




# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

JANUARY 30, 2015



## Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE <b>30 JAN 2015</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2015 to 00-00-2015</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA, 22350-1500</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

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## Mission

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# Results in Brief

## *Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police*

January 30, 2015

### Objective

The objective of this project was to assess the planning and execution of the Afghan National Police (ANP) logistics, supply, and maintenance systems developed and implemented by U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Specifically, this assessment evaluated whether:

- U.S. and Coalition goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources were sufficient to effectively develop, manage, and transition logistics, supply, and maintenance systems to the ANP in 2014;
- U.S. and Coalition plans to transition ANP logistics and maintenance processes to Afghan lead included mitigation for the impact of delays in the transition; and
- U.S. and Coalition plans and resources would effectively support ANP logistics, supply, and maintenance systems sustainment and continued development beyond 2014.

### Observations

Coalition force and ANP leaders recognized that development of logistics, including supply and maintenance capabilities, was crucial to long-term ANP success. Coalition force advisors identified a need for certain policy updates in support of logistics transition, and encouraged the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and ANP leaders to implement and enforce established logistics policies and processes. Coalition, MoI, and ANP leaders readily offered input on and analysis of MoI and ANP logistics development, and the importance of implementing a demand-based logistics, supply, and maintenance system to ANP mission success.

This report contains 11 observations, resulting in 29 recommendations. Our team identified key logistics issues in three areas—resources, policy implementation and enforcement, and emerging logistics processes.

- Resource-related sustainment challenges included: Afghan budget laws and procedures that impeded ANP logistics funding, planning, and execution; the inability of the MoI to fund existing ANP infrastructure at a minimal essential level for operations; and insufficient numbers of skilled, experienced candidates available to Coalition forces to serve as ANP logistics advisors.
- Issues with MoI and ANP implementation and enforcement of logistics policies and procedures included: core deficiencies in the ANP logistics system; failure to identify supply needs and plan in accordance with ANP logistics requirements; lack of support for Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs); delayed review and revision of required MoI logistics policies and guidance; and failure to take advantage of logistics training offered by the Afghan National Army Combat Service Support (ANA CSS) School.



# Results in Brief

## *Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police*

### **Observations (cont'd)**

- Challenges and opportunities related to emerging logistics processes included: implementation of automated processes used to manage inventory; transition of ANP maintenance from contract-delivered support; and lack of fleet management plans for vehicles and other major items of equipment.

### **Recommendations**

We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy establish a formal developmental program, including career track incentives, for individuals who volunteer as MoI advisors during the post-2014 Resolute Support Mission.

We recommended that the Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function (EF)5 Lead:

- Advise and assist the ANP National Logistics Center (NLC) to issue frequently-demanded supply items to RLCs in accordance with RLC demands and authorized levels of supply stocks; ensure advisors are able to assist ANP to develop basic logistics expertise at national, regional, and provincial / district levels; assist ministries with options for increasing accessibility to the Core Inventory Management System (CoreIMS) through wireless solutions; advise and assist the MoI to require ANP to use CoreIMS as connectivity issues are resolved, and to determine if the Nangarhar RLC performs a necessary function.
- Begin a phased reduction of the ANP vehicle maintenance contract; determine logistics advisor requirements; and, in coordination with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and U.S. Central Command, ensure incoming advisors meet rank, skill-level, and experience requirements.

- Advise and assist the MoI to validate, implement, and enforce published logistics policies; develop an ANP supply forecasting and requirements process; and, advise and assist the MoI and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to establish an Afghan Program Management Office to oversee system support for CoreIMS.
- Advise the MoI to enforce its RLC policy or change the policy to reflect changes to RLC usage and procedures; update and consolidate MoI logistics policies; and develop an ANP vehicle and equipment fleet management plan.

We recommended that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / EF1 Lead:

- Advise and assist the Ministry of Finance to propose and adopt a modification of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) budget law and/or procurement law to allow for an expanded period of time to initiate and complete current year budget and procurement actions; advise and assist the MoI Facilities Director to inventory and develop a plan to reduce ANP facilities; and advise and assist MoI to review, and if necessary, gain an enhanced role over the coordination of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan-funded construction with the MoI.
- Advise and assist the MoI to determine the cost-effectiveness of hiring civilians versus uniformed police personnel to work in ANP vehicle maintenance positions; advise and assist the MoI and MoD to update the memorandum of understanding allowing ANP personnel to attend Afghan National Army (ANA) logistics training; and create a mechanism to transfer funds between ANP and ANA for student support.



# Results in Brief

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## *Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police*

### **Recommendations (cont'd)**

We recommended that the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Resolute Support / EF4 Lead, advise and assist the MoI and Afghan National Police Training General Command to: develop a sustainment training policy to provide training to ANP logistics personnel at all levels; monitor ANP attendance at the ANA CSS School; and encourage ANP Commanders to send logistics personnel to the ANA CSS School.

### **Management Comments**

We request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / EF5 Lead; Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / EF1 Lead; and Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Resolute Support / EF4 Lead provide comments in response to this report. Please see the Recommendations Table on the following page.

## ***Recommendations Table***

<b>Management</b>	<b>Recommendations Requiring Comment</b>	<b>Recommendations Requiring No Additional Comment</b>
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy	11.c	
Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / EF5 Lead*	1.a, 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 4.b, 5.a, 5.b, 7, 8.a, 11.a.4,	1.b, 4.a, 5.c, 8.b, 9.a, 11.a.1, 11.a.2, 11.a.3, 11.b
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / EF1 Lead	9.b, 10.b.1, 10.b.2,	2, 6.a, 6.b
Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Resolute Support / EF4 Lead	10.a.2	10.a.1, 10.a.3

Please provide additional required comments by March 2, 2015.

\*Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force became Headquarters, Resolute Support on December 28, 2014. Therefore, recommendations that were directed to ISAF in the draft report are now directed to Resolute Support in the final report, although the management comments still refer to the responding ISAF staff section.



**INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

January 30, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, RESOLUTE SUPPORT AND UNITED STATES  
FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, RESOLUTE SUPPORT /  
EF 4 LEAD  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, SUPPORT, RESOLUTE SUPPORT /  
EF 5 LEAD  
COMMANDER, COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION  
COMMAND AFGHANISTAN

**SUBJECT:** Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police  
(Report No. DoDIG-2015-067)

We are providing this report for review and appropriate action. This is a continuation of a series of reports published by the Office of the Inspector General's Special Plans and Operations directorate that focus on the mission to train and equip the National Security Forces of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

We conducted this assessment from March 2014 through January 2015 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

We considered management comments to a draft of this report when preparing the final report. As a result of those comments, we redirected Recommendation 11.c to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and request comments in response to this recommendation in the final report. We also request additional information on implementation of recommendations as outlined in the Recommendations Table on page iii.

We should receive your comments by March 2, 2015. Your comments should describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the completion dates of your actions. Please send copies of documentation supporting the actions you may have already taken.

Please provide comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible, send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [SPO@dodig.mil](mailto:SPO@dodig.mil). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

Please direct questions to [REDACTED].



Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Deputy Inspector General  
Special Plans and Operations

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations



## Introduction

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U.S. and Coalition forces developed the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by focusing first on rapid growth of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) operational forces. Coalition forces did not prioritize the development of logistic systems and other force enablers until after the ANSF reached force structure goals. Hence, during 2014, while ANSF demonstrated increasing capability to conduct security operations, logistics capabilities lagged, creating a gap between ANP operational and support capabilities.

Coalition advisors helped Ministry of the Interior (MoI) logisticians develop initial logistics policy in 2009. In 2013, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reported that, although ANP logistics had progressed, the MoI was not prepared to sustain its security operations without Coalition assistance. In 2014, the ANP continued to struggle with logistics support and facilities sustainment. Finally, as a result of the formal announcement in May regarding U.S. participation in the post-2014 Resolute Support Mission, Coalition officials shared plans for continued development of logistics capability post-2014 to ensure the long-term sustainability of the ANP.

## Objectives

The objective of this project was to assess the planning and execution of the ANP logistics, supply, and maintenance systems developed and implemented by U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Specifically, this assessment evaluated whether:

- U.S. and Coalition goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources were sufficient to effectively develop, manage, and transition logistics, supply, and maintenance systems to the ANP in 2014;
- U.S. and Coalition plans to transition ANP logistics and maintenance processes to Afghan lead included mitigation for the impact of delays in the transition; and
- U.S. and Coalition plans and resources would effectively support ANP logistics, supply, and maintenance systems sustainment and continued development beyond 2014.

## Background

In March 2011, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) published an assessment of U.S efforts to train, equip, and mentor the ANP.<sup>1</sup> DoD IG reported that, at that time, Coalition efforts to develop the ANP focused primarily on force generation. Logistics system development was a secondary priority. In late 2013, as the ANP achieved its personnel and force structure goals, ISAF shifted emphasis for their advising and assisting efforts to sustaining the force.

Coalition advisors trained, advised, and assisted ANP logisticians in accordance with MoI logistics policies, and, in 2013, transitioned responsibility for supplying basic commodities, such as food, clothing, and personal items to ANP logisticians. Leaders of U.S. and Coalition forces acknowledged that long-term ANP execution of MoI logistics processes was at risk without significant improvements in their logistical capabilities, an ongoing focus of ISAF's efforts.

In June 2014, discussions with senior MoI and ANP leaders led us to conclude that they understood the importance of a functional logistics system to their continued operations. We concluded that the ANP generally seemed capable of performing basic logistics functions. The significant gaps resulted from a lack of experience with demand-based logistics, for which they have only recently assumed responsibility. They lacked logisticians with 15 to 20 years of experience who could run and maintain systems while training their successors. Senior Afghan leaders recognized this challenge. More than one Afghan official also discussed the significance of "transparency," in this case defined as the MoI's ability to demonstrate good stewardship of international donations.

Coalition forces leadership was also fully aware of the importance of logistics system development and the challenges faced by the MoI and the ANP. However, logistics system development was one mission among many that had to be executed during major force reductions and a transition to the Resolute Support Mission. In response, the Commander, ISAF was in the process of reorganizing his command around the concept of functionally-based security force assistance, establishing eight essential functions critical to achieving the objectives of the Resolute Support Mission, and allocating additional resources to close sustainment capability gaps in the ANP.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Report number DODIG-2011-003, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police," March 3, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Functionally-based security force assistance concentrated on eight essential functions: 1. Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE); 2. Internal controls: assuring transparency, accountability, and oversight (TAO); 3. Rule of law (ROL) and governance; 4. Force generation: recruit, train, retain, manage, develop; 5. Force sustainment; 6. Command and control (C2) operations; 7. Intelligence; and 8. Strategic communications (STRATCOM).



Figure 1: Contracted ANP Vehicle Repair Parts Supply Facility  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

### ***The Afghan National Police Logistics System***

Prior to 2009, ANP logistics consisted of Coalition forces pushing supplies and equipment through the MoI to the ANP. This system was practical while the Coalition generated and equipped ANP forces, but did not support long-term sustainment. Centrally-planned logistics did not necessarily meet unit supply demands, often creating shortages in some units and excess supplies in others. Coalition officials did not support continued use of the push system to supply the ANP.

In 2009, MoI and ANP logisticians published demand-based MoI logistics policy. Effective implementation of demand-based logistics required supply officer initiative and coordination among commanders and logisticians at all levels in the supply chain. Coalition advisors observed that, although the ANP logisticians understood the supply system, MoI and ANP senior leaders and logisticians demonstrated inconsistent support for and enforcement of critical aspects of the policy. As of June 2014, Coalition forces retained control of many aspects of ANP logistics. To prepare for the impending transition of responsibility to the MoI and ANP, advisors continued to help the MoI and ANP augment and revise logistics policy to reflect demand-based ANP processes and procedures.

### *Afghan National Police Supply*

The MoI demand-based supply system was modeled on U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) logistics doctrine (see Table 1). It anticipated that ANP unit supply officers would requisition supplies based on unit need in support of ANP operations. The 2009 MoI logistics policy included requirements and procedures for inventory accountability, supply request reconciliation, consumption reporting, and confirmation of shipment and receipt of supplies. The system required all participants to maintain visibility of the status of customer needs and requests.

MoI policy also authorized ANP logisticians to identify and pre-stock critical, frequently-demanded supplies. The purpose of these authorized stockage lists (ASL) was to position critical supplies in logistics unit inventories to enhance ANP unit readiness. In accordance with MoI policy, Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs), designed as logistics hubs for supply requisition, storage, distribution, and reconciliation, were to stock, maintain, and distribute ASL items to rapidly satisfy unit demands for critical supplies.

*Table 1. ANP Materiel Groups and Classes of Supply*

Supply Class	Grouping	Description
CL 1	Food and Rations	Sustenance
CL 2	Clothing, Stationary, Supplies, Equipment, General Supply	General supply items, items consumed in use, clothing, material, uniform items, office equipment, furnishings, supporting sets, kits, outfits, general equipment
CL 3 Bulk	Fuel	Petroleum products transported and stored in bulk, such as aviation fuel, heating oils, diesel, benzene / petrol and wood
CL 3 Package	Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants	Petroleum products transported in consumption size containers or packages
CL 4	Construction Materials	Material normally only associated with construction
CL 5	Ammunition and Explosives	Ammunition and Explosives
CL 6	Demand Items for Hygiene, Comfort, and Welfare	Candy, gum, dental care products, soap
CL 7	End Items	Weapons, Weapon Support Systems and Primary items authorized by Tables of Organization and Equipment
CL 8	Medical Material	Consumables to support health care
CL 9	Spares / Repair Parts	Items required to be replaced on a form, fit, and function basis
CL 10	Non Military / Police Support	Items such as tractors, firefighting equipment, disaster relief material not used in military / police roles

Source: Ministry of Interior Policy, Process for the Management of Logistics, 6 January 2009

### *Afghan National Police Maintenance*

As of June 2014, Coalition forces funded contractors who performed vehicle and communications equipment maintenance, facilities management, and repair parts supply and management for the ANP. Coalition forces planned to allow most of these contracts to end during 2015 and transition responsibility to the ANP. For example, in 2014, in preparation for the transition of vehicle maintenance, Coalition force and MoI officials revised the ongoing vehicle maintenance contract to include maintenance and repair parts management training for ANP logisticians through 2015. However, with the high level of support required under the contract, Coalition force officials recognized that the ANP would likely be incapable of independent maintenance and maintenance management by the end of 2015.

