6%	1864	71	3.8%
Women	66	35	53.0%	50	2	4.0%	185	5	2.7%
MAJCOM	543	216	39.8%	545	3	0.6%	1374	55	4.0%

Figure 19: CY 2012 LAF Cols Central Selection Board Results
Source: HQ AFPC Promotion Statistics

Below the zone promotions and general officers

Currently there are approximately 3500 Colonels in the active-duty Air Force. Of those only between 30 and 35 (roughly one percent) are promoted to General Officer each year. Consequently, if you take into consideration all the officers that are in the Air Force there is less than one-half of a percent chance that an officer will ever reach the rank of general officer.

Through describing African-American career progression this study has tried to illuminate it is no different than any other officer's career progression. The framework, processes, and selection criteria are the same for black officers as they are for all officers. Over the course of describing this process it is clear that black officers are not promoted at the same rate as other officers. It is also shown that black officers are accessed at the same rate as the percentage of the US population that is qualified to serve in the Air Force. As this study moves into the analysis chapter, the reader is reminded that this study is seeking to answer the question: Why is the Air Force not meeting its diversity objectives? In the course of unpacking this question, the puzzle of why black officers do not get promoted at the same rate as other officers is a recurring theme in this thesis.

CHAPTER 4

Analysis

Data is important, but analysis is critical.

—Colonel (ret) Chevalier “Chevy” Cleaves

This chapter analyzes the theoretical framework of mind – body – spirit and as it applies to black officer career progression. The mind is examined from a cognitive perspective; it looks to see how the role of implicit bias can affect officer career progression. Concrete evidence is not releasable to the wider Air Force population or the public as to what explains black officer’s lag in promotion rates. One can infer how implicit bias can manifest itself in two of the Air Force’s developmental areas. First, is in officer mentoring relationships. The second is in the selection of jobs and assignments that routinely prove to be the foundations of a “high-powered” career. These jobs result in below the zone promotion and paths to the senior ranks in the Air Force.

The mind is a metaphor for examining the educational impacts on black officer career progression. Black officers historically have lower SAT and Air Force Officer Qualification Test (AFOQT) scores than whites. This is the basis for the theory of “start behind, stay behind.”¹ Some studies say this tendency accounts for the achievement gap that exists between black officers and the majority white officers. One particular RAND study suggests that they can predict senior officer production based on where officers finish in their order of merit from their respective commissioning sources. When asked about outliers such as General (retired) Stephen Lorenz, Maj Gen (retired) Al Flowers, and Maj Gen Ed Bolton, researchers say there are always outliers to any analysis and therefore cannot be relied upon for yielding systematic consistent

¹ The key issue for understanding the more limited career progression of minority officers appears to be their difficulties compiling competitive performance records. This may result from more limited social integration and, on average, weaker pre-commissioning preparation.

results.² This work proposes that there are many more pathways that can be examined through implicit bias if the Air Force is willing to let experts come in and analyze our personnel processes to identify potential pitfalls.³

The next area analyzed was the body, representing the physical sphere. The theoretical framework draws on the body of research dedicated to critical mass theory and how physical numerical representation has an impact on boardroom dynamics. As the Air Force strives to be more diverse, the question of what is the right amount of diversity frequently surfaces. The historical significance of a military that is representative of the society it defends in terms of upholding national values has long since been established.⁴

The literature on critical mass offers a wealth of insights on how the Air Force may want to consider what is the appropriate amount of diversity, whether on staffs or entities, that helps inform senior decision-makers. It is this author's belief that while the proper amount of diversity is a question that needs to be explored further beyond this study, the Air Force has built in mechanisms of combating sheer numbers in terms of physical representation. For example, if five squadron commanders are in a meeting with the group commander, they are all commanders, which mean they have been through a series of validation methods to prove their worth to be at the table. Designation as a squadron commander negates the critical mass assertion that 30 percent of the squadron commanders in the meeting needs to be

² By their own accounts these General officers started slow, finished low on order of merit from commissioning source or in HS, Gen Flowers and Gen Bolton both served as enlisted troops, but still made it to flag rank.

³ The author recommends that the Air Force partner with OSU's Kirwan Institute, Dr. Sharon Davies on Implicit Bias.

⁴ Currin, Scovill, *Turning Aspirations Into Reality: Ensuring Female and Minority Representation in the US Air Force Officer Corps and Senior Leader Ranks*, (School Of Advanced Air And Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2009), 11.

minorities so they feel comfortable enough to share their inputs and feel valued.⁵

In addition, from the author's personal experience as Weapons Officer, Special Operations Evaluator pilot, and the only African-American pilot in the room on many occasions; I never felt that my input was not valued or that my voice was not heard. In fact, because of my qualifications my inputs were often sought after and extremely valued in the minds of senior level decision makers.⁶

The previous example is evidence that the Air Force can counter the board room example presented at the core of critical mass theory. However, the representation of diverse Air Force officer ranks adds a different dimension. As expressed in two different *Amici Curiae* briefs to the Supreme Court supporting race-based considerations for college admission, this issue has a huge impact on diversity in the officer corps.⁷ Both arguments have been filed stating racially representative armed forces are critical to national security. The ability to build demographically diverse cohorts of officers entering the service is a military necessity. Further, the ability to develop and promote diverse officers through the ranks is part of the national security imperative. This is supported by retired three and four star generals from all branches of the military.⁸

How to execute this vision moves into the spirit sphere of the research framework. Here one can analyze the Air Force's organizational culture and its propensity for institutionalizing diversity. As Schein pointed out there are layers to organizational culture; artifacts,

⁵ This builds on Schein's idea of organizational culture theory of artifacts, beliefs/values, and basic underlying assumptions

⁶ Again, evidence of Schein's model of artifacts being supported by values and basic underlying assumptions.

⁷ Fisher, Abigail Noel. "Supreme Court of the United States" 10022 (11); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 306 (U.S. 2003).

⁸ Fisher, Abigail Noel. "Supreme Court of the United States" 10022 (11); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 306 (U.S. 2003).

values/beliefs, and basic underlying assumptions. Artifacts can be easily identified in an African-American career progression. They are exactly the same as any other Air Force officer. To ascend to the senior leader ranks, one must excel at his or her primary duty. They must stand out amongst their peers by way of distinguished graduate distinction, awards, selection for special programs, and PME. Lastly, they must have the proper job assignments, like Flight Commander, Squadron Commander, and Group/Wing Commander, as a general rule to achieve General officer rank.

Values and beliefs are the things that are taken away from artifacts. The fact that related guidance, policy, regulations, and strategic planning documents exist now is tangible evidence that the Air Force values diversity. These documents have all been produced in the last three to four years. The most senior leaders in the Air Force speak about how the institution values the mission impact of increased diversity. However, this message does not resonate with the majority of the service. The artifacts that would be evidence of this acceptance simply do not exist.

In the Air Force, the sum of artifacts, values, and the basic underlying assumptions is promotion. Regardless of what people say they value, or no matter what Air Force guidance tries to push its members towards, people know that who gets promoted is what counts. The fact that 70 percent of the General officers in the Air Force are pilots indicates that aviators are whom the Air Force truly values in its most senior leadership positions. Steven Rosen states, "Military organizations are disciplined, hierarchical bureaucracies. Power is won through influence over who is promoted to positions of senior command. Control over the promotion of officers is the source of power in the military."⁹

⁹ Rosen, *Winning the next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, 20.

After looking at the data as applied to African-American officers through the lens of JFC Fuller's mind, body, and spirit threefold order how we fix the issue is clear. First, the statistics must be analyzed to determine that there is indeed a noticeable difference between African-American promotion rates and the overall percentages. Appendices A through D show the raw data and quantitative analysis for two separate datasets – the first lists promotion rates for white and black officers for the years 1978 through 1987. The second data set shows similar data for 1989 through 2012. In each case, a *difference of means test* (or *t test*) was utilized, which gives a probability that the difference in the means of two variables is significantly different than zero. In both datasets, the differences between African-American promotion rates and either white officers (1978 to 1987 dataset) or the overall promotion rates (1989 to 2012 dataset) were striking. In addition, the statistical significances from the *t tests* indicate that the difference is not random. In other words, there is some mechanism at work which must explain the difference in the promotion rates.

In 1996, then Army Lieutenant Colonel (now Brig Gen retired) Remo Butler wrote an Army War College paper entitled: *Why Black Officers Fail in the U.S. Army*.¹⁰ Brig Gen Butler concluded that there are four areas the Army needed to examine to remedy why black officers in the Army were not succeeding.¹¹ Education, mentorship, culture, and the 'good old boy network' were the four areas that Brig Gen Butler felt needed attention. These four areas are the same for the Air Force, only adapted to meet the service's current paradigms.

Education

¹⁰ Butler, Remo., *Why Black Officers Fail In the U.S. Army*, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996.

¹¹ Brig Gen Butler's definition of success was reaching the rank of General officer. However, today it is commonly accepted that a successful career in the USAF is reaching the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

First, the Air Force must educate its personnel on why diversity is a military necessity. This is not done simply by putting the message in strategic guidance documents, policy directives, Air Force instructions, Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force declarations, and strategic roadmaps. It must become a part of the operational and tactical fiber of the Air Force as an institution. On the tactical level, this is an issue that needs to be talked about as part of the broader force development conversation. As Flight Commanders and Squadron Commanders teach officers through their formal and informal methods about Air Force professional development, diversity must be brought into this conversation and its importance must be stressed.

