

**EVOLUTION OF THE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER POST GOLDWATER-
NICHOLS**

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

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ABSTRACT

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This research determined that the role of the air component commander has evolved since its institution. It highlights the importance of the air components commander's ability to form his own organization as well as modify it to fit unique combatant command organizational structures such as the "dual hatting" of senior commanders and the challenge of geographic separation between component and command headquarters.

CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
DISCLAIMER.....	ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
ABSTRACT.....	v
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1 OPERATION DESERT STORM.....	6
2 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.....	23
3 OPERATIONS ENDURING AND IRAQI FREEDOM.....	41
4 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS.....	55
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	60

INTRODUCTION

The last hundred years have brought huge increases in the technology and application of manned flight. From Orville and Wilbur Wright's flights at Kitty Hawk to sensor-fused, supersonic stealth fighters and bombers, the significant accomplishments of the US Air Force clearly exemplify American drive and ingenuity. A study of the services' organizational structures and command relationships, however, tells a different story.

During WWI, when powered flight was in its infancy, ideas about the best way to command it also began to emerge. With the late entry of the US into the war, few American ideas matured. Nevertheless, General William Mitchell did exercise unified command of air assets in the Battle of St. Mihiel. There, British, French, and American aircraft and personnel worked under a single air commander.¹ Placed in charge of the largest air force ever assembled for a single operation, Mitchell commanded 1,481 aircraft. He also planned and executed an operation that supported the ground effort and stifled more experienced German air units.² The degree of autonomy given him by General John Pershing allowed for unity of effort and command within the air component, helping it effectively contribute to the overall combined-arms operation.

The desire for a single commander for air carried on into the next war. When the US entered World War II, combat became global with American involvement in two principal theaters. The organizational constructs for the employment and command of US airpower varied between these theaters. A single commander for air emerged in the Solomon Islands Campaign of the Pacific theater. After the initial Marine

¹ Tami D. Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (Princeton University Press, 2004), 52.

² Walter J. Boyne, "The St. Mihiel Sailer," *Air Force Magazine* 83, no. 2 (February 2000): 77.

landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942, a single air commander for land-based airpower originated with the arrival of Marine and Army aircraft. The functions of US airpower in the Solomon Islands ran the spectrum from support of ground troops to attacks on Japanese Naval entities, representing a joint endeavor with a single air commander in COMAIRSOPAC and an accompanying joint staff.³ This structure enabled resolution of the parochial arguments that often occurred between the services over the use of airpower, thereby making it both effective and efficient.

The command of air assets was much different in the European theater. General Eisenhower commanded the Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF) for the Normandy campaign. The AEF was comprised of three functional subcommands of land, air, and sea combat. The air component, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), comprised of the US Ninth and British Second Tactical Air Forces, was commanded by Air Vice Marshall Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Although Leigh-Mallory commanded these forces, the US Eighth Air Force and British Bomber Command remained as separate entities outside the formal structure of the AEF, reporting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the accomplishment of the Combined Bomber Offensive, while coordinating with Eisenhower's operations to prepare the Normandy battlefield. These units were attached, but not assigned, to the AEF, and the formal centralization of command of the air forces for the Normandy invasion never actually existed. Instead, Eisenhower was forced to deal with three separated entities, over only one of which he had de jure command authority, to receive the desired effects from airpower for a successful invasion and campaign.⁴

These separated commands and the division of airpower, along

³ James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, *Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991* (Naval Inst Press, 1993), 30-31, 36.

⁴ Thomas Alexander Hughes, "Normandy: A Modern Air Campaign?," *Air & Space Power Journal* 17, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 19.

service lines for support of specific missions, continued into the Korean War. There, a fierce Navy – Air Force battle over limited defense funding was paralleled by divergent airpower doctrines. Lieutenant General George Stratemeyer, commander of Far East Air Forces, sought command over all USAF and USN airpower used in the Korean theater. But Vice Admiral Turner Joy, commander of Naval Forces Far East, argued for separate areas of responsibility in Korea. Because his naval forces also held responsibilities outside of the Korean theater, Joy also wanted any decision that placed naval air forces under USAF operational control to be made by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief Far East Forces. In an attempt to reach a compromise, the concept of “coordination control” was developed. This murky notion mandated, that in the event both the USAF and USN assumed a mission in Korea, the “Commander in Chief Far East prerogative is delegated to Commanding General, Far East Air Forces”.⁵ USAF officers believed this directive empowered them to ensure the USN could not run its own air war. However, naval officers interpreted it to mean that the USAF could request the use of naval assets but not direct them.⁶ These diverse interpretations impeded the orchestration of operations throughout the rest of the conflict. This compromise, combined with the lack of joint doctrine for the control of air assets, fragmented air operations.

Things became worse during the Vietnam War. As the war in Vietnam escalated, the US never produced effective joint doctrine for the command of airpower.⁷ Lack of agreement and continued tension between service parochial interests allowed a divided command structure to develop along many different lines. The commanders of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) sought command of all air assets

⁵ Winnefeld and Johnson, *Joint Air Operations*, 42.

⁶ Winnefeld and Johnson, *Joint Air Operations*, 43.

⁷ Winnefeld and Johnson, *Joint Air Operations*, 65.

in Southeast Asia, including USAF aircraft based in Thailand and USN carrier aircraft.⁸ However, MACV never received this authority. Similar to the compromises of Korea, agreements between the USAF and USMC, made under the concept of “mission direction,” produced different interpretations among the services.⁹ The result was a fractured command structure that placed operational control of US air assets in Thailand, Vietnam, the Tonkin Gulf, and Guam, each under separate organizations. Fractured employment concepts, such as the “route package system,” prevented a joint approach that could maximize the effects achieved.¹⁰ Other dysfunctions caused by these divisions undermined America’s achievement of its strategic objectives.¹¹

Such deficiencies in the employment of the country’s air assets helped spawn the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Goldwater-Nichols legislation redefined the roles and responsibilities of the commanders and command structures of the services. It promoted joint war-fighting by placing the commanders of combatant commands directly subordinate to the President and the Secretary of Defense. It also made the service chiefs responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the forces used by the combatant commander. Additionally, it gave commanders of combatant commands the authority to organize their commands in the way they saw best to accomplish assigned missions.¹² These initiatives invigorated the idea to organize military forces on a functional basis of land, maritime, and air

⁸ Winnefeld and Johnson, *Joint Air Operations*, 68.

⁹ Winnefeld and Johnson, *Joint Air Operations*, 73-74. Mission Direction was a vague concept perceived differently by the Air Force and Marines. The Air Force interpreted it to mean operational control while the Marines believed they could override Air Force control if immediate air-ground team strikes were required and they could appeal Air Force decisions to CINCPAC.

¹⁰ The route package system divided North Vietnam into six geographically distinct areas and deconflicted Air Force and Navy airpower operations. However, it prevented joint air operations because it did not allow for one service to enter the designated area of the other.

¹¹ Winnefeld and Johnson, *Joint Air Operations*, 77-79.

¹² Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, <http://www.jcs.mil/page.aspx?id=29> (accessed 15 April 2013).

domains. By organizing this way, the combatant commanders could establish a single commander for air operations, bringing back the concepts used at St. Mihiel and in the South Pacific during World War II.

This thesis will examine the role of the single commander for air since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The study of Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, and Enduring and Iraqi Freedom shows progress in the concept of a single commander for air and demonstrates the effects of three important variables: the ability and energy required to customize organizations for specific campaigns, the “dual hatting” of senior commanders, and the geographical separation of component commanders. The three historical examples represent sufficiently diverse operations from which to derive useful conclusions. Those who conducted Operation Desert Storm enjoyed ample planning time for a war against one of the world’s strongest militaries. Friendly forces were coalition land, air, and maritime assets. Those who conducted Operation Allied Force enjoyed some planning time against a much less militarily capable adversary. Friendly forces consisted of substantially fewer airpower assets, provided by NATO, and no land forces. Those who conducted Operation Enduring Freedom had extremely limited planning time against a small enemy comprised of a corrupt regime and a dispersed terrorist network with extremely limited military capabilities. However, many of the same people conducted Operation Iraqi Freedom and enjoyed ample planning time against a strong military force. Friendly forces were coalition land, air, and maritime assets for both efforts.

There are two important limits to this study. It focuses only on the initial major conventional campaigns of Enduring and Iraqi Freedom and does not examine the counterinsurgency operations that occurred after the toppling of the governments. Furthermore, it does not address a conflict with a near-peer adversary.

CHAPTER 1

Operation Desert Storm

Five years after the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the US faced a formidable adversary in Iraq. In early August 1991, Saddam Hussein ordered the Iraqi Republican Guard and associated military units to occupy Kuwait. The incursion of the Iraqi forces not only violated Kuwaiti sovereignty, but also threatened Saudi Arabia. It thus spurred a series of decisions that eventually led to Operation Desert Storm and the first significant test of the changes made by Goldwater-Nichols.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Lieutenant General Charles Horner commanded Ninth Air Force and the US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF). These positions made Horner the presumptive Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). Horner's two greatest professional influences had been his experiences in the Vietnam War and his service for General William Creech.¹ Horner despised the operational dysfunctions of the Vietnam War. His two Vietnam tours both took place during Operation Rolling Thunder. The gradual approach to air strikes used then, combined with the frustrations brought with the route-package system of aerial deconfliction, left an indelible impression on Horner. The practice of target selection by senior military men and political leaders also bothered Horner. In his eyes, such meddling contributed to poor results in the Vietnam air war.²

Horner had taken special interest in CENTAF and CENTCOM exercises conducted in 1989, especially those dealing with command and control, which afforded the opportunity to practice the processes involved in operation of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS) and its central locus, the Theater Air Control Center (TACC). TACS was comprised of a

¹ General Charles Horner, interview by the author, 23 January 2013; Tom Clancy and Charles Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1999), 145.

² Horner, interview; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 96.

network of radar and communication sites linking together the different air components from each service, thereby enabling the centralized command of all air assets from the TACC.³ Strategic Air Command (SAC), Mobility Air Command (MAC), US Army Central (ARCENT), US Navy Central (NAVCENT), US Marine Corps Central (MARCENT), and US Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) sent liaisons to Horner's TACC during these exercises.⁴ These interactions helped develop and refine the relationships and processes in the TACC. Internal Look, a CENTCOM exercise held in July 1990, also proved beneficial because it centered on a war plan dealing with Iraq invading Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. For Internal Look, Horner was the JFACC, Area Air Defense Commander (AADC), and Airspace Control Authority (ACA). His TACC produced the Air Tasking Orders (ATO) and oversaw the air plan execution of the exercise.⁵

These exercises were the first instance General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of CENTCOM (CINCCENT), delegated the AADC authority to Horner, thus placing the US Army air defense systems under the command of an Airman. These exercises led to refinement of other methods of airpower application, such as Push Close Air Support (Push CAS).⁶ Goldwater-Nichols and these exercises helped Horner delineate the roles of the JFACC across service boundaries and develop processes he later used to conduct the air war in Desert Storm.

These roles and processes enabled Horner to overcome the limitations of service-specific doctrine in order to employ airpower how he saw fit. Although AirLand Battle had become Army Doctrine in 1982, it never appeared in either USAF or Joint Doctrine. Horner saw some

³ Diane T. Putney, *Airpower Advantage: Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign, 1989-1991* (Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2004), 6; Horner, interview.

⁴ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 7.

⁵ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 18.