### ***Afghan National Police Logistics Progress***

While development has been slow, ANP logistics has progressed in several areas, including:

- revision of some logistics policy,
- senior leader understanding of and involvement in systems,
- transition of logistics responsibility to the MoI and ANP, and
- acceptance of the use of civilian mechanics in the ANP logistics workforce.

Between 2012 and 2014, the MoI, with advice and assistance, supplemented and revised fuel management and equipment salvage policies. The revisions addressed the establishment of responsibility for fuel and the disposal of unserviceable equipment, respectively. Also, the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy published the first 2-year National Police Plan that included logistics education, merit-based recruiting, and facility construction tasks for the MoI.

Knowledgeable MoI and ANP senior leaders discussed automated systems, specifically the Automated Human Resource Information Management System and the automated Core Inventory Management System (CoreIMS) used by the ANP. The MoI Deputy Minister for Support clearly understood the need for logistics system transparency and discussed the capability of information technology systems to enable international donors to verify the use of donated materiel in the ANP supply system.

Acceptance of logistics responsibility by the MoI continued on schedule, with transition of responsibility for food, construction materials, and weapons maintenance executed in 2013, and fuel in 2014. In the summer of 2014, in preparation for transition from contractor-run maintenance, the MoI and ANP supported maintenance and supply chain management training by ensuring students filled training courses offered by logistics contractors.

MoI senior leaders remained open to discussions of civilianization of support personnel positions in the ANP logistics workforce. The MoI Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy advocated consideration for increasing civilians in the ANP, while other ANP senior leaders were willing to consider civilian mechanics.

## Observation 1

### Core Deficiencies in the Afghan National Police Logistics Systems

Fundamental ANP supply processes and procedures did not function in accordance with MoI logistics policies.

This occurred because:

- All elements of supply chain management (consumption reporting, supply requests, demand history, reconciliation, etc.) across the ANP lacked transparency.
- There was a lack of commodities available at the RLCs for issue to ANP units.
- ANP logisticians assumed U.S. and Coalition force advisors would not allow significant logistics shortages to cause ANP operational failure.

As a result, ANP forces were not motivated to rely on their supply system, which, in the past, had not consistently provided them with the essential supplies and equipment required to maintain operational readiness and performance.

### Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 3 and 4, for additional detail.)

- “DoD Supply Chain Material Management Policy,” DoD Instruction 4140.01, December 14, 2011
- “Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate,” 6 January 2009

### Discussion

Coalition force advisors acknowledged the lag in development of ANP supply processes and procedures compared to operational needs, and the resulting lack of confidence in the ANP’s logistics system. In 2009, Coalition force advisors, in coordination with the MoI, established demand-based logistics policies to support and sustain the ANP. These new processes and procedures differed significantly from the ANP’s previous centrally-controlled supply system. In 2014, Coalition force advisors observed that, while ANP supply chain management had improved, further progress was required to sufficiently develop ANP confidence in the logistics system.

## ***Afghan National Police Supply Chain Management***

MoI logistics policies included supply chain processes to transmit and monitor information on the flow of supplies between customers and suppliers. MoI policy required customers to report consumption of supplies and request re-supply.<sup>3</sup> Supply chain managers were expected to monitor availability and movement of supplies at each organization and report this information to customers and critical supply chain nodes. MoI policy further instructed logistics personnel to record demands for materiel to help predict and plan for future supply requirements. MoI expected to use this demand history data to add or delete items to ASLs and pre-stock these ASL items in RLCs and the National Logistics Center (NLC).

However, MoI and NLC leadership often failed to follow and enforce MoI processes and procedures, and the mechanisms for supply chain transparency, accountability, and feedback developed slowly and unevenly. Examples of weak enforcement included:

- MoI and NLC officials accepted ANP commanders' failures to submit required consumption reports, and explicitly authorized several to ignore the requirement.
- ANP logisticians did not always base requests for resupply on forecasts of future needs, negatively impacting timeliness and readiness as units requested unnecessary supplies from an already unresponsive supply chain.
- Personnel at the NLC practiced poor stock control and distribution, resulting in inaccurate warehouse inventories, gaps in filling orders, and cancellation of supply requests.
- ANP logisticians failed to record demand history for critical items and were unable to build demand histories to generate required levels for authorized supplies necessary to maintain readiness.
- ANP supply chain managers did not regularly reconcile supply requests, inventories, shipments, and deliveries. Upon receipt of a supply request, RLCs often shipped supplies on-hand and cancelled any remaining items due to the customer, instead of passing the request higher and updating the customer on the status of the unshipped supplies. Coalition force advisors stated there were no records of supplies owed to supply chain managers or customers from higher-echelon suppliers, and at least two MoI Support Command officers were not aware of the MoI reconciliation process for supply items owed to customers.

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<sup>3</sup> Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate, January 6, 2009.

Diminished participation by RLCs and unwillingness on the part of NLC officials, ANP commanders, and other ANP leaders to either enforce MoI policies or implement new ones risked continued erosion of confidence in the ANP supply system.

### ***Regional Logistics Centers***

According to MoI policy and Coalition force officials, RLCs performed a central role in regional ANP supply requests and distribution. In order to build a demand-based, distribution-focused logistics system for the ANP, the MoI issued policy directing provincial and regional ANP units to use their aligned RLCs as their first level of logistics support. However, reports from Coalition force advisors and direct observation showed clearly that most RLCs lacked full stocks of useful commodities or high-demand supplies. ANP units gained little from using RLCs as the policy dictated.

In addition, as stated above, the MoI allowed some units to bypass their supporting RLCs and request supplies directly from the NLC. Coalition officials recommended filling the RLCs with high-demand supplies as a means to more firmly establish RLCs' participation in the ANP logistic system.

### ***Implementing Afghan Solutions***

Although some MoI leaders expressed confidence in the ability of the ANP to assume increased responsibility for logistics, Coalition force advisors expressed concern over the impact of the MoI, NLC, and ANP failure to take full control of existing MoI logistics processes. For example, Coalition force advisors believed the continued failure of the MoI and NLC to enforce consumption reporting would disrupt efforts to build logistics forecasting capability. Without reliable information for planning and coordination, the ANP logistics system remained unresponsive to unit needs.

Coalition officials emphasized that Coalition force advisors should train, advise, and assist the MoI and ANP to implement and validate MoI logistics systems, instead of repeatedly interfering to fix logistics problems for them. MoI and ANP failure to validate, implement, and enforce existing logistics policies undermined confidence and trust in those policies, and increased the risk of prolonged dependence on Coalition support.



Figure 2: ANP Supply Manager Explains the MoI Supply Request Process Request Process  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 1.a***

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and the Ministry of Interior, advise and assist the Regional Logistics Centers to request, and National Logistics Center to issue, high-demand supply items to the Regional Logistics Centers in accordance with authorized stockage levels.**

### ***Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments***

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, stating that logistics advisors will influence the use of the MoI 14 supply requisition process between the Regional Logistics Centers and the National Logistics Center.

### *Our Response*

The response partially addressed the recommendation. We request Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead provide a response to the final report with an update on MoI's plans to provide authorized levels of supply stocks to the NLC and the RLCs.

### **Recommendation 1.b**

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to validate, implement, and enforce processes and procedures in its published logistics policy.**

### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, stating that Coalition force advisors will continue to coordinate with MoI to enforce logistics accountability.

### *Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.



## Observation 2

### Afghan Budget Laws

Budget laws and procedures of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) impeded ANP logistics processes.

This situation existed because GIROA laws:

- required the MoI to execute and disburse funds within the approved budget year, and
- were unclear as to when and to which level the ANP officials could plan for procurement in advance of the budget being signed into law.

As a result:

- contract awards were not completed until the eighth month of the Afghan budget year, compressing the budget execution timeline and preventing efficient and effective obligation and expenditure of funds, and
- the MoI was unable to completely execute its budget requirements, interfering with contracting and delivery of ANP goods and services.

### Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 7 and 9, for additional detail.)

- “Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law, GIROA,” 23 December 2013
- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MoF), “The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,” Procurement Policy Unit (PPU), 18 November 2009

### Discussion

GIROA budget laws and procedures impeded MoI logistics budget execution in support of the ANP. Further, many ANP officials adhered to procurement planning restrictions that appeared to be misinterpreted and self-imposed, increasing their negative impact.

#### ***Executing and Disbursing Funds within the Budget Year***

The GIROA budget was ordinarily a single-year appropriation comprised of a statement of proposed government expenditures, revenues, borrowing, and other financial transactions. The Afghan Parliament authorized expenditures by approving a budget act consistent with budget proposals. International donors

provided the majority of MoI funds. The ability of the Ministry to execute its budget was critical to ANP operational readiness and a criterion influencing international donor funding.

GIRoA operated on a cash accounting method, meaning funds had to be spent within the Afghan budget year, which ran from December 21 to December 20. GIRoA typically released contracts for bid in April and completed contract awards in August or September, leaving only 3 to 5 months to deliver goods and services before the end of the budget year. A Coalition force finance advisor estimated that approximately 70 percent of the goods and services contracts in a given budget year could not be completed in this 3 to 5 month execution period.

GIRoA budget law required ministries or other government agencies to request individual contract approval from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to carry-over an appropriation from one budget year to the next. GIRoA procurement law allowed ministries to enter into multi-year contracts only with prior approval of the MoF. A senior Coalition official described individual negotiations for exceptions for carry-over of funds as lengthy and inefficient for budget planning, and a senior Coalition force advisor described the current carry-over restrictions as the main issue impeding ANSF budget planning, resourcing, and execution.

### ***Planning for Procurement in Advance of the Budget Year***

Afghan procurement law stated that no ministerial or government agency procurement proceedings could begin prior to approval of the GIRoA budget. Coalition force advisors believed that, due to this language, the ANP was reluctant to even plan for procurements prior to budget passage. GIRoA typically completed the annual budget in January or February (months two and three) of the budget year; for example, the MoF planned to issue the 2015 budget on February 7, 2015. Waiting for GIRoA budget approval before taking any action regarding procurements:

- limited ANP planning time,
- increased the risk of hasty contract decisions,
- raised the potential for delayed execution of approved funding from international donors, and
- decreased the time available to deliver goods and services.

Coalition force advisors focused their efforts on the development of ANP budget requirements, planning procurements, awarding contracts, delivery of goods and services, and payment of contractors. They stated that the ministries could recover the 90 to 120 day procurement process delay at the beginning of the fiscal year if the MoF would change procurement laws to specifically allow ministry budget

officials to complete procurement planning up to, but not including, contract award prior to actual budget passage.<sup>4</sup> With this change, ANP officials could award contracts immediately following completion of the budget in January or February. Most contracts would then be awarded in April and May, giving contractors up to an additional 4 months to deliver goods and services.

Coalition force advisors believed that allowing the ministry to carry-over unexpended appropriations and routinely conduct procurement planning prior to budget completion would result in higher budget execution rates and a more deliberate and informed selection of contracted goods and services.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 2***

**Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Finance to propose and adopt a modification of Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan budget law and/or procurement law to allow for an expanded period of time to initiate and complete current year budget and procurement actions.**

### *Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead Comments*

Commander, CSTC-A agreed with our recommendation, stating that while the Afghan government should ultimately address budget and procurement law changes, Essential Function 1 (Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution) advisors, collaborating with CJ8 (CSTC-A Resource Managers), will assist the MoF to propose and adopt modifications to budget law and/or procurement actions.

### *Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.

<sup>4</sup> Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance “The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,” 18 November, 2009, p.12. Annual procurement planning includes detailed breakdowns, schedules, resource estimations, and procurement methods of goods, works, and services required (Rule 9). Further steps, such as soliciting bids, and conducting negotiations “up to, but not including contract award,” are only permissible in special circumstances, and must be approved in writing by the Ministry of Finance (Rule 14(4)).



## Observation 3

### Ministry of Interior Logistics Policy

MoI logistics policy for the ANP was outdated, incomplete, and overly-complex.

This situation existed because MoI policy was written by Coalition contractors, originated from U.S. / NATO logistics doctrine, and had not been updated to reflect ANP field practices and organizational changes.

This led to lack of clarity and relevance in the ANP logistics system guidance and policy. Inability to have or follow written guidance impeded the ability of ANP logisticians to do their jobs and decreased the functionality of the ANP logistics system.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Numbers 2, 4, 6 and 12 , for additional detail.)

- “Class III (Fuel) Management Policy” (Draft), MoI, 15 February 2014
- “Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate,” 6 January 2009
- “Process for the Management of Maintenance” Decree, MoI, Logistics Management Directorate (undated)
- “Vehicle Disposal Policy,” Ministry of Interior Policy, Deputy Minister for Support, General Department of Logistics, November 2012

### Discussion

The MoI published its logistics policy, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” in 2009. The policy introduced a “demand-based, distribution-focused supply system” to the ANP, based on U.S. / NATO doctrine, replacing the previous, centrally-controlled logistics system. While the Coalition planned for the 2009 policy to serve as a basis for modernization of MoI logistics through routine policy updates, this process of routine updates was never fully implemented.

Some policies were adequate but not enforced, with U.S. and Coalition advisors relating several instances of failure by MoI officials to follow and enforce their own logistics policies. In several instances, MoI logistic policies did not address or reflect widely-accepted ANP logistics operations and procedures. Some policies were incomplete, with content “to be published,” or discussed generic logistics principles without including information specific to ANP logistics operations.

### ***Policy Timeliness and Completeness***

The MoI based its 2009 logistics policy on U.S. / NATO doctrine, but MoI did not subsequently take responsibility for updating its logistics policies. As an example, contractors managed the ANP's vehicle maintenance and repair parts supply chain until 2014, and, in early 2014, ANP began a transition to organic maintenance. MoI logistics policies never addressed ANP procedures and responsibilities under contracted maintenance operations, nor were the MoI policies in place or established to assist with ANP transition to organic maintenance.

The 2009 logistics policy contained many unfinished sections, such as the concept of logistical support for communications and electronics, and an explanation of logistics transportation processes. Coalition force advisors identified additional areas requiring MoI update or direction, including consumption reporting guidance for ammunition and fuel, procedures for logistics contract management, and guidelines for demand analysis of critical supplies to forecast future requirements.