University of Michigan professor Scott E. Page examines the power of diversity through the eyes of an economist. In his book, *The Difference*, while he is not specifically talking about racial diversity, he explains the power of diversity to solve highly complex problems. In addition, he offers two mathematical formulas that prove diversity does make a difference. The first is the Diversity Prediction Theorem and the second is the Crowds Beats Averages Law. He also answers the question of how much diversity matters, “just as much as ability, no more, no less.”¹² He provides models that prove diverse groups consistently outperform homogeneous groups.¹³

Professional Military Education (PME) is the next area where the Air Force should concentrate its efforts. Currently only Squadron Officer School (SOS) has a dedicated lesson to teach Air Force diversity policy. The syllabus is a robust lesson plan in which each seminar discusses diversity and the power of diversity on mission accomplishment.¹⁴ Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) dedicates only part of a lesson to

¹² Page, *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies*, 197.

¹³ Page, *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies*, 197.

¹⁴ SOS Diversity Teaching guide, L5160 dated 1 January 2013.

diversity. However, the lesson plan is inadequate in guiding the officers to have a meaningful diversity dialogue. It is left up to the Majors to come in and guide the discussion. Lastly, Air War College does not have a lesson dedicated to diversity. If officers are not getting a robust indoctrination on diversity through the Professional Military Education (PME) system, then they are left to their own experiences and desires to learn and spread the message of diversity. Valuable diversity discussions are hard. They make people feel uncomfortable because they deal with issues that have emotional baggage behind them. Discussions that deal with race, sexual orientation, gender, and equality are socially sensitive issues in our society. In the military, at times, we have become too politically correct where people are afraid to engage in meaningful dialogue because they may use an inappropriate term. PME provides the ideal structure to have open, honest, and frank non-attribution conversations about diversity. This ties into one potential way to break down and combat implicit bias. In addition, it helps to give officers an understanding as to why diversity is a military necessity and institutionalize it throughout all levels of the Air Force.

Education can also help commanders at all levels understand and articulate the importance of diversity. This topic should be addressed at the squadron, group, and wing commander's courses. Talking about the value of diversity and the power of a diverse force in a demographically shifting nation needs to happen in these forums. Explaining how each commander at his or her particular level is a stakeholder in cultivating diversity will help foster his or her role in institutionalizing it in the service. The conversation must take place on a level that commanders can understand that they are the conduit that translates the strategic intent from the Air Force senior leadership to the members at the unit level. This is how the message of diversity as a force multiplier and an inclusive process is spread. Commanders who reach out and raise the level of performance in underperforming groups raise the level of all

officers across the force. It must be kept in mind that diversity is an inclusive process and it does not call for changing the standards for anyone. Yet it will work hard to break down barriers to ensure opportunities are available for all officers.

As the Air Force continues in its efforts to institutionalize diversity, it should strive to change the face of who most often articulates its diversity message. Specifically, minorities should not always be the ones up briefing these topics or working in the offices concerning diversity. At times it sends a powerful message when a person who has experienced the difficulties of can speak on these topics. However, it is also important for majority officers to be the ones out in front articulating the message of diversity. Since the creation of the Air Force Diversity Office (HAF/A1DV) in 2009, there have been three directors: One African-American female, one white male, and one African-American male. This office needs to be led by the most qualified Colonel possible, but there is a powerful message given when the Colonel is a majority officer. An even more powerful message is sent when the Colonel is promoted to the next rank from that job. Having a majority officer fill this position can help take away the stereotype of being self-serving for the minority officers who hold this job and try to advance diversity in the Air Force. In addition, as you show diversity is important to the service, the directors of A1DV should be officers that are highly competitive for Brigadier General, to show the rest of the Air Force that it truly values diversity. This is similar to how the Colonels who run Air Force General Officer Management (DPG), the Colonel's Management Group (DPO), and the Secretary/CSAF's Action Group (HAF/CX) traditionally are promoted to Brigadier General out of those jobs.

Continuing on the theme of education, making detailed promotion data available to officers is necessary. Air Mobility Command for example, does a great job posting post promotion board analysis briefs to

the Mobility Air Force's community.¹⁵ This also happens after each IDE/SDE selection board as well as Commanders selection boards. Officers must have an idea of what it takes for them to obtain the goals that they set for themselves. The Air Force Personnel Center does post generic data after the results of promotion boards that show statistically how each demographic performed on the promotion board. This research used this data extensively. However, the data does not have the fidelity to inform officers as to why they were or were not selected for promotion. In addition, they give little insight into the benchmarks of the Management Level Review (MLR) processes across the Air Force, which are key components of the Air Force promotion process.

Mentorship/Role Models

Brig Gen Butler also emphasized the area of mentorship as an important area in which to focus. The presence of role models however, is equally as important as mentorship. General Butler suggested that black officers do not get the same level of mentorship as white officers in the US Army. While this study does not present evidence to support a claim like that for the United States Air Force, it is a fact that different functional specialties within the Air Force conduct mentoring in different ways.¹⁶ The Air Force has a number of mentoring tools that Commanders are not formally taught how to use. The Air Force Portal, Airman's Development Plan (ADP), and "Mentoring Network" are systems the Air Force has developed to help commanders and supervisors mentor their Airmen. Unfortunately, these development tools depend on Airmen to learn how to use these systems without formal training. At the time of this study, lessons on how to use these systems did not exist in the

¹⁵ AMC A1 portal page: <https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af/USAF/ep/globalTab.do?channelPageId=s6925EC1353620FB5E044080020E329A9>, (Accessed 15 April 2013).

¹⁶ AMC A1 spread the word brief: AMC A1KO, 23 January 2012.

Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College curriculums. Mentoring in the Air Force across the board needs to be improved.

General Hal Hornburg, former commander of Air Education and Training Command, and white male officer, explored this assertion further. General Hornburg recalls when he was once asked by a young Airman, “Sir, where are the black role models?”¹⁷ He thought on the question and could only think of a few names, and this bothered him. So he asked then Lieutenant Colonel Darren McDew, a young black officer he knew the same question. “Where are the black role models?” Without pause, Lt Col McDew instructed the General with “The next time someone asks you where the African-American role models are, you say, ‘You’re looking at one.’”¹⁸ This affirms the responsibility that all officers who are senior have a duty to mentor and be a role model to junior officers, regardless of race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender. Studies have been conducted and found that mentoring is more difficult when it is forced, or the two individuals don’t have something in common.¹⁹ Mentoring cannot be mandated by the Air Force. Mandating an activity will not achieve its intended aim of developing and inspiring people. However, it must be encouraged, and looked favorably upon, so the force continues to motivate and develop officers from Second Lieutenant forward.

An updated article by Colonel Irving Smith (US Army) on Brig Gen Butler’s 1996 Army War College paper said that black senior officers should be made to be more accountable and accessible to younger black

¹⁷ Hornburg, Hal., *What I Believe*, Air Space Power Journal, Spring, 2005, 7.

¹⁸ Hornburg, Hal., *What I Believe*, 7-10.

¹⁹ Cho, Hyo Jon, “*Unspoken Leadership Development Tool: A Phenomenological Study on Cross-Race Mentoring In the United States Army*,” Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctorate of Management in Organizational Leadership, University of Phoenix, July 2011, 3.

officers.²⁰ This point would be contentious in today's Air Force. However, this proposal could have a valuable impact. Before such an action can be made it must be understood and taken in context. There are approximately 3800 black officers in the Air Force. At the time of this study, there are only 15 black general officers and 163 black Colonels. There is not enough time for those few senior officers alone to mentor all the junior black officers, not to mention still maintaining mentoring relationships with other officers in their spheres of influence.

However, lists of black officers should be made available to black senior officers when they request them. These lists can be similar to the Air Force's High Potential Officer (HPO) lists that various commands and organizations maintain. For example, Air Mobility Command keeps track of all their Phoenix Horizon program officers.²¹ If diversity is a military necessity these lists of diverse officers who bring diverse perspectives should be made available so all officers have the opportunity to cultivate this capability.

An area where this process works currently is the selection of Air Officers Commanding (AOCs) at the United States Air Force Academy. Based on a qualified pool of officers who have made the IDE cut by their respective Development Team's, USAFA selects AOCs from a broad diverse background to expose cadets to all mission types and also include race, gender, and ethnic diversity.

Programs such as Air Force Cadet Officer Mentoring Program (AFCOMAP) need to be resurrected and aid in the mentoring efforts. The Army has a highly successful mentoring program known as The Rocks Incorporated. The Air Force should have the same network that enables officers to connect. In addition, emphasis on professional organizations

²⁰ Smith, Irving, *"Why Black Officers Still Fail,"* Parameters, Autumn 2010, 13.

²¹ Phoenix Horizon is Air Mobility Command's executive-development program. Its charge is to identify and track the best-qualified mobility officers for leadership development based on Air Force requirement.

like the Company Grade Officer Council (CGOC), Association of Military Comptrollers, Logistics Officers Association, Airlift/Tanker Association, and other professional networks must be structured, continued, and pushed as avenues for mentoring and networking.

