

**THE FULCRUM OF US REGIONAL REBALANCING:
RUSSIAN AND US SECURITIZATION MOVES IN CONTEMPORARY
STRATEGIC SHIFTS**

BY
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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

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ABSTRACT

In January of 2012, President Barack Obama issued strategic guidance to the Department of Defense. This guidance included extensive rebalancing of US regional focus for security policy. The regions of primary impact in this Rebalance include Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. These regions describe an arc around the Russian Federation making this nation a geopolitical pivot in US rebalancing efforts. Using Regional Security Complex Theory and the concept of securitization moves, this thesis examines security policy documents from both nations to identify potential areas of conflict or cooperation. Through identifying links and connections in the securitization moves of the United States and the Russian Federation across the European, Eurasian, Middle Eastern, and Asian regions essential context emerges for consideration by strategists involved in rebalancing US regional focus.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Analytical Framework

United States security strategies are experiencing a period of extensive change and realignment. In January of 2012, the President of the United States announced significant changes to foundational principles of US national security policies and a shift in strategic emphasis. These changes were summarized in a document entitled “Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” This document lays out a “strategic turning point” that includes the intent for a “global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe, and strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions.”¹ While comprehensive in its scope, this statement does list three global regions specifically: the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe. Naturally, with these regions explicitly mentioned, the attention of strategists has turned to the security dynamics of these areas. However, these three regions also describe an arc that revolves around one nation – the Russian Federation. From a geopolitical standpoint, the Russian Federation thus becomes the hinge of the United States’ strategic turning point. As the United States pursues the intent that “*we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region,*”² US strategists must consider the changing strategic environment of the Russian Federation to avoid unhinging this strategic turning point.

¹ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (Department of Defense, January 2012), Secretary of Defense Introductory Note.

² President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 2. Emphasis in original.

An absence of consideration for Russian security developments creates contextual gaps and increased risk for US security strategy and policy.³ Any analysis of Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific that fails to include the inter-regional and peripheral influence of the Russian Federation runs the risk of missing potential areas of conflict or cooperation. Identifying areas of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation assists in closing contextual gaps while identifying areas of conflict assists in reducing the risk of creating security policies with unintended consequences. The purpose of this work is to explore the security policies of these two nations and identify potential areas of conflict or cooperation in the strategic shifts currently underway.

Conflict or cooperation identification in the international sphere presents a rather large scope of analysis. Given the context surrounding the announcement of the United States' strategic turning point, a narrower analysis in the areas of security cooperation and conflict is suggestive. Thus, the focus here is on a comparison of national security documents and current security policy statements of the United States and the Russian Federation. At first glance, an analysis of security policy documents and statements from politicians would seem to be an exercise in exploring propaganda rather than identifying areas of potential cooperation or conflict. After all, these documents and statements are targeted messages for both domestic and international audiences and are authored to promote certain purposes. However, promotion of purpose is the value to be found in analyzing these documents. As Michael Haas puts it, "although security documents are

³ Richard L. Kugler, *New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents* (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 17.

highly declamatory and often propagandistic . . . they are of value in assessing Moscow's security policy of today and tomorrow.”⁴

Two theoretical tools created by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever provide a mechanism for exploring the ways in which security policy documents inform the identification of cooperation and conflict. The first of these tools is the concept of securitization or the process of migrating issues to the security sphere.⁵ Securitization moves provide the bridge between political rhetoric and potential for cooperation or conflict. The second tool is Regional Security Complex Theory or RSCT, a regional level of analysis in international relations between the domestic and global levels of analysis.⁶ RSCT provides the appropriate level of analysis based on the regional dynamics of the US turning point. Although reflective of the global nature of US strategic concern, the rebalance is among regional focus. “Sustaining Global Leadership” outlines general US policy intentions in the regions of Europe, the Middle East, and The Pacific. These regions surround the Russian Federation which suggests that regional analysis is the appropriate level for examining the dynamics between securitization moves by the Russian Federation and the United States. Analyzing the security documents of the Russian Federation and the United States through these two theoretical tools identify areas of *potential* security cooperation or potential security conflict between these two nations.

The approach used here begins with a description of the theoretical tools used in the analysis. Following this explanation, subsequent chapters analyze the principal

⁴ Marcel De Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*. (Routledge, 2011), 158.

⁵ Barry Buzan, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1998), 23.

⁶ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3–4.

security documents of the United States and Russian Federation and the securitization moves found in these documents that are most closely linked to the regions involved in the US strategic shift. First, the two most recent national security strategies are examined as a baseline to determine the issues likely to be securitization moves by each nation. Next, the military doctrines of the two nations are examined to identify the ways in which these documents amplify or inform the securitization moves in the national security documents. Finally, recent security documents and policy papers from the two nations are examined to identify any new directions or securitization moves and any continuity of issues from previous documents. Following this analysis, a conclusion identifies some of the areas of potential conflict and cooperation, presents some observations and recommendations for US policy and indicates areas for further exploration as the United States executes the rebalance.

RSCT and Securitization

Securitization is defined as “the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.”⁷ An issue becomes securitized when “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”⁸ In a basic sense, securitization is taking politics to the next level or bridging the gap between war – “a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” - and politics without violence.⁹ For securitization to be successful it must include: the perceived reality of existential threats, a call for emergency action or undertaking such action, and

⁷ Buzan, *Security*, 25.

⁸ Buzan, *Security*, 23–24.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz et al., *On War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.

effect on relations by breaking free of norms or rules. From these three criteria, “the distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure.”¹⁰ The rhetorical nature of securitization is suggestive of security policy documents.

Security policy documents cannot be viewed, however, as successful securitization in and of themselves. Successful securitization of an issue includes the following indicators: people killing each other in organized ways, the spending of large and/or escalating sums on armaments, populations being driven from homes in large numbers, or nations resorting to unilateral actions contrary in discernable ways to international undertakings.¹¹ Obviously, these are not indicators from security policy documents. The feature of securitization in security policy documents then becomes securitization’s antecedent – the securitizing move.

A securitizing move is simply an attempt to securitize an issue. It is the discourse that presents an issue as an existential threat. It is the initial step in transitioning an issue from the realm of politics without violence towards securitization. The issue is securitized “when the audience accepts it as such” and begins to legitimize emergency measures to deal with it. The discussion of an issue in a security policy document can be interpreted as a securitization move. In security policy documents, issues are presented in a rhetorical and propagandistic context to indicate that they are not merely politics but issues of potential securitization.

In subsequent chapters, an analysis of the security policy documents of the United States and the Russian Federation identifies the securitization moves of each country that interact in the regions of Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific, and the Arctic. The

¹⁰ Buzan, *Security*, 26.

¹¹ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 73.

process of securitization moves presents a consideration in the second analytical tool used in the analysis of this paper, RSCT. Securitization moves “can easily upset orders of mutual accommodation among units.”¹² On the interregional level then, securitizing moves create imbalance among neighboring regions. These securitization moves need to be analyzed in relation to each other at the regional level as suggested by RSCT.

Regional Security Complex Theory is an intermediate level of analysis between global security concerns and domestic security concerns. Establishing this level of analysis seeks to distinguish between system interplay of global powers and subsystem interplay of lesser powers. “To paint a proper portrait of global security, one needs to understand both of these levels independently, as well as the interaction between them.” RSCT paints its portion of the portrait by creating a blend between materialist and constructivist approaches. The materialist elements of the approach include the acceptance of bounded territoriality and the analysis of power distribution. The constructivist elements of the approach include consideration of the political process in security issues, or securitization.¹³

RSCT divides the globe into groups of Regional Security Complexes or RSCs. RSCs are defined as “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.”¹⁴ RSCs are categorized into four types: standard, centered, great power, and supercomplexes. The Russian Federation is located

¹² Buzan, *Security*, 26.

¹³ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 4, 27–30.

¹⁴ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 44. Several authors whose work is cited in this study are European and use British spelling conventions for the English language. In this work, these authors’ spelling will be conserved in direct quotes but the American spelling convention will be used outside of these direct quotes.

in the post-Soviet RSC, relabeled here as the Eurasian RSC, and the United States in the North American RSC. Both of these RSCs are classified as centered RSCs meaning that the RSC is unipolar in the security sense and dominated by either a superpower (North American RSC) or a great power (Eurasian RSC). The other three regions identified in “Sustaining Global Leadership” fall into the European centered RSC, the Middle Eastern standard RSC, and the Asian supercomplex RSC. These classifications provide the starting point for analyzing interregional and intraregional security dynamics.¹⁵

In analyzing these dynamics RSCT utilizes several variables. The first of these is the patterns of amity and enmity present within the region. These patterns reflect the influence of historical and cultural dynamics on security interdependence and are best understood by expanding analysis in both the global and domestic directions. Another variable is the interplay of the international anarchic structure with the regional balance of power pressures and geographic proximity pressures. This interplay is a dependent variable for RSC formation but also includes subordinate mechanisms of adjacency, penetration, and overlay. Adjacency is the concept that simple geographic proximity increases security interaction. Penetration is the condition of outside powers creating security alignments with nations within an RSC. Penetration is facilitated by regional balance of power dynamics that create the space for outside actors to influence security concerns. This then links the regional security patterns into global security concerns. Overlay is a mechanism that goes beyond penetration and occurs when outside security concerns are so pervasive and overwhelming that local or regional security patterns cease operating. Overlay usually results from great power rivalry alignments with the

¹⁵ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 55–62.

permanent presence of external great powers' armed forces as a symptom of this mechanism.¹⁶ These variables and mechanisms provide RSCT's tools for analysis. RSCT asserts that the regional level will always play a role in security analysis, occasionally a dominant one. As mentioned above, one of RSCT's central purposes is to separate global and regional security concerns for analysis of their interaction.¹⁷ This is of particular importance in a comparative analysis between US and Russian policies. The US rebalance involves regions that it is not a part of in RSCT. The United States lacks adjacency and, as an outside influence, has the ability to withdraw. However, "superpowers by definition largely transcend the logic of geography and adjacency in their security relationships."¹⁸ The United States, despite illustrating many of the symptoms of a declining superpower as identified by Robert Gilpin, is the only current superpower as defined by RSCT.¹⁹ This creates both challenges and advantages. At the RSCT level, US influence is largely confined to penetration and overlay attempts – the mechanisms that compensate for its lack of adjacency. This also facilitates choice, "and this choice underpins a whole range of policy options not possessed by actors that are really 'in' their regions."²⁰

When viewed through the lens of RSCT, the January 2012 US strategic turning point represents an adjustment of penetration and overlay mechanisms in the RSCs where the United States is exerting external influence. The rebalance includes increased interregional dynamics. This increase is illustrated in the shifting levels of penetration in

¹⁶ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 45–47, 61–62.

¹⁷ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 52, 81.

¹⁸ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 46.

¹⁹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 156–176; Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 55, 265, 288.

²⁰ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 81.

US security policy and the potential for rivalry between China and the United States to induce overlay in East Asia.²¹ RSCT indicates that “strong instances of interregional dynamics may be indicators of external transformation (merger) of RSCs.”²² Thus, the dynamics introduced by the US turning point can transform all the RSCs surrounding the Eurasian RSC. Likewise, shifts in levels of penetration attempts from the Russian Federation can influence the dynamics for US attempts in these regions.

In contrast to the United States, the Russian Federation is not a superpower. However, it is the great power of the centered Eurasian RSC. This has ramifications for the U.S. policy shift as, “in a centred region, the factors that drive the foreign policy of the dominant regional power are obviously of special importance.”²³ Since 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, security policy development in the Russian Federation has displayed four general characteristics as identified by Michael Haas: a fear of the alien or being surrounded by enemies, a desire for security buffer zones, a feeling of superiority, and a tradition of servitude to the state with no heritage of democracy.²⁴ The interregional dynamics between the Eurasian RSC and the neighboring RSCs will be strongly influenced by Russian security policy, even at the domestic level. As Buzan and Waever point out, “especially in centered RSCs, it will very often be the domestic struggle over security in the central state that determines major developments.”²⁵ However, within the Russian Federation, the domestic struggle for security is strongly tied to international relations.

²¹ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 2–3.

²² Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 49.

²³ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 404.

²⁴ Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 3.

²⁵ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 75.

International recognition is key to the Russian Federation's identity and connects international and domestic roles. This is primarily through the leadership coterie of the Russian Federation that has maintained power for the last two decades. As Lilia Shevtsova points out, the Russian foreign policy "aim remains to keep in place a personalized power system."²⁶ Thus, for the leadership of the Russian Federation "the *global* arena is today much more important than Europe for Russia's attempts both to secure a larger role outside its region and to legitimize its regional empire."²⁷ The Russian Federation has a strong impetus to leverage interregional dynamics for advantage at both the global and domestic levels and motivation to find opportunities in shifting regional dynamics.

Despite the importance of the Russian Federation's position as the central state in its RSC, there are limitations to how this position can be leveraged at other levels. Specifically, the Russian Federation faces a problem in that conflict within its own RSC can weaken its power in relation to other global powers.²⁸ So, not only do shifting regional dynamics offer opportunities for advantage to the Russian Federation, they also pose threats to its regional dominance and power status. With the connection to domestic politics mentioned above, these threats can easily be perceived as existential. As a result, the United States must be careful to analyze how the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific shifts perceptions of threat. As the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission concludes, "Russian and the United States are certainly not enemies but neither are they allies. The

²⁶ Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," in *Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives*, ed. Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 6.

²⁷ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 398. Emphasis in original.

²⁸ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 59.

two are strategic partners on some important international questions, but strategic competitors on others.”²⁹

In Buzan and Waever’s RSCT analysis, they characterize the Russian Federation as unlikely to reemerge as a major player in East Asia due to domestic challenges.³⁰ They explain this conclusion by illustrating that since the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1904-1905, the Soviet Union and Russian Federation have not concentrated on Asia as a primary arena. They further use this reasoning to Russia from East Asia in RSCT terms.³¹ In their analysis then, the importance of the Russian Federation and the Eurasian RSCT is diminished in the analysis of the Asian supercomplex. In the context of the US strategic turning point, the Russian Federation would then occupy a place of minor importance for the target RSC of the rebalance. However, there are several developing conditions that can influence this analysis in a different direction.

Buzan and Waever recognize the first of these conditions, the relationship between the Russian Federation and China. Their analysis recognizes the challenges importance of Russian and Chinese adjacency, demographics, trade, and regional security alliances. Nevertheless, they characterize the interregional relationship as weak.³² In the light of the US strategic turning point, this characterization must be reconsidered. Russian relations with China in the issues listed above can have significant impact if the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific develops a condition of overlay within the East Asian RSC subcomplex. The Russian Federation would become a key consideration, especially

²⁹ Jim Nichol, “Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy” (Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2011), 42, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42006.pdf>.

³⁰ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 177.

³¹ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 399–400.

³² Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 431–432.

in connection with its Chinese security alliances, if the United States and China entered into a rivalry condition of sufficient strength to induce overlay in the Asia-Pacific region.

Another condition is the emergence of the Arctic as a strategic consideration. The Arctic will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three but is introduced here as one reason that the Russian Federation deserves more careful consideration as a player in the Asia-Pacific region. The opening of trade routes through the Arctic can fundamentally alter any US containment strategies, create a flash point at the Bering Straits, and influence the global economic position of the Russian Federation. The Arctic is not treated as an RSC in Buzan and Waever's work and largely has avoided strategic attention in the United States. "Sustaining Global Leadership" makes no mention of the Arctic as a region of concern in the strategic rebalance. However, as discussed below, this is not the case in the Russian Federation. The Arctic region looms comparatively larger in Russian security documents underscoring the perceived importance of the region. The emergence of this additional regional dynamic can increase Russian influence in the Pacific region and can shift the interregional relations between the Eurasian RSC, the European RSC, and the Asian RSC.

In addition to adjacency and the emerging Arctic, there is an institutional condition that suggests Russian involvement in any US strategic moves involving neighboring regions. Shevtsova points out there is an inclination for the Russian Federation to oppose US strategic initiatives from the constraints of international prestige mentioned above. The Russian personalized power system is inherently hostile to liberal democracies, especially neighboring democracies, regardless of whether cooperation or

confrontation is pursued with western powers.³³ This condition suggests Russian involvement of some kind in the neighboring regions will occur through either cooperation or conflict.

Finally, “Russia is a geographical concept.”³⁴ As such, geopolitics is a condition that plays a large role in Russian foreign policy and increases sensitivity to interregional dynamics that influence the perceived sphere of influence. “A continuing line in Russian external policy has always been that Russia has a legitimate influence in the former Soviet area, in which other actors, such as the West, would not be tolerated.”³⁵ In essence, the Russian Federation considers its regional power and influence as more than simply politics but as a securitization move. These securitization moves become a central element in the analysis of these interregional dynamics.

In RSCT, “it is really the relationships (the moves) that tie [securitization] together, not the particular referent objects.”³⁶ In this case, the rebalancing of strategic concerns currently underway in the United States and the strategic developments underway in the Russian Federation are relationship adjustments or the securitizing moves that really matter in RSCT securitization. In this case, RSCT suggests that security connectedness should be analyzed in three steps: successful securitization of the issue by an actor, identification of links and interactions from this securitization, collection of links and interactions into a set of interconnected security concerns.³⁷ In the following chapters, the securitization moves rather than actual securitization are analyzed

³³ Shevtsova, “Russia’s Choice: Change or Degradation?,” 6; Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Vintage, 2009), 61–62.

