The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor

VOLUME IV
APPENDIX

Report Documentation Page

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

VOLUME IV

APPENDIX

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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APPENDIX IV

(October 18, 1941 - December 6, 1941)

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS

No. 1

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.

Accept my congratulations on your appointment. Although I was instructed to carry out the policy of the former cabinet and endeavored to do my best, I was not able to do anything useful and naturally I have been keenly conscious of the responsibility. Since my appointment to this post, things have developed contrary to my wishes and, for this reason, I am deeply concerned. It should be fairly clear that I, with my limited ability, shall not be able to accomplish much in the future; I am afraid I shall be leading not only a useless existence but even a harmful one. Grateful for the kind encouragement which the former minister gave me, I would like to think over carefully what I should do; I would like also to return to Japan in the near future so that I may personally report the situation here to you and incidentally receive your instructions in all matters. Will you, therefore, give your approval at once. Inasmuch as both WAKASUGI and IGUCHI are men of ability and efficiency, there should be no objections to leaving matters in their hands after I have left.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 2

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.

(RETRANSLATION BASED ON COMPLETE INTERCEPT COPY)

Will Your Excellency please read this for your own information and then please transmit it to the Minister of the Navy.

My dear Mr. Minister:

Congratulations on your new appointment! When this humble Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washington I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office. The times do not permit of such lack of coordination. On the one hand the United States is faced by the European war and on the other hand by the Pacific problem, but still she has made no military move. I believe that there is a weak point here. Therefore, I had expected the United States to take a more less conciliatory attitude toward us as soon as the situation was favorable, but, contrary to my surmises, so far all America has done is to stick to her own national policy, and I am beginning to doubt if she can be reformed very much. I think that probably in the last analysis that is due to the fact that the United States has too many interests in China. My own desire has been to leave the China question out of the picture and work out some *modus vivendi* between our two countries. In my conversations with the Secretary of State I have shown this by my way of talking. However, the Secretary says that the China question is inseparably bound up with the stability of the Pacific. Some days ago I talked for an hour or more with HALIFAX. He said that the

British Empire has a great interest in the Pacific problem and he would like to see some *modus vivendi* worked out between Japan and the United States to avoid a crisis. He said that he would like to talk with Secretary HULL about this. Since then, however, I have had no chance to talk with him. Well, before I came here I had talked with all the cabinet officials of that time and thought I thoroughly understood the position of the Government; however, since then there have been two administrative changes and now I am left floundering. I cannot tell you how much in the dark I am. I have talked along my own lines with the Secretary of State so often that, if we now explore the situation from a new angle, all my presence would do would be to confuse the situation and cause an unfavorable reaction. There is no doubt about this. That is why I wired the other day that I would like to come home. If you have anything which you want the Foreign Office to transmit to me, please be sure to let them know.

Trans. 10–22–41

No. 3

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

Trans. 10–23–41

No. 4

FROM: Tokyo October 23, 1941
TO: Washington No Number.

From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reasons, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.

Trans. 10–23–41

No. 5

FROM: Tokyo — October 21, 1941
TO: Washington — # 698.

Re your # 966[a].

What you say is well justified. We should, of course, send you instructions immediately, but in view of the fact that the new cabinet was only just formed, they have been unavoidably delayed.

The new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our country has said practically all she can say in the way of expressing of opinions and setting forth our stands. We feel that we have now reached a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to urge the United States to reconsider her views.

We urge, therefore, that choosing an opportune moment, either you or Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal United States counter-proposal to our proposal of 25 (?) September.

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[a] See III, 284. Wakasugi-Welles-Hull talk on 17 Oct. in which there is an extensive rehash of arguments and counter arguments that have been repeatedly discussed before. Wakasugi continues to emphasize the impracticability of evacuating China, while Hull emphasizes non-discrimination in trade (i.e., the Open Door up-to-date).

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 6

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 973.

Yesterday, the Sabbath day, -----[a] told me the following:

"Through Finland and Bulgaria, Germany is putting out peace feelers and she stands some chance of succeeding. She will probably embark on a peace offensive offering Great Britain generous terms. Now that Great Britain has taken Ethiopia, Syria and Iraq, the LLOYD GEORGE wing may listen to what HITLER has to say. As CHURCHILL's position for some time has been none too safe, ROOSEVELT is upholding the Prime Minister with might and main."

Not long ago the Secretary of State said to me, "Doubtless some 'QUISLINGS' will make their appearance in Great Britain. That's why the United States Government is supporting CHURCHILL so strongly."

Well, the trust of the English people in CHURCHILL seems to me rather real, so I do not put much belief in this story. However, the strange part of it is that -----[a] has always believed in a German defeat. Nevertheless, he came and told me this story, so it may be worth thinking about.

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[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 7

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #989.

Re your #698[a].

Today I am going to have WAKASUGI go and continue his talks with WELLES in a friendly fashion. However, the Chief of Staff has sent the Military Attache some secret advice. Now, what I want to know is this: Is this the future policy of the Government? I feel sure that I will get some instructions from you today. However, as we have to continue our talks, for my private information let me know something about this immediately.

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[a] See IV, 5.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 8

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #995.

(Part 1 of 4.)

Re your #698[a].

On the 24th from 2:30 p.m., WAKASUGI conferred with WELLES for an hour, and following the purport of your telegram, explained that our new cabinet was as anxious as the former cabinet for a just readjustment of our relations; that our desires have already been clearly stated; and that since, from what WAKASUGI himself could judge on the basis of what he saw and heard during his recent visit in Japan, circumstances there do not permit prolonging these conversations any longer, he—though not yet in receipt of detailed instructions— would like to see, without a day of further delay, some sort of conclusion reached. He then requested that the United States submit a counter-proposal to our proposal of September 25th. WELLES first expressed his pleasure of learning that the new cabinet intends to continue the discussion of this question and proceeded to say that recently men in responsible positions in Japan—for example, the Naval spokesman—had made such a war-like statement as "the Japanese Navy is 'itching for action'", and that the ferocious attacks which the Japanese newspapers have been making on the United States had greatly provoked the American people both in and out of the government and are injurious to the continuation of discussions.

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[a] See IV, 5.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 9

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #995.

(Part 2 of 4.)

WAKASUGI replied that there were not a few influential politicians in the United States as, for example, Senator PEPPER, who have severely criticized Japan; that especially the speech

made today by Secretary of Navy KNOX to the effect that Japanese-American war is inevitable and the clash of the two countries is only a few days ahead and other war-like statements are quite provocative to the Japanese government as well as the people; and that in this respect the two countries are very much alike. To this, WELLES came back with the argument that the Naval Secretary's speech was not such a provocative one but the newspapers had played up certain parts of it; that as a man responsible for the United States Navy, which is the most powerful influence in the country, he occasionally indulges in strong words with the intention of encouraging the Navy; and that he would like WAKASUGI to realize that these speeches are nothing other than those made for such purposes. WELLES proceeded, saying, "As to the counter-proposal which you request of the United States, as I have repeated at the time of the previous conversation, the principles as well as the proposal of the American Government are clearly given in the proposal made on June 21. To be sure, one way of approaching a solution would be to adjust the wordings of that proposal to those of the proposal made by Japan.

Trans. 10–27–41

No. 10

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #995.

(Part 3 of 4.)

"However, in the light of the experience of the informal discussions held during the past several months, to do no more than to consider each paragraph of the past formula would result in repetition of the same old arguments and, therefore, would not be conducive to progress. As I have pointed out during the previous conversation at which Secretary HULL was present, it might be well to try to reach an agreement on such general matters as the three important points which are comparatively easy of settlement; such a new formula may be a short-cut. However, if this is to be done, we had better take up at the beginning the question of equal treatment in commerce, a question which is comparatively easy of agreement by both countries (in reference to this point, WELLES asked if we had transmitted to our government what HULL had so strongly advocated during the previous conversation, and so WAKASUGI replied that he had communicated the matter in detail); and secondly, we should debate the question of Japan's duties to the Three-Power Alliance." He spoke as if there was a possibility of some adjustment also on the part of the United States with regard to this question. WELLES then suggested taking up the China question next. Thus, he made an entirely new proposal.

Trans. 10–27–41

No. 11

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #995.

(Part 4 of 4.)

WAKASUGI replied, saying, "Since I have not yet received detailed instructions from my government, I haven't the liberty to add anything today to the proposal of September 25, but I would like to have the United States authorities draw up a definite proposal with reference to the new approach you just suggested and submit it before we will have our next conversation. We, too, shall make a study of this point."

Speaking on the request that frozen funds be released for the dispatching of the two tankers referred to during our previous conversation and the two ships of the NYK line at this time, WELLES said, "We at that time made immediate arrangements, and all procedures have been completed by the Treasury Department with regard to the three NYK ships; but in the matter of tankers, since the United States banking laws require strict investigations for the purpose of protecting bank depositors, once money has been transferred to an account with the Yokohama Specie Bank, it is impossible to release it, regardless of the fact that the money is in the form of cash or of a draft for transference of money to that bank. However, the State Department will offer as much assistance as possible if you wish to have drafts made so that they could be transferred through some American bank."

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 12

FROM: Tokyo — October 25, 1941
TO: Washington — # 709.

Re your # 989[a].

We are particularly anxious to get an idea of the extent to which the United States will agree with our final proposal. We are putting much expectation that this point will be clarified during the Wakasugi-Welles talks on the 25th.

With regard to the military general staff office's message, we obtained an explanation from it after we received your message. It seems that that message was an expression of the General Staff's hopes and the government in the meantime is going ahead with its studies to establish a basic national policy, embodying the results of the Japanese-United States negotiations.

My personal intentions are as I outlined in my message # 698[b] (those on which the army and navy concurred). Bearing these facts in mind, will you please urge the United States to voice its intentions. At the same time will you continue to make an effort to definitely ascertain the U.S. attitude with regard to our proposal. I am exceedingly anxious to receive your findings on these points.

---

[a] See IV, 7.
[b] See IV, 5.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 13

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — October 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1004.

Chief of Office Routing.

On the 25th, I met and talked with Admiral Pratt. The Admiral is one who recognizes the fact that in the final analysis, the aims of economic warfare and actual armed conflict are one and the same. He is of the opinion that as long as Japan stays within the scope of the China Incident, there will be no shooting war between Japan and the United States. He said, however, that if Japan moved either northward or southward, he feared the consequences. He added that the final decision rested in the Emperor and the President.

Knox's speech, he went on, was exceedingly unfortunate. When he (the Admiral) writes for magazines or speaks on the radio, he always takes Japan into his calculations very carefully. After all, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as far as the President is concerned, is of course, Stark. The opinions of the two completely coincide. Unfortunately, however, Stark cannot be said to be a "strong" individual, Admiral Pratt said. Hart, on the other hand, although he has enemies within the Department, is a strong character.

He further reported that he had heard from other sources that the President is sincerely desirous of having a peaceful and stabilized Pacific. However, because he is advised by various people to pursue various courses of action, the Admiral could not guarantee that there would be no trouble on those waters.

Admiral Pratt went on to say that Harriman, who was sent to the Soviet Union, is a very capable person in whom every confidence could be placed. This man states that Stalin is not in a position to discuss peace and that without a doubt, Hitler is winning that battle.

Concerning the project to attempt to have Italy enter into a separate peace, Pratt is of the opinion that such a peace would put Italy in the same disastrous position that France now occupies and for this reason he is inclined to doubt that Italy will consider it.

In the final analysis, the Admiral is of the opinion that the war will be a long drawn out affair, and that sooner or later, one side will become more fatigued than the other.

Thus, he expressed what probably is the most optimistic view to come from any authoritative American.

He went on to express his opinion that the Atlantic would be saved for Great Britain.

Japan should do everything to avoid impairing her might on the seas, so that she can take it with her to the eventual peace conference. It will be only with a strong navy to fall back on that Japan will have much say in those peace terms, he said.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 14

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1008.

(In 3 parts complete.)

From Minister Wakasugi.

U.S.-Japanese relations are now fast approaching a critical crossroad. In view of the fact that the times are indeed grave, I am waiving formality and, though it may seem very presumptuous of me, am reporting to you my views on the general attitude of the United States after coming in contact with its representatives on several occasions.

As you no doubt are well aware through the many other reports pertaining to this matter, the basic U.S. policy is the crushing of the so-called "Hitlerism", (establishing of a new order through the force of arms). Working from this principle, the United States is gradually strengthening its wartime structure. Britain and China have been set up as the first line of national defense. In this way, the United States has succeeded in steamrollering over the isolationist opposition and is forcing the government and the public alike to follow this policy.

The government has determined to gamble on a long term program. It is on those grounds that Hull has said on several occasions that though he yearns for the preservation of peace on the Pacific, on the other hand it will have to be based on agreements covering the entire Pacific area and not upon a patchwork of hit-or-miss local agreements. During my talks with him on the 24th, Welles said that the United States was not in special relations with her colonial holdings. The United States is a firm advocate of absolute non-discrimination and equal

opportunities for all in the entire Pacific area, (including Japan, United States, Britain, China, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, etc.). Every nation will be offered opportunities equal to those existing between the home government and its colonies. For this reason, Welles pointed out on that occasion, this policy should be advantageous to Japan as well.

Judging from these factors, we assume that the United States based their demands for equal opportunities of access to the natural resources of French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as a guarantee that they will remain strictly neutral, upon their principle of non-discrimination. Apparently, they presume that we intend to develop this area under the principle of our military's co-prosperity sphere, in a monopolistic manner, and through the force of arms.

Thus, there has arisen a clash of ideologies.

The United States wants to tackle the China problem as merely one phase of the aforementioned "peace on the Pacific" issue. On the other hand, it should be recalled that Hull once said to the late Ambassador Saito that it was exceedingly doubtful that there should be war between Japan and the United States over merely the China problem. There are indications that the United States is still not anxious to fight Japan over only the China problem. However, it must be borne in mind that China is now relying solely on the United States. (It is said that T. V. Soong and others in the United States are working on the Treasury Department in particular and the United States is doing everything in its power to prevent the bringing about of a truce between Japan and the United States.) Since China is entirely dependent on the United States, the United States cannot turn a cold shoulder to her pleas. It is impossible for the United States to cruelly impose terms on China which would be almost impossible for the United States herself to endure.

Welles used the above described excuse during our talks on the 24th. He went on to say, however, that the United States would not be unreasonable; she would not demand of Japan to carry out that which is immediately impossible. What his implications were when he said that are not clear, but possibly he may have been referring to some such tough problem as that of evacuating our forces (indications are that in spite of our repeated explanations concerning the garrisoning of troops in China, the above ambiguous statement may have been his camouflaged way of pointing out a means of carrying out a program of withdrawal of troops). I got the impression that he wanted to convey to me that the United States would not demand that it be carried out immediately.

In any event, it has become apparent that U.S.-Japanese relations have now become an integral phase of the national policy of the United States. There is every indication that the United States is anxious to adjust the relationship between the two nations as it has much bearing on her national policy. However, she is willing to come to terms only if the conditions suit her. She has set forth her stand in her proposals of 21 June and of 2 October. I am very doubtful that she will make any concessions therefrom.

Her preparations in the event of the worst have been completed. Therefore, I cannot believe that she is stalling for time. On the other hand, I am of the opinion that she is not so anxious to enter into the agreement that she will sacrifice any of her terms. Therefore, I do not believe that we should expect any further counter proposals from them. They have decided on a course of economic pressure plus watchful waiting.

Therefore, if we choose to good naturedly continue these talks, I am of the opinion that all is not hopeless. I feel that such a move will almost automatically open up ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use of world developments. However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local differences by insisting upon our freedom of action, we must have our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated, but that our national relations will be severed.

The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that

the new Cabinet establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that would be to our best interests.

Trans. 11-1-41

No. 15

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1010.

(In 2 parts complete.)

Chief of Office routing.

I report the following points to you merely as reference material in connection with the adjusting of national relations.

1. Admiral -----[a] told Member of Parliament Kasai that the more influential Congressmen from the Middle West (where there are many Americans of German descent) state that the majority of the Middle Westerners are opposed to a war against Germany, but that at the same time, a great number of them favor a U.S.-Japanese war. This is due, in part, he said, to Germany's superior propaganda work. I have heard -----[a], who is familiar with that area, express similar opinions.

2. Secretary Hull has told Congress that the U.S. Government looks upon the Tripartite Pact as an instrument to be used to intimidate the United States. Its aim is to make impossible the aiding of Great Britain by the United States and thus gradually to force the United States to give up the control of the seas and bring back the first line of U.S. defense to the U.S. shore line. The United States desires peace; however, it is a well established fact that there is a better chance to have peace if strength can be shown. If I (Hull) were to make too many concessions to the Axis powers, there is danger that they would be interpreted as weaknesses on my part and no doubt their demands would be increased. (This is particularly true in Tokyo.) There are indications, Hull continued, that the degree of enthusiasm in Tokyo to proceed on selfish courses, is determined to a considerable extent on how the German-Soviet war is going.

It is said that he went on to say that the situation was "very delicate and very changeable". (Reported in the New York Times, 28th.)

To me, Secretary Hull once said that the people of both Japan and the United States were proud peoples. For this reason, neither would easily succumb to bluffs of the other.

3. It is said that Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long told a certain Japanese who called on him and set forth the many advantages of speedily entering into an understanding with Japan along the lines published in a newspaper as a Tokyo dispatch, that it would be impossible for the United States to get everything in order before 15 November.

4. On two different occasions recently, I met and talked with Lord Halifax. I tried to sound him out as to the British attitude with regard to a Japanese-U.S. understanding. I gather from these that, in accordance with the Churchill speech, Britain would string along with the United States. Lord Halifax said that Britain did not want trouble on the Pacific; that is true of the United States, too, he said, adding that he hoped that Japan would give the matter her thorough study from all angles and exercise the utmost of patience before doing anything.

He refused to enlarge upon the U.S. and British embargo policy in effect at present.

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[a] Name withheld.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 16

FROM: Tokyo — November 2, 1941
TO: Washington — # 723.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Day before yesterday when I met the diplomatic corps, during the conversation I had with the American Ambassador, I said, "I am very sorry that Japanese-American relations have lately been growing worse and worse. If this continues, I fear that unfortunate results will ensue. For six months negotiations have been dragging along and our people are growing impatient. Therefore, I hope that a speedy settlement will be reached. In this connection, I would like to ask your friendly cooperation." I added, "It is necessary for the United States, in order to arrive at a frank understanding, to relinquish its theoretical procedure and view the Oriental situation realistically. For example, when we come to the question of evacuation, there are other countries besides Japan who actually have occupation forces in China. Furthermore, although Outer Mongolia is considered a part of Chinese territory, the Soviet has a considerable force stationed there. The United States must realize these facts and understand our position." The Ambassador nodded to this and promised cooperation. He said that he would like for the parleys between the United States and Japan to proceed amicably.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 17

FROM: Tokyo — November 2, 1941
TO: Washington — # 723.

(Part 2 of 2.)

On the 26th the British Ambassador came to see me on other business, and I said to him, "The attitude of the United States is entirely too theoretical, and if this continues there will be scant chance of a settlement. At the present time I am very much concerned over this. If the negotiations turn out to be a failure, I cannot tell but what a lamentable situation will occur. Now you English, who have such important interests in the Far East, would not like this. I think that England ought to endeavor to improve Japanese-English-American relations in order to reestablish and maintain the peace of the world." The Ambassador replied that he would transmit what I said immediately to London. I saw him again (yesterday?) and endeavored to impart to him the impression that the situation is waxing more and more acute and will not permit of procrastination.

Sent also to London.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 18

FROM: Tokyo — November 1, 1941
TO: Washington — # 721.

Please advise this office what actual relationship exists at present between the original contents of the U.S. proposal of 21 June and the following points:

The matter pertaining to the exchanging of the official texts which was put into the 21 June proposal as a footnote to Section 2 thereof, (that part concerning the attitude of the respective

nations to the European war); and, the three questions which were submitted concerning the United States' proposal of non-discrimination in trade, a subject which was put in as a supplement to Section 3, (concerning peace between China and Japan), of the 21 June proposal.

According to your message # 424[a], you told Secretary Hull on 22 June that you could not deliver the official note to the home government. Moreover, there seem to be indications that the U.S. Government is beginning to understand our viewpoint with regard to the matter of the right of self-defense.

In view of these facts, may we assume that the matter of exchanging of official notes has been dropped by the United States? We must have this information to discuss this whole matter in a business-like manner, so please advise us immediately, although it may seem like bringing up old issues.

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[a] See II, 79. Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, Hull made the statement that there seem to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S. so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concessions as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 19

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1025.

Re your # 721[a].

1. As you mentioned in your message, it is true that I refused to relay the text of the exchanged notes. They have stuck firmly to their original stand and consequently the two proposals have remained at odds with each other.

2. The questions regarding the three items were made with reference to the 21 June proposal. They are still, as before, awaiting our definite reply.

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[a] See IV, 18.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 20

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 722.

The government has for a number of days since the forming of the new Cabinet been holding meetings with the Imperial Headquarters. We have carefully considered a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision in a meeting on the morning of the 5th and will let you know the result at once. This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once. This is at present only for your information. When we take up these negotiations once more, we trust you can handle everything with the greatest of care.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 21

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1021.

I plan to see Hull in two or three days. If possible I would like to be advised of the Cabinet's definite policy before then. If this is impossible while you please advise me of the points I should bear in mind while talking to the Secretary.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 22

FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 725.

(Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 3.)

Concerning my # 722[a].

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the government and the military High Command (ensuing Nos. 726[b] and 727[b]). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

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[a] See IV, 20.
[b] See IV, 25 and IV, 29.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 23

FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 725.

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 3.)

When the Japanese-American meetings began who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone

far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this—to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without reckoning the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.

Trans. 11–4–41

No. 24

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
725.

(Urgent.)

(Part 3 of 3.)

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end—at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations—the government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations about how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, as soon as you have got the consensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.

Trans. 11–4–41

No. 25

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
726.

(Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 4.)

Proposal "A".

1. This proposal is our revised final proposal made as a result of our attempts to meet, in so far as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistences as follows:

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement, "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no explanation of our sphere of self defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 26

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
726.

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 4.)

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.

We are toning down our stipulations in this connection as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the China Incident.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or some sort of a statement.)

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 27

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
726.

(Urgent.)

(Part 3 of 4.)

2. *Explanation.*

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

Trans. 11–4–41

No. 28

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
726.

(Urgent.)

(Part 4 of 4.)

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, we have fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices we have made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

Trans. 11–4–41

No. 29

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
#727.

(Urgent.)

1. Proposal "B".

This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to put forward some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as follows:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States agree that neither will militarily invade any area in Southeast Asia and the South Seas with the exception of French Indo-China.

(2) The Governments of Japan and the United States will cooperate mutually in guaranteeing the obtention of the materials they need in the Netherlands Indies.

(3) The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets and the government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the petroleum she needs.

(4) The Government of the United States will engage in no activity which might put an obstacle in the way of Japan in her efforts to make peace with China.

Addendum:

(1) If necessary, upon the establishment of this understanding, as soon as peace is established between Japan and China, or as soon as a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to promising to evacuate her troops.

(2) If necessary, we will insert an additional stipulation concerning the interpretation and carrying out of the Three-Power Pact and the question of non-discrimination in commerce which were referred to in proposal "A" in my #726[a].

[a] See IV, 25.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 30

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
#730.

Re my #725[a]

In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request on instructions from me, Ambassador KURUSU is leaving ----- on the 7th by clipper to assist you. He will be your right-hand man in these parleys. He is carrying with him no additional instructions, so in order to prepare him for the talks, will you please tell him all, and I hope that you can, by all means, arrange for an interview between him and President ROOSEVELT.

By the way, will you please be sure to keep Ambassador KURUSU's activities strictly secret.

[a] See IV, 22.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 31

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 5, 1941
734.

Ambassador KURUSU accompanied by Secretary YUKI left the 5th for *Shanghai* (?).

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 32

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 6, 1941
739.

(Urgent.)

Re my # 730[a].

The reason why we are sending Ambassador KURUSU to you so quickly is, in addition to what I have already wired you, to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to follow. As I wired you before, he brings with him no new instructions in addition to the ones I have already sent you. I wish him, however, to communicate to you at first hand as best he may, the exact situation here in Japan, and now that we are on the last lap of these negotiations, I do hope that he can help you in unravelling this bewildering maze and through cooperation lead to a solution, and that right soon. To make it sound good, we are telling the public that he is coming to help you quickly compose the unhappy relations between the two nations. We have explained all this fully to the British and American Ambassadors here in Tokyo, and Ambassador KURUSU himself had a heart-to-heart talk with the American Ambassador before he left, and both Ambassadors fully understand why he is making the trip.

The officials of both the Army and the Navy are pleased with the special dispatch of the Ambassador and are very grateful for the trouble he is taking. After you read this, please go and tell the American officials concerned and wire me back their reply.

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[a] See IV, 30.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 33

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
731.

(Urgent.)

Re my # 725[a].

In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also, as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without any definite assurances on this point and reach an accord with Washington alone, it might very well be that it would never work.

Consequently, I want you please to impress upon the American officials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign those terms in which they are concerned. Please wire me the results.

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[a] See IV, 22-24.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 34

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1042.

(Strictly confidential, to be handled in government code.)

Re your # 731[a].

Just what is meant by Britain's and the Dutch East Indies' relation to the above understanding? As I understand it they are to sign the document at the same time America does. But just what is meant by this? What items are included?

Again what is meant by joint signature? Will the four countries sign the same document or will separate documents be prepared for the British and the Dutch and the four countries sign these? Or will the several countries exchange official documents? Please wire by return dispatch for my information.

---

[a] See IV, 33.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 35

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1036.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Secret.

Re your # 725[a].

Naturally I, too, am hurrying to make English translations of Proposals A and B, but remember what you said in paragraph 5. I do not wish any variant words or other discrepancies to occur between the English text you hand Ambassador GREW and the one I make. So please send me yours at the earliest possible moment.

---

[a] See IV, 22-24.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 36

FROM: Washington — November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1036.

(Foreign Office Secret.)

Re your # 725[a].

We will, of course, make English translations of the texts of both Proposals A and B. However, in view of the contents of paragraph (5) of your message and to avoid our using words and phrases which conflict with the English texts you submit to Ambassador Grew, please send us your English translations immediately.

---

[a] See IV, 22-24.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 37

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1044.

Foreign Office secret.

Rushed.

(English Text)

The Japanese Government recognizes the principles of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, provided that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 38

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1045.

(Chief of Office routing.)

With regard to term "Self-defense" the Japanese government desires to make it clear that it has no intention of placing too liberal and interpretation on the term that will lead to an abuse of that right.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 39

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1046.

(Chief of Office routing.)

A. Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof:

With regard to the Japanese forces that have been dispatched to China in connection with the China affair, those forces in certain areas in North China and Mongolia (Inner Mongolia) as

well as in Hainan-Tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain necessary period of time after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as peace is restored between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years after effective maintenance of peace and order is re-established.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 40

FROM: Tokyo 5 November 1941
TO: Washington #732.

Re my #725[a].

If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U.S. proposals, we feel that the U.S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate ratification.

We have been lead to believe that it is the U.S. Government's intention to use this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and that it would be classified as one type of an "Executive Agreement" as the President is authorized to do. We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. (Please refer to page (3 ?) 1, Volume 2, of Hyde's International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States.) Will you please ascertain the U.S. attitude on this point.

In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into along the lines given in the message referred to in the heading at the earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolutely essential factor.

---

[a]See IV, 22-24.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 41

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 5 November 1941
TO: Tokyo #1041.

Re your #732[a].

From various considerations, the United States also would not care to put the documents confirming these negotiations in the form of a treaty to be submitted to the Senate for the constitutional majority (two-thirds) approval. The reasons for this are, as Hamilton and others have made clear, that in the course of the negotiations thus far, the United States government has left the matter of mutual understandings between the two countries and arrangements concerning statements of policies as being legally within the jurisdiction of the President to handle, by "executive agreement". Article One of the preamble to the U.S. note of 21 June contains the expression "general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declar-

ation" etc. Also in the latter part of the same note the same intent is set forth in the words "mutual understanding and declaration of policy".

Of course the present situation is different from that involved in past agreements of this kind, and they emphasize that from the standpoint of the U.S. government and domestic politics, it would be difficult to keep the matter secret very long, as I have stated in successive messages.

---

[a] See IV, 40.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 42

FROM: Tokyo 5 November 1941
TO: Washington #735.

1. Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations referred to in my message #725[a] was taken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions.

2. We assume that it would meet with the U.S. approval, in view of past developments, if, for the time being, the 21 June proposal—25 September's from our point of view—was used as a basis of these new talks. Subsequently, we feel that from the standpoint of the likelihood of reaching an early agreement, our Proposal A (contained in my message #726[b]) should be submitted for discussion. (As a matter of fact, there are a number of points in the form and in the expressions used in the U.S. proposal which do not meet with our complete approval. However, we feel that for convenience and speed's sake, Proposal A should be submitted first.) Please, therefore, explain these points to the United States and at the same time have them clearly understand the circumstances contained in my message #725[a]. Thereupon, do your utmost to have them accept that proposal in the shortest possible time.

3. If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B (contained in my message #727[c]). Please, therefore, ascertain the U.S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.

4. As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over.

5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.

Although a "1' was placed at the beginning of the body of my message #727[c], there was no need for it, so please delete it.

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[a] See IV, 22-24.
[b] See IV, 25.
[c] See IV, 29.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 43

FROM: Tokyo — 6 November 1941
TO: Washington — # 740.

Re your # 1025[a].

Through Your Honor's continuous efforts, gradually both the Japanese and American insistences centering around the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Treaty have become clear. Now we might say that there exists almost no division between our respective views. At any rate, we have been taking it for granted that this is the case for some time. Our proposal of September 25, which is a counter-proposal to the American Proposal of June 21, makes no reference to any exchange of notes, which means that we are refusing to consider such an exchange. We are taking it for granted that the United States, too, is eliminating this as a matter of course from the negotiations, and we are continuing the negotiations on the assumption that there will be no such exchange of notes. If, by any misadventure, the United States should say that they will not leave out the proposal for exchange of notes, it will be utterly and absolutely impossible for us to agree, so when you negotiate, please be fully aware of this.

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[a] See IV, 19.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 44

FROM: Tokyo — 5 November 1941
TO: Washington — # 736.

(Of utmost secrecy.)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 45

FROM: Washington — 5 November 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1037.

I have received all of your messages of instructions, and after giving the matter my very careful consideration, I have decided to continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be. I, therefore, made arrangements immediately on this, the 5th, to meet with President Roosevelt through Hull. (I shall advise you the date and time of this interview as soon as it is made definite.) I am of the opinion that it would be to our advantage to keep this meeting as secret as possible. I would appreciate being advised of the Foreign Office's view on

this point as soon as possible. If you believe that it would be better if this were made an official interview, please advise me as to the manner in which it should be announced to the public.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 46

FROM: Tokyo — 6 November 1941
TO: Washington — #741.

Re your #1037[a].

The matter of Your Honor's interviewing the President is delicate in the extreme, and if the newspapers speculate on the import of it, the effect would doubtless be most regrettable. Therefore, if possible, I think we should avoid letting the press get wind of the substance of the interview or even the fact of the interview. If the American officials will agree with this, naturally we, too, will observe the same secrecy.

Carrying this idea still further, in all your subsequent contacts with American officials I would like for you to do your utmost to maintain the same secrecy and avoidance of publicity.

---

[a] See IV, 45.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 47

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — 5 November 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1040.

Re your #735, paragraph 5[a].

On the 5th, reports from Tokyo were played up by the newspapers here to the effect that Domei, the mouthpiece of the Japanese Government and the Times-Advertiser, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, were declaring that the 15th had been set as the "deadline" for the negotiations and were giving a list of the Japanese demands, (seven was given as the number).

While I recognize that the above may be considered as well intentioned efforts on our part to lead to a favorable reception of the negotiations still the above reports are directly opposed to the interest of your caption telegram. As you are well aware in view of the present delicate situation such reports will have the effect of alienating American public opinion or causing it to become actively opposed to Japan.

There is danger that America will see through our condition. If we have really made up our minds to a final course of action it would be the part of wisdom to keep still about it. I realize that the internal situation is causing you no end of worry, however I feel that in view of the present grave situation still further guidance should be given to the newspapers.

---

[a] See IV, 42.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 48

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 6 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1051.

In the present delicate state of Japan-American relations the local press is becoming more and more excited over the dispatch of KURUSU, etc. From now on all kinds of articles and editorials based on conjecture will continually be appearing. Although I have been very careful in my contacts with the local and foreign press, on account of the rivalry between the different newspapers, spontaneous conjectures and reports are published.

Moreover these articles in English-language newspapers may be sent just as they are to Japan where I fear they would have an unforeseen influence on our already tense population. Considering the seriousness of the situation please prevent the publication of such writings for the time being in the interest of better Japan-American relations, and, keeping a strict control, follow the most prudent policy.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 50

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 6 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1050.

(Urgent.)

(Secret.)

At nine tomorrow morning, (Friday, the 7th), I will go with WAKASUGI for the secret meeting with Secretary HULL, at which time I will ask for an audience with the President. Just this for the present.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 51

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1052.

Re your # 743[a].

We assume that that part which reads "provided. . . .", etc. at the end of paragraph 2 of your message referred to above, refers to the "non-discrimination" matter contained in paragraph one of that message and not to the matter concerning the stationing of troops. Please advise us definitely on this point, together with the text in the form you wish to have it in.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 52

FROM: Washington 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1054.

Re my # 10--.

I met and talked with Secretary Hull at 0930 on the 7th, and I explained our new proposal to him in accordance with your instructions. I requested that it be given consideration by the United States and at the same time I expressed my desire to meet with the President at the earliest possible moment. Hull promised to give them his consideration.

With regard to the matter of non-discrimination in trade, Hull showed indications of being satisfied. He did not indicate either approval or disapproval of the matters pertaining to rights of self-defense and of withdrawal of our troops.

The interview lasted approximately one hour.

This message dispatched at 1330.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 53

FROM: Washington 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1055.

(Part 1 of 3.)

At 0900 on this, the 7th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull at his home. (Ballantine was also present.)

I said that I had been instructed by my home government to explain to the President and to the Secretary of State, Japan's attitude and position in the hopes of bringing about immediate settlement of the various problems involved in the relationship between Japan and the United States.

In way of replying to this, Hull said that at present there were two political factions in this world which were at odds with each other and which were, consequently, embroiled in an armed conflict. Neither faction is able to decide the outcome speedily and hence there is a danger that they will be gradually thrown into the chaos of anarchism.

If, at a time like this, the United States and Japan simultaneously hit upon a method of maintaining peace on the Pacific, it is quite possible that the world may be saved from the apparently imminent chaos.

I, therefore, said, in accordance with your various instructions, that:

1. Of the three outstanding problems, agreements have been practically reached on two. With regard to the matter of garrisoning or withdrawing troops, Japan is prepared to make the maximum concessions which can be permitted by the domestic political conditions of Japan.

2. From the viewpoint of U.S.—Japanese friendship in its broad sense, the U.S. Government should take a philosophic attitude concerning present conditions, I said, and I urged that the United States cooperate in bringing about a speedy settlement on that assumption.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 54

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1055.

(Part 2 of 3.)