Culture

Brig Gen Butler described Army culture in terms of socialization skills and dress and appearance. In terms of socialization skills, he used a social setting example, and asked how many white officers have participated in social events where the majority of the people there were black? Brig Gen Butler asserts the answer is probably very few.²² For dress and appearance, Brig Gen Butler talked about the difference between blacks and whites with respect to wearing a mustache. He used a personal anecdote when he was in the headquarters building and an officer pointed out that all the pictures of the commanding officers hanging on the wall none of them had a mustache. Brig Gen Butler did have a mustache at the time. He described culture in terms of the associated problems that result from misconceptions and a lack of understanding.

Additionally, Gen Hornburg, in a brief to Corona 2001, said we (the 4-star Generals at Corona) don't understand the differences in black culture. He felt that senior leaders must learn what those differences are in order to bridge the cultural and generational gaps that exist between the Generals and the young Lieutenants.²³ This effort must be taken up and continued in the Air Force today and in the future.

In addition, the importance of inclusive culture cannot be overemphasized, one in which all officers feel valued, and each has the opportunity to make it to the top. The Air Force must also attack

²² Butler, Remo., *Why Black Officers Fail In the U.S. Army*, 18.

²³ General Hal Hornburg (AETC/CC) brief to Corona titled "Black Officer Accessions and Development."

problems so white officers don't feel as though they are being discriminated against. The Air Force should continue to work towards a diversity culture that becomes institutionalized. However, what does that look like?

Benjamin O. Davis Jr. once said that when he as a black man could just be an American without qualifying it by putting 'African' in front of it, then and only then would America be rid of its racist past.²⁴ When five or six black officers stop and talk or congregate and that does not generate a different conscious or subconscious reaction than when five or six white officers do the same thing, that is when the Air Force will have institutionalized a culture of diversity. When a non-rated officer gets promoted to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and nobody within the Air Force cares about his or her badge or occupational background, but instead focuses on how great of a leader the new Chief of Staff will be, that is when we will have institutionalized a culture of diversity as an Air Force.

Another goal for culture is to get to a place where the term 'diversity' does not carry a negative connotation. This will be difficult because many who do not understand diversity, or do not believe it is a military necessity, see it as a means for reverse discrimination, where something is being taken away from majority officers. If 90 percent of General Officers are white and diversity efforts are bringing that number down, then yes, the initiatives will take General Officer slots away from white officers. However, officers must remember that we serve the nation, and those General Officer billets belong to America, in order to provide national defense. The Air Force owes it to the nation to fill those billets with the best men and women who will provide national security for the nation. True champions of diversity as a military necessity understand that it is truly mission essential for the strategic success of

²⁴ Davis, Benjamin O. *Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American: An Autobiography*, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991).

the Air Force. The service must change not by putting less capable officers in senior leader positions, but instead by developing a larger pool of talented diverse officers so there is more diverse talent available to be chosen from.

This leads to the last element of culture, namely transparency. If people do not know the 'why' behind a decision or process, then they are left to their own devices to figure out how it happened. This is a very difficult area in the military because of our structures, and the nature of how certain processes are safeguarded. For example, many agree the promotion system within the Air Force is fair. It is not a perfect system and is at times fallible, yet it is generally accepted that the process is fair across the board.

However, even though the process is fair, there is never a clear feedback loop to explain to officers why someone was not promoted. For the integrity of the process, maybe this should be maintained. However, there are now numerous processes where the Air Force as a whole is not transparent in terms of how it arrives at its decisions affecting officer progression. One case is the Air Force's Student Management Level Review (MLR) process. Students are awarded promotion recommendations by an MLR board president who they have never met. In addition to having never met the individual, they don't get feedback from them. So the process is not open for the member to learn what was missing from their record to make them more competitive in future boards.

Transparency can help properly inform commanders on the state of diversity in their units. Squadron commanders and above should be made to write up a diversity assessment of their unit annually. In this assessment, commanders would have to account for the diversity in their organization and how they are playing a role in developing it. This assessment will force commanders at the lowest level to have a better understanding of Air Force diversity and inform the chain of command

all the way up through MAJCOM commanders who will in turn brief the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. This will give the Chief an annual picture of diversity based on his commanders' perspectives.

This process is known as Accountability Reviews in the Navy. This was a process that was instituted by former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen. His successor as CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead, continued the practice of having his department heads personally brief him on the state of diversity in their units. In addition, they were accountable as to what they were doing to develop diversity within their organizations.

The Good Old Boy Network Revisited

"It's not who you know, it's who knows you!" Brig. Gen. Butler described the 'good old boy network' as a means for cultivating relationships between senior commanders and lower-level commanders to get younger promising Army officers into key jobs.²⁵ In the Air Force, a more common term for a senior advocate would be 'sponsor,' a senior leader Colonel or above, who works on the younger officer's behalf in the Air Force developmental process. No matter what name you call it, most Air Force officers acknowledge that one can't make it to the most senior levels of the Air Force without some level of guidance and help. This network is known in sociology as *work relationships*.²⁶ It is important to make sure all officers have the opportunity to access these types of relationships in order to open pathways to the senior ranks.

In the Air Force, it is also important to confront the good old boy network not just from a racial, gender, or ethnicity standpoint; but also from an Air Force specialty code and functional standpoint. Books like *Officers in Flight Suits*, *Rise of the Fighter Generals*, and *Rise of Air Mobility and its Generals* highlight the marked improvement of specific

²⁵ Butler, Remo, *Why Black Officers Fail In the U.S. Army*, 21.

²⁶ Smith, Irving, "Why Black Officers Still Fail," *Parameters*, Autumn 2010, 11.

functional communities within the Air Force. It is prudent that the Air Force values all of its contributing members, and the service must continue to strive to build the best Air Force for national security and our nation.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

*There comes a time when one must take a position that is
neither safe, nor politic, nor popular, but he must take it
because conscience tells him it is right.*

— Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

In the final chapter, this study emphasizes that the author does not have an axe to grind. Nor does the author wish to paint the Air Force in a negative light. This study has only sought to answer the question of why the Air Force is not meeting its diversity objectives by analyzing African-American career progression as a case study. In the course of that exposition, military theorist J.F.C. Fuller's threefold order of mind-body-spirit provided a foundation for three research areas. The mind was used as a symbol representing a body of research that deals with cognitive structures. This science could possibly give insight into explaining how we as human beings favor one group over another. The body was used as a symbol for examining the collection of research around critical mass theory. This literature was applied to explore how critical mass manifests itself in physical representation in the Air Force. Spirit was used as a symbol for looking at the organizational culture of the Air Force. This supported an effort to understand the roles artifacts, values/beliefs, and basic underlying assumptions play into the promotion process. In addition, through organizational culture this study uncovered some insights into why black officers are promoted less than other officers.

Next, this study sought to explain the journey of black officers in the Air Force as they attempt to ascend to the rank of General officer. Statistically, black officers are worse at achieving career milestones than their peers. Promotion rates, distinguished graduate (from their accession source, initial qualification training, and PME), IDE select from their Major's board, and below the zone promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel, are the benchmarks that help get an officer on the path to

the senior ranks. Black Air Force officers simply are behind the rest of the officer corps in these endeavors.

The notion of ‘start behind and stay behind’ has been a popular theory, positing because black officers score less on standardized tests like the SAT, ACT, and AFOQT, they can never make up for being behind in aptitude. First, these tests do not determine career success in the military. The SAT and ACT are tests that are used to measure college readiness.²⁷ The AFOQT measures aptitudes used to select candidates for officer commissioning programs and specific commissioned officer training programs.²⁸ If data proves officers who have higher standardized test scores (SAT, ACT, and AFOQT) and finish in the top of their accession source eventually become senior leaders in the Air Force, then the Air Force must institute strategies that recruit diverse talent which meets that higher threshold.²⁹ In addition, the Air Force must realize growing senior leaders is a complex process, in which many variables affect the outcome. In order to change the demographics of the senior officer ranks sooner rather than later, the Air Force should focus its leadership, especially at the Flight and Squadron levels on how to better develop officers.

Two valuable take-a-ways must be observed for Air Force senior leadership and the Air Force as an organization. First, one cannot ignore the fact many senior officers were not ranked at or near the top of their accession sources at their time of commissioning. Second, every senior leader acknowledges at some point in their career, a leader had to take an active role in their development. This active role can range from helping with an award to solidifying a promising job opportunity. At some point during their career, a leader saw potential in them and invested energy to help them get on the path to senior rank. Brig Gen

²⁷ SAT Pressroom, (Accessed 4 April 2013),
<http://press.collegeboard.org/sat/faq>.<http://press.collegeboard.org/sat/faq>.

²⁸ US Air Force Officer Qualifying Test Information Pamphlet, (AFPT) 997.

²⁹ The Air Force Academy does not use the AFOQT in calculating cadet’s order of merit.

Remo Butler's four areas identified in his Army War College paper *Why Black Officers Fail* are: education, mentorship, culture, and the good old boy network. These are all areas that need to be improved in the Air Force for black officer promotion rates to increase.

What follows are the study's conclusions and recommendations the Air Force should do in the future. First, the question this research has been looking to answer is a rhetorical one, because the Air Force does not have diversity objectives or quotas. In all the strategic governance, Air Force instructions, and regulations, the service never articulates what its desired goals are with respect to representation along race, gender, and ethnic lines. The Air Force has a broad definition of diversity, which includes a range of socioeconomic perspectives, geographic cultural backgrounds, and other factors. All of these different perspectives (when harnessed) help make the Air Force a better fighting force. However, the only way the Air Force has to categorize these perspectives are along racial, gender, and ethnicity lines.

Recommendations

This study proposes five areas of improvement for the United States Air Force.