### ***Policy Complexity and Consolidation***

Coalition force advisors believed that many ANP officers below the senior level didn't follow the MoI logistics policies because they did not know or understand them. The MoI 2009 logistics policy, although unfinished, was lengthy and included a significant amount of complex detail. In addition to unpublished policy annexes, the MoI directed various logistics changes through ministerial ciphers (written orders) and decrees. The Coalition was not aware of any central repository to track, update, or rescind logistics ciphers, directives, and decrees, and Coalition force advisors claimed they did not always know what changes MoI ciphers and decrees directed, or whether the MoI had published or disseminated them. Senior coalition advisors agreed that in order to be effective, the MoI needed to revise its logistics policy to incorporate all current MoI logistics and maintenance ciphers, decrees, and necessary updates.

### ***Recent Policy Successes***

Notably, MoI officials developed three particularly useful logistics policy updates between 2012 and 2014. The MoI published its "Vehicle Disposal Policy" in late 2012, as Annexes C and D to the 2009 MoI Policy, "Process for the Management of Logistics." This policy offered clear and concise disposal and property book guidance and examples, although it did not include procedures for disposal of equipment, once it was removed from the property books. The MoI also published Annex E to its 2009 logistics policy, "MoI Ammunition Policy," in 2014.

In preparation for MoI control of bulk fuel in May 2014, MoI's (Draft) "Class III (Fuel) Management Policy," completed February 2014, updated MoI and ANP procedures for bulk fuel management. This policy clarified and directed

important logistics functions such as inventory management, demand forecasting, fuel requisition, creation of fuel distribution plans, and fuel consumption reporting. Unfortunately, this new fuel policy remained an unsigned draft as of June 2014, even though responsibility for bulk fuel transitioned to the MoI/ANP in May 2014.

Instead of strictly enforcing or updating logistics policies to make them work, MoI officials allowed some subordinate leaders to ignore policies. Coalition and ANP leaders cited examples of relaxation of policy requirements due to personal influence and patronage. A senior advisor stated that the MoI's continued lack of attention to policy undermined logistics process enforcement and related MoI / ANP system discipline. Coalition force advisors agreed that the MoI needed to take ownership of its logistics policies, amend them as necessary, and then enforce them.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### **Recommendation 3**

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police senior leadership to:**

- a. update the 2009 Ministry of Interior policy "Process for the Management of Logistics" to reflect current logistics processes and procedures,**
- b. consolidate logistics-related ciphers into the updated 2009 policy, and**
- c. expedite, approve, distribute, and enforce the draft Ministry of Interior fuel policy.**

### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation. The Command responded that the draft fuel policy was still awaiting MoI approval as of December 2014, and advisors were working to elevate its priority within MoI.

### *Our Response*

The response did not address Recommendations 3.a and 3.b. In response to the final report, we request a response on updating the MoI's 2009 logistics policy and the plan to consolidate logistics-related ciphers. Per Recommendation 3.c, we request a copy of the final MoI fuel policy, once signed by the MoI.



## Observation 4

### Afghan National Police Requirements Generation

ANP had not developed sustainable logistics planning capabilities.

This occurred because ANP:

- Logisticians lacked experience with a demand-driven supply system.
- Supply forecasting, demand data collection, reconciliation, and inventory management was a recent requirement.

As a result, ANP logisticians did not forecast future requirements, submit timely requisitions, or use demand history to project future needs.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Numbers 4, 8, and 12 , for additional detail.)

- “Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate,” 6 January 2009
- “Removal of Lost/Damaged/Destroyed Class VII Property From Records,” Change 1 to MoI Logistics Policy, 9 August 2011
- “Vehicle Disposal Policy,” Ministry of Interior Policy, Deputy Minister for Support, General Department of Logistics, November 2012

### Discussion

MoI Policy, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” dated January 6, 2009, emphasized that timely logistics support depended on ANP units’ submission of accurate forecasts of supply requirements and timely supply requests to their higher echelons. Although Coalition force advisors noted that MoI logistics processes in support of the ANP had demonstrated recent improvement, ANP logisticians still had not gained sufficient proficiency in projecting unit supply requirements. Generating timely logistics requirements required ANP logisticians to confirm supply inventories, incorporate historical demand information, and forecast future supply needs, before requisitioning supplies from the MoI supply system.

## ***Afghan National Police Experience with Demand-Based Logistics***

ANP logisticians had little experience with demand-based logistics. In accordance with the MoI's 2009 logistics policy, the ANP logistics system existed as a "pull" or demand-based system, driven by unit demands and needs. However, supplies were often pushed from the Coalition, MoI, or NLC in an effort to fill ANP units with the equipment they needed to fight. Although ANP logisticians continued to take more responsibility for logistics, the MoI contracted much of the ANP's logistics requirements until 2014. The MoI planned to de-scope many logistics contracts in 2014, but the ANP would not be ready to take responsibility for one of the largest contracts, management of vehicle repair parts, until late 2015.

In 2013, Coalition priorities transitioned from growth of the ANP force to sustainment. As part of this shift, Coalition force advisors increasingly focused on improving the effectiveness of logistics support by developing demand-driven supply capability based on sustainable requirements generation processes. Transition to demand-based logistics, a dynamic logistics concept requiring greater ANP unit and supply chain coordination to generate requirements, remained a significant challenge.

## ***Supply Forecasting and Demand Data Collection***

MoI policies addressed the different levels of supply forecasting, ranging from normal projections of subsistence item usage based on ANP personnel strength to consumption based on more unpredictable operational needs. Coalition force advisors at every level stressed the need for senior ANP leaders to develop and use consumption-based forecasting in their logistics planning, and advised ANP logisticians to collect accurate demand and inventory data as prerequisites for managing an effective consumption-based supply system.

RLCs were conceived as the focus for the collection of logistic data. However, because RLCs often lacked sufficient supply stocks, ANP units periodically bypassed the Centers, detracting from their ability to collect consumption and demand data from ANP units. A 2009 MoI policy addressed detailed, technical requirements for recording customer demands over time as a basis for supply forecasting, but ANP logisticians had not yet demonstrated the ability to execute this function. The 2014 "MoI Class III Management Policy," still in draft as of June 2014, and the 2014 "MoI Ammunition Policy" represented two improvements to the lengthy 2009 MoI policy. The updates explained procedures and simplified formulas for fuel and ammunition forecasting based on historical data and projections of operational needs. While more manageable, these procedures still required units to maintain accurate records.

## ***Inventory Management and Reconciliation***

MoI policy required inventory management and reliable consumption reports to synchronize supply chain activities and verify accountability. However, Coalition force advisors stated that ANP leaders did not uniformly enforce the use of management practices such as inventory accountability, consumption reporting, or re-order points to coordinate delivery timing, stockage requirements, and storage capacity for fuel. Poor inventory management also hindered other aspects of ANP requirements generation. For example, maintaining excess equipment inventories enabled ANP units to use this equipment instead of more efficiently managing its logistics systems by ordering parts to repair broken equipment, as required by MoI logistics policy. This practice reduced opportunities and incentives to collect demand data for repair parts.

Coalition force unit advisors reported that ANP supply personnel often misunderstood or ignored inventory and consumption documentation. At the National and Regional Logistic Centers, for example, supply personnel routinely failed to reconcile supply shipments with supplies still due to the customer. They shipped what was available and cancelled the remainder of the order. In many instances, ANP supply managers only had visibility of available supplies at their own organization. Coalition and MoI leaders discussed options for automating the ANP inventory management system to improve efficiency, accountability, and oversight. However, Coalition force advisors believed that the existing manual inventory management system would be sufficient for most supply chain processes, if ANP leadership would enforce its use.



Figure 3: Potentially Repairable ANP Vehicles in Regional ANP Vehicle Yard  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 4.a***

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to develop a fundamental supply forecasting and requirements generation process for use by Afghan National Police logisticians.**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, noting that supply forecasting and requirements generation is a major line of effort for EF5, predicated on Mol ability to produce accurate and timely consumption data and inventory accountability.

#### *Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. Additionally, EF5 sustainment conference briefings in October 2014 confirmed that Coalition Force advisors intended to focus on consumption-based forecasting and inventory management between June 2014 and January 2016. No further comment is required.

### ***Recommendation 4.b***

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, ensure Resolute Support Mission Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams have the capability to assist the Afghan National Police at national, regional, and provincial / district levels to develop logistics expertise that meets their basic supply and maintenance needs.**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, emphasizing that Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams should receive pre-deployment training specific to each assignment. The Command also noted that as regional and provincial level advisors are phased out under Resolute Support, training will be limited to the national level in the Kabul area.

*Our Response*

The response partially addressed the recommendation. We request a response to the final report with an update from Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead addressing whether logistics trainers on Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams are adequately trained for the Resolute Support Mission, and if not, whether additional pre-deployment and/or in-country training options are planned.



## Observation 5

### Afghan National Police Logistics Asset Availability

CoreIMS, a warehouse inventory management software program, was fielded to the NLCs and RLCs but almost never used.

This occurred because of:

- poor Internet connectivity and an insufficient number of computer connections, and
- lack of emphasis and enforcement from NLC and RLC leadership.

As a result, the ANP lacked capacity to capture and analyze consumption and demand data history necessary to build a sustainable supply chain management and logistical support system.

### Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 4 , for additional detail.)

- “Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate,” 6 January 2009

### Discussion

CoreIMS was intended to be used by the ANSF for warehouse inventory management. Originally designed as a stand-alone system, CoreIMS was upgraded with Web-enabled functionality in 2009. ANSF assumed legal ownership and technical responsibility for the system, and maintained it at the MoD Network Operations Center where it supported the ANA and the ANP. At a minimum, CoreIMS was designed for use at RLCs and higher logistics organizations. However, as of June 2014, several RLCs, the Material Management Center–Police, and the MoI Support Command did not have a functional CoreIMS system.

### Technical Issues

Both Afghan leaders and Coalition force advisors identified technology constraints that prevented the ANP from effectively using CoreIMS. According to one military advisor, the ANP communications officer attributed connectivity issues to contractors who were unable to successfully complete the work required to connect CoreIMS to the Internet. An advisor stated that the “lack of connectivity is a ‘showstopper’ for CoreIMS.” Another Coalition official noted challenges with slow CoreIMS data exchange due to lack of bandwidth. For example, the RLC in Regional Command-West reportedly did not use CoreIMS because data transmission via the Internet connection was too slow.

In addition to poor Internet connectivity, a shortage of functioning connection ports limited the ANP's use of CoreIMS. While some Internet connectivity existed in Kabul and Wardak, at the MoI Support Command in Wardak none of the three computers were used for CoreIMS. As reported by Coalition force advisors, some locations had Web access, but only the computers of senior officers were connected to the Internet. Similarly, at the Medical Warehouse in Kabul, the ANP staff had computers for CoreIMS, but the computers were not connected to the Internet. In some cases, Coalition advisors reported that computers remained in boxes, which were used as tables.

After our field work, at the request of the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics sponsored a team that deployed to Afghanistan that focused on information technology initiatives, including improvements to CoreIMS. One option under review was disconnected operations, which would allow CoreIMS operators continued use of the system during periods of lost Internet connectivity. Another team focus was the improvement of the ANSF (including the ANP) information technology infrastructure, specifically the application of wireless solutions.<sup>5</sup> According to one senior Coalition official, the ANP was already Internet and wireless capable, and Kabul had, or would soon have, 4G Internet capabilities.

### ***Leadership Support***

Despite the technical challenges, senior MoI and ANP officials expressed support for CoreIMS. The MoI Director for Logistics stated that CoreIMS made logistics easier, and that one skilled computer operator could do the work of 20 clerks using paper ledgers. The ANP Commander for the National Medical Depot believed that CoreIMS was valuable, claiming that it allowed him to input the data for items contained in the warehouse and distribute copies to the various regions. Most significantly, the leadership at the ANP national ammunition storage facility uploaded and tracked ANP ammunition inventory in CoreIMS. Coalition force advisors reported that the effective use of the system at 22 Bunkers should be the model for CoreIMS application throughout the ANP.

While senior officials voiced support, the MoI and ANP as a whole had not coordinated or enforced the use of CoreIMS. ISAF Joint Command (IJC) advisors stated they could not identify an office in the Ministry that would accept CoreIMS Program Management Office responsibility. Also, as stated above, CoreIMS support and use at the RLCs lagged national logistic support organizations. For example,

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<sup>5</sup> Examples of possible "wireless solutions" include internet through mobile communications technology, such as 4G, or connections through satellite internet.



readily accessible. For example, demand data contained in requests that were partially filled (one or more items were unavailable) or rejected outright were not collected to establish demand requirements. CoreIMS offered logisticians the ability to assemble demand history through analysis of its “Back Order” and “Open and Closed” shipping reports. In addition, as of June 2014, the contractor was preparing to field a “Demand Analysis” report that should provide another method to develop demand data.

In addition to lost data, the paper-based ledger system required the physical transfer of paperwork from the RLCs to the Material Management Center–Police at the NLC. Coalition force advisors stated this led to delays in uploading new stock and a lack of validation of the paperwork from the MoI Support Command to the Material Management Center–Police. As noted by one Coalition advisor, “the inability of the RLCs to utilize CoreIMS obstructs the national level visibility to order repair parts.”

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Recommendation 5.a***

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, assist Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to investigate possible options for increasing accessibility to Core Inventory Management System through wireless solutions.**

### ***Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments***

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, noting that establishing CoreIMS capability is a critical line of effort for EF5 and the ANSF. The Command stated that wireless solutions are used when possible and appropriate, and provided examples of MoD and ANA CoreIMS capabilities and limitations.

### ***Our Response***

Although the Command concurred with the recommendation, the status of wireless solutions for ANP CoreIMS was not clear. In addition, in the fall of 2014, a logistics automation assistance team visiting Afghanistan resulted in numerous proposed enhancements to CoreIMS, but included no recommendations for further wireless solutions. We ask that the Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead provide additional comments in response to the final report, clarifying options for wireless CoreIMS access specific to MoI and ANP.

### **Recommendation 5.b**

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to issue a cipher requiring the Afghan National Police to use Core Inventory Management System for warehouse inventory management as connectivity issues are resolved.**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, stating that EF5 advisors were working with the MoI to revise current policies and establish new ciphers that mandate the use of CoreIMS.

#### *Our Response*

While the Command's comments were responsive, we request a copy of the revised policies and ciphers mandating the use of CoreIMS, once finalized and approved.