⁶ Push CAS was a concept devised to support requirements for CAS while adding flexibility to the air attack plan when CAS was not needed by allowing the designated sorties to strike other targets.

merit in the doctrine but viewed it as overly limiting for airpower because it emphasized the role of the land force commanders.⁷ Joint Publication 26, produced in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, recognized the role of the JFACC and gave Horner the authority to choose the air doctrine he wished to employ.⁸ Goldwater-Nichols reinforced this idea by stipulating that the commander of a combatant command had the authority for the mission he received and battlespace in which he operated.⁹ This aided Horner's argument that airpower was not always an adjunct to the Army or to the ground fight.¹⁰ Horner's new-found authority set the stage for creation of the organizational structure implemented in Operation Desert Shield and later in Operation Desert Storm.

But forces had to reach the theater before any of the organizational structure mattered. The first few days of August 1990 were chaotic as numerous meetings and briefings with key US military and civilian leaders shaped the US response to Iraq's aggression. To determine if a military option was viable, President George H. W. Bush sent Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Schwarzkopf, Horner, and other military and civilian representatives to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to confer with King Faud. King Faud sensed the threat posed by the Iraqi troops along his border and was aware of the many Kuwaiti refugees within the boundary of his Kingdom. These factors weighed heavily in his decision to ally himself with the US and allow the deployment of American troops to Saudi Arabia. With this agreement, Schwarzkopf left Horner in Saudi Arabia as the CENTCOM Forward Commander, thereby demonstrating

⁷ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 8-9.

⁸ Jeffrey E. Staumbaugh, "JFACC: Key to Organizing Your Air Assets for Victory," *Parameters*, Summer 1994, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/1994/stambau.htm> (accessed 15 January 2013); Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations Headquarters, United States Air Force, *JFACC Primer*, 10 January 1994, <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/usaf/unit/docs/JFACC-94-Complete.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁹ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, <http://www.jcs.mil/page.aspx?id=29> (accessed 15 April 2013).

¹⁰ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 9; Horner, interview.

the high degree of trust he had in his air commander.¹¹ Horner's responsibility now entailed the reception of the arriving US military personnel and preparation for the operation.

The decisions Horner made during his time as CENTCOM Forward Commander had a significant influence on subsequent operations. Co-location of the functional component commanders was one of Horner's main desires. He also wanted other functional entities to be located together. His selection of the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters at Riyadh reflected those desires, as did his request to use the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) building, located in Riyadh, for CENTCOM Headquarters. He also chose the Royal Saudi Air Forces Headquarters (RSAF HQ) as the location for CENTAF Headquarters. These locations each brought the allied military leadership of approximately equal rank and responsibility to a common location that allowed for ongoing interaction. This decision also placed CENTAF and CENTCOM within a few miles of each other.¹² By choosing these locations, Horner established the opportunity for close interaction between himself and Schwarzkopf when the latter arrived in theater. In addition, by attaining Saudi concurrence on this placement of headquarters, Horner created the conditions for useful interaction among coalition members. Horner also attempted to co-locate all allied organizations with at least one US unit to bolster the distribution of information and ensure unity of effort.¹³ For Horner, proximity was the breeding ground of problem solving.

Such unity of effort was necessary to overcome the potential friction brought by the lack of unity of command in the alliance. Negotiations with Saudi Arabia had resulted in a parallel command structure. At the top of this structure, Saudi Lieutenant General Prince

¹¹ Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 178-185.

¹² Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 91; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 207, 213.

¹³ Horner, interview.

Khalid Bin Sultan al-Saud was commander, Joint Forces and Theater of Operations. His American counterpart was General Schwarzkopf as commander of all US forces in theater. Subordinate to Schwarzkopf were the functional component commanders: Lieutenant General Horner as the JFACC/AADC with ACA; Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur as the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC); and himself as the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC).¹⁴ Schwarzkopf's decision to assume duties of the land component commander left Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, ARCENT and Third Army Commander, in the operational chain of command at the equivalent level but without the authority of a functional component commander. General Khalid made the chief of the Royal Saudi Air Force, Lieutenant General Ahmad al-Buhairi, Horner's counterpart as the Saudi air commander.¹⁵

The relationships formed through these appointments, combined with Horner's approach to the role of the JFACC, created efficiencies as well as difficulties during the planning and execution of the operation. According to Horner, "My job in Riyadh was to serve the CINC and form the coalition... and my job as the JFACC was to provide for vision and esprit de corps."¹⁶ Serving the CINC meant helping him develop the best plan and execution possible. This sometimes involved confrontations between Schwarzkopf and Horner. To ameliorate these conflicts and accomplish his JFACC responsibilities, Horner ensured these discussions occurred in private, a preference that required Horner deal directly with Schwarzkopf and not through their respective staffs. To provide the best advice to his commander, Horner used the lessons learned earlier in his career and delegated much of his authority and

¹⁴ Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, *Revolution in Warfare?: Air Power in the Persian Gulf* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Inst Press, 1995), 4; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 212-213.

¹⁵ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 90.

¹⁶ Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 286.

duties to subordinates, which afforded him the opportunity to focus on the entire Area of Operations (AOR). This coincided with his belief that during war, the JFACC could not be in charge of the details and effectively accomplish his task, and because the land corps commanders' focus did not expand beyond their own sectors, it was imperative for the JFACC and the CINC/JFLCC to focus on the entire theater.¹⁷ Additionally, he felt that if a JFACC started micromanaging his subordinates, they would fail to exercise initiative.¹⁸ For Horner, it was better for the JFACC to, "sit in the TACC Operations Room and let the war wash over him," while others did their job.¹⁹

Horner believed that the daily crew changeover briefings of the TACC staff served this function. Attending these briefings kept him abreast of the current situation and emerging problems. They also afforded him opportunity to meet with his staff, impart any new philosophy or intent, and clear up confusion. These meetings also allowed him to prepare for the daily briefing with Schwarzkopf. The focus of the meeting with Schwarzkopf, however, was not on current operations but on the plan for two days hence. This method stemmed from his distaste of the approach taken during the Vietnam War, where officers had focused on past results instead of future paths. Horner felt that looking ahead allowed for a greater likelihood of victory.²⁰

To form the coalition and provide vision and esprit de corps required clear communication at all levels. Forming the coalition of Airmen from several nations proved easier because aviators use English as a common language. Aviators also often share a sense of air-mindedness that enables them to bond quickly.²¹ But communication outside of aviation channels was more difficult, especially with the

¹⁷ Horner, interview; Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 321.

¹⁸ Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 341.

¹⁹ Horner, interview.

²⁰ Horner, interview; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 359-61.

²¹ Horner, interview; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 545.

ground and naval forces commanders. These leaders often did not grasp airpower terminology. This posed a challenge for Horner. To bridge this gap, Horner devised a set of graphics depicting the flow of the operation. This was similar to the method that ground forces used to show ground maneuver from an elevated perspective.²²

Horner's belief that rank was only important for the enforcement of a decision also contributed to open communication. He viewed planning and problem-solving aspects of war the same way he viewed a mission debrief of a fighter sortie. In the fighter community, the flight debrief is a sacred tradition in which rank has no place. It is a setting in which all operators receive criticism with equal scrutiny. This informal milieu allows for open and honest feedback and discussion. Horner saw the benefits of this type of interaction and used it throughout Desert Storm.²³

The Air Tasking Order (ATO) was the mechanism Horner relied upon to command the air component. When the Saudis established a policy prohibiting any sorties not listed on the ATO, the ATO became much more than just a coordination document.²⁴ Because Horner controlled the ATO, this policy gave Horner virtual command over all air component assets.

Horner's philosophy toward doctrine also influenced his actions and decisions throughout the force buildup and the war. He believed that doctrine should be a guide to build a plan, not a prescription or justification for action. He carried this perspective to his daily operations and was not concerned that his actions were setting a precedent that subsequent JFACCs might follow. He believed that the commander should analyze the situation and derive the most appropriate action to

²² Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 270-271.

²³ Horner, interview; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 60, 545.

²⁴ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 96.

attain the desired results.²⁵

Deriving the most appropriate action depended on the accuracy and availability of information, which posed problems for Horner and his intelligence section. The first problem was with the training of intelligence personnel. Horner believed it was hard to get intelligence people to think operationally because their peacetime training, especially within the fighter pilot community, encouraged the conveyance but not the analysis of information.²⁶ At the outset of Desert Storm, intelligence officers had not analyzed post-strike battle damage since the end of the Vietnam War. This lack of proficiency, combined with the advent of penetrating smart weapons and other precision-guided munitions, made it difficult to conduct accurate battle-damage assessment (BDA).²⁷

The lack of timely and accurate BDA was not the only problem associated with choosing targets. The request for intelligence from agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) often took weeks to fulfill. Temporary expedients by members of Horner's intelligence staff, such as Captain John Glock's calling associates in CONUS-based units, alleviated this problem for a limited time. However, high-ranking supervisors in the intelligence community stopped these efforts when they were discovered.²⁸ The members of Horner's Special Planning Group (named the Black Hole) also initiated similar attempts. Some of these members came from the Checkmate Division in the Pentagon and maintained this connection. This connection led to a timely source of information for the planners through Checkmate Division Director Colonel John Warden's numerous ties to many different government intelligence and security agencies. Brigadier General Buster Glosson, lead planner in the Black Hole, recognized this benefit and asked Checkmate to continue directly supplying information it thought relevant

²⁵ Horner, interview; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 237.

²⁶ Horner, interview; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 360.

²⁷ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 281.

²⁸ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 157.

to his team.²⁹ According to Lieutenant Colonel David Deptula, a planner with Glosson, this method became the primary way for the planners to get information. Although the CENTAF intelligence personnel continued to work, their processes were not responsive, and Checkmate frequently provided answers before they did. When planners required information more rapidly than Checkmate could provide, they contacted Rear Admiral John M. McConnell, Directorate for Intelligence on the Joint Staff, and a close colleague of Glosson's.³⁰

Although Horner believed in delegation, he reserved the critical decisions to himself. The first of these was the establishment of rules of engagement (ROE) for the air component. This decision had roots in Horner's experience in Vietnam, where he considered the overly restrictive ROE detrimental to effective operations. He believed ROE must be intelligible to a pilot in the heat of battle. This, coupled with his significant flying experience, allowed him to develop appropriate ROE.³¹ Horner sought to balance the lethality of the operation with the safety of his Airmen and the protection of his air assets. To enhance aircrew safety, Horner set the minimum bombing altitude at ten-thousand feet.³² Although this compromised bombing accuracy, it reduced the rate of aircraft losses, caused mostly by low altitude tactics.³³ As the conflict progressed, Horner allowed air assets directly supporting ground forces to operate at lower altitudes to protect soldiers better.³⁴ To increase responsiveness to the needs of ground forces, Horner instituted the Push-CAS technique developed in pre-war exercises. From a planning standpoint, Horner also valued lethality and safety. He separated the offensive planning team, the Black Hole, from his defensive planners in

²⁹ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 190.

³⁰ Lieutenant General David Deptula, interview by the author, 21 February 2013.

³¹ Horner, interview.

³² Keaney and Cohen, *Revolution in Warfare*, 13.

³³ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 354. Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 346, 353.