- Establish diversity objectives.
- Improve diversity **and inclusion** education.
- Increase emphasis on mentorship especially at the Flight Commander and Squadron Commander level.
- Institutionalize Air Force Diversity Culture.
- Establish accountability reviews and data transparency.

The Air Force should establish a goal of representing the society it defends. In 2013, this translates into an officer corps which is 78 percent White, 13 percent Black/African-American, 5 percent Asian, 2.3 percent multiracial, 1.2 percent American Indian/Native Alaskan, .2

percent Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and 16.7 percent Hispanic or Latino.³⁰ This allows the Air Force to focus its recruiting, development, and retention efforts on a tangible target.

Diversity and Inclusion education should emphasize that these initiatives are not about lowering standards. Diversity and inclusion efforts are not about women and minorities, nor do they exclude white men. Diversity and inclusion initiatives should not be used to pay a debt for past injustices. They are not about quotas, tolerating others, treating people the way you want to be treated, or just the right thing to do. Diversity is a part of a system to be leveraged to spur innovation, productivity, and solve complex problems. Diversity is about leadership competency imperatives that make the Air Force better. Diversity is based on requirements, and not traditions or what appears to be the latest trend in the business world. Diversity is fundamental to one of the core characteristics of all airmen: airmindedness. Diversity and inclusion training should be included in all Commander's courses: Squadron, Group, Wing, and above.

Air Force leadership has been at the core of innovation since its inception as an independent service. There are countless examples of how different leadership perspectives led to unrivaled innovation.³¹ That innovation helped build the strongest Air Force in the world. In order to compete for the best talent in a demographically shifting society, the Air Force is going to have to take aggressive action now to stay in the fight. Mentorship at the Flight and Squadron Commander level is an area where the Air Force can do better. Mentoring at these two levels set the foundation where all Airmen feel valued by the service. The measures proposed in this study are feasible in a fiscally constrained environment.

³⁰ The reader is reminded that someone of Hispanic or Latino ethnicity can claim any race. This is why the percentages add up to more than 100 percent.

³¹ General Billy Mitchell, General Jimmy Doolittle, General William Tunner, General Bernie Schriever, Colonel John Boyd, and Colonel Warden are examples of leaders who spurred unrivaled innovation.

However, they do cost an individual's time, and call for improved leadership from all Air Force officers. The Air Force must shift its mindset with regards to diversity, one that not only embraces its power, but understands it requires leadership by all Air Force members to be successful.

Institutionalizing Air Force Diversity Culture requires true leadership at all levels of the Air Force, from Second Lieutenant to four-star General. Embracing the Air Force message of diversity as a military necessity is the marching order. As evidenced in the promotion rates of black officers, it is obvious the Air Force needs to take steps to improve areas that contribute to this disparity, because African-American officers are one type of variation that houses the key attributes the Air Force desires. Closing this gap is critical to expanding the numbers of minority officers flowing through the professional development pipeline. Realizing this is not only applicable to African-American officers, the same methodology can be applied to any demographic, in which the Air Force is lacking. This action is an imperative in order to align Air Force rhetoric with the perceptions the statistics show to the force. Only through transparency will the message of diversity be spread throughout the Air Force.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force should adopt the same method Admirals Mullen and Roughead used in their position as the nation's top naval officer. The CSAF should hold annual accountability reviews for each MAJCOM commander. During this accountability review, the CSAF should be briefed from each commander, one on one as to the state of diversity in his or her command. This type of meeting is repeated all the way down the chain of command to the Squadron Commander where they have to produce a report as to the state of diversity in their unit. This helps to keep a diversity mindset at the forefront of Commander's minds and it reinforces that it is a priority to the Air Force.

Transparency in the sharing and presentation of data that can help explain why certain demographics within the Air Force officer corps are not maintaining the standard. The data would illuminate why black officers do not perform as well as other USAF officer demographic categories. While conducting research for this study, there were several requests for data that were denied. A senior analyst at AFPC acknowledged the Air Force does not make public much of the promotion analysis data. The rationale was because of the potential misrepresentation of the Air Force. There are a number of benefits from presenting data which could inform why a demographic is underrepresented, especially with promotions. For example, SOS tracks the number of distinguished graduates (DGs). Examining the data from 2008 through the first class of 2013, there were 1401 total DGs, of which, only 24 were African-American officers.³² That means only 1.7 percent of DGs over the course of the last five years are black. An interesting coincidence is that the below the zone promotion rate to Lieutenant Colonel for black officers the past two years is 1.7 percent. So this calls out the question: Are black officers just not as good as other officers, or is there something wrong with the people who evaluate officers within the officer development system? Regardless of the cause of the problem, we must strive to fix it, so the Air Force can be better. One way of fixing the problem is to inform officers what specifically they are lacking in order to be promoted.

³² The data is from 2008 through the first SOS class of 2013, see Figure 20 for statistical breakdown.

2008-2013	Total Classes	30	Males	11989	81.78%
	Total Students	14660	Female	2665	18.18%
Active Duty	13097	89.34%	Married	4483	30.58%
Reserves	426	2.91%	Single	10177	69.42%
National Guard	448	3.06%	White	11591	79.07%
Foreign	310	2.11%	African American	984	6.71%
Civilian	378	2.58%	Asian	574	3.92%
USAF	2778	18.95%	American Indian	62	0.42%
ROTC	6262	42.71%	Hawaiian or Pacific	82	0.56%
OTS BOT	3166	21.60%	Multi	321	2.19%
OTS COT	439	2.99%	Unknown	1046	7.14%
AMS	1001	6.83%	Prior Service	2096	14.30%

2008-2013			Males	1280	91.36%
	Total DGs	1401	Female	121	8.64%
Active Duty	1372	97.93%	Married	1067	76.16%
Reserves	7	0.50%	Single	334	23.84%
National Guard	8	0.57%	White	1280	91.36%
Foreign	10	0.71%	African American	24	1.71%
Civilian	4	0.29%	Asian	22	1.57%
USAF	456	32.55%	American Indian	7	0.50%
ROTC	608	43.40%	Hawaiian or Pacific	4	0.29%
OTS BOT	230	16.42%	Multi	20	1.43%
OTS COT	18	1.28%	Unknown	44	3.14%
AMS	42	3.00%	Prior Service	114	8.14%

Figure 20: SOS Student Statistics 2008-2013

Source: USAF Squadron Officer School

This is the Air Force of the 21st century whose mission is to Fly, Fight, and Win...In Air, Space, and Cyberspace. Since 1947, the Air Force has been dominated by a culture of air-mindedness. This is the spirit of conquering problems with an 'over, not through' mentality. With a look back at history, one must ask the questions: Is the Air Force better because of diversity? Is the Air Force better because of the Tuskegee Airmen? I am sure the bomber pilots who they flew escort for would answer with a resounding yes! The Tuskegee experiment took executive involvement to help the service move forward. Today, the US Air Force is the best on the face of the planet. The Air Force will remain the best because it will continue to develop and improve its most essential weapon, the Airman.

CHAPTER 6

Black and Blue: The Air Force and J. Roux

Knowledge alone is not enough to get desired results. You must have the more elusive ability to teach and to motivate. This defines a leader; if you can't teach and you can't motivate, you can't lead.

—Coach John Wooden

This is my story, and while it may not be in line with traditional scholarly research presented in a SAASS thesis, I believe it outlines and illustrates many of the prescriptions in my paper. It offers evidence in support of my conclusions, which are not always supported by studies, statistics, or traditional Air Force developmental norms.

I was born August 6, 1977 in Inglewood, CA. My mother and father never married. In fact, at the time of my birth, my mother suffered from a drug addiction, and my father was not very involved in my life. Thankfully, my mother's parents Everette and Dorothy Burton took me in and raised me while they were at the ripe young age of 50 years old. My grandmother, the oldest of 17 children, was born in 1927 and raised in Natchitoches, LA. She left home at the age of 16 to work for a white family in California and go to school. She spent the majority of her young adult life cleaning houses and raising children of the white families who she worked for. She learned at an early age hard work would always provide a basic standard of living.

My grandfather was also born in 1927, in the town of Ruston, LA. He was the youngest of 11 children. His family moved to Los Angeles, CA when he was in grade school. In his early twenties, my grandfather got a job with McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company, where he would work forty-four years and retire. He was drafted in the Army and served three years in World War II before was wounded in the war and earned a Purple Heart.

My grandfather worked at McDonnell Douglas as a machinist cutting parts for aircraft. My grandmother worked as a babysitter and

part time housekeeper, once I started elementary school; from my perspective, life was good. My family was not rich, nor did I grow up poor. We would be classified in today's standards as a lower middle class family. However, it was a home filled with love, founded on Christian beliefs, and one built on the principles of respect, discipline, and hard work.

As I progressed through elementary school in the early 1980s, the city of Inglewood began to get more violent. Street gangs became more prevalent. My family was not immune to this type of violence as my cousin Derek was murdered in a drug deal gone bad while I was only in the 3rd grade. This was among one of the many signs that made my grandparents decide to move to a city about 50 miles east of Inglewood called Rialto. It was a part of California that was unaffected by gang violence on a large scale and the school system was rated top notch.