. . . . (I pointed out that):

3. I have been instructed by my home government to fully explain Japan's determination and Japan's position to the President and the Secretary of State, and through such understandings to reach settlements as soon as possible.

4. After six months of negotiations, the people of Japan are getting a little impatient and that hence the situation there is becoming exceedingly critical. For this reason, we are very anxious that these negotiations are brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

5. In view of the very critical situation parallel negotiations in Tokyo are to be conducted.

Explaining that Japan is now displaying the maximum amount of good will and the utmost of sincerity, I submitted the counter proposal which you sent us, to them. I requested that the United States give it her consideration from the broad aspect, and urged them to accept the terms contained therein.

Hull carefully read this document. He nodded approval of the section concerning the principle of non-discrimination, and commented that that way would prove to be to Japan's interest. With regard to the section of garrisoning troops, he simply asked what would be the proportion of those remaining to those being withdrawn. I replied that such of the greater part would be withdrawn and only a small portion would be kept in China. I went on to explain our position with regard to the "right of self-defense" issue, in accordance with your instruction which I received today.

It was decided that an answer to all of the points would be submitted after this note had been carefully studied by them. They will submit their reply after my interview with the President, at which time I shall endeavor to make a more detailed explanation.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 55

FROM: Washington 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1055.

(Part 3 of 3.)

Hull went on to say that as he had said on previous occasions, Britain, China, the Netherlands and other countries had to be consulted regarding Japanese-U.S. talks of maintaining peace on the Pacific. He let it leak out in this connection that China was being consulted with regard to matter pertaining to the China problems.

Hull then said that he had happened to wonder what Japan's attitude would be if there were the following developments: Supposing an influential and reliable representative of China were to join in these talks. Supposing, further, that this representative states that China is desirous of resuming friendly relations with Japan, giving his pledge of true friendship and sincerity. What would Japan's reaction be?

Wakasugi asked whether he could assume first, that China's attitude had been ascertained. Hull replied that the matter hadn't been taken up with China as yet, and that it was just something that he as an individual had happened to think of. If such a thing could be done, however, he continued, peace on the Pacific would be maintained, and no doubt it would set an example for the world and thus have a very favorable effect on it.

We got the impression that he may have already discussed this matter with the Chinese and that his plan was a consequence thereof. In either event, Hull requested that this plan be struck upon, be relayed to the government of Japan and its attitude on it be ascertained. I said that I would give it my consideration.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 56

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo #1056.

Please make the following corrections to part 3 of 3 of my message #1055[a].

In the first part, please insert "for the purpose of conducting official negotiations" following that part which reads "negotiations between the United States and Japan".

In the middle part, change the phrase reading "án influential representative" of China, to "the person of highest influence and integrity" and delete reading "participate in these negotiations".

[a] See IV, 53.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 57

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 8 November 1941
TO: Tokyo #1061.

On the 7th, when I called on Secretary HULL, he handed me the memorandum given in my #1062[a] concerning the incident in which American missionaries were imprisoned in Harbin. Calling my attention to the fact that the American authorities had allowed three Japanese Naval officers to return home, the Secretary complained that it was hard for him to understand why American missionaries have been accorded such stern and unreasonable treatment. Therefore, I replied that although this matter is one in which Manchurian officials were involved and is unrelated to Japan, I would transmit the complaint to Tokyo since the question had been brought to my attention. Will you get in touch with the Manchurian authorities and take suitable steps and then wire me the results?

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 58

FROM: Tokyo 8 November 1941
TO: Washington #747.

Re your #1054[a].

You say you explained our rights of self-defense. I believe I elaborate on this matter in my #742[b]. If this message was delayed and did not reach you in time, please be sure to take measures to fit the instructions in my #742[b] into your explanations.

[a] See IV, 52, in which NOMURA says that he explained the new proposal to Secretary HULL.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 59

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 8 November 1941
TO: Tokyo #1060.

As the work for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations continues, we may expect frequent exchange in the future of urgent telegraphic messages. I would like to report to you the following for your consideration in arranging business in this connection. We may expect, with the crisis so near at hand, that we shall be facing questions which must be dealt with with no loss of time, and so I would appreciate the Foreign Office fully cooperating with us at this time.

My #1036[a], in which I sought your instructions, was sent at 9:56 P.M. on the 5th. I believe it reached you on the afternoon of the 6th, Tokyo time. Your reply to it; namely your #743[b], was sent at 7:34 P.M. on the 7th, Tokyo time, and was received here at 8:20 A.M., Washington time. However, since my appointment with Secretary HULL was, as I have previously reported, to have been at 9:00 A.M., there was but forty minutes allowed us for decoding and revising the code with all hands working together, and, consequently, we could get the message read only by considerably postponing the hour of the appointment. I would like to have messages of this nature sent hereafter by you taking into consideration the difference in time as well as the actual limit of efficiency on the part of telegraphic officials here and give us a little more time. When we are expecting instructions of this nature, all officials concerned stay up all night waiting for them. Will you please arrange matters with this in mind.

We have an understanding with the telegraph company to let us know as soon as possible by telephone, even at night, whenever a telegram marked "very urgent" is received. However, since the words "very urgent" had been changed to "kinqu" the telegraph company had found it impossible to distinguish one telegram from another. Therefore, for the sake of convenience, I would like to have telegrams of this nature captioned, as heretofore, with the words, "very urgent."

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[a] See IV, 35.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 60

FROM: Tokyo November 11, 1941
TO: Washington #759.

Re your #1060[a].

From the telegraph section to telegraph clerk Horiuchi:

We can see the point of view contained in your message. Please dispose of that matter in accordance with the contents of my Circular #2(2 ?)81[b].

All messages which have the words KINQU (you will probably not have much occasion to use this), or DAIQU in the heading, are to be given the same handling as those which were marked "Very urgent" in the past. Please notify the telegraph companies of this fact.

My message #743[b] was dispatched from the Foreign Office at 1530 on the 7th. Because of unfavorable atmospheric conditions, however, it could not be dispatched from Tokyo until 1734 of the 7th. (1934 was an error.)

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[a] See IV, 59.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 61

FROM: Tokyo — November 9, 1941
TO: Washington — # 752.

Re your # 1040[a] and # 1053[b].

1. This office is in complete agreement with the contents of your messages referred to above. The government is doing everything in its power to give enlightenment to correctly guide public opinion. The censor bureau has evolved a plan whereby there will be no comments on the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. It goes without saying, of course, that the contents of the negotiations will not be published, but furthermore, all utterances which may tend to excite the United States will be censored. (It has been unofficially decided to even suppress information as to the dates on which the representatives of the two nations confer.) We shall prevent the publication of anything that may interfere with the progress. We have issued a particularly vigorous warning to the Times of dire consequences if there are any infractions.

2. We see reports from correspondents in the U.S. area, (for example from the Domei office in your city), which are not in accord with our established policy of maintenance of calm and patience regarding the Japanese-U.S. talks. The situation here is a critical one, so please give correct guidance to all of the correspondents there.

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[a] See IV, 47.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 62

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — November 10, 1941
TO: San Francisco — # 168.

To Ambassador KURUSU.

The AP issued a dispatch from Manila, said to be from authoritative sources, that Your Excellency had told an old friend there, "I am going to Washington but I have no great hopes for a successful conclusion to the negotiations." This was printed in large headlines of the first page of the "New York Times." Editorial comment gave out that there would be no new compromise by the Japanese which would satisfy the United States.

We have not permitted the publication of this dispatch in papers here in Japan. This is for your information.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 63

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1065.

(Secret.)

On the 7th, President ROOSEVELT called for secret consultation the Secretary of Navy KNOX; Admiral STARK, Chief of the Naval Operations, and other leaders of the Navy. I sup-

pose they met to discuss our proposal as well as the question of withdrawing the Marines from China.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 64

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 9, 1941
#751.

Re the last part of your message #1055[a].

We interpret Secretary Hull's plan to have a Chinese person of the highest integrity give his pledge regarding the China problem, to mean that the Secretary wishes to leave the China problem which has been a stumbling block in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations, up to direct negotiations between Japan and China for settlement. This would lead to having Chiang Kai-shek propose to us that peace negotiations be begun.

We recognize this to be a great contribution toward bringing about friendly relations between Japan and China and for this reason we highly welcome it. We will, of course, follow this message up with another giving this government's opinions. In the meantime please ascertain and advise us what relation this proposal has upon the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. Please make suitable inquiries on this phase to obtain as much information as possible, on whatever concrete plans the United States may have.

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[a] See IV, 54.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 65

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 10, 1941
#755.

(Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #754[a].

In adjusting Japanese-American relations, the Government of Japan has attached a great deal of importance to the speedy solution of the China Incident. At the same time the United States Government also has maintained the attitude that if peace is to be established in the Pacific, the China question cannot be overlooked. Now, if it is the intention of the United States Government to mediate between Japan and China along the lines proposed by Secretary HULL and also to leave the matter of peace terms to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, this plan harmonizes with what the Japanese Government has been looking forward to since the beginning of -----. It would mean that the question of withdrawing troops from China would, according to HULL's suggestion, be left out for the time being from the negotiations. This would make it possible for us to hasten the settlement by means of negotiations conducted between Japan and China alone and it would also have the advantage of bringing about peace between Japan and China without American interference.

Should we take advantage of this proposal, it goes without saying that it would be necessary to secure a promise or a definite statement that the settlement of the negotiations between

Japan and the United States would not make the establishment of peace between Japan and China its condition and that the United States would not interfere with the peace to be established between Japan and China. (This promise includes cessation of activities for aiding CHIANG.) Furthermore, it is necessary to make it clear that the agreement between Japan and the United States would be immediately signed and put into effect.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11–10–41

No. 66

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 10, 1941
755.

(Part 2 of 2.)

As regards the China question, this would mean that the paragraph concerning the China Incident in Proposal "A" of my # 726[a] (paragraph 3 of the Agreement) should be eliminated from the agenda of the negotiations and paragraph 4 of Proposal "B" given in my # 727[b] (namely that the United States will refrain from any action detrimental to the efforts made for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China) be substituted in its place.

Furthermore, I believe that the United States wishes to see a speedy settlement of an agreement between Japan and the United States and so, for this reason, HULL's proposal is a sincere one and from this standpoint the United States Government proposes to mediate between Japan and China. If the United States is of the intention of postponing the settlement of questions other than the China question until peace is established between Japan and China or of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the proposal for it would prevent the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States and furthermore, would be apt to put the blame for the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations upon us. I need hardly point out to you but I would like to have you take care so that this would not happen.

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[a] See IV, 25–28.
[b] See IV, 29.

Trans. 11–10–41

No. 67

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) Vice Chief General Staff
TO: Circular (Beyoglu) (RIKUGUN)

November 9, 1941
910.

Two parts complete.

(Part 1.)

Ultra Secret.

To the Attaches resident abroad.

From the Vice Chief of Staff.

We would like to have you report any material reflecting the international situation especially anything connected with the following items:

1. The extent of the determination of America and Britain to make war on Japan and Germany.

2. America's reciprocal relations with Japan and Germany.

3. The condition of the military, political and economic union between America, Britain, CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Holland and Russia.

4. The present situation regarding the dispatch of additional military strength by America and Britain, especially of planes, marines and (?infantry?) to the Southern Area and to the Aleutians.

(Part 2.)

5. The present situation regarding the non-expansion of bases in the islands scattered in the Pacific.[a]

6. Movements of American and British troops in China.

7. Movements of ships of American and British registry in the Southwestern Pacific and the Sea of Japan.

8. The influence of the Empire's attitude upon America, Britain and the other countries. Also the influence of Japan and America's negotiations.

Please pay attention to the first item in this list before its timeliness is lost.

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[a]The test appears to refer to the bases which Japan was not to establish in the Mandated Islands. They probably want to know what the world knows about their activities in those islands. Note the date the message was translated.

Trans. 2-3-45

No. 68

FROM: Tokyo — November 10, 1941
TO: Washington — #757.

(Part 1 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)

On the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and DOOMAN sat with us. I opened the conversation with a resume of my #725[a] and reiterated my earnest hope that a decision could be reached in the negotiations on a basis just to our Empire. I explained that I would bend every effort toward the solution of this difficult situation. Then I continued, "Having examined the results of the negotiations thus far, what I feel is that the United States does not have full knowledge of the true situation. I feel that the United States does not have enough understanding and knowledge. Secretary HULL says that he recognizes Japan's stabilizing influence, yet unless he realizes sufficiently present conditions in East Asia and that we Japanese have been occupied over a period of four and a half years with the China incident, even though he calls us a stabilizing influence, he contradicts himself. Our population is ever increasing. Already we have about 100,000,000 people. In order to maintain their existence, we absolutely must obtain the necessary materials. On the other hand, six months have passed since Japanese-American negotiations began, and during that time, although we have given in as much as we could, the United States sticks to her first proposals and will not bend an inch. This is a most regrettable circumstance. It would seem that there are not a few Japanese who doubt the sincerity of the American Government. Consequently, a further delay would do great damage to our popular spirit. Moreover, the cabinet will soon convene, and the situation is becoming exceedingly tense. Without the loss of a day, we should establish these negotiations.

I hope that the American Government, too, will fully consider all these points and take the large view, settling the whole thing at once. I do not honestly believe that there is any other way to settle this perplexing situation.

[a] See IV, 22-24.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 69

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 10, 1941
#757.

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)

Next I presented him with the English text of Proposal A contained in my #726[a] and said, "As a result of deep thought, this was arrived at by the Government and represents he maximum compromise that we can endure to make. There is absolutely no possibility of our yielding any further.

"1. The attitude of both nations toward the European war is recorded in our proposal of September 25. Therefore, I take it for granted that we are in agreement on this score.

"2. I feel that this proposal fully covers America's desires concerning non-discriminatory treatment in commerce.

"3. Concerning the ever-knotty problem of evacuating troops, the present proposal, in view of the difficulties we face here in Japan, ventures our maximum compromise. I am sure that the United States officials can readily comprehend this. Let me tell you how strongly I hope that we can reach a quick settlement. Now included in this document are many matters in which Great Britain' interests are deeply concerned, so it is necessary that, simultaneously with the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations, Japan and England make preparations to sign." I added, "I hope that the Government of the United States will undertake this."

The American Ambassador answered, "I have had no instructions from my home government, so I would like to reserve my opinion. Only as a hint, let me say that I have wired to Washington the true situation in detail, so the American Government understands the Oriental situation fully. Concerning influence for stability, there are many ways of interpreting that. Concerning the question of the obtention of materials, the present negotiations aim at that very thing, and I think that there will probably be some way for you Japanese to obtain what you need in a peaceful manner."

[a] See IV, 25-28.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 70

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 10, 1941
#757.

(Part 3 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)

I answered, "Though I have all along fully appreciated the efforts of Your Excellency, I do not feel that the Government of the United States has as yet fully appreciated the situation. The

feeling in favor of stability and peace is, as a matter of course, the feeling of the majority of the people. Then too, insofar as the question of resources is concerned, if we take the example of the recent situation wherein the supplying of raw materials to Japan was suspended as a result of America's actions in the freezing of assets, such strong-arm measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat, indicate the probability of even more severe measures in the future. The people of Japan, though they may feel deeply within themselves that extreme steps for self-defense must be brought to bear, cannot bring themselves to the point of carrying this out.

"On this question there is a definite need for the United States to give the most careful consideration. Furthermore, insofar as the China question is concerned, would you have us ignore the successes gained as a result of sacrifices that we have made over four and a half years? Submission to terms such as these would be suicidal to Japan. For the Government, as well as for the people, I believe that such a course is impossible."

At this point, Counselor DOOMAN interposed the following: "We cannot accept the results of aggression." I refuted him by saying, "The Imperial Government does not consider that it has carried on a war of aggression. Therefore, the question of the results of aggression cannot be raised. We should, therefore, make an exception even in a non-aggression pact insofar as military action in the interests of self-defense is concerned. The fact is, insofar as the interpretation of the right of self-defense is concerned, judging by the examples of recent arguments, I believe that it is the United States which has been exhibiting a tendency to wrongfully magnify this. Therefore, it seems indicated that it is for Japan to call for the exercise of self-control by the Government of the United States. But at any rate, insofar as today is concerned, it behooves us not to become too involved in such arguments as these."

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 71

FROM: Tokyo — November 11, 1941
TO: Washington — #758.

Re my #757[a].

In these talks, the conferences being conducted in Washington are referred to as being "negotiations". The U.S. Ambassador here states that they should be termed "conversations". I, therefore, replied that I thought they were well within the realm of "negotiations" now. The Ambassador seems to have been satisfied with this.

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[a] See IV, 68.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 72

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1066.

(Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

1. I sent ——[a] to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

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[c] Name withheld.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 73

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1066.

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 2.)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke to told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 74

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1059.

The conference with the President has been scheduled for Monday at 11 a.m.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 75

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1069.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Today, the 10th, at 11:30, accompanied by WAKASUGI, I had an hour's conversation with President ROOSEVELT in the presence of Secretary HULL. I told them what you said in your instructions and explained in detail our proposal for the settlement of the three problems. In response the President said that in the present world crisis the American Government has as its objective to contribute to the establishment of peace and order in the Pacific in the spirit of fair play and that he hoped the Japanese-American conversations would be effective.

He continued, "In accordance with the desire of the Japanese Government we will endeavor immediately to continue the parleys and I hope that Japan too will make it evident that she intends to take a friendly attitude. What the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting peace."

He concluded with the promise that he would carefully study, with Secretary HULL, our proposals as explained by me and after thinking them over make a reply.

I will wire you the details later, however, I am in a hurry to send you this resume.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 76

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 4.)

(To be handled in Government Code. Secret outside the department.)

My interview with the President, referred to in my # 1069[a], was held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity. It was as follows:

Prefacing my remarks with the fact that I was speaking on instructions, I said, "I have had no talks with the Secretary of State for about three weeks: ever since the resignation of the KONOYE cabinet; and since the present situation between Japan and the United States is such that it could not be left as it is, I am very pleased to have this opportunity of speaking with you. The conversations on this question have lasted for more than six months. From their inception, Japan has been wishing to arrive at a quick settlement. The people of Japan also looked forward to these conversations with much hope; however, the conversations have dragged on and in the meantime the relation between the two countries has grown worse. It has become increasingly difficult for the people of my country to be patient. Now, the Government of Japan has in the meantime made many concessions, but the Government of the United States has held to its arguments and has shown no willingness to respond to our compromises. As a result, some people in Japan have begun to doubt if the United States is really sincere in this matter. The Japanese people regard the freezing of funds as a kind of economic blockade, and there seem to be some who say that modern warfare is not limited to shooting alone. No country can exist without the supply of materials indispensable to its industry. From what reports I have received from Japan, the situation seems to be serious and threatening and, therefore, the only way to keep peace is for Japan and the United States to come, without further delay, to some kind of a friendly and satisfactory agreement. It is for no other purpose than

that of keeping peace in the Pacific that the Japanese Government is endeavoring so hard to arrive at a satisfactory agreement by continuing our conversations.

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*See IV, 75.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 77

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.

(Very Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 4.)

"As a major effort in attaining this objective, our Government has made the recent proposal. I wish that your Government would make its views clear to us as soon as possible by responding to the views and desires expressed by the Japanese Government."

I incidentally told him that the Japanese Government, realizing the seriousness of the situation, is dispatching Ambassador KURUSU to assist me. Then I continued and said, by way of an explanation of our proposal, that taking together the views expressed on October 2 by the Secretary of State relative to our proposal of September 25, and what both the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary had said subsequent to that date, the whole question could be boiled down to consist of the following three difficult points. I went on to say:

1. "As to the principle of non-discrimination, we have decided to recognize the fact that if this principle is, as your Government wishes, to be applied to the whole world, it is to be applied in the entire Pacific area including China. Since this is something which the Secretary of State has often spoken to me about as being a long-cherished desire of his, I hope that this guarantee which our Government is offering would prove to be satisfactory to you.

2. "Now as to the attitude of the two governments toward the European war, we proposed in our proposal of September 25 that the action on the part of the two governments should be based upon consideration of 'protection and self-defense.'" (The English text used our expression as it stood.)

Regarding this point, I asked whether the United States Government would guarantee that it will not give an unnecessarily broad interpretation to the words "protection" and "self-defense", and I said, "If the Japanese Government could get such a guarantee from the United States Government, the Japanese Government is also willing to give a similar guarantee." I continued, "As to the words 'in case the United States enters the war, etc.,' since our conversations had for their object the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, we are not in a position, under the present circumstances, to make any definite statement outside of what has been given in our proposal of September 25. Unless we have confidence in each other, as you well realize, no guarantee would be a satisfactory one even if backed by a hundred promises and a hundred documents."

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 78

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.

(Very Urgent.)

(Part 3 of 4.)

3. I submitted the new proposal, as it stood, regarding the question of stationing and withdrawing of troops and proceeded to say, "With regard to this question, the Japanese Government has gone a step beyond her past proposals and has, by definitely fixing not only the localities in China where our troops would be stationed but also the period of their occupation, made it clear that the occupation is not a permanent and definite one. No doubt you would like to see the troops withdrawn at once, but I am sure you well understand that it is impossible under the present circumstances to do so. I earnestly wish that you would give favorable consideration to this question from the standpoint of the general situation.

Next, I said, "The Japanese Government is making the following proposal with regard to the Japanese troops in French Indo-China," and so saying, I submitted the proposal contained in your instructions.

In reply to this, the President, remarking that he had already thought on the question before our explanation was given him, spoke as follows from a note which he had been holding in his hand, "As a result of a confusion created by the forces of aggression, the whole world has fallen into a critical state. What seems to me to be common sense is for us to wish earnestly that the world will return to peaceful normalcy and for the United States Government to do its utmost in the spirit of fair play for the establishment of peace, stability, and order in the Pacific. If this object is to be realized, actual results must be effected for the sake of human welfare. It is my earnest wish that the preliminary talks relative to this question would have good results which would serve as a basis of future negotiations. I will, just as the Japanese Government hopes, do my best in order to help carry on these negotiations successfully. I wish that the Japanese Government would clearly set forth its intention of following a peaceful course in its policy and not an opposite course. This is the way to attain the results toward which both you and we are working."

What the United States desires, according to the President, are (1) to prevent the war from spreading; and (2) to establish a permanent peace.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 79

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.

(Very Urgent.)

(Part 4 of 4.)

The President elaborated on the point that with regard to the question of non-discrimination, he had agreed with CHURCHILL when he had conferred with that statesman to abolish the economic limitations throughout the world; that he had opposed Germany because Germany followed a policy contrary to this idea; and that he wished that the principle of non-discrimination would be applied generally throughout the world. The President then said by way of an incidental remark that in the days of President TAFT when disturbance arose in Cuba, the United States had failed by resorting to a policy of force; however, today under his administration, because the government had adopted a friendly policy, the relations with the Latin-American countries had improved. He then explained how necessary it is to follow a new policy in accordance with new situations. Secretary HULL inserted the remark that the South American countries, who had in the past been fearful of the United States, have come to take an attitude of welcoming the United States. Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that

economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a *modus vivendi* if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this expression should be translated as "method of living." Although it is not clear to me what it really means, I intend to ascertain whether he refers to, possibly, a provisional agreement.

The President then asked if Ambassador KURUSU was bringing with him a proposal other than that referred to above. I replied that he was not bringing any proposal, but in response to my wishes he was coming to assist me. Then the President said that he is leaving on the 15th and will be away for one week, as he must attend, as is his custom, a children's party at Warm Springs during the Thanksgiving week (the 20th), and that he wondered whether he would have the opportunity of meeting Ambassador KURUSU before he leaves.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 80

FROM: Tokyo 11 November 1941
TO: Washington #762.

Re your #1069[a].

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736[b] is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time.

The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day ?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U.S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A.

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[a] See IV, 75.
[b] See IV, 44.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 81

FROM: Tokyo 11 November 1941
TO: Washington #763.

Re my 671[a].

With regard to our representations to the United States in this matter, we have received two representations from the Germans since then. On 6 November, I advised the German Ambas-

sador in Tokyo that in view of the present general relationship between the United States and Japan, it was essential that this matter be given very careful study. I explained that there is a good chance that it would be more effective under the present circumstances, for us to present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether a mere representation would bear any fruit.

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[a] See III, 277.

Trans. 11–12–41

No. 82

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

11 November 1941
764.

(In 3 parts complete.)

1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message # 723[a]) to his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines, he said:

"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U.S. Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States and Japan."

2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.

The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages.

I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I added.

I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not know the developments in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? However, I said, with the U.S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and in view of the fact that I realize that there were certain relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks at this time.

The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a week or ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations. Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in reaching a decision.

I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U.S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations. There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these factions were checked.

For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.

A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.

In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving indications that he was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.

3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt reported by you in your message #1070[b] (that part in which he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis of the real negotiations, etc.)

That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

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[a] See IV, 16.
[b] See IV, 76–79.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 83

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 11 November 1941
TO: Tokyo #1072.

In paragraph (2) of your message #726[a], in which you explain our Proposal A, you stated that with regard to the matters involving the Tripartite Pact, the United States was "apparently satisfied in general with our proposal and therefore . . ."

In your message #757[b], in which you give us the gist of your explanations to the U.S. Ambassador, you say under paragraph (1) concerning the attitudes of the respective countries with reference to the European War that "we assume that this matter has already been settled with their acceptance of this phase of our proposal of 25 September".

I presume that you took this position to press our claims on this particular point. We are proceeding under this assumption. Actually, however, no agreement has been reached as may be seen from the contents of their "oral statement" of 2 October.

The only comment I ever made in this respect was in my message #995[c] in reporting Wakasugi's conversations with Welles, when it was noted that regarding the Tripartite Pact,

"the United States also gave indications that adjustments in this matter may be a possibility".

As we replied in our message #1025[d] to the question contained in your #721[e], we are proceeding with the exchange of notes plan without coming to any definite decision on this point.

I merely mention the above, so that no misunderstandings will arise.

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[a] See IV, 25.
[b] See IV, 68.
[c] See IV, 8.
[d] See IV, 19.
[e] See IV, 18.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 84

FROM: Washington — 11 November 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1073.

The Chinese Ambassador to the United States had an audience with the President yesterday the 10th and is said to have handed him a document (contents unknown). (It is said the interview lasted two minutes.)

This might be of some information to you.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 85

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1076.

Re your #727[a].

In order that we may have a dependable translation into English of Proposal B, please have it written in English and wire it to me.

The word "provided" in my #1044[b] (text concerning the principle of non-discrimination in commerce) ought really to be changed to "on the understanding". Please take care of that.

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[a] See IV, 29.
[b] See IV, 37.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 86

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1077.

(Part 1 of 4.)

From the Intelligence Official.

1. The ROOSEVELT administration is dashing along the road of military, economic, and industrial reconstruction with the object of defeating the Nazis. So far as war on the sea is concerned, the United States has already entered the conflict. Even if ROOSEVELT should now decide to leave the Nazis be, he is already in too deep. Even though he tried to do a 180° turn, his economic reconstructionists would not let him. Therefore, it can be said that the United States is following the one road to complete war.

2. It is true that the American army is not yet equipped, but even if war were declared against Germany, no more than the present ocean fighting would be necessary and, therefore, such a declaration is possible. The reason why things are not going so well for the administration in this connection, however, is because the people are not completely behind it.

ROOSEVELT has the full support of the government, the military, and the Congress and is tantamount to a dictator (on the 10th, the *Times Herald* said in an editorial that ROOSEVELT is a dictator in no way less than HITLER or STALIN). The people, however, most certainly do not support ROOSEVELT. During the last two or three weeks this has been particularly evident. Let us look into some concrete examples: Accordingly to reliable reports, the leaders of the America First Committee are secretly endeavoring with all their ingenuity to impeach ROOSEVELT. The stronger government pressure against it becomes, the more belligerent does this committee grow, and it may well be that the time will come when they will resort to force. The pressure of the government against the America First Committee is also becoming fierce. On October 30 in New York, there was a meeting of this committee, but they could not make any radio broadcasts. ROOSEVELT's own life is in grave danger. On that night in Madison Square Garden, the immense crowd totalling 8,000 filled the building to overflowing.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 87

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo #1077.

(Part 2 of 4.)

At a mass meeting in Washington, ——[a], a former Ambassador, made a scathing attack on the ROOSEVELT regime and demanded a referendum against this deliberate drift toward war. On that occasion he said that at this so fateful moment in the nation's history ROOSEVELT might die. These were words of profound meaning and drew great applause from the audience. The *Times Herald* in an editorial said that the President holds the whip over the Army and Navy and has the full support of the Government. Therefore, it will be impossible for the Congress to impeach him. The editorial said, however, that some believe that he will be impeached, in any case, later on. Now, for papers in their editorials to use the word "impeach" cannot be overlooked as something light. Furthermore, pickets in front of the White House recently carried placards on which were written the words "Impeach the President". Another thing, some days ago in Detroit, Ambassador HALIFAX was pelted with eggs. Again the sinking of the Reuben James gave the popular spirit of this country a great shock and filled the people with a gloomy foreboding. In his speech on October 27th, ROOSEVELT did not stress foreign questions so much as he did internal matters. This is to be regarded as a declaration of internal warfare whereby ROOSEVELT whipped from its scabbard the sword of an unlimited national emergency.

[a] DoD Comment: Name and identifying information withheld.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 88

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1077.

(Part 3 of 4.)

2. The Congress, as I said, is supporting ROOSEVELT. True enough, the Senate approved the entrance of armed merchantmen into the war zones; however, the actual figures were 50 to 37, and this could not, by any means, be called a crushing defeat for the opponents. This also may be regarded as a reflection of public opinion.

Things being as they are in the country, in order to dispel the dilemma and to condition the people for a war against Germany, it may be now that a counter-hand will be played. I mean to say, many people in the United States fear the German war machine frightfully. However, they know how we have fought so hard in China for four years and figure that we are about worn out. They also figure that we are weak in materials. They do not think that we could resist them very much and optimize over how quick we would be to come to our knees.

If we scrutinize this psychology closely, we find that the ROOSEVELT administration, although it does not want a two-ocean war, would probably not do anything to prevent the outbreak of a war with Japan, depending on how we Japanese act. Perhaps a point-blank declaration of war might be made. Then the people's thirst for blood could be stimulated, an unlimited emergency declared, the America First Committee dispersed, and all opposition crushed. Then they figure the popular mind might turn favorable for a war with Germany. In other words, we Japanese would be merely the tool with which the American administration prepares the way for coming to grips with the Reich.

4. What will happen if the United States and Japan come to blows? Well, Germany now has a vast occupied territory and is in the most favorable position to talk peace. England is already complaining that the United States is not sending her enough help. Germany, of course, does not want a long war, and she may suddenly, on unexpectedly generous terms, conclude peace with England. I mean to say that while the United States would be at grips with us, American aid to England would naturally slow down and give Germany a chance to make a separate peace with Great Britain. Germany will certainly do her best to achieve this feat.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 89

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1077.

(Part 4 of 4.)

The New Deal failed, and the opposition to ROOSEVELT within the country became unmanageable. Just then the European war took a more lively turn through Germany's invasion of the Netherlands. ROOSEVELT, who is well-versed in international questions, joined the war then and there. It might be said that HITLER's attack on the Netherlands caused ROOSEVELT to enter the struggle immediately. Japanese-American relations are now at identically that same pass. I mean to say that a war with Japan would put the people squarely behind ROOSEVELT and make him a dictator. He knows fully that if he has to fight, there will be a suitable opportunity which would not admit delaying war. Furthermore, in view of Japan's foreign policy, it can be seen that our relations with the United States have reached such a pass that a decision on war is about the only thing that could

raise them from the dead. Judging from internal conditions in the United States, for the foregoing reasons there is no hope for a thorough-going pact at the present time. It would be better to devise some relatively easy small-scale makeshift of a temporary nature laying stress on economic matters. Germany will keep sinking American ships, and the President's position will become harder and harder, so as soon as a show-down with Germany is inevitable, then we can get a fullfledged pact. Again, if we do have to fight the United States, we could do this much better after she is at war with Germany.

Trans. 11–14–41

No. 90

From United States Communications Intelligence:

Important summaries of Japanese Naval operations.

Date of Operations	*Serial*	*Date of Issue*
Oct. 13–22, 1941	16–41, No. 907–100	Nov. 12, 1941

. . . . . .

Oct. 17

"Numerous new calls are now appearing in Mandate traffic which indicate a decided increase in the Mandate Force."

Oct. 18

"It has been noted with interest during past few days that the Mandate Islands of Truk, Palau, Jaluit, and Saipan have been included in dispatch headings which ordinarily do not concern them".

"The Commander Sixth Base Force originates a dispatch addressed to four unidentified units now at Yokosuka, and information to 6th Base Force. All of the above action addresses are evidently new units scheduled for assignment to the 6th Base Force in Jaluit area."

No. 91

FROM: Washington — 11 November 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1074.

Re your # 762[a].

After my conversation with the President, I told HULL that as the situation is urgent, I would like to meet him the same evening or this morning, and go on with concrete discussion. He replied that they understand fully our need of haste, that, as a matter of fact both yesterday after our conversation and today, although it is the 11th and the Armistice holiday, he would gather those concerned and give study to our proposal, and that it would facilitate the negotiations to have our discussion tomorrow the 12th after hearing their opinions.

As for a conjecture regarding the success or failure of the negotiations, I will ----- after getting their opinions in tomorrow's interview.

[a] See IV, 80.

Trans. 11–13–41

No. 92

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1087.

(Part 1 of 4.)

(Departmental secret. To be handled in Government code.)

On the 12th at 3 p.m. WAKASUGI went with me to talk with Secretary HULL. BALLANTINE sat in and we conversed for about an hour. I asked if they had any answer to our proposal and HULL gave me the oral statements contained in my # 1083[a] and # 1084[b]. He said that he wanted me to ascertain if the new cabinet would also approve of oral statement A and stated that oral statement B was presented in the sense of a suggestion concerning peace between Japan and China referred to in our last conversation in accordance with our request. He went on to say that if the same principle were applied to the China question as was applied to all the other problems, a settlement should be possible; that also, such things as the question of non-discrimination in commerce had to be connected with this; and that by day after tomorrow he could let us have a definite proposal. I said that judging from this suggestion and our conversation it looked as though it was implied that unless Japan and China could get together on the question of the stationing of troops there would be no chance for any success at all in the Japanese-American negotiations. I said that if this was what was meant it would be leaving the key to Japanese-American relations in the hands of someone else, which looked rather inappropriate, and I asked him if he meant that Japanese-Chinese relations could be left to Japan and China and that the United States and Japan could agree on the other questions. HULL, however, replied vaguely that if the general principles were applied to China too, an understanding would be possible.

He then continued, "We have not yet privately informed China about these talks, but we are letting England and the Netherlands, who are concerned, know something of their general lines. In case some basis for negotiations is worked out, I believe it possible that they may sign along with the United States. "However," he added, "I cannot guarantee this."

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[a] See IV, 93.
[b] See IV, 97, 98, 99.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 93

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1083.

(Part 1 of 4.)

Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.

A. Oral. Strictly Confidential.

It will be recalled that the documents communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28, 1941 contained a statement of the position of the Japanese Government in regard to its desire and intention to pursue peaceful courses. That position was set forth in excerpts taken from those documents as follows:

"Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations."