### **Recommendation 5.c**

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to establish an Afghan Program Management Office to oversee system support for Core Inventory Management System.**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, stating that EF5 is working with MoI advisors to establish a CoreIMS Afghan Program Management Office.

#### *Our Response*

The Command's comments addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Additionally, an OSD team visiting Afghanistan in the fall of 2014 to assess ANSF logistics automation systems reported that an effort to establish an Automation Program Management Office (PMO) was underway, and was supported by the Director of Plans, Policy and Operations (PPO), under the Afghan Ministry of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. No further comment is required.



## Observation 6

### Sustainment of Afghan National Police Facilities

The ANP lacked the funding and experience to sustain existing infrastructure at a minimal essential level for operations.

This situation existed because the:

- MoI allocated insufficient budget for infrastructure sustainment.
- Central Prison Directorate was not included in the program of record.
- Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan funded construction of facilities without visibility, participation, or requirements input from the MoI Facilities Director.
- MoI's inefficient contracting processes led to a \$40 million outstanding debt to contractors from the previous fiscal year.

Delayed and deferred maintenance will lead to deteriorating infrastructure, negatively impacting ANP operational readiness and increasing budgetary requirements needed to execute repairs in future years.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Numbers 4, 7, and 9, for additional detail.)

- “Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate,” 6 January 2009
- “Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law, GIRoA,” 23 December 2013
- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MoF), “The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,” Procurement Policy Unit (PPU), 18 November 2009

### Discussion

The MoI faced significant challenges operating and sustaining ANP infrastructure because of maintenance costs, excess facilities, and system complexity. Several factors contributed to these challenges. First, Coalition forces often constructed ANP facilities with high-grade materials that were potentially expensive for the ANP to maintain. Second, a Presidential Decree required the ANSF to accept and manage all vacated Coalition facilities. The ANP portion of these additional Coalition facilities gave the ANP more infrastructure than they needed or could afford, built to Western standards (for example, wall sinks vice foot-washing

basins). Advisors questioned whether ANP facility managers could effectively execute more complex tasks associated with support of these Coalition facilities, such as maintaining modern installation power generation and water treatment facilities.

### ***Budgetary Issues***

The operations and maintenance costs of ANP facilities became an ANP priority and raised concerns as the Coalition neared the completion of infrastructure construction in 2013. For example, the ANP Deputy Director for Facilities reported that when Coalition forces transferred responsibility and funding for infrastructure to the ANP in 2013, the amount transferred was only 13 percent of the funds required for the 6-month period. Funding for the future also appeared questionable. Coalition projections showed that the funding for MoI infrastructure sustainment in 2016 left a \$26.4 million shortfall (\$180.5 million programmed, \$206.9 million projected).

ANP officials reported facility budget shortfalls across the organization. One RLC commander stated that the funding received by his Facilities Manager did not satisfy RLC maintenance requirements and allowed only for limited repairs of the highest-priority projects. The Commander of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) observed that two ANCOP battalions did not yet have permanent facilities. Finally, an Afghan Border Police (ABP) facilities officer reported he had not received the budget allocation he required to maintain over 135 buildings and checkpoints in his zone of operations.



Figure 5: Facilities Construction at the National Logistics Center  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

### ***Central Prison Directorate***

In June 2014, the Coalition force advisor to the ANP Deputy Director for Facilities was concerned that the Facilities Directorate was responsible for maintaining the 34 facilities belonging to the Central Prison Directorate without the commensurate increase in budget authority. A senior Coalition engineering advisor reported in August 2014 that a request for funds for maintenance of the Central Prison Directorate infrastructure was added to the comprehensive list of budget requirements for the Afghan 2015 budget year. However, he further reported that MoI officials had not yet published their budget priorities, or identified a funding source for the requirement.

### ***Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan***

The United Nations Development Program established the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan in 2002, as a means to mobilize resources for the development of the police forces in Afghanistan. Priorities for the fund included the restoration and construction of police facilities throughout Afghanistan, including dormitories, training centers, hospitals, and others.

The ANP Deputy Director for Facilities reported that United Nations fund representatives planned and funded construction projects without guidance or approval from the ANP Facilities Department. He believed that these actions were contrary to standing agreements between the MoI and fund administrators, and he was concerned that the MoI Facilities Department would be held responsible for Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan facility construction and sustainment without participating in the planning process.

### ***Contracting Processes***

GIRoA budget and contract laws required the MoI to execute and disburse funds within the same budget year, but the MoI was unable to award contracts until the eighth month of the Afghan budget year. As a result of this compressed budget execution timeline, the ANP was routinely unable to execute its annual budget requirements. The ANP Deputy Director for Facilities illustrated the significance of the issue, stating that the ANP owed \$40 million to contractors from the previous fiscal year. This occurred because specific budget codes terminated or changed during the year, and the ANP was unable to receive approval to realign funds to alternate budget codes in time to allow a complete expenditure of funds before the conclusion of the budget year.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> See Observation 2, Recommendation 2, p.13.

### ***Mitigation Strategies***

A number of Coalition advisors pointed out that the ANP lacked an accurate inventory of its real property, including physical locations and year of construction for structures. The Assistant Chief of Staff for ANSF Development at one regional command headquarters suggested that an MoI order directing an inventory was a way to emphasize its importance and help ensure its accuracy.

Coalition advisors also updated the Small Facility Sustainment Design plan, designed to address the complexity of structures built for Coalition use and transitioned to ANSF control. The concept was to revise and simplify construction standards to match ANSF capabilities and resources, for example, by reducing plumbing and power generation requirements. The Deputy Director for Facilities stated that the MoI Deputy Minister for Support and Deputy Minister for Finance had approved the plan for 2015, but MoI budget prioritization for 2015 was still in progress.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Recommendation 6.a***

**Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior Facilities Director to complete a baseline inventory, including Central Prison Directorate facilities, and develop a plan for appropriately reducing Afghan National Police facilities.**

### ***Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead Comments***

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead concurred with the recommendation, noting several ongoing initiatives to assist MoI with facility inventory requirements, including: a 2014 MoI Strategic Basing Plan to help MoI to determine baseline inventory requirements; installation of an inventory database encompassing at least 80 percent of MoI infrastructure, including a plan to add Central Prison Directorate facilities; and the creation of funding incentives to reduce identified excess MoI facilities.

### ***Our Response***

The response addressed the specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.

***Recommendation 6.b***

**Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to review, and if necessary, gain an enhanced role over ongoing and future Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan-funded construction with respect to future Ministry of Interior sustainment responsibilities.**

***Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead Comments***

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead concurred with the recommendation, citing a number of planned initiatives to facilitate coordination, planning, and cost estimation between the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan and the MoI Facilities Department.

***Our Response***

The response addressed the specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.



## Observation 7

### Afghan National Police Fleet Management

The MoI did not have a fleet management plan for vehicles and other major end-item equipment.

This occurred because:

- Fleet management had not been a Coalition priority with respect to ANP capacity building and sustainment.
- Availability of excess equipment reduced ANP incentives to manage the maintenance, repair, and replacement of vehicles and other end-items.
- MoI leadership had not been required to plan for fleet management.

Lack of an ANP fleet management plan has or will result in reduced ANP ability to sustain its equipment and maintain force readiness.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Numbers 4, 8, 11, and 12, for additional detail.)

- “Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate,” 6 January 2009
- “Removal of Lost/Damaged/Destroyed Class VII Property From Records,” Change 1 to MoI Logistics Policy, 9 August 2011
- “Transition of ANP Vehicle Maintenance,” DCOS ANSF LOG DLO Information Paper, 27 May, 2014
- “Vehicle Disposal Policy,” Ministry of Interior Policy, Deputy Minister for Support, General Department of Logistics, November 2012

### Discussion

The MoI did not have a fleet management plan for vehicles and other major end-items, including weapons, communication gear, and equipment to counter improvised explosive devices. Without an effective plan, the MoI and ANP will not be capable of maintaining sustainable use of equipment and appropriate force readiness. ISAF officials were aware of this deficiency and characterized the development of an ANP fleet management plan as a force sustainment and operational readiness priority.

Adequate planning for fleet management would increase maintenance cost-effectiveness, identify repair criteria, eliminate unrepairable and unnecessary equipment, and determine the optimal level of equipment inventory and resources. Equipment acquisition, fielding, maintenance, and disposal continued to develop as separate logistics management functions in the ANP. Collective management as part of a fleet management plan offered opportunities for the MoI to integrate logistics and maintenance processes.

### ***Previous Coalition Priorities***

The ANP lacked fleet management plans primarily because prior to 2014, force generation, not ANP logistics systems development, was the Coalition's priority. As of May 2014, the ANP had gained little experience managing its own end-item equipment logistics; contractors provided the majority of maintenance and repair parts management. While the Coalition transitioned weapons maintenance responsibility from contractors to the ANP in 2013, the transition of vehicle and communications equipment maintenance was planned for no earlier than 2015.

Lack of training and experience potentially prevented ANP logisticians from developing individual sustainment policies and procedures that could collectively comprise a basic fleet management plan. These would need to address:

- synchronization of lower-level maintenance and scheduled services,
- operator training,
- increased supply discipline through improvements in forecasting, inventory accountability, and requisition processing, and
- an efficient means of equipment disposal and replacement.

In 2014, the Coalition's primary focus was on developing maintenance and repair parts management capabilities at ANP logistics centers. However, the Coalition believed development of fleet management capability and more advanced fleet management tasks, such as heavy equipment repair and vehicle reset programs to extend equipment life, were important considerations for future ANP sustainment planning.

### ***Excess Equipment***

The immediate need for ANP fleet management planning was diminished by the availability of excess equipment. ISAF leaders believed that having excess equipment on-hand was a significant disincentive to proper care of vehicles and weapons, as reflected in poor execution of maintenance, services, and disposal processes. For example, although weapons maintenance had transitioned from contractor to ANP responsibility in 2013, advisors reported that the number of weapons turned-in and repaired at ANP RLCs was negligible. One Coalition



Figure 6: Scrap ANP Vehicles in Regional ANP Vehicle Yard  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

ANP logistics advisor reported that the organization he advised had three times its authorized quantity of small arms. Fifty percent of these were non-mission capable, but due to excess inventory, the unit readiness rate for weapons was still 100 percent. Coalition advisors cited similar examples related to excess vehicles in ANP unit inventories.

### ***Lack of Awareness of Fleet Management Concepts***

ANP also lacked fleet management capability because MoI leadership had not required its development. The Coalition pushed major end-items to the ANP during the force build-up, contractors managed major end-item repairs and services, and the MoI did not need to enforce ANP equipment disposal procedures. MoI has gained no experience managing “end-to-end” logistics pertaining to the life cycle of major equipment. For example, the MoI has little equipment procurement expertise, and even with additional experience and training, Coalition advisors expected and were prepared to provide the MoI continued assistance to complete future foreign military sales procurements.

In the absence of sustainable logistics procedures, equipping ANP units often depended on relationships rather than documented procedures. Coalition advisors stated that many ANP units reported excess equipment, while others were short the same equipment. But, the MoI did not enforce cross-leveling of excess equipment among ANP units. In addition, the MoI habitually issued all equipment, including items excess to unit authorizations, without a budget for establishing

a reserve. Although an ANP vehicle fleet reserve reportedly existed in the past, these vehicles had since been distributed to ANP units in response to equipment losses and changes to authorized quantities of equipment.

MoI leadership and many ANP commanders did not consistently enforce equipment maintenance and service requirements for which the ANP had responsibility. For example, while the maintenance contractor serviced and repaired ANP vehicles, ANP units were required to deliver them to the contractor for needed or scheduled work. The contractor estimated that 25 percent of the ANP vehicle fleet had not been delivered for scheduled servicing.

ANP units were required to turn in unserviceable major equipment items in order to receive replacements. However, Coalition advisors cited difficulties with the equipment disposal process, stressing MoI and ANP leadership approval procedures and lack of involvement as primary obstacles.

### ***Efforts to Sustain Afghan National Police Equipment Through 2015***

While the ANP lacked a comprehensive plan, Coalition and MoI efforts continued to improve supply and maintenance functions integral to overall fleet management. In early 2014, Coalition advisors, in coordination with the ANP vehicle maintenance contractors, initiated a comprehensive vehicle maintenance training effort to prepare for the transition to ANP-run vehicle maintenance and repair parts supply. By June 2014, the MoI had begun to prepare maintenance facilities in the provinces by determining the required number of mechanics and supply personnel, certifying personnel training and readiness, and issuing necessary tools and an initial grouping of repair parts.

In support of this effort, IJC advisors and vehicle maintenance contractors identified repair part requirements for each level of maintenance to sustain ANP vehicle readiness post-2015. The CSTC-A Security Assistance Office helped the MoI develop Foreign Military Sales program cases to procure these repair parts. Finally, Coalition advisors, in coordination with the MoD as ANSF lead, offered procurement training for MoI and ANP logistics personnel at its Afghan Development and Resource Management facility in Kabul.

The MoI published its vehicle disposal policy during 2012, and advisors worked with the MoI to process equipment disposal actions. Advisors reported that some ANP commanders with equipment shortages were aware of the need to cross-level excess equipment. An advisor also anticipated that modifications to ANP vehicle authorizations for the next Afghan solar year might permit rebuilding a vehicle strategic reserve from the existing fleet.

The Coalition required an MoI fleet management plan prior to transition of responsibility for vehicles and other end-item equipment to the MoI. Key considerations included timing, availability of MoI resources, and competing priorities. Acknowledging the long-term importance of a viable fleet management plan for both the ANA and ANP, the CSTC-A Commander requested a team from the U.S. Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command Life Cycle Management Command to assess ANA and ANP fleet management needs and capabilities. This team arrived in August 2014 to conduct its initial planning assessment.



Figure 7: ANP Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) Awaiting Repair by ANP and Afghan Civilian Personnel  
Source: DoD IG-SPO



Figure 8: ANP LTV  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 7***

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to develop a vehicle and equipment fleet management plan for sustainment of the Afghan National Police that, at a minimum, addresses policy, organic and contracted capabilities at all levels of maintenance, and funding within budget constraints.**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, stating that EF5 is working with the ANP to create a lifecycle management organization to set policy and direction for maintenance and support of fielded systems.