6th grade was my first year in Rialto. I was accepted into the gifted and talented program (G.A.T.E.) at W.J.C. Trapp elementary school. I had the great fortune of being placed in Ms. Stephanie Lee's class. Ms. Lee was a teacher from Barnstable, MA. She was a hardcore educator who loved children and strove to push them to their limits. She was responsible for Trapp elementary competing in the Odyssey of the Mind program.¹ I was again fortunate to participate in this creative competition program, and under the coaching of Ms. Stephanie Lee and Mrs. Violet Grimes, our team advanced to the world finals competition. The Worlds were held at the University of Colorado at Boulder that year. During the week-long competition, the team drove down to Colorado

¹ Odyssey of the Mind is an international educational program that provides creative problem-solving opportunities for students from kindergarten through college. Team members apply their creativity to solve problems that range from building mechanical devices to presenting their own interpretation of literary classics. They then bring their solutions to competition on the local, state, and World level. Thousands of teams from throughout the U.S. and from about 25 other countries participate in the program. <http://www.odysseyofthemind.com/>, (Accessed 5 May 2013).

Springs, CO and toured the United States Air Force Academy. This was my first encounter with the school, and at the age of twelve all I remember was how impressive the spires on cadet chapel were.

During High School, I was an above average student, and a pretty decent basketball player. I was being recruited by small state schools in California and Oregon and looked forward to earning a scholarship to attend college. The summer before my junior year, while playing in Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) tournaments, my AAU coach asked if I would be interested in going to a service academy to play ball. A former Air Force member, he said I had the grades and attitude it took to make it through the Academy. I had no idea what the service academies were all about. At the time I just knew about David Robinson, the center for the San Antonio Spurs who was a Naval Academy graduate. During that summer, I had the opportunity to play in front of some of the coaches from all three service academies. By the fall, I started receiving letters from the United States Air Force Academy. Unsure about the military, but wanting to keep options open, I started the application process. I had taken the SAT as a sophomore and scored 980. Combined with my 3.5 GPA, my record of leadership, community involvement, and taking AP classes, I thought I was well qualified as a student athlete to get into most schools. I never realized people getting into the service academies had SAT scores that averaged around 1300.

As spring of my senior year rolled around it was time to pick a school for college. My grandparents could never afford to pay for me to go to college. And by this point my mother was in and out of my life due to her personal struggles. By the time I was a senior, my father and I had not seen each other or communicated for about 5 years. In order for me to attend college, I would need to rely on scholarships and financial aid. Thankfully, I had been accepted to UCLA (under affirmative action at the time), Cal Poly Pomona, Lewis and Clark College in Oregon; in

addition, I was offered a slot at the United States Air Force Academy Preparatory School.

My family was hoping I would stay in California or on the West Coast to go to school. I had my eye on one thing, and that was playing Division One basketball. Since I was 6'1 and only weighed about 150 pounds, I thought I could go to the prep school, gain some weight, improve my skills, and head to a big time Division One School. So for me the only clear choice was to go to USAFA Prep. I had no idea about serving my country, and had no clue about flying airplanes; I just wanted to play basketball and receive a free education.

Not to mention, members of my family warned me about the military and how it was no place for a black man. Even my favorite movie of the time, *Boyz N the Hood*, had a line in it where the main character's father is telling him to stay away from the military. However, I did not see it as the military; I saw it as a gateway to achieve my goal of playing basketball. On 26 July 1995, I reported to the United States Air Force Academy Preparatory School.

My time at the Preparatory school was eye opening. Over the course of that year, I was indoctrinated into the military lifestyle. I improved my SAT scores from 980 to 1320, and earned an appointment to the United States Air Force Academy. I remember the first black General Officer I had ever seen in person. It was the Commandant of Cadets at the Air Force Academy, Brigadier General John D. Hopper, who was the first black Commandant in Academy history. I remember being very impressed and inspired seeing a black man was in charge of all the cadets at the Academy.

During my first year at the Academy, I had three seniors I really looked up to as role models. Cadet First Class Bonar Luzey, who played on the basketball team with me. Cadet First Class Adam "Big Daddy" Burks, who got the name Big Daddy because he was always stopping by making sure freshmen were studying, like your Dad would have always

wanted you too. Lastly, Cadet First Class James A. Finlayson, he was captain of the Cadet Honor Guard team and cadet commander of the “First Beast.”² I thought the cadets on the Honor Guard team were crazy, because they spent their free time doing additional military training. However, I highly respected Cadet Finlayson because his uniform was always sharp; shoes shined like a mirror, and seemed to always be squared away. Even though these were my role models I did not always live up to their standards. One time the Commandant popped in and inspected my room while I was at class and was not happy. He left his business card, with a note on the back stating “This room fails. Lorenz!” Needless to say, I never had a problem with keeping my room clean the rest of the time I was a cadet. See Figure 20.




Figure 21: Brig Gen Lorenz Business Card
Source: Author's Personal Library

During recognition of my freshman year at the Academy, I was given a sheet of paper with a bunch of black history facts. I was told I had to learn all these facts, just like Contrails.³ In fact, I was told that

² “First Beast” is the name for the first half of cadet basic military training at the United States Air Force Academy.

³ Contrails is the book of knowledge freshmen, or fourth class cadets had to memorize during their first year at the Academy.

these were “Blacktrails” and if asked about them I better be able to recite the information. From that sheet of paper, I learned about the first black cadet wing commander. His name was Cadet Edward Augustus Rice, class of 1978. I remember later during the spring of my freshmen year, my sponsor told me that Cadet Rice was now Colonel Rice and a Group Commander at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. From then on, I kept track of Colonel Rice, sort of like a kid keeps track of his favorite baseball player, with baseball cards.

While at the Academy, I struggled academically, graduating 922/942 according to the academic order of merit.⁴ More than anything as I look back, it was poor time management in balancing the academic, military, and athletic duties involved in cadet life, while trying to excel as a Division One athlete. I changed my major from Management to Social Sciences, which was a divisional major and allowed me to graduate with a few less credit hours. In addition, I sat out my junior year from the basketball program to concentrate on my grades to ensure I would graduate. My junior year was my best all-around year at the Academy; I would just miss the Dean’s list, but made the Commandant’s list and the Athletic list. I was able to boost my GPA enough to be able to return to the basketball program with enough confidence I could play and still graduate.

While at the Academy, an affinity club known as the Way of Life Committee was influential in my development. It is a club at the Academy, which is similar to black student unions on many of the college or universities across the country. This group was a support group, in all areas of life for me at the Academy. Many of the members of this club were my closest friends, and remain so today. The club would meet once a week and talk about various issues that resonated with me and my cadet experience. Topics ranged from how to get jobs in the

⁴ Taken from the author’s official USAFA transcript.

cadet wing, to what are the best jobs in the Air Force to go into after we graduated.

My senior year at USAFA was key in shaping the direction my career would go. First, in the summer we got a new Commandant of Cadets, Brig Gen Mark Welsh took over for Brig Gen Steve Lorenz. Brig Gen Welsh continued the policy of the former Commandant, which stated if any cadet was pilot qualified and turned down pilot training, that individual had to see the Commandant and explain their decision. Since it was generally never good to have to see the Commandant, I signed the paper, but always knew I could get out of pilot training if I did not want to go. In the winter of my senior year, we had to officially submit what AFSC we wanted to do. The deadline to submit happened while the basketball team was on an away trip, and so our Officer Representative (OR) was responsible for collecting our choices and turning them in. The OR for the team that year was Col Mike DeLorenzo. Col DeLorenzo was the Department Head for the Astronautical Engineering department, and to this day may be one of the smartest people I have ever met in my life. As he was collecting the teams job choices he collected mine, and another African-American cadet named Mathew Elleby. Both of us had selected Acquisitions as our job choice. We both thought we would graduate, hang around the Academy for a year, and then go to Los Angeles AFB, CA and have awesome careers buying and selling stuff for the Air Force, while hanging out with movie stars in our spare time. Col DeLorenzo did not preach to us; he simply stated, "I would trade being a Colonel to being a pilot any day, I was never medically qualified to fly, and so this is why I became an engineer." Taken aback, I asked the Colonel to clarify, because I could not believe he would trade all the work he did to become a PhD, or a Colonel in the Air Force, just to be a pilot. Col DeLorenzo repeated the statement again, and added he would do it in a heartbeat. From that small speech, from a man whom I respected and

knew was much wiser than I was, I changed my mind and went to Undergraduate Pilot Training, and so did Mat!

After graduation, I spent my first year on active duty working in the USAFA Minority enrollment office, under the Director of admissions. During this year, three very important things happened to me that are still shaping my career to this day. First, I got my first active duty role model with whom I could interact with. Colonel William “Trapper” Carpenter was the Director of Admissions. He was a soft spoken, combat proven, Fighter Weapons School graduate F-15 fighter pilot, who would tell the best stories about flying fighters. He confirmed for me that I had made the right choice to go to pilot training.

Second, on 19 October 2000, the Way of Life Committee sponsored an alumni panel of black officers who came back and talked to the cadets. This panel consisted of Colonel Dartanian Warr, who would go on to get promoted to Brigadier General but would not be confirmed due discipline issues. Lieutenant Colonel Gail Colvin, a member of the first class of women to graduate from the Air Force Academy. She would go on to achieve the rank of Colonel and would retire from the Air Force in the job of Vice Commandant of Cadets for Climate and Culture. Lieutenant Colonel Will Gunn, who was a Staff Judge Advocate and also a member of the class of 1980. He would go on to achieve the rank of Colonel, and retire from the Air Force. Today he is the General Counsel at the Department of Veterans Affairs. There were many others who participated on that panel. This panel lasted well over two hours and it was the first time I heard senior officers talk about a 20 year career in detail, and what it takes to make a successful career in the Air Force. To this day, I still have the 18 slides from that presentation. They are evidence of my first professional development session from successful Air Force officers.