³⁴ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 354.

order to ensure operational security.³⁵

The types of decisions Horner was willing to delegate depended on the capabilities of his staff, most of whom he personally selected. His core staff was that of the Ninth Air Force. Many of the members on this staff were majors and lieutenant colonels, some passed over for promotion, who had participated in numerous joint and AOR tailored exercises for years. When Horner arrived at Ninth Air Force in 1987, it was obvious to him that these people knew how to set up a TACC quickly and build an ATO. They became the planning staff for air defense and training during Operation Desert Shield, the defensive phase of the war in the Fall of 1990. However, because the nature of the situation also required a tightly compartmented offensive plan, Horner selected the Black Hole planning staff from a combination of key members of his CENTAF staff, augmented by highly skilled planners such as Deptula and Glosson.³⁶

But as the transition to offensive operations neared, Horner reorganized his staff. He sought to merge the Black Hole members with the CENTAF staff. However, the transition to a single planning staff, established by combining the offensive and defensive planning staffs, never fully developed. Although Glosson became the overall chief of both entities, the Black Hole merely added a few more personnel and remained tightly compartmented. While integration remained elusive among the planning staffs, the necessary integration happened within the ATO production process. This was accomplished through improved information flow between the separate planning groups. This cooperation, although it failed to reach the level Horner desired, enabled the compilation of a comprehensive ATO disseminated to the field.³⁷

Horner also augmented CENTAF with additional USAF general

³⁵ Keaney and Cohen, *Revolution in Warfare*, 42; Horner, interview.

³⁶ Horner, interview; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 267-69.

³⁷ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 309-10; Deptula, interview.

officers. These officers were required to work with joint partners because other service leaders frequently refused to deal with non-flag officers. They included Brigadier General Buster Glosson as head of the planning cell and commander of the fighter wings, Major General John Corder as CENTAF Director of Operations, and Brigadier Generals Larry Henry and later Glenn Profitt as commanders of the electronic combat assets. Horner personally selected each of them.³⁸ Horner said of this team:

I think the organization could be very inefficient and I liked that. I wanted people who could argue with each other and with me, we were going to enter chaos and I wanted people with passion, thoughtful people who could give and take as our discussions yielded light. To be sure, there were some pretty opinionated folks but they had to be able to give and take. Rank would not win an argument until the decision was reached and then it became my argument and I had an advantage second only to Schwarzkopf. We sought to be efficient, right weapons on right targets, low loss rates, and maximize the sorties per jet per crew per day and delivery accuracies. Unfortunately, war is an extremely inefficient business, it had not come too far from folks standing around and clubbing one another, so we were not efficient, but as it turns out we were effective, the higher goal one must seek.

We had a mixed bag: folks who had been doing this for years, new comers who had no clue, folks with great leadership skills or exceptional knowledge of air operations, folks who had suffered dysfunctional training for years in jobs that were distorted by peacetime developed doctrines and tactics. So we came together with respect for each other but suspicious of all ideas that could not stand common sense tests, and that bled over into the combined leaders and staffs in our organization.³⁹

Although Horner was successful in shaping his own organization, he had less success shaping the external command environment at CENTCOM headquarters. Despite the emphasis Goldwater-Nichols had placed on joint employment, each military service still held tightly to its

³⁸ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 309; Horner, interview.

³⁹ Horner, interview.

traditions and doctrines.⁴⁰ Horner's general indifference to doctrine and his consolidation of power over the air component of each service created an environment fertile for disagreement among air, land, and maritime commanders. Furthermore, Schwarzkopf's dual roles as the CINC and the JFLCC complicated Horner's provisions of air support to land forces.

Schwarzkopf focused on the entire AOR, and his plan was to use airpower to strike the Iraqis from north to south. Horner agreed with this approach and, much like Schwarzkopf, hoped to end the conflict early by striking key Iraqi leaders, or at least damage Iraq's command and control architecture used for their air defense and communications with the Iraqi military forces in Kuwait. The original plan consisted of four phases, executed sequentially. Phase One was the "strategic" portion of the campaign, which focused on bombing Iraq's command and control facilities and integrated air defense nodes. Many of these targets were in Baghdad. Phase Two focused on attaining air supremacy. Phase Three focused initially on the enemy ground forces in Iraq, and then shifted south to target enemy ground forces in Kuwait. Finally, Phase Four encompassed support of the ground invasion into Kuwait by coalition forces.⁴¹ In both Schwarzkopf's and Horner's opinion, phasing the campaign in this manner lowered the risk for coalition ground forces.⁴²

The corps commanders desired a different plan than Schwarzkopf and Horner because they wanted to strike south to north to eliminate adversary forces closest to them first, thereby decreasing the risk to friendly forces earlier. Army doctrine addressed this type of discord of

⁴⁰ Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 123.

⁴¹ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 305-09. Although the plan was originally a sequenced by phases, the massive increase in the numbers of available aircraft in early January allowed the simultaneous execution of first three phases. Horner then used the phases to describe the weight of effort employed.

⁴² Norman Schwarzkopf and Petre Peter, *It Doesn't Take a Hero : General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 319-20; Horner, interview.

desired plans through the placement of a JFLCC directly superior to the land force commanders and equal to the JFACC.⁴³ This JFLCC had the responsibility to weigh and prioritize the corps commanders' requests for presentation to the other functional component commanders. However, Schwarzkopf's decision to retain JFLCC authorities for himself and place the Army corps commanders subordinate to Yeosock created inefficiencies and friction among the CINC's subordinate commanders. In the absence of a single-function JFLCC dedicated to passing information, gathering the strike requests directly from the corps commanders, and prioritizing them for the air component, the corps commanders became frustrated. Horner had to prioritize Army and Marine targets without understanding the exact rationale behind each corps' request. Lieutenant General Gary Luck, Commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, submitted very few strike requests, hoping that their importance was highlighted by the lack of other submissions. In contrast, Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, Commander of VII Corps, requested many more strikes, hoping to have as many targets struck as possible but making target prioritization difficult.⁴⁴ This left Horner in a difficult position without any Army colleague devoted solely to the responsibilities of the JFLCC to help him make judgments about target priorities.⁴⁵ Additionally, the corps commanders often did not know Schwarzkopf's theater priorities, which often conflicted with their sector priorities. When Schwarzkopf's guidance conflicted with the corps' requests, Horner followed the theater commander's desires, which often produced last minute changes to the targeting plan.⁴⁶ The differing strike request approaches without direct access to a single JFLCC resulted in the corps

⁴³ DA, FM100-5, *Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1986), 170-71.

⁴⁴ Horner, interview; Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 450-51.

⁴⁵ Stephen A. Bourque, *Jayhawk! : The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2002), 368.

⁴⁶ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 321-322; Robert H. Scales, *Certain Victory* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army : [Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., distributor], 1993), 181.

commanders, particularly Franks, blaming Horner for their strike requests remaining unfilled.⁴⁷

Further complicating the situation was the fact that the corps commanders were all lieutenant generals, the same rank as Horner. This left Horner without rank seniority, making his decisions open to scrutiny by the corps commanders. Additionally, the corps commanders' preference for the concepts of AirLand Battle doctrine competed with Horner's concept of airpower employment for the campaign, often leaving them at loggerheads.⁴⁸

The corps commanders also fought over the number of sorties allocated to each corps sector. Horner's preference was to eliminate the corps commanders' preferences from decisions about CAS allocation. He believed the push-CAS approach maximized flexibility of aircraft employment; he allowed interdiction missions to shift to a CAS mission if necessary.⁴⁹ As Horner saw it, this concept enabled him to reduce wasted sorties by ensuring CAS was made available to the land forces if it were needed, while at the same time preserving the ability to pursue broader operational objectives. The corps commanders opposed this plan and desired dedicated CAS because they were very concerned with penetrating the thick defensive crust along the Iraqi – Kuwaiti border.

Another misunderstanding of sortie apportionment and allocation exacerbated the friction between Franks and Horner. Franks' VII Corps had operated for many years as an integral part of NATO ground forces.⁵⁰ NATO doctrine delineated airpower in support of ground forces into two categories: CAS and Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI).⁵¹ It is probable

⁴⁷ Scales, *Certain Victory*, 180.

⁴⁸ Horner, interview.

⁴⁹ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 346.

⁵⁰ Bourque, *Jayhawk!*, 8-9.

⁵¹ Harold R. Winton, "An Ambivalent Partnership: US Army and Air Force Perspectives on Air-Ground Operations, 1973-90," in *The Paths of Heaven : The Evolution of Air Power Theory*, ed. Phillip S. Meilinger, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1997), 422-23. BAI is a concept wherein airpower strikes ground forces slightly behind

that Franks expected to receive BAI. However, because Horner controlled the air-strike assets, Franks was left without air assets he could use for planning purposes. Also, Horner did not apply NATO doctrine; hence, although Franks expected the air component to provide BAI, there was no US doctrine or organizational mechanism with which to provide it.⁵²

The use of the new Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) also caused friction between the land and air components. While some ground commanders wanted it used for intelligence gathering purposes, others adhered to USAF perspectives that the best use was as a targeting and operations platform. Furthermore, who controlled JSTARS and whether it was a corps-level or theater-level asset complicated cross-service cooperation. While the Army saw it as a corps-level asset, the Air Force viewed it as a theater-level asset able to provide a view of the entire battlefield. This was resolved by using the aircraft for both functions. Commanders determined how best to use the data provided to accomplish their mission, and Horner attempted to satisfy the surveillance and targeting requests through the ATO planning process, often to some discord with the competing requests from commanders.⁵³

Disagreements such as these sometimes led to the ground commanders working to retain control over their organic airpower assets. Early in the conflict, Horner gave permission for flying helicopter missions without adding them to the ATO, provided they stayed short of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).⁵⁴ However, as the war was nearing the end and the Iraqi military retreat began, the ground commanders attempted to “game the system” by moving the FSCL much farther north than was consonant with prior agreement. This

the front ground forces. These targets could be reached in hours by ground forces but are not in direct contact with friendly ground forces wherein CAS is used.

⁵² Winton, “An Ambivalent Partnership,” in Meilinger, *The Paths of Heaven*, 178.

⁵³ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 293.

⁵⁴ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 114.

complicated joint employment.⁵⁵ Nobody consulted Horner on this decision; but upon learning of the situation, he was able to resolve the issue by dealing directly with Schwarzkopf.⁵⁶

While the relationship between the JFACC and the Army was complex and sometimes contentious, the working relationship between the JFACC and the USMC varied. While Horner and Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, I MEF Commander, agreed on the authorities laid out for the control of air power, Boomer's Marine air commander, Maj Gen Royal Moore, did not. Throughout the war, Moore tried to wrest control of Marine air assets from Horner, to no avail.⁵⁷ Although minor disputes and disagreements occurred over weapons usage and the mission-type logging of sorties, the relationship between the forces was satisfactory.⁵⁸

When dealing with the US Navy, most of the areas of discord occurred over planning. Air Force and Navy planners clashed over the location of air refueling, use of Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), and Combat Air Patrol (CAP) placement.⁵⁹ However, one issue went to the heart of the JFACC concept: the disagreement the Navy had with Horner's air-to-air ROE. The Navy desired a less restrictive ROE for beyond-visual-range weapons employment, increasing the risk of fratricide. This request stemmed from naval aircraft lacking the electronic identification systems spelled out in the ROE. Horner held firm with his ROE, though he eventually allowed a slight loosening for situations in which no coalition aircraft were near Navy fighters.⁶⁰ This situation demonstrated a productive balance between firmness and flexibility on Horner's part.

Horner believed that the relationship with the coalition countries

⁵⁵ Keaney and Cohen, *Revolution in Warfare*, 134; Bourque, *Jayhawk!*, 368.

⁵⁶ Horner, interview. Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 492-94.

⁵⁷ Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 216; Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 114.

⁵⁸ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 290; Horner, interview.

⁵⁹ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 287-290.

⁶⁰ Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 289.

was crucial.⁶¹ He showed this emphasis through the co-located organizational setup he instituted as well as negotiating agreements that gave the Saudis a substantive role in the ATO approval process. Horner believed that integrating coalition members was so important that against Schwarzkopf's desires, he integrated Saudi planners in offensive planning.⁶² He firmly believed that "Americans are allowed to lead as long as we do not act like we are in charge".⁶³ In the event, Saudi participation did not compromise the offensive air plan.