### *Our Response*

The response, combined with recent Command EF5 command updates, partially addressed the recommendation. An OSD life cycle management assessment team produced an EF 5 sustainment conference briefing as of October 2014 and a subsequent OSD report portraying life cycle management as a key focus area for both the ANA and the ANP. The briefing and report included a draft life cycle maintenance timeline and organizational structure for the ANA. However, there was little specific planning data for the ANP. We request a response to the final report with an update from Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead on MoI plans to establish life cycle management for the ANP.

## Observation 8

### Regional Logistics Centers

While ANP Commanders seemed to understand MoI policy regarding RLCs, police leadership normalized bypassed RLCs and, in many cases, did not use them as intended.

This situation existed because:

- MoI leadership, including the Material Management Center–Police and MoI Support Command Commanders, explicitly allowed some units to bypass the RLCs and obtain supplies directly from the NLC.
- The RLCs proved unable to consistently fill unit supply requests.
- For some units in eastern provinces, the NLC in Wardak was closer than the RLC in Kabul.
- The future of the Nangarhar RLC was in doubt based on security concerns and its geographic proximity to Kabul.

As a result, RLCs were unable to become fully functional and, without their effectiveness, supply chain operations remained inefficient.

### Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 4, for additional detail.)

- “Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate,” 6 January 2009

### Discussion

The IG team interviewed Coalition force RLC advisors from Kabul, Nangarhar, Gardez, Kandahar, and Herat, and visited the Kandahar and Herat RLCs. The team also spoke with key ANP logistics personnel in the MoI, Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). ANP officials responsible for logistics chain functions were aware of the policies governing RLC functions, and seemed to generally understand the RLC concept and its role.

### ***Bypassing the Regional Logistics Centers***

ANP units were supposed to conduct logistics business with Kabul and the NLC through the RLCs. However, in every region, ANP and Coalition personnel related that some AUP, ABP, and ANCOP units regularly bypassed the RLC and conducted logistics / supply business directly with the NLC. This occurred for various reasons, and in many cases had become a standard way of conducting business.

The Deputy Commanders of the MoI Support Command and the Material Management Center–Police agreed that MoI policy directed all ABP, AUP, and ANCOP units to route supply requests through the supporting RLC, but that the MoI often approved exceptions. For example, the Material Management Center–Police Deputy Commander said it was routine for the ANCOP, with MoI approval, to come directly to the NLC for supplies, using its own trucks for transport. He stated that even though his command could manage and account for these workarounds, he understood it violated established policy and therefore disliked the arrangement.

***Limited Supplies On-Hand at the Regional Logistics Center***

The RLCs had a history of not having the supplies their supported units required. Advisors in Kabul told the IG team that the RLC in Kabul was supposed to support nine provinces, but three of them ordered and received supplies directly from the NLC. An ANP logistics officer in Kandahar verified he ordered supplies directly from the NLC if the RLC did not have them on-hand. Advisors to the Kandahar provincial police headquarters said their advised unit bypassed the RLC because the Center “didn’t have the right supplies for units to order and build their confidence in the pull system.” Coalition force advisors throughout the country echoed this concern. The Deputy Commanding General for Force Development in Regional Command – South acknowledged his advised RLC had some supplies, but questioned whether the right supplies were regularly in its inventory to instill confidence in the ordering process.<sup>7</sup> An advisor in Kabul said that the RLC must have readily available supplies and commodities, along with NLC enforcement of MoI policy, to cause police units to use it. In Herat, the RLC advisors said that the provincial headquarters and ABP units regularly used the RLC, but would circumvent it when the RLC did not have what they needed.



Figure 9: Regional ANP Supply Warehouse with Stacks of Classroom Desks  
Source: DoD IG-SPO



Figure 10: Regional ANP Supply Warehouse with Construction and Barrier Materials  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

<sup>7</sup> See Observation 1, this report, “Core Deficiencies in the Afghan National Police Logistics Systems,” p. 9, “Regional Logistics Centers” and p. 10, Recommendation 1.a.

### ***Regional Logistics Center Proximity and Security Risk***

Advisors to the MoI Support Command, the Material Management Center–Police, and the NLC confirmed that the AUP headquarters in Parwan and the ABP Zone 1 headquarters in Nangarhar were authorized to bypass their assigned RLC because the NLC was physically closer than the RLC in Kabul. Advisors said that this impacted RLC and overall logistic system development, but understood that Afghan officials approved it because they believed that the shorter travel distance increased efficiency and lowered security risk.

### ***Concern for the Nangarhar Regional Logistics Center***

The RLC in Nangarhar was scheduled to open in October 2014. However, Coalition advisors understood that its completion and transition to the ANP would be problematic. The ANP was very concerned about the security of the RLC. The closest paved road to the Nangarhar RLC was approximately 3 miles away, and the RLC was located next to high terrain. The RLC staff thought that the unpaved access road leading to the RLC offered an easy target for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and was also concerned that the RLC had no guard towers in the direction of the high terrain. Further complicating the issue, paving the access road and building guard towers was not a part of the Coalition construction contract, but an Afghan responsibility. Because of these security concerns, the IG team was not able to visit the RLC in Nangarhar during fieldwork in June 2014.

The travel distance from Kabul to the Nangarhar RLC was another concern. The staff living in Kabul would be required to commute greater than 50 miles in each direction or move to Nangarhar. Many of the staff did not want to move from Kabul. Coalition advisors, “expected [RLC] staff exodus before transition,” listing this as a command challenge.

Pending completion of the Nangarhar RLC, originally anticipated for June 2014, ANP units in the surrounding districts intended to continue using the RLC in Kabul for supplies. However, the RLC in Kabul generally stocked only ammunition, and ANP units became accustomed to ordering and receiving supplies directly from the NLC. When asked, the ABP Zone 1 logistics officer admitted that he did not plan to use the Nangarhar RLC once it opened, expecting to continue directing supply requests to the NLC.

U.S. and Coalition officials had not decided whether the Nangarhar RLC was essential, or whether the amount of resources already invested in the site argued for its completion. A Coalition force logistics advisor further noted that funding and construction of the access road, guard towers, and other security improvements to make the facility fully functional would require an Afghan

solution. Advisors stated that replacing the capabilities of the Nangarhar RLC with the equivalent of an RLC at the National Logistics Center in Wardak, or combining the RLC with the Regional Maintenance Center in Jalalabad, could be viable alternatives.

### ***Future of the Regional Logistics Centers***

There were obvious advantages for units in geographic proximity to Kabul to obtain supplies directly from the NLC. However, in order to effectively develop RLCs as conceived in MoI logistics policy, MoI and ANP leadership needed to implement and enforce logistics policy throughout the entire chain of command, or change policy to reflect actual supply procedures that might be more practical and effective.



Figure 11: National Supply Warehouse, ANP NLC, Wardak  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

Figure 12: National Supply Warehouse, ANP NLC, Wardak  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Recommendation 8.a***

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise the Ministry of Interior to enforce logistics policy regarding the use of the Regional Logistics Centers or change the policies to reflect actual execution.<sup>8</sup>**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, noting that logistics policy regarding the use of the Regional Logistics Centers was a continuing challenge for the Chief of Logistics.

<sup>8</sup> This is a repeat recommendation from our 2011 DoD IG Report "Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police," Project Number DoD IG 2011-003, dated March 3, 2011.

### *Our Response*

Although the Command concurred, the response did not address the specifics of the recommendation. The response to Recommendation 8.b, below, states that regional supply nodes will continue to be used for supply distribution, but does not specifically address Regional Logistics Centers. We request a response to the final report with an update from Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead on advising efforts and/or MoI plans to enforce or change logistics policy regarding the use of the Regional Logistics Centers.

### **Recommendation 8.b**

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, assist Ministry of Interior to conduct a review to determine if the Regional Logistics Center in Nangarhar is necessary, and either complete efforts there or terminate the project and determine where the Nangarhar function will be performed.**

### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, stating that the MoI has taken custody of Nangarhar RLC and appears to be committed to using the facility. The response added that MoI logistics requirements will continue to be based on demand-based supply from national to regional logistics nodes.

### *Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.



## Observation 9

### Afghan National Police Transition to Organic Maintenance

The MoI-generated plan to transition the ANP to organic vehicle maintenance by December 2015 had received Coalition support, but conditions existed that could inhibit success.<sup>9</sup>

This occurred because:

- ANP had virtually no experience conducting organic maintenance, lacked maintenance management expertise, and had been dependent on contractor logistics support.
- The desired Army-type maintenance model requiring uniformed policemen to perform maintenance and maintenance management might not be affordable for the ANP in the long-term.

Withdrawal of Coalition force maintenance support by December 2015, without a corresponding MoI emphasis on recruiting, training, and equipping vehicle maintenance and supply personnel, may result in:

- failure to develop and implement a sustainable ANP organic maintenance capability,
- an increase in the amount of inoperable ANP equipment, and
- degraded ANP operational readiness and force sustainability.

<sup>9</sup> Organic maintenance in this report refers to maintenance operations conducted by MoI and ANP employees, not by contractors.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Numbers 1, 4, and 11, for additional detail.)

- “Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP), Mechanical Skills Development Plan ROM,” 24 February 2014
- “Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate,” 6 January 2009
- “Transition of ANP Vehicle Maintenance,” DCOS ANSF LOG DLO Information Paper, 27 May, 2014

## Discussion

In early 2014, MoI senior leaders decided to transition responsibility for vehicle maintenance and maintenance management from contractors to MoI and ANP personnel, a radical change to the model. The Coalition command, in conjunction with the MoI, developed a plan to transition responsibility for vehicle maintenance to the ANP no later than December 29, 2015. The transition plan included the ANP assuming responsibility for vehicle maintenance and repair, and maintenance management, including repair parts. The scope and timing of the plan was aggressive.

### ***Contracted Maintenance***

Since 2006, contractors funded and managed by the Coalition performed all maintenance and maintenance management for the ANP. In 2011, the MoI established a contract, still in place in 2014, to manage ANP vehicle maintenance. The contractor, an international vehicle fleet management services company, maintained virtually all ANP vehicles and supplied vehicle repair parts. Even though ANP units had some trained mechanics and supply personnel, the ANP had never been responsible for its own vehicle maintenance or parts supply.

To expedite the anticipated transition from contracted maintenance, Coalition and MoI planners focused on strengthening organizational maintenance capability across the ANP. With Coalition assistance, MoI leadership would ensure a small number of district and provincial ANP maintenance facilities had a sufficient number of trained mechanics and adequate tools on site. The MoI would then issue a small quantity of repair parts to units to facilitate unit responsibility, and would urge them to exercise the ANP parts request process to request additional repair parts. In addition to supporting the Afghan-led pilot project, Coalition advisors planned a phased reduction of contractor support, expecting the ANP to exercise increased levels of responsibility for its own maintenance over time.



Figure 13: ANP Contracted Maintenance Facility-Tactical Vehicles  
Source: DoD IG-SPO



Figure 14: ANP Contracted Maintenance Facility-Vehicle Repair Parts Stockage  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

### ***Building Maintenance Management Expertise***

In 2014, MoI officials approved a proposal by the ANP's maintenance contractor to train ANP vehicle mechanics, supply chain managers, and workshop supervisors. Training began in June 2014 at selected maintenance facilities. This effort was designed to meet the ANP need for maintenance and supply technicians by transition at the end of 2015.

The contractor's training plan offered several advantages:

- hands-on training instead of classroom instruction,
- ANP maintainers working and training side-by-side with experienced contractor employees, and
- ANP management exposure to functioning maintenance and supply management.

MoI and Coalition officials planned for the contractor to continue training the ANP through June-July 2015, with the objective of training approximately 1,400 ANP mechanics and 200 supply chain technicians over a 12-month period. The plan called for a percentage of students to complete advanced coursework and qualify as trainers to ensure a self-sustaining training capability after contract completion.

However, Coalition advisors noted challenges to successful transition. ANP mechanics and supply managers training on maintenance and supply chain management concepts with the contractor would have few repair parts in their own facilities to support the planned increase in maintenance responsibilities at transition. IJC advisors emphasized that the timely procurement and stockage of repair parts, known as an authorized stockage list, was critical to the success of the transition from contract maintenance. The IJC DCOS ANSF Logistics J4, Maintenance, stated he had initiated a procurement of 1,381 types of vehicle parts for ANP use after contract termination in December 2015.

Trainers and advisors identified other potential shortfalls in support of transition from contract to organic maintenance. MoI logistics policies and systems were outdated or not used, and the contractor was not required to train ANP personnel on the MoI parts request system. The computerized warehouse management system, CoreIMS, had limited connectivity and was rarely used. ANP units would be required to manage maintenance processes they had no visibility over during contracted maintenance, such as scheduling routine vehicle services and conducting complex levels of repair. In addition, ANP units would have continued responsibility for management processes, such as operator maintenance, vehicle recovery, and inspection of unserviceable vehicles for turn-in, each requiring continued attention.

### ***Prospects for Workforce Civilianization***

The transition from contract maintenance required a large number of trained mechanics, supply personnel, and warehouse managers. It was unclear if the ANP could find a sufficient number of educated volunteers to be trained to support the plan. MoI and ANP leaders argued for using uniformed policemen as mechanics and supply chain technicians. This personnel system approach would be more expensive than hiring civilian technicians because uniformed police earned a higher salary than civilians on the force. Some Coalition force advisors supported “civilianizing” police maintenance, and suggested hiring contractor employees once the current contract was complete. However, contractor employees earned higher salaries than ANP civilian employees, and could potentially earn more outside the police force. Coalition force advisors agreed that MoI should consider civilian staffing options, and one MoI advisor thought that the ANP would have an incentive to hire civilians if the lower wage costs meant more money available overall for the ANP force. At least one senior Coalition official believed the MoI should consider reducing force numbers to pay for additional mechanics and other logistics sustainment needs.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Recommendation 9.a***

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, begin a phased reduction of the Afghan National Police vehicle maintenance contractor’s role in order to increase Afghan responsibility.**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, but stated that a phased reduction will not begin until MoI/ANP leadership and personnel demonstrate that they are fully capable of conducting and sustaining maintenance and maintenance management operations. In the interim, ANP contracted support will continue to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations and train ANP personnel.

#### *Our Response*

The Command’s decision to begin the phased reduction of the Afghan National Police vehicle maintenance contractor’s role once MoI/ANP maintenance and supply chain management capabilities improve addressed the intent of the recommendation. No further comment is required.

### ***Deleted Recommendation 9.b***

Management confirmed continued MoI/ANP maintenance and maintenance management training by the Coalition-sponsored contractor, including Class IX repair part support. As a result, we deleted draft Recommendation 9.b and renumbered draft Recommendation 9.c as Recommendation 9.b.