"In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the President of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area. For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready: for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the Government of Japan, like the Government of the United States, would be proud to make sacrifices."

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 94

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1083.

(Part 2 of 4.)

(Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.)

With reference to the stationing of Japanese troops in Indo-China, it was stated:

"The Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.

"Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo-China as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.

"Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo-China is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories."

The statement was made specifically applicable to Thailand as follows:

"The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan's intentions toward Thailand."

Specific reference was also made to the Soviet Union by the Japanese Government as follows:

"As regard Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said Treaty."

In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 95

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1083.

(Part 3 of 4.)

With reference to the general program in view, it was stated:

"Such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the Government of the United States.

"Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself."

Inasmuch as subsequent to the giving by the Japanese Government of the foregoing statement of its position a new cabinet has come into office in Japan, the Government believes that it would be helpful, in order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding, if the Japanese Government could at this time confirm that the position of the Japanese Government has not changed.

This Government, in its statement to the Japanese Government of October 2, 1941, pointed out that, although we were gratified to receive the statement of the position of the Japanese Government, we found it difficult to understand the need for the qualification by the Japanese Government of its statements of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases. We had in mind such phrases as:

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 96

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1083.

(Urgent)

(Part 4 of 4.)

"As long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty."

"Without provocation."

"Without a justifiable reason."

It is believed that it would be helpful if the position of the Japanese Government on this point could be clarified.

The foregoing observations are not directed to ——— proposals put forward by the Japanese Ambassador on November 10, (November 7) but are set forth merely in an effort to make abundantly clear the basis on which we are proceeding in order that there may be avoided any misunderstanding on the part either of the Japanese Government or of this Government. It has not been and is not the purpose of this Government to enter needlessly into a discussion of details. While presenting these preliminary observations toward ensuring a common understanding, this Government will expect to do everything it can to expedite consideration of the latest proposals of the Japanese Government.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 97

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1084.

(Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 3.) (Separate Wire.)

B. Oral. (Strictly Confidential.)

Reference is had to the Japanese Ambassador's request for any further amplification that the Secretary of State might have in mind in connection with the suggestion made by him in informal conversation on November 7th in regard to mutual exchanges of pledges between China and Japan for the establishment of real friendship and collaboration between the two countries.

It will be recalled that suggestion under reference was prompted by the observation of the Japanese Ambassador that should the Japanese Government agree to withdraw its troops within a definite period from all areas of China the Japanese people would feel that they had nothing to show for the four years and more of heavy sacrifice that they had made and that such an agreement would be regarded as having caused Japan a loss of prestige.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 98

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1084.

(English Text) (Urgent)

(Part 2 of 3.)

(To be handled in Government Code.) Strictly secret.

The Secretary, in reply to the Japanese Ambassador's observation, commented that the present world crisis, in which Europe finds itself threatened with anarchy, affords Japan a unique opportunity to enhance its national prestige on a basis of moral force in a way that military might could never accomplish. That, if the Chinese Government were now to say, either as a result of Japanese initiative or on its own initiative, that China desired a real friendship with Japan and would do everything it reasonably could to collaborate with Japan along peaceful and mutually beneficial lines, could not Japan find it possible to reciprocate in a policy of mutual friendship and conciliation with China, would not such a policy enable Japan to make a contribution of inestimable value toward arresting the destructive force which now menaces world civilization and to assume a leadership in the world which every peaceful nation would welcome.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 99

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1084.

(English Text) (Urgent)

(Part 3 of 3.)

For what is envisaged would be an implementation of the kind of constructive, liberal and peaceful world program concerning which we have been talking in our exploratory conversations. That program contemplates practical application of basic principles directed

toward preservation of order under law, peace with justice, and the social and economic welfare of mankind. It contemplates peaceful collaboration among nations, mutual respect for the rights of all, no aggrandisement, and the adopting of broad-gauge economic policies which would provide liberalization of trade, afford fair access to and development of natural resources and raise living standards to the betterment of all peoples.

Full association by Japan in such a program at this critical moment in world history would give Japan an undoubted position of moral leadership and be a tribute to the far-sighted and enlightened character of its statesmanship.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 100

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1087.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 4.)

(To be handled in government code.)

Then BALLANTINE inserted the remark that it is stipulated in the American proposal of June 21st that the United States will not be a party to applying to other countries any condition conflicting with the principles which the United States has been consistently upholding.

WAKASUGI said:

"While we heartily welcome the suggestion offered, I would like to know more definitely how China is to be made to pledge to follow the suggestion. Is it the intention of Secretary HULL to leave this matter up to direct negotiations to be conducted between Japan and China; or is it his intention to have the United States secure the pledge from China and transmit it to Japan; or is it to be accomplished with Japan, the United States, and China meeting in a conference?"

It seems that Secretary HULL had no definite plan in mind regarding this matter, but he spoke as if he was confident that if the Japanese-American negotiations are carried out in accordance with the principle of peace that a stage would in due time be reached at which this suggestion could be carried out.

Whereupon WAKASUGI asked:

"Is it your intention to have China make this pledge when that stage has been reached in the course of the negotiations?"

HULL avoided making a definite reply and instead he brought out an example, stating that when two parties in a dispute wish to come to an agreement they could do so by the mediation of a third party and, so saying, HULL hinted his having the intention of mediating between Japan and China depending, of course, on conditions.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 101

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1087.

(Part 3 of 4.) (Departmental Secret.)

(To be handled in government code.)

Concerning the stationing of troops, I explained to him that in the new proposal we made it clear that we do not mean to keep them there indefinitely. HULL replied that to interfere in the private affairs of other nations contravenes any general peace program and that permanent occupation is impossible. However, he seemed quite satisfied with my explanation.

In connection with a general peace policy, HULL said, "In one breath you say that the three-power pact has a peaceful objective and in the other you confess that Japan is bound by the agreement and is tied up with Germany. Now the officials of our country and our public are at a loss to understand any explanation like this. HITLER has a hard task and to carry it out, he is making the people of the various small nations suffer. Now he cannot hold out forever in such a difficult undertaking, and sooner or later we are going to have to take charge of things after the war. In this we are going to need every resource. Leaders of both Japan and the United States ought to cooperate in a peaceful program. Thus, if some sort of plan can be worked out between Japan and the United States comprising the nations concerned—for example, England and the Netherlands—to bring about complete harmony over the Pacific, Japan would no longer need to worry about the three-power pact, and the three-power pact would die a natural death." I refuted this argument, saying, "The Japanese-British alliance was in effect at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, but afterwards at the time of the Washington conference it was nullified, so you see the situation changes with the times. The existence of the three-power pact presents no obstacle to any peace plan.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 102

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1087.

(Part 4 of 4.) (Departmental secret.)

(To be handled in governmental code.)

Continuing, he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force—not by any means. If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, I don't think that the United States will have any objection to our proposal."

HULL answered, "The United States also recognizes that the situation is tense and is considering your proposals concerning the three problems. We are doing this just as fast as we can but questions pending over a period of ten years cannot be settled over night. By day after tomorrow, I will be ready to reply."

WAKASUGI reiterated, "As I told you, the Diet assembles on the 25th and the situation is drawing more and more grave. I want to get a definite reply to our proposal at any time now so by day after tomorrow I will expect a clear concise reply on these various problems."

In a word, during that conversation they sought our recognition of the statement of August 28, number B, and made explanations of their recent suggestion for a Japanese-Chinese peace. They only wished to tell us that the United States is going deeper into the three problems and our proposal of September 25 and that they are making ready for a quick

reply. I am not satisfied with their attitude toward taking up negotiations so tomorrow morning I am going to have WAKASUGI again tell HULL please to hurry up with a decision.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 103

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) November 13, 1941
TO: Washington #079.

Honolulu to Tokyo #217.

From Kurusu.

-----[a], who was one of the -----[a] party during its Far Eastern tour, was among the passengers on the Clipper.

During conversation with him he mentioned that he thought it was already too late to try and arrive at a peaceful negotiation between Japan and the United States, and I gathered from the conversation that the -----[a] party are hoping that negotiations for a peaceful settlement will not be successful.

I am also wondering if the pessimistic outlook on my mission by U.S. radio announcers, etc., of which both Tokyo and Washington cables addressed to me here mention, is not also influenced by this party. Perhaps this will be of some value for you to know.

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[a]DoD Comment: Name withheld.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 104

FROM: Tokyo November 13, 1941
TO: Washington #768.

Re my #727[a].

Delete that part of note (1) following "HITUYO NI OZI (as required) which reads "HON TORIKIME SEIRITU SEBA" (in the event that the agreement is reached.)

Insert the words "GEN NI FUTURYO INDO SINA NI HAKEN SERARE ORU" (dispatched to French Indo-China at present) following that part which reads "KOSEI NARU HEIWA KAKURITU SURU UE WA" (Upon having a just peace assuredly established).

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[a]See IV, 29.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 105

FROM: Tokyo November 13, 1941
TO: Washington #766.

Re your #1055[a].

1. Through the U.S. Ambassador's courtesy, I was, in confidence, shown the record of your conversations with Secretary Hull of the 7th. According to this record, the Secretary asked you, point blank, in connection with the so-called self-defense rights, for a "concrete statement of Japan's relations with the Axis powers."

You made no mention of this in your message. Will you please give us a detailed report of this.

2. Judging from the tone of these talks, the United States is apparently still assuming that they are of a preliminary nature. We pleaded with the U.S. Ambassador again on the 12th to try and see the seriousness of the situation. Will you, too, do everything in your power to make them realize this in accordance with the lines contained in my various instructions on this subject.

3. Since the record of your conversations with Hull were shown to me only through the personal courtesy of the Ambassador, please maintain strict secrecy regarding it.

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[a] See IV, 54.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 106

FROM: Tokyo — November 12, 1941
TO: Washington — # 765.

(To be handled in Government code.)

Please take steps to acquaint Finance Official NISHIYAMA with matters pertaining to the Japan-American negotiations which are the focal point of the recent international situation.

He should receive a confirming wire from the Finance Minister in the near future.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 107

FROM: Tokyo — November 15, 1941
TO: Washington — # 774.

Re your # 1087[a].

During the conversations with HULL, Wakasugi asked, with regard to the form in which the "B" suggestion should materialize, "or is it your intention to have it conducted by the consular representatives of Japan, the United States, and China?" As you are aware, the Imperial Government is opposed to its taking that course.

Please be aware of the fact that the "B" suggestion was taken up because we thought it might be a short cut to settlement. In other words, we decided to take it up because we thought it would speed up the procedure. We do not wish to give it even a chance to further complicate and prolong matters.

Bearing this in mind, do everything in your power to not only prevent further complications but to simplify matters as much as possible.

[a] See IV, 92.

Note: The "B" above refers to the "Oral" Statement B handed to Nomura on Wednesday afternoon by Mr. Hull.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 108

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 13, 1941
1089.

Re my # 1087[a].

On this, the 13th, Wakasugi called on Ballantine.

(1) Wakasugi said:

"Yesterday's conversations led to no settlement and moreover, the outcome of it fell far short of Japanese anticipations. The times have become exceedingly critical and the Japanese people have become impatient with regard to the Japanese-U.S. conversations. They are becoming desperate as far as Japanese-U.S. relations are concerned. This being the general condition in Japan, and being confronted with the fact that it is the eve of the convening of the session of the Diet, the government of Japan is anxious to have these U.S.-Japanese talks reach some conclusion without a moment's unnecessary delay.

"The above is as was explained forcefully in yesterday's conversations. In the next conversations, any discussions of general attitudes and comments on the possible outlook should be unnecessary.

"We request that Hull be asked to give a clear reply at our next meeting on the following points: Does the United States intend to accept our proposal of 25 September, including the proposals submitted by us on the 7 and 10th of this month? If not, will the United States submit a counter proposal to the above, clearly indicating the revision desired? Or, on the other hand, is the United States of the attitude that she will stick to her proposal of 21 June and make that instrument her final proposal?

"Many in Japan are of the opinion that the United States is purposely stalling the procedure", Wakasugi said.

Ballantine:

"The United States is also aware of the fact that matters have reached an exceedingly critical stage. In spite of the fact that the 11th was a holiday, it was disregarded and this matter was discussed. There is no truth in the charge that the United States is pursuing a "stalling" policy.

"However, in spite of the fact that we do not wish to appear to be quibbling about details, there are several points which will have to be explained by Japan before the United States can make definite replies.

(Part 2.)

"For example, Japan has expressed her acceptance of non-discrimination of commerce on the Pacific but on condition that said non-discriminatory treatment be applied to the entire world. Does this sweeping proposal include those nations which are at present embroiled in the war? We cannot help but have some misgivings as to when such an agreement would become effective over the entire Pacific area, if its effectivity there depends on its applicability on the nations at war."

Wakasugi:

"Fundamentally speaking, the basic aims of this is to bring about a U.S.-Japanese agreement. The supporters would be Japan and the United States, hence the terms are not intended to be made applicable to every country in the world. It is our intention that the United States and Japan agree upon the basic principle of non-discriminatory treatment throughout the world."

(2) Concerning the matter contained in your messages #758[b] and #764[c], it is true that the United States is still assuming that, as it was in the beginning, these talks are as yet in the exploratory stages through which the basis of agreements may be discovered. We, on the other hand, are going on the assumption that these are the actual negotiations. There exists, therefore, a fundamental discordant note.

Wakasugi pointed out this fact, to which Ballantine replied:

"The United States is proceeding along the lines set forth heretofore. Even as late as yesterday, Hull said that if these conversations can be carried to the point of their being made the basis of a negotiation, we could no doubt get Britain and the Netherlands to participate."

(Part 3.)

Wakasugi:

"Leaving aside the U.S. viewpoint on this particular matter for the time being, if talks between the duly recognized Ambassador of one country and the President and Secretary of State of another, concerning adjustments of relations between the two countries they represent—regardless of the form in which said talks are conducted—are not negotiations, we are indeed hard put to it to figure out what, indeed, does constitute a diplomatic negotiation.

"I request that Hull be clearly advised that we are treating the present proceedings as part of the negotiations."

(3) Regarding your message #766[d]:

The main objective of that day's interview was to submit our new proposal and to arrange for a meeting with the President together with Secretary Hull and to advise them that we would make a more detailed explanation at that time. For that reason, as I reported in my message, the only reference I made to the Tripartite Pact was to express my hopes that they would not insist upon enlarging the scope of the right of self-defense. Besides that, we discussed nothing pertaining to the Tripartite Pact. Hull never requested that we make a "concrete statement" concerning our relations with the Axis Powers. Had he done so, I would have been compelled to make some reply.

For the sake of reassuring myself, I had Wakasugi make indirect reference to this matter to Ballantine who was present on the occasion in question. Wakasugi asked Ballantine if he could remember any other points that might have been discussed, stating that he wanted this information for the sake of the records. Ballantine replied that he could recall nothing further.

If any mention was made of the topic you state was in the records of the meeting, it would not be likely that Ballantine, who was the only other person there, knows nothing about it. No doubt there is some mistake there. You are aware, of course, that the United States is trying to get us to assure them on our stand with regard to our duties under the terms of the Pact. You can see that by the contents of their proposal.

(Please insert "766–(2)" following that part reading "764" in (2) of this message."

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[a] See IV, 92.
[b] See IV, 71.
[c] See IV, 82. *Note:* In connection with this reference see last sentence above.
[d] See IV, 107.

Trans. 11–17–41

No. 109

FROM: Tokyo — November 14, 1941
TO: Washington — # 771.

I finally received your # 1087[b] at 10:30 P.M. on the 13th. As I told you in my # 745[a], I want you to wire me quickly brief summaries of such conversations as the one on the 14th. You may wire me the details later at your convenience.

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[a] See IV, 100–102.
[b] See IV, 92.

Trans. 11–14–41

No. 110

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1090.

(Part 1 of 3.) (Departmental Secret.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.

I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must tell you the following:

1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward; they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in evidence.

3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China, and insofar as possible she is assisting CHIANG. For the sake of peace in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 111

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1090.

(Urgent)

(Part 2 of 3.) (Departmental Secret.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and closer with the Axis.

5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence and our lives, it naturally follows that we will have to fight England and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for their economic existence on the United States and must maintain a neutrality partial thereto.

6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out till the end will be the victor.

7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength to the Pacific.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 112

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1090.

(Part 3 of 3.) (Secret outside the Department.)

Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German and Italian navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that should the United States start war-like activities in the Atlantic, there would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be carried out through the Pacific area.

8. Though I cannot be a hundred per cent sure of the present situation in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be the best plan.

Furthermore, I would like to call your attention again to my wires Nos. 894[a] and 901[b] sent to you on the 3rd and 4th of November, respectively.

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[a] Message in which NOMURA gives his views on the present world situation.

[b] (See III, 246) Ambassador Nomura apologizes for expressing himself carelessly on the spur of the moment on October 3 and ventures the opinion that Japan will have to drastically reorganize her economy before she is able to become self-sufficient as a result of the establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity. He suggests a profitable foothold from a southward movement within several years.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 113

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1093.

Re my #1073[a].

According to what -----[b], told IGUCHI, the document which the Chinese Ambassador submitted to the State Department was a message which CHIANG KAI-SHEK had addressed to the President and contained a plea for intensive American aid to China in the event Japan attacks the Burma Road; but, since the United States Government rejected the plea, T.V. SOONG is now endeavoring to get Secretary HULL and the President interested in it.

Please tell the telegraphic section to cancel the message indicated in the caption of your #767[c].

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[a] (See IV, 84) The Chinese Ambassador to the United States had an audience with the President on the 10th and handed him a document.

[b] Name withheld.

[c] Not available.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 114

FROM: Tokyo November 15, 1941
TO: Washington #775.

Through my various messages on the subject, you are fully aware of the fact that these talks have gone beyond the preliminary stage and that they are now well within the realm of the "real thing". It is true that at the time the Konoye statement was dispatched, the negotiations were more or less conducted as preliminary to a meeting of "the leaders".

However, for all practical purposes, the talks had gone beyond the point where they could be termed as being of a "preliminary" nature. By that time, we had centered all of our efforts toward bringing about a speedy termination of the talks. That has been made perfectly clear. I feel sure that the United States too, regardless of what they may have said, recognized this fact from a realistic point of view.

It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature.

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736[a] is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.

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[a] See IV, 44.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 115

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1098.

(In 2 parts complete.)

Let us suppose that the Japanese-U.S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down, and that, as a consequence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The following is my guess as to what would be the relationship between the United States and Japan under such circumstances.

Much, of course, would depend on what move we make and how we make it, but

(a) It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off immediately;

(b) Even if they are not, the same situation as now exists between Germany and the United States—that is, the closing of the consulates and recalling of the Ambassador—will probably be effected. (Through the application of the order freezing the assets, economic relations have already been broken off for all practical purposes.) Under such circumstances, only a small staff will remain at the Embassy here. (Please see my separate wire #1099[a] for my suggestion as to the personnel of such a reduced staff.)

I presume that the government has given careful consideration as to the disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here. I would appreciate being advised in confidence of your decision in these matters.

In the event of (b), I presume that the same procedure as was followed in the case of U.S.-Germany will be followed. That is, personnel of the consulates of the respective countries will no doubt be evacuated by mutual consent. We can see that it could be possible for the officials and businessmen who remained here at that time (they would total about 300 or 400) to be evacuated on another vessel. However, we fear that the number of persons desiring passage will undoubtedly skyrocket. The Consuls will, of course, urge our nationals to remain here even if the worst eventually should materialize, but we feel that there will be many who, because of various circumstances, will find it impossible to do so.

It will be practically impossible to make a distinction between them and officials and businessmen. Will you, therefore, give your consideration to sending enough ships to evacuate these people.

(Part 2.)

In the event of (a)

(1) No doubt some agreement between the United States and Japan will be entered into to guarantee the safe passage of Embassy and Consulate staff members, (agreements will no doubt be entered into with regard to the course of the vessel, markers, and communication methods). (One plan may be to have these officials sent to some half-way point, for example Hawaii, some port in the Aleutian Islands, or, if unavoidable to French Tahiti, on ships belonging to the nation to which they are accredited, and at such prearranged place, have the respective ships exchange passengers.) To the representative of what nation do we plan to entrust our national property and to protect the rights of our nationals remaining here? Is it correct to assume that negotiations with the country which has been selected will be completed in Tokyo with the diplomatic representative of that country and in that country by our ambassador or minister?

(2) Japanese residents here who are of military age, will undoubtedly be held here. Therefore, a plan to exchange our nationals residing here for Americans residing in Japan is conceivable, but in view of the difference in numbers, it is indeed a very slim hope. Dependence on ships of neutral register, too, would be an exceedingly precarious undertaking should war actually be declared. We would appreciate being advised of the government's attitude on these points.

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*See IV, 116.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 116

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1099.

1. Duties are to be limited to only the most pressing matters. Other non-urgent duties, such as auditing of accounts, will be dropped. Accordingly, I desire to have one or two secretaries, two foreign service attaches, and one clerk ordered back to Japan. (There are family considerations involved in the case of Foreign Service Attaches Fujiyama and Inagawa. If possible we would like to have these two returned to Japan.)

2. The intelligence staff will not be returned (to Japan). Instead, we plan to arrange for their transfer to South America; (Secretary Terazaki and Clerk Yamamoto).

3. All overseas students and so-called student attaches will be returned to Japan or transferred elsewhere. (Attaches Ando, Honjo, Nishibori, Arita, Matsui and six 2nd class clerks.)

4. Employees engaged locally will be dismissed as the occasion may demand.

5. Those returning to Japan would go in one of the evacuee ships. Those transferring to South America, or elsewhere, would leave immediately for their posts.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 117

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 15, 1941
781.

To Ambassador Kurusu.

I wish to express my sympathy on the presumption that you must be experiencing considerable fatigue as a consequence of your long trip by air. Not only this Minister, but everyone in government circles, feels deep gratitude that you have agreed to tackle the exceedingly difficult problems which confront us. As I said, I realize that your task is a difficult one, but at the same time it is an important one; success or failure will have a great bearing on the rise or decline of our nation.

Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to him. After you have perfect understanding of each other, cooperate with him in an unsparing effort to guide the negotiations to an early settlement. That is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted.

Even after the presentation of the final proposal by us, the U.S. Government apparently continues to show laxness. There are even those who suspect that the United States is intentionally stalling for time. In view of the fact that the crisis is fast approaching, no subsidiary complications can be countenanced even when considering the time element alone. Such an eventuality would make impossible the surmounting of the crisis.

Please familiarize yourself with my various instructions to Ambassador Nomura on this subject, after which do everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation. I beg of you to make every effort to have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacific.

Because of your expressed desires prior to your departure from here, we have not as yet presented our "B" proposal to the United States. We are of the opinion, however, that we had better submit it to them at an early opportunity.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 118

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 14, 1941
1094.

(To be handled in Government code.)

My interview of the 14th, with Secretary of State HULL, has been postponed until 9:00 a.m. the 15th, to suit their convenience. Furthermore, I have contacted them and arranged an interview with the President for 11:00 a.m. on the 16th for Ambassador KURUSU and myself. (Prior to this interview we plan to pay our respects to Secretary of State HULL.)

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 119

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 15, 1941
1095.

(In 2 parts complete.)

On this, the 15th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull, (Ballantine was also present), for an interview which lasted about one hour and a half. I shall report in detail subsequently, but in the meantime, I am sending you a resume of the meeting as follows:

The United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter, which I am forwarding to you as separate wire "A", numbered my message #1096[a]; separate wire "B", numbered my message #1097[b], contains the text of their proposal involving this matter. (The latter is a proposed joint statement on economic policy and is composed of (1) general policy; (2) Japanese-U.S. relations; and, (3) policies involving the Pacific area.)

We stated that we would give these notes our careful study and after requesting our government's advice, would make a reply. We went on to say that we insist that these talks have now progressed to the negotiations stage.

To this Hull replied that before any settlements can be reached, it is necessary that other countries involved, such as Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, be consulted. This procedure is desired by Japan too, he pointed out. There are reasons, he said, that make it inconvenient for the United States to state that negotiations are being conducted with Japan alone, before they have had a chance to participate therein. He went on to repeat that for those reasons, these talks shall continue to be of an exploratory nature. At the same time, the continuation of these conversations shall not be hampered, he promised.

We then requested that he reply with regard to other matters to which Hull said:

"Japan on the one hand is attempting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States, while simultaneously, on the other hand, she is insisting that her military alliance with Germany be maintained. I, personally, can understand Japan's explanations, however, I feel that it would be exceedingly difficult to make the general U.S. public and even of the world, see through the seeming paradox.

(Part 2.)

"For this reason, it is essential that we have the definite word of the new Japanese Cabinet on the peaceful policy. In other words, it is essential that this new Cabinet give definite recognition and approval of the statement submitted by the previous government concerning this matter. On 21 June, we made certain proposals which concerned political stabilization of the entire Pacific area. Even if Japan were to favor limiting this area to only the southwestern Pacific area, the United States would continue to desire that it be made applicable to the entire Pacific area.

"Therefore, we shall submit our reply on the other two points only after we have received a reply to the proposal we are submitting to you today."

We therefore stated that our government's attitude has already been expressed by the contents of our proposal through which it may be seen that there have been no changes therein. However, for the sake of reassurance, we would ascertain this point, we said.

Hull expressed several doubts concerning our relations to the Tripartite Pact. He pointed out that in spite of the Japanese-U.S.S.R. neutrality pact, it was apparently essential that great armed forces of both countries had to constantly face each other across the Japanese-U.S.S.R. border. The United States wants no peace of that nature. He went on to say that the United States desires that simultaneously with a peace agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall become a mere scrap of paper.

We, therefore, repeated that part of our proposal which involved that alliance and again pointed out that there need be no clash between U.S.-Japanese peace and the government would no doubt be very disappointed at the results of today's conversations. We then decided to meet again after I had received my government's further instructions.

Will you, therefore, please rush your instructions concerning the matters contained herein.

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[a] See IV, 121.

[b] See IV, 127.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 120

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1106.

(In 6 parts, complete.)

Chief of Office routing

The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you in my message #1095[a]:

Hull said that the United States is making sincere efforts too, and through such efforts, he said, he is now able to present a proposal concerning the commerce problem. So saying, he related to me Note "A", which was reported to you as my message #1096[b].

Hull: "The United States has entered into trade agreements with 22 nations, all of which are based on the status of a "most-favored nation." Through them trade barriers throughout the world are being removed. There actually are between 1000 and 1200 articles on which tariffs have been substantially reduced. I strongly advocated this policy at the Economic Conference which was held in London some time ago, but because opposition to it was voiced by some, it was not adopted at that time." (He added that Germany was one of the countries which was opposed to it.)

"In this way, the United States desires to apply the non-discriminatory policy over a wide scope. Japan wants that part of the proposal which adovates the application of these terms to the entire Pacific area to be revised so that it will be applicable to the entire world. The United States is unable to guarantee any conditions which are outside of the United States' sphere of influence. Therefore, I hope that Japan will agree to delete her condition, in which she insists that she will agree to applying the non-discriminatory treatment to the Pacific area only if it is applied to the world."

(Part 2.)

So saying, he submitted Note "B" which contains the U.S. proposal and which was sent to you as my message #1097[c]. Wakasugi asked Hull if this was a counter proposal to that part of our proposal which we submitted the other day concerning the three major problems pertaining to non-discrimination. Hull replied that in its application it covers a wider range, (meaning, apparently, that its contents covers a wider range). I, therefore, advised Hull that we would give it our study and that we would seek our government's opinion thereon after which I would submit our reply.

I said: "Since official proposals have been submitted by me to the President and the Secretary of State, we feel that these talks should be looked upon as negotiations."

Hull: "Your government may consider these talks as being negotiations today. As I said at our previous meeting, however, the subjects being discussed must be taken up with Britain, Netherlands, and others. Moreover, the Foreign Minister himself told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that it was essential that those countries participate in the negotiations. For these reasons, we feel that it is necessary to hold these preliminary exploratory conversations between Japan and the United States first. It would be inappropriate if we were to consider these talks formal negotiations, because then it would seem as if we were trying to force whatever settlement we reached upon those other nations.

"I feel that we should first find the basic principles on which a suitable agreement could be reached, after which, the United States would reveal its attitude to those other countries, and ask them to participate in the final settlement. Thus until we work things out to a point which would seem to be satisfactory to all parties concerned, I shall consider these talks to be exploratory in nature.

(Part 3.)

"From a more practical viewpoint, too, if there were negotiations, the free exchange of opinions between the United States and Japan would be considerably hindered. In Tokyo the Foreign Minister requested to Ambassador Grew that ——— (several lines missing).

"In the United States proposal of 21 June, the United States advocates that that part pertaining to the political stabilization be made applicable to the entire Pacific area. Japan wants to limit it to the southwestern Pacific area only. In view of the fact that my talks with Your Excellency concerns the establishment of peace in the entire Pacific area, I find it difficult to understand Japan's desires to so limit the area. I would like to have this point explained."

He went on to repeat what he has said from time to time before, regarding Japan's peace policies and her connections in the Tripartite Pact.

(Part 4.)

Hull, as he did on the previous occasion, requested that the present government of Japan give its definite approval of the spirit of peace contained in our statement of 28 August.

I therefore replied: "The spirit of that statement was contained in our lastest proposal and therefore I am convinced that there has been no change in our government's attitude. We are doing everything in our power to bring about a settlement so that peace may be guaranteed on the Pacific. It is true that the words "southwestern Pacific" appear in the main text of our proposal, but in the preface thereto we made it clear that our aims are to establish and maintain peace on the entire Pacific area."

Hull: "The preface is not a part of the main text and therefore its contents had no binding powers. The only parts which have any binding powers are the contents of the main text."

So saying, he again repeated his doubts as to Japan's expressed peaceful intentions.

He went on to say that Japan is apparently wanting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States on the one hand while maintaining a military alliance with Germany on the other.

Hull: "I, myself, can understand Japan's viewpoint and explanations on this matter. The general public, however, are aware only that Japan is allied to Germany and to it—the general public—this has a very militaristic connotation. Should the United States, disregarding what seems to be a paradox, enter into a peace agreement with Japan, the general public and the world in general would probably howl with laughter. We would be in a very difficult position to try to make any explanations.

"If Japan succeeds in coming to an agreement with the United States, she would not find it necessary to hold on to the Tripartite Agreement, would she?

(Part 5.)

"While on the one hand Japan is asking that Britain and the Netherlands, which are at war with Germany, participate in a peaceful agreement which is to be established between Japan and the United States, while on the other she negotiates a military alliance with Germany which is the enemy of Britain and the Netherlands. That is incongruous."

I: "We have already explained our position in the Tripartite Pact in our proposal. As I said before, an alliance and a peace agreement need not necessarily be at odds with each other as may be seen by the example of the Japanese-British alliance. Fundamentally speaking, this alliance in question has peace as its main objective. Germany, too, understands that the alliance would not conflict with peace between Japan and the United States."

Hull: "If Japan insists on adhering to the alliance with Germany even after an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States, we could not explain the apparent paradox to other countries. The United States does not desire a situation such as exists between Japan and the U.S.S.R., which in spite of the fact that a Neutrality Pact exists, vast armed forces of each nation must constantly be facing each other across the national boundary.

We desire that simultaneously with the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall disappear." (He called it a "dead letter".)

Wakasugi: "In other words, do you mean that a U.S.-Japanese agreement is an impossibility as long as Japan does not withdraw from the Triple Alliance?"

Hull: "A peace agreement and a military alliance must be at odds with each other. Therefore, if and when an understanding is reached between Japan and the United States, I desire that the alliance become a dead letter".

Wakasugi: "May we consider that as your reply to our proposal pertaining to the matter of right of self-defense which is a part of the other two subjects?"

(Part 6.)

Hull: "Our reply to the other two problems will be issued after we receive: Definite assurance that your present government approves the peace policy expressed in a statement issued by the previous government; clarification of the meaning of changing "the entire Pacific area" in the U.S. proposal, to Japan's proposal's "southwestern Pacific area"; Japan's reply to today's U.S. proposal regarding a joint statement on the economic policy."

I said: "In view of the very critical situation, I am afraid that my government will be very disappointed over your replies."

We agreed to meet again after I had received further instructions from my home government.

Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion.

Since the above seems to have been fairly clearly established, will you please speedily express your definite approval of the government's statement involved, so that we may make a reply to their proposal.

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[a] See IV, 119.
[b] See IV, 121.
[c] See IV, 127.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 121

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.

(Part 1 of 6.)

Chief of Office Routing.

Separate wire A.

Strictly confidential.

Oral.

The Japanese Government has stated that it "recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, *on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.*" (Italics added)

The italicized portion of the statement sets forth a condition the meaning of which is not entirely clear. It is assumed, however, that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to ask the government of the United States to assume responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside of its sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the consent and cooperation of all other governments.

Note: This is Mr. Hull's Note, handed Nomura this date.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 122

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.

(Part 2 of 6.)

The principle of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment has for many years been the cornerstone of the commercial policy of the United States. Since the first world war this principle has been embodied in virtually every commercial treaty concluded by this government.

Since 1934, when the United States embarked upon an extensive program of commercial agreements for the reduction of trade barriers, it has constantly applied this principle. In twenty-two agreements this government has on its part reduced duties on over a thousand classifications of the American tariff, and it has extended these reductions to Japan (and) all other countries of the world with only two exceptions. These exceptions have been countries whose commercial practices represented a flagrant departure from the principle of non-discriminatory treatment.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 123

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.

(Part 3 of 6.)

The withholding of trade-agreement concessions from those countries was itself a step in furtherance of the policy of non-discrimination since the purpose was to create inducement for the abandonment of discriminatory practices. One of the countries from which the benefit of such concessions had been withheld abandoned its flagrant discriminatory measures; and the United States at once extended to that country the benefit of the duty reductions made in its trade agreements.

The government of the United States has not only placed its own trade relations with foreign countries on an unconditional most-favored-nation basis, but has sought consistently to further the application of that policy throughout the world. On every appropriate occasion it has urged upon other countries the adoption of non-discriminatory policies and has sought to bring about the progressive elimination of preferences and discriminations of all kinds.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 124

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.

(Part 4 of 6.)

In the twenty-two trade agreements above referred to, the government of the United States has obtained from foreign countries commitments respecting the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers on thousands of products. These concessions affect products which are imported not only from the United States but from other countries as well. The government of the United States has neither sought nor accepted commitments whereby these benefits would be restricted to imports from the United States. On the contrary, it has obtained these reductions in the trade barriers of foreign countries on the assumption and expectation that they would be extended to other supplying countries. Indeed, as part of its general policy of non-discrimination in international trade, it has advocated the extension to all countries of the concessions made in such agreements.

In this way the reduction of trade barriers which results from a program of trade agreements such as that pursued by the United States is given the widest possible effect and makes the maximum contribution to the building up of world trade from which all nations benefit.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 125

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.

(Part 5 of 6.)

Chief of Office Routing.

It is believed that, if Japan would devote itself to wholehearted cooperation in furthering the policy of non-discrimination as practiced and advocated by the government of the United States and as practiced and advocated for many years by the government of Japan, a long forward step would be taken toward attaining the objective which the Japanese Government's statement under reference has in view.

In the light of the foregoing, the government of the United States raises question whether in the view of the Japanese Government there is need of the proviso under discussion, namely, "on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well," and whether the proviso might not be omitted.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 126

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.

(Part 6 of 6.)