³⁴ Dmitrii Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization* (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 22.

³⁵ Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 157.

³⁶ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 73.

³⁷ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 73.

to identify the elements of these steps already apparent. As an analysis of security policy documents, the first step of the RSCT analytical approach will often not be present. The issues are still securitization moves and the focus will be on the second step, links and interactions within the securitization moves. In some cases, issues have already been successfully securitized in one region but remain as securitization moves in other regions. The modified purpose then becomes to identify collections of links and interactions into sets of interconnected securitization move concerns rather than purely security concerns. Prior to that analysis, some relevant, general parameters of Russian securitization moves are reviewed for context.

There are two general aspects of Russian securitization moves that are born out in the following, more specific analysis. First, Russian securitization moves are rooted in a confrontational heritage. Shevtsova points out that “after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin abandoned the doctrine of total military confrontation with the West, but retained aspects and symbols of militarism, which still often impose their logic on the current system.”³⁸ This symbolic logic, inherited from the Cold War regime, lends a historical weight to Russian securitization moves that may not be fully appreciated in western circles.

The second general aspect of Russian securitization moves is the nature of the current political leadership. As mentioned above, the ties between domestic and international issues run through the leadership coterie. “In a quasi-imperial structure like Russia’s . . . one always has to give highest priority to the inner circles because their health is the precondition for that of the next circle outward.”³⁹ Basically, in Russia’s

³⁸ Shevtsova, “Russia’s Choice: Change or Degradation?,” 3.

³⁹ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 406.

structure, the domestic concern gains high priority because of the state power structure itself is securitized. This securitization is then projected outward to regional and global levels. There is high probability that Russian leadership would try to use foreign policy as a tool in a crisis or power struggle. For current conditions, Shevtsova warns that “in any case, the current ‘reset’ should not make either Russia or the outside world complacent . . . The honeymoon can continue only if the Western powers accept the Russian way of dealing with the world.”⁴⁰ These two general aspects of Russian securitization moves suggest a difficult environment to conduct a strategic rebalance.

On the other hand, RSCT embraces that “leaders and peoples have considerable freedom to determine what they do and do not define as security threats.”⁴¹ The material found in the following national security strategies and policy documents helps identify these definitions and lists those issues or concerns that national and military leadership are using as securitizing moves. Thus, while the ability of the United States or the Russian Federation to realize the ambitions declared in their security documents is certainly suspect, the existence of these topics in the security policy documents indicates a securitization move in that issue and the subsequent possibility of successful securitization. This analysis seeks to recognize the “patterns [that] emerge from the fact that different actors securitise differently” or rather create securitization moves differently.⁴²

⁴⁰ Shevtsova, “Russia’s Choice: Change or Degradation?,” 28.

⁴¹ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 26.

⁴² Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 87.

CHAPTER 2

National Security Strategies

The United States and the Russian Federation use similar documents to outline their national security policy. Both nations produce a governing security document that is then further refined through military strategies, doctrine, and political statements. These documents as a whole can be viewed as part of the process of creating a securitization move and indicate the issues that a nation is more likely to securitize. Based on the policy document structure that both nations utilize, the governing security documents provide the analytical starting point for determining these securitization moves. This chapter examines the United States and Russian Federation national security strategies through comparative analysis to identify the securitization moves with links and interaction to the US strategic rebalance. The analysis of the Russian Federation national security policy is intentionally more in depth to provide context. Some of the securitization moves that are identified will be analyzed in this chapter to illustrate that the issue has relevant connection between these two nations in the current strategic environment. Other moves will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters since the securitization moves for these issues are magnified by subordinate policy documents or recent political statements.

The United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of May 2010 and the Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020 (SNSRF) of May 2009 are the most recent national security policy documents of the two nations. In a general comparison of the two documents, several identifiable areas of similarity and difference stand out. The perception of the usefulness of military force, a global versus regional focus, and the intended forums for international discourse highlight the differences

between the two strategies. Conversely, a focus on domestic reform, the importance of international institutions and law, and the rhetorical attitudes towards weapons proliferation highlight similarities in strategic approaches to securitization moves.¹

The SNSRF and NSS exhibit very different tones regarding the use of military force. The SNSRF is focused primarily on the military instrument of national power. This may merely reflect the fact that the Russian Federation also issues separate policy documents for foreign policy and socio-economic policy.² However, the division of socio-economic policy from security policy is also indicative, in and of itself, of the differing view regarding the role of armed forces in the Russian Federation. Discussion of socio-economic factors in the SNSRF is used primarily as indicators of threat to the Russian Federation or as possible methods to support the military instrument of national power. The need to reinvigorate the military-industrial complex dominates much of the economic discussion.³ Additionally, forces of national security are tasked, together with civil society, in improving human rights, developing the legal system and legislation, ensuring food access, improving transportation infrastructure, preserving cultural and spiritual legacy, and assisting in several other areas of civil society that the military is often excluded from in the United States.⁴ The SNSRF establishes the military instrument

¹ These areas of similarity and difference help to establish categories for the securitization moves found within these documents. This classification structure is used in Appendix A to organize a more complete list of securitization moves found in the national security strategies.

² President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020" (Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009), <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>. Article 3.

³ President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020". Articles 21, 24-25, 28-29, 53-65, and 112.

⁴ President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020". Article 52.

of national power as the primary instrument of power for the security of the Russian Federation.

The conception of the military instrument of power as the primary means of security also finds voice in the Russian academic security policy community. In an article discussing present US conflicts, the United States is blamed for the emergence of unilateral use of force in international relations. The conclusion drawn mirrors the implicit tone of the SNSRF. “It can thus be stated that only real force is recognized in the world today, a force based on a vast economic potential and battle-worthy armed forces.”⁵ In broad terms then, the SNSRF treats the armed forces as the solution to national security.

In contrast, the NSS has a greater focus on the socio-economic instruments of national power. “Simply put, we must see American innovation as a foundation of American power.”⁶ This is not a surprising point of view for a liberal democracy.⁷ Extensive discussion of economic, diplomatic, and information strategies dominate the NSS with comments about the need to maintain an effective military force filling an almost ancillary role.⁸ These ancillary statements about military force are also qualified when they appear. “Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complimented.”⁹ “Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies . . . while the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust

⁵ Sergei L. Tashlykov, “General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies,” *Military Thought* 19, no. 3 (2010): 68–69.

⁶ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy” (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010). Introductory Note.

⁷ Everett C. Dolman, *Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age*, Cass Series--Strategy and History (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 6. This reference identifies the emphasis of socio-economic factors in democracy as a well-established principle in political science.

⁸ Richard L. Kugler, *New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents* (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 18.

⁹ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy”, Introductory Note.

other options before war whenever we can.”¹⁰ In tone, the NSS implies that, for the United States, military force is a reluctant necessity.

Another major difference between these two security documents is in the regional and domestic focus of the SNSRF compared to the global focus of the NSS. The global focus of the NSS can be seen in the discussion of concerns throughout the globe and the US role at the international level.¹¹ The NSS addresses concerns for over forty nations by name throughout the document. Seventeen regional and international organizations are also included by name with accompanying discussion of US intentions within their framework. In agreement with this global focus, the NSS identifies common challenges that require international cooperation. These include violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the global economy.¹²

In addition to the nations, multinational organizations, and international cooperation issues named in the document, the NSS lays out a clear intent for the United States to maintain global leadership. This intent is extended to the realm of international security. The NSS states that “the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security” and “we embrace America’s unique responsibility to promote international security.”¹³

In contrast, the SNSRF focuses more on the regional dynamics for Russian Federation security policy. The SNSRF does state the long term goal of establishing the Russian Federation as a world power; however, the document maintains a regional focus,

¹⁰ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 22.

¹¹ Kugler, *New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy*, 14.

¹² President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 12.

¹³ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 1, 17.

rarely discussing concerns beyond immediate border areas.¹⁴ As Mark Galeotti observes “while on the one hand, the 2010 doctrine embodies a grudging retreat from claims to a truly global status, on the other, it articulates a much sharper and arguably more aggressive assertion of its regional power status and, indeed, its claims to hegemony in post-Soviet Eurasia.”¹⁵ Shevtsova claims that this is a reflection of a longstanding trend in Russian politics.

Foreign and security policies have to pursue contradictory paths. For the outside, these policies have to create the image of Russia as a modern and responsible European state. For the inside, foreign policy has to supply constant justification for the “Besieged Fortress” mentality and secure rejection of the Western standards by the Russian society. This “driving two horses in opposite directions” is actually the agenda of Russian foreign and security policies that the Kremlin has been pursuing with great skill during the last 10 years...One could risk the conclusion that the Kremlin foreign and security policies are more influenced by domestic needs than by the logic of international relations.¹⁶

Buzan and Waever also identify this phenomenon as a primary security threat at the domestic level. A lack of recognition or a lack of a respectable international role is a threat to state identity and, therefore, has significant play at the domestic level.¹⁷

This domestic influence is further shown by the content of the SNSRF. Where the NSS discusses over forty nations by name the SNSRF discusses only six: the United States of America, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the European Union.

¹⁴ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 21.

¹⁵ Mark Galeotti, “Reform of the Russian Military and Security Apparatus: An Investigator’s Perspective,” in *Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives*, ed. Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 66.

¹⁶ Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia’s Choice: Change or Degradation?,” in *Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives*, ed. Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 6–7.

¹⁷ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 405.

Of these nations, all share a border with the Russian Federation except the United States. Additionally, the SNSRF discusses several domestic regions by name while the NSS does not list any domestic units.

For discussion of multinational organizations discussed by name, there is closer parity in numbers between the NSS and SNSRF. The SNSRF references eleven organizations to the seventeen of the NSS. However, only four multinational organizations are discussed in both documents: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), the Group of Eight (G8), and the Group of Twenty (G20). The more extensive list of organizations discussed in the NSS does not include the seven other organizations that are named in the SNSRF. These seven organizations are the Eurasian Economic Community, the Russia-India-China forum (RIC), the Brazil-Russia-India-China forum (BRIC), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Four of these seven organizations are regionally focused to Eurasia and two of the others include Russia but not the United States. The last of these seven, the WTO, is an international organization that currently includes both nations although, at the time the NSS and SNSRF were authored, Russia was not a member. These differences in multinational organizations discussed in the documents reinforce the regional focus of the SNSRF.

The SNSRF also specifically identifies a growing trend of regional influence in conflict resolution. “A tendency is developing to seek resolutions to existing problems and regulate crisis situations on a regular basis without the participation of non-regional

powers.”¹⁸ In other words, regions can handle conflict themselves without the intervention of global powers. In summary, the United States views globalization as an opportunity while the Russian Federation views globalization as a threat.¹⁹

There is also a noticeable difference in the international forums that the two nations intend to use in advancing national security. As discussed above, there is little overlap between the documents in named multinational organizations. Of the four overlapping organizations, two of them are economic forums. The UN then becomes the only international forum that both recognize as legitimate for tackling regional and international security concerns.²⁰ Beyond the UN, there is sharp divergence in recognition by name of legitimate international forums. NATO is viewed as a forum for addressing international security concerns in the NSS.²¹ However, NATO expansion and its assumption of global roles are considered a threat in the SNSRF.²² This securitization move will be discussed in greater depth in chapter three but the divergence itself is an important difference between the two documents.

The different organizations in the SNSRF discussed above indicate a further divergence. This divergence shows an intent on the part of the Russian Federation, in pursuit of its national security objectives, to use multinational forums that exclude the United States. Explicitly, “the Collective Security Treaty Organization is regarded in the capacity of the main intergovernmental instrument called to stand against regional

¹⁸ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 8. Author’s translation.

¹⁹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 1. President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 40–50.

²⁰ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 2, 12–13; President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 18.

²¹ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 2, 22, 40–42, 48.

²² President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Articles 8 and 17.

challenges and threats of a military-political or military-strategic character.”²³ Based on this analysis, the stated intent of the two nations is to work mainly through multinational forums at the regional level that currently exclude the participation of the other nation.

In addition to the differences in multinational organizations, the two documents also discuss unilateral and multilateral action. The NSS reserves the right of the United States to use unilateral force but uses language to frame this use of force within the norms of international law.²⁴ The SNSRF, however, considers the unilateral use of force to have a negative influence on international relations and advocates the importance of multilateral institutions.²⁵ Marcel Haas points out that this attitude is not new. Since 2000, “Moscow felt threatened by attempts to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for international security, by economic and power domination of the United States and other Western states, as well as by ignoring Russian interests and influence in resolving international security problems.”²⁶ The Russian Federation sees multilateralism as an opportunity. Specifically, “the transition from opposing blocs to principles of multilateral diplomacy, together with Russia’s resource potential and pragmatic policy for its use, have expanded the possibilities for the Russian Federation to reinforce its influence on the world stage.”²⁷ Buzan and Waever point out that Russian policy has consistently opposed US unilateral action and supported multilateral approaches.²⁸

²³ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 13. Author’s translation.

²⁴ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 22.

²⁵ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 9 and 10. Author’s translation.

²⁶ Marcel De Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*. (Routledge, 2011), 17.

²⁷ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 9.

²⁸ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 405.

The NSS and SNSRF also display several similarities. The general similarities between the two documents include the importance of domestic reforms to national security, the importance of international law in government behavior, and the dangers of weapons proliferation. Both the NSS and the SNSRF recognize the importance of domestic reform efforts for national security. In the NSS, President Obama states that “our strategy starts by recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home.”²⁹ Likewise, the SNSRF identifies the need to ensure national security through efforts to strengthen domestic institutions and capabilities.³⁰ In addition to domestic reform, both documents claim international norms and law as the basis for legitimacy. The Russian Federation clearly states the intent to maintain its international relations and foreign policies within the bounds of international law. The UN Security Council is identified as a central element of this effort.³¹ The United States also states a commitment to the rule of law and the necessity of efforts for international justice.³² The third general similarity between the NSS and SNSRF is weapons proliferation. Both documents discuss the need to curtail the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Additionally, both the NSS and the SNSRF openly state the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. The NSS goes even further and establishes a policy that no nuclear weapons will be used against non-nuclear nations in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This policy even extends to a pledge not to use even a threat of

²⁹ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy”. Introductory note.

³⁰ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 24.

³¹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 13.

³² President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 2, 48.

nuclear weapon use to nations compliant with the treaty.³³ These similarities in addition to the differences identified above provide context for analysis of these security policy documents and the securitization moves found within.

The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020

The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020 defines national security as “a condition of individual, societal, and governmental security from interior and exterior threats which allows the provision of constitutional rights, freedoms, a suitable quality and standard of life for citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the stable development of the Russian Federation; the defense and security of the state.”³⁴ Of note in that definition, is the inclusion of both interior and exterior threats to security. Indicators of national security, included later in the document, highlight this duality in the sources of perceived threats. This list of indicators includes the level of unemployment, the decile coefficient (the correlation between the incomes of the top ten percent and the bottom ten percent of the population), the rate of consumer price growth, the level of internal and external state debt as a percentage of GDP, the level of fiscal support for healthcare, culture, education, and science as a percentage of GDP, the annual level of military equipment and weapons replenishment, and the level of military logistics and supply.³⁵ As noted earlier, the armed forces of the Russian Federation are tasked to answer to both the internal and external threats to national security. This places a duality

³³ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 23; President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Articles 30, 90, 92, and 94-95.

³⁴ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 6. Author’s translation.

³⁵ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”, Article 112.

of responsibility on the Russian Federation's armed forces that does not exist for the US armed forces.

In addition to the definition and indicators of national security, the SNSRF includes a general identification of near and long term threats at the international level:

The attention of international politics, from a long-term perspective, will be focused on ownership of energy resources, including in the Near East, the Barents Sea shelf and other Arctic regions, in the basin of the Caspian Sea, and in Central Asia. A negative influence on the international situation, from a medium-term perspective, will be rendered, as before, in the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as conflicts in the Near and Middle East, in a number of South Asian and African countries, and on the Korean peninsula.³⁶

This list of threats shows three themes of importance that recur throughout the document: energy security, weapons proliferation, and violent extremism. Listing energy security at the top of the list is not a coincidence. Energy, as a securitization move, will be discussed in greater depth in chapter four but the SNSRF includes significant concern for the long and medium term security implications of the economic sector and its reliance on energy. Since Putin's first term, the Russian Federation has become increasingly reliant on the energy sector as the basis of its economy. The funds brought in from this sector form a large portion of the power base available for current leadership in Moscow to maintain their power.³⁷ Energy security has featured prominently in Russian national security strategies since that time but it is not the only issue to enjoy continuity.

The SNSRF was signed by President Dmitri Medvedev in 2009. However, it shows extensive consistency with the security policies and outlook of Medvedev's

³⁶ President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020". Article 11. Author's translation.