Third, I was introduced to my first mentor. At the time he was Maj Chevalier “Chevy” Cleaves. I met him through my prep school basketball

coach, whose sister is Maj Cleaves wife. From our first conversation on the phone, Maj Cleaves reached out to me like a big brother or a dad and explained to me how to be an Air Force officer. He even sent me a 6-page word document he created called "The Rules of the Game," I still refer to this document today. He helped me focus on what was important as I prepared for pilot training, and was a constant voice of encouragement and understanding while I was going through the UPT program. It would be six years from the time I first talked with Maj Cleaves on the phone until I would meet him in person!

Undergraduate Pilot Training was one of the most difficult years in my life. I had very little flying experience before I started, namely the 40 hours and private pilot license in a Cessna 172, which was part of the Introductory Flight Training program the Air Force had at the time to expose UPT students to flying before they started formal training. In my pilot training class at Columbus Air Force Base, Class 02-13 welcomed 34 students to begin a journey to earn their pilot wings. Of those 34 students, six were African-American. Zero African-American students graduated in class 02-13. I happen to be one of those students and I washed back three classes, finally graduating in class 03-01. What happened? Were the African-American students in this class ill-prepared for the rigors of Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (JSUPT)? Was there an aptitude issue that plagued this certain demographic? I cannot speak to the other five black students that were in the class. I know while I was a student I never had a problem with racism. I know that every instructor I flew with worked extremely hard to see me succeed. The instructor pilots I flew with all went out of their way to make sure I was able to grasp the concepts. In my flight I happened to have two African-American instructor pilots in my flight, Lieutenants Charles Gilliam and Avery Payton were always sources of inspiration and encouragement. On this, I am sure not every UPT student experience is

the same. Some may call it fate; my religious faith allows me to believe it was something more than that.

After graduating from UPT, I was assigned to fly C-17s at Charleston AFB, SC. I showed up to the squadron in March of 2003, just as Operation Iraqi Freedom was kicking off. Two very fortunate things happened while I was in the squadron. First, there was another black pilot, Captain Adam “Big Daddy” Burks, who I knew from the Academy, and who had always been a mentor and teacher to younger cadets. When I showed up in his squadron he continued to be that role model and teacher for me. He was in the Special Operations Low Level II (SOLL II) program at Charleston, where the senior pilots in the program were known as the best in the C-17 community. With my knowledge of how great of a person Adam Burks was, and the reputation SOLL II pilots had in the community, that was all I needed to identify becoming a SOLL II Evaluator pilot as my goal. I had always wanted to be the best at whatever I did; now I was flying the C-17 and saw the best pilots were SOLL II pilots, so this became the standard I wanted to achieve. Through Adam, I had a chance to meet and establish relationships with some of the best instructor pilots in the C-17 community, pilots with thousands of hours, Distinguished Flying Crosses, and many other accolades. Upon meeting those pilots, I let them know I wanted to be the best and they reached out and taught me the things necessary to be one of the best C-17 pilots.

I am sure diversity was not a part of their calculus at the time. I believe they saw a young Lieutenant, who wanted to learn as much as he could about the C-17 and would listen as long as they talked. So they invested the time to teach and mold me. The other important dynamic was a group of peers who accepted me for who I was. I could list a number of individuals, but certainly Lt Col Eric Carney, Lt Col Rich Tanner, Ed Kaufman, Mark Baran, and Matt Inscoe were among the line

pilots who formed my circle of peers and were my daily example of how to be a great pilot and officer.⁵

As time went on, I was given the opportunity to upgrade into the SOLL II program by evidence of my hard work and competence in flying the C-17. As I upgraded to Left Seat Evaluator pilot, I was on station for over six years. During that time, I had the chance to serve under the command of five squadron commanders, all of whom played a role in my development. Lt Col Steve Shope welcomed me to the squadron, and told me up front he evaluates officers by what they do and not what they look like. It was during his tenure I won the distinction of Copilot of the Year in the squadron, proving I was not only a hard worker, but also a competent pilot.

During the summer of 2006, I had the honor to be a part of a total force C-17 crew that participated in the annual Tuskegee Airmen Convention. I was the instructor pilot for the crew, which would fly the C-17 aircraft named "The Spirit of the Tuskegee Airmen" to the convention and fly approximately 50 documented original Tuskegee Airmen around Arizona, where the convention was being held. During this Amazing experience, I would sit down and talk with Lee Archer and Col Charles McGee. In addition, at the convention I would get a chance to sit and talk with then Colonel CQ Brown, who is now Maj Gen CQ Brown and Deputy Combined Forces Air Component Commander for USCENTCOM. I would have the chance to sit and talk with Colonel Rich Clark, who is now Maj Gen Rich Clark, and defense attaché to Egypt. I was fortunate enough to meet and have on the airplane, Maj Gen Harold Mitch Mitchell, who at the time was the mobilization assistant to the commander of USTRANSCOM. I would also have a chance to see in person for the first time, Maj Gen Edward A. Rice, who is now General

⁵ There are many other officers and enlisted who influenced me during my assignment in Charleston. These ones in my squadron were there with me for the majority of my six-year tour.

Rice, and the Commander of Air Education and Training Command. Finally yet importantly, I would have the opportunity to meet in person for the first time my mentor, Col Chevy Cleaves. The experience of flying some of the original Tuskegee Airmen in the airplane, along with the convention stands as one of the most empowering and inspirational experiences in my life!

My third commander was Lt Col William Dale Anderson, who after about four months into his command called me into his office and said to me that my paper record did not match the performance I put out every day. My reply to him was “Sir, I just want to be the best C-17 pilot in the Air Force. I don’t worry about what my OPRs say; I know that if I work hard that stuff will take care of itself.”⁶ He explained to me that sometimes good officers can fall through the cracks, because the system is not perfect. He then said to me, “We need to work on your paper.” He meant we needed to improve my OPRs. During Lt Col Anderson’s tenure, I decided I would like to apply to the C-17 Weapons School. The Weapons School is recognized Air Force-wide as producing tactical experts. In my quest to be the best C-17 pilot, I felt like I needed to make it through that program. In addition, up to that point, I knew only two black C-17 pilots had ever been to the Weapons School. One was (now) Brig Gen select Brian Robinson, and the other was my good friend Adam Burks. Lt Col Anderson was supportive of my application to the Weapons School, and I was accepted the first time I applied to class 07B. Under Lt Col Anderson’s command, I was fortunate enough to be selected for numerous awards, including Instructor Pilot of the Year; I was instrumental in bringing the Joint Precision Airdrop System online at Charleston Air Force Base. All of this was made possible because my squadron commander opened up opportunities for me.

⁶ OPR stands for Officer Performance Report. This is the annual evaluation tool used to rate officers on their job performance.

My next squadron commander was then-Lt-Col Johnny Lamontagne. He was the Director of Operations in my squadron before he became the commander. He had the opportunity to observe my performance before assuming command. During his time, I was the Squadron's Weapons officer and he entrusted me with making sure our squadron was ready for our deployment. I, along with the other officers in the tactics shop, did our best to do just that. Over the course of the deployment, we were able to break many records and do a lot of great work in support of OEF/OIF. For the work my crew and I did in the mission planning cell, and for leading our squadron to airdrop more supplies to troops in Afghanistan in the four months of September 2008 until December 2008, than in the two years prior, we won the Jimmy Doolittle trophy for AMC's most outstanding aircrew in 2008. It is an honor for which I am extremely proud.

During the spring of 2009, the results from my Major's board were released. I had been selected for promotion to Major, a milestone for which I was extremely proud. As a cadet in my Management 210 class, we were tasked to create an investment plan and pick a rank we thought we would retire at. For me it was Major, and by achieving that milestone, I felt like I was doing a pretty good job in the Air Force. When Lt Col Lamontagne called me to tell me I had been promoted to Major, he was happy, but his voice was not satisfied. I had not been designated as an IDE select. I was not expecting an IDE select designation since I had not completed my Master's degree, which was a huge emphasis item in the Air Force at the time. Lt Col Lamontagne felt like I had more potential in the Air Force, and the promotion board made a mistake by not identifying me as a school select. In my mind, I felt fortunate to lock in an assignment to be an instructor at the C-17 Weapons School, and at this point in my career, I had a wife and a baby daughter who were all settled on moving to McGuire AFB, and I thought this was the path my career was supposed to go.

Lt Col Lamontagne took it upon himself to try to find opportunities that would help get me to IDE. He worked his contacts and connections to try and find me a job on AMC staff or some other opportunity which could possibly help accelerate my career. Then fate would intervene and change everything.

Brig Gen Sam Cox, Commandant of Cadets at the Air Force Academy, was the delivery official for a new C-17 that was delivered to Charleston AFB in April of 2009. Brig Gen Cox was a former C-17 Squadron commander of Lt Col Lamontagne and others who were stationed at Charleston during that time. Several officers joined the General at dinner the night after the delivery. Over dinner, Brig Gen Cox explained he was in the market for an executive officer. He also expressed the challenges he observed at the Air Force Academy with black cadets not choosing to go to pilot training. Lt Col Lamontagne immediately informed him about me. The General, after hearing the good things my Commander had to say about me, said he would start working the process once he got back to the Academy.