As a practical manifestation of the way in which the government of the United States has applied and is prepared to apply the principle of non-discrimination in international com-

mercial relations, there is offered for consideration as a purely tentative suggestion a draft of a possible United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy. It is understood, of course, that agreement as to such a declaration is subject to agreement on the other points involved in a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area as a whole and that this government would expect, before entering into negotiations on such a possible United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy, to discuss the matter with the British Government and with other specially interested governments.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 127

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1097.

(Part 1 of 4.)

Separate wire B.

Strictly Confidential

Unofficial, Exploratory and Without Commitment.

Joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy.

1. General policy.

1. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake to cooperate fully in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, to eliminate all forms of discrimination in international commercial relations, and in general to work toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which all countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure, through peaceful trade processes, the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safe-guarding and development of its economy.

2. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake that each of them shall make its appropriate contribution toward the creation of the type of international economic relations envisaged above.

Note: This is text of note "B" given Nomura by Mr. Hull.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 128

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1097.

(Part 2 of 4.)

3. As important steps in that direction, the government of the United States and the government of Japan shall establish between themselves and shall seek to establish in the Pacific area the economic relationships indicated below.

2. The United States-Japan relationship

1. The United States and Japan undertake to inaugurate, as rapidly as practicable, measures toward restoring the commercial, financial and other economic relationships between them to a normal basis.

2. The United States and Japan agree to enter into discussion looking toward the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement between the two countries.

3. It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities for its own use subject to such restrictions or limitations as may be required by each for its own security and self-defense. It is understood that both governments will apply any such restrictions or limitations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 129

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1097.

(Part 3 of 4.)

3. Policy in the Pacific area

1. Complete control over its economic, financial and monetary affairs shall be restored to China.

2. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake not to seek in China any preferential or monopolistic commercial or other economic rights for themselves or their nationals, but to use all their influence toward securing in China commercial treatment for themselves no less favorable than that accorded to any third country and full cooperation in the promotion of the general policy stated in the first paragraph of this declaration.

3. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake to suggest to the Chinese government that it inaugurate, with foreign assistance where necessary, a comprehensive program of economic development, a full opportunity to participate in which shall be accorded the United States and Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 130

FROM: Washington November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1097.

(Part 4 of 4.)

4. The relations which the United States and Japan, respectively, will seek to establish with other countries of the Pacific area shall be governed by the basic principles set forth in this declaration, and the governments of the United States and of Japan agree to urge those countries, wherever possible, to undertake comprehensive programs of economic development with full opportunity to participate in such programs, in so far as foreign assistance may be requested, accorded to the United States and to Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 131

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 16, 1941
782.

(To be handled in government code.)

Re your # 1083[a].

1. Please give the following reply to them regarding the question of recognition:

—— the various points in the statement made by the Japanese Government on August 28, which is included in the American oral statement (quote only the points given in the said oral statement) were also included in our proposals of September 6 and 25, and the present cabinet also has no objection to recognizing them as they stand. However, these points have been given on the assumption that the Japanese-American negotiations would reach an agreement. Naturally, therefore, should the negotiations end in a failure, these points would not be binding on Japan alone. We wish to have this clearly understood.

2. Regarding the general question of use of force, the expression "without provocation" was used in the reply of the Japanese Government made on August 28. In the same reply, relative to the Soviet question, we used the words "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty" and then in our proposal of September 6, we used the words "without any justifiable reason." Now all these expressions mean fundamentally the same thing. The reason for our having gone somewhat into detail concerning the Soviet Union is that we found it necessary to do so in view of the connection between the existence of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty and the Russo-German war.

In short, we had stipulated the "qualification" which we as an independent country should necessarily and naturally state. It goes without saying that this qualification by no means either limits nor minimizes our peaceful intentions.

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[a] See IV, 93–99.

Trans. 11–17–41

No. 132

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 17, 1941
783.

Re your # 1110[a].

We have no objections to have it apply to the entire Pacific area. Therefore, we shall not object to your deleting the word "southwestern" from Article 6 of our proposal of 25 September.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11–17–41

No. 133

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 17, 1941
1118.

(Part 1 of 5.)

(To be handled in government code.)

On the morning of the 17th at half-past ten, I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL. First HULL said, "After the last war there were no able statesmen; therefore, a situation like the present one came about. What we have to think about now is saving the world from this sort of extremity." KURUSU replied, "I am in entire agreement with what you say. Fortunately, the United States and Japan, who have not yet participated in this war, have a grave responsibility on their shoulders for working in this direction. However, before we can talk about that, there are some things which have to be settled between Japan and the United States. Still, if we do not engage in concrete negotiations, we cannot get anywhere." (Then he went on briefly to tell how he had come to the United States at the behest of the Premier and Your Excellency.) Then he continued: "The Premier earnestly hopes for a settlement between Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, he seems to be rather hopeful beyond expectation. There are at present three problems causing a deadlock between Japan and the United States. They are: Equality in commerce, the Tripartite Agreement, and evacuation. The Premier seems to be very hopeful of a settlement concerning the first two. However, when it comes to the third question—that of evacuation—he seems to entertain great concern.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 134

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1119.

(Strictly secret.)

(Restricted distribution.)

Re my #1118[a].

I presented the contents of your messages numbered #782[b] (?) and #783[c] to the Secretary of State at the time of our interview on the 17th, in the form of a verbal statement.

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[a] (See IV, 133 and 135-137) Ambassador NOMURA's report of the conference with the President and Secretary HULL on the 17th.

[b] (See IV, 131) Tokyo's reply to the United States' oral statement of November 12, regarding the question of recognition and the general question of use of force.

[c] (See IV, 132) Tokyo wires Washington that it is all right to delete the word "southwestern" from Article 6 of the proposal of the 25th, thus having it apply to the entire Pacific area.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 135

FROM: Washington November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1118.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 5.)

Since the time had come to meet the President and since HULL has expressed his wish to continue the conversation in the presence of the President, we all left our seats. Together with Secretary HULL, I went to see the President at 11:00 a.m.

KURUSU began his conversation by saying, "As I had already told Secretary HULL, the present Cabinet is very much interested in the Japanese-American negotiations. You, Mr. President, as a statesman, no doubt well understand in what frame of mind the Japanese people are after four years of experience in the China incident. While on my way to this country I noticed—though I am not by any means an expert in making such observations—that the situation is militarily strained in Hong Kong, Manila and in other islands. The situation is so tense that we cannot tell when an explosion would occur and, even if it occurred, of what benefit would such a situation be to the United States and Japan? (The President showed that he felt the same way.) To be sure Japan wishes that the Japanese-American negotiations would prove to be a success. However, the time element must be taken into consideration. Delaying the solution avails Japan nothing since in the meantime conditions, both militarily and economically, would become less favorable to her if she is to defend herself. The Premier also seems to be quite hopeful that all of the three questions, namely, that of the Three Power Alliance and Pact and the question of withdrawing troops would be settled.[a] However, he is very much worried over the question of withdrawing troops."

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[a]Translator's note: Apparently the writer neglected to include in the three questions that of non-discrimination in trade.

Trans. 11–18–41

No. 136

FROM: Washingtin
TO: Tokyo

November 17, 1941
1118.

(Part 3 of 5.)

The President: "A long time ago, Secretary of State Bryan once said, 'There is no last word between friends'."

"There have been many so-called 'non-aggression pacts' in the past, but all of them are now out of date. I believe, however, that by the establishing of some general understanding between the United States and Japan, the situation may be saved."

Kurusu: "That would seem to be very acceptable from my point of view. From my way of looking at it, apparently the main difficulties in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations to date, have been over the problem of what to do about Japan's connections with the Tripartite Pact, and what to do about the various claims that the United States has made with regard to the method in which the China Incident should be settled. In the final analysis, it would seem as if adjusting these two points is the main problem at hand at the present time.

"With regard to the Tripartite problem, Japan is bound by certain duties under the terms of that instrument. Moreover, she must consider her dignity and honor as a great power. Because of these considerations, it is impossible for her to violate the terms of the alliance. Since the United States has been strongly insisting right along that international agreements must be adhered to, I cannot believe that the United States is urging us to do so now. I feel doubly sure of this where the Tripartite Pact is concerned since the basic objectives of that pact are the prevention of the war's spreading and the maintenance of peace.

"Under these circumstances, it seems as though it should be possible to coordinate and adjust the two problems so as to bring about a settlement. Please understand, however, that no proposal, regardless of how good it may sound, can be accepted by Japan if the terms contained therein cannot be put into effect."

The President: "With regard to the China problem, I have been advised that Japan finds the withdrawal of troops from China a very difficult undertaking. The United States is not trying to intervene or mediate in the problems of Japan and China. I don't know whether there is such a word in the parlance of diplomats or not, but the United States' only intention is to become an 'introducer'."

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 137

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 17, 1941
1118.

(Parts 4 and 5 of 5.)

(Part 4.)

Kurusu: "Concerning Japan's duties to go to war under the terms of the Tripartite Pact, Japan has stated that Japan alone will determine this. The United States apparently interprets this to mean that Japan will wait until the United States is deeply involved in the battle on the Atlantic and then stab the United States in the back. This is not the case. There have been indications in the past that there are those in the United States who have been laboring under the erroneous belief that Japan would move at Germany's demands; that Japan was merely Germany's tool. Japan issued the statement that she would act in accordance with Japan's decisions alone, for the purpose of correcting this misapprehension.

"In any event, if at this time a great understanding between the United States and Japan with regard to the Pacific can be reached as described by the President, such an understanding would far out-shine the Tripartite Pact. Under such circumstances, I feel confident that all doubts you may harbor regarding the application of the Tripartite Pact would automatically and completely melt away."

At this point, Hull broke in, and after describing Germany's policy of conquest, said: "Suppose that Germany succeeds in conquering England and then establishes various subservient governments in South America. Suppose after that that Germany attacks the United States with the British fleet. If the United States waits till then, it would be too late regardless of what she tries to do. That is why the United States must prepare her defenses now and this is what the United States calls her rights under defense. There is no reason why Japan cannot see this."

Thus did Hull go over his theory again.

The President: "The map I referred to in my speech the other day, which described German policy in Central and South America, was an authentic map. Its source was the German Government circles."

(Part 5.)

Kurusu: "Mr. President, a while ago you made reference to the general relationship between Japan and the United States. As long as we are speaking of peace on the Pacific, and since at least one side of the western hemisphere is on the Pacific, the various countries in Central and South America must be covered when we speak of the Pacific area. It would be impossible for Japan to be a partner in any project aimed at disturbing the peace of the western hemisphere.

"You say that people would give voice to their disapproval should these negotiations lead to a successful settlement between us on the grounds that Japan would be promising the United States peace while on the other hand she would be carrying the spear for Germany. From the beginning, however, the Japanese Government has been saying that should a just peace be established on the Pacific, she would withdraw her troops from French Indo-China. If, therefore, matters progress to that point, this withdrawal should satisfy the general public of the United States as actual proof of Japan's peaceful intentions.

"In any event, I am convinced that the immediate objective is to successfully and speedily come to an agreement on the various problems now being discussed at present between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull."

Hull: "I favor the continuation of these talks. Heretofore, I and Ambassador Nomura have met and talked on numerous occasions but we always seem to come to a certain point and then start going around and around the same circle. I would welcome your—Kurusu—attacking this point from a different angle."

The President expressed his approval of this, and said: "I am planning to remain in Washington until this Saturday (the 24th). I shall be glad to discuss matters with you and Secretary Hull at any time before then.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 138

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1121 (?).

Ambassador Kurusu and I expect to confer with the Secretary Hull again at 10 a.m. tomorrow, the 18th.

Trans. 11-20-41

No. 139

November 18, 1941

Communications Intelligence Report:

These were the important points:

Date of Operations	*Serial*
October 23-29, 1941	19-41, No. 907-100

Oct. 23

"Shinto Maru # 2 who has been previously serving the South China Fleet will probably move into the Mandates in the near future."

"Comairron 24 and Commander Yokohama Air Group are in Wotje vicinity. Commander Chitose Air Group is at Saipan. Commander Combined Air Force is appearing more frequently in traffic concerning the 24th Airron and with the Fourth Base Force Air Group."

Oct. 24

"During the evening two unidentified Marus (air tenders) were heard working KONGO MARU (Tender?). Direction-finder bearings indicate these units are probably enroute to the Mandates." *(Marked by asterisk to denote important.)*

Oct. 25

"The following units originated movement reports today—Commander # 1 Base Force CinC Third Fleet, Commander Northern Blockade Force, Commander Airron 6 and Commander Airrons Combined Fleet. This may be an indication of a large scale movement or possibly only a few ships in each group. Traffic routing and direction-finding bearings indicate no change in general direction."

"Shinto Maru # 2 is now enroute to the Mandates apparently having Saipan as a destination."

"A new division is now being formed in the 4th Base Force at Truk. The Commander is now aboard an unidentified vessel enroute to Saipan from Truk. Two Maru units are apparently now enroute from the Empire to the Mandates to join this command."

Oct. 26

"NAGURA(?) (Salvage vessel) has now departed Yokosuka enroute to the Mandates."

"Considerable confusion now exists on all Mandate circuits, due largely to the extensive use of secret calls. Airron 24 units are continuously active on aircraft frequencies and traffic shows indication of the presence of a part of the Staff of the Combined Air Force command in the Mandates. Air Group Commanders make frequent changes in location, principally between Saipan, Truk, Jaluit and Wotje. Fourth Fleet units are concentrated in Truk area. Traffic indicates an increase in size on the 4th, 5th and 6th Base Force, particularly the 6th. Several additional itinerant marus are now moving toward the Mandates, some of which have previously been active in China waters. Traffic headings have indicated a possible connection between some Third and Fifth Fleet Units with Base Force units in Jaluit area. Occasional dispatches are originated by major units of the First and Second Fleets addressed to Mandate Base Force activities. As a result of the general appearance of traffic the following major units are being watched for a possible move into Mandate area: First Fleet, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Fifth Fleet, Submarine Force, Combined Air Forces or Air Squadrons, Combined Fleet." (All marked by asterisk to denote important.)

"MATSUEI MARU—Fourth Fleet repair ship is now at Truk having recently arrived there from Palao area."

Oct. 28

"Commander Yokohama Air Group is at Wotje (Marshall Islands)."

"Increased radio activity between Mandates Islands and various units of the Combined and Third Fleets have been noted for the past two days possibly indicating movements of additional units to the Mandated area." (Marked by an asterisk to denote important.)

"Commander Third Base Force—Palao Area and a part of the Third Base Force staff is now aboard the KASHIMA, flagship Fourth Fleet in Truk area."

Oct. 29

"The KOMOBASHI is now on a course for the Ponape having completed a large irregular circuit around the Marshall Islands."

No. 140

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 17, 1941
1127.

The most emphasis in the talks between Hull, myself, and Ambassador Kurusu on the 18th, (lasting about three hours), was placed on matters pertaining to the Triple Alliance. Hull, in his customary manner, denounced the Hitlerian policy of expansion through armed force. He pointed out that as long as Japan is tied up with such a policy through the Tripartite Pact, it would be difficult to adjust Japanese-U.S. relations.

Kurusu then said that it would be impossible to comply if he was demanding of Japan that she abrogate the Tripartite Pact. He also pointed out that the alliance is not aimed at expansion through the force of arms.

Hull said that he was in no position to tell Japan to abrogate the Pact but that as long as there is no substantiating proof of the real aims of the pact, it serves absolutely no purpose.

Then I and Kurusu explained that it was an impossibility to settle such a basic point in any specified time limit. However, to ease the exceedingly critical situation, the first step would be to mutually return to the situation which existed prior to the date on which the freezing of assets order was put into effect, (in other words, Japan would withdraw from south French Indo-China and the United States would rescind her order to freeze the assets). Talks should then be continued in a more congenial atmosphere, we suggested.

He did not seem particularly receptive to this suggestion. He said that if the government of Japan could make it clear that it wants to pursue a course of peace, then the United States would confer with the British on the subject of returning to the conditions which existed prior to the time that the freezing order went into effect. It is essential, however, that under those conditions, Japan continue to pursue a peaceful policy with ever increasing vigor.

There were indications that Hull, because of his usual cautious nature, was somewhat influenced by the exaggerated reports carried in the press regarding the Premier's speech in the Diet in which he expressed the three basic principles of international relations and intention of increasing the troops in French Indo China.

Details will be sent in a subsequent message.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 141

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 18, 1941[a]
1131.

(5 Parts.)

(Foreign Office Secret.)

(Chief of Office routing.)

On the 18th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull at 10:30 in the morning and we conversed for two hours and forty-five minutes.

Hull (in his customary tone): "I am one who worried about Hitler's activities right from the beginning. However, at that time, no one paid any attention. He is a man who does not know how to stop once he starts. The United States will no doubt become his objective in the near future." (So saying, he repeated his theory which he expounded on the 17th.) "In the event that Hitler continues to be victorious, Japan should be thinking of his coming on to the East Asiatic stage. If Japan doesn't see this for herself, I can't feel sorry for her." (He continued in his usual vein, bringing up again a description of the 'confused era (?)' and the turn about in Germany's attitude toward the Soviet Union.)

"The basis of the national policy of the United States is and will be the maintenance of peace. Therefore, it is impossible for the United States to ever condone the policies of Hitler which depends on expansion through the force of arms.

"As long as Japan is tied to Hitler by means of the Tripartite Pact, there shall be great difficulties in adjusting Japanese-U.S. relations".

Placing emphasis on Japan's part in the Tripartite Pact the Secretary went on to describe his point of view.

Hull: "Even if an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States at this time, it would be impossible at this time to shake the general U.S. public's conviction that, as Germany is pursuing a policy of expansion by force of arms, Japan is doing likewise in the Far East.

"Of the extremists in the United States, there are those who even say that the United States has become Hitler's partner in his policy of aggression, through her relationship with Japan.

(Part 2.)

"Even if some agreement is reached between Japan and the United States under present circumstances, it could mean no more than the existing agreement between Japan and the U.S.S.R., under which, the agreement notwithstanding, enormous forces, which are constantly being increased, have to be facing each other at all times.

"Unless the fundamental trouble is removed, it will be impossible to expect any progress in our talks."

Kurusu: "If something is impossible to do, it simply can't be done, regardless of what fancy words may be used to dress it up.

"Even if you tell us to abrogate, or at least to make ineffective, the Tripartite Pact at this time, that is something that is impossible for us to do."

Hull: "The United States is not in a position to demand that you nullify the effect of the Tripartite Pact. The only thing I say is that although I can comprehend the circumstances making it possible for Japan to maintain the status quo of her relationship to the Tripartite Pact and at the same time seek an agreement with the United States, in view of the nature of the United States, it is impossible to completely disregard the effects of public opinion."

Kurusu: "The alliance in question does not advocate, or even condone, expansion through the force of arms."

Hull: "If that is the case, it is a useless instrument unless some definite proof as to its purposes are presented."

Nomura: "It would be difficult to do so within any limited time. The situation in the southwestern Pacific area is at present very critical. To counter Japan's sending of troops to French Indo-China, Britain is increasing her armed forces in Singapore while the United States is doing likewise in the Philippine Islands.

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[a]Translator's note: From cryptanalytic study the date is evidently the 18th.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 142

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 18, 1941
(Probable date of drafting)
1129.

Re your # 784[a] and my # 1106[b].

During my talks with Hull on the 18th it became evident that he is thinking about readjusting the economic situation of the world after the conclusion of this war and that he has only a passing interest in the various problems of China. Furthermore, there are indications that the matter prognosticated by Ambassador Kurusu in the separate message, is also being given consideration by Hull.

As a matter of routine, of the three points contained in our Proposal "A", they are apparently desirous of first disposing the matter pertaining to non-discriminatory treatment. In view of this attitude on this subject, unless we delete from our Formula "A" that part which follows after "on the understanding", (as you are aware, Konoye's message contained no such qualification), and give them a more definite agreement, I fear that the progress of our talks may be impeded. This is, of course, not in accordance with our policy of a speedy settlement. Since our formula concerning non-discrimination is also contained in our "B" proposal, unless we reach an agreement on this point now, I fear that our Proposal "B" will not help matters any.

I realize thoroughly that there are domestic issues which make it very difficult. Please give your consideration to the deletion of that part which follows "on the understanding", etc.

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[a] Explanation of phrase: "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world." We mean that it shall apply uniformly throughout the world. China included. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of the nations are in favor of the principle.

[b] See IV, 120.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 143

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1131.

(Part 3 of 5.)[a]

(To be handled in government code.)

"If we both undertake to increase our military strength at any time, something which we would regret might occur. Therefore, since, even though we keep fighting each other with broad, idealistic arguments there would be no end to them, let us first relax this tension for the time being. To do this we should return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing order. I mean Japan should evacuate southern French Indo-China, and in return the United States should rescind the freezing order. If the atmosphere is calm in this manner, there will be no need of sending warships to Singapore or strengthening military facilities in the Philippines. Then we would like to continue these talks." HULL said, "While we are not yet agreed on fundamental questions, it would be futile to do what you say as a temporary stop-gap measure. We hope that as first of the East Asiatic nations, Japan will take the leadership for a policy of peace. However, if a policy of armed conquest is to dominate Japan, we will consider it a danger to world peace, and we will not, by any means, yield. (To this both I and Ambassador KURUSU had something to say.) If the leaders of the Japanese Government will show that they will exert a peaceful policy in any event, why then, in turn, I will not object to getting in touch with Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., and consider returning to the status prior to the exercise of the freezing order. However, this is so that Japanese politics will turn more and more toward a peaceful trend."

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[a] Parts 1 and 2 not available.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 144

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1131.

(Part 4 of 5.)

(To be handled in government code.)

Concerning the China question, HULL asked a question about the stationing of troops. I explained what you said in Proposal A of your # 726[a] (of course, I didn't mention the twenty-

five years you spoke of), and HULL let it go at that. Referring again to the China question, he said that England, the Netherlands and China had all contacted him, and KURUSU wanted to know on what points they were concerned. HULL said that he assumed that Great Britain was mainly interested in the principle of equality of treatment in commerce; that it was the same in the case of the Netherlands; and as for China, she merely spoke in generalities without going into definite matters. Now concerning the principle of equality of treatment, the following conversation took place: HULL: "Have you received any reply from Tokyo on our proposal of the 15th?" (See my #1095.[b]) KURUSU: "Well, we have a general answer, but further study is necessary. I haven't enough to tell you yet. You seem to mean that the United States can't bear the responsibility of other countries. Well, aren't we pretty much in the same position? Until peace is established between Japan and China, we could say the same thing about the China question, I think. You see, Japan and the United States are in different economic positions. You Americans are in an advantageous position relative to the various nations when it comes to commercial negotiations. We do not have the advantageous bargaining position that you have.

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[a] See IV, 25–28.
[b] See IV, 119.

Trans. 11–21–41

No. 145

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1131.

(Urgent.)

(Part 5 of 5.)

(To be handled in government code.)

"There is a remarkable difference between the extent to which the economy of the United States depends on foreign trade and that to which ours does. You cannot measure them by the same rule. When the economic set-up is suddenly disrupted, great turbulance ensues. Take, for example, the question of controlled exchange in North China. If that were abolished now, the economy of a hundred million Chinese would be thrown into chaos. Now out of consideration of the welfare of the Chinese people alone, we could not do such a thing as that." HULL: "I well understand that. When I was insisting on the principle of equality of treatment in commerce, I had the post-war situation in mind. I rather think that in post-war economic reconstruction, probably the principle of non-discrimination will be an all-encompassing one. What I would like to see is Japan and the United States working together for the principle of non-discrimination. Now all along I've fought against the preferential system of the British Empire resulting from the Ottawa Conference, and now we are talking it over with England. I don't want you to tell anybody about this, but don't you know, only lately Great Britain is coming around to my point of view." (In this connection, see the newspaper article quoted in separate wire #1132[a].)

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[a] Not available

Trans. 11–21–41

No. 146

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1134.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #1131[a].

In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as well as to bring about a return to the situation existing before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China.

HULL, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan has clearly demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain, the Netherlands and other interested powers."

In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather, exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans insofar as they pertain to the Tripartite Alliance. With regard to other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B" immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". Therefore, looking at it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in Proposal "B" and then to try to proceed with the solution of other questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.

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[a] See IV, 141.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 147

FROM: Washington November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Probable date of drafting)
#1134.

(Part 2.)

It is true that the Konoye government reiterated its approval of the government's statement referred to here. However, that statement carried several supplementary notes, some of which apparently aroused the suspicion of the United States. These supplementary notes were of such character that even if they are not written down in black and white, they would naturally become applicable under the rights of self-defense in the event that to do so becomes necessary.

Please therefore issue a statement as that of the new government's, in which there are no provisional notes, and which express our peaceful policies.

The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises in effect. It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and materials are made available to us.

Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133[a]. (Hull told me that he would be glad to see me at any time. However, the day after tomorrow, the 20th, is a major holiday here, so if you could make it possible for me to make a reply tomorrow, it would be very convenient for me.)

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 148

FROM: Tokyo — November 19, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular #2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency, (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger—HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East Wind rain).
(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations—KITANOKAZE KUMORI-(North Wind cloudy).
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE-(West Wind clear).

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 149

FROM: Tokyo — November 19, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U.S. relations, "HIGASHI".
(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.)—"NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 150

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 14, 1941
772.

(Urgent.)

The time of presentation of Proposal B will be according to my instructions of today. We have drawn up this proposal in a formal measure including the addendum. (I mean to say the proposal you are to present to the American officials upon instructions from me.) I am sending to you the English text thereof in ensuing message # 773[a].

[a] See IV, 151.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 151

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 14, 1941
773.

(Urgent.)

Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given in my # 727[a].

5. The Japanese Government agrees to withdraw her army, which is at present stationed in French Indo-China, whenever peace shall have been established between Japan and China or a just peace firmly established in the Pacific area.

6. The Japanese Government (agrees ?) that if the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in trade is to be applied throughout the world the same principle should also be applied to the entire Pacific area, in other words, in China as well.

7. The two governments shall make world peace their common objective and shall cooperate at a suitable time for speedy realization of world peace. However, in dealing with developments prior to the establishment of world peace, the two governments shall act in accordance with the viewpoint of protection and self defense. Furthermore, in the event of the United States' participation in the European war, Japan shall automatically carry out what she understand to be the obligations which befall her as a party to the Three Power Agreement existing between Japan, Germany and Italy. (Point 7 is identical with what is given in paragraph 2 of our proposal of ----- of this month and does not contain the purport given in the first part of (2) of our Proposal "A". This is for your information.)

[a] See IV, 29.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 152

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 15, 1941
779.

Re my # 727[a].

The English text of (our) Proposal "B" is being forwarded separately as #780[b].

[a] See IV, 29.
[b] See IV, 153.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 153

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 15, 1941
#780.

(Part 2 of 2, Part 1 not yet available.)

Chief of Office routing.

English text.

6. The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.

7. Both governments maintain it their common aim to bring about the peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of the world peace.

With regard to the developments of the situation prior to the restoration of the world peace, the governments of Japan and the United States will be guided in their conducts by considerations of protection and self-defense: and, in case the United States should participate in the European war, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 154

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 20, 1941
#1144.

(Extremely Urgent.)

At noon on the 20th I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL at the State Department and we talked for an hour and a half. Today we went into a somewhat lengthy explanation of the various subjects taken up in the instructions in your message #798[a]. On everything else HULL expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion, however, when we came to the part about the United States doing nothing to obstruct our efforts for a comprehensive peace with China, he showed that he was terribly aroused. He said, "So long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG just like it will also be impossible to cut off assistance from Great Britain,"

or words to that effect. He said that in any case, after particular study, he would have some views to express.

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[a]Tokyo says that no further concessions can be made other than the "B" Proposal and if the United States' consent to this cannot be secured negotiations will have to be broken off.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 155

FROM: Washington — November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1147.

(Very Urgent.)

Departmental secret.

To be handled in Government Code.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Our conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as follows: (That day is America's biggest holiday. They call it "Thanksgiving." In spite of that, however, Mr. HULL not only agreed to talk with, but seemed glad to see both me and Ambassador KURUSU when we went to call on him.)

First, we explained the various items mentioned in the instructions in your #798[a]. HULL had only one or two questions about the other parts and expressed hardly any opinions but, when we came to the part where we state that we do not want the United States to do anything to hinder us in bringing about a complete peace over China, he seemed extremely reluctant to consider it. He went on to reiterate what he had always said about the Tri-Partite Alliance. He said that so long as fears emanating from that treaty existed in the heads of the Americans, the United States would find it well-nigh impossible to cease aiding CHIANG KAI-SHEK and that, as we know, the United States is now opposing the German policy of military expansion which knowns no bounds; that on the one hand she is helping Great Britain and on the other hand CHIANG KAI-SHEK; that therefore until we Japanese made it perfectly clear that our policy is to be one of peace, it will be impossible to cease aiding China, just like it will be impossible to stop aiding England. He continued that, leading up to the state of affairs we find today, American interests in Japan, including Manchukuo, had undergone terrible embarrassment.

---

[a]Which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal "B" to the U.S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 156

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1147.

(Part 2 of 2.) (Departmental Secret.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

KURUSU said, "When I had an interview with the President the other day, he talked as if he would like to act as an introducer. Now if he wants to take the trouble to do this introducing in order to bring about peace, I cannot reconcile it with continued assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK, which actually hinders peace. In other words, it seems quite reasonable to us to ask the President to stop aiding CHIANG if he is going to act as an introducer." HULL replied, "Well, what the President meant when he said that was that he was presupposing that you Japanese would first make it apparent that your fundamental policy was peaceful. Heretofore, influential Japanese statesmen have expressed opinions favorable to HITLER's military expansion policy, and the American people find it very difficult to believe that Japan is turning peaceful." I said, "Well, the plan which I propose today makes no progress whatever on two or three points. However, since the situation is so tense, if the tension between Japan and the United States can be relaxed, be it ever so little, particularly in the southwestern Pacific, and quickly clear the atmosphere, then I think we could go on and settle everything else." HULL said, "Yes, I understand what you mean thoroughly, but that would be very hard to do. In any case, you and I have on our shoulders a heavy responsibility toward both the Japanese and American people. I might say toward the whole human race." Mr. HULL's face assumed a sadly compassionate expression, and he said, "I want to think over this proposal you have brought me fully and sympathetically, and then I want to talk to you again.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 157

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1148.

(To be handled in government code.)

Secretary of State HULL, in the conversations I detailed in my #1144[a], expressed his satisfaction that in the last two or three days Japanese newspaper editorial comment on the United States had become calm. This, doubtless, is due to your great efforts.

Since newspaper editorial comment in this country has become extremely circumspect in conjunction with our conversations, no doubt as a reflection of State Department opinion, I would like to have you continue your efforts in guiding newspaper opinion.

---

[a] See IV, 154.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 158

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1158.

(Government Code.)

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your #817[a].

As you are aware, I have advised them concerning the first part. Insofar as the latter part of that message is concerned, on the occasion of the interview outlined in my #1147[b], no reference was made to this matter. However, after they have studied the matter, they will doubtless present some opinions concerning it.

Furthermore, Ambassador KURUSU and myself, at their request, are scheduled to have an interview, as already announced, with Secretary of State HULL at 8:00 P.M. today, the 22nd.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 155, 156.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 159

FROM: Washington — November 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1160.

(In 2 parts, complete.)

Re my #1159[a].

From Kurusu:

Secretary Hull and I conferred for about a half an hour on the 21st to arrange our talks for the 22nd. At that time Hull said that he thought my idea of attaching so much importance to the agreement that it would outshine the Tripartite Pact, as expressed by me during our talks on the 18th, was wholeheartedly in favor of peace on the Pacific through joint action of the United States and Japan, and through this accomplishment, to contribute to the peace of the world.

He went on to say that he still remembers with pleasure that at the Economic Conference in London, he fought for free commerce shoulder to shoulder with Viscount Isii and (Eigo Fukai ?). Hull said that he has looked upon Japan's leadership in the Far East as only a natural phenomenon. It is true that Japan's actions and statements regarding the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere have been slightly on the unpolished and abrupt side but he is able to be sympathetic with the spirit of it.

(Part 2) (Garbled)

As long as Japan strives for this goal without resorting to the force of arms, the United States has nothing against the program and has no intention of interfering with its realization.

"I would like to see the U.S.-Japanese relationship which existed shortly subsequent to the Russo-Japanese war reestablished. At that time Japan and the United States exercised their influence over the Far East and the Western Hemisphere respectively, but at the same time maintained very friendly relations and close cooperation in all matters with each other.

"I hope that we can revive the spirit of those times and reach an agreement to maintain peace on the Pacific. At the same time, I wish that Japan would make it clear that the Tripartite Pact is not an obstacle to attaining that goal".

Under the present critical conditions, the United States acceptance or rejection of our Proposal "B" may have a vital bearing on whether or not the negotiations will break down. However, because of the circumstances outlined in my message referred to in the heading, we may receive some proposal from Hull with regard to an agreement covering the Pacific area on Monday.

In the meantime, if you have any suggestions which may lead to a settlement, please advise us immediately.

---

[a] See IV, 161.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 160

FROM: OPNAV — November 21, 1941
TO: CINCPAC, CINCAF — 211755 CR 0151

It has been indicated by reliable reports, of the recent establishment by Japan of a combined Air and Surface Craft Patrol, covering shipping routes from the U.S. to Australasia[a]. Daily aircraft patrols have been observed extending to the Gilbert Islands from Base at Jaluit. Surface craft believed to cover area reaching Ellice Islands. Japanese East Indies fishing fleet also reported coordinated in patrol operations. Present indications this fleet divided into three groups now in areas vicinity Bathurst Island, Arnhem and Thursday Island in Torres Strait. They are expected round Dutch New Guinea operating from base in Palau and are equipped with long range radio sets.

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[a] Australasia—water to east of Australia on South Pacific.

No. 161

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1159.

(In 4 parts complete.)

On the 22nd, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the Secretary of State Hull. (Ballantine was also present.) The resume of their conversation follows:

Hull: "I conferred with the Ambassador and Ministers of Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands on the 22nd." (The press reports that this conference lasted for about two and a half hours.) "I sought their opinion on the Japanese proposals. They all said that if Japan's intentions are assuredly pacific, then they would wholeheartedly favor them. They said that it would be the source of much joy to them to cooperate in the matter of resuming trade relations with Japan under those circumstances.

"However, they said, we are not sure of Japan's real intentions as yet, for while on the one hand she apparently indicates her desire for peace by dispatching a special envoy, the tone of the politicians and press of Japan seems to be in direct opposition.

"The diplomats who called on me also pointed out that just prior to the application of the freezing order, Japanese imports of petroleum took a very sudden upward swing, disproving any contention that it was to be used solely for peaceful undertakings, but that it was being stored away by the navy.

"They further expressed the opinion that the embargo should be lifted only in slow degrees.

"These diplomats, however, said that they would seek their home governments' instructions regarding the Japanese proposals and would submit their replies by the coming Monday. Upon receiving these advices, I shall make a reply to you."