³⁷ Steven Rosefielde, "The Impossibility of Russian Economic Reform: Waiting for Godot," in *Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives*, ed. Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 37–59.

predecessor and successor, Vladimir Putin.³⁸ This implies a level of consistency in the issues that the leadership of the Russian Federation intends to use as securitization moves, at least for the foreseeable future. Five continuous issues are of particular note. These include military modernization; the threat posed by NATO, the United States, and the West; the perception of strength to influence international relations and forward the Russian agenda; the protection of Russian citizens beyond national borders; and, as previously mentioned, energy security.³⁹ The continuity of these issues indicates some intent to achieve successful.

One article of the SNSRF is specifically dedicated to discussing the intentions of the Russian Federation regarding the United States. The stated intent is to build an “equitable and valuable strategic partnership” to address several priorities. Those priorities include arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, cooperative agreements, antiterrorist efforts, and resolution of regional conflicts. In addition to these areas of cooperation, this article also indicates that the relationship between the United States and Russian Federation exercises “key influence . . . on the condition of the international situational as a whole.”⁴⁰ Based on these statements, this article appears to serve dual purposes. The first purpose is the obvious identification of issues for cooperation with the United States and these issues line up nicely with a similar list in the NSS discussed below. The second purpose is to act as a securitization move to boost Russian legitimacy and influence at the global level. So, although the statement is framed to encourage

³⁸ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 15–82. This extensive discussion of Putin's security policies between the years 2000 and 2008 are nicely summarized by Table 1.2 on pages 25-29.

³⁹ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 159.

⁴⁰ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 18. Author's translation.

cooperation, it also emphasizes some of the securitization moves pursued by the Russian Federation.

The United States National Security Strategy

An analysis of the US securitization moves in the NSS provides comparative material for exploration of links and interactions with the securitization moves in the SNSRF. One contrast between the two is that the NSS does not display the same consistency with previous versions that the SNSRF displays. A marked difference in the current NSS from previous versions is the transition away from a focus on the military instrument of power and defense preparedness. Two other departures from previous strategies include a reemphasized focus on a whole-of-government approach to security challenges and a greater emphasis on multilateral approaches to international relations. The emphasis on multilateral approaches is also reinforced by a reduced emphasis on the pursuit of global democratization.⁴¹ Thus, as is to be expected with a change of political party in the US administration, the current NSS represents changes to the securitization moves than those pursued by the previous administration.

The new direction of the NSS has three general themes. These themes include economic renewal, comprehensive engagement, and global leadership. Together, these three themes are intended to strengthen collective action to meet security threats.⁴² Within these themes, the NSS identifies four strategic interests for the United States: security, domestic and international economic prosperity, respect for universal values,

⁴¹ Kugler, *New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy*, 2.

⁴² Kugler, *New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy*, 1.

and the advancement of international order.⁴³ These themes and interests indicate the basic securitization moves of the document.

More specific securitization moves are found in the NSS discussion of six security objectives. These objectives include strengthening domestic security and resilience, defeating al-Qaeda and violent extremist affiliates, reversing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, advancing Middle East peace, building partner capacity, and securing cyberspace.⁴⁴ These six securitization moves reflect the changing direction of the NSS and can be viewed as some of the core issues.

The NSS also includes a section specifically dedicated to discussing areas of cooperation with the Russian Federation. Three specific areas of mutual interest are highlighted in this section starting with nuclear weapons. The U.S. states an interest in working with the Russian Federation to reduce nuclear arsenals and ensure global compliance with nonproliferation. The second cooperative area is in the efforts to confront violent extremism with an explicit emphasis on Afghanistan. The final cooperative area is mutual trade and investment opportunity.⁴⁵ These three areas of cooperation all match areas of securitization moves by the United States. As a result, this section on cooperation also includes security concerns.

Despite this section on relations with the Russian Federation residing under the title “Building Cooperation with Other 21st Century Centers of Influence,” two specific warnings are included. The NSS states that the United States will “support efforts within Russia to promote the rule of law, accountable government, and universal values.”⁴⁶

⁴³ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 7, 17.

⁴⁴ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 18–28.

⁴⁵ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 44.

⁴⁶ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 44.

While couched in the language of cooperation, this amounts to a declaration of intent to influence domestic political processes within the Russian Federation and directly conflicts with a domestic securitization move in the SNSRF. The second warning follows on the heels of the first. “While actively seeking Russia’s cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors.”⁴⁷ This second warning indicates the United States’ stated willingness to become involved in regional security issues that the Russian Federation typically considers its own area of influence.

This analysis of the two principal security policy documents already shows indications of cooperation and conflict among the securitization moves. An exhaustive analysis of all the securitization moves within the two national security strategies is not the intent of this paper.⁴⁸ Rather, the intent is to analyze those securitization moves that deserve the most consideration in the regional context of the contemporary strategic developments in both nations. There are nine such securitization moves found in the national security strategies: values, nonproliferation, terrorism and violent extremism, NATO, missile defense systems, border security, the Arctic region, military transformation, and energy resources. From this list, three securitization moves are analyzed in this chapter. The remaining securitization moves are analyzed in subsequent chapters. The three securitization moves analyzed here are values, weapons of mass destruction, and violent extremism.

⁴⁷ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 44.

⁴⁸ See Appendix A for the author’s comprehensive list of securitization moves in the two national security strategies.

Values

The first issue to be analyzed between the NSS and SNSRF is the respective securitization moves regarding values. These securitization moves tie the cultural identity of the nations to their security concerns. Thus, it becomes a foundational consideration for any interactions between the two nations. As Alexander Wendt argues in *Social Theory of International Politics* “the fundamental factor in international politics is the ‘distribution of ideas’ in the system.”⁴⁹ In this light, values take on a fundamental importance as securitization moves since their influence can, to a greater or lesser extent, influence other securitization movements undertaken by the government.

The NSS claims several values as universal and states the intent to promote these values internationally. These universal values include a human right to economic opportunity, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of worship, democratic election, dignity, tolerance, equality, and justice administered fairly and equitably. Additionally, the NSS states that “nations that embrace these values for their citizens are ultimately more successful – and friendly to the United States – than those that do not.”⁵⁰ This last statement can be viewed to implicitly link the acceptance of these values to the capacity for cooperation or the level of threat that a nation presents to US interests. Indeed, in another section of the NSS entitled “Practicing Principled Engagement with Non-Democratic Regimes,” this relationship between cooperation and values is overtly made. “Even when we are focused on interests such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, or enhancing economic ties, we will always seek in parallel to expand

⁴⁹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006), 96.

⁵⁰ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 5, 35.

individual rights and opportunities through our bilateral engagement.” This policy ties the US values securitization move as an appendage to other forms of cooperation.⁵¹ Again, the Russian Federation is not identified by name. However, the fact that the methods of cooperation listed in this statement exactly match the areas of cooperation that the NSS specifically lists as areas of cooperation with the Russian Federation is highly suggestive.

Unfortunately, the values listed in the SNSRF do not match the values listed in the NSS and further illustrate the potential for conflict in interaction. Russia’s definition of shared values includes the freedom and independence of the Russian government, humanism, multinational peace, cultural unity, respect for family tradition, and patriotism. The SNSRF lists specific threats to these values and cultural national security. These threats include popular media oriented to the spiritual needs of marginalized groups and the vandalism of cultural artifacts. Furthermore, a list of negative cultural influences is presented that includes the revisionist portrayal of Russia in world history, the advocacy of permissive and violent lifestyles, and the increasing intolerance of racial, national, and religious groups.⁵²

The SNSRF goes even further by tying the armed forces into this securitization move. One of the tasks assigned to security forces is to “provide for the preservation of a cultural and spiritual legacy.” This dictum is reinforced with extensive recommendations of state action to influence culture and media.⁵³ The state role looms large in the Russian

⁵¹ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 38.

⁵² President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Articles 1, 80, and 81.

⁵³ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020” Articles 52 and 82-84. Author’s translation.

Federation's view of protecting cultural values. In contrast to the US values listing freedoms, the Russian values are more focused on duties. This difference is not trivial.

In fact the NSS offers a pointed, if implicit, observation to the Russian Federation. "Even where some governments have adopted democratic practices, authoritarian rulers have undermined electoral processes and restricted the space for opposition and civil society, imposing a growing number of legal restrictions so as to impede the rights of people to assemble and access information."⁵⁴ While this observation is applicable to several regimes throughout the world, in light of recent events, the Russian Federation emerges as a prime example.

One example of the interaction between these value securitization moves is the Russian Federation laws governing Non-governmental Organizations (NGO). These laws are not new to the Russian Federation but recent changes and clarifications to the law are indicative of a "growing number of legal restrictions so as to impede the rights of people to assemble and access information." The most recent changes to the law sharply increase the amount of information required for an organization to register with the government and operate legally. Funding from foreign sources is also prohibited unless the organization accepts classification as a "foreign agent," a term that carries negative connotations in Russian society and is an express concern of the SNSRF.⁵⁵ In sum, these measures increase government control over the activities of non-governmental entities.

⁵⁴ President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 35.

⁵⁵ An excellent summary of the provisions of this law can be found at "NCO Law Monitor: Russia," *ICNL: The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law*, February 20, 2013, <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html>; The SNSRF concern for NGOs is expressed in President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020". Article 37. See "WWF Partners in Russia Targeted as 'Foreign Agents'," News Media, *RIA Novosti*, April 26, 2013, <http://en.ria.ru/politics/20130426/180865587/WWF-Partners-in-Russia-Targeted-as-Foreign-Agents.html> for a brief explanation of the Russian cultural view of the term "foreign agent."

Indications that this behavior is perceived to be outside of norms from the US perspective, and thus satisfying one of the indicators of successful securitization, can be found in the reaction to Russian prosecution of this law. The US State Department issued a statement of concern in July of 2012. In words reflective of the vocabulary used in the NSS, Patrick Ventrell stated that “we believe that people everywhere should enjoy the same fundamental freedoms and universal right . . . that’s why we’ve raised our concerns about the potential passage of this new NGO legislation.”⁵⁶

A response from the Russian side came in September of 2012 when the Russian Federation expelled the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Although some human rights advocates within Russia have condemned this action, the broader mood within the Russian Federation still runs counter to the United States.⁵⁷ A January 2011 survey showed that seventy percent of the Russian population thinks that it has enemies. Forty percent name the United States as that enemy. Furthermore, “despite the reset, 65 percent consider the United States an aggressor that seeks to take control of the entire world.”⁵⁸ An “us” versus “them” mentality is very strong in the Russian Federation indicating that domestic perception of this behavior is within accepted norms.⁵⁹

The securitization moves of values by these two nations are linked by their fundamental impact on other securitization moves. These securitization moves already

⁵⁶ “Washington Voices Concern over Russia’s NGO Bill,” News Media, *RIA Novosti*, July 12, 2012, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120712/174561536.html>.

⁵⁷ “Russia Expels USAID Development Agency,” News Media, *BBC News*, September 19, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19644897>.

⁵⁸ Shevtsova, “Russia’s Choice: Change or Degradation?,” 21.

⁵⁹ Eric A. Beene, Jeffrey J. Kubiak, and Kyle J. Colton, “U.S., Russia and the Global War on Terror: ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ into Battle?” (Air University, 2005), 212–214; Shevtsova, “Russia’s Choice: Change or Degradation?,” 6–7.

show signs of successful securitization as shown above. While it is unlikely that these securitization moves will, of themselves, lead to other indicators of securitization (organized killing, population expulsion, or creation of an existential threat perception) they are likely to persist as an undercurrent to all other security concerns. More than just cultural differences, the national security policy documents indicate that these securitization moves are linked to perceptions of national security.

The remaining two securitization moves analyzed in this chapter are both listed expressly as areas of cooperation that each nation desires with the other. On the surface, cooperation in the areas of nonproliferation and counterterrorism seem straightforward. Both nations state an intent to cooperate with the other in efforts against terrorism and extremism and in policies that oppose the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.⁶⁰ These stated intents are suggestive that the links and interactions in a connectedness analysis have already been established and cooperation is possible. However, the manner in which these issues are being securitized may be eroding these links and connections. There is a latent or growing antagonism in the interaction of these security issues. As a result, cooperative links and connections stand the chance of eroding into interactions of conflict. Both nonproliferation and counterterrorism show symptoms of this scenario.

⁶⁰ President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 44; President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020". Article 18.

Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Of the two securitization moves, the symptoms of cooperation erosion are weaker for terrorism and extremism, but they do exist. The principal difference between US and Russian securitization of terrorism and violent extremism reflects one of the general differences in tone identified above. The United States treats terrorism and violent extremism in an international context while the Russian Federation treats them in a domestic and regional context.⁶¹ A simple text analysis of the SNSRF and NSS also supports this observation. In the SNSRF, seven of the ten uses of the word terrorism and all six of the uses of the word extremism are used in a domestic or regional context.⁶² The NSS, in contrast, uses the word terrorism seven of eight times in an international context and the word extremism is placed in an international context ten of eleven times.⁶³ The NSS paints terrorism and extremism as a global problem while the SNSRF suggests it is a domestic and regional problem. This divergence suggests that cooperation may not be as natural as expected at first glance.

The differences in views are also illustrated by the successful securitization of this issue by both nations. The United States clearly meets all measures of successful securitization of this issue. Following 11 September 2001, this issue was perceived as an existential threat and calls were made for emergency action outside of previously established norms and rules. A decade of organized killing, increased defense spending,

⁶¹ Beene, Kubiak, and Colton, "U.S., Russia and the Global War on Terror: 'Shoulder to Shoulder' into Battle?," 211–214.

⁶² President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020". Articles 1, 10, 18, 36–38, 40, 41, 43, and 104. This analysis is based on translating the Russian words экстремизм and терроризм as extremism and terrorism respectively. The Russian words are cognates.

⁶³ President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 3, 4, 8, 11–12, 15, 18, 20, 24, 26, 36–37, 42–44, 48.

and perceived unilateral action indicate that the United States successfully securitized this issue. Furthermore, it was done on an international scale with manifestations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

During the same period, the Russian Federation also successfully securitized this issue but not on an international scale. The same indicators listed above for the United States were also discernable for the Russian Federation but were localized to the domestic regions of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. This domestic focus by the Russian Federation for its terrorism securitization move raises a significant question of labels. As Stathis Kalyvas so cogently points out, the label of terrorism in a domestic struggle can often be euphemistic or semantic contestation.⁶⁴ Buzan and Waever conclude that Russian securitization of terrorism is largely to legitimize Chechen operations and the cross border operations of Russian military and intelligence assets into neighboring republics.⁶⁵ US reaction to Russian military activity in these conflicts seems to reflect a suspicion of Kalyvas's, Buzan's, and Waever's observations in this case. There is a resistance in US perception to include these conflicts in the international counterterrorism efforts.⁶⁶

At the regional and international levels, Russian securitization of this issue has largely been confined to rhetoric. At a recent SCO summit, Medvedev identified "terrorism, ethnic separatists, and religious extremists [as] the 'three evil forces' [that]

⁶⁴ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17.

⁶⁵ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 410, 420.

⁶⁶ Beene, Kubiak, and Colton, "U.S., Russia and the Global War on Terror: 'Shoulder to Shoulder' into Battle?," 215–218, 267.

threatened regional security.”⁶⁷ Yet, as Haas observes, “the SCO states have claimed their primacy in Central Asian regional security, but so far action by the SCO of countering the threats from Afghanistan has not taken place.”⁶⁸ This reluctance in cooperation on the part of the Russian Federation is further illustrated at the international level. Cooperation with the efforts pursued by the United States has been confined largely to intelligence sharing, logistical support, and the land supply routes of the Northern Distribution Network.⁶⁹

In this context, the successful securitization of this issue by each nation has not resulted in widespread cooperation. For the intended cooperation to be realized, the Russian Federation needs to pursue a securitization move of these issues at the international level or the United States needs to leverage Russian involvement at the regional level with the attendant danger of differences in the interpretation of terrorism. Otherwise, this area of cooperation can easily erode and, based on the underlying antagonism of the values securitization move, lead to an area of conflict.⁷⁰ Working to strengthen the cooperation will facilitate the rebalance strategy currently being pursued by the US administration.

⁶⁷ “Medvedev Calls on SCO Members to Strengthen Anti-terror Cooperation,” *Xinhua*, December 5, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-12/05/c_132021276.htm.

⁶⁸ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 162.

⁶⁹ Beene, Kubiak, and Colton, “U.S., Russia and the Global War on Terror: ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ into Battle?,” 268–273.

⁷⁰ Prior to US securitization of terrorism and extremism after 11 September 2001, US leaders were critical of Russian actions in Chechnya. See “Russia Will Pay for Chechnya,” News Media, *BBC News*, December 7, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/553304.stm> for an example of this antagonism.

Nonproliferation

The issue of nonproliferation faces a similar scenario. Both the United States and the Russian Federation clearly state in their national security strategies the intent to cooperate with the other in preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.⁷¹ The National Military Strategy of the United States of America also states US intent to work “through institutions, alliances and coalitions, [to] dismantle proliferation networks, interdict movement of materials, further improve nuclear forensic capabilities, and secure nuclear, chemical, and biological materials worldwide.”⁷² Furthermore, the NSS identifies weapons of mass destruction, specifically a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon, as the greatest security threat to the United States.⁷³ On the surface this appears to be one of the strongest areas of cooperation suggested in the national security strategies. This perception is especially strong in light of the fact that both national security strategies claim to seek a world free from nuclear weapons.⁷⁴ In apparent pursuit of this goal, the New START Treaty was completed within a year of the NSS being issued.⁷⁵ This treaty includes further reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of the two nations and represents a significant step towards realization of the mutually stated goal. Unfortunately, other aspects of nonproliferation securitization are causing divergence on this issue.