In all, Horner engendered a high degree of trust vertically but a much lower degree of trust horizontally. Within his air component organization there was a highly functioning team that displayed loyalty and dedication. Horner and Schwarzkopf also displayed a high degree of mutual respect and trust. However, the relationships formed between the air component and the other functional components, other than those formed with the coalition partners, were more tenuous and less trusting. In the end, Deptula best summed up the impact of Operation Desert Storm:

*Desert Storm was a turning point in the history of warfare. It was not just another conflict, it truly signified the juxtaposition between the industrial age of warfare relying on segregated application of force to a much more rapid, precise, and effects based way in an age of rapid information. Many estimates showed we expected to lose thousands of soldiers in Desert Storm, but we lost less than two hundred. It was because Schwarzkopf understood and liked the notion of using air to spare US lives. It set huge expectations to follow on low collateral damage and loss of life. Precision, stealth, and effects based approach to conflict were key.*⁶⁴

Schwarzkopf's trust in air power was a direct reflection of his trust in his JFACC, and the organizational constructs created during Desert Storm served as the first step in a new process of joint operations.

⁶¹ Clancy and Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, 527.

⁶² Putney, *Airpower Advantage*, 294-295.

⁶³ Horner, interview.

⁶⁴ Deptula, interview.

CHAPTER 2

Operation Allied Force

With the demise of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, the Balkan region began a period of instability that persisted throughout the decade. This instability started with the secession of the republics comprising Yugoslavia.¹ These internal conflicts, especially the incidents in the Bosnia-Herzegovina region between the recently independent government and the Bosnian Serb population, led to United Nations (UN) involvement and the introduction of protective forces to shield ethnic groups from ethnic cleansing, primarily by the Serbians.² Additionally, the UN requested that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provide forces. This began with NATO Operation Sky Monitor, which enforced a UN mandated No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. In 1993, the operation received authority to shoot down aircraft violating the mandate as well as to provide close air support (CAS) for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and to conduct other air strikes for deterrence and retaliatory purposes. With these changes, the operation was renamed Operation Deny Flight.³

Operation Deny Flight escalated throughout 1994 and 1995 in response to continuing aggression by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). This aggression peaked with the mortar shelling of the Mrkale marketplace in Sarajevo in August 1995, causing over one-hundred civilian casualties and prompting the initiation of Operation Deliberate Force.⁴ This shift

¹ Dr. Karl Mueller, "The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses," in *Deliberate Force : A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning : Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study*, ed. Col Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, January 2000), 6-12.

² Mueller, "The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia," in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 14-15.

³ Mueller, "The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia," in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 19.

⁴ Mueller, "The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia," in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 25; Lt Col Bradley S. Davis, "The Planning Background," in *Deliberate Force : A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning: Final Report of the Air University*

demanded important coordination because the initiation of offensive action required both Admiral Leighton W. Smith, NATO commander-in-chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), and British Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, commander of UNPROFOR, to agree to the strikes. When both agreed to offensive action, Lieutenant General Michael Ryan, commander AIRSOUTH and Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), received authorization to implement an air campaign.⁵ The plan for this campaign was a modified version of AIRSOUTH plans stemming from previous NATO plans. The original air campaign plan was to employ a gradual, phased approach against the Bosnian Serb Army. The plan initially focused on military targets having a low chance of collateral damage and escalated to targets with a higher chance of collateral damage, and eventually to targets such as petroleum, affecting the general population.⁶ The aim here was to conduct “a robust NATO air campaign that adversely alters the Bosnian Serb Army’s advantage in conducting successful military operations against Bosnia and Herzegovina; desired end state: Bosnian Serbs sue for cessation of military operations, comply with UN mandates, and negotiate.”⁷

These plans reflected a predominately American imprint due to the large percentage of US military in senior command positions and planning staffs. Although Ryan asked participating NATO members to provide senior staff members for Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC), few complied.⁸ This essentially created an all-US chain

Balkans Air Campaign Study, ed. Col Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, January 2000), 37.

⁵ Davis, “The Planning Background,” in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 37.

⁶ Col Christopher M. Campbell, “The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan,” in *Deliberate Force : A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning : Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study*, ed. Col Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, January 2000), 99-100.

⁷ Campbell, “The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan,” in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 106-07.

⁸ Campbell, “The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan,” in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 91.

of command for NATO air operations; but the UN still controlled ground operations, thereby creating a parallel command structure for the joint and combined operation. Ryan's superior officers supported his plan and obtained both UN and NATO approval. Additionally, the UN and NATO both approved targets nominated by Ryan and subsequently delegated the authority for striking the approved targets to the CFACC, enabling Ryan to meet the operation's political and military objectives.⁹ This streamlined the decision process for NATO operations and placed the development and execution of the air strategy in the hands of one Airman.

Because the UN desired to end the conflict quickly through negotiations, NATO agreed to an operational pause after one day of air strikes. When these negotiations failed, air strikes began again. With intensified efforts, NATO forces quickly hit nearly all the approved targets for the initial phase before NATO leaders believed they had substantially achieved their objectives. They requested another pause on 14 September 1995, after General Ratko Mladić and President Radovan Karadžić of the Serb Republic had accepted UN terms, in order to determine the degree of Bosnian Serb compliance. The lack of suitable targets, combined with the BSA removal of forces involved with the siege of Sarajevo, convinced NATO leaders that their objectives had been achieved. NATO leaders then proclaimed achievement of the desired end state, thereby ending Deliberate Force.¹⁰

From a CFACC perspective, Deliberate Force demonstrated the potential issues that arise with alliance operations and some of the inefficiencies of parallel command structures. Nevertheless, delegating authority to the level of the expert, with oversight by senior authorities, ensured progress was made toward the strategic and political objectives.

⁹ Davis, "The Planning Background," in *Deliberate Force*, in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 57.

¹⁰ Campbell, "The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan," in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 114-16; Davis, "The Planning Background," in *Deliberate Force*, in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 60.

While political constraints prevented certain military plans, the military as a whole worked together with minimal friction.

Although Operation Deliberate Force was successful in staving off the Bosnian Serbians' attack, it failed to quell the desire of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to expand his control in neighboring regions to create a Greater Serbia.¹¹ Three years later, regional tensions arose when Milosevic attempted to create an ethnically pure Greater Serbia by invading Kosovo.

Kosovo is highly valued by the Serbs because they view it as the place where ancient Serbian nationhood originated. Over time, however, the majority of Kosovo's population had become ethnically Albanian. In 1989, Milosevic rescinded Kosovo's autonomy, which increased tensions with the Albanian Kosovars and inspired the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA insurgency reached a tipping point in the spring of 1998 when Milosevic sent the Yugoslav army into Kosovo to cleanse the region of Albanians. A cease-fire in October quelled the conflict until early 1999, when revelation of evidence of massacred Kosovar civilians and the return of Serbian forces to Kosovo produced another round of negotiations that ended with Serbia rejecting the terms. This prompted NATO to begin a military campaign against Serbia on 24 March 1999 called Operation Allied Force (OAF).¹²

Lieutenant General Michael C. Short was the commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, NATO, which made him the CFACC for OAF. Although this was his first time as a CFACC, he possessed substantial combat experience. As a first lieutenant, Short accrued the first of his eventual 276 combat missions in Vietnam.¹³ His feelings about the Vietnam War were similar to Horner's. As a brigadier general,

¹¹ Mueller, "The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia," in Owen, *Deliberate Force*, 12-14.

¹² HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia - Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force*, (April 2000), 1-4.

¹³ US Air Force, "Biography: Lieutenant General Michael C. Short," July 2000., <http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=7136> (accessed March 20, 2013).

Short also led F-15E missions in the Persian Gulf.¹⁴ These experiences, combined with his long association with nine different types of fighter and attack aircraft, including commanding an F-117 group, gave him knowledge in the tactical and operational application of airpower's new technological capabilities.¹⁵

Short complemented his operational knowledge as chief of staff, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, NATO, during Operation Deliberate Force. As the chief of staff, Short worked directly for Ryan, which exposed him to the workings of a CFACC in the same region in which he would later command allied air forces. This experience shaped Short's management principles. Although he believed Ryan to be an exceptional officer, Short felt that Ryan controlled target selection too closely. As a result, the CAOC director and the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force commander felt themselves underutilized.¹⁶ These experiences and working within the alliance gave Short a good understanding of the intricacies involved in alliance operations.

Short had an opportunity no previous CFACC had been afforded: the chance to meet and discuss the situation with enemy leaders before the conflict. In October 1998, Short accompanied Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to negotiate the removal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. This gave Short the opportunity to gauge the adversary, increasing his awareness of potential ways to coerce Milosevic during combat operations.¹⁷ These situations prepared him to lead, but they did not prepare him completely for the particular situation he was about to encounter during OAF.

The organizational structure presented Short several challenges. The first challenge was the parallel command structure. Although

¹⁴ Dana Priest, "United NATO Front Was Divided Within " *Washington Post*, September 21, 1999; US Air Force, "Biography: Lieutenant General Michael C. Short."

¹⁵ US Air Force, "Biography: Lieutenant General Michael C. Short."

¹⁶ Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, interview by the author, 14 March 2013.

¹⁷ Dag Henriksen, *Nato's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Inst Press, 2007), 153.

designed for unity of command within the alliance, NATO's command structure did not take into account individual national interests. These interests, expressed as caveats in military parlance, allowed member nations to restrict the actions of their forces and to oppose certain alliance actions. The former detracted from achieving unity of effort, while the latter often limited the military options available.

Parallel command structures also required dual-hatting of many commanders. For example, US Army General Wesley Clark was Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in the NATO chain of command and the commander in chief, United States European Command (USCINCEUR) in the US chain of command. This gave him two different headquarters, one in Mons, Belgium, and another in Stuttgart, Germany, neither of which was co-located with other task force or functional component commanders.¹⁸ Each of these positions also required separate staffs.

The composition of the commanders' staffs lacked functional diversity. Admiral James Ellis, US Navy, was the commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, NATO, and the commander, Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, the US name for OAF. Ellis did not have a single Air Force officer on either of these staffs.¹⁹ Additionally, Army four-star generals held all the top three positions on Gen. Clark's SACEUR staff. The highest-ranking Air Force officer on Clark's staff was Maj Gen J. R. Dallager.²⁰ Furthermore, Clark preferred the opinion of "his four stars" on operational issues.²¹ This left General John Jumper, Clark's senior ranking USAF officer in the European theater, as the Airman he turned to for advice. Jumper was the commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe

¹⁸ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War : Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), xxv.

¹⁹ HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia*, 23.

²⁰ HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia*, 6

²¹ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 233.

(COMAIRCENT), NATO. This gave him administrative control over USAF forces in Europe as well as operational authority as the designated CFACC if a conflict arose in NATO's central region. He did not, however, have any authority in AFSOUTH. Jumper believed his role was to support Short's execution of the air war.