(Part 2)[a]

Thus the Secretary seemed to feel considerable concern over the recent trend of Japan's public opinion. He pointed out that a clear statement by the Japanese Government of its desire for peace would have a most important reaction on the public opinion of the United States. (Ballantine said that a clear statement of attitude from the government of Japan to the Japanese people, which would of course be cabled abroad, would bear more fruit than propagandistic reports sent through press channels for foreign consumption only) and in turn would have a most favorable bearing on the chances of a settlement. He even went on to say that was it not the duty of every politician to strive for peace up to the day before war is found to be unavoidable? The President and the Secretary of State, he said —— (two or three lines too badly garbled).

I then said: "Leaving British, Australian and Dutch opinions aside for the time being, what is the attitude of the United States itself regarding our proposal?"

His subsequent reply, which he made by taking up the proposal paragraph by paragraph, was a complete evasion. However, there were indications that what the United States, Britain, Australia, etc. actually desire is to dissolve the crisis in the south Pacific, so that the fighting powers they have to maintain in this area to keep things under control, may be transferred for action in other parts.

(Part 3)

He pointed out that since that is their main objective, the assurances given by Japan in her proposals were insufficient.

I said: "Our troop concentrations in the northern part of French Indo-China are aimed at cutting Chungking's life line. Therefore, they are, for the most part, directed towards Yunnan. As such, they do not and are not intended to form a threat to the south Pacific area."

After I pointed out this fact, Kurusu said that the acceptance of our proposal would naturally lead to the conditions desired not only by the United States, but by the other nations he referred to. To this, Hull replied that what these countries desired was a quick turn-about in the situation.

Hull: "With regard to resumption of trade, a rapid change in the situation can be wrought here, too, once Japan's pacific intentions have been ascertained. This change for the better can be brought about in a mere matter of days."

Regarding aid to China, Hull said:

"We must take into consideration the possibility of a U.S. mediation when considering the possibility of cutting off aid to Chiang. If we promise Japan that we shall cease aiding China, the United States could no longer be considered a fair and neutral party to propose peace between China and Japan.

(Part 4)

"Moreover, if it is terminated immediately upon the beginning of the negotiations, the promise would be utterly without value. In any event, the so-called 'aid to Chiang Kai-shek' is not as great as is commonly publicized.

"It is Japan's desire to improve the situation which has reached a critical stage by first settling the outstanding factors involved. Since that is the desire expressed by your proposals, we cannot at this time concur in Japan's demands with regard to stopping aid to Chiang."

He went on to say that he did not believe that the time was as yet ripe for the President to suggest peace to China.

I said "I feel that on Monday the United States will submit some sort of a counter proposal to us. I further feel that this proposal will contain a suggestion that Japan join in some plan to maintain peace on the Pacific and in some kind of a trade agreement. No doubt it will be necessary for the United States and Japan to come to some preliminary agreement, after which it would be submitted to the other countries for their approval."

Kurusu: "If it is intended that a sort of a group be formed by those nations and that if they expect to make it appear as if we were 'voted down' by the majority of the voters, we wish to state now that we shall be absolutely unable to accept such a proposal."

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[a] Part 2 badly garbled; considerable reconstruction work contained.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 162

FROM: Tokyo — November 22, 1941
TO: Washington — #812.

To both your Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736[a]. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to your fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth), if the pertinent notes can be exchanged, if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

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[a] See IV, 44, Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 163

FROM: Tokyo — November 24, 1941
TO: Washington — #823.

For both Ambassadors.

The time limit set in my message #812[a] (in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th) is in Tokyo time.

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[a] See IV, 162.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 164

FROM: OPNAV
TO: CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMS 11 12 13 15
INFO: SPENAVO LONDON, CINCLAT

November 24, 1941
242005 CR 0443

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action Adees to inform senior Army officers their areas x Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action x Guam will be informed separately."

No. 165

Communications Intelligence Report:

Japan Mandated Islands

Topic	*Serial*	*Date of Issue*
Coast Defenses-Communications	20-41, No. 603-700	November 24, 1941

"In the past few months it has become known that stations temporarily classified as Coast Batteries, Lookout Stations and Landing Forces, have been active at certain Mandate Islands. During late April the Coast Batteries and Lookout Stations on Saipan were identified. In early July the Coast Batteries, Lookout stations and Landing Forces at Truk were identified."

. . . . .

"Since such defense activities are known to be established at Saipan, Truk and perhaps Ponape, it is reasonable to assume that similar defense preparations are being made at islands in Jaluit and Palao vicinities where bases, supplies, etc., are located."

No. 166

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 25, 1941
1177.

Re your # 792[a].

In this office we are withholding all reports regarding the content of the Japanese-American negotiations themselves or any predictions regarding the future. The State Department also is exercising extreme caution in its press conferences. Hence the Japanese correspondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news. I have observed particularly this meaningless competition to get the news among the correspondents who have come to Washington from New York. That this senseless competition to gather

inaccurate news will not exert a harmful influence on the course of the negotiations themselves is something that I cannot guarantee. In view of this situation I would greatly appreciate it if the Foreign Office would speak a word of caution to the newspapers concerned regarding this useless competition between their special correspondents in collecting news regarding these negotiations. And it would be particularly helpful if the head offices of the newspapers concerned would issue orders direct to their special correspondents along this line.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 167

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 26, 1941
TO: Washington #830.

(Urgent)

To both Ambassadors.

It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connection between the question of withdrawing our army from French Indo-China and that of the freezing of assets. As I have already indicated in my #798[a], my proposal made on the 17th, even if submitted by you, would be inadequate to meet the situation. Our final proposal envisages an agreement on the basis of the "B" proposal in toto (it excludes from the "B" proposal paragraphs 6 and 7; namely, the question of non-discrimination in trade and the question of the Three-Power Agreement, and includes, as indicated in my #816[b], the proposal which the United States Government made on the 12th; that is, the question of mediation by the United States for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China as contained in our Proposal "B"), and so the acceptance of this proposal is the most that we can expect. In view of the fact that time is getting short with but few days left this month, I would like to have you at once contact the United States authorities again and do your utmost in getting them to accept our proposal.

I need not suggest the following, for you, no doubt, have already thought of it. I would like to have you make full use of influential Americans about whom you have wired me in the past and put pressure on the United States authorities indirectly as well.

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[a] Which states that no further concession can be made and if the U.S. does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

[b] Which states that if the U.S. accepts Proposal B, Japan will have no objection to letting Pres. ROOSEVELT act as mediator between Japan and China.

Trans. No Date

No. 168

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1183.

(Urgent)

Re your #830[a].

The evacuation of troops from all of French Indo-China, brought up in your message, is nothing more or less than the speculations of American newspapermen. Here in Washington they haven't mentioned such a thing even in jest. We have driven home our insistences.

Furthermore, in regard to the latter part of your message, we two here have been currently using it sufficiently. Recently, however, Secretary of State HULL, before we had mentioned it, beat us to the punch and turned it to his own advantage.

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[a]See IV, 167.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 169

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 26, 1941
#833.

(Priority.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

Re my #798[a].

When you reach a settlement in accordance with our new proposal, it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection with clauses 2 and 3 of that proposal. Of these goods, the acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the Empire. Therefore, in accordance with the course of negotiations, prior to the signing of an understanding, and at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following lines:

4,000,000 tons per year from the United States. (This figure is the average amount of imports during the years 1938, '39, and '40 from the United States. The breakdown according to type, aviation gasoline included, corresponds to the actual figures covering imports before the freezing legislation went into effect.) That is to say, roughly, 333,000 tons per month.

In addition, on the basis of past negotiations and roughly in the agreed amounts, we hope to import from the Netherlands Indies 1,000,000 tons per year.

After the establishment of a verbal agreement, I would like to have a definite promise of the above incorporated into an exchange of documents between Your Excellency and the Secretary of State.

Furthermore, these figures are to be taken as the basis for negotiation (however, they can not be called our absolute minimum figures). On the other hand, as far as we are concerned, along with a restoration of trade in the future, we hope for an increase of these figures, over the past. Therefore, after you have read all this, please negotiate along these lines to the best of your abilities.

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[a]Which states that no further concessions can be made and if the United States does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 170

FROM: Washington — November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1180.

(Extremely urgent.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 171

FROM: Washington — November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1180.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 2.)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands Indies is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 172

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 26, 1941
836.

To be handled in Government code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

Japanese	*English*
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)	Nyuu Yooku (New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)	Shikago (Chicago)
Shina Mondai (The China question)	Sanfuranshisuko (San Francisco)
Soori (Premier)	Itoo Kun (Mr. Itoo)
Gaimudaijin (Foreign Minister)	Date Kun (Mr. Date)
Rikugun (The Army)	Tokugawa Kun (Mr. Tokugawa)
Kaigun (The Navy)	Maeda Kun (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotiations)	Endan (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo (President)	Kimko San (Miss Kimiko)
Haru (Hull)	Fumeko San (Miss Fumeko)
Kokunaijoosei (Internal situation)	Shoobai (Trade)
Jooho Suru (To yield)	Yama Wo Uru (To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu (Not to yield)	Yama Wo Urenu (Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyuuten Suru (Situation taking critical turn)	Kodomo Gaumareru (The child is born)

For your information, telephone addressees other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMATOTO:	Setegaya 4617
Section Chief, KASE:	Yotsuya 4793

Japanese	*English*
The Minister's residence	Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence	Ginza 1022

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 173

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1181.

Re your # 836[a].

Even if it is put into effect at once, since the hours for telephone communication between Japan and America are restricted to 7:00 to 10:00 A.M., 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M., 2:00 to 5:00 P.M. (Tokyo time), it is better to wire urgent news rather than phone it.

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[a]See IV, 172. In which Tokyo says that, due to the fact that the situation is becoming more tense and telegrams take too long, reports should be made by telephone making use of the code words given.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 174

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 25, 1941
1179.

Hull has conferred jointly with the diplomatic representatives of Britain, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, and China, on two different occasions recently. In harmony with developments however, he has chosen the British representative as his main conferee. Since this morning, the 25th, he is maintaining communications with the Australian and the N.E.I. representatives through the British Ambassador. He will confer with the Chinese Ambassador tonight, alone, after conferring first with the British Ambassador.

The fact that he has dispensed with the custom of conducting joint conferences and has substituted separate ones is drawing considerable attention from the public in general.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 175

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 24, 1941
1166.

Re my # 1160[a].

BALLANTINE has informed us on behalf of the Secretary of State that, since the representatives of some of the countries have not yet received instructions from their governments,

he would like to postpone until tomorrow (25th) the meeting between Secretary HULL, Ambassador KURUSU, and myself which was scheduled for today (24th).

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[a] See IV, 159.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 176

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 1178.

We made inquiries as to their conveniences this morning, and were advised that they were in conference, and that some reply would be submitted this afternoon. We pressed them again this afternoon, therefore, and were told that Hull had been conferring on this matter yesterday and today, but that he had been unable to secure a clear reply. They said that they feel certain that it will be ready tomorrow, and for that reason requested that we get in touch with them again tomorrow.

In view of the fact that the bureaus concerned of the State Department were discussing this matter all day yesterday and again today, and in view of the conference between the British Ambassador and Hull which lasted for an hour, apparently they are making an effort to speed up the negotiations, too. We, therefore, decided to postpone our discussions scheduled for today, and take the matter up with them tomorrow morning.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 177

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1184.

(Urgent.)

Re my # 1178[a].

At my insistence TERASAKI again called on BALLANTINE this morning and questioned him in regard to the scheduled time for our interview. BALLANTINE stated, "Secretary of State HULL today, from early this morning, has been giving profound study to this matter. The fact is that he has scarcely given any consideration to anything else. I am sure that even now he is reaching a decision as to the time for the scheduled interview." Furthermore, for your information, after communicating with the Secretary of State, though virtually the same reply was received, TERASAKI is understood to have gotten the impression that arrangements for the interview would be made sometime today. This is for your information.

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[a] See IV, 176.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 178

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1187.

(Urgent.)

Ambassador KURUSU and I have a meeting scheduled with Secretary HULL today (26th) at 4:45 p.m.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 179

FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo 1745 EST (Telephone code)[a]

Trans-Pacific Telephone

To Kumaicho Yamamoto[b] from Kurusu:

Wakasugi speaking, said:

"This is Wakasugi speaking at Kurusu's request. Kurusu and Nomura have at this very moment gone to meet HULL with whom they had an appointment at 4:45."

Yamamoto: "Would they then meet the President?"

Wakasugi: "They would (arrange?) (to) meet the President after seeing Hull, but they had not yet taken steps to see the President. Hull has been conversing with the Chinese for three days past and had seen the Chinese today also. The future of the present talks would be decided during the course of today's conversations."

Yamamoto: "Call me by telephone again upon completion of today's meeting."

Wakasugi: "Have you anything you want me to tell Kurusu?"

Yamamoto: (Reply unintelligible to intercepter and according to him unintelligible to Wakasugi as well.)

After above few unintelligible sentences Wakasugi concluded with a promise to phone later.

Note: A call has been placed for 2100 EST this evening.

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[a] See IV, 172.

[b] Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 180

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1193.

Extremely urgent (Part 1 of 2.)

Separate wire.

(To be handled in Government code.)

Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment.

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.

Section 1.

Draft mutual declaration of policy.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial design in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

Trans. 11–29–41

No. 181

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1193.

(Part 2 of 2.)

(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes; the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of internal economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

Trans. 11–29–41

No. 182

FROM: Washington (Nomura November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1194.

(Extremely urgent.) (Part 1 of 4.)

Secret Wire.

(To be handled in Government code.)

Section 2.

Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan:

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 183

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1194.

(Extremely urgent.) (Part 2 of 4.)

Secret outside the Department.

(To be handled in Government code.)

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—military, politically, economically—any Government or regime in China other than the national government of the republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 184

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1194.

(Part 3 of 4.)

5. Both Governments will give up all extra-territorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 185

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1194.

(Extremely urgent.) (Part 4 of 4.)

Secret outside the department.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

8. Both Governments will agree upon applying the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 186

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1192.

(Part 1 of 4.)

Oral.

Strictly confidential.

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and

sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 187

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1192.

(Extremely Urgent)

(Part 2 of 4.)

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary "modus vivendi" could be agreed upon to be in affect while the conversations, looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purpose above indicated.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 188

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1192.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 3 of 4.)

(To be handled in government code.)

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 189

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1192.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 4 of 4.)

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our future conversations.

The plan herein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1942 and the Japanese draft of September 25th by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 190

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1189.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 191

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1189.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 2.)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 192

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1191.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 4.)

On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him. First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in separate messages # 1192[a], 1193[b] and 1194[c], and then engaged in an argument. The gist of it was as follows:

(1) HULL said: "Although we have conferred with the various nations concerned and have studied your proposal of the 20th (B proposal with 6 and 7 left out) for five days, we have decided that we cannot consider it."

(2) I said: "You talk of reconciling the American proposal of June 21st with ours of September 25th, but this is vastly different from either."

HULL retorted: "As for that I want you to read and compare the paragraph I point out with the one immediately preceding it. I said that it was a plan for reconciling both the Japanese and American proposals. Since the opening of conversations, the contents of it have been kept secret and, therefore, in this country where popular opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising; particularly, rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving China in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what Japan said at

the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various important people are still uttering non-pacific statements. There does not seem to be much I can do in the face of that."

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[a] See IV, 186–189.
[b] See IV, 180–181.
[c] See IV, 182–185.

Trans. 11–29–41

No. 193

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1191.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 4.)

(To be handled in government code.)

(3) Concerning Section 1 of the proposal, I pointed out that of the four principles, the fourth has changed the so-called Stimson Doctrine; but I got no clear reply. I reminded him of their insistences so far concerning the principle of non-discrimination and said that if we applied that immediately to China there would be a sudden darkening of the already cloudy economic situation and that this was improper and impossible.

HULL replied: "I fully understand that and the principle as such does not necessarily have to be put into effect right away."

(4) Concerning 1 of Section 2 of this proposal, I said: "If this plan aims to review a Nine-Power Treaty set-up, we cannot feature it at all because we have fought a four year war in China without a cent of profit."

To this he countered with no strong rebuttal.

Trans. 11–29–41

No. 194

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1191.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 3 of 4.)

(5) I said that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same section were out of the question and, as for paragraph 4, for a country like the United States, who recognizes the Chungking Government, to say that she cannot desert the Chiang Regime is just like us saying that we certainly cannot desert the Nanking Regime."

In reply HULL said: "The evacuation under 3 would be carried out by negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected immediately. As for the Nanking Government, according to the best reports available to us, it hasn't much influence over China as a whole any way."

I retorted: "Well, that argument is based on the statement that in the long history of China there have been many rises and falls of governments."

(6) When we came to the question of the Three Power Treaty, I said: "For the United States to hope on one hand, that she can make us make the last possible concession regarding the Three Power Pact and on the other virtually to say to us concerning the China question "apologize to Chungking" is certainly strange. I do not suppose that that is what the President meant the other day when he spoke of 'introducing'."

HULL made no special answer.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 195

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1191.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 4 of 4.)

I said: "Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult plan for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is concerned, it contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so I, who would like to see an understanding established between Japan and the United States, do not know if I should even report it to Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts. We will both read it over again and consider it fully. Then we will reply." Finally I said, "I wonder if the United States means that there is no other way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the other day said that between friends there are no last words. I wonder if you could arrange for an interview." To the former he replied that in a word this was a plan and to the latter he said that, although he did not think that much progress was being made, he would manage the matter.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 196

FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo 1946 to 1953 EST

(Telephone Code.)[b]

Trans-Pacific Telephone

To Kumaicho Yamamoto[a] from Kurusu:

Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they *will* not yield.[c] I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how thing will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."

Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."

Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."

Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail."

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."

Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."

Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i.e., progress) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation."

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[a] Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

[b] See IV, 172.

[c] Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The Intercepter read this as "Sore . . . kesa" (that . . . this morning) and translated this as "it is now . . .", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 197

Communications Intelligence Reports

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

Date of Issue	*Serial*
November 26, 1941	22-41, No, 901-200

"Submitted by the 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit:

Since the latter part of October, the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet has been forming a task force consisting of:

Second Fleet

Third Fleet (including First and Second Base Forces, and First Defense Division)

Destroyer Squadron Three

Submarine Squadron Five

Combined Air Force

Air Squadron Seven

and possibly vessels of the Third Battleship Division in the first fleet.

Third Fleet units are believed to be moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

It appears that the Seventh Cruiser Division and the Third Destroyer Squadron are an advance unit, and may be enroute South China.

The Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao, and indications are that some of it has already moved on to Hainan Island.

It seems that the Second Base Force is transporting equipment of the Air Force to Taiwan.

Radio calls for the South China Fleet, the French Indo-China Force, and the Naval Stations at Sama, Bako and Takao appear also in headings of dispatches concerning this task force.

The Resident Naval Officer Palao, and the Third Base Force at Palao have communicated extensively with the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet.

It is thought that a strong force of submarines and air groups are in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. This force includes the 24th Air Squadron, at least one aircraft carrier, and probably one-third of the submarine fleet. (Note: this may mean one-third of the fleet submarines.)

The 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit evaluates the foregoing information to indicate that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts of the Task Force may operate from the Marshalls and Palao."

Com 14 260110 of November 1941 to OPNAV
Info: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16.

No. 198

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

Date of Issue	*Serial*
November 27, 1941	23-41, No. 901-200

"Following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, referring to and commenting on yesterday's information from the 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, contained in the above reference.

During the past few days traffic analysis indicates that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, is directing units of the First, Second, and Third Fleets, and Submarine Force in a loose knit Task Force organization that apparently will be divided into two section. For purposes of clarity the units expected to operate in South China Area will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in the Mandates will be referred to as Second Section. The estimated units in First Section are Cruiser Division Seven, Air Squadron Six, Defense Division One, Destroyer Squadron Three, and Submarine Squadron Six.The Second Section consists of Cruiser Division Five, Carrier Division Three (RYUJO and one Maru), Destroyer Squadrons Two and Four, Submarine Squadron Five, Destroyer Division Twenty-three, First Base Force of Third Fleet, Third Base Force at Palao, Fifth Base Force at Saipan, and lesser units unidentified. Cruiser Division Six and Battleship Division Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively, but status cannot be clarified yet.

There are slight indications today that Destroyer Squadron Three, Cruiser Division Seven, and Submarine Squadron Six are in the Takao Area. The balance of Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assume that these vessels including Destroyer Squadron 5 will take stations in the Straits of Formosa or further south. Combined Air Force units from the Empire proper are at Paidoh.

It is impossible to confirm the supposition of reference report that carriers and submarines are in the Mandates. The best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet Carriers are still in Sasebo-Kure Area.

. . . . . Directives to the above Task Forces, if such, are directed to individual units, and not to complete groups. Special calls usually precede formation of Task Force used in area operations.

Commanders-in-Chief, Second, Third, and Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles.

Traffic from the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of Naval General Staff to Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet appears normal.

This evaluation is considered reliable.

COM 16 261331, Nov. 1941 to CINCPAC, COM 14, OPNAV, CINCAF."

No. 199

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1190.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message # 1189[a]) showed a great disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set.

Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there would be "no last words." If we do not cause any stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set -----.

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[a] See IV, 190, 191.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 200

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1190.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 2.)

To be handled in Government Code.

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 201

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 27, 1941
1204.

Re your # 842[a].

The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U.S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it.

As was made plain in the text of this announcement, the main objective of this occupation was to guarantee accessibility to aluminum produced there, which is vital to the national defense of the United States. Ordinarily, the Netherlands Government would dispatch its armed forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies for this purpose, but she is unable to do so at present because of the present situation in the southwest Pacific area. For this reason, the U.S. Army is being used to protect the aluminum mines in that area. At the same time, at the invitation of the Netherlands Government, Brazil is also taking part in protecting them.

The Netherlands Foreign Minister stopped in the United States en route to visiting the Netherlands East Indies, and conferred with U.S. Government officials. Since then, there has been a considerable increase in the amount of military supplies being shipped to the Netherlands East Indies; the traffic of technicians and experts between the United States and N.E.I., has swung up sharply. From these indications as well as from the history of the Netherlands East Indies, it is believed, that depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-U.S. negotiations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. They will do this, probably, much in the same manner as U.S.-Brazil joint occupation of Netherlands Guiana, in the name of protecting the products of the N.E.I. which are vital to national defense, tin and rubber.

I feel that it is essential that we give careful consideration to this possibility. I made reference to this point in my message # 1180[b]. The gist of this message does not differ from that contained in that message.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 170, 171.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 202

FROM: OPNAV
TO: CINCAF

November 26, 1941
271442.

For the purpose of remedying the unintentional omission of CINCAF, in the forthcoming revision of WPL 46, para 3744 will be amended. If formal war eventuates between U.S. and Japan "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare May 1941" will be placed in effect. This will however be supplemented by additional instructions including authority to CINCAF to conduct unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping within that part of the Far East area lying south and west of a line joining Lat 30 N Long 122 E and Lat 7 N Long 140 E. You will declare this as a strategical area. You will warn all friendly, enemy and neutral merchant ships and aircraft to refrain from entering this

strategical area—except under certain specified conditions—in your proclamation. You will state that this step is necessary to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft from supporting hostile action and to prevent them from obtaining info which if transmitted to the enemy would be seriously detrimental to armed forces of the U.S. The only conditions under which friendly and neutral merchant vessels may enter the strategical area will be through certain prescribed lanes that lead to Naval control stations. You are requested to take up the matter of defining and establishing these lanes and control stations with the Dutch and British Naval authorities, but take care not to disclose for the present these instructions to wage unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare. The situation will be far more complex if hostilities ensue without a formal declaration of war, but it appears probable that very nearly the same procedure will be followed. However, further advice must be received from CNO before this is done.

No. 203

FROM: OPNAV — November 28, 1941
TO: CINCAF — # 271912 CR 0863.

Request from the Army Chief of Staff that you inform General MacArthur of the contents of my 271442 so that Army air forces may make appropriate plans.

No. 204

FROM: CNO — November 26, 1941
TO: CINCPAC — # 270040 CR 0756.

If you consider this desirable, Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for re-enforcing defense battalions now on station x For advance bases which you may occupy, Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable the recommended armament and number of troops desired x

No. 205

FROM: CNO — November 26, 1941
TO: CINCPAC — # 270038 CR 0758.

Provided you consider this feasible and desirable and in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier x Essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels and planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats x Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents x Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies x Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers in Philippines x If necessary, additional parking areas should be laid prompt-

ly x Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations x As soon as practicable, confer with Commanding General and advise x

No. 206

FROM: CNO — November 29, 1941
TO: CINCPAC — # 282054 CR 02.

The arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be the best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via SARATOGA. War Department will instruct COMGEN HAWDEPT to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines. War Dept will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon. Marine Corps will shortly receive sixteen 37 MM AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake? Request air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future.

No. 207

FROM: Washington — November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1206.

(In 4 parts.)

On the 27th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the President. (Secretary Hull was also present.) The resumé of our talks follows:

The President: "In the last Great War, Japan and the United States were together on the side of the Allies. At that time, both Japan and the United States were given ample proof that Germany failed to comprehend the way the people of other countries think.

"Since these conversations were begun, I am aware of the fact that much effort has been made by the Japanese side, too, by those who cherish peace. I am highly appreciative of this fact. It is clear that the majority of the American people are anxious to maintain peaceful relations with Japan. I am one of those who still harbors much hope that Japanese-U.S. relations will be settled peacefully."

I: "Your recent proposal will no doubt be the cause of painful disappointment to the Japanese Government."

The President: "To tell you the truth, I, too, am very disappointed that the situation has developed in the manner that it has. However, during the several months that these conversations were being conducted, cold water was poured on them when Japan occupied southern French Indo-China. According to recent intelligences, there are fears that a second cold water dousing may become an actuality." (He apparently meant the increase in our troops to French Indo-China and our occupation of Thai.) (See my message # 1205[a].) "I fully understand that the general public in Japan who have been living in war conditions for the past year, cannot see a parallel with conditions in the United States, which is living under peaceful conditions.

"During all of the time, however, that Your Excellency and Secretary Hull have been conversing, we have never heard of or seen concrete proof of any peaceful intention by the leading elements of Japan. This had made these talks an exceedingly difficult undertaking.

(Part 2)

"Even the suggestion that the present situation be overcome by a 'modus vivendi' would be without any value if in the final analysis the basic principles of international relations of Japan and the United States do not agree. If there is a basic difference, no stop gap measure could carry any weight, it seems to me.

"In my conversations with Churchill on the high seas, for example, it was predetermined that our respective basic policies coincided. Moreover, even the subjects which were to be agreed upon had been clearly defined in advance."

Kurusu: "Judging from the records of the developments of our negotiations in the past, the differences of opinions between Japan and the United States were not differences in the basic principles of each. Rather, the differences arose in the practical applications thereof. For a very simple example Japan has no disagreements to the principles of non-discriminatory treatment of commerce, strongly advocated by the United States.

"However, it is when we consider the immediate application of this principle in China, bringing about a radical and sudden change in the economic situation there, it is only natural that Japan insists upon certain special conditions. I feel that this difference may have been the source of some misunderstanding."

Hull: "By your frequent explanations, we thoroughly understand that point. According to advice I have received, however, there are approximately 250,000 Japanese merchants in China at present who followed or accompanied the military. These are engaging in various business enterprises. There have been indications that various incidents have arisen involving the relations between these merchants and nationals of a third country. If you are going to consider the profits of these people, the problem of course will become an exceedingly difficult one."

Kurusu: "Japan's claims are not based on such minor factors, but concern only the various major problems."

(Part 3)

We then went on and brought up the subject which has reference to the President's "suggestions."

The President: "I have not abandoned giving consideration to that matter. However, it is first essential that both Japan and China simultaneously desire that that be done."

We pointed out that from a practical standpoint that would be very difficult to accomplish. To this, the President said:

"In domestic issues, I have had several experiences along the same lines. No doubt, some method will be found in this case, too."

I: "We have, as yet, received no instructions from Tokyo regarding your proposal. I, for one, hope that you, Mr. President, whose statesmanship I respect highly after over thirty years of close acquaintance with it, will find some way that will lead to a settlement."

The President: "To tell you the truth, I have since the end of last week, twice postponed a trip which I was going to take for my health, because of a critical domestic issue, and because of the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu to the United States. I am leaving tomorrow afternoon, Friday for the country for a rest." (He looked very tired.) "I plan to return next Wednesday. I would like to talk with you again then. It would be very gratifying, however, if some means of a settlement could be discovered in the meantime.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11–29–41

No. 208

FROM: Washington — November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1206.

(Part 4 of 4.)

In the middle of our talks, Hull, with reference to the cause for the failure to agree upon a *modus vivendi*, said:

"There are other factors other than those pointed out by the President. Japan has sent vast numbers of troops to French Indo-China with which to keep the military powers of other countries checked. With this advantage on her side, Japan carries in one hand, the Tripartite Pact, and in the other, the Anti-Communism Pact. Armed with these, she demands of the United States that petroleum be made available to her.

"It would be absolutely impossible to reconcile the people of the United States to granting such a demand. As I stated during our last conversations, while we here are putting forth our best efforts in attempting to bring about peaceful settlements of Japanese-U.S. differences, your Premier nor your Foreign Minister nor any other influential person utters not a single word nor moves one finger to facilitate these talks of ours. On the contrary, they insist upon promoting the establishment of a New Order through might. This is an exceedingly regrettable state of affairs.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 209

FROM: Washington — November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — (2327-2334 EST)

(Telephone Code.)

Trans-Pacific
Telephone

(Conversations between Ambassador Kurusu and Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief, Yamamoto.)

	Literal Translation	*Decode of Voice Code*
	(After connection was completed):	
KURUSU:	"Hello, hello. This is Kurusu".	
YAMAMOTO:	"This is Yamamoto."	
KURUSU:	"Yes. Hello, hello."	
	(Unable to get Yamamoto for about six or eight seconds, he said aside, to himself, or to someone near him):	
KURUSU:	"Oh, I see, they're making a record of this, huh?"	
	(It is believed he meant that the six second interruption was made so that a record could be started in Tokyo. Interceptor's machine had been started several minutes earlier.)	
KURUSU:	"Hello. Sorry to trouble you so often."	

	Literal Translation	*Decode of Voice Code*
YAMAMOTO:	"How did the matrimonial question get along today?"	"How did the negotiations go today?"
	"Oh, haven't you got our telegram[a] yet. It was sent—let me see—at about six—no, seven o'clock. Seven o'clock. About three hours ago.	
	There wasn't much that was different from what Miss Umeko said yesterday."	"There wasn't much that was different from Hull's talks of yesterday."
YAMAMOTO:	"Oh, there wasn't much difference."	
KURUSU:	"No. there wasn't. As before, that southward matter—that south, SOUTH—southward matter is having considerable effect. You know, southward matter."	
YAMAMOTO:	(Obviously trying to indicate the serious effect that Japanese concentrations, etc. in French Indo-China were having on the conversations in Washington. He tries to do this without getting away from the "Miss Umeko childbirth, marriage" character of the voice code.)	
YAMAMOTO:	"Oh, the south matter? It's effective?"	
KURUSU:	"Yes, and at one time, the matrimonial question seemed as if it would be settled."	"Yes, and at one time it looked as though we could reach an agreement."
KURUSU:	"But—well, of course, there are other matters involved too, but—that was it—that was the monkey wrench. Details are included in the telegram[a] which should arrive very shortly. It is not very long and you'll be able to to read it quickly.	
YAMAMOTO:	"Oh, you've dispatched it."	
KURUSU:	"Oh, yes, quite a while ago. At about 7 o'clock."	
	(Pause)	
KURUSU:	"How do things look there? Does it seem as if a child might be born?"	"Does it seem as if a crisis is at hand?"
YAMAMOTO:	(In a very definite tone): "Yes, the birth of the child seems imminent."	"Yes, a crisis *does* appear imminent."
KURUSU:	(In a somewhat surprised tone, repeating Yamamoto's statement): "It *does* seem as if the birth is going to take place?"	"A crisis *does* appear imminent?"
	(Pause)	
KURUSU:	"In which direction . . ."	
	(Stopped himself very abruptly at	

	Literal Translation	*Decode of Voice Code*
	this slip which went outside the character of the voice code character of the talk. The "boy, girl, health" byplay has no other significance):	
YAMAMOTO:	"It seems as if it will be a strong healthy boy."	
KURUSU:	"Oh, it's to be a strong healthy boy?" (Rather long pause.)	
YAMAMOTO:	"Yes. "Did you make any statement (to the newspapers) regarding your talk with Miss Kimiko today?"	"Did you make any statement regarding your talk with the President today?"
KURUSU:	"No, nothing. Nothing except the mere fact that we met."	
YAMAMOTO:	"Regarding the matter contained in the telegram[b] of the other day, although no definite decision has been made yet., please be advised that effecting it will be difficult."	
KURUSU:	"Oh, it is difficult, huh?"	
YAMAMOTO:	"Yes, it is."	
KURUSU:	"Well, I guess there's nothing more that can be done then."	
YAMAMOTO:	"Well, yes." (Pause)	
YAMAMOTO:	"Then, today . . . "	
KURUSU:	"Today?"	
YAMAMOTO:	"The matrimonial question,—that is, the matter pertaining to arranging a marriage—don't break them off."	"Regarding negotiations—don't break them off."
KURUSU:	"Not break them. You mean the talks." (Helplessly):	
KURUSU:	"Oh, my." (Pause, and then with a resigned laugh):	
KURUSU:	"Well, I'll do what I can." (Continuing after a pause):	
KURUSU:	"Please read carefully what Miss Kimiko had to say as contained in today's telegram[a]."	Please read carefully what the President had to say as contained in today's telegram[a]."
YAMAMOTO:	"From what time to what time were your talks today?"	
KURUSU:	"Oh, today's was from 2:30 . ." (Much repeating of the numeral 2)	
KURUSU:	"Oh, you mean the duration? "Oh, that was for about an hour."	

	Literal Translation	*Decode of Voice Code*
YAMAMOTO	"Regarding the matrimonial question." "I shall send you another message. However, please bear in mind that the matter of the other day is a very difficult one."	"Regarding the negotiations."
KURUSU:	"But without anything,—they want to keep carrying on the matrimonial question. They do. In the meantime we're faced with the excitement of having a child born. On top of that Tokugawa is really champing at the bit, isn't he? Tokugawa is, isn't he?" (Laughter and pause)	"But without anything,—they want to keep on negotiating. In the meantime we have a crisis on hand and the army is champing at the bit. You know the army.
KURUSU:	"That's why I doubt if anything can be done."	
YAMAMOTO:	"I don't think it's as bad as that."	
YAMAMOTO:	"Well,—we can't sell a mountain."	"Well,—we can't yield."
KURUSU:	"Oh, sure, I know that. That isn't even a debatable question any more."	
YAMAMOTO:	"Well, then, although we can't yield we'll give you some kind of a reply to that telegram."	
KURUSU:	"In any event, Miss Kimiko is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in the country until Wednesday."	"In any event, the President is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in the country until Wednesday."
YAMAMOTO:	"Will you please continue to do your best."	
KURUSU:	"Oh, yes. I'll do my best. And Nomura's doing everything too."	
YAMAMOTO:	"Oh, all right. In today's talks, there wasn't anything of special interest then."	
KURUSU:	"No, nothing of particular interest, except that it is quite clear now that that southward—ah—the south, the south matter is having considerable effect."	
YAMAMOTO:	"I see. Well, then, good bye."	
KURUSU:	"Good bye."	

[a]See IV, 207–208.
[b]See IV, 190–191.