⁷¹ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 44; President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 18.

⁷² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership” (Department of Defense, February 8, 2011), 7–8.

⁷³ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 4, 17, 23.

⁷⁴ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 23; President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 90.

⁷⁵ “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Treaty Finalized,” News Media, *USA Today*, February 5, 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-02-05-start-treaty_N.htm.

While the ratification of the New START Treaty is encouraging, two other treaties related to nuclear proliferation have experienced setbacks in recent years. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June of 2002 to pursue missile defense. This unilateral action is perceived as a violation of an established norm and has caused the emergence of a new securitization issue.⁷⁶ In the analysis of two Russian military officers, the US intent is “to contribute tangibly to deep cuts (down to zero even) in nuclear weapons and simultaneously focus efforts on deployment of a large-scale (global) missile defense system and a force of efficient strategic nonnuclear weapons . . . that can deter any adversary from aggression.”⁷⁷ The issue of ballistic missile defense is now an additional securitization move that has spun off from nonproliferation and will be discussed in greater depth in chapter three.

The Russian Federation is also indicating a desire to change its status within a current treaty. In October of 2012, the Russian Foreign Ministry indicated that the Russian Federation does not intend to renew the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, also known as the Nunn-Lugar Treaty.⁷⁸ This is one of the major US initiatives in the NSS to counter nuclear proliferation and Russian withdrawal increases the perceived threat of increased proliferation.⁷⁹ The termination of these two treaties indicates a divergence in securitization moves of the nonproliferation security issue.

⁷⁶ James Clay Moltz, *The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests*, Second edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 270–272.

⁷⁷ Vladimir I. Lumpov and Vladimir V. Karpov, “On the U.S. New Strategic Triad,” *Military Thought* 21, no. 1 (2012): 147.

⁷⁸ Sergey Kazak, “Russia May Quit Nunn-Lugar Program,” *RIA Novosti*, October 10, 2012, http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20121010/176527879.html.

⁷⁹ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (Department of Defense, January 2012), 5; Beene, Kubiak, and Colton, “U.S., Russia and the Global War on Terror: ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ into Battle?,” 262–266; Samuel B. Vandiver, “Russia’s Great Power Security Relationship with the United States” (Air University, 2003), 20–23.

A final example is the interaction between the two nations when the nonproliferation issue is taken up as a securitization move at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Over the last decade, the Russian Federation has opposed three different US nonproliferation securitization moves. Russia joined France and Germany in opposing US attempts to use nonproliferation as justification for an invasion of Iraq in 2003. More contemporary examples include Russian opposition to the use of force in the Iranian nuclear proliferation issues and emerging international concern over the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. Only diplomatic methods are acceptable to the Russians for addressing these issues.⁸⁰ A confinement of these issues to the realm of diplomacy is a move away from securitization back towards politicization. This pattern of opposition to US nonproliferation securitization moves indicates clear limits to Russian willingness to cooperate. As Samuel Vandiver put it, “the problem is that Russia’s cooperation on WMD only goes so far; it . . . solely pursues diplomatic means, not military or economic pressure to address the challenge.”⁸¹

These emerging seams between US and Russian approaches to nonproliferation create a constant threat of cooperation eroding into conflict. As with counterterrorism, the differences and divergences must be considered closely in any strategic shifts. Failure to recognize how strategic shifts will impact the securitization move of nonproliferation can cause the seams of cooperation listed above to develop into rifts of

⁸⁰ “Russia’s Lavrov Urges Diplomatic Solution to Iran Nuclear Issue,” News Media, *RIA Novosti*, December 22, 2012, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20091222/157322284.html>; Beene, Kubiak, and Colton, “U.S., Russia and the Global War on Terror: ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ into Battle?,” 232; “U.S., Russia Split on Disputed Chemical Weapons Strike in Syria,” News Media, *Los Angeles Times*, March 19, 2013, <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/19/world/la-fg-wn-syria-chemical-dispute-20130319>; “Moscow Says UN Decision on Syria Chemical Weapons ‘Politicized’,” News Media, *The Voice of Russia*, April 25, 2013, http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_26/Moscow-sees-UN-Secretariats-decision-on-chemical-weapons-in-Syria-as-politicized/.

⁸¹ Vandiver, “Russia’s Great Power Security Relationship with the United States,” 22.

conflict. With nonproliferation securitization moves causing seams between the United States and the Russian Federation in the UNSC, the potential for this security issue to impact any US strategic shift is high.

Values, counterterrorism, and nonproliferation represent three security moves in common to both the Russian Federation and the United States. The values securitization moves of each nation are foundational and influence all other security issues. As a result, this securitization move will impact any other strategic changes pursued by either nation. In the US strategic rebalance, the divisions apparent in the different values securitization moves must be considered for their influence on the proposed changes.

Additionally, two of the fundamental areas of cooperation explicitly identified in the national security strategies are threatened by associated security moves. Some measures of cooperation are evident in counterterrorism and nonproliferation. However, clear divergences in how these issues are securitized illustrate the vulnerability of these cooperative areas in a dynamic strategic environment. Any strategic shifts must take these issues under consideration.

These foundational securitization moves recognizable in the national security strategies of the Russian Federation and the United States are not the only securitization moves that directly relate to the current US rebalance. These additional securitization moves become even more apparent with the added perspective of The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, and the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2020. These three security policy documents and additional securitization moves are analyzed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

National Military Strategies and Doctrines

Subordinate to the national security strategies of the United States and the Russian Federation are several security policy documents that expand on some of the securitization moves. For the United States, the National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America, published in February 2011, serves this purpose. For the Russian Federation, two separate documents serve a similar role. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (MDRF) and The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2020 (Maritime Doctrine) combine as security policy documents equivalent to the NMS. These documents refine the securitization moves from the national security strategies for the military instrument of national power. These documents are chosen for further analysis of securitization moves in light of the Russian Federation's emphasis, as described in chapter two, on the importance of the armed forces in maintaining national security.

The national military doctrines inform four securitization moves from the national security strategies that relate to the ongoing strategic shifts. These securitization moves are border security, the Arctic, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. All of these securitization moves are introduced in the national security strategies and further emphasized in the national military policies. Three of them are common themes for both nations. However, the Arctic securitization move by the Russian Federation is not reflected in US security policy documents to a comparable extent. Each of these securitization moves is analyzed below following a brief overview of the national military doctrine documents.

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America

The current version of The National Military Strategy of the United States of America was completed in February 2011. This document is very similar in tone to the NSS, reflecting an international outlook and the goal of global leadership. “As a global power, U.S. interests are deeply intertwined with the security and stability of the broader international system – a system of alliances, partnerships, and multi-national institutions.” While acknowledging the necessity of sensitivity to cultural and sovereignty concerns, the NMS highlights the importance of overseas basing. “Global posture remains our most powerful form of commitment and provides us strategic depth across domains and regions.”¹ This interleaving of global interests and posture reinforce the international tone found in the NSS.

Additionally, the NMS presents four objectives to achieve the four enduring strategic interests of the United States outlined in the NSS.² The four National Military Objectives are to counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional security, and shape the future force.³ The majority of the NMS is organized to discuss these four objectives and the supporting material for the securitization moves from the NSS is found within this framework.

In addition to material that is related to the securitization moves of the NSS, the NMS introduces a concern that was not directly addressed previously. Principally, this is a concern about international access. This concern has become one of the fundamental strategic considerations among US military circles in their strategic approach to the

¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership” (Department of Defense, February 8, 2011), 10.

² President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy” (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010), 7 These interests were listed previously in chapter two.

³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” 4.

Pacific rebalance. The NMS states that “anti-access strategies seek to prevent our Nation’s ability to project and sustain combat power in a region, while area denial strategies seek to constrain our Nation’s freedom of action within the region.”⁴ This introduction of the anti-access and area denial concern is reflective of the international scope of the document and informs some of the securitization moves discussed below. The anti-access and area denial concept also has direct ties to the strategic shift currently underway and is discussed further in chapter four.

Similar to the NSS, the NMS contains a short paragraph relating directly to the Russian Federation. This paragraph opens by setting a goal for increased dialogue and military-to-military relations with the Russian Federation. It then reiterates US intent to cooperate in nonproliferation and counter-terrorism efforts. The NMS also adds two other areas of cooperation with the Russian Federation that are not specifically listed as such in the NSS. These areas are space and ballistic missile defense.⁵ Cooperation with Russia in space fits with the more general goals presented in the NSS but, as discussed below, cooperation on ballistic missile defense is unlikely.⁶

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation

Like the NMS, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation remains largely consistent with its parent document, the SNSRF. Similar to the SNSRF, the MDRF specifically defines several terms at the beginning of the document that have importance to understanding the securitization moves that are discussed later in the document.

Military security is defined as “a condition of protection for the vitally important interests

⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” 8.

⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” 13.

⁶ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 31.

of the individual, the society, and the state from external and internal military threats associated with the application of military force or the threat of its application; characterized by the absence of a military threat or the ability to counter such a threat.” Military danger is defined as “a condition of interstate or intrastate relations that are characterized by an aggregation of factors capable in certain conditions of leading to the emergence of a military threat.” Military threat is defined as “a condition of interstate or intrastate relations that are characterized by the real possibility of an emergence of military conflict between opposing sides and by a high level of readiness of any state (group of states) or separatist (terrorist) organizations to apply military force (armed violence).”⁷ These definitions become important when analyzing the securitization moves of the Russian Federation within the MDRF.

Continuing to reflect the principal policy objectives of the SNSRF, the MDRF cites the prevention of arms races and military conflicts as the “prime tasks of the Russian Federation’s military policy.”⁸ The MDRF maintains an emphasis on civilian support for military development and on the military as the principal instrument of security policy. Also, the role of the armed forces in both internal and external government functions is reemphasized. Specifically, the MDRF identifies changes to constitutional structure and challenges to government as military dangers.⁹ This domestic securitization move for the armed forces emphasizes that domestic policies do not reach

⁷ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (Kremlin, February 5, 2010), http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/print. Articles 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c). Author’s translation.

⁸ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Articles 17-18. Yevgeny S. Sirotin, “Containing Aggression in the Context of the New Russian Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” *Military Thought* 19, no. 2 (2010): 8.

⁹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Articles 9, 34(b-c), 39-45.

the same level of separation from military roles as the level achieved for the US armed forces.

An additional similarity between the SNSRF and the MDRF is the regional focus. This focus is most clearly stated in Article 7. “Many regional conflicts remain unregulated. The tendencies to resolve these conflicts by force remain, including in regions which border the Russian Federation.”¹⁰ This leads to the identification of foreign troop deployments to nations contiguous with the Russian Federation as a principal external military danger. The MDRF also states the intent of the Russian Federation to prevent military conflict through support to alliance systems which, as was discussed in chapter two, are primarily regional in nature.¹¹

One aspect of the MDRF that differs from the SNSRF is a more hostile tone towards the United States and NATO. As Margarete Klein points out, NATO and the United States are classified as military dangers whereas the military threats are regional conflicts and border concerns.¹² This distinction places the United States and NATO at a lower tier of a military danger, but with indications that the path to classification as a military threat is certainly open. Other analysts feel that the MDRF already considers the United States and NATO well along the path to becoming a military threat. Lilia Shevtsova argues that containing the West is the MDRF’s main goal while Klein concludes that the MDRF has a more aggressive tone towards the west than the SNSRF.¹³

¹⁰ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 7. Author’s translation.

¹¹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” Articles 8(c and h), 19, 21, and 51.

¹² Margarete Klein, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine Until 2020: Indecisive Compromise between Traditionalists and Reformers,” trans. Robert Blasiak, *SWP Comments* no. 12 (May 2010): 2–3.

¹³ Klein, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine Until 2020: Indecisive Compromise between Traditionalists and Reformers,” 2; Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia’s Choice: Change or Degradation?,” in *Can Russia Reform?*

Several passages in the MDRF support the observations of Shevtsova and Klein. Of the eleven external military dangers listed in the MDRF, five of them are implicitly or explicitly tied to the United States and NATO.¹⁴ One example occurs when the MDRF claims the increased influence of “states aspiring to comprehensive domination, multipolarity, and the globalization of various processes.”¹⁵ This reference does not list the United States specifically as the target of the observation but other sources makes the connection more clear, at least in the minds of some military officers. Colonel Vladimir Lumpov of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and Colonel Vladimir Karpov of the Peter the Great Military Academy, in their classification of US military developments, create their structure to reflect their interpretation of US goals as outlined in security policy documents. This structure reflects

the ambitions still written into U.S. doctrines to hold on to the leading position America still enjoys in the world, to its role as the chief architect of the world order as America sees it, and an irreproachable maker of other nations’ destinies, and its right to control and maintain a favorable operational climate in areas in the focus of U.S. vital interests (ready markets and cheap mineral resources).¹⁶

In agreement with Lumpov and Karpov, Captain Sergei Tashlykov, a Reserve Naval Officer and assistant professor at the General Staff Academy states that recent US military operations were “illegitimate and aggressive in terms of international law.” He goes on to argue that the United States ignores world opinion, is determined to solve problems by force, and desires a unipolar world. His conclusion is that “military

Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed. Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 19–20.

¹⁴ Klein, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine Until 2020: Indecisive Compromise between Traditionalists and Reformers,” 1–2.

¹⁵ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 7. Author’s translation.

¹⁶ Vladimir I. Lumpov and Vladimir V. Karpov, “On the U.S. New Strategic Triad,” *Military Thought* 21, no. 1 (2012): 146.

operations like Operation Iraqi Freedom will continue” and that these operations are a “seizure of strategic bridgeheads for further advancement of U.S. global political and economic interests.”¹⁷ These comments are suggestive of an antagonistic attitude towards the perceived intentions of US security policies and represent a somewhat harsher tone than the SNSRF. As a result, any efforts that the United States undertakes in pursuit of regional stability are likely to be interpreted in a negative light.

The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2020

This anti-western attitude of the MDRF is muted in its companion security policy document. The current maritime doctrine for the Russian Federation is over a decade old. Published in 2001, the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2020 lays out a comprehensive approach to maritime development that both differs from and reflects aspects of the MDRF and the SNSRF.¹⁸ The principal difference in the Maritime Doctrine is a more socio-economic focus rather than a military focus. More specific attention is placed upon economic and infrastructure development than the SNSRF or the MDRF. Additionally, the Maritime Doctrine does not contain extensive discussion on military threats or dangers. However, the military aspects of the national security policy agenda that are prevalent in the SNSRF and MDRF are in no way absent from the Maritime Doctrine.

¹⁷ Sergei L. Tashlykov, “General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies,” *Military Thought* 19, no. 3 (2010): 62, 66, and 68.

¹⁸ Although the Maritime Doctrine is over a decade old, it is the governing policy document for naval forces as listed on the web page of the Security Council of the Russian Federation as of 27 May 2013. This web page is found at <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/sections/3/>.

In the Maritime Doctrine, the Russian Federation Navy is described as “the main component and basis of the maritime potential of the Russian Federation.”¹⁹ This again reflects the tone of military capability as the principal instrument of national security. This is further reinforced by the national interests and objectives listed in the Maritime Doctrine. The first two national interests listed indicate intent to ensure territorial sovereignty as well as rights and jurisdiction over riverine territory, the continental shelf, and territorial waters. The objectives of the policy are then developed to match this intent. These objectives include preserving sovereignty, implementing jurisdictional controls mechanisms, infrastructure development, and resource exploitation. Specifically, the doctrine calls for “possession of essential naval potential and its effective use, in times of necessity, for force support to state maritime activity” and “the presence of the Russian fleet in the far regions of international waters” to ensure the protection of Russian shipping and scientific endeavors.²⁰

The Maritime Doctrine’s discussion of maritime policy is divided along regional lines. Five principal regions are discussed including the Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans and the Caspian Sea. Of note, the Maritime Doctrine includes a full-page discussion of Russian Federation interests in the Arctic and the connection between the Arctic and Pacific Oceans in economic terms. This connection is described as the need to accelerate “the socio-economic development of the Russian Far East on the basis of an

¹⁹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020” (Security Council of the Russian Federation, July 27, 2001), <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/34.html>. Article III(1,b). Author’s translation.

²⁰ President of the Russian Federation, “The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Articles II(1) and III(1, b). Author’s translation.

intensification of the maritime activity of the Russian Federation.”²¹ More than a decade ago, Russian rhetoric in security policy documents began to tie the Arctic and the Pacific regions together which serves as an indication that the Russian Federation may become a more significant player in the Pacific region over the next decades.

The effectiveness of these regional policies in the Maritime Doctrine is to be measured by three general criteria: the realization of the policy goals, the realization of sovereignty rights and freedom of the seas, and the ability of the military maritime component to protect the interests and security of the Russian Federation.²² These three measures of effectiveness underscore the generation of securitization moves as a central purpose of this document.