### ***Recommendation 9.b***

**Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead, in coordination with Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Resolute Support / Essential Function 4 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to create incentives to compare staffing options for Afghan National Police maintenance functions and develop a business case in support of the most cost-effective option.**

### ***Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead Comments***

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead concurred with the recommendation. He stated, however, that neither Afghan Security Forces Funds nor U.S. funding for the Law and Order Trust Fund included any funding for MoI civilians. If ANP desires to civilianize a portion of its workforce, unless other donor nation options can be found or funding agreements can be restructured, the Afghan government will be responsible for funding the salaries of ANP civilians.

### ***Our Response***

The response partially addressed the recommendation. We request a response to the final report with an update from Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead addressing advisor support to MoI regarding the comparison of staffing options for ANP maintenance and the development of a business case in support of the most cost-effective option.



## Observation 10

### Afghan National Police Attendance at the Afghan National Army Combat Service Support School

ANP commanders have not effectively used the ANA CSS School for logistics specialists in Kabul.

This occurred because:

- MoI officials did not have a sustainment training policy, nor did they encourage CSS school attendance for personnel serving in logistics-related positions.
- ANP Training General Command efforts to promote use of the ANA CSS School were limited.
- ANP Commanders reported that the ANA CSS School gave inadequate life support to ANP personnel attending classes.

Underutilization of available training capacity in the ANA CSS School limited the development of the logistics capability required to sustain the ANP.

### Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 7, for additional detail.)

- “Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law, GIRoA,”  
23 December 2013

### Discussion

The ANP was entitled to send logistics personnel for training at the ANA CSS School in Pol-E-Charki, Kabul, based on a written agreement between the MoD and MoI. Under the agreement, the ANA made 25 percent of the allocations in each logistics course available for ANP use. Course offerings included basic supply and transportation for commissioned officers; supply, transportation, fuel, ammunition, and warehouse management for non-commissioned officers; and basic supply and transportation for soldiers. The ANP did not fully use their allocations, and several ANA logistics courses had no ANP personnel enrolled. Coalition advisors stated they encouraged MoI leadership to better utilize the available training.

A senior NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan official explained that the MoI did not have a developed strategy or published training policy regarding the long-term development and sustainment of logistics capability within the ANP. He further stated that Coalition advisors were working with the MoI and ANP Training General Command to develop written guidance. Completion and publication of

training policy would impress upon ANP Commanders the importance of developing logistics expertise and reinforce the commitment by MoI leadership to use ANA CSS School allocations for ANP personnel.

An additional factor contributing to limited use of the ANA CSS School allocations by ANP commands was insufficient promotion efforts by the ANP Training General Command. The Training General Command produced a course catalogue and calendar of available logistics training for distribution, but made no other visible outreach efforts to ANP commands to market logistics courses or to actively solicit students. The Training General Command and Coalition advisors were aware that police district commanders were not sending personnel to logistics training, but Coalition advisors were unsure if district police headquarters were receiving information regarding training course allocations.

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan advisors relayed reports from ANP Commanders stating their reluctance to send ANP personnel to training at the ANA CSS school because the school provided ANP students with inadequate life support. Specifically, ANP personnel reportedly were required to either furnish their own food or pay for the meals they received. This practice was contrary to the MoI / MoD agreement, whereby MoD would provide meals with reimbursement from the MoI. However, as of October 2014, there was no fiscal mechanism to transfer funds between the ministries to cover costs associated with training and life support, including meals. Coalition advisors stated they were working with the ministries to establish a mechanism for reimbursement and to ensure both ministries included these costs in their budgets.

The development of logistics professionals was a significant challenge, because MoI had had not yet demonstrated commitment to an aggressive logistics training and education program.<sup>10</sup> As a result, the ANP had not taken full advantage of valuable logistics training opportunities to further develop logistics capability. In response to the identified challenges, some ANP Training General Command officials expressed the desire to establish their own logistics training program and school, but MoI officials admitted they lacked the necessary resources.

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<sup>10</sup> Department of Defense, "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," April 2014, p. 31, para. 5.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### **Recommendation 10.a**

**Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Resolute Support / Essential Function 4 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police Training General Command to:**

- 1. Develop a sustainment training policy which identifies the requirement and means to provide appropriate training to all levels of Afghan National Police logistics personnel.**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 4 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 4 Lead agreed with Recommendation 10.a.1. In response, he noted the ANP's establishment of a requirement for all qualified logisticians, commensurate with their grade levels and duty positions, to attend a comprehensive, 212-hour ANP-certified operational and administrative course on police logistics.

#### *Our Response*

The response to Recommendation 10.a.1 addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment on Recommendation 10.a.1 is required.

- 2. Monitor the Afghan National Police attendance at the Afghan National Army Combat Service Support School to ensure that seats allocated do not go unfilled.**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 4 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 4 Lead agreed with Recommendation 10.a.2, stating that the ANP Training General Command maintained course graduation data from the MoI Logistics Specific Training Course.

#### *Our Response*

The response to Recommendation 10.a.2 partially addressed the recommendation. We request a response to the final report with an update from Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Resolute Support / Essential Function 4 Lead on any available statistics collected since our assessment in May-June 2014 showing an increase in filled ANP seat allocations for logistics courses taught at the Army Combat Service Support School.

3. **Encourage Afghan National Police Commanders to send logistics personnel to the Afghan National Army Combat Service Support School.**

*Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 4 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 4 Lead agreed with Recommendation 10.a.3, noting that in 2014, Coalition force advisors advised ANP on the use of provincial and national ANP training conferences, where ANP leaders and the Training General Command focused on training center utilization, training schedule planning for 2015, and training schedule execution.

*Our Response*

The response to Recommendation 10.a.3 addressed all specifics of that recommendation. No further comment on Recommendation 10.a.3 is required.

**Recommendation 10.b**

**Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead, in coordination with Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Resolute Support / Essential Function 4 Lead, advise and assist Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to:**

1. **Update the memorandum of understanding between Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to ensure adequate life support is provided to Afghan National Police personnel who attend Afghan National Army schools or training programs.**

*Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead Comments*

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead concurred with Recommendation 10.b.1. EF4 advisors, with support from EF1, will work with both MoI and MoD to update the training requirements and associated life support in the current Memorandum of Understanding, with completion expected no later than June 2015.

*Our Response*

The response to Recommendation 10.b.1 addressed all specifics of the recommendation. We request a copy of the updated Memorandum of Understanding, when it is completed and signed.

- 2. Implement a fiscal mechanism, such as a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request, to transfer funds between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to provide reimbursement of costs associated with Afghan National Police personnel training at Afghan National Army Schools.**

*Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead Comments*

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead concurred with Recommendation 10.b.2. In response to Recommendation 10.b.2, EF1 advisors, working with the Ministry of Finance, discovered an existing Afghan process for realigning funds between MoD and MoI, as well as among other ministries, although establishing the process among all ministries may take up to two years.

*Our Response*

The response to Recommendation 10.b.2 partially addressed the recommendation. We request a response to the final report with an update on any plans for establishing an interim process for realigning funds between MoD and MoI, prior to bringing all Afghan ministries into the process.



## Observation 11

### Advisor Resources

Some U.S. military and civilian logistics advisors did not have the required skill sets, experience, or cultural awareness to support functionally-based, multi-echelon advising.

This situation existed because:

- Coalition leadership did not adequately identify the qualifications and experience necessary for functionally-oriented logistics advisors,
- highly-skilled, experienced candidates were insufficiently incentivized to serve as Coalition force logistics advisors, and
- U.S. and Coalition leaders did not synchronize individual advisor tour lengths with conditions-based mission criteria.

As a result, the Coalition risked insufficient support for continued development of MoI and ANP logistic systems development during the remaining 2014 ISAF mission and upcoming 2015 Resolute Support Mission.

### Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 13, for additional detail.)


- “RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.0,” ISAF, July 1, 2014

### Discussion

In 2014, the focus for ISAF advising shifted from advising ANA and ANP operational units to functionally-based advising at the ministries, ANA corps, and ANP zone headquarters. ISAF identified “sustaining the force through effective logistics systems” as one of eight ANA and ANP “essential functions.” Advisors to the MoI and MoD emphasized building ministerial capacity to plan, program, budget, and acquire goods and services in support of their security forces, while logistics advisors to the ANA and ANP were to focus on developing ANSF sustainment processes and closing supply and maintenance capability gaps across all command levels below the ministries.

## **Advisor Skills, Experience, and Cultural Awareness**

Functional-oriented, multi-echelon, logistics advising required military and civilian Coalition force advisors with appropriate qualifications and experience to coordinate actions across multiple



Coalition commands and effectively advise and assist ANSF to implement logistics systems. Commander, ISAF, emphasized that advisor team capability was critical to the success of functional area advising, but resource shortfalls persisted.<sup>11</sup>

A CSTC-A senior leader expressed frustration that problems remained with ANP advisor recruitment. He acknowledged that Coalition leadership needed to do a better job of properly identifying advisor skills and experience levels the ANP needed. He also stated that many highly-skilled candidates were hesitant to volunteer for, or if selected, accept advisor positions because of insufficient incentives to take time away from high-level positions. In fact, their concerns acted as a disincentive due to the perceived negative impact on promotion potential and future assignments.

A senior ministerial advisor stated that, as Coalition advisor numbers decrease during the drawdown of the ISAF mission and the transition to Resolute Support Mission, U.S. and NATO senior leaders need to select the best available individuals as advisors. He explained that junior personnel continued to report to the Coalition without the credentials to properly advise at the ministries. New advisors needed to have better-than-working knowledge of the MoI logistics system, and enough experience and personal influence to accomplish the mission as resources diminished.

A NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan senior officer stated that to be effective, logistics advisors had to demonstrate an understanding and appreciation of Afghan culture as well as wide-ranging subject matter expertise in logistics and facilities maintenance. He noted that some Afghan senior ministry leaders had worked with

<sup>11</sup> [ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide, 2.0](#), 1 January 2014. Security Force Assistance (SFA) is defined as unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Military forces conduct SFA to facilitate a host nation’s ability to deter and defend against transnational and internal threats to stability. Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFA-ATs) provide training, advice, and assistance to ANSF units and functional areas.

as many as 15 different Coalition advisors since 2001. The demands of transition to Afghan lead and the force reductions associated with the Resolute Support Mission made it critical for advisors to be culturally-adept in order to quickly develop strong relationships with MoI and ANP decision-makers.

One senior Coalition officer in a Regional Command asserted that transition should be decided using conditions-based criteria. He was concerned that Coalition leadership would prematurely reduce the number of advisors in his area of responsibility and reposition them in Kabul and areas of Afghanistan where the insurgency posed the largest threat. He believed a time-driven withdrawal of advisor resources could threaten progress achieved by ANP units in his area of responsibility.

The length of advisor tours varied from 4 months to several years, hindering advisor unity of effort. A senior Coalition officer in a Regional Command noted that some advisors were addressing short-term issues instead of systemic issues as required by the mission. He also stated that some advisor efforts were fragmented. For example, a senior ministry advisor related that budget advising was not synchronized because advisors at the MoI lacked visibility of the budget training conducted by Coalition Contract Advise and Assist Team advisors in the provinces. CSTC-A planned to add 60 budget and procurement advisors and 20 sustainment and logistics advisors by December 2014 in response to MoI and ANP advisor fragmentation and shortages.



Figure 15: Advisors Accompany IG Team on Tour of ANP Contracted Maintenance Facility  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

In setting conditions for Resolute Support, Coalition commanders should structure logistics advisor drawdown to minimize impact to the continued development of ANP logistics and sustainment capabilities. To be effective, the advising effort going forward requires the best-qualified individuals to serve as advisors with the appropriate rank, skill level, experience, and cultural awareness. Finally, functional advisors must coordinate efforts at all levels to maximize their impact.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Revised Recommendation 11.a.1***

As a result of management comments, we revised Recommendation 11.a.1 from determining requirements down to the provinces to determining requirements down to the lowest advised ANP levels, in recognition of the effects of the continued drawdown on ANP advisor presence at the provincial level.

### ***Recommendation 11.a***

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead:**

- 1. Determine advisor capability and manning requirements necessary to support Afghan National Police sustainment and logistic development down to the lowest advised ANP levels.**

### ***Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments***

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with Recommendation 11.a.1. He noted that in accordance with the Coalition reduction of forces, advisors will not reach down to provinces.

### ***Our Response***

The response to Recommendation 11.a.1 addressed all specifics of the recommendation. We revised the recommendation in accordance with management comments. No further comment is required on Recommendation 11.a.1.

**2. Develop conditions-based criteria for logistics advisor draw-down.**

*Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with Recommendation 11.a.2, stating that conditions based criteria for logistics advisor draw-down exists in the form of EF5 Sustainment campaign objectives, plans of action, and milestones.

*Our Response*

The response to Recommendation 11.a.2 addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required on Recommendation 11.a.2.

**3. Ensure ministerial and provincial-level coalition logistics advisors synchronize their efforts on an integrated and cohesive basis.**

*Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with Recommendation 11.a.3. He stated that EF 5 advisors led regular Essential Function updates and weekly synchronization meetings at the national and regional levels to synchronize advisor efforts.

*Our Response*

The response to Recommendation 11.a.3 addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required on Recommendation 11.a.3.

**4. Ensure that U.S. Government employees receive sufficient training on applicable Afghan budget laws, Afghan National Police logistics policies and processes, and Afghan culture prior to assignment to their advising positions.**

*Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

While Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with Recommendation 11.a.4, he stated that ensuring adequate training for logistics advisors was outside the scope of EF 5.

*Our Response*

The response partially addressed the recommendation. The intent of Recommendation 11.a.4 was for Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead to provide sustainment expertise and feedback through

CENTCOM to DoD that identifies training gaps as necessary to ensure that training of U.S. Government employees as EF5 advisors is sufficient to meet the logistics training needs of the ANP. We request a response from Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead on the final report on the ability of EF5 to provide this type of training feedback through CENTCOM to DoD.