No. 210

FROM: OPNAV — November 27, 1941
TO: CINCAF, CINCPAC — 272337 CR 0921.

INFO: CINCLANT, SPENAVO

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval Task Forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or KRA Peninsula or possibly Borneo x Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x Inform District and Army authorities x A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Spenavo inform British x Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

No. 211

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

Date of Issue — *Serial*
November 28, 1941 — 26-41, No. 901-200

Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, reported the following movements and dispositions:

Tuesday, Nov. 25, 1941—An unstated number of transports on a southwesterly course with troops aboard were sighted from a position 21 N 115 E.

Wednesday, Nov. 26—Eight Warships believed to be led by the cruiser NAKA proceeding south at a good speed.
Many transports sighted during the week 19–26 November between Hong Kong and Shanghai heading south. A number of these transports had troops on board.
. . . Two senior Construction Officers and 4000 men whose status is not known have been ordered to the Mandated Islands.
CINCPAC and COM 14 have received the information submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.

No. 212

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

Date of Issue — *Serial*
November 29, 1941 — 24-41, No. 901-200

Submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.
". . . The Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet indicates he will shift communications from the Kure Communication Zone at 0400, 29th; from the Sasebo Communication Zone at 0000, 1st; and later Bako Communication Zone at 0000, 2nd. Thus implying a move from Japan proper to the south."

COM16, 291029, November 1941 to CINCPAC
COM14, CINCAF, OPNAV

No. 213

FROM: Rio de Janeiro — November 28, 1941[a]
TO: Santiago — Circular # 326.

(Message from Tokyo, Circular # 2416.)

(To be handled in Government code.)

Concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the counter proposal presented to us by the United States on the 27th, overlooks all we stand for; therefore, of course, we disregard it. There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn. The above is for your information only.

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[a] DoD Comment: Note time of translation.

Trans. 12-9-42

No. 214

FROM: Tokyo — November 28, 1941
TO: Washington — # 844.

Re your # 1189[a].

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the view of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your # 1180[b] and he said that under the present circumstance what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

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[a] See IV, 190-191.
[b] See IV, 170-171.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 215

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo [b]

Re my #1190[a] (in which Nomura expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption).

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers. "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese" and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

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[a] See IV, 199–200.

[b] Date not provided in original.

Trans. 12–1–41

No. 216

FROM: OPNAV November 29, 1941
TO: COM PNNCF, COM PSNCF 290110 CR 066.

INFO: CINCPAC, COM PNCF

Refer to my 272338. Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense Command "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the U.S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. A separate message is being sent to G2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in U.S. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed on overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

No. 217

FROM: OPNAV
TO: CINCAF
INFO: CINCPAC

Nov. 30, 1941
300419 CR 0214.

There are indications that Japan is about to attack points on KRA Isthmus by an overseas expedition. In order to ascertain destination of this expedition and for security of our position in the Philippines, desire you to cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on 3 days commencing upon receipt this dispatch. Instruct planes to observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked. Understand that the British Air forces will search an arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across KRA Isthmus near Singora. Inform MacArthur if expedition is approaching Thailand. British mission here informed.

No. 218

FROM: Mexico City (MXMRK)
TO: Tokyo

December 1, 1941
220.

The general opinion in this country is that President ROOSEVELT suddenly terminated his weekend holiday and returned to the capital because the steady advance of our army toward the south and particularly the speeches of Premier TOJO, have brought them[a] to an actual realization of our determination, and a decision on the part of Washington as to whether war or peace can be expected here in a couple days.

According to reports of Americans in political and economic circles in Washington and New York, a survey of well-informed American sources shows that the ratio (? of those expecting peace or war ?) between Japan and America is one for peace to seven for war.

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[a]This could refer to the American people or to President Roosevelt. Note date of translation.

Trans. 1-13-45

No. 219

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 1, 1941
865.

Re my # 857.[a]

1. The date set in my message # 812 (November 29th for the absolute deadline to complete negotiations) has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for your information only.)

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message # 1124.[b] Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

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[a] Re new proposals to the U.S.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 220

FROM: Washington — December 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1226.

Re my # 1222[a].

Within governmental circles, although decisive comments were withheld, the general opinion seems to be that Tojo's speech indicates the refusal of the Japanese Government to accept the proposals submitted to it by the U.S. on the 26th. These circles also seem to feel that the speech indicates Japan's decision to give up hope for the talks and resort to stronger measures.

The press on the 1st carried a UP dispatch from Tokyo reporting that though Japan was not satisfied with the U.S. reply, Japan is desirous of having the discussions continue for at least two more weeks. In view of the reports of the Premier's speech, this report has an ominous tone about it.

Some of the newspapers comment that since Japan's invasion of Thai has already been definitely mapped out, the above is merely a means of stalling for time so as to give the Japanese a chance to seize the most opportune moment with respect to developments in Europe, to launch this attack.

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[a] Speaks of unfavorable U.S. reaction to Tojo's speech.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 221

FROM: Tokyo — December 1, 1941
TO: Washington — # 858.

Kurusu's and Yuki's traveling expenses, $8,000 each, being cabled. Get State Department's unfreezing permit.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 222

FROM: COM16 — December 1, 1941
TO: COMINCH, ALL FORCES — 011422.

JVJ (radio station in Tokyo) announced tonight in closing "All listeners be sure and listen at 0700 and 0730 tomorrow morning, since there may be important news."

No. 223

FROM: Tokyo — December 1, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular # 2444.

The four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my Circular message # 2447[a], the U.S. (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

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[a] See IV, 436.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 224

FROM: OPNAV — December 3, 1941
TO: COM16, CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM14 — 031850 CR 0553.

Highly reliable info has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Jap Diplomatic and Consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

No. 225

FROM: Tokyo — December 2, 1941
TO: Washington — # 867.

1. Please destroy by burning all of the codes you have in your office, with the exception of one copy each of the codes being used in conjunction with the machine, the OITE code and the abbreviation code. (This includes other Ministries' codes which you may have in your office.
2. Also in the case of the code machine itself, one set is to be destroyed.
3. Upon completing the above, transmit the one word HARUNA.
4. Use your descretion in disposing of all text of messages to and from your office, as well as other secret papers.
5. Destroy by burning all of the codes brought to your office by telegraphic courier Kosaka. (Consequently, you need not pursue the instructions contained in my message # 860,[a] regarding getting in touch with Mexico.

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[a] See IV, 225A.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 225A

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

1 December 1941
860.

Have Courier Kosaka, who will arrive there shortly from Brazil, return to Japan on the Tatuta Maru leaving Los Angeles on the 25th.

If this schedule makes it difficult for Kosaka to go to Mexico as planned, have him abandon that trip. Establish communication with Mexico, if this is the case, and make some sort of arrangements with regard to Kosaka's business.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 226

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

Date of Issue
December 1, 1941

Serial
25-41, No. 201-200

Submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.

Details of ship arrivals in Takao, all under command of Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet. Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, in ATAGO shifted from Kure to Sasebo Communication Zone, apparently enroute South China waters.

All Orange service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 0000, December 1, 1941.

CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM14 have received the above information.

No. 227

FROM: COM16
TO: OPNAV, COM14

December 4, 1941
041502.

Five numerals intercepts subsequent to 0600 today indicate change of cipher system.

No. 228

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

December 2, 1941
1232.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my # 1231[a].

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador Kurusu and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State Welles. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire # 1233[a]. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing

as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. [b]We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China, the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

(Part 2 of 2.)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State Welles said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally disolve". The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire # 1233.

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[a]Not available.

[b]Original translation incomplete from this point on.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 229

FROM: OPNAV
TO: CINCAF

December 2, 1941
012356 CR 0313.

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this dispatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a "Defensive Information Patrol" Minimum requirements to establish identity as U.S. Men-of-War are commanded by a

Naval Officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. 1 vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indo-China coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of ISABEL authorized by President as one of the three but not other Naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

No. 230

FROM: CNO
TO: CINCAF

December 2, 1941
012358 CR 0323.

In view of existing situation CNO considers it very important that you exchange full military information with the British and Dutch Naval Commanders-in-Chief except in cases where you consider it definitely inadvisable. These exchanges may appropriately be made through Naval Observers Singapore and Batavia provided ciphers are adequate. Suggest reconsideration of the question of establishing a Dutch Liaison Officer at your headquarters in Manila. Make arrangements direct and advise action.

No. 231

FROM: Madrid (SPAIN)
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)

December 3, 1941
342.

Parts 1 and 2 Complete.

Part 1.

The Japanese-American conference, once perilously near the breaking point, now is viewed as going on in an easier atmosphere since the resumption of talks made possible by Japanese concessions. The apologies of Ambassador KURUSU and some Japanese newspapers for the phrase about the destruction of the Anglo-American hegemony in the Premier's message, are thought to be somewhat satirical in tone. However, the President's statement, "America will probably be in the war by next year," and that of an important (?American?) Navy man, "we could wipe out the Japanese Navy in no time at all", were blustered out, with no criticism from Japan. (These people) tend to underrate Japan's military strength.

Part 2.

The conclusion of an Anglo-American agreement on the establishment of military bases on Christmas, Fiji, Samoa, and other Pacific Islands, has been reported. We are allowing America to grow stronger, while Japan pursues a conservative and hesitant course.

It is our prayer that the Army (?take some?) decisive (?action?).

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[a] Note date of translation.

Trans. 2-15-45

No. 232

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSANA TOKYO, ALUSANA BANGKOK, ASTALUSANA PEIPING, ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI

December 4, 1941
040330 CR 0640

INFO: CINCAF, ALUSNA CHUNGKING, COM16

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word JABBERWOCK. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "BOOMBERANG".

No. 233

FROM: OPNAV
TO: CO MARDET PEIPING, CO MARDET TIENTSIN

December 4, 1941
040343 CR 0641.

INFO: CINCAF, COM16

Destroy this system at discretion and send word JABBERWOCK when this has been done. All registered publications except this system must be destroyed immediately by MARDETS PEIPING and TIENTSIN and reported by word "BOOMERANG" in plain language. Use discretion on all other confidential papers.

No. 234

FROM: OPNAV
TO: NAVSTA GUAM

December 4, 1941
042017 CR 0701.

INFO: CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMFOURTEEN, COMSIXTEEN

Action addressee destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter, with the exception of that which is necessary for current purposes and special intelligence. Retain minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with OPNAV, CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMS 14 and 16. Report which crypto-channels are retained. Be prepared to destroy instantly all classified matter you retain in event of emergency.

No. 235

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA TOKYO, ALUSNA BANGKOK, ASTALUSNA PEIPING, ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI

December 4, 1941
042019 CR 0703.

INFO: CINCAF

Action addressees also destroy all secret and confidential files with the exception of those which are essential for current purposes. Destroy all other papers which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the U.S. This supplements my 040330.

No. 236

FROM: OPNAV
TO: CINCAF

December 4, 1941
042018 CR 0702.

Wake should now be stripped of all secret and confidential publications and papers which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the U.S. At your discretion, keep for essential communications a minimum number of cryptographic channels. Advise which ones are retained. Your 120828.

Trans. 00-00-00

No. 237

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER (VICE-CHIEF, GENERAL STAFF))

December 5, 1941[a]
276.

(Parts 1-5.)

Part 1.

1. In the severe criticism which the U.S. Secretary of State has recently directed against Japan (cf. DOMEI wires), there are many points which serve to show the firm resolution of the U.S. Gov't authorities. However, it is felt that these statements are intended as a reprimand in an attempt to bluff Japan into intimidation and check her southward advance.

Part 2.

2. We will give you 2 or 3 examples which can be regarded as a basis for the above conjecture.

(A) When relations between Japan and the U.S. were tense at the time of the invasion of Siam, discussions appeared in newspapers and elsewhere. Some were of the vein that there was no need at all to pull Britain's chestnuts out of the fire and thereby risk the danger of a war between the U.S. and Japan which would be very costly and which, it was feared, would drag on for a long time; others said that first of all, a temporary agreement should be made between Japan and the U.S. on the basis of the status quo, and that the impasse could be broken and the problems solved by proceeding slowly and carefully with negotiations.

Part 3.

This shows that the U.S. people strongly desire to avoid war between the U.S. and Japan. It is clear that the possibility is very remote that the U.S. Gov't will ignore public opinion and fling the country headlong into a clash with Japan.

(B) Yesterday on the 4th, the Washington TIMES HERALD published an article in which it spoke of a plan drawn up by the President which essentially proposed to increase the army and navy to 10,000,000 and then by sending an expeditionary force of 5,000,000 to completely crush the Axis.

Part 4.

It makes one wonder whether it isn't a scheme of some of the government authorities to throw a scare into Japan. The article adds that since neither ROOSEVELT nor HULL has confirmed or denied the authenticity of the plan, it gives the matter a certain degree of credence.

Part 5.

(C) At the conference today (the 5th) between HULL and our Ambassador, in view of HULL's attitude, all was calm and harmonious on the surface. The fact that he suggested continuing the conference in the future makes one think that they are not absolutely resigned to war with Japan and are not thinking of rushing headlong into a struggle.

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[a] Note date of translation.

Trans. 5-23-45

No. 238

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) December 6, 1941[a]
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff) # 276.

3. With circumstances as described above, in the event that the Japanese Army invades Siam we must be prepared from the outset for a war with England and America and we must be in complete readiness for operations to meet this contingency. However, we surmise that England and America will not immediately declare war but may at first close the consulates, increase economic pressure (such as in agreements between Japan and Latin America), and occupy the Netherlands East Indies. But in the event of a Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies and an assault on Singapore, we believe that America will take increasingly severe steps against Japan.

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[a] Note date of translation.

Trans. 3-31-45

No. 239

FROM: Peking December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo Circular # 625.

To be handled in government code.

Re my secret military communication # 262 (Not available) of November 30th.

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her Consulates and prohibited all communications between them and enemy countries.

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland Consulates.

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 240

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 6, 1941
#901.

Re my #844[a] (in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal, and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.)

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902.[b]

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

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[a] See IV, 214.
[b] See IV, 241A for 14 pt. message (DoD comment).

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 241

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 7, 1941
#907.

(Urgent—very important.)

Re my #902[a].

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

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[a] See IV, 241A.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 241A

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 6, 1941
#902.

(Part 1 of 14.)

Separate telegram.

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Goernment of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each ----- place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intention, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

(Part 2 of 14.)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands goverment to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

(Part 3 of 14.)

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a

settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

(Part 4 of 14.)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-Americn relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to t e northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

(Part 5 of 14.)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese government.

(Page 6 of 14.)

From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regard the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

(Part 7 of 14.)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

(Part 8 of 14.)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligation under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

(Part 9 of 14.)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

(Part 10 of 14.)

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at the times more inhuman than military pressure.

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr ——— (45 letters garbled or missing) ——— been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice

the ——es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

(Part 11 of 14.)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good examplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the a—— (50 letters missed) ——sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

(Part 12 of 14.)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

(Part 13 of 14.)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND[a] presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTAUL YLAK——[b] be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

Trans. 12-6-41

(Part 14 of 14.)

(*Note:* In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

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[a] Probably "and as".
[b] Probably "China, can but".

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 242

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 6, 1941
#905.

(Urgent.)

(-----.)

According to AP and UP reports the State Department has announced that the President had wired a personal message to His Majesty the Emperor. Please wire me the fact.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 243

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 7, 1941
#908.

(Urgent.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations; matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 244

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 7, 1941
#910.

(Extremely urgent.)

After deciphering part 14 of my #902[a], and also #907[b], #908[c], and #909[d], please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner all secret documents.

[a] See IV, 241A.
[b] See IV, 241.
[c] See IV, 243.
[d] See IV, 467.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 245

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

December 7, 1941
#1278.

Re your #910[a].

Your instructions and your #911 (not available) have been duly received and decoded, and as soon as we have composed and dispatched this telegram we will commence the demolition and destruction by fire.

Also, we have destroyed the codes brought by Kosaka.

Furthermore, the key of your #881 (Instructions for disposing of codes) and your Circular #2400 (re new keying method for cipher machine), should have been burned but because the mails to Mexico are not safe it has not yet been sent.

[a] See IV, 244.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 246

FROM: CNO
TO: CINCPAC, COM PANAMA, CINCAF, PACIFIC NORTHERN, PACIFIC SOUTHERN, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COSTAL FRONTIERS

December 7, 1941
072252 CR 0102

Execute against Japan unrestricted air and submarine warfare. CINCAF inform British and Dutch. Inform Army.

No. 247

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Circular

December 8, 1941
Circular #2508.

(Part 1 of 5.) Rio de Janeiro Circular #346.

Statement by the Imperial Japanese Government December 8, 1941.

An Imperial Rescript declaring war having been graciously granted, the Japanese Government hereby makes an announcement to all the world.

"It is the immutable policy of Japan to insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to the cause of world peace, while the guiding principle of its foreign policy has been to carry out the aforesaid national policy by cultivating friendship with all nations.

"Unfortunately, the China affair broke out, owing to the fact that China failed to comprehend Japan's true intentions, and provoked a conflict, but under the august virtue of our sovereign, our Imperial forces proved victorious wherever they went. All important points in China have now fallen into our hands, and farsighted Chinese leaders sharing the same views with us have established a new national government of China with which Japan has forged the ties of neighbourly friendship, and which has already been recognized by as many as eleven friendly powers. Today, the Chungking

(continued in part 2.)

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 248

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Circular

December 8, 1941
Circular # 2508.

(Part 2 of 5.) Rio de Janeiro Circular # 346.

(Continued from Part 1.)

Government, surviving in the remote interior, can do no more than continue its futile resistance. However, the United States of America and the British Empire, unwilling to alter their senseless policy of keeping East Asia permanently in a servile position, obstructed by all means the settlement of the China affair.

"Moreover, they instigated the Netherlands East Indies, menaced French Indo-China and resorted to all possible measures for a view alienating Japan ----- natural aspiration to promote with these countries of the south the relationship of common prosperity, that it appeared they were about to open a planned attack upon us. Finally, they went so far to adopt the outrageous measure of severing economic relations with Japan. Between non-belligerent powers the rupture of economic relations constitutes a hostile attack comparable to a challenge by armed force. ----- even with such an impermissible -----, the two powers, by inducing other countries to follow suit, used the increase of armed forces on all sides of Japan."

(Part 3 not available.)

(continued in part 4.)

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 249

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Circular

December 8, 1941
Circular # 2508.

(Part 4 of 5.)

. . . "There exists any hope or formula to maintain the peace of the Pacific in cooperation with the United States and associate powers through the adjustment of our relations with them by peaceful means. The stability of East Asia and the existence of ----- Japan are now in jeopardy. Even today they are directly attacking our armored forces. Such being the situation, an Imperial Rescript declaring war on the United States of America and the British Empire

has been issued. The Government is filled with awe on receiving the Imperial injunction. It is time for us, one hundred million subjects of His Majesty to stand up resolutely with a unity of will strong as iron, and devote the nation's total strength to the prosecution of the war in order that we may eliminate forever the sources of evil in East Asia and thereby meet the august wishes of our sovereign.

"There remains, glorious as the sun and stars, the Imperial Rescript on Japan's mission to enable all nations to have each its proper place in the world. All immutable is our policy to realize, prosperity of Japan,

(continued in part 5)

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 250

FROM: Tokyo — December 8, 1941
TO: Circular — Circular # 2508.

(Part 5 of 5.) Rio de Janeiro Circular # 346.

. . . "China and Manchoukuo through the cooperation and collaboration of the three countries, and to lay the foundation for the rise and progress of East Asia. And firm and unshakable as ever is our national resolve that, in alliance with Germany and Italy sharing the same aspirations with Japan, we should mark a foundation for world peace and march forward towards the construction of new order. Japan is now obliged newly to take action in the various regions of the south, but it should be stressed that we harbour no hostile intention toward the peoples of those regions. We only desire to do away with the tyranny of America and Britain and to restore East Asia to its proper and undefiled state of existence and share in the enjoyment of common prosperity with them all. We -----[a]

[a] Incomplete.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 251

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS, Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) — December 8, 1941[a]
TO: Circular (Berlin, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City, Stockholm) (SIKUGUN) — # 693.

(3 Parts Complete.)

(REVISION.)

1. Japan has been patient since the spring but the tyrannical attitude of the U.S. has made it impossible to reach any compromise in our negotiations and today Imperial Japanese Army, Navy, and Air Units attacked U.S. and British forces in the south. (We are sending a separate wire on the details of the negotiations.)

We need not emphasize the fact that the fate of our country is at stake in this opening of hostilities.

For the time being, please stress the following points in propaganda against the U.S.:

Part 2.

1. Britain and the U.S. had been steadfast in their opposition to Japan's fixed and natural policy of prosecuting the China incident. Moreover, they had increased military preparations, organized an economic blockade, and were completely encircling Japan. Finally, it reached the point where the very existence of the Japanese Empire was threatened.

2. Japan has great faith in the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis and has made clear her determination to cooperate in the establishment of a new world order.

Part 3.

2. We would like you to send us (a) detailed report(s) of your opinions on the decisive step taken by Japan and continue sending intelligence reports. It is our earnest hope that even though your daily living conditions may grow more and more restricted, that you shall continue in your work, helping our country now embroiled in a great conflict.

(Wire addressed to all attaches.)

3. For daily reports on the situation, other than special reports, please rely on DOMEI wires and overseas broadcasts.

---

*Note date of translation.

Trans. 1-13-45

No. 252

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

December 13, 1941
940.

(Ankara to Tokyo # 242.)

. . . 1. Foreign Minister SARADOGURU told the German Counselor here on the 8th that he had received word from the Ambassador in Tokyo that we were going to commence the war on the 10th. He received a great shock from the announcement that came at this time -----

Trans. 12-20-41

No. 253

FROM: Seattle (Sato)
TO: Tokyo

October 22, 1941
147.

(Priority.)

The following warships entered Bremerton Naval Yard on the 21st: The Warspite (repairs are to be made to her bridge), the Maryland and a vessel which seems to be a cruiser.

Relayed to ----- and Los Angeles.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 254

FROM: Seattle (Sato)
TO: Tokyo

October 28, 1941
150.

(Priority.)

In commemoration of Navy Day, the 27th, fifteen Coast Guard vessels sailed through the harbor here in single file. Their names were as follows: The *Kane, Giruma*[a], the *Brooks,* the *Fox* (the above listed vessels have had their four-inch guns replaced by five-inch guns; all of these were brand-new ones), the Frigate *Bird,* the *Crow,* the *Pintail,* the *Eagle 57, Batukei*[a], the *Butternut,* the *Amber,* the *YP 83, 87, 89,* and *90.*

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 255

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) November 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff) # 226.

According to (a) certain important person(s) having connections with the United States War Department, a large number of (?heavy bombers?) as well as fighter planes were freshly dispatched to Alaska as reinforcements during 3, 4, and 5 November. There were 6 companies of bombers and 20 companies of fighters, probably about 150 planes (in all). Because it is such an excessively large number of planes, and even though it may be an underhanded American scheme to force us to compromise by making a show of readiness to go to war against Japan, I am reporting it for your information exactly as I heard it.

Trans. 2-15-45

No. 256

FROM: Seattle (Sato) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 165.

(Priority.)

(Message to Washington Circular # 80.)

Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: Saratogo, Warspite, Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.

Relayed to ----- and Los Angeles.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 257

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 25, 1941
TO: Seattle # 026.

Regarding Warspite, a British war ship now under repair at Bremerton.

Please investigate progress of repair, also when repair is completed report day and time of its departure and if possible find out its destination and report.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 258

FROM: Tokyo — November 29, 1941
TO: San Francisco — Circular # 2431.

Make full report beginning December 1st on the following.

Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at which it arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 259

FROM: Seattle — December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 184.

Urgent intelligence.

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.
2. The Saratoga sailed the same day.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 260

FROM: Tokyo — October 28, 1941
TO: Mexico — # 218.

(Strictly Secret.)

Have you begun the work of furnishing general information? Please wire me the results.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 261

FROM: Mexico (Miura) — October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 427.

(Secret.)

Re your # 218[a].

After talking the matter over with the Naval Attache here, we wired # 57 to the Chief of the Special Service Section of the Naval General Staff, and we are at present waiting for a reply. Since, for reason of the necessity of maintaining the security of the "L" organ, the naval authorities are not in favor of furnishing general information, will you please take the matter up again with the Navy and wire me the reply.

[a] See IV, 260.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 262

FROM: Tokyo — November 5, 1941
TO: Mexico City — # 225.

Re your # 427[a].

General intelligence in contradistinction to Naval intelligence is used for reference purposes by the Foreign Office. Therefore please reorganize your office immediately along the line of my communication No. 953.[b]

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[a] See IV, 261.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 263

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) — November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 432.

Re your # 225[a].

Your communication No. 953[b] has not arrived. Please wire the gist of it immediately.

---

[a] See IV, 262.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 264

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) — October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 231.

According to intelligences coming from Costa Rica, I have learned the following:

1. It is understood that the American air force has decided to take over bases in the Golfo Dulce off Costa Rica and the Gulf of Fonseca which faces on the territory of (Honduras ?).

2. It is understood that the Government of the United States has admonished the various nations of Central and South America to watch rigorously residents of Axis affiliation.

3. The Government of the United States is now preparing to construct destroyer, submarine, and air bases in the (Gulf/Bay?) of Keyatamu[a] in the southeastern area of the Island of Cocos off the coast of Puntarenas.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 265

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #220.

(Part 1 of 2.)

1. Ship movements from the 14th to the 18th:

Moving toward the Pacific: 4 American, 1 British freighters; 2 American tankers.

Moving toward the Atlantic: 4 American, 2 British, 1 Dutch freighters; 1 American tanker, 1 American passenger steamer. Recently ships have been going through the canal at night.

2. In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th. (Naturally they do not allow us to inspect the forts.) I found that construction is going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and 8 barracks to accommodate 200 men each.

At Corozal, 4 two-hundred-men barracks, 55 two-family officer's quarters and a 500-patient hospital are nearing completion.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 266

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #220.

(Part 2 of 2.)

At Fort Clayton there are stationed, as before, the 2nd Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st Engineers, and the 33rd Infantry. Besides barracks for the (signal ?) units attached to these groups, 18 or (48?) barracks large enough to accommodate 250 persons each are approaching completion. In addition to the recently completed hangars at Howard Field, barracks for 26 companies have been roughly completed at Fort Kobbe. Some of these are already in use (details will be sent (by mail ?)). In the Canal Zone there are between the two oceans three cruisers, 8 new type destroyers, 18 submarines, one gunboat, and one submarine tender. The construction work of the submarine base at Balboa is progressing. According to information coming from -----, 16-inch guns have been emplaced on Pearl Islands, and some of the warships of (this country ?) are patrolling the waters around them.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 267

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #232.

1. On the 27th, a warship of the Omaha class left this port for the Pacific.

2. On the same day, two single-funnel destroyers, one light cruiser, and one 10,000 ton class transport were anchored in Balboa harbor.

3. On the 26th, one American destroyer and two submarines were anchored in the harbor at Christobal.

4. From the 22nd until the 27th, four American and four British merchant vessels passed through the Canal bound for the Pacific (one of the British vessels was of the 14,000 ton class).

Six American merchant vessels, one American tanker, and one Netherlands cargo ship passed through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 268

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #241.

1. On the 3rd, one American destroyer was seen to pass through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. On the same day, an American warship (which did not seem to be the *Zane*), having two funnels on her fore deck and airplane equipment on her after deck, of 2,000 or 3,000 tons, was seen to pass through the Canal going in the same direction.

2. From the 2nd to the 4th of this month, nine American freighters and one tanker passed through the Canal heading in the direction of the Pacific. Five American freighters and one American passenger vessel as well as one Danish ship were observed passing through the Canal heading in the direction of the Atlantic.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 269

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #246.

1. According to news from an Italian source, it is reported as follows: Fifty army air officers of Italian origin who had been training at RIOHATO departed for China during the end of October. It is thought that they were sent to China as they are of Italian blood and would not be suitable for Europe.

2. Report on ships passing through Panama.

November 2nd, an army transport of over 6,000 tons, with capacity load of army men, headed for Pacific.

3. November 4th, two cruisers of Omaha type anchored at Balboa.

4. Ships that passed during 4th and 5th towards Pacific, one U.S. freighter, one British freighter, 1400 tons. From Pacific, three U.S. freighters, one U.S. tanker, one British freighter, 20,000 tons.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 270

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #265.

1. The warship mentioned in my #262[a] is not of the Vanoc class but has been confirmed to be the Diomede. Its destination is the Pacific.

2. On the 10th two American submarines moved through the Canal into the Pacific.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 271

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 11,(?)
TO: Tokyo 1941
273.

Ships passed through Panama on 11th and 12th.

To Pacific:
Freighters: 1 American, 2 British, (one 10,000 ton with tower looked like warship).
To Atlantic:
Freighters: 3 American, 3 British, (one with 2 guns, two with 1 gun).

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 272

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 282.

1. On the night of the 11th, a British light cruiser went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. This cruiser is understood to have undergone repairs in San Francisco and seems to have been the *Liverpool*.

2. On the 12th, a British military transport of approximately 27,000 tons, of the Union Castle class, passed through the Canal on its way from the Pacific, filled to capacity with military personnel.

3. Early in November, 12 Douglass two-motored bombers and six Airacobra pursuit planes, flew here to increase the Canal air force.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 273

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 285.

Panama shipping report.

(1) A commercial ship of Union Castle type passed through towards the Atlantic, with about 1000 of what seemed like evacuees (women and children) and a few wounded, aboard, on the 13th.

(2) The heavy cruiser which passed through on the 11th is believed to be passing through to make up a convoy on the Atlantic, and looks as though it had accompanied # 1 (Union Castle type commercial ship) from the Pacific. The German reports say it is a Liverpool class cruiser, but not the Liverpool.

(3) The Omaha type ship has the bow painted black and the stern painted white and at a glance looks like a destroyer.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 274

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #300.

1. On the 18th, one British ship and one Netherlands vessel of approximately 17,000 tons went through the Canal in the direction of the Pacific. One 10,000 ton British vessel and one American ship went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic.
2. One destroyer and one submarine are undergoing repairs in Cristobal.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 275

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #310.

1. On the 19th and 20th, four American cargo ships, one British cargo ship and one tanker, and one French ----- passed across to the Pacific.
2. An American cargo ship and one tanker passed across to the Atlantic.
3. (----- message goes off -----.)

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 276

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #321.

(Part 1 of 4.) (Strictly secret.)

I suppose you are already acquainted with these facts but the manner of defending the canal is now as follows:

1. The United States is publishing as though it were utterly true, that a Troy horse has been found not only among the foreigners in Panama but also in government circles. However, this country replies that her principle is Panama for Panamanians. ARIAS stated that though Panama was weak, if certain concessions were made to neighboring countries, the United States might be defied. The United States, however, fixed his regime good and proper. At present, the canal officials are checking over, one by one, 2,000 Germans, 700 Italians, and 400 Japanese.

2. I hear that the United States has set up in Panama air bases (some of which have -----), anti-aircraft gun bases, and airplane detector bases (some of these detectors are said to be able to discover a plane 200 miles away). Thus, we see that in her policy toward South America, the United States is now exerting unprecedented pressure.

PART 2

In spite of the fact that it is in violation of the treaty concluded in 1936, the United States is coercing Panama where the canal is. She is expending vast sums of money there, and if necessary will take still more drastic steps. However, the difference in the points of view is forever and eternally a cancer's growth in the relations of the two countries.

3. From the Pacific to the Atlantic coast, between Panama and Colon, there is no thoroughfare. The reason why one has not been constructed, is that the jungle constitutes a natural defense for the canal. As an indication of the United States' policy of defense, lately they have begun to construct a road even of macadam which will probably go as far as Colon. However,

it is not yet completed. (This is an exceptional case in preparation for the possible destruction of the canal.) It also seems that when complete the American continental highway will extend as far as the borders of Colombia, but when this will be is uncertain.

PART 3

4. The United States government is going on the assumption that the attack on the Canal will be made from both air and sea. Especially, in preparation for a possible attack from the Pacific side, it has reenforced the special fleet recently, as I have already indicated in my telegram. They have mapped out an area 900 (kilometers ?), with the center of the radius at Panama, as a patrol area and are constantly patrolling it. The Army has built fortifications here and there in the territory of Panama in which there are 16″ and 14″ gun emplacements. (These forts are equipped with hygienic facilities. The soldiers are indulging in pleasures. The distance ----- of the fortifications if ----- exceeds 1500 (kilometers ?).) In addition, they are endeavoring to guard such vital points as locks, spillways, and especially the control tower controlling the spillway on Lake Gatun and the electric plant.

PART 4

The anti-air defenses (?) on lock #1, which is now being used, are being improved. (Of course, there are anti-air defenses (?) at lock #3.) The naval defense area, patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene (on?) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands.

5. Present army strength is 47,000; naval 10,000; air force, 5,000. In addition, it is estimated that there is approximately twice this general total, made up of the families of laborers (excluding Panamanians).

Trans. 12-25-41

No. 277

FROM: Washington — December 1, 1941
TO: Panama — #040.

Report passage through the Canal of the U.S.S. MISSISSIPPI, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, WASP.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 278

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) — November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #460.

Reports from our Consul in BEREN (Belem ?) regarding the number and dates of U.S. bomber planes flown from Natal to British Bathurst (on west coast of Africa) are as follows:

	Date	*Number of planes*
August	30	2
September	4	2
	30	2 (40 passengers each)
October	16	3 (4 passengers each)
	19	3 (same as above)
	— (?)	3 (same as above)

	— (?)	4 (same as above)
November	5	1 (40 passengers)
	9	2 (4 passengers)
	12	3

Of the above list, those having large number of passengers are ships carrying technicians to strengthen bases at Bathurst, (refer to my message # 415[a]). Those with few passengers may be thought to be ships being flown to Near East British forces for their use.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12–7–41

No. 279

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 15, 1941
TO: Honolulu (Riyoji) # 111.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

Trans. 12–3–41

No. 280

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my # 219[a] on that day.

Area A[b]—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C[c]—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th, the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D[d].

3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to -----.

[a] Not deciphered. Dated 14 November 1941.
[b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
[c] East Loch.
[d] Middle Loch.

Trans. 12–6–41

No. 281

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 224.

An advance party of 46 American transport experts and engineers, headed by Captain RICHARD M. JONES arrive in port on the 16th to operate trucks on the Burma Road. It is said that there are now in use on the Burma Road 3,500 new type trucks, mostly of 2½ ton capacity.

Trans. 12–5–41

No. 282

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 18, 1941
TO: Honolulu # 113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein; Area "N" Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

Trans. 12–5–41

No. 283

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 20, 1941
TO: Honolulu # 111.

Strictly secret.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet ----- bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

Trans. 12–4–41

No. 284

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 234.

Part 1 of 2. Strictly secret.

Re your # 114[a].

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

2. Recently, the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another

vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

---

[e] Not available.

Trans. 12-16-41

No. 285

FROM: Honolulu
TO: Tokyo

November 24, 1941
234.

Part 2 of 2.

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Monday, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of -----, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

Trans. 12-16-41

No. 286

FROM: Honolulu
TO: Tokyo

November 28, 1941
238.

Military report:

(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots—12; interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 287

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Honolulu

November 28, 1941
119.