This basic analysis of the military policy documents of the United States and the Russian Federation provide a foundation to explore specific securitization moves related to the current strategic shifts. As described earlier, the Russian Federation borders each of the regions involved in the US strategic shift. As a result, the border security securitization moves of the Russian Federation must be considered in US policy changes to avoid unintended conflict.

²¹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020” Article III (2). Author’s translation.

²² President of the Russian Federation, “The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article V.

Border Security

Border security is one of the principal military threats outlined in the MDRF.²³ The centrality of this concern can be found in the evolution of this securitization move over the past two decades and has led to a conception of the “near abroad” as a region of Russian influence. This conception of the “near abroad” as Russian security priority dates back to 1992.²⁴ It was further developed as the 2002 hostage situation in the Dubrovka Theater and the 2004 school hostage crisis in Beslan caused significant changes to security documents. In 2002, violent extremists took hundreds of hostages during a performance at the Dubrovka Theater and demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops for Chechnya. The subsequent attempt by the security forces to rescue the hostages resulted in hundreds of deaths among the hostages. A similar outcome occurred in 2004 when violent extremists took hundreds of children and parents hostage on the first day of school in the town of Beslan. Over three hundred hostages, more than half of whom were children, were killed when security forces attempted to storm the school.

In the wake of these disasters, emphasis on large-scale warfare changed to recognition of internal threats and regional dynamics. “Russian authorities repeatedly made it clear that Russia granted itself the right to attack terrorists abroad . . . by doing so, Moscow permitted itself to violate norms of international law, such as the prohibition of using force and the non-intervention principle, as laid down in the UN Charter.”²⁵

This evolution ties internal and external policy in relation to border security. In other

²³ Klein, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine Until 2020: Indecisive Compromise between Traditionalists and Reformers,” 3; President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 10 (c and d).

²⁴ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 404.

²⁵ Marcel De Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*. (Routledge, 2011), 19.

words, the border security securitization move is not restricted to the immediate border or internal concerns but extends to the near abroad. Border security for the Russian Federation involves nations beyond Russia's borders, namely those nations of the former Soviet Union and where the Russian Federation claims regional influence.

The MDRF considers the use of armed force to protect its citizens outside of the borders of the Russian Federation in accordance with international law and international treaties as a legitimate use of the armed forces.²⁶ These MDRF articles regarding the use of force to protect Russian citizens directly support the securitization move in the SNSRF.²⁷ This securitization move was the very motive claimed by the Russian Federation for its invasion of Georgia in 2008. The Russian Federation had previously issued passports to the population of South Ossetia, a Georgian province, thereby making them citizens. When Georgia attempted to suppress dissidents in the region, the Russian Federation invaded Georgia, claiming the protection of Russian citizens as justification.²⁸ This action met all four indicators of successful securitization for this particular move. These indicators include people killing each other in organized ways, the spending of large and/or escalating sums on armaments, populations being driven from homes in large numbers, or nations resorting to unilateral actions contrary in discernable ways to international undertakings.²⁹ The international response has done little to effectively counter Russia's actions. For the United States, the NSS mentions conflict in the

²⁶ President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation". Articles 20 and 27(j).

²⁷ President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020" (Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009), <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>. Article 38.

²⁸ "Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia," Research, *Library of Congress*, August 8, 2012, <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-war.php>.

²⁹ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 73.

Caucasus but both the NSS and the NMS avoid mentioning the nation of Georgia by name.³⁰

With the securitization of this move largely successful in Georgia, it is important to recognize that it is not confined to the Caucasus. The border securitization established in the Caucasus shows an example of how this securitization move may apply in other surrounding regions. The SNSRF offers the following as solutions to border security:

The solution to the problems of security provision for the state border of the Russian Federation is achieved by creating high-technology and multifunctional border complexes, especially on the borders with the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Georgia, and the Azerbaijan Republic, and also by increasing the effectiveness of state border defense, particularly in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, the Far East, and in the Caspian sector.³¹

In other words, the securitization move of border security extends to all of the regions that surround the Russian Federation. This is also one of the more likely areas of action both in the recent past and the immediate future. Buzan and Waever conclude that “the near abroad is the most obvious arena in which Russia might define a mission.”³² As the United States rebalances strategic emphasis in regions along the borders of the Russian Federation, US policy should seek to find cooperation in the definitions for these Russian missions in the “near abroad.”

The Arctic

In one of these areas US policy is clearly lacking. There is very little official US security policy in relation to the Arctic region. Both the NSS and the NMS only mention

³⁰ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 42.

³¹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 42. Author’s translation.

³² Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 404, 408.

the Arctic once and only in single sentences. The NSS states that “the United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues.”³³ The NMS mentions the Arctic as an example of a regional security issue for partnership with Canada.³⁴

Perhaps the most robust US security policy document in relation to the Arctic is an executive policy directive. NSPD-66/HSPD-25 indicates that US security interests in the arctic are missile defense, strategic sealift, deterrence, presence, security operations, and freedom of access. It specifically lists “freedom of the seas is a top national priority.” Additionally, the policy directive outlines an approach to governing agreements. The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) is designated as the principal framework for conflict resolution and boundary disputes rather than a specific Arctic treaty. However, the policy also states that “the United States and Russia are abiding by the terms of a maritime boundary treaty concluded in 1990, pending its entry into force. The United States is prepared to enter the agreement into force once ratified by the Russian Federation.”³⁵ This leaves a condition where neither of the treaties mentioned as a framework for the political resolution of conflicts have been ratified by both parties. The United States has not ratified the LOSC and the Russian Federation has not ratified the maritime boundary treaty. In this case, any resolutions achieved under either framework would be dependent on domestic political acceptance. Based on the

³³ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 50.

³⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” 11.

³⁵ President of the United States of America, “NSPD-66/HSPD-25: Arctic Region Policy” (The White House, January 9, 2009).

continued inability to ratify the LOSC in the US congress, domestic challenges are a likely result of any attempt to utilize the LOSC as the principal means of resolving Arctic issues.

This situation has led analysts to conclude that the current US strategic approach lacks focus. The security policy documents barely mention the region and the policy directive is amorphous and confusing. Melissa Bert points out that US policy does not provide guidance to enforce laws and treaties nor does it provide adequate security policy.³⁶ William Edwards adds that “there is no question that the United States is behind.”³⁷ The United States has not developed any clear securitization moves in the Arctic region.

Initially, this lack of attention may seem justified. The United States only borders the Arctic region on the northern border of the state of Alaska and the region’s strategic importance has declined with the end of the Cold War. However, recent developments are creating a context where inattention may prove strategically fatal. The ice of the Arctic Ocean is receding. “Scientists now almost universally conclude that the Arctic will be a recurrent seasonally ice-free ocean in the 2030s.”³⁸ The US Arctic Research Commission Deputy Executive Director Dr. Lawson Brigham stated that “the observed retreat of the Arctic sea ice is a real phenomenon.”³⁹ This creates the opportunity for exploitation of natural resources and trade routes throughout the region.

³⁶ Melissa Bert, “The Arctic Is Now: Economic and National Security in the Last Frontier” (Fellowship, Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), 2, 18.

³⁷ William Edwards, “Our Arctic Strategy Deficit,” Blog, *The New Atlanticist*, March 8, 2013, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/our-arctic-strategy-deficit.

³⁸ Bert, “The Arctic Is Now,” 4.

³⁹ As quoted in Bert, “The Arctic Is Now,” 4.

This opening of the arctic sea lanes will significantly alter the strategic importance of the Russian Federation in relation to the Pacific. Routes to European ports through the Arctic are much shorter than the routes through the Indian Ocean. The Northern Sea Route cuts thousands of miles and ten to fifteen days of transit time between Europe and Asia.⁴⁰ The ports of Murmansk and Archangelsk provide trade and supply routes into Europe, exploited by the British during and after the First World War, that can increase the world trade share of the Russian Federation.⁴¹ The potential for the strategic significance of Bering Straits to approach the strategic significance of the Straits of Malacca cannot be ignored in this context. The Bering Straits thus become another strategic chokepoint for sea traffic to Asia.⁴²

The Russian Federation is not the only nation to benefit from the Northern Sea route. China has significant interest in shorter sea routes and increased access to natural resources. In support of this interest, the Chinese are developing capability to exploit the Arctic routes. “Asia...is banking on this new route. Half of China’s GDP is based on shipping, and China is eager to reduce reliance on transit through the Straits of Malacca and the Lombok Strait.”⁴³ If the Bering Strait becomes an additional and more efficient outlet for shipping from the Pacific, the relations between the Eurasian RSC and the East Asian RSC would dramatically increase. With the importance of these routes to Chinese

⁴⁰ Vassily I. Sosnin, “The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences,” *Military Thought* 19, no. 3 (2010): 3; Bert, “The Arctic Is Now,” 5–6.

⁴¹ A description of the British use of these two ports can be found in Clifford Kinvig, *Churchill’s Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia, 1918-1920* (London; New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006). This account also provides information about operating around ice seasons at these ports. With ice receding, their ability to handle cargo and channel it south will only increase.

⁴² Bert, “The Arctic Is Now,” 6.

⁴³ Bert, “The Arctic Is Now,” 7, 13–14.

development, the United States cannot afford to ignore the Arctic in any attempts to rebalance strategic interest to the Pacific region.

The Russian Federation, in contrast, has not ignored the Arctic and has already made several securitization moves in relation to this region. The SNSRF discusses the Arctic in securitization moves related to border security, energy resources, and military infrastructure.⁴⁴ These moves are expanded by a full page discussion in the Maritime Doctrine. The Maritime Doctrine emphasizes the importance of the Northern Sea Route to Russian economic interests and the need to restrict foreign naval activities within treaty zones. Additionally, the doctrine specifies the need to develop infrastructure for shipping and create icebreakers and ice-resistant vessels.⁴⁵

State support for producing icebreakers and coastal infrastructure is also found in The Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020.⁴⁶ This policy document further outlines Russian securitization moves in the Arctic. This strategy states that the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic include using the regions as a strategic resource base, preserving peace and cooperation in the Arctic, protecting the Arctic ecology, and guaranteeing the use of the Northern Sea Route.⁴⁷

The Russian Federation has already claimed sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route and other areas of the Arctic.⁴⁸ These claims are not new. Russian claims on Arctic territory date to 1926 and Vassily Sosnin emphasizes that, at the time, there were

⁴⁴ President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020". Articles 11, 42, and 62.

⁴⁵ President of the Russian Federation, "The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020" Article III (2).

⁴⁶ Maxim Rusnak and Ilan Berman, trans., "The Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond," *The Journal of International Security Affairs* 10, no. 18 (Spring 2010): 101.

⁴⁷ Rusnak and Berman, "The Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond," 98, 105.

⁴⁸ Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 13; Rusnak and Berman, "The Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond," 98, 100, 102.

no objections from the other Arctic powers. “No one seems to care that Russia owns, fully under international law, the longest Arctic shoreline and its adjoining continental shelf.”⁴⁹ However, the continental shelf is now a point of contention. The Russian Federation claims the Lomonosov Ridge as part of their continental shelf but this claim is disputed by Denmark and Canada. The Russian Federation has already submitted a claim for resolution of this conflict under the LOSC.⁵⁰ If any similar conflicts over resource claims arose between the United States and the Russian Federation, the unresolved treaty status would not allow for any such avenue of resolution at the international level. The issue would devolve to the realm of domestic politics in both nations.

In addition to trade routes and territorial claims, the Russian Arctic policy describes the Arctic as a ground for energy resources to increase economic and political leverage in international sphere. The economic potential of the Arctic is enormous. Estimates place oil reserves at thirty billion barrels and natural gas reserves at 220 trillion cubic feet. In addition to the fuel reserves, the Arctic holds additional sites for extraction of rare earth minerals that are in growing demand.⁵¹ Russian estimates of the influence of the Arctic on its economy are also substantial. The Arctic contributes to approximately twenty percent of the gross domestic product and accounts for twenty-two percent of exports. The Arctic is also responsible for ninety percent of nickel and cobalt resources, sixty percent of copper resources, and ninety-six percent of platinumoids. Energy

⁴⁹ Sosnin, “The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences,” 2; Rusnak and Berman, “The Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond,” 97–98.

⁵⁰ Bert, “The Arctic Is Now,” 12.

⁵¹ Bert, “The Arctic Is Now,” 2.

production is estimated to reach thirty million tons of oil and 130 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year by 2030.⁵²

With the recognized importance of this region to the Russian Federation's strategic posture, Russia has taken an understandably proactive stance to get ahead of Western initiatives.⁵³ Border issues and sovereignty rights take center stage as concerns in Russian Arctic policy and the policy clearly states the intent to maintain forces capable of conducting combat operations in the region.⁵⁴ In support of this securitization move, the Russian Federation has already created a Spetsnaz brigade for Arctic operations.⁵⁵

In the context of these securitization moves and the disparity between the maturation of US and Russian policy, several analysts foresee the Arctic as a region of conflict. Because of the amount of oil and gas in the region, Haas concludes that "the Arctic region is more likely a future area where a clash between Russia and the West might occur."⁵⁶ This sentiment is echoed by Sosnin who states that "science in this region is giving way to force" and argues that the Russian Federation will be forced to undertake "moves of a military nature" to back up national interests in the Arctic.⁵⁷ This observation may be a result of the condition recognized by Bert that "all of the Arctic coastal states seem to have some military presence there now, even without any real risk of terrorism or hijacking."⁵⁸

⁵² Sosnin, "The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences," 3.

⁵³ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 128.

⁵⁴ Rusnak and Berman, "The Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond," 97–102.

⁵⁵ Edwards, "Our Arctic Strategy Deficit."

⁵⁶ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 128, 179.

⁵⁷ Sosnin, "The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences," 6, 8.

⁵⁸ Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 12.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, does not share in these conclusions. He suggests that “all attempts to pump up emotions and make the arctic look like a conflict-ridden region are dishonest and counter-productive.”⁵⁹ This opposing view may have merit but, in the absence of clear US securitization moves in the region, a determination of conflict or cooperation is difficult to assess. The securitization moves of the Russian Federation in the Arctic represent an unrecognized complication in US strategic shifts that must be addressed. In any case, as Yuri Shevtsov observed, “tensions around the Arctic will only grow in the future.”⁶⁰

NATO

The tensions in the Arctic also have the possibility of bleeding over into another security issue between the United States and the Russian Federation. The United States, Norway, Canada, Denmark, and Iceland are all members of the North Atlantic Treaty organization. Any conflict between the Russian Federation and one of these states regarding Arctic claims has the potential to involve NATO. Unfortunately, the possibility of an Arctic confrontation involving NATO is minor in comparison with securitization moves already in place regarding relations between NATO and the Russian Federation.

The relationship between the Russian Federation and NATO is certainly complicated. This level of complication has led to a wide variety of conclusions in recent years. The spectrum ranges from suggesting that the Russian Federation join NATO to

⁵⁹ Quoted in the newspaper article A. Strizhevskiy, “Osvoeniye ‘Polyarnykh Kladovykh’ Okazhetsya Nevozmozhnym Bez Silovoy Komponenty,” *Novye Izvestia*, March 26, 2010 as translated in Sosnin, “The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences,” 4.

⁶⁰ As quoted in Sosnin, “The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences,” 6.

arguing that the two sides cannot avoid conflict.⁶¹ Furthermore the MDRF does little to resolve this complication in one direction or another. As Klein asserts, “the new military doctrine does not represent a clear step forwards or backwards.”⁶²

The MDRF casts NATO as a principal external military danger.⁶³ This assertion supports the SNSRF statement that “a determining factor in relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the unacceptability for Russia of plans to extend the military infrastructure of the alliance to Russia’s borders and attempts to impart global functions to NATO that go against the norms of international law.”⁶⁴ The MDRF cites NATO’s assumption of global functions and expansion to the borders of the Russian Federation first on the list of primary external military dangers. Additionally, the MDRF defines “a demonstration of military force with provocative objectives in the course of conducting training in territories adjacent to the Russian Federation or its allied states” as a central military threat.⁶⁵ This statement can be characterized as an additional aspect of

⁶¹ The rhetoric in security policy documents certainly indicates the possibility of conflict. Since the focus of this paper is on securitization moves, it leans more towards that end of the spectrum. However, two very good arguments for why conflict is not likely can be found in Arvid Halvorsen, “When Is Russia Joining NATO? Russian Security Orientation in the Twenty-first Century” (Graduate, Air University, 2010); and Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 113 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 218–219, 240–241.

⁶² Klein, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine Until 2020: Indecisive Compromise between Traditionalists and Reformers,” 4.

⁶³ The distinction between a military threat and a military danger were emphasized earlier in the chapter. The definitions are repeated here for convenience. A military danger is defined as a condition of interstate or intrastate relations that are characterized by an aggregation of factors capable in certain conditions of leading to the emergence of a military threat. A military threat is defined as a condition of interstate or intrastate relations that are characterized by the real possibility of an emergence of military conflict between opposing sides and by a high level of readiness of any state (group of states) or separatist (terrorist) organizations to apply military force (armed violence).