This created a situation in which Short reported to three different senior officers: to Jumper through USAF chains, to Ellis through US Joint Forces and NATO chains, and to Clark directly, given Clark's penchant to bypass Ellis.²² Although Short tried to work issues up through Ellis, Clark's close involvement made this difficult. In essence, this made Clark the de facto Joint Task Force Commander in addition to his SACEUR and USCINCEUR responsibilities. This arrangement surprised Short because he had prepared himself to work for Ellis, whom he considered an Airman. All this clashed with Short's approach to the CFACC position and the clean command lines conducive to fluid military operations.²³

Short believed the role of the CFACC was to make the Joint Forces Commander successful.²⁴ Short's leadership style in accomplishing this objective was to build a successful plan by delegating tasks to the appropriate levels, and then trusting those individuals to use their expertise to find good solutions. He allowed his subordinates to make decisions.²⁵ When Short arrived at the CAOC, he had three trusted people already in place: Brigadier General Randy Gelwix, CAOC director, who had been working the Yugoslavian issue for about a year and brought an element of continuity; Major General Garry Trexler, Deputy Commander, Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force, NATO, and the day director at the CAOC; and Italian Air Force Lieutenant General Leonardo

²² Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo : A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 210.

²³ Short, interview.

²⁴ Rebecca L. Grant, "Michael C. Short: Airman Undaunted," in *Air Commanders*, ed. John Andreas Olsen, (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012), 392.

²⁵ Col Michael V. Smith, interview by the author, 21 March 2013.

Tricarico, Commander, Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force, NATO and Deputy CFACC. Short trusted these three men and had faith in their abilities to run the CAOC and make good decisions. In fact, Short believed that Tricarico deserved most of the credit for the success of Allied Force.²⁶ However, not everyone working at the CAOC met Short's expectations.

When OAF started, Short identified several deficiencies within his organization. He relieved several officers who overly controlled their subordinates. He asked Jumper for replacements and received some of Jumper's best officers. This was not a one-time occurrence, as theater staffing was insufficient to meet wartime tasking due to the dramatic reduction of forces the previous ten years, leaving USAFE and 16AF understaffed.²⁷ However, according to Short, despite Jumper's own shortage in manpower, "Jumper was really good about giving me whatever I needed. When I told him that I was failing at the administrative side of my command, he gave me everything he could to make sure I succeeded." This left no doubt in Short's mind that he could get whomever he wanted if he asked.²⁸

NATO also allowed Short to build his team with little interference. All the division chiefs in the COAC, for instance, were US officers. Although they could have done so, NATO elected not to make an issue of this fact. These four division chiefs formed a cohesive team, which risked "groupthink" but proved to be vital in overcoming the lack of training for CAOC personnel among Allied nations.

Because there was no single training establishment for CAOC operations, CAOC procedures varied. Although there were numerous European COACs, they were all different than the CAOC at Vicenza. The most striking difference stemmed from most European CAOCs focusing on air-policing operations, whereas the focus for OAF was on planning

²⁶ Short, interview.

²⁷ HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia*, 37.

²⁸ Short, interview.

air-strike operations. Few Allied nations had experience in this area. Short compensated for this deficiency by initiating strike-planning training and exercises with his COMAIRSOUTH staff at Naples in conjunction with the COAC staff at Vicenza, eventually producing an initial air plan. However, when Clark received this plan, he sent it to Jumper and insisted it be classified US Only to prevent NATO members from leaking it. This complicated future planning and disturbed the cohesion of the alliance. In essence, this move left NATO without an early plan.²⁹

Complicating matters further, Clark believed NATO goals were not clear at the outset of hostilities. He felt the only NATO objective stated at the start of hostilities was for airpower to force the Serbs back to negotiations.³⁰ NATO expected airpower to create the conditions for political solutions based on the Rambouillet Accords, which were a three-year interim agreement providing democratic self-government, peace, and security for everyone living in Kosovo.³¹ As additional objectives formed, both US and NATO objectives sprang from the desires to stop the killing of Kosovars and to reduce Serbia's capacity to wage future war. NATO, however, had an additional constraint, to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties.³² The subjective nature of this objective spurred debate among NATO members over the selection of targets. This often resulted because of the French perspective on limiting airpower strikes to those targets of the smallest significance, while gradually escalating to more critical targets. This belief led French leaders to veto many targets, which caused a stalemate within the nineteen-member alliance because

²⁹ Henriksen, *Nato's Gamble*, 5.

³⁰ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 423.

³¹ Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, "Understanding the Rambouillet Accords", March 1, 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html (accessed 18 May 2013).

³² HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia*, 9.

it required unanimous agreement to act.³³ The possibility of these disagreements in NATO shaped US objectives even further.

The objectives Clark set for the CFACC constrained Short's ability to employ his forces as he wished. The highly politicized nature of the conflict and the expectations of both US and NATO leaders led Clark to establish three objectives for Short: not to lose any airplanes, not to allow Milosevic's forces to attack NATO forces in Bosnia or Macedonia, and to keep the coalition together.³⁴ These objectives were what Mark Clodfelter has called negative objectives, achievable only by limiting military force.³⁵ This limited approach went against many of the beliefs of Air Force leaders, including Short, who believed in the swift and overwhelming use of air power to yield the fastest results, as they had in Desert Storm.³⁶ Clark, however, believed that keeping NATO together was of greater importance because if NATO failed it would likely meet its demise, and many European governments that depended on NATO would collapse.³⁷ Clark conferred with Jumper and agreed that while the capability of Serbia's IADS warranted the Desert Storm approach, he also wanted to use a phased approach of coercive air strikes aimed at Serbian forces, similar to the one used in Bosnia for Operation Deliberate Force.

The plan consisted of three phases. Phase One struck Serbian IADS and command and control throughout Yugoslavia as well as Serbian heavy weapons in Kosovo. Phase Two added strikes against Serbian forces south of the 44th Parallel. Phase Three expanded Phase Two to cover all of Yugoslavia.³⁸ Although the intent was to phase the operation by area and target type, few expected the operation to last

³³ Henriksen, *Nato's Gamble*, 61-62.

³⁴ Short, interview.

³⁵ M. Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), xv, 13.

³⁶ Henriksen, *Nato's Gamble*, 52-56.

³⁷ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, xxiv.

³⁸ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 13; HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia*, 10.

more than a few days. Both military commanders and the American political leaders shared this assumption, demonstrated by Secretary of State Madeline Albright's statement, "I don't see this as a long term operation. I think this is something that is achievable in a relatively short period of time."³⁹

The assumption of a rapid victory discounted the reality that target approval proved to be a giant obstacle. Short believed that he had an effective military strategy with which to pressure Serbian leaders to resume negotiations quickly. His strategy assumed the ability to strike the Serbian leaders and put direct pressure on them. However, the targets Short had to strike to implement his strategy differed from the approved targets he could strike. The target approval process was extremely complex and the most difficult aspect of the campaign for Clark.⁴⁰ Not only had Washington instituted a target-by-target approval requirement instead of allowing general target category striking, but as stated earlier, many of the NATO allies added constraints to strikes and demanded insight into the process. This dramatically lengthened the time required to get a target approved.⁴¹ It also decreased the likelihood of sensitive targets getting approved at all, because foreign ministries preferred the gradual approach taken in Deliberate Force, hoping to limit damage to Europe's historical cities.⁴²

Beyond this, Short and Clark had fundamentally different approaches toward achieving the end-state of negotiations. Short viewed Milosevic as the center of gravity, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends, the point against which all energies should be directed.⁴³ Thus, applying direct pressure to Milosevic would force him to seek negotiations. However, Clark's objectives prioritized protection of

³⁹ HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia*, 4.

⁴⁰ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, xx.

⁴¹ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 187.

⁴² Clark, *Waging Modern War*, xx-xxi, 224.

⁴³ Carl von. Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595-96.

friendly forces and cohesion of the alliance, which many considered the friendly center of gravity.⁴⁴ The fragility of the alliance became clear when NATO members heavily opposed committing ground troops to the effort, putting into question the degree of resolve they had for the operation. These strategies, although both striving for the same outcome, were vastly different in the target sets required for their success.

Clark's strategy required degradation of the IADS to allow access to direct fires against the Serbian forces, in contrast to Short's strategy requiring the degradation of IADS to allow access to key government infrastructure in Belgrade, such as the power grid and key command and control as well as other important infrastructure. These two strategies shared the requirement to degrade the IADS, and this allowed Phase One to go forward without major command friction between Short and Clark. But as the first few days passed with but a slight expansion of the approved target list and movement into Phase Two operations, the difference in strategies became apparent. Short thought the allies had a clear air strategy, but the lack of approved targets kept them from executing it. He faulted himself for this, because it took him a long time to break the mentality that bombing for just a few nights by itself would force Milosevic to capitulate. However, when Short realized his preferred strategy was not going to be quickly executed, he elected to strike any approved target, even if he thought it would not contribute to accomplishing the operation's objectives. This was done in an attempt to keep some pressure on the enemy, while avoiding operational pauses such as those that occurred in Vietnam and Bosnia.⁴⁵

Short continued to push the issue of striking strategic targets with Clark. Nearing a month into the operation without success in forcing Milosevic to resume negotiations, NATO approved striking Serbian

⁴⁴ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 12.

⁴⁵ Short, interview.

headquarters locations and Milosevic's private residence.⁴⁶ This was just two days before NATO celebrated its Fiftieth Anniversary with a summit in Washington DC. Senior NATO leaders at the summit agreed the situation warranted a more aggressive approach and expanded the target list from 169 targets to more than 976 by the beginning of June. However, the addition of the targets to the master list did not automatically include striking approval, necessitating their vetting through the approval process.⁴⁷

This increase in targets finally led to the approval for NATO to strike the Serbian power grid in early May, another type of target commensurate with Short's strategy.⁴⁸ But three days later, the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy spurred France to prohibit any further strikes in downtown Belgrade.⁴⁹ With a low likelihood of ever shifting back to his initial strategy, Short became resigned to a plan of which he was not proud but which was congruent with political restraints. The plan he briefed to leaders in Washington was to fly armed reconnaissance over Serbia with the intent to "bomb something." This approach allowed pilots to bomb predetermined targets, such as roads and tunnels, avoiding any undue risk to the Serbian population. Short took no pride in this plan because it reminded him of his sorties in Vietnam in which he felt bombing for the sake of bombing did not contribute to the desired objectives, but he felt it was better than doing nothing.

Short's realization that he could not strike anything that might significantly change the course of the war made him very conscious of risk. He did not want to risk the lives of his flyers for unimportant tasks, and conveyed to his subordinates that if they did not have everything they needed to accomplish the mission safely, then the mission could

⁴⁶ HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia*, 20.

⁴⁷ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 38.

⁴⁸ HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia*, 22.

⁴⁹ Short, interview.

await another day. This desire was in complete consonance with Clark's guidance not to lose aircrew. Short continued this strategy throughout the end of the conflict in early June.⁵⁰

While Short was debating about targets with Clark, Clark was arguing for more air assets with both Washington and Short. Clark requested three hundred more combat aircraft from US leaders, two weeks before the NATO Anniversary. Short opposed this addition because he was already running out of approved targets and more aircraft would not help unless the target list grew.⁵¹ Clark also felt Short would be more effective at attacking Serbian ground forces if he instructed his fighters to attack at lower altitudes. Short had instituted a 15,000-foot minimum attack altitude for fighters, to keep them clear of enemy anti-aircraft weapons. Short saw no need to elevate the risk to his aircraft by eliminating this restriction, particularly when NATO had no ground forces fighting the Serbian army and medium altitude was preferred for dropping precision weapons.⁵²

Clark's focus on the Serbian army and his intent to employ Task Force Hawk, both of which Short opposed, became an impediment for the two men's constructive command relationship. Clark's high prioritization on striking the Serbian army created a sanctuary for Milosevic. Clark also only allowed stealth aircraft to operate in Serbia. This created a daytime sanctuary because stealth assets only operated at night. Additionally, the very small numbers of stealth assets allocated made even these night strikes extremely limited. This left Milosevic with little direct threat in Belgrade and created an uneasy relationship between Clark and Short.