Once Brig Gen Cox got back to the Academy, the next day he had an appointment with Director of Admissions, Colonel Chevy Cleaves. The meeting was requested by Col Cleaves to discuss a Major he knew, who flew C-17s and had a good record but was not identified as a school select, and he wanted to get the General's perspective on why that did not happen. Before the meeting got underway, Brig Gen Cox asked Colonel Cleaves if he had heard of a Capt Jaron Roux. Colonel Cleaves chuckled, as he had my records in his hand and said I was the officer he was coming to talk to him about. This episode convinced Brig Gen Cox that I was the right pick for the job. All that was left was to work the personnel system. During the process AFPC pushed back on the assignment to the Academy, saying I was already slated to be an instructor at the WIC. As a counter, AFPC offered all the black "Major selects" who were identified as IDE selects. The list produced 3 names.

Convinced this was further evidence of an obvious void in the Air Force officer corps, Gen Cox solicited the support from his boss, a three star general at the Academy, and the Director of Operations at AMC (a two star general) to lobby for the move, and after those discussion plus fifty phone calls later, the move was approved. I was now headed to be the Executive Officer to the Commandant of Cadets.

Prior to working as the Commandant of Cadets Brig Gen Cox was the Director of General Officer Management, HAF/DPG. In this position he was responsible for planning and executing general officer force management across Air Force and joint organizations. As the head of this office he oversaw operational support to all general officers, and developed and positioned the general officer force via assignments, promotions, training and retirements. This experience, combined with a record of outstanding performance allowed him to become intimately familiar with how the Air Force grows General officers. His career and his previous job gave him tremendous perspective into the state of black officers in the senior ranks and potential for new entrants into this arena. His position is not only is the pipeline very small, but the system is not producing from the current pool of black officers. Therefore, between his job as the Director of General Officer Management and Commandant of Cadets, he saw how officers begin their careers and how officer's at the most senior levels of the Air Force made their careers.

Following my year as the Executive Officer to Brig Gen Sam Cox, I was fortunate enough to be hired as the Aide-de-Camp to the USAFA Superintendent, Lt Gen Mike Gould. The mentoring, development, leadership, and overall exposure I received during these two years were incredible. First, while I worked for Brig Gen Cox, he would spend time with me just about every day talking about leadership and force development. In addition, I was exposed to his family and learned even officer's at the most senior levels have to learn how to balance work and family. I learned about how the job impacts the family. I was able to see

first-hand that General Officers are human too, they can only do so much to help people, and they carry a tremendous burden that spills over into their family life. Likewise, Lt Gen Gould mentored and taught me what it takes to be a great officer. One of the greatest lessons I witnessed from him first hand was the teamwork he and his wife have when it comes to his jobs in the Air Force. Lt Gen Gould never gave a public statement without acknowledging the monumental role his spouse Paula, played in his success. His wife Mrs. Paula Gould is a retired Colonel and pilot from the Air Force Reserves. Even though Lt Gen Gould is known in many circles by his callsign of “Coach,” I fondly think of Lt Gen and Mrs. Gould as “Falcon-1” and “Falcon Mom” for their lasting impact on the United States Air Force Academy.

Both Lt Gen Gould and (now) Maj Gen Cox spent hours teaching me about what it means to be an Air Force officer. We had countless conversations on Diversity, and what diversity means in the Air Force. They often reminded me, they did not hire me as some diversity charity case. Instead, it was because I was qualified, and had a strong record, they gave me opportunities. In addition, they were also quick to note that diversity does not just happen; sometimes you have to survey your organization, and go out and find it. If diversity is absent, then go out and look for the diversity to bring to your organization, and this was a trait both Generals displayed.

During my time at the Academy, I was selected to attend Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) academic year 2011-2012. My year at ACSC was eye opening. First, I was the only black Air Force pilot out of all the 278 Air Force students at the school. There were only 22 black Air Force officers in ACSC, and this number included guard and reserve officers. ACSC produced 54 officers who were identified as distinguished graduates. Two were black, and I am extremely humbled to have been one of those two. The other was an African-American female, Major Mary Carnes, who is a navigator in the Air Force Reserves. During my year at

ACSC, I found very little diversity was built into the curriculum. The only diversity lesson taught was during the last course of the year, which is a two week course on leadership and command. The lesson focused on social change, with diversity being an aspect of the lesson. In addition, it was really up to the students to come in and lead the discussion.

In my seminar, when I brought up the fact black officers get promoted less than any other demographic, that was not shocking to people. When they found out by how much, that is the part that shocked people. To a person, my seminar mates admitted they were slightly aware of diversity effort, but had no clue the Air Force had a roadmap, a policy directive, Air Force Instruction, and that they had any real part in cultivating diversity in the Air Force. In my opinion, this is a failure of the Air Force development system. During my year at ACSC, I asked if SOS or AWC had lessons on diversity and found AWC does not, but SOS had a very detailed lesson, which allow the Captains in the class to have a very constructive conversation on diversity and can help educate officers on the power of diversity.

Another issue at ACSC that I was shocked by is the fact there is not more structured mentoring. Students had to go out and find people they know from previous assignments, or try to meet people from the same community in order to get advice or guidance on the next steps of their Air Force careers. For example, as MAF officers we approached an ACSC faculty member and asked him to organize some MAF mentoring sessions to talk about post ACSC staff assignments, the school MLR and promotion processes, and Squadron Command. These sessions were informal, however; they were extremely valuable in educating the MAF students on what to expect next and ways to navigate the system.

SOS has a day where they bring in officers from AWC to talk and mentor, but that is not enough as it is just an introduction to a senior officer. There is time during the yearlong school for ACSC and AWC, to


meet up with all the SOS classes that come through Air University and offer career guidance and mentoring. Things that would help would be a system to connect officers who would like to mentor and be mentored.

Where does the story go from here? This is my story. However, it is not just about Major Jaron Roux. It is a story that illuminates the power of strong leadership at the Squadron Commander and Flight Commander level. It demonstrates the commitment by leaders at the Captain all the way up to the General officer level. I show that it takes a community effort in order to enhance diversity in the Air Force. It demonstrates how rigid and inflexible the Air Force system can be when senior officers are trying to develop talent. I believe it is a story that shows how officers can benefit from good mentoring. This story illustrates how when given opportunities officers are able to perform despite initial standardized test scores or the promotion board failing to identify them as high potential officers. Finally, I want to stress that in my experience, and to my knowledge have standards ever lowered; there was just added attention to the situation, which helps to cultivate tangible results with respect to increasing diversity. In my view, this is leadership in action.

Appendix A – Raw Data for Quantitative Analysis

White and Black Promotion Rates 1978-1987

	white pc	black pc	total						white	black	total		
87	84.35	63.04	82.42					87	cons	2319	230	2549	
86B	82.87	58.03	81.02						sel	1956	145	2101	82.42448
86A	80.88	66.31	79.75					86B	cons	2399	193	2592	
85	80.85	60.19	79.51						sel	1988	112	2100	81.01852
84	79.36	65.38	78.57					86A	cons	2223	187	2410	
83	77.69	68.97	77.43						sel	1798	124	1922	79.75104
82	76.72	60.66	76.42					85	cons	3029	211	3240	
81	75.00	65.79	74.77						sel	2449	127	2576	79.50617
80	75.67	72.58	75.61					84	cons	3014	182	3196	
79	73.74	64.71	73.56						sel	2392	119	2511	78.56696
78	68.73	58.70	68.53					83	cons	2846	87	2933	
									sel	2211	60	2271	77.42925
								82	cons	3183	61	3244	
									sel	2442	37	2479	76.418
								81	cons	2960	76	3036	
									sel	2220	50	2270	74.76943
								80	cons	3120	62	3182	
									sel	2361	45	2406	75.61282
								79	cons	3328	68	3396	
									sel	2454	44	2498	73.55713
								78	cons	4522	92	4614	
									sel	3108	54	3162	68.53056



Appendix B – Quantitative Analysis
White and Black Promotion Rates 1978-1987

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
white pc	11	68.7307	84.3467	77.805524	4.4954517
black pc	11	58.0311	72.5806	64.031984	4.4677674
Valid N (listwise)	11				

One-Sample Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
white pc	11	77.805524	4.4954517	1.3554297
black pc	11	64.031984	4.4677674	1.3470826

One-Sample Test

	Test Value = 0					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
white pc	57.403	10	.000	77.8055236	74.785438	80.825609
black pc	47.534	10	.000	64.0319840	61.030497	67.033471

Appendix C – Raw Data for Quantitative Analysis
African-American and Overall Promotion Rates 1989-2012