⁶⁴ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 17. Author’s translation.

⁶⁵ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 8(a) and 10 (d). Author’s translation.

the securitization move against NATO activities in those nations that have recently joined the alliance.

This hostility towards NATO is certainly not new and seems natural from a historical context. Since the Kosovo crisis in 1999 there has been consistent rhetoric in Russian security policy documents against NATO.⁶⁶ Shevtsova attributes this to the logic of the political system in the Russian Federation. One of Putin's rhetorical points to achieve power and win his first presidential election in the nineties relied on painting the West as a threat. Thus, Western alienation is necessary to keep the current Russian power system in place.⁶⁷ Another perspective is offered by Anthony Kurta who argues that Russia does not feel its interests are given due respect in NATO forums.⁶⁸ The resurgence of a claim on global influence in Russian security policy documents in the Putin and Medvedev eras likewise lends merit to this argument.⁶⁹ Thus, the hostility of the Russian Federation towards NATO has both internal and external components.

Vincent Pouliot offers an alternative perspective to hostility between NATO and the Russian Federation. He argues that NATO and the Russian Federation have formed a security community as defined by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. These scholars define a security community as "a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change." Pouliot claims that the two sides have met Adler and Barnett's criteria for a security community by exhibiting a low possibility of resorts to force, the normalization of disputes, and daily cooperation on the ground. However, he qualifies this assertion by recognizing that the

⁶⁶ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 25–29.

⁶⁷ Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," 17.

⁶⁸ Anthony M. Kurta et al., "The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense" (Harvard University, 2001), 19; Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 174–182.

⁶⁹ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 25–27.

two groups have not formed collective identification. Eventually, he concludes that difficulties in Russian-NATO relations are due to the unwillingness of each side to accept the leadership model of the other.⁷⁰ So, although Pouliot does not believe that relations between NATO and the Russian Federation are hostile, he does reflect Kurta's observation about tension in interests and leadership.

Pouliot's argument reflects the American point of view that the issue of NATO is a political one. However, the rhetoric against NATO in the Russian security documents indicates that, for the Russian Federation, the evolution and behavior of NATO extend beyond politics and into security. A Russian perception of NATO as a security problem clashes with the US perspective which views NATO as a solution. The NSS calls NATO "the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today" and the NMS proclaims that "NATO will remain our Nation's preeminent multilateral alliance and continue to drive our defense relations with Europe."⁷¹ Based on this statement, any effort to build strategic maneuver space for a rebalance to the Pacific would require even greater reliance on NATO for US interests in European security. This increased reliance may carry the potential for increased antagonism with the Russian Federation based on its securitization moves against NATO. This may not be an entirely negative result. As David Mutimer suggests, "Western European security may be *enhanced* by an antagonistic Russia, by providing coherence to the West European societies' sense of self."⁷² On the other hand, the antagonism may stifle US attempts to shift focus to Asia

⁷⁰ Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 3–5, 98–99, 111–112, 122–129, 140–147.

⁷¹ President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 41; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 12.

⁷² David Mutimer, "Beyond Strategy: Critical Theory and Security Studies," in *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, 3rd, Revised (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 52. Emphasis in original.

and keep forces locked down in Europe due to heightened tensions. In either case, these securitization moves must be considered as context for the strategic shifts.

Another difficulty lies with Russia's concern for an expanding global mission for NATO. The NMS reinforces US intent to use NATO as a tool for security concerns beyond Europe. "NATO members act as a stabilizing force on [Europe's] perimeter, which ranges from the Middle East and the Levant, Northern Africa, the Balkans, and the Caucasus."⁷³ The inclusion of the Caucasus in this list directly conflicts with Russian securitization moves in Georgia. Additionally, the NMS ties success in the Middle East to NATO by stating that "success requires the Joint Force to closely work with NATO, our coalition partners, Afghanistan, and Pakistan."⁷⁴ NATO operations in Afghanistan and the surrounding nations are literally in the back yard of Russia's regional alliances, the CSTO and SCO. With Chinese membership in the SCO and Afghanistan granted observer status to this alliance, Russian antagonism towards NATO's extra-regional role in the Middle East influences both the US ability to drawdown in the Middle East and US relations with China. The securitization moves of the United States and the Russian Federation regarding NATO have multiple and complex links to strategic shifts for both nations.

Missile Defense Systems

Another securitization move tied to the ability of the United States to draw down forces in Europe and the Middle East and bolster its strategic position in the Pacific is the development and deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. The NSS states the

⁷³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 12.

⁷⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 5.

BMD securitization move by indicating that the United States “will strengthen our regional defense postures – for example, through phased, adaptive missile defense architectures – in order to make certain that regional adversaries gain no advantages from their acquisition of new, offensive military capabilities.”⁷⁵ The NMS reflects this securitization move. “We will continue to lead in advancing Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities against limited attacks and we seek opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners in this area.”⁷⁶ These statements can be interpreted as simply stating an intent to develop certain defense technology. However, further context illustrates the securitization nature present.

Prior to September 11, 2001, the United States was a party to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that prohibited the development of ballistic missile defense systems thereby maintaining the deterrent strength of nuclear weapons. However, on December 13, 2001, the United States, claiming the terrorist threat of nuclear weapons as an existential threat, sought to break free from the established norm and gave the six month notice to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.⁷⁷ The withdrawal was completed and the United States started the process of securitizing BMD systems.

An additional aspect of US securitization of BMD ties directly to the rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region. James Moltz points out that BMD is also aimed at countering recent advances in Chinese military technology.⁷⁸ These Chinese advances in military technology are tied to the anti-access and area denial concerns mentioned

⁷⁵ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy,” 41.

⁷⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” 7.

⁷⁷ James Clay Moltz, *The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests*, Second edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 269.

⁷⁸ Moltz, *The Politics of Space Security*, 270.

previously. This in turn ties the BMD securitization move by the United States to the strategic shifts currently underway.

The statements of the NSS and NMS show two aspects to this move. First, the rhetorical intent is to strengthen regional defense. Second, the United States intends to lead the development of this capability. So far, these both of these aspects appear to be achieving success. A 2008 poll showed that 87 percent of Americans support a national missile defense system and 65 percent believe that it should extend to our allies.⁷⁹

However, the Russian Federation has taken a completely opposite view of the development of BMD systems and has started securitization moves in opposition. President Putin's response to US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was that "we consider this decision a mistake."⁸⁰

The reasons for this opposition start with nuclear weapons and strategic deterrence. Russia has increased reliance on nuclear force for national security as a result of budget constraints. The deployment of missile defense systems by the United States exacerbates this situation. It is already financially difficult for the Russian Federation to sustain its nuclear force and American BMD systems deployed to regions bordering the Eurasian RSC would cause a significant increase in the cost to maintain this foundation of national security.⁸¹ As a result, the Russian Federation views BMD as a move by the United States to undermine the current nuclear balance.

This view of the Russian Federation is reflected in analyses of Russian security academics. Lumpov and Karpov argue that "deployment of the U.S. global missile

⁷⁹ Jacques Gansler, *Ballistic Missile Defense: Past and Future* (Charleston: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), x.

⁸⁰ Moltz, *The Politics of Space Security*, 269.

⁸¹ Kurta et al., "The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense," 8, 19.

defense system, *no matter how limited*, will give the U.S. and almost 30 percent advantage over the other party in terms of total nuclear potential.”⁸² Yevgeny Sirotinin also weighs in. He states that nuclear forces “will only be able to act as an instrument of containment if they possess strategic stability . . . to be able to inflict the amount of damage unacceptable to the attacker, however difficult the circumstances.”⁸³ BMD removes that strategic stability from Russian nuclear forces and reduces their ability for containment.

A disrupted balance in nuclear deterrence could also extend beyond US-Russian relations. In addition to the Russian belief that BMD would alter the strategic balance in US favor, BMD impact relations between Russia and China. Feasible Chinese responses to BMD could alter the strategic balance between Russia and China, probably in a negative way for Russia.⁸⁴ This second order effect of BMD systems on Russian-Chinese relations could also have repercussions that extend to the Asia-Pacific region.

Ultimately, the Russian Federation does not believe that BMD systems will reduce proliferation but, rather, support US efforts for a unipolar power structure.⁸⁵ As a result, Russian Federation policy documents contain several statements supporting a securitization move against BMD. The SNSRF claims that “the possibility of supporting global and regional stability will substantially contract with the placement in Europe of elements of the United States of America global missile defense system.” In response, the Russian Federation will “undertake all necessary efforts, at the minimum level of expenditure, to sustain parity with the United States of America in the area of strategic

⁸² Lumpov and Karpov, “On the U.S. New Strategic Triad,” 149. Emphasis added.

⁸³ Sirotinin, “Containing Aggression in the Context of the New Russian Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 8.

⁸⁴ Kurta et al., “The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense,” 35.

⁸⁵ Kurta et al., “The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense,” 18.

offensive arms under the conditions of their development of a global missile defense system.”⁸⁶

The MDRF expands on these securitization moves. BMD is labelled as a primary external military danger to the Russian Federation.⁸⁷ The MDRF also emphasizes the importance of the nuclear deterrent to Russian Federation national security. Abandoning any mention of nuclear zero, this document emphasizes that “nuclear weapons will remain an important factor to prevent the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts applying conventional strike means.”⁸⁸ Furthermore, the MDRF reserves the right of the Russian Federation to use nuclear weapons to counter nuclear or conventional existential threats.⁸⁹

One other aspect of the BMD securitization move is related to space weaponization. Joan Johnson-Freese indicates that BMD can easily be transferred into antisatellite capability. In fact, it is technologically easier to hit a satellite than another missile.⁹⁰ The Russian security policy documents do not miss this connection. Both the SNSRF and the MDRF raise concern about BMD and space weaponization in the same sentence.⁹¹ This securitization move in the Russian Federation security policy documents reflects the Russian concern regarding shifts in the balance of nuclear weapons, conventional capabilities, and space weaponization.

⁸⁶ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 12. Author’s translation.

⁸⁷ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 8(d).

⁸⁸ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 16. Author’s translation.

⁸⁹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 22.

⁹⁰ Joan Johnson-Freese, *Space as a Strategic Asset* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 7.

⁹¹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020”. Article 30. President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 8(d).

The links in the securitization moves of the United States and the Russian Federation with respect to BMD extend from Europe to Asia. They also link to areas of intended cooperation including nonproliferation and nuclear arms reduction. As a result, the strategic shifts of the United States and the Russian Federation will be impacted by this issue and the directions of these BMD securitization moves must be included in the context. Having discussed the security policy documents of these two nations and some additional securitization moves, it is time to turn to the most recent major security policy statements of the two nations and evaluate additional securitization moves that they develop.

CHAPTER 4

Recent Security Policy Documents

In the early months of 2012, the leaders of the Russian Federation and the United States released documents indicating updates to national security policies. In January 2012, President Barack Obama released “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” as the new security strategy for the United States. The next month, Russian Federation Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin published the article “Being Strong” to outline his defense policy platform. With Putin’s successful election, these two documents represent sources of recent securitization moves by both nations. In this chapter, each of these documents are summarized and examined for securitization moves.

In January of 2012, President Barack Obama made an unprecedented visit to the Pentagon for a joint press conference with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During this event, President Obama introduced a new strategy for United States defense policy entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.” The driving motivation behind this guidance is a reduction in defense spending. A goal of reducing the defense budget by 450 billion dollars over the next decade was released simultaneously with the strategic guidance.¹ The principal securitization move of this document is the rebalance in strategic priorities to the Asia-Pacific region as mentioned in chapter one. This securitization move provides the principal context for the regional analysis approach in this paper. However, “Sustaining Global Leadership” also

¹ Jim Garamone, “Obama: Defense Strategy Will Maintain U.S. Military Pre-eminence,” *American Forces Press Service*, January 5, 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66683>.

introduces a securitization move for military development in light of current US fiscal challenges. This securitization move is discussed below.

As the title suggests, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” continues the theme in US security policy documents of the United States acting as a leader in the global arena. President Obama clearly states his determination that the United States will emerge from current challenges “even stronger in a manner that preserves American global leadership.”² The document also notes the leading role of the United States in the international system for the past sixty-five years and indicates a US desire to be “the security partner of choice” with nations throughout the world.³ In agreement with both the NSS and the NMS, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” continues to promote US leadership in international security.

In addition to maintaining an international tone, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” also reemphasizes several securitization moves from the NSS and NMS. These include preventing nuclear proliferation, countering violent extremism, and the central importance of NATO to European and global security.⁴ The mention of these issues that appear as securitization moves in previous documents indicate a continuity for these moves in US security policy. Unfortunately, a negative continuity with security policy documents also exists in “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.” The Arctic is not mentioned in any way.

² President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (Department of Defense, January 2012), Presidential Introductory Note.

³ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 1, 3.

⁴ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 2–3.

Regarding the Russian Federation specifically, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” states that “our engagement with Russia remains important, and we will continue to build a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest and encourage it to be a contributor across a broad range of issues.”⁵ While recognition of the Russian Federation in “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” indicates at least a minimal level of consideration in the strategic shift, the guidance remains extremely amorphous and lacks cohesive direction. This ambiguous policy direction is highlighted in contrast with the other broad policy statements in the document for Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁶ While these policy statements address an identified weakness in the NSS, which pays scant attention to Europe and Asia in security matters, it provides little guidance with regards to the Russian Federation.⁷ Based on the apparent security policies of the Russian Federation, more specific guidance is in order.

Vladimir Putin was reelected as President of the Russian Federation on 4 March 2012 replacing Dmitry Medvedev. One month prior to the election, Putin outlined his objectives for Russian national security in a Russian newspaper article and in a shorter, English language article in *Foreign Policy*, both entitled “Being Strong.” The tone of these articles, particularly the Russian newspaper article, portrays little doubt in Putin’s confidence in winning the election and the continuation of his security policy objectives.

⁵ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 3.

⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership” (Department of Defense, February 8, 2011), Introductory Note, 2–3, 13.

⁷ The failure of the NSS to adequately address security concerns in Europe and Asia is pointed out in Richard L. Kugler, *New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents* (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 16.

With his subsequent victory, Putin ensured the opportunity for these objectives to enter the arena of securitization.

In these articles Putin emphasizes the need for a strong military establishment, reinforcing the tone of the SNSRF and MDRF. Putin considers it a simple truth that “the Armed Forces must be valued . . . they must be strengthened, otherwise it will become necessary to ‘feed a foreign army’ or completely surrender to the servitude of bandits and international terrorists.”⁸ He also argues that “in a world of upheaval there is always the temptation to resolve one’s problems at another’s expense, through pressure and force.”⁹ Putin’s reasoning reflects the propositions of two Russian military scholars. In 2010, Anatoly Shavayev claimed that “a state’s military capacity is one of the most powerful means of attaining political goals.”¹⁰ Additionally, Tashlykov indicated that military force is becoming the common method for diffusing crises.¹¹ Putin’s comments lend resonance to these ideas in security policy.

Putin also continues the theme that, for the Russian Federation, military power is the solution. “Russia cannot rely on diplomatic and economic methods alone to resolve conflicts. Our country faces the task of sufficiently developing its military potential as part of a deterrence strategy.”¹² In justifying this position, Putin lauds the efforts of the military during the decade of economic hardship at the close of the twentieth century. “We must always remember how indebted the nation is to the soldiers and officers who,

⁸ Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: Guarantees of National Security for Russia,” *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, February 20, 2012, 5708 edition, <http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html>. Author’s translation.

⁹ Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: Why Russia Needs to Rebuild Its Military,” *Foreign Policy* (February 21, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong.

¹⁰ Anatoly Shavayev, “A State’s Military Capacity and Its Relation to Politics,” *Military Thought* 19, no. 1 (2010): 151.

¹¹ Sergei L. Tashlykov, “General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies,” *Military Thought* 19, no. 3 (2010): 61.

¹² Putin, “Being Strong,” February 21, 2012.

in the most difficult years of the nineties, despite everything, protected the Army and guaranteed the combat readiness of their units in critical moments . . . they defended the security of our borders. They did not allow the degradation or the ‘writing off’ of the nation.”¹³

Other similarities between Putin’s articles and the established security policy documents include recurring security issues. Perhaps the most forceful statements in Putin’s articles deal with strategic deterrence. Putin does not dissemble by stating that “we will, under no circumstances, surrender our strategic deterrent capability. Indeed, we will strengthen it.”¹⁴ While Putin shares this determination in both the English and Russian versions of the article, the first half of this quote is highlighted as a pull quote in the material printed in Russia. Further, Putin asserts that “while the ‘powder’ of strategic nuclear force, created by the enormous efforts of our fathers and grandfathers, remains ‘dry,’ no one will dare to launch widespread, large-scale aggression against us.”¹⁵ This rhetoric indicates that Putin places the efficacy of Russia’s strategic deterrence capability at the most fundamental level of national security.

The central importance of the deterrent capability emphasizes the BMD securitization move discussed previously. United States missile defense efforts lie in direct conflict with Putin’s defense philosophy. Putin states this explicitly. “We are being pushed into action by U.S. and NATO missile defense policies.” The most effective way to counter these policies, in Putin’s view, is to develop effective and asymmetrical capabilities with “the ability to overcome any missile defense system and

¹³ . Author’s translation. Putin, “Being Strong,” February 20, 2012.