Re your message # 243[a].

Secret outside the Department.

Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have traveled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 288

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Honolulu

November 29, 1941
122.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 289

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Honolulu

November 28, 1941
118.

(Priority.)

Re your # 232[a].

To be handled in government code.

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 290

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)
TO: Tokyo

December 1, 1941
241.

(In 2 parts complete.)

Re your # 119[a].

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on:

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as an ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on:

(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns cannot be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message # 231[b] were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 knots) is possible, however, figuring on 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleship is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

---

[a] See IV, 287.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 291

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) December 2, 1941
TO: Honolulu # 123.

(Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Trans. 12-30-41

No. 292

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) December 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 245.

(In 2 parts complete.)

Military secret.

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of # 3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

a. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

Meaning		*Signal*
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units	Preparing to sortie	1
A number of carriers	Preparing to sortie	2
Battleship divisions	All departed between 1st and 3rd.	3
Carriers	Several departed between 1st and 3rd.	4
Carriers	All departed between 1st and 3rd.	5
Battleship divisions	All departed between 4th and 6th.	6
Carriers	Several departed between 4th and 6th.	7
Carriers	All departed between 4th and 6th.	8

2. Signals.

a. Lanikai[a] Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p.m.	1
One light between 9 and 10 p.m.	2
One light between 10 and 11 p.m.	3
One light between 11 and 12 p.m.	4
b.	
Two lights between 12 and 1 a.m.	5
Two lights between 1 and 2 a.m.	6
Two lights between 2 and 3 a.m.	7
Two lights between 3 and 4 a.m.	8

Part 2.

c. Lanikai[a] Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

d. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House[b] will indicate the following:

Times	*Signal*
1900 - 2000	3
2000 - 2100	4
2100 - 2200	5
2200 - 23--	6
2300 - 2400	7
0000 - 0100	8

e. K.G.M.B.[c] Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHICH..GO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium[d] at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40′N, longitude 156° 19′W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

Time	*Signal*
From 7 - 8	3 or 6
From 8 - 9	4 of 7
From 9 - 10	5 or 8

[a] Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
[b] A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.
[c] A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
[d] At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 293

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) December 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 247.

Ship report.

2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.
3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 294

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) December 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 248.

Ship report.

December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movement.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 295

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 249.

On the afternoon of the 3rd, one British gunboat entered Honolulu Harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 tons class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft. ----- -----.

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port, a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.

Trans. 12-12-41

No. 296

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 252.

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message # 239[a] arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships
3 light cruisers
16 destroyers

Four ships of the Honolulu class and ----- were in dock.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 297

FROM: Honolulu — December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 253.

Re the last part of your # 123[a].

1. On the American continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred ballons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa[b], there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion, the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

---

[a] See IV, 291.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 298

FROM: Honolulu — December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were ----- and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition, there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 299

FROM: Davao (Kihara) October 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo #156.

Regarding My #124[a].

As an air base for central Mindanao district, 300 men are being managed by Americans, and the ground is now being leveled.

An underground hangar and underground oil tanks are planned; however, the material for this is delayed so that building on this is not progressing as planned.

Already several times a week planes are flying here, and it seems they are expecting large heavy bomber planes too, very soon.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 300

FROM: Manila (Nihro) October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #701.

The American ship *American Leader* which arrived in port on the 20th is unloading more than ten tanks, each tank equipped with a gun having a barrel about six feet long.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 301

FROM: Manila (Nihro) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #693.

Primary intelligence. The Houston, the Marblehead, eight destroyers, ten submarines (of the 170 and 190 class) and one mine layer left port on the morning of the 20th. Their destination is unknown.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 302

FROM: Manila (Nihro) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #711.

1. The REI[a] and one destroyer left during the morning of the 25th. Destination is not known.
2. Ships in port are the following:
a. Manila.
TON[a]

MADDO[a]
CHESTER
BUKKU[a]
BERU[a]
ROYGXOMU (?)
HON[a]
5 destroyers
11 large submarines
5 small submarines
b. Cavite.
PASU[a] (under repair)
2 destroyers

3. There are indications that all of the vessels are to be repainted into an ash color (almost a grey). The TON[a] and one destroyer have already been repainted.

---

[a] Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are:

REI	— Langley
TON	— Houston
MADDO	— Marblehead
BUKKO	— Black Hawk
BERU	— Isabel
HON	— Heron
PASU	— Canopus

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 303

FROM: Manila — October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #707.

1. Two destroyers, the Ton[a] and the Maddo,[a] two submarines and one mine layer touched port on the afternoon of the 23rd.

2. The President Cleveland, which entered the port on the afternoon of the 23rd, landed American soldiers (an unconfirmed report is there were 2,500).

3. The Chester, a Class A Cruiser no doubt convoying the Cleveland, also entered the port on the afternoon of the 23rd.

4. Referring to my #661[b] and 685[c] the Gold Star was a mistake for the Ohotos[a] (or Ohotou[a]) estimated to be a 10,000 ton ship formerly Norwegian and remodeled after the war).

---

[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Not available.
[c] Manila wires Tokyo the ships that are laid up in the harbor at the present time and the ones that left port on the afternoon of the 13th.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 304

FROM: Manila (Nihro) — October 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #713.

1. The PISU entered Cavite on the 26th and the REI entered on the morning of the 27th.
2. On the morning of the 27th, 3 destroyers, 11 submarines of the N type, the HON and 2 minelayers left port, destination unknown.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 305

FROM: Manila — October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #719 (?).

The TON[a] and the MADDO[b] sailed on the afternoon of the 28th and the Chester on the morning of the 29th. Destination unknown.

---

[a] Houston ?.
[b] Marblehead ?.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 306

FROM: Manila (Nihro) — November 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #722.

1. The TON[a], MADDO[a], HON[a], 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 minesweepers entered port on the 31st. But the TON[a] left again on the morning of the 1st, destination unknown.
2. On the morning of the 2st the President Cleveland and President Madison left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up, (number uncertain).
3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands is as follows:
(a) Military planes.
Large bombers, 29.
Scout planes, 324.
The same, B type, 62.
Fighters, 317.
The same, B type, 131.
Pursuit planes, 302.
The same, D type, 69.
Training planes, 49.
Total, 1283.
(b) Naval planes.
Large flying boats, 26.
4. Ships in port on the 1st: MADDO[a], BAKKU[a], PISU[a], HON[a], BERU[a], 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite: REI[a], PASU[a], 2 Z.
5. According to a report from the De La Rama steamship company two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons), had been requisitioned by the local American Army.

---

[a] Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are: TON (Houston); MADDO (Marblehead); HON (Heron); BUKKU (Black Hawk); PISU (Canopus); BERU (Isabel); REI (Langley); PASU (Canopus).

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 307

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #723.

(Re your #318.)[a]

Strict guard is being maintained, hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows:

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino ----- ----- (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3,000 workmen are being used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000 infantry troops left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are being built there and the docks are being enlarged.

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is said that even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur ?) and by the middle of October there are less than two kilometers that had not been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day and night and the progress is amazing.

4. In Iba there are 30 or 40 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several score of *altitude planes (?)* it is said.

Details by mail.

---

[a] "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest."

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 308

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 5, 1941
TO: Manila #349.

Re your #722[a] (reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine Islands).

Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in paragraph 3.

---

[a] IV, 306.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 309

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #727.

Intelligence.

1. Since about a month ago little by little brown soldiers have been arriving at the Stotsenburg Barracks. The number at present is about two or three thousand. In view of the fact that these soldiers speak Spanish, they may be "Iko's." I understand that they are not very friendly with American soldiers. We are now secretly investigating where they have come from.

2. Taraiao[a]. Recently the Migual Air Field has been extended to form a rectangle about 1,000 meters long.

3. All the wooden bridges on the national highway between Taraiao and Lingayen[b] have been replaced with concrete bridges.

4. At the foot of a hill situated to the north of Teraiao (the hill overlooks the Lingayen Gulf) about 200 barracks have been constructed. I understand that new barracks are being built at Ste Ignatia.

5. From what I hear the American soldiers stationed at Stotsenburg maintained an arrogant attitude toward the Filipinos and, since there have been two or three cases of assault on Filipinas, the Filipinos are furious.

---

[a] Tarallo, Camarines Province.
[b] Pangasinan Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands on Lingayen Gulf.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 310

FROM: Tokyo November 5, 1941
TO: Manila #355.

For Secretary Yuki.

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:

These items in regard to each port of call:

(1) Conditions at air ports on land.
(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
(3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
(4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 311

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 5, 1941
TO: Manila #349.

Re your #722[a].

Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in paragraph 3.[a]

---

[a] See IV, 306.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 312

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #735.

Of first importance. Re my #732[a].

The following information has been pieced together from two intelligence reports.

1. 50 American officials and 1200 Philippine soldiers are stationed at Bugallon in Pangasinan[b] province. There are also 8 light tanks and 8 aircraft guns (with fixed mounts). There is a number of American artillery men stationed in the Yashiyama (literally—Coconut (?) mountain) between Sual[c] and Lingayen[c].

2. There are 10 two-motored light bombers, 190 Curtis fighting planes (up to now intelligence reports have given the number to be 60 but recently reenforcements were received) and 400 American air force officers stationed at Iba in Zambales[d] province. A division of Philippine soldiers (15,000) are stationed at San Marcelino. This division is composed of 3 infantry regiments, 3 field artillery companies and 3 self-propelled armored artillery companies and it is expected that a reenforcement of a large number of tanks will soon be received. They have recently started the construction of a new air field there.

Furthermore, 320 Philippine soldiers are stationed at Botolan.

3. They are now constructing barracks at three points (out 4 kilometers, (less than 10) kilometers and 22 kilometers) on the road from Tarlac to Santa Ignacia in Tarlac province which will accommodate 500, 1000, 1500 soldiers respectively, a total of 3,000. Also construction is being started on a new airfield 5 kilometers south of Tarlac (a five year plan) apparently a part of the leveling has already been finished. A military road from Capas through O'Donnell to Botolan in Zambales province is almost completed. (Upon several occasions lately troop camouflaging was observed.)

4. Recently 200 light tanks were (landed ?) at Stotsenburg in Pampanga[e].

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Province north of Manila beyond Tarlac province.
[c] Pangasinan Province.
[d] On the western side of the peninsula across the bay from Manila.
[e] On the northwest shore of Manila Bay between Tarlac and Bataan Province.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 313

FROM: Manila
TO: Tokyo

November 8, 1941
738.

Re your # 353[a]

Retransmitting that portion of the message following *Raichaku*.

732. Re my # 723[b].

1. Since the last part of last month a reenforcement of 4 or 5 thousand soldiers has been received in the province of Bataan.[c] They were stationed along the coast and in the central mountain districts at Saysain,[d] Cobcaben, Lamao, Limay, etc.

2. An excellent military highway has been constructed between Lamao and Mariveles (154 kilometers to 157 kilometers from Manila) along the coast and in the interior. Sentries are posted at the entrance prohibiting the passage of civilians, Philippine military and others not possessing special permits ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- (powerful) guns and many defenses seem to have been put in.

Although the road between Bagao and Balanga has already been converted into a military highway, construction of a military road connecting Moron and Olongapa has been suspended. I believe that commercial connections between these places have been by boat for a long time.

(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE.)[e]

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 307.
[c] Philippine province across the bay from Manila.
[d] All places mentioned in this message are in Bataan province.
[e] The last part of the message was not retransmitted.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 314

FROM: Manila (Nihro)
TO: Tokyo

November 8, 1941
742.

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows: The *Marblehead*, the *Black Hawk*, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the *Heron*, the *Wohotosu*[a], the *Isobel*, and the tanker *Trinity* (the latter arrived on the 8th).

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 315

FROM: Manila (Nihro)
TO: Tokyo

November 10, 1941
745.

1. The Houston touched port at Cavite on the 8th.
2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown.

3. Two cargo boats (former President boats of the 10,000 ton class with the names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing 2,300 soldiers.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 316

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #746.

Re my #722[a], first part of part 3—the number of large attack planes, latest models, 4-motored B-19's, is 32.

Re my #727[b], the black soldiers are American Negroes.

---

[a] See IV, 306.
[b] See IV, 309.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 317

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #753.

On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on -----. It is thought likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port. This vessel preceded the cruiser into port.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 318

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #754.

According to a report handed on to me by a Japanese who has lived in the Province of Ilocos Norte for some fourteen or fifteen years, the following has been ascertained.

1. At the present time there are approximately 400 Philippine soldiers and seven or eight officers stationed in Laoag[a]. It is being rumored, however, that the Philippine troops will be increased to approximately 1,700. At the present time they are constructing additional barracks.

2. There seems to be no indication that they plan the expansion of the present civil airport in Laoag (length, 1,200 metres; width, 850 metres) nor are they stationing any military planes at that field. Aside from a reconnaissance flight nightly (one plane) over the coastal area in the vicinity of the city, no extensive activity is in progress.

3. Though it is said that Claveria[b] and Burgos[b] are being equipped with ----- -----, the details are unknown. (I am continuing my private investigations in this connection.)

---

[a] Seaport in the Province of Ilocos Norte on the Island of Luzon, P.I.
[b] Towns on the northern shore of the Island of Luzon, P.I.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 319

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #755.

A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines Norte[a] is as follows:

1. In that area at the present time there does not seem to be many troops stationed. Only about 60 members of the Philippine Patrol organization, with headquarters in Daet[b], are located in that area. Every day five or six of these patrolmen are dispatched as a relief unit to Paracale[c] and Jose Panganiban[d].

2. The Civil Airport at Paracale is not being used at the present time. Insofar as the military air field at Daet is concerned, though one or two military planes landed there during February of this year, from that time to this there has not been a single military plane alight on this field. As this field is located right on the beach, should it be necessary it is said that naval planes could land in the shipping lane just off of the beach as well.

3. On the point of land, San Muricio[e], north of Jose Panganiban it is rumored that they are equipping ----- with -----, but this has not been verified. (I am continuing my secret investigations.)

4. Twelve or thirteen coastal reconnaissance planes were seen to have flown over the area within a period of three days. Toward the latter part of last year 13 American freighters are said to have entered the port of Panganiban. Since then, almost on the average of once a week, American freighters sail from Batganas[f] to Hondagua[g].

---

[a] Province near southeastern extremity of Luzon.
[b] City on southeastern extremity of the Island of Luzon.
[c] Seaport in the province of Camarines Norte.
[d] English spelling. Cannot identify.
[e] English spelling. Point of land cannot be identified.
[f] Seaport in southwestern Luzon.
[g] Seaport on Lopez Bay off Lamon Bay.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 320

FROM: Manila November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #757.

1. The CA heavy cruiser of my #753[a] was the Portland.
2. On the morning of the 13th a British destroyer of the Defender type entered port.

3. It has been ascertained that 8 *(or 4)?* of the nine submarines of my #742[b] are of the 129 class. They have entered port here recently but the exact date is uncertain.

---

[a] See IV, 317.
[b] See IV, 314.

Trans. 11–13–41

No. 321

FROM: Manila — November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #767.

The following is from a report of a Japanese resident in Cebu.

1. At present there are about 300 American and 2500 Filipino soldiers stationed there. (There are four barracks each with a capacity of about 500 or 600 soldiers.)

2. The airport has an area of about 196 acres but is being enlarged (by use of convict labor). About 12 planes (of medium size) used by the Philippine Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12 or 13 American Army planes, (monoplanes—whether they were scout planes or pursuit planes was not clear), are now stationed there. In addition to these there is one large bomber in the hangar (double type, capacity 40 planes).

3. The headquarters of the former patrol force are being used as the commisariat storehouse and all sorts of provisions are being stored there.

4. On the 22nd of September, about 20 American warships anchored on the northwest coast of the Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle of October two destroyers and one cruiser entered Cebu Harbor and early this month, one oil supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a camouflaged cruiser of the 10,000 ton class, entered port and anchored for two or three days. It has been recognized that occasionally two or three American ships anchor around the south of Mactan, Bacol, and Panglao.

5. There is an open drydock at MAKUGAA (operated by Chinese) capable of handling ships up to 10,000 tons.

Trans. 11–18–41

No. 322

FROM: Tokyo — November 15, 1941
TO: Manila — #368.

Strictly confidential.

Re your #746[a].

Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, and also please make investigations again as to their number.

---

[a] See IV, 316.

Trans. 11–24–41

No. 323

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #767.

1. It has been ascertained that the ship of my #757[a], paragraph 2, was a British transport, the AWATEA which entered port at the same time under convoy, (12,000 or 13,000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board). Both ships sailed again on the evening of the 14th, destination unknown.
2. On the afternoon of the 14th, 4 destroyers, 11 submarines, 1 minelayer, entered port.
3. Ships in port on the 15th:

A. Manila:
MADDO
Portland
BUKKU
BERU
BERU[b]
HON
WOHOTOSU
8 destroyers
20 submarines
1 minelayer

B. Cavite:
TON
PASU

---

[a] See IV, 320.
[b] BERU repeated.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 324

FROM: Manila November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #768.

An AP dispatch from Hong Kong on the 16th, states that a large number of soldiers from Canada disembarked there on the morning of the 16th.

However, I am wondering if these are the same as those reported in my #767[a], paragraph 1.

---

[a] See IV, 321.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 325

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #769.

On the morning of the 17th the
MADDO[a]
Portland

J[b] 10 ships
M[c] 1 ship
left port. Destination unknown.

---

[a] Marblehead (?).
[b] May be garble for "D"—destroyer.
[c] Minelayer.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 326

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #773.

On the 17th, the Bulletin published a special dispatch from Lingayen of the 13th, saying that recently light tanks (54 14-ton tanks), scout cars, provision cars, and baggage cars, and various types of military trucks together with mechanized troops arrived there from Fort Stotsenberg, stayed overnight and then returned again to Fort Stotsenberg. Due to the heat, there were a number of minor troubles, but other than that there were no mishaps. The tanks attained a speed of 60 miles an hour on the sandy beach.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 327

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 20, 1941
TO: Manila #372.

Strictly secret.

Please advise immediately the result of your investigations as to the type of Craft ----- presumed to be in the water adjacent to Subic Bay[a].

Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo.

---

[a] Near Manila, P.I.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 328

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #785.

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st, an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and materiel.

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila—Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu[a]; Pisua; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.

Cavite—Houston (?); Canopus.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 329

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 789.

1. Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount of military stores was removed from the "port area" during the "black-out" on the night of the 21. Forty or fifty civilian buses (carrying the "mark" of the Manila Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal Province district. Investigations are being made to find out if these were loaded with troops.

2. At about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd, 60 light tanks (carrying one gun, two ——) and 20 ammunition trucks were seen leaving (Quezon Bridge?). These light tanks and ammunition trucks were seen on the 21st grouped near the headquarters of the "port area" military police. It is conjectured that (troops?) arrived on military boats recently entering the Harbor. An English language "bulletin" of the 24th stated that a large number of light tanks and ammunition trucks had left at four and six o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd in transit for Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in Pampanga Province. I believe that these had been landed sometime around the 21st. The final destination of these tanks and trucks is now being investigated.

3. At present, it is seen that there are two or three hundred American army trucks near the "port area" which have been imported at short intervals, creating a hurried atmosphere. Also, troops have newly arrived at (certain places in ?) the hills within the city. They are evidently American reinforcements. Feeling among the people, the general, has become tense.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 330

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 790.

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Hollard[a] (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.

2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

[a] Probably the U.S.S. HOLLAND of 8,000 tons.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 331

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 797.

The Portland, BUKKU[a], 2 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on the *26th (?)*. Destination unknown.

---

[a] Probably Black Hawk.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 332

November 27, 1941

U.S. AIR FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

NAVY

Type	*Strength*
PBY-4 (Patrol)	14
PBY-4 (Patrol)	14
SOC-3 (Scout Observation)	4
SOC-1 (Scout Observation	2
J2F-4 (Utility)	3
SOC-1 (Scout Observation)	2
SOC-2 (Scout Observation)	2
052U-2 (Observation)	2
TOTAL	43

2 squadrons of OS2U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the Philippines as soon as practicable. It is expected that they will be shipped from San Pedro in January, 1942.

ARMY

B-18 (Heavy Bomber)	18
B-17 C & D (Heavy Bomber)	35
P-35A (VF)	52
P-40B (VF)	30
P-40E (VF)	117
O-46A (VO)	7
O-49 (VO)	3
O-52 (VO)	10
A-27 (Dive Bomber)	9
C-39 (Combat)	1
C-49 (Combat)	1
P-26A (VF)	15
TOTAL	298

In addition to the above 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been shipped to the Philippines this month, and further extensive reinforcements have been approved for complete delivery by February, 1942.

SUMMARY

Bombers	*Fighters*	*Combat*	*Patrol*	*Observation*	*Utility*	*Total*
62	214	2	28	32	3	341

JAPANESE ESTIMATE OF U.S. AIR FORCES IN PHILIPPINES

Type	*Strength*
Military Planes	
Large bombers	29
Scout planes	324
The same, B type	62
Fighters	317
The same, B type	131
Pursuit planes	302
The same D type	69
Training planes	49
TOTAL	1283
Naval Planes	
Large flying boats	26

No. 333

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #799.

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless squalls come once a day.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 334

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #805.

Ships in port on the 29th.

1. Manila:
   Submarine tender WOTOSU and HORAN[a]
   Submarines 190 class 5
   Submarines 170 class 5
   Submarines 170 class 5

(When the 180 class entered port there were 8 but 3 departed, destination unknown)

   Submarines 150 class 5
   Submarines small size 4
   Oilers, 2 (PISU[a] and TRINITY)
   Destroyers, 2
   Gunboats, 1 (BERU[a])
   Minelayer, 1

2. Cavite:
TON[a]
PASU[a] (being repaired)
3. It was announced on the 27th that for a time the lights at Langley Point in Cavite, at Manila, Baguio, and on the buoys in the bay would be turned out.

---

[a]Probably HOLLAND, PECOS, ISABEL.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 335

FROM: Manila (Nihro) December 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #812.

Ships in port on the 1st.
A. Manila:
Submarine tender HOLLAND.
Submarines, small 2.
Submarines, large 6.
Oilers, 2 (PISU[a] and TRINITY).
Gunboats, 1 (KASUBERU).
The PASU[a] which was undergoing repairs at Cavite lies at anchor of -----.
Cargo ship, 1 (4,000 tons class), taking on provisions.
The submarine tender, WOTOSU.
14 large submarines and 2 destroyers, left port this morning, destination unknown.
The American Navigation (10,000 ton class) entered port about 3 days ago. From it are being unloaded 12 objects 1 meter in diameter and about 3 meters in length. I think they are boilers. (I am making investigations.)
A former Danish ship, the Manchen Maersk (10,000 ton class), present registry Panama, present name unidentifiable (under investigation) entered port this morning, about half loaded, it appeared.
5 British freighters (6,000 ton class) are at the pier taking on cargo, details not ascertainable.
The Spencer Kelogg (American registry, 6,000 ton class), entered port about 2 days ago, unloaded crude oil and is scheduled to load castor oil.
The Don Esteban (requisitioned by the American Army) entered port this morning.
B. Cavite:
TON[a]

---

[a]Probably PECOS, CANOPUS, and HOUSTON.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 336

FROM: Tokyo October 22, 1941
TO: Singapore #316.

Strictly secret.

From the Vice-Chief of General Staff. Through Chancellor TAHIRA please report the following two things concerning the air force now stationed in the Federated Malay States:

1. Their drills and battle maneuvers (aerial formation).
2. Investigate their organization.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 337

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 18, 1941
TO: Singapore #353.

----- ----- ----- that a squadron consisting of eight ships of the 15,000 ton class and ten other boats set out from port on November 4th, with about 10,000 British troops, including many aviators, heading for the Malay States. Therefore, please pay particular attention to the above.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 338

FROM: Tokyo December 5, 1941
TO: Singapore #377.

(Abstract)

Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships.

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 339

FROM: Tokyo October 23, 1941
TO: Hsinking #725.

(Vladivostok to Tokyo #471.)

Relaying No. 471 from Vladivostok to Tokyo.

On the 20th the American Consul remarked regarding this matter that as yet he had received no official communication regarding the tankers coming here and he did not know why. However, it had been decided at the Moscow conference to continue aid to Russia but due to various considerations the transportation of material to Russia in American ships via Vladivostok would be discontinued after the ships that were already on their way had arrived and a new routing would be used. This would undoubtedly be via Iran. There are at present about 100 American tankers and 100 American freighters in this vicinity[a] now.

[a] U.S.—Near East Route.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 340

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Peking, Nanking and Shanghai

November 28, 1941
Cir. # 231.

(Message to Tokyo # 779.)

Local military intelligences are as follows. For your information.

1. At the military review in celebration of the revolution, 47 airplanes of an unrecognizable type flew over the city of Kuibyshev. They were definitely of American design and construction. It seems that large numbers have recently been arriving.

The above is a report of the Japanese Military Attache in the Soviet.

2. Large bodies of anti-Communist mobile forces are fighting in the vicinity of Mininsk (Bumo[a]) and Barugujin[a] (south of Krasnoyarsk), destroying lines of communication and attacking the Kolhoz and Sofhoz. (The above is a spy report.)

3. The 39th Sharpshooters Division (in the neighborhood of Kogaiko[a]) has executed before the firing squad 20 unsuccessful deserters who tried to get into Manchukuo between May and November. To date, 46 Soviet troops have deserted. The Soviet, in order to prevent desertion, has moved certain detachments away from the border or have strung charged barbed wire fences along the border. Another means which they are utilizing is making the regiment responsible for detachments from which there have been deserters.

(The above is intelligence of primary importance.)

4. Recently on the Ude[a] front, the surveillance troops of the Outer Mongolian area have within the last few days deliberately trespassed on Mongolian territory several times, even to the extent of 10 to 20 kilos. They are taking a strong, hostile attitude toward Japanese surveillance troops.

(The above is intelligence of primary importance.)

I have transmitted this to Peitai, Shanghai, and Nadal.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 341

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

November 28, 1941
880.

On the 20th Russian newspapers carried the following story. They said that Domei had reported on the 16th that a Russian division had violated the Manchurian border over an extent of forty kilometers in the neighborhood of -----, and that in the fighting ----- soldiers had been killed and ----- taken prisoner. But the Russian paper said this was at variance with the facts, that Russian soldiers had not crossed the border.

The above story disagrees with telegram # 747[a] from our Manchurian Ambassador to the Foreign Minister in regard to the place and time, but since the facts agree with you please let us know the true situation.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

No. 342

FROM: Seattle (Sato) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #145.

1. After a conference between our offices and Vancouver, Portland, and ----- relative to the matter of embarkations on the *Hikawa Maru*, a plan was drawn up. However, in the event money is not at hand, it has been decided that the three offices will be contacted again.

2. We have made inquiries of the NYK concerning the matter of life belts mentioned in Part 3 of wire #963[a] from the United States to the Foreign Minister, and it is understood that there are plentiful supplies in stock at San Francisco at the price of $2.36 each.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 343

FROM: New York (Morishima) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #484.

Re my message #482[a].

According to further investigations of the cultural society (Bunka-Kai), the Foreign Missions Conference (the combined organization of all American mission boards) has applied to the government for permission to send over $37,000 to Japan proper and over $7,700 to Korea. (This does not include funds for St. Luke's Hospital and Women's Christian College mentioned in a previous telegram.)

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 344

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) October 20, 1941
TO: Washington #71.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

It is understood that Member of Parliament KASAI is scheduled to deliver a lecture on the 29th at the *Konnyū Kyuuerusu*[a] Club on the subject, "Will Japan and the United States Fight?" Right now when we are strengthening our efforts to refute such ideas as "the alienation of Japan and Germany" and "the alienation of the military and the people" brought out in pamphlets distributed among Japanese here by British and American agencies, I believe that this lecture might cause embarrassment to our propaganda work here. Then, too, there is the matter mentioned in the secret letter #159 from Chicago to the Foreign Minister as well as the request by the Ambassador that we caution him as much as possible (at least as long as he is here in this country). Therefore, it is my earnest wish that you have him cancel his lecture.

Relayed to Tokyo and New York.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 345

FROM: Portland — October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #28.

(To be handled in government code.)

(Strictly Secret.)

To the Finance Official.

Japanese evacuees from the United States are not allowed to take with them more than $210.00, and, as a matter of fact, it is impossible for them to remit money. Consequently, the evacuees here who are planning to leave on board the *Hikawa Maru* find themselves in quite a predicament. They have sent to me a representative of theirs and secretly asked if it would not be possible for them to pay to this office cash amounts running from $5,000 to $10,000 and receive in Tokyo in exchange for them cash in Japanese currency at the rate of $23.50 per hundred yen. The fact is that this office is so short of funds that it is not in a position to pay the traveling expense of any official transferring to another place. However, if you would pay the representative, when he arrives, the cash from the funds which are earmarked to meet the general expenses as well as salaries of this office, we should be able to tide the evacuees over this difficulty. Please consider this matter and wire me your reply immediately.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 346

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #974.

From TERASAKI to—YOSHIOKA.

Although tentative reservations have been made for official HARADA to sail on board the Hikawa Maru leaving Seattle on November 4, since his stay here would be too short, if he is to carry out the instructions given in your #545[a], it would be much better if he could leave on board the Terukawa Maru scheduled to sail from Manzanillo early in December. Do you have any objections to this official prolonging his study after ascertaining whether this ship will touch at Mexico?

Please reply by wire.

Relay to Mexico, Seattle.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 347

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — October 20, 1941
TO: Washington — #689.

Re my #687[a].

We would have to get the approval of the United States to establish a route through Seattle for money to be sent to Vancouver through the Yokohama Specie Bank.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 348

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 20, 1941
TO: Washington #690.

Although we had applied for an entrance visa for Secretary MATSUI who is starting for his new post in Washington, in order that he not miss sailing on the *Hikawa Maru,* we had him leave without waiting for the visa to come through. I want you to go to the State Department at once and have them send instructions to the American consul in Vancouver about this and the visa.

MATSUI already has a Canadian passport and entry visa.

Trans. 10–24–41

No. 349

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 20, 1941
TO: Washington #691.

We are entrusting certain confidential documents to Vice-Consul KO--SHI who is traveling on the *Hikawa Maru.* Please negotiate to have these passed through customs without opening. (He is carrying with him ----- (garbled) ----- from the American Embassy in Tokyo.)

Relay to Seattle.

Trans. 10–27–41

No. 350

FROM: Seattle (Sato) October 20, 1941
TO: Washington Circular #66.

(Message from Tokyo Circular #2205.)

Hikawa Maru, sailing under government orders, left the 20th, 4:00 p.m. from Yokohama with supervisor KENSUKE SATŌ of the Foreign Office and Communications engineer KIICHIRŌ UENO (a qualified maritime official) aboard.

Trans. 10–27–41

No. 351

FROM: Tokyo October 21, 1941
TO: Hsinking #719.

(Vladivostok to Tokyo #477.)

(Abstract.)

Transmitting Vladivostok's #477[a] to the Foreign Minister in which the Consul at Vladivostok outlines his views that America is watching the Far Eastern situation closely; that he had observed the progress of the Russo-Anglo-American conversations. The present status of the Hull-Nomura discussions indicates that the Tojo cabinet must not alter Japan's fundamental task of establishing its position in the Far East and that the adjustment of American-Japanese relations seems hopeless.

[a] Not otherwise available.

Trans. 10–24–41

No. 352

FROM: Tokyo — October 21, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 892.

Re your # 1247[a].

In conference with the Vice Minister we have decided to apply these regulations also in the case of a neutral country's carrying on propaganda work for a belligerent nation. The U.S. Embassy thus far has not been distributing "bulletins", but if in the future they should undertake direct propaganda work in Britain's stead in Japan, this would of course have to be taken into control. At the same time the British and American affiliated news correspondence over which the Germans and Italians are not a little perturbed is already discriminated against to quite some extent. A large number of foreign dispatches received by Domei and other firms are either prohibited from publication, or else withheld voluntarily.

The Germans seem gradually to be coming to understand the real intentions of this and they have discontinued the Japanese bulletins, and also have limited the places of distribution of other material to meet our requests.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 353

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — October 21, 1941
TO: Los Angeles (Rioyji) — # 095.

Administration clerk Harada will bring those articles mentioned in my messages No. 53[a] and 60[b]. Please send them to the Consulate General in San Francisco.

---

[a] Dated 14 June 1941, and reading as follows: "I want you to obtain the items listed below and inconspicuously turn them over to the master of some ship going to Japan, wiring me the name of the ship:

1 "Hallicrafter" "Diversity" receiving set. (If this is not manufactured, get one from second-hand stock.)

1 "Hammarlund" "Super-pro" short wave receiving set. Spare vacuum tubes for 11 of the above sets divided between the two kinds.

5 each "Spider web" and "Magic Web" antennas and 10 wire cable for 5 sets."

[b] Dated 9 July. Further instructions on obtaining and shipping above equipment.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 354

FROM: Rome — October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 682.

A Swiss newspaper of the 20th, the *Neue Zuerich Zeitung*, publishes a dispatch of the 19th from Washington to the effect that the Japanese Government has expressed to the United States a desire to resume the negotiations and that the United States has accepted. It is alleged that the United States has presented to Japan four *sine qua non* terms and that the Japanese Government has accepted them in principle.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 355

FROM: Tokyo — October 22, 1941
TO: Washington — #699.

In regard to the Shoyo Maru waiting in San Francisco harbor:

1. In order to pay for additional supplies of water and food for this ship, the Nittō Kōgyō Company (Japan-Eastern Mining Company) presented a letter of credit for $900 on the Yokohama Specie Bank on October 5th, but they do not have an American permit to cash it. Their California representative, the Asano Bussan Company, says that the delay in sailing will make an additional $3,000 necessary.

2. The San Francisco branch of Mitsui Bussan Company is applying to the American authorities for permission to load her bunkers with 350 tons of fuel oil, but the permit has not yet been granted.

Considering how long this ship has already had to delay in port, please try to get a permit from the American authorities as soon as possible.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 356

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #983.

Re your #699[a].

They telephoned me from San Francisco about this. So, on the 20th I asked ACHESON about the matter and he replied that he had arranged to have the permit issued immediately.

---

[a] See IV, 355.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 357

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #980.

Re your #692[a] and #694[a].

With regard to the aforementioned, is it not your intention to have our residents who are studying abroad board the Asama Maru at Lisbon?

If so, I would like to have you inform me of the date agreed upon for the boat's touching port at Lisbon.

---

[a] School terms for certain Japanese students in foreign lands are being shortened, and they are to return home earlier than scheduled.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 358

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #981.

To Advisor TASHIRO from IGUCHI:

Semi-official OBATA will return to Tokyo on the Tatsuta Maru. Since he is carrying a considerable amount of my luggage, etc., with him, I want a member of the staff to be sent to Yokohama to meet him. Will you please so inform an official.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 359

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 22, 1941
TO: Washington #700.

The Miyako newspaper has under contract a man by the name of[a]--- working for the Universal News Feature at a monthly salary of $1,000. Because the American Government has not as yet granted permission for the sending of monthly drafts to cover salary for this man he is understood to be financially embarrassed. Please negotiate immediately so that we may wire him his salary. Furthermore, this has some bearing on future permits to American newspapers by us to cover drafts to Japanese correspondents here in Japan.