By mid-April 1995, Clark and Short's relationship degenerated to one of mutual distrust. Short, like his strategy for the war, was

⁵⁰ Short, interview.

⁵¹ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 36; Short, interview.

⁵² Grant, "Michael C. Short," in Olsen, *Air Commanders*, 388.

impatient. He was also intolerant of micromanagement, a trait Clark had mastered. Clark involved himself in CAOC target-selection meetings, gave tactical guidance to army battalion commanders in the field, made tactical decisions enabled through Predator feed to the CAOC and his headquarters, and discussed possible tactics to get a surface-to-air missile battery to turn on so that they could be struck.⁵³ This high-level command involvement over-rode the Strategy, Guidance, and Apportionment steps in the ATO process.⁵⁴ Short felt it displayed a lack of trust in him, and that Clark thought the CFACC incapable of conducting an air campaign. Clark's consistent second-guessing of Short's advice was a manifestation of Clark's low opinion of Short. Another indicator was Clark's frequent calls to Jumper to seek his opinion on Short's strategy. Clark later wrote that his "real window on the operation was going to be provided by Jumper."⁵⁵

By way of contrast, Short's relationship with the other commanders was generally good. He respected both Jumper and Ellis for their constraint. They were both in a position to undermine Short when dealing with Clark but consistently supported Short's positions. Short also had a good relationship with Admiral Dan Murphy Jr., Commander Allied Naval Forces, NATO. However, Clark's decision to classify the first plan as US Only undermined Short's relationship with allied commanders. Clark's classification of the plan as US Only drove a requirement for the CAOC to plan two separate Air Tasking Orders (ATO). The first ATO was US Only and contained the missions for the stealth assets such as the B-2, F-117, and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The second ATO contained the rest of the US and NATO missions. The production of an additional ATO exacerbated the shortage of personnel trained on ATO production. This classification also led to animosity from

⁵³ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 245, 315; Short, interview.

⁵⁴ HQ USAF, *Initial Report: The Air War Over Serbia*, 22.

⁵⁵ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 195.

NATO partners because they sensed a lack of trust from the US. In an attempt to solve this problem, Short told his foreign partners to take up the issue through their national command structures because that would be the only way around Clark.⁵⁶ Eventually, Short was able to rectify the situation and create one ATO, which improved alliance harmony.

Despite the conflicts between the differing strategies and leaders, OAF achieved success just two months into the campaign when Milosevic capitulated and withdrew his troops from Kosovo. Short had achieved the goals set by Clark without the need to employ ground forces. Although the predominant mechanism remains debatable, continued pressure by airpower combined with the potential loss of Russia's political backing of Serbia and the implicit threat of a ground invasion coerced Milosevic to submit.

Although OAF achieved success and NATO accomplished its objectives without a single combat fatality, Short admitted to deficiencies in the air war. Short wished he had included more alliance personnel in his command staff. He also regretted not using General Horner as a mentor. However, he felt unprepared to address underlying issues causing friction between himself and Clark. He never, for instance, felt sufficiently sophisticated to engage Clark in a discussion about the center of gravity, an unenviable circumstance indeed. Although Short felt that making Milosevic the center of gravity was the correct approach, Clark's focus was on the Serbian Army. The issue of different strategies was the major wedge between the two men and fostered distrust that was never adequately addressed.⁵⁷

Although Short regretted not trying harder to mend his relationship with Clark, the geography of the situation made doing so

⁵⁶ Short, interview.

⁵⁷ Short, interview; Smith, interview.

difficult.⁵⁸ Allied Force brought with it a much different situation than had Desert Storm, with the co-location of the land and air component commanders during hostilities. The historical bargaining of the alliance to distribute infrastructure, such as the locations of different headquarters, left the key commanders involved in OAF geographically separated from each other. With Short at the CAOC in Vicenza, Ellis at Naples, Jumper at Ramstein, and Clark between Mons, Stuttgart, and Washington DC, communication proved difficult. The disadvantage for Short of not being co-located with Clark was that the only time they talked was via the daily video teleconference. Unfortunately, this discussion occurred in front of a large audience with their respective staffs and subordinates. Compounding this was the lack of effort by either man to pursue direct communication outside this venue. In this environment, neither Short nor Clark would back down when one challenged the other, which led to camps forming on each side of the debate. This situation precluded the ability that Horner and Schwarzkopf had to resolve disputes behind closed doors, and present a united front to subordinates.⁵⁹ This resulted in Short's COAC possessing a high degree of internal trust, but the animosity between Clark and Short spread through their organizations and provided a very low level of trust between these staffs.

The success that airpower brought to this conflict had a positive impact on the CFACC concept. Airpower's perceived importance, accentuated by its employment as the sole form of force used, finally proved for some that airpower could stand on its own. It also demonstrated the effectiveness the CFACC has within their organization when given the opportunity to build their own team. However, one negative impact was the inability for the CFACC to ensure a functional relationship with his commander that formed a cohesive organization

⁵⁸ Grant, "Michael C. Short," in Olsen, *Air Commanders*, 392-93.

⁵⁹ Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 217; Short, interview; Horner, interview.

vertically as well as horizontally. The CFACC role would not have to wait long for an opportunity to rectify these deficiencies because the US conducted yet another military operation less than three years later in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 3

Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom

On 11 September 2001, CENTAF commander Lieutenant General Charles Wald and Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley met at the Pentagon to discuss the transition of the command to Moseley. During the meeting, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the building, immediately intensifying the importance of the transition. This act of terrorism prompted US leaders to approve military action against Afghanistan. Becoming the CENTAF commander also made Moseley the presumptive choice as the CFACC for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Moseley's career experiences weighed heavily in how he approached the CFACC position. Unlike Horner and Short, Moseley was not directly involved in the Vietnam War. Moseley spent his career up to that point alternating primarily between Nellis AFB, NV, and Washington DC.¹ At Nellis, Moseley was a student and a division commander at the USAF Fighter Weapons School, and later a wing commander. These assignments afforded him the opportunity to focus on the execution and planning aspects of war fighting at the tactical and operational levels. His Washington DC assignments spanned a wide array of duties, from plans, to political military affairs, to legislative liaison duties, and even to instructing at the National War College.² This breadth of experience would help him as the CFACC.

The first strikes of OEF in Afghanistan occurred less than a month after the September terrorist attacks. This left little time for planning. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not want an operational dynamic like OAF, in which the alliance approved the military actions. Instead, he preferred the US have more influence in the operation and

¹ US Air Force, "Biography: General T. Michael Moseley, July 2008, <http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6545> (accessed March 20, 2013).

² US Air Force, "Biography: General T. Michael Moseley"

kept many decisions at his level. From a military perspective, this was similar to OAF in that General Tommy Franks, commander USCENTCOM, had two VTCs a day with General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Rumsfeld. They discussed the approach to the conflict and the modified strategy as events changed, driven primarily from Rumsfeld's fear that collateral damage gave the Taliban and Osama bin Laden a potent weapon to wield on the world stage to spoil support for the US effort.³

The US effort rested upon a four-part strategy: one, a military effort to defeat those responsible for the terrorist attacks; two, operations aimed at states that harbored or supported terrorists; three, the formation of a worldwide coalition to counter terrorism; and four, a strengthening of US homeland defenses.⁴ This strategy, however, lacked detail and a clear idea of what the end state would look like.⁵ To flesh out some of the details with the little time available, CENTCOM chose to apply highly restrictive ROE, similar to that used in Operation Southern Watch (OSW), and dissimilar to those imposed on Horner's Desert Storm forces.

The application of this restrictive ROE undermined newly gained efficiencies in the CAOC. With Wald as the CFACC for the first month of operations, and Moseley succeeding him, both experienced improvements in access to intelligence. For the first time, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets provided persistent coverage of the area of operations. Additionally, actionable, contemporaneous, tactical human intelligence in Afghanistan combined with other intelligence to form an accurate and detailed assessment of the situation, greatly facilitating decision making.⁶ However, according to CAOC director Brigadier

³ Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2005), 98, 116.

⁴ Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, 40-41.

⁵ Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, 61.

⁶ Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, xxiii-xxix.

General David Deptula, “you could not make a move or select a target without CENTCOM or Washington’s approval.” The rules were conservative in nature and required operators to attain clearance from high levels of command before they could strike a target. This slowed down the operation significantly and often nullified time-sensitive targeting opportunities against key Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership. It could take more than twenty-four hours to get strike approval, which contradicts the concept of time sensitive.⁷ These missed opportunities frustrated CAOC personnel and caused friction between them and the CENTCOM staff.⁸ Additionally, when Moseley first arrived at the CAOC at Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB), Saudi Arabia, it was undermanned. Moseley did not inherit a complete staff and lacked complete liaison elements from the other services. Additionally, OEF was not the only operation for which the CAOC had responsibility. Operation Southern Watch (OSW) and operations in the Horn of Africa were ongoing as well, contributing to manning shortfalls.⁹ This shortage was partially due to the Saudi government’s restricting the number of personnel to 350.¹⁰

Although the CENTCOM ROE and this manning deficiency made operations difficult for the CFACC during the first months of OEF, there was strong cohesion among service and functional component commanders. Deptula believed that the component commanders exhibited more trust in each other than the commanders of Desert Storm did.¹¹ This trust formed because they all agreed they had a significant threat; and this common belief, along with the maturation of the CFACC concept, stopped much of the inter-service bickering.¹² Moseley and Franks had a relationship of mutual respect. Franks rarely participated

⁷ General David Deptula, interview by the author, 21 February 2013.

⁸ Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, xxiv; General T. Michael Moseley, interview by the author, 27 February 2013.

⁹ Moseley, interview.

¹⁰ Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, 281-83.

¹¹ Deptula, interview.

¹² General Charles F. Wald, interview by the author, 21 February 2013.

in the daily VTC with the CAOC and preferred instead to deal with the functional commanders through his deputy and staff officers.¹³ This was partially due to Franks's electing to keep his headquarters in Tampa, Florida instead of moving into the theater, creating a situation where Moseley and Franks, who was dual-hatted as CINC and Combined Task Force Commander, were separated by eight time zones and the Atlantic ocean. However, Moseley felt that Franks attended the VTCs that he should have, and that he had access to Franks if he needed it. Thus, the two men built a relationship in which Franks was open to Moseley's suggestions.¹⁴

Moseley also had close relationships with the other component commanders. For example, before Brigadier General James Mattis led Marine forces in the taking of Kandahar, he spoke with Moseley; and they agreed to conduct the operation with CFACC-provided assets instead of with organic Marine assets.¹⁵ This was drastically different from the Marine practice of using organic airpower and a far cry from the Air Force-Marine spats of the Korean and Vietnam wars. Additionally, Moseley asked Mattis to place one of his Marines in the CAOC to assist in the planning process for Marine support requirements, which avoided wasting sorties.¹⁶

Moseley's approach to building partnerships spread to other organizations within the CAOC including the Central Intelligence Agency representative, various Special Operations forces members, and international coalition members and regional states. For example, to provide maximum air coverage for ground troops in Afghanistan, Moseley called Pakistan's top Airman, Air Chief Marshal Mushaf Ali Mir, to ask for help. Moseley told Mir that he had a sensitive request and wanted to

¹³ Deptula, interview; Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, 306.

¹⁴ Moseley, interview.

¹⁵ Moseley, interview.