LAF Major

Zone	Board	Overall			White			Black		
		Cons	Sel	Pct	Cons	Sel	Pct	Cons	Sel	Pct
IPZ	MAJ1989	4584	3846	83.9%	3896	3337	85.7%	404	283	70.0%
	MAJ1991	4137	3083	74.5%	3525	2635	74.8%	369	271	73.4%
	MAJ1992	2915	2191	75.2%	2533	1903	75.1%	215	166	77.2%
	MAJ1993	2741	2003	73.1%	2385	1759	73.8%	219	156	71.2%
	MAJ1994	2891	2098	72.6%	2560	1876	73.3%	201	133	66.2%
	MAJ1995	2564	1874	73.1%	2324	1696	73.0%	138	101	73.2%
	MAJ1996	2859	2088	73.0%	2584	1904	73.7%	132	89	67.4%
	MAJ1997	2862	2323	81.2%	2579	2093	81.2%	118	100	84.7%
	MAJ1998	2497	2062	82.6%	2211	1836	83.0%	140	115	82.1%
	MAJ1999	1953	1689	86.5%	1701	1477	86.8%	113	96	85.0%
	MAJ2000A	2195	1943	88.5%	1942	1729	89.0%	114	96	84.2%
	MAJ2000B	1841	1620	88.0%	1635	1445	88.4%	103	92	89.3%
	MAJ2001	1909	1685	88.3%	1690	1513	89.5%	80	58	72.5%
	MAJ2002A	2048	1814	88.6%	1783	1581	88.7%	118	108	91.5%
	MAJ2002B	1681	1557	92.6%	1423	1329	93.4%	111	92	82.9%
	MAJ2003A	1973	1824	92.4%	1687	1582	93.8%	89	70	78.7%
	MAJ2003B	2287	2132	93.2%	1983	1856	93.6%	138	121	87.7%
	MAJ2004	2360	2197	93.1%	1971	1852	94.0%	173	151	87.3%
	MAJ2005	2057	1901	92.4%	1699	1597	94.0%	146	121	82.9%
	MAJ2006	2363	2204	93.3%	2005	1877	93.6%	132	123	93.2%
	MAJ2007	2348	2211	94.2%	1964	1856	94.5%	138	124	89.9%
	MAJ2008	2520	2366	93.9%	2059	1949	94.7%	190	175	92.1%
	MAJ2009	3147	2950	93.7%	2531	2395	94.6%	206	181	87.9%
	MAJ2010	2935	2616	89.1%	2414	2177	90.2%	188	155	82.4%
	MAJ2011	2611	2331	89.3%	2159	1942	89.9%	128	102	79.7%
	MAJ2012	2574	2287	88.9%	2120	1903	89.8%	135	111	82.2%

Appendix C Cont'd – Raw Data for Quantitative Analysis
African-American and Overall Promotion Rates 1989-2012

LAF Lt Colonel										
Zone	Board	Overall			White			Black		
		Cons	Sel	Pct	Cons	Sel	Pct	Cons	Sel	Pct
IPZ	LTC1989	2495	1586	83.9%	2280	1479	64.9%	116	57	49.1%
	LTC1990	2495	1601	74.5%	2279	1475	64.7%	120	65	54.2%
	LTC1991A	1765	1161	75.2%	1582	1065	67.3%	120	61	50.8%
	LTC1991B	1988	1332	73.1%	1791	1217	68.0%	104	67	64.4%
	LTC1992	1887	1196	72.6%	1658	1065	64.2%	138	83	60.1%
	LTC1993	2246	1413	73.1%	1945	1222	62.8%	192	127	66.1%
	LTC1994	2930	1843	73.0%	2545	1625	63.9%	216	114	52.8%
	LTC1996	2200	1386	81.2%	1877	1195	63.7%	197	123	62.4%
	LTC1997	1845	1163	82.6%	1609	1024	63.6%	129	81	62.8%
	LTC1998	1774	1110	86.5%	1538	980	63.7%	144	76	52.8%
	LTC1999A	1817	1179	88.5%	1609	1057	65.7%	122	75	61.5%
	LTC1999B	1690	1112	88.0%	1500	995	66.3%	96	53	55.2%
	LTC2000	1718	1118	88.3%	1548	1016	65.6%	79	47	59.5%
	LTC2001	1989	1304	88.6%	1772	1175	66.3%	93	57	61.3%
	LTC2002	1765	1265	92.6%	1556	1117	71.8%	107	78	72.9%
	LTC2003	1502	1085	92.4%	1342	986	73.5%	78	49	62.8%
	LTC2004	1676	1223	73.0%	1496	1091	72.9%	87	62	71.3%
	LTC2005	1454	1073	73.8%	1292	956	74.0%	84	61	72.6%
	LTC2006A	1426	1063	74.5%	1288	959	74.5%	53	37	69.8%
	LTC2006B	1470	1099	74.8%	1301	979	75.2%	82	61	74.4%
	LTC2007	1198	895	74.7%	1033	792	76.7%	76	50	65.8%
	LTC2008	1388	1026	73.9%	1202	912	75.9%	54	31	57.4%
	LTC2009	1412	1045	74.0%	1219	923	75.7%	72	45	62.5%
	LTC2010	1406	1036	73.7%	1172	886	75.6%	100	68	68.0%
	LTC2011	1318	992	75.3%	1081	825	76.3%	96	66	68.8%
	LTC2012	1453	1096	75.4%	1221	938	76.8%	89	55	61.8%

Appendix C Cont'd – Raw Data for Quantitative Analysis
African-American and Overall Promotion Rates 1989-2012

LAF Colonel										
		Overall								
					White			Black		
Zone	Board	Cons	Sel	Pct	Cons	Sel	Pct	Cons	Sel	Pct
IPZ	COL1989	1204	531	83.9%	1159	514	44.3%	17	7	41.2%
	COL1990	1228	540	74.5%	1182	521	44.1%	21	8	38.1%
	COL1991	1134	510	75.2%	1085	484	44.6%	22	13	59.1%
	COL1992	1279	535	73.1%	1229	517	42.1%	21	7	33.3%
	COL1993	1102	458	72.6%	1055	437	41.4%	22	12	54.5%
	COL1994	1308	548	73.1%	1223	511	41.8%	49	26	53.1%
	COL1995	1198	502	73.0%	1096	453	41.3%	52	29	55.8%
	COL1996	834	349	81.2%	761	321	42.2%	46	14	30.4%
	COL1997	921	384	82.6%	833	358	43.0%	54	19	35.2%
	COL1998	798	330	86.5%	709	300	42.3%	58	18	31.0%
	COL1999	927	384	88.5%	790	339	42.9%	93	28	30.1%
	COL2000	1188	530	88.0%	1033	462	44.7%	86	36	41.9%
	COL2001	927	432	88.3%	795	375	47.2%	86	31	36.0%
	COL2002	791	363	88.6%	685	314	45.8%	61	25	41.0%
	COL2003	795	355	92.6%	711	312	43.9%	60	30	50.0%
	COL2004	808	372	46.0%	728	342	47.0%	57	26	45.6%
	COL2005	736	331	45.0%	671	311	46.3%	34	8	23.5%
	COL2006	806	365	45.3%	750	345	46.0%	32	12	37.5%
	COL2007	1010	459	45.4%	915	413	45.1%	51	27	52.9%
	COL2008	958	434	45.3%	852	392	46.0%	56	25	44.6%
	COL2009A	846	372	44.0%	767	345	45.0%	41	13	31.7%
	COL2009B	982	447	45.5%	875	407	46.5%	50	19	38.0%
	COL2010	938	428	45.6%	839	379	45.2%	50	25	50.0%
	COL2011	934	427	45.7%	841	382	45.4%	34	16	47.1%
	COL2012	921	424	46.0%	817	383	46.9%	50	20	40.0%

Appendix D – Quantitative Analysis
African-American and Overall Promotion Rates 1989-2012

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Afr-Am Maj	26	66.1692	93.1818	81.340553	7.8533645
Overall Maj	26	72.5700	94.1652	85.965400	7.7284394
Afr-Am Lt Col	26	49.1379	74.3902	62.351909	7.0674634
Overall Lt Col	26	62.5705	75.4301	68.716777	5.0715978
Afr-Am Col	25	23.5294	59.0909	41.668722	9.3736950
Overall Col	25	41.3534	46.6019	44.089523	1.7981005
Valid N (listwise)	25				

Paired Samples Statistics

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1 Afr-Am Maj	81.340553	26	7.8533645	1.5401715
Overall Maj	85.965400	26	7.7284394	1.5156717
Pair 2 Afr-Am Lt Col	62.351909	26	7.0674634	1.3860436
Overall Lt Col	68.716777	26	5.0715978	.9946222
Pair 3 Afr-Am Col	41.668722	25	9.3736950	1.8747390
Overall Col	44.089523	25	1.7981005	.3596201

Paired Samples Correlations

	N	Correlation	Sig.
Pair 1 Afr-Am Maj & Overall Maj	26	.774	.000
Pair 2 Afr-Am Lt Col & Overall Lt Col	26	.643	.000
Pair 3 Afr-Am Col & Overall Col	25	.139	.508

Appendix D Cont'd – Quantitative Analysis


African-American and Overall Promotion Rates 1989-2012

Paired Samples Test

		Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
			Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
					Lower	Upper			
Pair 1	Afr-Am Maj - Overall Maj	-4.6248468	5.2440696	1.0284467	-6.7429724	-2.5067213	-4.497	25	.000
Pair 2	Afr-Am Lt Col - Overall Lt Col	-6.3648677	5.4408804	1.0670444	-8.5624868	-4.1672485	-5.965	25	.000
Pair 3	Afr-Am Col - Overall Col	-2.4208015	9.2959601	1.8591920	-6.2579852	1.4163823	-1.302	24	.205


Appendix D Cont'd – Quantitative Analysis

African-American and Overall Promotion Rates 1989-2012




Appendix D Cont'd – Quantitative Analysis

African-American and Overall Promotion Rates 1989-2012



Appendix D Cont'd – Quantitative Analysis

African-American and Overall Promotion Rates 1989-2012



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