¹⁴ Putin, “Being Strong,” February 21, 2012.

¹⁵ Putin, “Being Strong,” February 20, 2012. Author’s translation.

protect Russia's retaliation potential."¹⁶ These statements cast long shadows over the BMD securitization move discussed previously.

Both of Putin's articles carry the title "Being Strong" but the subtitles differ, underscoring the difference in tone for the intended audiences. In the English version that appeared in *Foreign Policy* magazine, the subtitle is "Why Russia Needs to Rebuild Its Military." In contrast, the Russian version that appeared in the newspaper *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* carries the subtitle "Guarantees of National Security for Russia."¹⁷ Much of the material is the same but the shorter, English version includes excerpts from the Russian version that focus on justification while those passages discussing threats, glorifying Russian arms, and outlining a military modernization program are included only in the Russian version.

Another striking aspect unique to the Russian language version is Putin's treatment of the military-industrial complex. Putin fully embraces the concept as necessary for the Russian Federation. "The military-industrial complex – it is our pride. Concentrated here is the most powerful scientific-technical potential."¹⁸ He goes on to encourage reverse engineering and claims that the arms industry serves as a powerful incentive for innovation. In response to those that criticize the military-industrial complex as the reason for the downfall of the Soviet Union, Putin states "I am convinced – this is a profound delusion."¹⁹ Putin is returning the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation to the forefront of security policy.

¹⁶ Putin, "Being Strong," February 21, 2012.

¹⁷ Putin, "Being Strong," February 21, 2012; Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012. Author's translation.

¹⁸ Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012. Author's translation.

¹⁹ Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012. Author's translation.

Putin's emphasis on the importance of the military-industrial complex stands in contrast to the general US views on the subject that are strongly influenced by Dwight Eisenhower's famous speech. A similar contrast exists in the principal securitization moves that both leaders pursue in the two documents discussed in this chapter. Military transformation is a principal topic of both "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" and "Being Strong". For the United States, military transformation focuses on reduction and capability maintenance while the Russian Federation focus in military transformation is on modernization and expanded capability.

Military Transformation

Military transformation in "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" is about reducing the cost of defense while countering anti-access and area-denial strategies of other nations. President Obama states that the purpose of this strategic review is to guide defense spending to meet the current fiscal challenge. Later, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" is classified as an assessment that "supports the national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending."²⁰ Combined with the Budget Control Act of 2011, more commonly known as sequestration, and the intended reduction in spending mentioned above, these statements indicate the increased importance of defense spending in overall national security. Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2007 through 2011 made this argument clearly by stating that the national debt is "the single biggest threat to our national

²⁰ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," Introductory Note, 1.

security.”²¹ In other words, the need to transform the military in a way that reduces costs is starting to display the characteristics of a securitization move.

This theme of reduced spending and transforming the military into a less expensive force is laced throughout “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.” In discussing US military options for Africa and Latin America, the guidance emphasizes that “*wherever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives.*”²² Additionally, there is a clear emphasis on using non-military means and reducing demand for US forces in stability operations. “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”²³ This appears to be at least a small step back from the assertion in the NSS that states “the United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances.”²⁴

Despite this apparent small step back, force projection is still to be used for countering area denial and anti-access strategies. In the terms of RSCT, the United States intends to maintain the capability to use penetration and overlay mechanisms to secure its interests in the RSCs surrounding the Russian Federation. A concern with economic interests, growth, and commerce is mentioned several times throughout “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” resulting in the determination of the United States to “*assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms or*

²¹ Geoff Colvin, Admiral Mike Mullen: Debt is Still Biggest Threat to U.S. Security, Web Page, May 10, 2012, <http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/10/admiral-mike-mullen/>.

²² President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 3. Emphasis in original.

²³ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 6.

²⁴ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy” (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010), 17.

responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.”²⁵ One of the primary mission of the armed forces thus becomes to project power despite anti-access and area denial challenges. “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” calls for military transformation to meet this mission. *“The U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments”*²⁶

The need to reduce defense spending while maintaining capability is reflected in the US force development guidance contained in “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.” Of the eight guiding principles, half deal with reductions to force structure and cost. The other half focus on capability maintenance.²⁷ The military transformation securitization move for the United States is about reduced spending and capability maintenance.

In contrast, the similar securitization move for the Russian Federation is about increased spending and expanding capability. Unique to the Russian language version of “Being Strong” is an extended explanation of the necessary transformation of the Russian Federation armed forces. This transformation is listed as one of the most important priorities of government policy. “With all our power, we must provide the technical, technological, and organized excellence over any potential adversary.”²⁸ More than half of Putin’s article in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* is dedicated to discussing this issue.

In Putin’s formulation, the armed forces are to transform into a modern type. “The priorities here are nuclear forces, aerospace defenses, network systems, command

²⁵ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 2–5. Emphasis in original.

²⁶ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 4–5. Emphasis in original.

²⁷ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 6–9.

²⁸ Putin, “Being Strong,” February 20, 2012. Author’s translation.

and control, electronic warfare, remotely-piloted and robotic threat complexes, modern transport aviation, individual battlefield warrior defense systems, precision weapons and the means to conduct warfare with them.”²⁹ These priorities indicate a response to calls from military academics Sergei Chekinov and Sergei Tashlykov. Chekinov states that “it is still important in our day to make a clean break with the laws of military art adapted for the conduct of a large-scale war.”³⁰ At a more specific level, Tashlykov calls for means to counter air and sea attacks through GPS jamming and development of weapons to deter aircraft carriers, surface ships, and nuclear submarines.³¹ In agreement with these conclusions, Putin calls for a shift from conscript forces to an army of professional soldiers and a transition from divisions to brigades as the principal organizational unit. These new forces are to receive updated equipment including new submarines, fifth-generation aircraft, helicopters, missile systems, and ground combat systems. Additionally, naval modernization is to focus in part on the Pacific. “In this manner, the task of the next decade is inclusive of a new structure for the armed forces that can operate on the principles of new equipment. Equipment that can see farther, shoot more accurately, react quicker, than analogous systems of any potential adversary.”³²

Putin clearly raises the need for this military transformation to the level of a securitization move. In explaining the need for military transformation he warns that, without transformation, Russia will definitively lose its military potential. “There is only one exit – build a New Army.” Additionally, Putin advocates for the resurrection of a

²⁹ Putin, “Being Strong,” February 20, 2012. Author’s translation.

³⁰ Sergei G. Chekinov, “Predicting Trends in Military Art in the Initial Period of the 21st Century,” *Military Thought* 19, no. 3 (2010): 47–48.

³¹ Tashlykov, “General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies,” 67.

³² Putin, “Being Strong,” February 20, 2012. Author’s translation.

blue-water navy for the Russian Federation and more robust aerospace defenses. He asserts that “in this question, it is impossible to be too patriotic.” In accordance with this conclusion, Putin states the intent to allocate twenty-three trillion rubles to defense spending over the next decade.³³ Based on the February 2012 exchange rate, this expenditure translates to seven hundred sixty-six billion dollars and represents a substantial increase in defense spending as well as meeting one of the indicators of successful securitization for this securitization move.³⁴

Energy

In addition to military transformation, “Being Strong” includes an additional securitization move directly tied to an increase in defense spending. The foundation of this securitization move is found in Putin’s identification of a threat from those calling “for resources of global significance to be freed from the exclusive sovereignty of a single nation.” Putin sees a real danger in threats to energy resources and argues that “this cannot happen to Russia, not even hypothetically” and the Russia “should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak.”³⁵ The reason for energy as a securitization move is not difficult to understand.

The political history of Russia over the past fifteen years illustrates that the current leadership has consolidated its hold on power. Haas points out that the main power instruments for this current Russian leadership are the military and energy.³⁶ Thus, it is not surprising that Putin securitization moves for both issues in his policy.

³³ Putin, “Being Strong,” February 20, 2012. Author’s translation.

³⁴ <http://www.freecurrencyrates.com/exchange-rate-history/USD-RUB/2012>. Accessed 5 January 2013.

³⁵ Putin, “Being Strong,” February 21, 2012.

³⁶ Marcel De Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*. (Routledge, 2011), 164–165.

Thane Gustafson argues that in Putin's view "the state remains the engine for growth and progress; the job of the oil industry is simply to provide the fuel for it." The oil industry can play an indispensable role for decades to come as a source of revenue, regional development, and geopolitical influence.³⁷ Putin clearly views energy resources as central to the security of the Russian Federation which explains this securitization move in "Being Strong."

The securitization moves of military transformation and energy security espoused by these recent security policy statements link into the shifting strategies of both nations. The trajectories of military transformation are in opposite directions. The US armed forces are looking to retrench while the Russian armed forces are striving to modernize. Defense expenditures in the United States are contracting while they are dramatically expanding on the shoulders of an energy economy in the Russian Federation. These opposite trajectories suggest comparative analysis in the strategic shifts underway. The following chapter presents an analysis of these and the other securitization moves previously discussed.

³⁷ Thane Gustafson, "Putin's Petroleum Problem: How Oil Is Holding Russia Back - and How It Could Save It," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 6 (December 2012): 93.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion and Recommendations

The United States and the Russian Federation both proclaim rhetorically the intent to cooperate with each other on the international level, particularly in security concerns. However, the securitization moves in the security policy documents of both nations do not support an unequivocal conclusion that such cooperation will actually take place. Some of these securitization moves have been considered in previous chapters. This chapter will consider the potential for cooperation or conflict for these securitization moves and offer some recommendations regarding these securitization moves in the context of the current strategic shift by the United States.

One of the tools employed in this analysis is a focus on the regional level for determining the links and connections between securitization moves as advocated in RSCT. The nine securitization moves selected for analysis in previous chapters from the security policy documents of the Russian Federation and the United States display several connections between the European, Eurasian, Middle Eastern, and Asian RSCs. Each of the securitization moves informs links and connections in different RSCs but the values securitization move underlies them all.

As mentioned in chapter two, values represent one of the foundational issues in international relations including security policy. The discrepancy in values embraced by the leadership of the two nations in their security policy documents indicate antagonistic influences on relations. To his credit, President Obama has tried to reset relations with the Russian Federation since his first election. However, the reset does not appear to have achieved the desired results. Putin complains that the reset did not bring what

Russia had anticipated.¹ As Steven Rosefielde argues, “Putin is not wavering, and Obama’s ‘reset’ hasn’t triggered a popular domestic ground swell for democratic free enterprise.”² Continued efforts toward a reset may yield results but the underlying differences in values appear to hold sway. Rather than looking to values as a source of cooperation, they should be considered in the light of avoiding conflict. In any assessment of strategic moves in the rebalance to the Pacific, the United States must consider how the contrasting values with the Russian Federation that are apparent in security policy documents will impact the ability to pursue security policy. As will become evident below, this underlying difference in values can turn cooperation into conflict. A significant change in domestic power structures on one side or the other is the only realistic expectation for the latent antagonism in values to translate into latent cooperation. A condition of latent cooperation occurred briefly with the domestic changes in Russia immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the opportunity to foster deeper cooperation was missed and another change in the Russian domestic power structure has returned latent hostility.³ As discussed in chapter one, barring an unlikely change in Russian domestic politics, the latent antagonism will remain and the United States will have to overcome a pattern of enmity at the regional level. With this pattern of enmity in the values securitization move, the principal recommendation is to treat the values securitization move as essential context in all strategic considerations rather than simply ignore it as unassailable.

¹ Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia’s Choice: Change or Degradation?,” in *Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives*, ed. Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 19.

² Steven Rosefielde, “The Impossibility of Russian Economic Reform: Waiting for Godot,” in *Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives*, ed. Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 50.

³ Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Vintage, 2009), 61.

One of the most obvious and principal areas of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation lies in the issue of WMD proliferation. However, this cooperation may not be as solid and transparent from the rhetoric. The securitization moves analyzed above indicate both successes and strains in cooperation between the two nations on this issue. Moving forward, it is imperative for the United States to build in this area of cooperation with the Russian Federation.

This imperative is recognized in the most recent security policy document. “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” calls for the Department of Defense to act with foreign partners in operations to counter WMD proliferation. More specifically, one of the primary missions of the US armed forces is to prevent proliferation, especially that of nuclear weapons to Iran.⁴ Anthony Kurta points out that the United States cannot realize success in nonproliferation without the cooperation of both Russia and China.⁵ This relates back to RSCT. The principal nonproliferation efforts of the United States center on North Korea and Iran, involving the Middle Eastern and Asian RSCs. The US nonproliferation securitization move relies on a penetration mechanism for these regions whereas, the Russian Federation securitization move can leverage the adjacency mechanism. Thus, Russian cooperation in these efforts can reduce the demand on US resources in this effort and open up space for shifting attention to the Pacific.

However, this cooperation will not be automatic. One of the main obstacles to cooperation in nonproliferation is the issue of missile defense. The subject of missile defense sends cooperation on nonproliferation into a spin. The Russian Federation relies

⁴ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (Department of Defense, January 2012), 3, 5.

⁵ Anthony M. Kurta et al., “The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense” (Harvard University, 2001), 60.

on its nuclear arsenal for strategic stability. Andy Butfoy concludes that, for the United States, Russia will be the yardstick for US nuclear force sizing.⁶ This creates a condition of mutual reliance on nuclear force sizing. However, as mentioned earlier, this stability is threatened by missile defense systems from the Russian point of view. As Lumpov and Karpov conclude, “the U.S. administration appears to be in no haste to make nuclear cuts that it is going to begin and proceed with only after it is certain that its global strike and global missile defense concepts are well underway.”⁷ The Russian perception of missile defense systems creating a strategic imbalance will hamper efforts at nonproliferation.

As a result of this situation, the United States must proceed carefully. US pursuit of missile defense strengthens the security of allies throughout the world, bolsters homeland defense, and counters anti-access and area denial strategies.⁸ These are necessary elements of the strategic shift, especially one intended to reduce the cost of defense commitments across multiple regions. But, as Kurta notes, the Russian Federation should be approached first.⁹ US missile defense efforts should seek to meet the MDRF call for “the creation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms for regulation in the area of anti-missile armaments.”¹⁰ Another recommendation is to keep the system limited to deter rogue nuclear attacks but insufficient to render Russian and

⁶ Andy Butfoy, “Nuclear Strategy,” in *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, 3rd, Revised (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 209.

⁷ Vladimir I. Lumpov and Vladimir V. Karpov, “On the U.S. New Strategic Triad,” *Military Thought* 21, no. 1 (2012): 149.

⁸ President of the United States of America, “National Security Strategy” (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010), 41; President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 5.

⁹ Kurta et al., “The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense,” 60.

¹⁰ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (Kremlin, February 5, 2010), http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/print. Article 19 (i). Author’s translation.

Chinese strategic assets obsolescent.¹¹ However, in the view of some Russian military officers, even a limited missile defense system presents an unacceptable advantage to the United States.¹² Ultimately, the United States must tread carefully and determine whether the impacts to partnership capacity outweigh the conflict that may arise with the Russian Federation over this securitization move. Based on the current fiscal environment for the US defense budget, the recommendation here is to securitize BMD in favor of strengthening partnership capacity.

These solutions are in no way the proverbial silver bullet solution. The rising importance of allies in the US strategic shift carries the need for increased consideration of allied concerns. This extends from the promises of missile defense to the alliance structures themselves. Any reduction or wavering on missile defense commitments on the part of the United States could sour alliance relations in both the European and Asian RSCs and prevent the successful pursuit of increased reliance on partnership capacity.¹³ The Russian Federation's perceived threat of NATO will continue to complicate any attempts at cooperation in security concerns. However, despite the pointed rhetoric of Russian security policy documents and the part NATO plays in securing domestic political power, there are several avenues that the United States and its allies could pursue to reduce conflict on the issue of NATO.

The suggestion of Vincent Pouliot makes a good first step. Pouliot suggests acceptance of the reality that both the Russian Federation and NATO will assume the

¹¹ Jacques Gansler, *Ballistic Missile Defense: Past and Future* (Charleston: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), x.

¹² Lumpov and Karpov, "On the U.S. New Strategic Triad," 149.

¹³ President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 3.

right to speak for the international community.¹⁴ In step with this suggestion, recognition in US security policy documents of the Russian Federation's regional alliance structures could start building ties between alliance blocks. The MDRF specifically indicates a desire for "the development of relations in this sphere [detering military conflicts] with other interstate organizations (the European Union and NATO)."¹⁵ In turn, the NMS states that "we will actively support closer military-to-military relations between the Alliance and Europe's non-NATO nations, some of which have reliably contributed to trans-Atlantic security for decades," but leaves the non-NATO nations unnamed and does not explore the possibility of interaction between alliance blocks.¹⁶ Recognition of the SCO and CSTO in future US security policy documents would extend outreach that compliments the invitation in the MDRF and indicate a desire for interaction between NATO and "NATO of the East."¹⁷

These moves in security policy can be used to diffuse Russian rhetoric against NATO thereby removing the issue as a securitization move and returning it to the realm of politics. They can also provide a method to strengthen Afghan security in the long term and reinforce multinational efforts against terrorism and violent extremism. Joseph Collins suggest that the Russian Federation "can be helpful in a settlement or it can be a

¹⁴ Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 113 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 237–238.