¹⁶ Moseley, interview; James D. Kiras, "T. Michael Moseley: Air Power Warrior," in *Air Commanders*, ed. John Andreas Olsen, (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012), 415.

place a flight of A-10 Thunderbolt IIs in Jacobabad to shorten the time required for them to reload ordnance and refuel compared to how long it would take them to return to Kuwait or Oman. Mir relayed the request to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf granted Moseley's request by having Mir relay, "My friend, our mutual friend says yes."¹⁷ This tightly integrated environment provided the CFACC with insight into the total operating picture as well as good international access, allowing him to provide airpower effectively in support of land operations.

The air effort shifted to support ground operations two weeks after the first strikes. These ground forces consisted of the indigenous Northern Alliance and a small number of US special operations forces (SOF) integrated with joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC). The ground forces integration gave the Northern Alliance a link to air support through the SOF component. This link helped the Northern Alliance overrun Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul, two key Taliban strongholds, in less than four weeks. Also, the Northern Alliance's control increased from 10 percent to nearly 75 percent of Afghanistan during this period. These gains dispersed the al-Qaeda contingent and made the Taliban disperse or flee to their last stronghold, Kandahar, which subsequently fell to friendly forces sixty-three days after the start of combat, ending the reign of the Taliban.¹⁸

With the Taliban neutralized, the priority became finding and killing Osama bin-Laden. The earlier dispersal of al-Qaeda sent many to seek protection in the hundreds of caves located in the mountainous area of Tora Bora along the Afghani-Pakistani border. Regular forces were not yet available, mainly because the Marines needed to secure Kandahar and continue to hunt for Taliban leader Mullah Omar.¹⁹ This led to a plan for small numbers of SOF teams already operating in the

¹⁷ Moseley, interview.

¹⁸ Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, xviii-xix.

¹⁹ Rebecca Grant, "Tora Bora," *Air Force Magazine* 94, no. 2 (12 December 2011): 53-54.

Tora Bora region supported by airpower. Although the Tora Bora operation failed to kill bin-Laden, effective coordination and communication between ground and airpower succeeded in destroying much of the protective cave complex, denying a sanctuary to al-Qaeda.²⁰

However, pristine communication and operational planning were not a given. Operation Anaconda was a case in point. In late February 2002, a plan for the Tenth Mountain Division to clear a valley in the Shah-I-Kot Mountains, where Taliban and al-Qaeda forces were concentrating after their earlier defeats, encountered numerous difficulties. The problem stemmed from a lack of communication between components. Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, commander of the Tenth Mountain Division, assumed the USAF air liaison officer with Task Force Dagger provided the CAOC with sufficient information to provide the necessary airpower for his operation. However, that assumption proved false. The information did not reach the CAOC until eight days prior to the planned execution.²¹ This left little time to develop a sound air plan and even less time to shape the battle area through focused intelligence gathering efforts and pre-operation strikes. Furthermore, because he was not notified of the operation earlier, Moseley assumed it was safe to release large portions of the airspace back to the Afghani government to help them reestablish commerce. This left only minimal airspace in which coalition air forces could operate, increasing the danger of mishaps and making coordination difficult.²² These factors combined to make the first few days of Operation Anaconda much more difficult than necessary.

After Operation Anaconda, Moseley shifted his focus to another rising contingency in theater, Iraq. Although Franks did not order the component commanders to start planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom

²⁰ Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, 152.

²¹ Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, 167-72; Moseley, interview.

²² Moseley, interview.

(OIF) until the summer of 2002, Moseley knew it was a possibility from a conversation he had had with General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, six months earlier. This knowledge allowed Moseley to contemplate not only the operational approach necessary for running two simultaneous air campaigns, but also to address current deficiencies in his organization.²³

One of Moseley's high priorities was to increase the size and quality of his air component to enable it to execute a much larger air campaign. To increase the quality of the COAC staff, Moseley requested that several USAF Weapons School Instructors from Nellis AFB rotate through the CAOC for a month at a time. His prior command tours made him intimately familiar with the school, and Moseley respected the quality of officers and the high degree of tactical knowledge they brought with them. He trusted them. He used them for quality control and to relieve some of the long hours his personnel worked, but he also chose them because he believed they would give honest criticism.²⁴

The air campaign for OIF required a larger staff as well, affording Moseley the opportunity to build his own team. He formed a complete air staff, which had not existed up to that point, and used his Deputy CFACC, Major General Walter E. Buchanan III, to help with COMAFFOR duties. He also had the other services and components provide liaisons. Moseley also attained a space representative in the CAOC to ensure integration of space effects. Additionally, between Wald and Moseley's efforts, a second CAOC was established at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.²⁵ Moseley requested a staff for the new CAOC, placed Brigadier General Robert J. Elder in charge, and had him mirror the operations at PSAB until OIF execution started, at which point Moseley delegated the

²³ Moseley, interview.

²⁴ Moseley, interview.

²⁵ Deptula, interview; Moseley, interview; Wald, interview.

operations in Afghanistan to Elder.²⁶ Furthermore, numerous planning exercises proved beneficial in working out problems with the adopted processes and plans and helped the CAOC staff come together as an integrated, cohesive team.²⁷ In all, this created a robust organization that Moseley trusted to devise and execute a plan to achieve the overall campaign objectives.²⁸

Clear objectives from the Secretary of Defense and Franks, combined with over a decade of continuous focus on Iraq and nine months warning, gave the CFACC time to build an effective air campaign plan.²⁹ Franks relayed to Moseley his desires to keep the oil fields safe, prevent Scud launches, find and neutralize the Republican Guard, and get to Baghdad as soon as possible.

The initial planning of OIF incorporated a compromise between air and land components to begin simultaneously in an effort to surprise the Iraqi's by not telegraphing intentions with a long air campaign prior to the ground invasion.³⁰ This plan prevented the air component from degrading the IADS prior to the land invasion, exposing both components to greater risk in the early portion of the campaign. Moseley did not object. He merely requested that Franks not meddle in his air interdiction and strategic attack plans and apportionment and allocation recommendations. Moseley agreed to increase the number of CAS sorties with the simultaneous air and ground execution plan if necessary, but did not want Franks to change the major air plan.³¹ Franks agreed, once again displaying the trust he had in the CFACC as "the best airman alive.

²⁶ Moseley, interview.

²⁷ Kiras, "T. Michael Moseley," in Olsen, *Air Commanders*, 418; Moseley, interview.

²⁸ Moseley, interview.

²⁹ Walter J. Boyne, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why*, (New York: Forge, 2003), 52, 95-96; Moseley, interview; CENTAF Assessment and Analysis Division, *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers*, 30 April 2003.

³⁰ Williamson Murray, "Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003," in *A History of Air Warfare*, ed. John Andreas Olsen, (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010), 282-83.

³¹ Moseley, interview.

He's my friend, I'd trust him with my life."³²

Franks and Moseley's mutual trust continued to increase throughout this period. The way to mitigate the Scud threat was to find and destroy the missiles, primarily those in the western deserts of Iraq, from where they could threaten Israel. Franks gave Moseley complete authority to authorize strikes in these regions. It was rare for an Airman to have strike authority of a land battle space when there is a Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), but Franks trusted Moseley enough to give him this authority. He also allowed Moseley to modify the OSW and CENTCOM ROE to ones more suitable for the active combat of OIF.³³ Loosening these restrictions, along with allowing strikes on Iraqi IADS south of the N33 parallel allowed Moseley to initiate Operation Southern Focus, which neutralized most of the IADS in southern Iraq by March 2003, reducing the risk to the air component in the plan to begin air and ground operations simultaneously.³⁴

Moseley also felt the process that created the air plan gave it a strong likelihood of success because of additional steps he had taken to get external advice. Once again, Moseley drew on the expertise from different USAF and USN weapons-systems experts outside his organization, and held a meeting at Shaw AFB to review and improve the plan.³⁵ As ground operations loomed, Moseley brought this team to the CAOC and constituted them as a cell inside the operations and plans division.³⁶ This brought continuity to the operation and further demonstrated Moseley's affinity for surrounding himself with individuals he trusted to perform at the highest levels.

³² Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, (New York: ReganBooks, 2004), 439.

³³ Moseley, interview.

³⁴ Moseley, interview.

³⁵ Timothy J. Keating, "This Was a Different War: Interview with Vice Admiral Timothy J. Keating, U.S. Navy," *Proceedings*, 2003, http://www.military.com/Content/MoreContent1?file=NI_Interview_0603 (accessed on 14 April 2013).

³⁶ Moseley, interview. Vice Admiral David C. Nichols, interview by the author, 14 April 2013.

Due to his preference for smooth working relationships and trust, Moseley focused on keeping tight bonds with other service commanders as they arrived in the theater.³⁷ Engaging incoming Marine commander Major General James Amos, Moseley ensured Amos that he understood the Marines' needs for airpower.³⁸ This continued the good relations set during OEF. Additionally, Moseley formed tight bonds with Lieutenant General David McKiernan when he became the CFLCC. McKiernan later stated, "the big strength in this campaign was the personalities of the various component commanders...You can say a lot of that [inter-Service cooperation was possible] because of developments in joint doctrine and training...but a lot of it [was]...also in the chemistry between...the leaders."³⁹ Moseley promised McKiernan, "When your Lieutenant crosses that line of departure, I am buying his mission. You will not have to stop on your way to Baghdad."⁴⁰ The cohesiveness of the entire Combined Forces demonstrated that this declaration was correct. Colonel Ghassan of the Iraqi General Staff asserted, "our divisions were essentially destroyed by air strikes when they were still about thirty miles from their destinations. Before elements of the 3rd Infantry Division were in a position to launch their main assault, the Medina Division had disintegrated."⁴¹ Moseley also promised the CFLCC that the ground forces would never have to fight a force bigger than they were. According to Colonel William Grimsley, First Brigade Commander, Third Infantry Division, "We never really found any cohesive unit, of any brigade, of any Republican Guard Division."⁴² All these factors combined to achieve the objective of capturing Baghdad, and it took the component commanders

³⁷ Nichols, interview.

³⁸ Murray, "Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003," in Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 286.

³⁹ General David McKiernan quoted in Nicholas E. Reynolds, *Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 12.

⁴⁰ Moseley, interview.

⁴¹ Cited in Maj Gen David Deptula, *Some Observations On Modern Warfare: Then and Now—Desert Storm, OEF, OIF*, (2005) Powerpoint presentation, slide 16.

⁴² Cited in Deptula, *Some Observations On Modern Warfare*, slide 17.

a mere twenty-one days, inspiring Franks to describe the group as a “Band of Brothers”.⁴³

There were, however, problems. A Patriot battery fired upon friendly aircraft. The underlying cause was a recurring one: uncoordinated movement of the FSCL. Much like the incident Horner experienced in Desert Storm, someone below the functional component commander level moved the FSCL without proper coordination with the air component. In this instance, the FSCL was placed farther out than some of the remaining Iraqi surface-to-air missiles. McKiernan had no knowledge of this decision. This placement complicated the inflight coordination required for CFACC air assets and CFLCC assets to operate effectively. Such incidents were Moseley’s biggest regrets because the coalition lost Airmen to circumstances that were completely preventable.⁴⁴

Through all of this, Moseley developed lessons for the CFACC. The first lesson was the complexities of the CFACC’s job. According to Moseley, the CFACC had four full-time jobs in combat: the first of these responsibilities was as the commander of Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR). In this role, Moseley had administrative control of USAF members in theater, making him responsible for knowing where everyone was and what they were doing. It also entailed the functions of performance reports, awards and decorations, and disciplinary actions. These functions remain crucial to ensure a learning and progressing fighting force.⁴⁵

The second job of the CFACC was to ensure political-military regional engagement. Developing working relationships with other country’s air chiefs proved a major force enabler. Major General John Corley, Moseley’s COAC director in OEF, stated, “With regards to

⁴³ Franks, *American Soldier*, 530.