### ***Recommendation 11.b***

**Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead, in coordination with Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Commander and U.S. Central Command, ensure that Ministry of Defense Advisor and Civilian Expeditionary Workforce personnel selected to fill Ministry of Interior sustainment-related advisor positions have the appropriate rank, skill-level, and expertise.**

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force (now Resolute Support) / Essential Function 5 Lead Comments*

Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead concurred with the recommendation, stating that EF5 provided input to the Ministry of Defense Advisor and Civilian Expeditionary Workforce programs through duty description updates and training recommendations. He added, however, that the selection of personnel was beyond the scope of EF5.

#### *Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. The intent of the recommendation was for Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support / Essential Function 5 Lead to provide sustainment expertise and feedback through CENTCOM to DoD as necessary to ensure that personnel selected to fill Ministry of Interior sustainment-related advisor positions have the appropriate rank, skill-level, and expertise. No further comment is required.

### ***Redirected Recommendation 11.c***

Recommendation 11.c was originally directed to Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as chairman of the Warfighter Senior Integration Group. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics requested that we redirect the recommendation to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as the office most suited to consider options for career track incentives and formal development programs for volunteer MoI advisors. In a prior report concerning logistics sustainability of the ANA, we directed an identical recommendation, to establish programs and incentives for MoD advisors, to the

Deputy Secretary of Defense, who concurred with the recommendation.<sup>12</sup> As a result of Defense Department staffing decisions and management comments received from Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, we redirected Recommendation 11.c. to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and request a response to the final report.

### ***Recommendation 11.c***

**Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, establish a formal developmental program, including career track incentives, for individuals who volunteer as Ministry of Interior advisors during the post-2014 Resolute Support Mission.**

### ***Management Comments Required.***

Because we redirected this recommendation from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on a draft of this report, we request the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's comments on Recommendation 11.c. in response to the final report.

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<sup>12</sup> "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army," December 19, 2014, p.31, Recommendation 3.c.



## Appendix A

### Scope and Methodology

We conducted this assessment from March 2014 through January 2015 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations,” published by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency in January 2012. Our objective was to assess the planning and execution of the ANP logistics, supply, and maintenance systems developed and implemented by U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. We believe that the evidence we obtained is sufficient and appropriate and provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our assessment objective.

Our scope was defined by the activities conducted and progress to date made by DoD, other U.S. Government, and non-U.S. entities related to ANP logistics development. This included contract statements of work and contractor performance as it impacted ANP logistics sustainment. We limited our scope by excluding contractor performance and pricing related to delivery of goods and services in support of the ANP, and investigation of U.S, Coalition, or Afghan organizations allegedly involved in corrupt activities.

To assess our objective, we reviewed Federal laws and Department policy, including annual National Defense Authorization Acts, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy, DoD instruction, and appropriate NATO/ISAF, IJC, and MoI/ANP guidance. We also reviewed Coalition force development plans and performance metric data for ANP forces.

We collected documents and conducted interviews throughout the entire period of our assessment. The SPO-Forward assessment team personnel assigned in Afghanistan conducted interviews from May 10, 2014 through May 26, 2014, with Coalition force and ANP commanders, staff, and other subject matter experts in Regional Commands East, South, and West. We chose these Coalition commands for site visits based on their high operational tempo and the resulting demands placed on ANP logistics systems. These regional visits allowed for identification of systemic logistics issues that could impact the overall operational readiness and sustainment of the ANP.

From June 2, 2014 through June 16, 2014, four team members from headquarters deployed to Afghanistan and joined SPO-Forward. The combined team conducted interviews with the Coalition forces, MoI, and ANP deputy ministers, commanders, staff, and other subject matter experts in Kabul and the Afghan Capital Region, visited the ANP NLC in Wardak, and conducted a video teleconference with Coalition Logistics Advisors from Regional Command Southwest on July 1, 2014, after re-deploying to headquarters.



Figure 16: ANP Ammunition Storage Facility  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

### **Use of Computer-Processed Data**

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

### **Use of Technical Assistance**

We did not require Technical Assistance to perform this assessment.

## Appendix B

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### Summary of Prior Coverage

The DoD, DoD IG, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a number of reports that are significant within the context of our assessment objective.

Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm>.

Unrestricted DoD reports can be accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs>.

Unrestricted SIGAR reports can be accessed at <http://www.sigar.mil>.

Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>.

### ***U.S. Government Accountability Office***

GAO-13-381, "Security Force Assistance: More Detailed Planning and Improved Access to Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in Afghanistan," April 30, 2013

GAO-12-951T, "Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces," July 24, 2012

GAO-11-760, "Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the Advising Mission," August 2, 2011

GAO-11-710, "Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan Government," July 20, 2011

GAO 11-66, "Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long Term Costs Not Determined," January 27, 2011

GAO-10-842T, "Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan," June 25, 2010

GAO-10-655R, "The Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan," June 21, 2010 (Revised date)

GAO-09-280, "Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation," March 9, 2009

GAO-09-267, "Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces," January 30, 2009

GAO-09-263SP, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," February 23, 2009

### ***Department of Defense***

Report to Congress In accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended; section 1221 of the NDAA for FY 2012 (P.L. 112-81); sections 1212, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for FY 2013 (P.L. 112-239); and Senate Report 113-211, to accompany H.R. 4870, the Department of Defense (DoD) Appropriations Bill, 2015, "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," October 2014

Report to Congress In accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), as amended; to include reports in response to section 1221 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81), the Senate Report (S. Rpt. 112-173), to accompany the NDAA for FY 2012 (P.L. 112-81), and sections 1212, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-239). "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," April 2014

Report to Congress In accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), as amended; to include reports in response to section 1221 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81), and sections 1212, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-239) "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," November 2013

### ***Department of Defense Inspector General***

DODIG-2014-027, "Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities Part II – Cross-Cutting Issues of Afghan National Army Enabler Development," December 23, 2013 (CLASSIFIED REPORT)

DODIG-2013-081, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise the Afghan Border Police," May 24, 2013

DODIG-2012-109, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police," July 9, 2012

DODIG-2011-003, "Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police," March 3, 2011

DODIG-2009-007, "Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces," September 30, 2009

Statement of Ambassador (Ret.) Kenneth P. Moorefield Deputy Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations Department of Defense Office of Inspector General before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee on Afghan National Security Forces and Security Lead Transition: The Assessment Process, Metrics and Efforts to Build Capability, July 24, 2012

### ***International Security Assistance Force***

"ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide 2.0," January 1, 2014

"RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.0," July 1, 2014

### ***Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction***

SIGAR Audit 14-3-AR, "Afghan National Army: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Lacks Key Information on Inventory in Stock and Requirements for Vehicle Spare Parts," October 16, 2013

SIGAR Audit 13-3, "Afghan Police Vehicle Maintenance Contract: Actions Needed to Prevent Millions of Dollars From Being Wasted," January 17, 2013

SIGAR Audit 13-1, "Afghan National Security Forces Facilities: Concerns with Funding, Oversight, and Sustainability for Operations and Maintenance," October 30, 2012

SIGAR Audit-10-11, "Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments," June 29, 2010

## Appendix C

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### Applicable Criteria

1. “Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP), Mechanical Skills Development Plan ROM,” 24 February 2014
2. “Class III (Fuel) Management Policy” (Draft), MoI, 15 February 2014
3. “DoD Supply Chain Material Management Policy,” DoD Instruction 4140.01, December 14, 2011
4. “Minister of Interior Policy Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate,” 6 January 2009
5. Islamic Government of Republic of Afghanistan Minister of Interior Affairs, “National Police Plan, Years 1393 and 1394 (2014 and 2015),” 10 May 2014
6. “Process for the Management of Maintenance” Decree, MoI, Logistics Management Directorate (undated)
7. “Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law, GIRoA,” 23 December 2013
8. “Removal of Lost/Damaged/Destroyed Class VII Property From Records,” Change 1 to MoI Logistics Policy, 9 August 2011
9. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MoF), “The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,” Procurement Policy Unit (PPU), 18 November 2009
10. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Minister of Interior Affairs, Deputy Minister for Policy and Strategy, General Directorate of Strategy, “Strategic Planning Directive,” January 2014
11. “Transition of ANP Vehicle Maintenance,” DCOS ANSF LOG DLO Information Paper, 27 May, 2014<sup>13</sup>
12. “Vehicle Disposal Policy,” Ministry of Interior Policy, Deputy Minister for Support, General Department of Logistics, November 2012
13. “RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.0,” ISAF, July 1, 2014

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<sup>13</sup> DLO is the acronym for Director of Logistics Operations

## Management Comments

### Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY,  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

DEC 8 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL SPECIAL PLANS AND OPERATIONS, DODIG

THROUGH: DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION RESOURCES AND ANALYSIS *NR 12/9/14*

SUBJECT: Response to DoDIG Draft Report "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police (Project No. D2014-D00SPO-0129)"

This memorandum provides the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics response to the recommendations from the subject draft report.

**Recommendation 11.c:** *Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as chairman of the Warfighter Senior Integration Group, in coordination with Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Commander, U.S. Central Command, incorporate career track incentives for individuals who volunteer as Ministry of Interior advisors during the post-2014 Resolute Support Mission.*

**Response:** Partially concur. The prior draft report regarding the Afghan National Army recommended: *That the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense establish a formal developmental program for DoD civilians who volunteer as advisors for the post-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION.* The Department responded that the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (OSD(P&R)), will assist the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in developing options for incorporating the skillsets needed to support enduring advisory requirements into career program development tracks, leveraging training and development resources to build a formal development program with consideration to career track incentives. To align the two reports, I recommend changing Recommendation 11.c to read: *The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in coordination with Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Commander, U.S. Central Command, develop options for incorporating the skillsets needed to support enduring advisory requirements into career program development tracks to build a formal development program with consideration to career track incentives.* It should be noted that the Warfighter Senior Integration Group (W-SIG) has no direct role in actions associated with career program development tracks. Therefore, the reference to the W-SIG should be removed from the recommendation.

My point of contact is [REDACTED]

Christopher C. O'Donnell  
Executive Secretary, Warfighter Senior  
Integration Groups  
Acting Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell

## United States Forces-Afghanistan Consolidated Response

UNCLASSIFIED



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-IG

20 December 2014

JAN  
20 Dec 14  
MEMORANDUM THRU USFOR-A DCDR-S

FOR United States Central Command Inspector General (CCIG), MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses for DODIG No. D2014-129, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police"

1. The Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) issued a draft report for USFOR-A to respond to open recommendations. DODIG's recommendations are labeled in the report, and in this memorandum, as follows: 1.a, 1.b, 2, 3, 4.a, 4.b, 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 6.a, 6.b, 7, 8.a, 8.b, 9.a, 9.b, 9.c, 10.a., 10.b, 11.a, 11.b. These recommendations, and their respective answers, are detailed in the following discussion.

a. **DODIG Recommendation 1.a:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and the Ministry of Interior, advise and assist the Regional Logistics Centers to request, and National Logistics Center to issue, high-demand supply items to the Regional Logistics Centers in accordance with authorized stockage levels.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. National level advisors will influence the Mol process once requisitions are received at the NLC. EF 5 aligned advisors at the TAAC level in turn have direct access to influence requisitioned items at the RLC and are the main focal point on these issues." (Encl 1)

b. **DODIG Recommendation 1.b:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to validate, implement, and enforce processes and procedures in its published logistics policy.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. EF 5 will continue to coordinate with Mol to address accountability issues. The Mamore challenges relate to a combination of overly bureaucratic processes together with an inability for Mol

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## United States Forces-Afghanistan Consolidated Response (cont'd)

USFOR-A-IG

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses for DODIG No. D2014-129, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police"

Chief of Logistics to monitor and enforce compliance outside of the DM SPT."  
(Encl 1)

c. **DODIG Recommendation 2:** *Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Finance to propose and adopt a modification of Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan budget law and/or procurement law to allow for an expanded period of time to initiate and complete current year budget and procurement actions.*

**Answer:** CSTC-A CJ-ENG: "Any modifications to the Afghan budget and procurement law should be addressed at the national level by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). We believe there is a need to expand the period of time to complete current year procurement, therefore Essential Function 1 (EF1) advisors, in collaboration with CJ8, will assist the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to propose and adopt modifications to GIROA budget law and/or procurement actions. It is recognized, however, that significant challenges exist in this regard. GIROA operates on a cash-based system; therefore all contracts must be obligated and disbursed before the end of the Afghan Fiscal Year, which ends 20 December XX. This system does not allow adequate time to complete procurement and delivery of goods for large contracts, or for contracts approved late in the FY.

In contrast, an accrual-based system (commitment, obligation, and disbursement) would allow for GIROA to complete contracting actions within the fiscal year, and deliver goods/services after the year ends. It is noted that proposed changes will require a modification to the current Afghan accounting system and processes to assist tracking of committed, obligated and disbursed funds. In order to facilitate the initiation and completion of current year budget and procurement actions, the advisors of EF1 will work to train, advise, and assist GIROA in this endeavor." (Encl 2)

d. **DODIG Recommendation 3:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, advise the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police senior leadership to:*

- (1) *Update the 2009 Ministry of Interior policy "Process for the Management of Logistics" to reflect current logistics processes and procedures.*
- (2) *Consolidate logistics-related ciphers into the updated 2009 policy.*
- (3) *Expedite, approve, distribute, and enforce the draft Ministry of Interior fuel policy.*

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## United States Forces-Afghanistan Consolidated Response (cont'd)

USFOR-A-IG

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SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses for DODIG No. D2014-129, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police"

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. The document remains awaiting approval. Efforts have been made to hasten the final Mol approval; however it is realistically a low priority for Mol. Work is in progress to ascertain the status of the fuel policy and raise priority." (Encl 1)

e. **DODIG Recommendation 4.a:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to develop a fundamental supply forecasting and requirements generation process for use by Afghan National Police logisticians.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. This is a major line of effort for EF5 which is predicated on Mol being able to implement a system which can produce accurate and timely consumption data and current stockholdings." (Encl 1)

f. **DODIG Recommendation 4.b:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, ensure Resolute Support Mission Security Force Assistance teams have the capability to assist the Afghan National Police at national, regional, and provincial / district levels to develop logistics expertise that meets their basic supply and maintenance needs.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. SFAATs should receive pre-deployment training specific for the SFAAT mission. However, that will be limited to the National level within the Kabul areas as regional and provincial level advisors are phased out under Resolute Support." (Encl 1)

g. **DODIG Recommendation 5.a:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, assist Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to investigate possible options for increasing accessibility to Core Inventory Management System through wireless solutions.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. Logistics Information Management (via COREIMSEE) is a critical line of effort and EF5.0 is working with the ANSF partners to establish this capability. Wireless solutions are used when appropriate and whenever possible. The Central Supply Depot (CSD) has wireless access points installed to provide support for COREIMS access as well as support for their wireless scanner technology. A partial wireless solution is also planned for the IT build-out at the Afghan National Army Office Academy on the NDU campus. The MOD GSG6 has made a determination that wireless is not an acceptable solution in other areas of the MOD and ANA." (Encl 1)

h. **DODIG Recommendation 5.b:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force/Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to issue cipher requiring the Afghan National Police to use Core*

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## United States Forces-Afghanistan Consolidated Response (cont'd)

USFOR-A-IG

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SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses for DODIG No. D2014-129, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police"

*Inventory Management System for warehouse inventory management as connectivity issues are resolved.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. EF5.0 is working this effort with MOI advisors to revise current policies and establish new ciphers to mandate the use of COREIMSEE." (Encl 1)

i. **DODIG Recommendation 5.c:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to establish an Afghan Program Management Office to oversee system support for Core Inventory Management System.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. EF5.0 is currently working this effort with MOI advisors." (Encl 1)

j. **DODIG Recommendation 6.a:** *Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior Facilities Director to complete a baseline inventory, including Central Prison Directorate facilities, and develop a plan for appropriately reducing Afghan National Police facilities.*

**Answer:** CSTC-A CJ-ENG: "CSTC-A concurs with the DoD IG SPO recommendation. In September 2014, CSTC-A CJ-ENG published the Ministry of Interior (MoI) Strategic Basing Plan (Blue Book), an assembly of MoI policy documents and information focused on Afghan National Police (ANP) permanent basing. Ministry of Interior-Facility Department (MoI-FD) advisors are training MoI-FD to use the Blue Book to determine the baseline inventory requirements.