¹⁵ President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation". Article 19(e). Author's translation.

¹⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership" (Department of Defense, February 8, 2011), 13.

¹⁷ Marcel De Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*. (Routledge, 2011), 166.

spoiler” with regards to peace in Afghanistan.¹⁸ The United States and NATO need to pursue the former option.

NATO and CSTO already cooperate in anti-drug operations in Afghanistan.¹⁹ This effort should be expanded and include the SCO. For the Russian Federation, the CSTO and SCO are the priorities for military-political cooperation.²⁰ However, expanded engagement of the SCO and CSTO in Afghanistan address specific statements from Russian security policy documents. The MDRF calls for the development of relationships with international organizations that will allow Russian peacekeeping in regions of conflict.²¹ Putin himself declared that “the CSTO is ready to fulfill its mission of guaranteeing stability in the Eurasian expanse.”²² Afghanistan provides the opportunity for the CSTO to prove the validity of Putin’s statement.

The recommendation here is to paint NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan as not only an opportunity for Afghanistan to stand on its own but to join other regional alliance blocks including the SCO and CSTO. Rather than a NATO withdrawal, 2014 can become a transition for Afghanistan to join regional security alliances. This transition can also provide the opportunity for closer military-to-military relations and joint military operations between NATO and the SCO. Although this may result in a strengthened regional influence of the Russian Federation in the Middle Eastern RSC, making the approach through alliance structures would mitigate direct Russian influence but still allow a channel for the United States through NATO to exercise the overlay mechanism.

¹⁸ Joseph J. Collins, *Understanding War in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 95.

¹⁹ Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 163, 180.

²⁰ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 51.

²¹ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Article 50(d).

²² Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: Guarantees of National Security for Russia,” *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, February 20, 2012, 5708 edition, <http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html>. Author’s translation.

While military cooperation may be extremely difficult due to political sensitivities, it should not be dismissed out of hand as a viable option for finding cooperation in the strategic shifts.²³

Involving the regional security alliances in the stabilization of Afghanistan will also relieve tensions in Russian Federation securitization moves regarding its borders. Russian sovereignty has become ingrained in the national psyche. As Shevtsova describes:

Today Russia finds itself in a situation where Europe is not prepared to integrate it, and it is not prepared to give up even part of its sovereignty. On the contrary, retaining sovereignty has become the elite's most important tool for retaining power. Even Russian Westernizing liberals do not dare mention that the country might have to give up a portion of its sovereignty to supranational European structures. For the man in the street, the very idea is blasphemous, a betrayal of the Homeland.²⁴

This view of a strong state is not necessarily viewed askance. As Putin explains, “for Russians a strong state is not an anomaly, which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change.”²⁵ The perceived necessity of a sovereign state reinforces the need for strong border protection, including protection beyond the borders. Indeed, some scholars argue that a central part of the Russian conception of the country is its size.²⁶

As a result of this conception of the state, the Russian security policy documents call for protecting the rights of Russian citizens abroad and stationing troops outside the

²³ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 162, 180.

²⁴ Shevtsova, “Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?,” 31.

²⁵ As quoted in Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 407.

²⁶ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 407.

borders of the Russian Federation.²⁷ “Overall, Russia’s military doctrine reflects the country’s pretence towards acting as a hegemonial power in the post-Soviet region and indicates its readiness to use military power to achieve this goal if necessary.”²⁸ Essentially, this extends into the other nations of the Eurasian RSC as well as the European, Middle Eastern, and Asian RSCs. Buzan and Waever point out that this is not merely expansionist tendency but a determination to play a dominant regional role. “It is unlikely that Russia even under pressure would retreat to a purely internal security agenda.”²⁹ They also conclude that a small, semi-permanent US presence is likely to stimulate formation of independent Central Asian RSC.³⁰ The development of such an RSC would reduce not only Russian regional influence but Chinese regional influence as well. Such a result may actually be beneficial to the United States and could be employed as a counter to SCO involvement in Afghanistan. However, such a move could also drive China and the Russian Federation closer together and frustrate US penetration and overlay mechanisms in the Asian RSC.

The global leadership of the United States and its activities in regions close to Russia and China are actually pushing China and the Russian Federation closer together in some analysts’ minds. As Bobo Lo observes “the U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have drawn Moscow and Beijing together in a common purpose—not in combating international terrorism...but in countering the geopolitical presence of

²⁷ President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. Articles 20, 27(j), and 34(h). President of the Russian Federation, “The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020” (Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009), <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>. Article 38.

²⁸ Margarete Klein, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine Until 2020: Indecisive Compromise between Traditionalists and Reformers,” trans. Robert Blasiak, *SWP Comments* no. 12 (May 2010): 4.

²⁹ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 408.

³⁰ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 428–429.

the hegemon in their ‘spheres of vital interests.’”³¹ As a result, “the bottom-line strategic threat is that, if Russia is to remain a great power able to both defend itself and to assert some influence globally, it needs to retain its sphere of influence in the CIS.”³² Buzan and Waever, in classifying the Russian Federation as the dominant power in the Eurasian centered RSC implicitly accept, by way of definition, this region as a Russian sphere of influence in security matters. As the United States conducts strategic-level shifts throughout these regions, it faces the danger of inciting even greater antagonism if the border securitization moves of the Russian Federation are ignored at the regional level.

The Arctic is also one of the border regions that must be considered. As discussed earlier, this is a region where the United States lags behind the Russian Federation in security policy. The bottom line is that the United States needs to determine its securitization moves in this region. The United States needs to establish a more robust policy for the Arctic and follow through.³³ Otherwise, the United States will be left in a reactionary position to the securitization moves of China and Russia as their economic concerns grow in the Arctic region. With the identified implications of this region to Pacific trade and the growing importance of the Bering straits, this cannot be ignored.

The most urgent securitization move that the United States faces in this region is incorporating the Arctic more thoroughly and specifically in security policy documents. In this manner, it will become easier to identify areas of cooperation and conflict with the material already available for Russian Federation policy. In fact, the United States can

³¹ Bobo Lo, *Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 5.

³² Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 410.

³³ Melissa Bert, “The Arctic Is Now: Economic and National Security in the Last Frontier” (Fellowship, Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), 18, 21–22.

act from an advantageous position of crafting securitization moves that will encourage cooperation between the two nations.

Additionally, the United States needs to pursue a coherent treaty framework for the region. At this moment, US policy relies on treaties that have not been ratified in their entirety by either the United States or the Russian Federation. Although the LOSC has been ratified by the Russian Federation and the bilateral Russian-US agreement has been accepted by the United States, the lack of mutual ratification of one treaty or the other exposes any agreements to rejection in favor of domestic political concerns. The only solution under direct control of the United States is to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention and establish an equitable playing field for Arctic claims.³⁴ Otherwise, the United States must hope for ratification of the bilateral agreement by the Russian Federation or hope that domestic political concerns do not obstruct agreements made at the international level. Unfortunately, LOSC ratification does not seem likely in the current political climate with the most recent attempt at ratification failing in 2012. This failure does not remove the need to create some form of treaty to govern the Arctic.³⁵ Otherwise, the potential for conflict in this region increases in probability. Due to the emerging importance of the trade routes, such a conflict could quickly spread to the European and Asian RSCs.

One of the central reasons for an increased probability of conflict in the Arctic is the rich energy resources in the region. As outlined previously, Russian Federation security policy documents have created a securitization move regarding energy and the exploitation of energy resources constitutes a principal source of power for the current

³⁴ Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 2–3, 15–16.

³⁵ William Edwards, "Our Arctic Strategy Deficit," Blog, *The New Atlanticist*, March 8, 2013, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/our-arctic-strategy-deficit.

regime. In the economic sector, a lack of state economic regulation is viewed as a threat to economic growth and innovation.³⁶

The energy situation for Russia is not stable. Thomas Gustafson's analysis is that "Russia is not running out of oil, but it is running out of cheap oil."³⁷ Somewhat paradoxically, oil and energy resources are a force for political and economic stability in the Russian Federation but also a potential for unrest.³⁸ To avoid unrest, government policy must be modernized and updated but the oil industry is tempting the government to continue leveraging it for political gain while quashing investment and innovation incentives.³⁹ Ruchir Sharma points out that this has led to a weak market economy in the Russian Federation. "In recent years, Russia's economy and stock market have been among the weakest of the emerging markets, dominated by an oil-rich class of billionaires whose assets equal 20 percent of GDP, by far the largest share held by the superrich in any major economy"⁴⁰ Yet, the incentives for adaptation currently remain low due to high energy prices.⁴¹

Under these circumstances, energy security may be one of the most volatile of the Russian Federation securitization moves. As the energy market develops, the Russian oil industry will have to search for new sources of oil, including the off-shore Arctic area, to

³⁶ President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020," 56.

³⁷ Thane Gustafson, "Putin's Petroleum Problem: How Oil Is Holding Russia Back - and How It Could Save It," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 6 (December 2012): 85.

³⁸ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 165.

³⁹ Gustafson, "Putin's Petroleum Problem," 86.

⁴⁰ Ruchir Sharma, "Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 6 (December 2012): 5.

⁴¹ Gustafson, "Putin's Petroleum Problem," 86.

prevent a production decline after 2020.⁴² Based on this conclusion, the window to resolve security issues in the Arctic is closing fast.

Further complications reside in the unwillingness of the Russian Federation to accept that other republics can trade energy resources according to their own desires and that the role of military forces in Russian energy security is increasing at rapid pace. These complications create difficulties for cooperation in the Eurasian and Middle Eastern RSCs. In the absence of restrictive rules of engagement or oversight by alliance nations, Russian forces in peacekeeping or anti-terrorism roles could also “incidentally” conduct actions in favor of Russian energy security interests. Cooperation would turn quickly to conflict in this case. Resolution of these complications likely will rely on a decrease in US and European dependence on Russian carbonate energy resources to reduce tensions and remove Russian leverage. Unfortunately, this is likely to induce domestic destabilization within the Russian Federation. Another suggestion is to pursue cooperation in addressing the threat to energy infrastructure from international terrorism and piracy.⁴³ Cooperation on this front does not carry the same domestic destabilization threat that accompanies a simple reduction in demand.

Pursuing energy cooperation in the Arctic and in securing infrastructure rather than reducing demand can also contribute to fewer tensions in the concurrent military transformations of the United States and the Russian Federation. Haas’s argument that the main power source of current Russian leadership is the military and energy strengthens the ties between Putin’s securitization moves and may be one reason for Russia’s continued pursuit of military modernization. Military modernization could

⁴² Gustafson, “Putin’s Petroleum Problem,” 89.

⁴³ Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 161.

represent an attempt to bolster the military power instrument before a waning energy power instrument creates challenges to the Russian domestic power structure. A perceived decrease by Russian leadership in international dependence on Russian energy resources may further accelerate Russian military modernization and power.

One of the indications of successful securitization is spending large or escalating sums on armaments.⁴⁴ This is the current condition of the military transformation securitization move for the Russian Federation. In contrast, the United States is reducing the size of the defense budget and seeking efficiencies in armament development. Successful military transformation in either nations remains uncertain. For the Russian Federation, “reform of Russia’s military is possible but will take a steady hand, a willingness to spend considerable economic and political capital in bad times as well as good, and a clear-sighted understanding of the real threats facing the country and a credible program for how to address them.”⁴⁵ A similar assessment applies to the US situation, at least in the cost of political capital.

The costs of military transformation impact all the RSCs considered in this analysis. The United States faces a tricky balance of reduced spending while trying to maintain overlay and penetration mechanisms in the European, Middle Eastern, and Asian RSCs. Increased spending by the Russian Federation, especially in a condition of latent enmity, threatens US ability to employ these mechanisms. The US military transformation securitization move must find ways to maintain the overlay and

⁴⁴ Buzan and Waeber, *Regions and Powers*, 73.

⁴⁵ Mark Galeotti, “Reform of the Russian Military and Security Apparatus: An Investigator’s Perspective,” in *Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives*, ed. Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 93.

penetration mechanisms in these RSCs, even in the environment of increased defense spending by the Russian Federation.

One method for avoiding conflict during the period of military transformation is to develop military-to-military relations at an even deeper level. Currently, these relations are largely confined to the senior levels of leadership. However, anecdotal evidence indicates the potential for highly successful relations and policy dividends when military-to-military relations are conducted at lower levels.⁴⁶ Haas also concludes that there is great potential to foster cooperation in this manner. “Since the problems between Russia and the West at the higher political-strategic level are likely to continue, emphasis should be placed at cooperation at the lower, ‘grassroots’, level.”⁴⁷ An expansion of military-to-military relations in this manner will create more robust and reliable links for cooperation. Such relations would also meet the NMS criteria that “military-to-military relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere through political upheavals or even disruption.”⁴⁸ The example of recent events in Egypt provides a strong example of the positive effects possible through military-to-military relations. The United States should pursue the same with the Russian Federation to the extent allowed by current leadership.

The links and recommendations explored in the preceding material does not represent an attempt at a conclusive solution to the intricate interaction between the shifting strategies of the Russian Federation and the United States. While these recommendations deserve consideration, the condition of central importance is including

⁴⁶ The author spent four months fostering lower level military-to-military relations in a nation that previously belonged to the Soviet Union. These relations proved to be of immense value to United States diplomats during subsequent diplomatic negotiations with this nation.

⁴⁷ Haas, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 163.

⁴⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” 6.

an analysis of Russian Federation securitization moves in the regions involved in the US strategic shift. The United States can no longer afford to engage with the Russian Federation only when a veto is exercised in the UN Security Council or the Russian Federation moves in opposition. Haas concludes that “the West should accept the fact that Russia is ‘back in business’ in the international arena, whether they like it or not.”⁴⁹ As such, US strategic shifts must take a more proactive approach to consideration of Russian Federation securitization moves. Continuing to marginalize the Russian Federation in US security policy for the European, Eurasian, Middle Eastern, and Asian RSCs induces strategic blindness and increased vulnerability. This is especially true when the entire US strategic rebalance geopolitically and figuratively pivots around the Russian Federation.

⁴⁹ Haas, *Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century*, 163.

APPENDIX: Securitization Moves

The similarities and differences between the national security strategies that were analyzed in chapter two can be used to create a classification structure for the securitization moves found within the two documents. The result is six categories of securitization moves for each nation. For the Russian Federation, the categories are Military Security, Regional Leadership, Regional Alliances, Domestic Concerns, International Law, and Weapons Proliferation. For the United States, the categories are Socio-Economic Security, Global Leadership, International and Regional Alliances, Domestic Concerns, International Law, and Weapons Proliferation. Table 1 presents a list of securitization moves from the Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020 and Table 2 presents a list for the US National Security Strategy. These have been divided into the categories established above. The securitization moves included in Table 1 and Table 2 are based on the author's analysis. Consideration of other issues in these documents are welcome in furthering an analysis of the strategic interaction between the Russian Federation and the United States, but they are outside of the scope of this paper. For the purposes of the present analysis, the lists presented below represent those securitization moves most identifiable and include all those pertinent to the established context.

Table 1: Securitization Moves from the Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020

<u>Military Security</u> - Military Superiority - Military Transformation and Parity - Maintenance of Governing Regime - Domestic Prosperity - Information Technology Gap - Arctic	<u>Regional Leadership/ International Legitimacy</u> - Dangers of Globalization - Unequal Global Development - Transnational Crime - Rights of Russian Citizens Abroad - Global Power Status	<u>Regional Alliances</u> - Alliance Commitments - Regional Forums - CSTO - SCO - CIS
<u>Domestic Concerns</u> - Social Stability and Harmony - Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity - Demographics - Corruption and Organized Crime - Food Security - Values and Culture - Illegal Immigration - Energy Resources - Economy - Terrorism and Violent Extremism	<u>International Law</u> - NATO Expansion - Unilateral Action - Foreign Intelligence Activities - Unilateral Behavior - Peacekeeping - Conflict Prevention	<u>Weapons Proliferation</u> - Weapons of Mass Destruction - Ballistic Missile Defense - Weapons in Space

Source: Author's original work.

Table2: Securitization Moves from the United States National Security Strategy

<u>Socio-Economic Security</u> - International Economy - Food Security - Energy - Cyberspace - Transnational Crime - Global Commons - Sanctions	<u>Global Leadership</u> - Military Superiority - Values - Climate Change - Arab-Israeli Conflict - Middle East Conflict - Iran - North Korea - Promotion of Democracy - Global Development	<u>International and Regional Alliances</u> - NATO - Alliance Commitments and Capability - International Economic Institutions - Bilateral Pacific Alliances
<u>Domestic Concerns</u> - Healthcare - Domestic Economy - Immigration - Homeland Security	<u>International Law</u> - Terrorism/Violent Extremism - Peacekeeping - Conflict Prevention - Border Guarantees	<u>Weapons Proliferation</u> - Weapons of Mass Destruction - Genocide/Mass Atrocities

Source: Author's original work.

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