⁴⁴ Moseley, interview.

⁴⁵ Moseley, interview.

relationships, General Moseley developed and nurtured those to an extreme...laterally with the other components...vertically to CENTCOM...as well as with coalition partners.”⁴⁶ As shown earlier with Pakistan, these relationships helped Moseley get access to locations and resources, enabling him to employ airpower more effectively and efficiently. These relationships were key because by Moseley’s departure from the theater in August of 2003, the air component operated out of eighteen different countries from fifty-one different airfields with a peak of thirty-eight at the same time.⁴⁷

Those locations often required the construction of an airfield or the constant resupply of war materiel, which encompassed the third job of the CFACC: logistics and mobility.⁴⁸ Tasking air assets to strike targets is useless if they do not have the required munitions, fuel, food, available quarters, and other amenities to function effectively. The focus required for this task alone is tremendous and without it, the air component could not fight.

The fourth and final job of the CFACC was the actual combat role, including planning and tasking. The challenge for Moseley was to prepare along the way for these four jobs to ensure he managed them effectively, because failure of one of them could have cascaded into the others.⁴⁹

Other lessons dealt with geographic separation of the functional and combatant commanders. During OEF, eight time zones separated Franks and Moseley, which caused friction between the CAOC and CENTCOM.⁵⁰ However, Moseley’s belief that the component commander had to be in the battle rhythm of the theater kept him from operating at CENTCOM. Additionally, because Franks operated out of Tampa,

⁴⁶ General John Corley, interview by the author, 14 April 2013.

⁴⁷ Moseley, interview.

⁴⁸ Moseley, interview.

⁴⁹ Moseley, interview.

⁵⁰ Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror*, xxv.

Moseley's duties for political military engagement increased, leaving less time to accomplish his other responsibilities. Although Moseley thought these engagements had high payoff, the geographic separation between himself and Franks sometimes led to friction with international partners. This stemmed from Moseley and Franks failing to communicate with each other over what agreements each had made with various countries. Eventually Franks moved his headquarters to Qatar in the fall of 2002, making it easier to coordinate with the functional commanders.⁵¹ "As long as they were in Tampa, they lived in a world of Operation Southern Watch and east coast time zones and they were not staffed to war fight, they were just staffed for OSW."⁵² McKiernan echoed this belief, "Personal relationships matter. Personal relationships happen through contact, and frequency of contact is important...It's being there that counts...all the information technology that we have available in the US...doesn't replace being there. It doesn't replace the personal day to day contact."⁵³

After the planning debacle with Operation Anaconda, Moseley learned the risks involved when geographically displaced from the other functional component commanders. To overcome this separation, Moseley developed the concept of the air component coordination element (ACCE).⁵⁴ These ACCEs were liaisons placed with the other functional commanders and other coalition leaders to represent Moseley within these commands as well as keep Moseley apprised of significant events. Because these liaisons would represent the CFACC and he treasured the concept of trust, Moseley took great care in personally

⁵¹ Moseley, interview.

⁵² Moseley, interview; Col Michael V. Smith, interview by the author, 21 March 2013. The quote is from Moseley but Smith corroborates the manning issues present at CENTCOM in Tampa.

⁵³ David D. McKiernan and James A. Helis, *An Exit Interview with General David D. McKiernan*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Military History Institute, 2010), 73.

⁵⁴ Kiras, "T. Michael Moseley," in Olsen, *Air Commanders*, 414-15.

selecting each ACCE as part of his team.⁵⁵

Moseley's success as a CFACC stemmed from his ability to learn on the job. The lessons from Operation Anaconda led him to the idea of the ACCE. It also highlighted the problems associated with not having time to prepare the battle space and gave him the idea for Southern Focus. The results of improper CENTCOM ROE used in OEF made him value aggressiveness. To Moseley, "OEF made the rapid success of OIF possible. The notion of what you can do from the air if you are a mature organization and you have thought about it is amazing. This was possible because I matured, Franks matured, and picking the right people to form the team."⁵⁶

The problems Moseley encountered in OEF, such as the problems air support experienced in the first days of Operation Anaconda, had the potential to undermine the accomplishments and reputation airpower had achieved in the hands of both Short and Horner as air component commanders. However, the other component and joint force commanders trusted Moseley as a commander and role of the CFACC as an institution, recognizing what both bring to the operation. This trust gave Moseley the time required to learn from mistakes and make the necessary changes to accomplish the objectives effectively and efficiently. These changes made airpower indispensable to the dominant land forces that ended Saddam Hussein's regime.

⁵⁵ Moseley, interview.

⁵⁶ Moseley, interview.

CHAPTER 4

Analysis and Conclusions

In each of the three cases examined, air operations were successful in achieving the objectives set for them. The air campaign in Desert Storm allowed the land forces to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait in four days. Airpower in Allied Force provided the only lethal force used to lead Milosevic to negotiate and comply with UN sanctions. In Enduring Freedom, airpower worked together with SOF and conventional ground forces to remove the Taliban Government and eliminate terrorist safe havens, while in its sequel, Iraqi Freedom, airpower was an essential element in the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime. These successes indicate that using a single commander for air has its merits.

These cases also highlight the challenges and opportunities for the CFACC. One such challenge is how trust and organizational modifications affect the CFACC's organization. In all three cases, the CFACC had the ability to create an internal organization in which they had a high degree of trust. Lieutenant General Charles Horner created his planning team from individuals who were critical thinkers who offered open and honest feedback. He also fostered this openness to the resident members of his organization from the start. Additionally, Horner brought in flag officers to help communicate with other service and component senior leaders who were conscious of rank. Lieutenant General Michael Short also had the ability to modify his team, which he did when he removed colonels and replaced them with others he trusted and that shared his leadership style. Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley also modified his organization through his incorporation into his CAOC of USAF Weapons School instructors and graduates as the tactical and operational experts. He also built an entire AFFOR staff. Each of these CFACCs modified their organization to one they trusted to accomplish the tasked mission.

External trust, on the other hand, was more difficult to develop early on but improved over time. Horner had confrontations with the other services, especially with the Marines and Army, over his application of airpower as well as their desire to retain control of organic air assets.¹ However, Horner's significant results from Desert Storm left the impression of the ability of the air component and gave it a sound foundation on which to build over the next ten years. Both Short and Moseley had fewer conflicts with fellow component commanders over the use of their air assets by the CFACC.

External trust from coalition members varied among the cases. While Horner and Moseley experienced a high degree of trust from coalition partners, the relationships in NATO that Short dealt with were more tenuous. These relationships became even shakier once the coalition partners discovered that the Americans were executing a US Only ATO as well as the NATO ATO. Short attempted to remedy this problem by asking his NATO colleagues to raise the issue through their national governments and have the US Only operations become open to the alliance. This eventually occurred and Short found success in preserving the relationships of his international military colleagues. However, discord over military plans at the higher levels of NATO continued, as seen when France vetoed many military targets, especially after the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. However, at the end of the campaign, regardless of their personal dissonance, Short and Clark accomplished their military, national, and international objectives, making OAF a success, and strengthening NATO. Short and Moseley would agree with Horner's statement:

Being in a coalition means doing business the hard way. It takes time and patience. Ego has to be aside, as the lives of men and women hang in the balance. You will not have all the answers, and mistakes will be made. But if you build a relationship of trust and openness, respect and acceptance,

¹ Lieutenant General David Deptula, interview by the author, 21 February 2013.

then you can work through the difficult times. The immediate success of the Gulf war was the liberation of Kuwait. Perhaps the more enduring success was the working together of the coalition nations.²

Much as a CFACC modifies his air component to gain efficiencies and effectiveness, other commanders in the combatant command do the same, and often these modifications result in friction between the components. One such modification can occur when the Joint Task Force commander determines that they will “dual hat” as a functional component commander. Although this decision may help streamline that function’s role into the operation, it may produce unintended barriers and consequences throughout the command. The CFACC, for example, may have no control over this decision because his superior, the Joint Force Commander, often makes it. However, with the decision made, it is incumbent on the CFACC to find processes that best fit in the new organizational structure and that minimize the frictions while maximizing the effectiveness that airpower brings to the joint force for the situation at hand. Horner experienced these frictions with the corps commanders because of Schwarzkopf’s decision to dual hat himself as the JFLCC. However, Horner attempted to find ways to support the corps as well as to meet Schwarzkopf’s desires. If these desires were in disagreement, Horner would fulfill the CINC’s requests at the expense of the corps’, satisfying the former but increasing friction with the latter. These disagreements are a common occurrence in war, and minimizing them often comes through effective compromise, communication, and trust among the commanders, as was the case twelve years later in Iraq.

The cases suggest geographic co-location of the JTF/CC and the functional component commanders establishes better communication and integration of operations. Operation Desert Storm exemplifies this.

² Tom Clancy and Charles Horner, *Every Man a Tiger*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1999), 546.

However, this arrangement may not be possible because the nature of the situation dictates otherwise. In the event that co-location is not possible, the responsibility falls upon all commanders to ensure the effective integration of components occurs. Whether they sacrifice their own location to co-locate with others, innovate through emerging communications technologies, or attain presence by proxy like Moseley did with the invention of the ACCE, commanders must once again modify their organizations and processes to attain unity of effort. However, US dependence on space and cyber for communication can create a ripe target for adversaries. Co-location not only brings the benefit of a shared experience to decision making, but also it provides protection from the key leaders becoming isolated from each other in the event that their communication links are denied, potentially paralyzing the informed decision making process. Therefore, co-location should not be discounted just because of new technological capabilities.

There have been two separate evolutions of the CFACC since Goldwater-Nichols. The first is one of minor variance from Desert Storm through OIF. The achievements of Horner set a high standard for Short and Moseley to follow. Although there were minor setbacks throughout the period, the increase in external trust over the twelve-year period of this study demonstrates advancement and acceptance in the CFACC concept by the other services leaders and coalition partners.

The second evolution is present in each case and is demonstrated best through the OEF to OIF transition. This transition illustrates the changes that each CFACC makes to accommodate his particular situation. Each conflict is different and therefore requires a different approach. According to Moseley, "Every CFACC goes through the normal pain of establishing the right organization. It is an evolution, and the next person to be the CFACC will have to go through it all over again.

This helped OIF because it all got squared away during OEF.”³ Deptula echoed this concept by noting, “You need to have an established organization for the theater and the ability to modify that for any level of contingency.”⁴

Since the end of the Cold War, coalition operations have become the norm. These operations highlight a best practice seen across all three cases studies. The close relationships between the senior leaders of the participating nations, especially at the functional component level, have enabled each CFACC additional help in problem solving. However, while these relationships have been beneficial at the senior leader level, attempts to integrate coalition members in the planning and execution at the lower levels have consistently encountered friction. Assuming that resolving future conflicts will again require effective coalitions, such as the recent operations in Libya, frictions created by stovepipe plans and unilateral operations due to the desire to keep secrets need to be minimized, not only for a more holistic operational and tactical approach, but also to form international bonds with greater affinity.

For the purposes of this study, the CFACC has evolved; and it remains important to today’s combined and joint operations. It must, however, continue to evolve. To paraphrase noted scientist Charles Darwin, “In the long history of humankind those who learned to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed. It is not the strongest of the species, nor the most intelligent that survive. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change.”⁵

³ Moseley, interview.

⁴ Deptula, interview.

⁵ Charles Darwin Quotes, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/c/charles_darwin.html (accessed 14 April 2013).

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