Moreover, CSTC-A MoI-FD advisors are facilitating the installation of the Afghan Infrastructure Database Integration System (AIDIS), a database containing inventory information on at least 80% of current MoI facilities (1,200 facilities). In order to facilitate the use of AIDIS, CSTC-A is funding two Subject Matter Expert (SME) positions through Afghan Fiscal Year 1394 (from 21 December 2014 to 20 December 2015). CSTC-A CJ-ENG's contractor, AMEC, will train these SMEs and will also provide Help Desk type hardware and software services through 30 June 2015. In turn, the SMEs will train MoI-FD personnel on the use of the AIDIS system and facilitate MoI-FD's expansion of the system, to include all MoI-FD facilities such as the Central Prison Directorate facilities.

Through survey and analysis, CSTC-A has determined that there are 205 facilities in excess to MoI Tashkil requirements. CSTC-A is not only encouraging MoI to reduce facility inventory through advisor planning assistance, but it is directly incentivizing MoI through the FY 1394 CSTC-A Commitment Letter. If MoI reduces the number of excess facilities to 103 (50%) by 19 Oct 14, it will receive

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additional funding in support of Facility Department programs. The Estimated Completion Date (ECD) to complete this recommendation (baseline inventory, plan to reduce ANP facilities) is 20 December 2015." (Encl 2)

k. **DODIG Recommendation 6.b:** *Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to review, and if necessary, gain an enhanced role over ongoing and future Law and Order Trust Funds for Afghanistan-funded construction with respect to future Ministry of Interior sustainment responsibilities.*

**Answer:** CSTC-A CJ-ENG: "CSTC-A concurs with the DoD IG SPO recommendation. In order to establish a point of contact (POC) within the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) organization for facility issues, CSTC-A CJ-ENG Mol-FD advisors have made coordination with the CSTC-A EF1 LOTFA Lead. A number of staff actions will be taken to improve LOTFA Ministry of Interior-Facility Department (Mol-FD) coordination. These include:

- i) Inviting a LOTFA construction project manager to the weekly Mol-FD/CSTC-A coordination meetings to facilitate illumination of LOTFA facility plans to the Mol-FD.
- ii) Providing Mol-FD leadership with the appropriate contact offices within LOTFA.
- iii) Ensuring the sharing of planning documents and expected sustainment cost burdens between Mol-FD and LOTFA.
- iv) Facilitating agreement on common facility operations and maintenance cost estimating techniques between LOTFA and Mol-FD." (Encl 2)

l. **DODIG Recommendation 7:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to develop a vehicle and equipment fleet management plan for sustainment of the Afghan National Police that, at a minimum, addresses policy, organic and contracted capabilities at all levels of maintenance, and funding within budget constraints.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. EF-5 is establishing, in conjunction with the ANA, a lifecycle management organization to establish policy and direction for maintenance and support to the fielded systems." (Encl 1)

m. **DODIG Recommendation 8.a:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise the Ministry of Interior to enforce logistics policy regarding the use of the Regional Logistics Centers or change the policies to reflect actual execution.*

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**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. This is an ongoing challenge for the Chief of Logistics." (Encl 1)

n. **DODIG Recommendation 8.b:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, assist Ministry of Interior to conduct a review to determine if the Regional Logistics Center in Nangarhar is necessary, and either complete efforts there or terminate the project and determine where the Nangarhar function will be performed.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. This task is already complete as RLC Nangarhar and Mol has taken custody as of 30 NOV 2014. Whilst there remain risks associated with access and security, Mol is working toward establishing a minimum level of operational capability and appears committed to the use of the facility. RLC Nangarhar is the seventh and final RLC to be stood up nationwide. All requirements in support of MOI's sub-pillars will be based on established demand-based logistics systems exercising the national node distribution to the regional nodes." (Encl 1)

o. **DODIG Recommendation 9.a:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, begin a phased reduction of the Afghan National Police vehicle maintenance contractor's role in order to increase Afghan responsibility.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. MOI/ANP leadership is not currently capable of conducting supply and maintenance management operations. ANP contracted support will continue at key nodes to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations while simultaneously coaching, teaching and mentoring ANP personnel. A phased reduction will begin when MOI/ANP leadership and personnel demonstrate that they are fully capable and able to sustain maintenance operations." (Encl 1)

p. **DODIG Recommendation 9.b:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, complete the purchase and receipt of the requested post-2015 Afghan National Police vehicle Class IX authorized stockage list order for the National and Regional Logistics Centers.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Non-concur. EF 5.0 is maintaining ANP CLS support and implementing a demand based requirements systems. ANP currently has approximately 150% of projected CL IX requirements on hand." (Encl 1)

q. **DODIG Recommendation 9.c:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to create incentives to compare staffing options for Afghan*

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*National Police maintenance functions and develop a business case in support of the most cost-effective option.*

**Answer:** CSTC-A concurs with the recommendation. If the ANP desires to pursue a "civilianization" plan that would introduce more highly skilled civilians into the ANP, Mol would work with the Independent and Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission in accordance with the GIRoA Civil Servants Law and Presidential Decree #20; however, the signed 1394 Afghan Security Forces Funds (ASFF) Mol Commitment Letter does not include any funds for Mol Civilianization. Additionally, the U.S. funding provided to the "Law and Order Trust Fund" (LOTFA) can only be used to pay salaries of Afghan National Police (ANP) on the Tashkil; therefore, GIRoA would be responsible for paying the salaries of civilians in maintenance positions working for the ANP. There might be an option for another donor nation to fund civilians via one of the other LOTFA pillars (there are four pillars associated with LOTFA funding – US only contributes to pillar one, which is ANP police pay); however, that would mean restructuring the LOTFA agreements and gaining coalition donor nation agreement.

r. **DODIG Recommendation 10**.a: *Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 4 Lead, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police Training General Command to:*

*(1) Develop a sustainment training policy which identifies the requirement and means to provide appropriate training to all levels of Afghan National Police logistics personnel.*

**Answer:** DCOS OPS: "ANP certified and instituted a comprehensive, 212-hour course on logistics for its personnel. The target audience for the course [are] those working in logistics departments, and they must be fully literate (Level 3) and have completed the police qualification associated with their grade to attend. The course covers both administrative and operational functions within police logistics, and it is required by the Ministry of the Interior for personnel according to the tashkil (manpower document) position they fill."

*(2) Monitor the Afghan National Police attendance at the Afghan National Army Combat Service Support School to ensure that seats allocated do not go unfilled.*

**Answer:** DCOS OPS: "ANP Training General Command has utilized both the joint course and their own to optimize capacity and enhance skills. They currently support and maintain graduation data on the CSSS commensurate with the ANP Logistics Specific Training Course."

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*(3) Encourage Afghan National Police Commanders to send logistics personnel to the Afghan National Army Combat Service Support School.*

**Answer:** EF5 will continue to encourage. "Furthermore, ISAF advised in Fall of 2014 both a Provincial Chiefs of Police conference and national training conference, the latter attended by regional and provincial training center commanders from across Afghanistan. ANP leaders extolled their personnel to increase training center utilization by executing training according to requirements for duties personnel are assigned to. They also emphasized [the] following training plans (enclosures 3-5), which outline priorities. Advisors are currently assisting Training General Command with developing training plans for 2015 as well as logistics and other institutional support."

s. **DODIG Recommendation 10.b:** *Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead, in coordination with Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 4 Lead, advise and assist Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to:*

*(1) Update the memorandum of understanding between Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to ensure adequate life support is provided to Afghan National Police personnel who attend Afghan National Army schools or training programs.*

**Answer:** CSTC-A CJ-ENG: "CSTC-A concurs with the DoD IG SPO recommendation. EF4 advisors, with support from EF1, will advise and assist the MoI and MoD to establish an updated Memorandum of Understanding that outlines training requirements and the associated life support for those requirements. The intent in doing so is to ensure properly audited reimbursement costs are accounted for and the total cost is documented on an invoice originating from the Corps Finance office. This would then be forwarded to the MoD Finance office, where an M16 payment voucher (legal request for contracted payment) is established requesting payment from MoI to the MoD using the MoI fund code (similar to a Line of Accounting in the U.S.) to input funds to the MoD. With advisor work in both ministries and a plan that is socialized with the ministerial leadership, we anticipate having an approved Memorandum of Understanding no later than June 2015." (Encl 2)

*(2) Implement a fiscal mechanism, such as a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request, to transfer funds between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to provide reimbursement of costs associated with Afghan National Police personnel training at Afghan National Army Schools.*

**Answer:** CSTC-A CJ-ENG: "In order to identify the Afghan National Police personnel training requirements at Afghan National Army Schools and ensure that

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adequate funding for training is identified and input into the respective Commitment Letters, Essential Function 1 advisors will train, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD). EF1 engaged Treasury officials within the Ministry of Finance (MoF) regarding the development of a MIPR-like process for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The MoF stated that there is already an Afghan process to handle this type of request. The MoF can realign funds via the monthly/quarterly allotment (B27) by reducing the allotment of MoI and transferring that amount to the MoD for costs rendered. The MoF also stated that to implement an Inter-Ministerial Cost Transfer process, they must revise their current Accounting Manual and Budget Law to reflect the details and operating procedures of the new form. A process that must be implemented by GIROA at the national level. Furthermore, since an Inter-Ministerial Cost Transfer could be used by all operating agencies of GIROA, all ministries and Mustafiats would have to receive additional training. For these reasons, going to a new cost transfer process may take up to two years." (Encl 2)

t. **DODIG Recommendation 11.a:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 1 Lead:*

(1) *Determine advisor capability and manning requirements necessary to support Afghan National Police sustainment and logistic development down to the provinces,*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. This recommendation is no longer relevant since IAW the reduction of forces in theatre; advisors will not be provided the reach down to province or Kandaks." (Encl 1)

(2) *Develop conditions-based criteria for logistics advisor draw-down,*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. This endeavor currently exists in the form of campaign objectives and PoAMs." (Encl 1)

(3) *Ensure ministerial and provincial-level coalition logistics advisors synchronize their efforts on an integrated and cohesive basis, and*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. Efforts are synchronized through ISAF Essential Function Updates as well as weekly EF5 led synchronization meetings attended by national level advisors and TAACs." (Encl 1)

(4) *Ensure that U.S. Government employees receive sufficient training on applicable Afghan budget laws, Afghan National Police logistics policies and processes, and Afghan culture prior to assignment to their advising positions.*

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**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. DOD must identify, segregate and train advisors prior to deployment without prejudice to service. Once personnel receive applicable training, it is imperative they fill designate, advisory billets succinct with advisory training vice being placed in a staff or operational assignment. This is outside the scope of EF5." (Encl 1)

**u. DODIG Recommendation 11.b:** *Deputy Chief of Staff Support, International Security Assistance Force / Essential Function 5 Lead, in coordination with Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Commander, U.S. Central Command, ensure that Ministry of Defense Advisor and Civilian Expeditionary Workforce personnel selected to fill Ministry of Interior sustainment-related advisor positions have the appropriate rank, skill-level, and expertise.*

**Answer:** IHQ/SPT/EF-5: "Concur. EF5 provides input to the Ministry of Defense Advisor and Civilian Expeditionary Workforce program through routine duty description updates and recommended addition to training. However, the selection of personnel is beyond the scope of EF5." (Encl 1)

2. The point of contact is the undersigned, [REDACTED]

6 Encls

1. DCOS SPT Response, 10 Dec 14
2. CSTC-A CG's Response, 4 Dec 14
3. ANP Course Catalog, 26 Nov 14
4. ANP Logistics Training Overview, 21 Jun 12
5. ANP Logistics Trainer's Guide, Jun 12
6. CSTC-A EF-1's Response, 16 Dec 14



PATRICK D. McEVOY, Colonel  
USFOR-A Audit Program Manager

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

<b>ABP</b>	Afghan Border Police
<b>ANA</b>	Afghan National Army
<b>ANCOP</b>	Afghan National Civil Order Police
<b>ANP</b>	Afghan National Police
<b>ANSF</b>	Afghan National Security Forces
<b>ASL</b>	Authorized Stockage List
<b>AUP</b>	Afghan Uniform Police
<b>CoreIMS</b>	Core Inventory Management System
<b>CSS</b>	Combat Service Support
<b>CSTC-A</b>	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
<b>DoD IG</b>	Department of Defense Inspector General
<b>GIRoA</b>	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
<b>IJC</b>	ISAF Joint Command
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of Defense
<b>MoF</b>	Ministry of Finance
<b>Moi</b>	Ministry of Interior
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NLC</b>	National Logistics Center
<b>RLC</b>	Regional Logistics Center
<b>SFA</b>	Security Force Assistance

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