---

[a] DoD Comment: Name withheld.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 360

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 24, 1941
TO: Washington Circular #2222.

(Strictly secret.)

At the end of September we changed the direction, time, and contents of our foreign broadcasts. Will you, therefore, think back in the past and make any suggestions you deem wise concerning technique, contents, priority and so forth.

Relay to San Francisco, Rio, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Panama, Honolulu.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 361

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #988.

Re my #516[a].

Please arrange for receipt of (22 boxes?) of records from this office sent by the *Norfolk Maru* which sailed for Japan from Callao, Peru the 3rd. There is a wooden box in box (#2 ?) which is to be handed over to the Navy Ministry.

---

[a] See 361A, in which Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo that the materials to be returned to the home office were loaded on board the *Norfolk Maru*, which left Baltimore on the 12th.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 361A

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #516.

(Strictly Secret.)

In accordance with your instructions, I have been compiling my records, and the materials which should be returned to the home office I have packed into 22 wooden boxes. These have been loaded on board the Kawasaki Steamship Company steamer NORFOLK MARU which left Baltimore on the 12th. I am mailing you the details and -----.

Furthermore, because this steamer will stop at ports of call in South America, it is understood that it will not reach Yokohama until the end of ----- month[a]. Should it be thought that in the light of the international situation that is too late a date, please arrange to have this ship not stop at its ports of call in South America but sail directly to Japan.

---

[a]The two letters giving the number of the month are very badly garbled and could not represent any number; however, it is felt that August is definitely the month meant.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 362

FROM: Tokyo October 25, 1941
TO: Washington #708.

The Fuel Bureau has agreed to supply fuel oil for the U.S. Embassy's heating system in Tokyo.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 363

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 28, 1941
TO: San Francisco #159.

Have you already dispatched the short wave receiving apparatus mentioned in the latter part of wire #155[a] from Los Angeles to Tokyo, which was to have been sent as part of Minister WAKASUGI's baggage? If not, please send it by the *Tatsuta Maru* in care of extraordinary official KOBATA as part of Ambassador NOMURA's baggage.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 364

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #261.

1. We have already loaded onto the *Itsukushima Maru* which is tied up in this port the five recording machines and cylinders which are labeled as the personal baggage of Minister WAKASUGI.

2. The five #90 recording machines and parts, the five #66 recording machines, twenty typewriters and cylinders, cannot be shipped because of the freezing legislation. Please acknowledge.

3. The wireless sets mentioned in my wire to Washington #693[a] are being sent on the *Itsukushima Maru* as the hand baggage of Colonel OKA. They have already been loaded. It is believed that it will be impossible to ----- these.

4. I am having extraordinary official KOBATA, who is to embark on the Tatsuta Maru, take the ----- ----- -----.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 365

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 29, 1941
TO: Washington #711.

Re your #1002[a].

We are making preparations to issue orders on November 1st regarding the general permit covering American diplomatic establishments and employees in Japan. However, before issuing it it is necessary to get America's concurrence in the following two points. Please get in touch with the State Department and wire the result before the 31st.

1. Our general permit will cover not only requests for transactions from November on but will also include the months of August, September, and October. America should also make similar arrangements.

2. The method of providing funds for Americans in Japan will be:

A. The National City Bank will purchase the checks on drafts of the American diplomatic establishments and employees resident in Japan.

B. Then the Specie Bank will provide yen for the above to the National City Bank. However, the Specie Bank will not provide the above yen until it has received a telegram from the Branch Office in America stating that an equivalent amount in dollars has been paid there.

Furthermore, only in the event that No. 2 above is carried out will there be no objections to the American proposal of your caption telegram, (that the American government pay into the Specie Bank), or to our proposal contained in my #639[b], (the proposal that the National City Bank pay into the Specie Bank. At present the National City Bank is negotiating with the American finance department).

---

[a] Dated 27 October. Re unfreezing enough currency from Specie Bank to cover Embassy expenses.

[b] (Not available) Details of negotiations with the U.S. for mutual release of funds for expenses of diplomatic missions

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 366

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1009.

Re paragraph 2 of your #711[a].

The American Government and the National City Bank say that if they pay dollars to the Specie Bank here in America and then the Specie Bank in Tokyo pays an equivalent amount

to the Americans there the exchange transaction will be completed and it will not be necessary for checks and drafts to be issued to American diplomatic establishments and employees and then cashed for them by the National City Bank. Please wire about this by return dispatch.

Furthermore, inasmuch as there are no mail ships running at present the buying and selling of checks and exchange is most inconvenient and there is no other way than to remit by telegraph.

This has been taken up with the Financial Attaché.

---

[a] See IV, 365.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 367

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1012.

Re my #1009[a].

Are there any objections to my conferring with the Secretary of State along the lines of my separate telegram #1013[b].

---

[a] See IV, 366.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 368

FROM: Tokyo October 30, 1941
TO: Washington #713.

(Urgent)

Re your #1009[a].

We have asked the American Embassy in Tokyo to have the expense money for their diplomatic staff and employees sent by the American government through the Yokohama Specie Bank, but the Embassy insists that, because of the red tape involved, they prefer to continue their customary method of selling money orders and checks.

Now the staff and employees write checks on their private accounts on banks in the United States, and sometimes they sell these, thus the practice which they wish to follow is the same thing as a reverse money order.[b]

Therefore, we wish:

1. In order to limit the responsibility for this on the National City Bank of New York, decree that only the National City Bank or affiliated banks may buy money orders, and

2. Require that the National City Bank's cash funds in this country be held to insure their fixed deposits, not used to buy money orders. The only money used for buying money orders shall be such money as is received by the Yokohama Specie Bank through the sale of telegraphic money orders from America.

Since we feel that to make the proposal now which you suggest in your caption telegram would only complicate matters and not help any, please make a proposal to the State

Department along the line of our #711[c] at once and wire the result by 2:00 p.m. on the 31st.

---

[c] IV-366.

[b] Jyaku kawase—an arrangement covered by a letter of credit whereby one man can draw funds from another man's account in another city simply by writing a money order on it.

[c] IV, 365.

Trans. 11-1-41

No. 369

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1016.

Re your #711[a] and #713[b].

IGUCHI called on ATCHESON, and ATCHESON talked on about financial permits, saying that every year in August general instructions go out from the State Department to their foreign diplomatic corps but these are not applicable to countries in which credits are frozen.

Details on this case are sent to GREW by the State Department, but since the American expenses are rarely smaller than the Japanese, the Tokyo branch of the National City Bank of New York has informed its home office in New York that the Yokohama Specie Bank is establishing a yen credit for the necessary amount with them in Tokyo and they want to have the equivalent in dollars paid to the New York branch of the Specie Bank. As they will be sending instructions to this effect to Grew at once, please arrange to have them carried out.

Now, item (1) in your telegram #711[a] referring to immediate payment takes care of your instructions in #648[c] for the time being. They had asked to have the September diplomatic salaries paid at once but now on the 30th they asked to have the August, September and October salaries paid at once in a lump sum. Please contact the finance ministry at once and wire an answer.

---

[a] See IV, 365.

[b] See IV, 368.

[c] Not available.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 370

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1022.

Re your #711[a].

Chief of Office routing.

In reply to our numerous requests to the Treasury Department regarding this matter, they insist that they have to consider it from all angles. (This morning's New York Times commented that the United States would probably refuse to ease its economic pressure on Japan, particularly in the matter of supplying oil, unless Japan completely mends her ways). This stubborness is probably a means of waiting to see what the developments are in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations.

These conversations have been going on for more than two months. The Treasury insists that first of all an amount equivalent to that withdrawn prior to the "freezing" order and which belonged to the Navy, (as you are aware, this was taken to South America in cash), would have to be refunded. In view of the fact that we did not have this on hand, they brought up the subject of having that much released in South America. At first, we agreed to do this, but chiefly through the Specie Bank's opposition, it fell through.

Then, because the military and the Commerce Ministry wanted it, the releasing in South America proposal was revived.

From the beginning this matter involved much pettiness. We have been doing everything in our power to obtain the petroleum. I have even gone so far as to take this matter up with Hull and, moreover, Wakasugi, on two different occasions, urged Welles to intercede in our behalf. In spite of this, we can see no indications that the Treasury Department has been moved much one way or another. At this rate it is hard to tell when any settlement will be reached. Moreover we do not believe it to be in line with the dignity of this office to have our laundry out drying forever.

We, therefore, have issued orders for them to sail. If the Treasury changes its attitude at some future time, we shall send for the tankers again. (The attitude of the Treasury depends greatly on developments in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. In this regard, this matter is very similar to the negotiations involving the trading of silk for petroleum and the joint usage of ship bottoms. In other words, all matters involving relations between the two countries are greatly affected by the adjustment of relations proposal at present under consideration.)

This matter has been discussed with the Financial Attaché and the Consul General in San Francisco.

---

[a] See IV, 365.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 371

FROM: Tokyo — October 30, 1941
TO: Washington — # 712.

Re your # 946[a].

If it appears that these negotiations will go on any longer, please get in touch with San Francisco and our finance officials and arrange to have both the *Itsukushima* and the *Shoyo* sent back to Japan.

---

[a] Regarding export permits for gasoline.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 372

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — October 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1017.

There is no sensitivity and reception is impossible on the new wave length up till the present. We wish that you would change immediately to JAU 2-7. 327.5 k.c.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 373

FROM: Washington — November 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1026.

Secret.

On the 30th of October ——[a] spoke to Terasaki as follows:

1. "At the time I (met with) President Roosevelt on August 26th, Roosevelt said that he had hoped to head for Japan and meet the Japanese leaders and that he desired to do this more than ever now.

"I thought that this was a great scoop and immediately got in touch with the editor in New York, but the editor thought that it was of too grave importance and so the publication was delayed for a time.

"Again I sounded out an official in the State Department (section deleted)[a] and learned from him that Japan had proposed that Konoye and Roosevelt hold a conference on board a Japanese warship.

"In regard to these negotiations the State Department is divided into two factions, the Moderationists and the Strong Policy Advocates, and there is sharp contention between the two.

"The first group is headed by the President and includes Undersecretary Welles, Hamilton and Ballantine. The second group is made up of Secretary of State Hull, Hornbeck, Coville, etc."

---

[a] DoD comment: Name and identifying information withheld.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 374

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1027.

Secret outside the Department.

As the American First Committee was meeting in New York on the night of 30 October, I rushed Terasaki up to New York on that date. He met with (an associate of officials of the Committee)[a]. (As the American First Committee is being watched by the F.B.I. this must be kept strictly secret.) After commenting on the fact that a crisis is right at hand between Japan and the United States he told ——[a] that he would like to have him tell Colonel Lindbergh, who is for America first, that, while the American people do not understand the reason for such a war, it has to do with the China problem, that the United States is about to fight with Germany over her policy of Britain first in the Atlantic, and with Japan over her policy of China first in the Pacific. ——[a] consented and later the same evening he said that he had told him.

On this same occasion Terasaki also strongly asserted that it is a mistake, based on a misunderstanding of the Japanese psychology, to think that Japan will give in if she is driven into a tight corner by the United States, and that even as the United States is adopting a realistic policy in regard to Central and South America, it is also necessary to take a realistic view of the situation in the Orient, and that it is most inconsistent to express fear of a southward push by Japan, while at the same time cutting off petroleum supplies.

Relayed to New York.

---

[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 375

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1028.

Secret outside the Department.

Re my # 1027[a].

(Abstract)

Terasaki met with other persons associated with the America First Committee and repeated the substance of his talk described in No. 374.

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[a] See IV, 374.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 376

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1029.

(Separate Telegram) (Strictly confidential.)

1. From this week on -----[a] will keep in touch with this office and devote his efforts toward planning for the organization of the committee which has as its objective the promotion of friendly relations between Japan and America. Terasaki will be the liaison agent. It will be promoted by Americans and will have the appearance of being financed by American money (although a portion of the actual expense will be born by this office). An attempt was made to establish this committee earlier but the invasion of French Indo-China followed by the freezing order complicated matters. The first meeting was held in New York with -----[a] acting as temporary chairman,

As yet the committee has no influential members, however it is sponsored by Americans and through its establishment and growth it is hoped that American public opinion can be made more friendly toward Japan. (Terasaki is having -----[a] make reports to the State Department relative to the activities of the above committee.)

2. On the 31st of October -----[a] proposed to Terasaki that a second meeting of the committee be held in Washington during September (sic) to discuss Japanese-American relations. Whereupon Terasaki explained to him the present strained state of Japanese-American relations explaining that as long as America continued to withhold oil from Japan there was not much hope of progress being made. Terasaki said that as soon as an opportunity presented itself he would have a member of the committee meet with Hull to state as strongly as possible the objectives of the committee and that the result of this conference would determine whether the committee would be continued or dissolved. It has been arranged for -----[a] to come to Washington in the near future to carry out this program.

---

[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 377

FROM: Tokyo — November 1, 1941
TO: New York — # 230.

Re your # 489[a].

The necessity of a "complete survey" of present U.S. economics (under war time) was also realized by this office for some time, while now with new world developments the urgency of carrying this out is felt.

The 1941 budget includes expenditures for this survey, both for (a) expansion of the present financial divisions of the Tokyo, New York, and Washington offices, and (b) the funds for establishing an independent economic survey office in New York.

In view of present conditions, however, after conferring with the Department of Finance, it has been decided to postpone for the present the (b) plan and instead to put all our efforts on the (a) plan of expanding the existing financial divisions. In view of this will you please commence this work, using the Commercial Attaché's office and any suitable U.S. surveys already made on this subject.

In reply to the latter part of your plan, you are to be allotted one secretary and two clerks for this work; suitable persons are now being selected.

Relay to Washington.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11–14–41

No. 378

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 4, 1941
TO: Mexico — Circular # 353.

(Message to Tokyo # 1034.)

(Part 1 of 4.)

When we view the present situation in the United States, we can see that regardless of the increase in damages to destroyers and merchantmen, the popular mind is not an iota more incensed against Germany; therefore, it is not likely that the government will sever relations with the Reich and invite war. Germany, too, well knows that a bout with the United States would not be to her advantage and will, insofar as possible, refrain from outright war against America. This country is not yet ready to become involved in Europe. She is content with furnishing the maximum material assistance, patrolling the sea, and affording technical aid.

Trans. 11–15–41

No. 379

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 4, 1941
TO: Mexico — Circular # 353.

(Message to Tokyo # 1034.)

(Part 2 of 4.)

As the danger of war is not in the immediate offing, the people are all worried about their own problems. Instead of war, they are worried about prices, increased taxes, inflation, and

other such matters which affect their immediate welfare. By and large, the government officials, too, seem inclined to wish to keep England, of course, and then as many other countries as possible, fighting; and then when the last extremity is reached, to jump in and seize the victory. Therefore, whether it turns out to be a five or a ten-year war does not seem to make any difference. The United States is aiding Russia today, but that is just because she can use Russia to her own ends; it does not by any means signify that she likes Communism.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 380

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 4, 1941
TO: Mexico Circular # 353.

(Message to Tokyo # 1034.)

(Part 3 of 4.)

When it comes to economic pressure on us Japanese, however, the officials have the full backing of the people. They all seem to think that their present strength in the Atlantic is sufficient for national defense and for protection against war. They seem to believe that there is not much to worry about in the southern Pacific, since British, American, and Netherlandish military strength is increasing gradually in that area. In the face of Japan's dauntless attitude, the Americans do not show the slightest fear. Furthermore, it has also been published that conferences already are under way to supply the ABCD nations with war materials, and this process of fortifying universal allies flourishes from day to day.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 381

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 4, 1941
TO: Mexico Circular # 353.

(Message to Tokyo # 1034.)

(Part 4 of 4.)

Ah, but when it comes to military men, they do not share this optimism; for

(1) Well do they know that English morale is not as good as reported. Full well do they know that after the fall of Russia, England may make peace with Germany.

(2) The Mediterranean Sea is in grave peril. The reason why CHURCHILL talked personally with the President was doubtless because he saw that the United States was tending to over-stress the Pacific Ocean, and he wished the President to know the gravity of the situation in the Atlantic and to warn him that the real danger lies in the Atlantic.

(3) I am sure that the officials know full well what a nuisance a war in the Pacific would be. Lately it has been said in editorials that if it comes to the question of war, the questions of where troops are to be stationed and the moment for striking will be chosen quickly when the whole situation has been taken into consideration.

For your information.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 382

FROM: Tokyo — November 4, 1941
TO: Washington — # 728.

Re messages from San Francisco to the Minister # 71[a] and your # 1030[b].

In spite of the fact that arrangements had been made with the United States Government concerning the schedule of ships carrying mail, an undesirable effect was created by the unexpected examination and (sorting ?) of the mail on the night before the sailing of the Tatsuta Maru.

It appears that the American understanding of the arrangements and ours differ, therefore, it is suggested that representations clarifying the situation be made so that the loading of mail may be smoothly carried out in the cases of the Taiyō Maru and the Hikawa Maru.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 383

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) — November 5, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular # 277.

(San Francisco to Tokyo # 274.)

Re my # 263[a].

-----[b], attached to -----[b], who we have been using for propaganda here, is being investigated regarding his connection with -----[b] and our connection with this matter. He is registered as a foreign correspondent for the -----[b] and we have stated that he is paid for this through us.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] DoD comment: Names and identifying information withheld.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 384

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1039.

Re your Circular # 2222[a].

Sensitivity of JLG 415.105 kc broadcast to here was fairly good and occasionally we could hear it. However, from 8 p.m. on, interference from other powerful stations was bad and sensitivity was poor. We will check this on successive nights. The sensitivity of other wave lengths was negligible.

The sensitivity of JLG 415.105 kc broadcast to South America was excellent here from 6 to 8 p.m. on successive nights and reception was excellent.

---

[a] See IV, 360.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 385

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 7, 1941
#744.

(In 2 parts, complete.)

Re your #1020[a].

We are wiring the distribution of the October and November salaries (to the official in charge of accounts) and the second and third period allowances to the various offices as follows: Please wire this to the various offices concerned.

Salaries and expenses of the personnel of the Embassy in Washington. (The unit is in yen.)

The Ambassador	13,200.00
Iguchi	6,469.54
Okumura	4,185.79
Matsudaira	4,924.35
Terazaki	5,493.75
Iriki	2,053.32
Takagi	2,053.32
Hoshida	1,906.64
Horiuchi	3,211.52
Fujita	1,992.66
Yamamoto	1,760.00
Fujiyama	1,966.58
Inagawa	1,966.58
Ando	1,966.58
Maeda	1,466.64
Okaniwa	1,466.64
Nakajima	1,466.64
Hori	2,216.88
Yamamoto	2,125.88
Kajiwara	2,198.48
Enseki	1,320.00
Honjo	1,584.00
Arita	1,584.00
Nishihori	1,584.00
Total	70,062.79

Operating expenses, (Unit in dollars).

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

	A. Actual expense	3,475.92
(3rd period)	B. Transfer expense	5,500.00
(3rd period)	C. Entertainment expense	1,000.00
	D. Telegraphic expense	10,000.00
	D. Temporary foreign telegraphic expense	5,000.00
	E. Miscellaneous	1,200.00
	B. 3rd period	500.00
	D. Emergency telegraphic expense	18,000.00
	Total	44,675.92

New York

Morishima	6,949.20
Inoye	4,312.00
Hirazawa	3,490.64

Kondo	3,827.52
Amano	2,901.94
Mori	2,874.64
Nakazawa	1,760.00
Hayashida	2,216.88
Watanabe	2,198.48
Saiga	2,053.28
Total	32,584.58

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	4,026.00
B. (3rd period)	3,650.00
C. (3rd period)	525.00
F. Rent (½ year)	11,500.00
D.	3,600.00
D. Temporary foreign	1,500.00
E.	1,200.00
D. Emergency	4,000.00
Total	30,001.00

Chicago

Mori	3,107.30
Uchida	2,053.28
Ishida	2,673.60
Kawabata	1,611.84
Total	9,446.02

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	1,464.00
B. (3rd period)	1,500.00
C. (3rd period)	250.00
F. (Last half of year)	4,329.00
D.	1,500.00
D. Temporary foreign	500.00
D. Emergency	500.00
Total	10,043.00

San Francisco

Muto	6,469.54
Inagaki	3,581.54
Takahashi (includes Sept. & Oct.)	4,478.52
Sata	2,279.20
Kurata	2,052.64
Hashizume	1,837.60
Imai	1,837.60
Total	22,536.64

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	2,922.00
B. (3rd period)	1,700.00
C. (3rd period)	325.00
F. (Last half of year)	3,930.00
D. (2 periods)	1,000.00
G. Salaries of foreign employees	600.00
D. Temporary foreign	2,000.00
E.	990.00

D. Emergency	2,000.00
Total	15,467.00

Honolulu

Kita	3,561.58
Okuda	2,368.10
Yuge	1,971.20
Tsukikawa	1,408.00
Seki	1,787.84
Morimura	1,026.64
Total	12,123.36

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	2,386.00
F. (Half period)	120.00
D.	500.00
G.	240.00
D. (Temporary foreign)	1,000.00
D. (Emergency)	500.00
Total	4,746.00

Los Angeles

Nakamura	2,635.06
Suga	1,848.00
Kamata	1,848.00
Total	6,331.06

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	3,051.00
B. (3rd period)	1,350.00
C. (3rd period)	200.00
F. (Half year)	3,720.00
D. (2nd period)	400.00
D. (Temporary foreign) (3rd period)	400.00
D. (Emergency)	500.00
Total	9,642.00

Translator's note: This actually adds up to 9,621—evidently they made a mistake in their figures as this is the first total that has been off, excepting the first column in the message which is off $1. (or Y1.)

Seattle

Sato	3,490.64
Kaneko	1,889.04
Okamura	1,300.64
Total	6,680.32

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	1,567.76
B. (3rd period)	1,000.00
C. (3rd period)	150.00
F. (Last half of year)	2,610.00
D. (Temporary foreign)	795.00
D. (3rd period)	500.00
(Emergency)	250.00
Total	6,832.76

Portland

Oka	3,412.56
Matsumoto	1,401.10
Total	4,813.66

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	2,497.00
B. (3rd period)	750.00
C. (3rd period)	100.00
F. (Last half of year)	1,890.00
D. (2nd period)	150.00
D. (Foreign diplomatic) (3rd period)	150.00
Total	5,537.00

New Orleans

Ito	3,813.86
Sato	2,399.60
Total	6,213.46

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	1,290.00
B. (3rd Period)	800.00
C. (3rd Period)	75.00
F.	1,740.00
D. (2nd Period)	250.00
D. (Temporary foreign) (3rd period)	250.00
Total	4,405.00

Houston

Sano	3,080.00

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	580.00
B. (3rd period)	450.00
C. (3rd period)	50.00
F. (Last half of year)	1,050.00
D. (2nd period)	150.00
D. (Temporary foreign) (3rd period)	150.00
Total	2,430.00

Manila (September, October & November)

Nihiro	5,148.00
Fukuda (from October 13th)	1,605.77
Mori	2,402.40
Ishida	2,001.96
Kijima	2,001.96
Nishi	2,001.96
Okazaki	1,539.96
Nakamura	1,539.96
Total	18,241.97

Operating expenses

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	Peso	1,765.87
A.	Yen	171.00
B.		2,000.00

C.	250.00
F. Aid for refugees actual and miscellaneous expenses	600.00 yen

Davao

Kihara	3,717.96
Nakamura	1,584.00
Kajiya	1,143.96
Total	6,445.92

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.	Peso	808.83
A.	Yen	150.00
B.		1,500.00
C.		125.00
D.		375.00
F.		390.00
D. (Emergency)		375.00

This is the end.

---

[a] Message dated 31 October concerns plans for handling money problems connected with staff salaries for July, August, September, October, November, following methods of remittance used by U.S.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 386

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 8, 1941
Circular # 2281.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re my circular # 2040[a].

From the Chief of the Telegraphic Communications.

Recently the number of messages designated "kinqu" has increased by leaps and bounds. Upon examining the material contained in these wires I find they are not of such enormous import that they require dispatching without loss of time or that in the event they are received late at night that they be communicated immediately to the Foreign Minister, Vice-Minister, or any other of the principal offices for the evaluating of intelligence and certainly not of such vital importance that they need be passed on at that late hour to parties outside the department.

Among these wires there are those which have been designated "kinqu" with utter disregard for their contents. (Wires coming from the United States have on very frequent occasions used this most unnecessarily. Furthermore, there certainly is no necessity to put the words "very urgent" in English before the address.) There are so many telegraphic officials who have become so accustomed to marking wires, of little import, extremely urgent (please refer to my mail circular # 8 of 1939) that there is considerable danger of a grave error resulting from this practice.

After you have read and entirely assimilated my wire referred to above, I would like to have you give due consideration to the choice of "kinqu", "daiqu" (which have been used in the past to designate urgency) and "sikyu."

This wire is addressed to the United States, Germany, Thailand and Batavia.

Note: "Kinqu" designation for "extremely urgent."
"Daiqu" designation for "urgent."
"Sikyu" designation for "Priority."

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 387

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) November 9, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 282.

San Francisco to Tokyo # 285.

The F.B.I. investigation of -----[a] (who was president of the committee concerned last year, at the time when the organization was dissolved) and others connected with the organization is being continued.

The F.B.I. has seven able investigators on this job, so that it would seem as though they considered the case an important one.

Although judging from the type of investigation, it would seem as though they were most interested in gathering evidence to be used against -----[a] and -----, it also is apparent that the Department of Justice feels the necessity of looking into this case, due to the numerous statements being made by the Dies Committee regarding Japanese propaganda in the United States. It also may be that they hope to make this the excuse for demanding recall from the United States of all Japanese Consuls-General and Consuls to Japan.

2. A rigid investigation of -----[a] is being carried on. As he is officially registered as a foreign correspondent for the -----, there is little danger of his being indicted (prosecuted). During the examination he will no doubt have to prove that he was hired by the -----[a] at $350. per month. Therefore, please arrange matters there so that if ----- should wire to "GO" of the -----[a] for a confirmation of the above, "GO" is to wire back to -----[a] this effect.

---

[a] DoD comment: Names withheld.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 388

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 756.

(Priority)

Re part 2 of my # 716[a].

In regard to the purchase of dollars by the Yokohama Specie Bank, through the National City Bank, it is understood that the National City Bank Branch in Tokyo has as yet received no instructions from their home office. Is it possible that the home office of the National City Bank does not fully understand the situation?

---

[a] Not available, perhaps # 711 meant, See IV, 365.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 389

FROM: Hsinking — October 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #693.

Re my #686[a].

The military are at present considering ways and means of disposing the matter involving the arrest of the four U.S. missionairies. If the Foreign Office wishes to express its desires in this matter, please do so at once.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 390

FROM: Tokyo — October 31, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #754.

Re your #686[a] and #693[b].

With reference to the missionaries concerned, they were involved in Korea in January and February of this year. If they are involved in the Fukei incident, sentence of banishment is suggested. We have as yet received no report from the Army.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 389.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 391

FROM: Tokyo — November 11, 1941
TO: Washington — #760.

Re your #1061[a].

According to information contained in a message from our Ambassador to Manchukuo, the Manchukuoan police officials arrested three missionaries in Harbin on 22 October, on the charge of infraction of the peace preservation laws. These are Baptist missionaries which was the sect of those missionaries in Korea who were deported on the grounds of lesé majesté'. It is said that in Manchukuo these missionaries were telling Koreans in Manchukuo that Japanese and Manchukuoans were treating the Koreans poorly. They were instrumental in organizing secret Korean organizations.

Our Ambassador in Manchukuo requested this office's suggestions on how to dispose of this matter. We, therefore, suggested that they follow the example set by the officials in Korea and order these persons deported. To this, our Ambassador replied that after conferring with the military and the Manchukuoan authorities, it had been decided that our suggested means would be adopted.

This message has been relayed to Manchukuo.

---

[a] See IV, Part A 57.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 392

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

November 11, 1941
788.

Re your # 707[a].

The American Embassy in Tokyo requests that, if the Americans concerned have been given a fair trail, before banishment they be permitted to come to Harbin in order to settle their personal affairs. Please wire your suggestions.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 393

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Tokyo

November 13, 1941
728.

Re your # 788[a].

As a result of conferences with the Manchurian and military authorities it has been decided to comply with your request.

---

[a] See IV, 392.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 394

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hong Kong

November 14, 1941
2319.

(Circular) (To be handled in Government Code.)

(Strictly secret outside the Department.)

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.

b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far

East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

This message is directed to Nanso[a], Hokudai[a], Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow, Hankow, Canton, and Hong Kong. Hokudai[a] will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 395

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1091.

From the Finance Official to the Vice-Minister of Finance.

It is at this time impossible to make any forecast as to how, in case of an emergency, diplomats, other government officials as well as some of the other Japanese should evacuate. After considering possible eventualities, I have come to the conclusion that it might be well to have some gold ready in Lima. Will you, therefore, please make suitable arrangements with the Yokohama Specie Bank (exchange control is most lenient in Peru). In case the Yokohama Specie Bank branch in that country has not formally been given a letter of attorney for this purpose, please take suitable steps by means of telegram sent through the Peruvian Ministry in Tokyo.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 396

FROM: Tokyo November 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 2330.

(Circular.)

The following is the order and method of destroying the code machines in the event of an emergency.

First of all, the scrambling section shall be destroyed in the following manner: All the screws shall be removed and the machine reduced to the smallest pieces; all wires shall be detached; next, the most vital part of the entire machine, the scrambling nest (HENKŌ-GUN)—(the revolving arrangement on which wires are attached, and which is located below that part is graduated in A, B, C, D)—shall be very thoroughly destroyed; wires, insulations, panels, etc. shall be doused with kerosene and burned; gears which have alphabetical graduations and the switch arrangements which are opened and closed with keys shall also be destroyed, and these parts, together with other parts which cannot be destroyed by burning, shall be thrown into the ocean or treated with sulphuric acid and buried in the ground.

Next, the printer shall be destroyed in very much the above manner. (The steel rod and bar attached to the lower part of typewriter "A" shall be removed and then the machine dismantled.)

All other markers on the machines and rectifiers shall be removed and burned. All screws which join pieces together shall be removed and disposed of, and all remaining parts shall be pounded with hammers.

Washington relay to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Berne relay to NSW and *NLH (Rome and Ankara (?))*. Bangkok (?) relay to Hanoi.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 397

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1108.

Departmental Secret. "B" Class report.

1. According to DAINERI[c], a secretary attached to the Italian embassy, the United States government is doing everything in its power to get Italy to leave the Axis. It is said that the American Ambassador to Rome, PHILLIPS (under instructions from ROOSEVELT), worked hard about three months ago to arrange a conference between ROOSEVELT and MUSSOLINI in the Azores, but on account of Italy's fear of German objection, the attempt ended in a failure. (This may sound fantastic, but in view of the fact that the information comes from the Italian embassy and, also, of the fact that the United States was so lacking in common sense as to have demanded that Finland conclude an armistice with Soviet Russia, it cannot be said to be entirely improbable.)

2. The details of the demands which Germany made to Soviet Russia prior to the Russo-German war (referred to in my #869[a]) were ascertained from MASARIKKU[b] several days ago (when he met the Czech Premier in New York, the latter confirmed them).

3. I understand that the United States' strategy to be employed against Japan in case of a Japanese-American war is to demolish the manufacturing centers at the outset by means of air raids (I understand that 16 airplane carriers are being either remodeled or camouflaged and that 32 additional ones are in the process of construction) and also to isolate the Japanese forces in China by severing Japanese supply routes in the China Sea by means of submarines.

---

[a] See 397A. Which says that HITLER demanded of STALIN: (1) Access to the oil and grain of the Ukraine; (2) joint operation of the Siberia railroad and establishment of military bases in the Far East; (3) place German representatives in the Soviet military general headquarters.

[b] Kana spelling.

[c] L. DANIELLI.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 397A

FROM: Washington September 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #869.

B Intelligence. Foreign Office Secret.

1. Prior to his war against the Soviet Union, Hitler made the following three demands of Stalin:

(1) Access to the oil and grain in the Ukraine. (By this was meant the occupation of that area for the duration of the war against England.)

(2) Joint operation of the Siberia Railroad and the right to establish military bases in the Far East, including the Vladivostok areas.

(3) Place German representatives in the Soviet military general headquarters.

Stalin agreed in principle to the first two points but flatly refused to comply with point (3).

2. At this time Ribbentrop told Hitler that according to information he had obtained through his own intelligence organization, should Germany strike at the Soviet from the outside the church faction and the bourgeoisie which had not been thoroughly crushed by the Soviet regime, would immediately rise up. The destruction of the Stalin regime would then be an exceedingly simple matter.

On being advised thusly by Ribbentrop Hitler launched his attack against Russia. Since the Soviet resistance has been surprisingly stubborn Ribbentrop has fallen in Hitler's favor. The intelligence system that Ribbentrop headed has either been disbanded or taken over by the military.

(The above is the gist of what our New York informant -----[a] related to Terrasaki in Washington. -----[a] got his information from Hauptman who until recently was in Italy, engaged in the intelligence business, and who is well versed in European matters. -----[a] expressed much confidence in the veracity of this information.)

This message was relayed to New York.

(*Trans. Note:* Above message was sent on 1 October from Tokyo to Berlin, verbatim, except that last two paragraphs were omitted.)

---

[a]DoD comment: Name withheld.

No. 398

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

November 17, 1941
2103.

Re my # 2089[a].

1. On the 15th, the Commander of the American Marines told the Commander in charge of the Japanese forces here, who is also Chairman of the Joint Defense Committee, that he had received official orders for the withdrawal of the American Marines here in the immediate future.

2. The Japanese army in harmony with previous discussions (see paragraph 2 of my caption telegram) desires to have responsibility for the defense of the "C" area, after the withdrawal of the Marines, divided between the Municipal Council Police and the Shanghai Volunteer squad. Whenever the Japanese army deems it necessary to preserve the public peace, they will participate freely in the policing of this area. An announcement of the above is scheduled to be made to the President of the Municipal Council and the Commander of the Italian force by the 20th.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 399

FROM: Tokyo — November 18, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #833.

Re your #720[a].

Although Japan, itself, has not frozen funds, but because America has, Japan has not granted permits, generally speaking, for the receiving of remittances. However, we are considering it to the extent of remittances from America to religious organizations in Japan, and from Japan to cultural organizations in America (an estimate of 400,000 yen). Right now we are in the midst of negotiating for this with America.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 400

FROM: Tokyo — November 18, 1941
TO: Washington — #788.

Strictly secret. Re your #1098[a].

1. It is hard to prophesy the future course of events, but in the case of "B" if we carry out the first sailing proposal in my #786[b] for: (a) the remaining officials; (b) such persons as must absolutely not be held back; (c) company employees; and (d) all residents who were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched, the matter can be satisfactorily handled. We will, at this sailing, have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as members of their staff who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail. The number of those who actually embarked at the first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applications. The reason, was, doubtless, nostalgia and a reluctance to part with their property.

2. Will you secretly, therefore, suitably advise the several consuls to take the following steps: (a) to help our citizens who remain behind to work together for the common good; (b) to destroy immediately such secret documents, and so forth, as are in the possession of Japanese companies and chambers of commerce.

3. We are now studying ways and means of cooperation between our diplomatic officials and our consulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of our high offices in case of "B". We will negotiate concerning the latter here in Tokyo.

4. I am wiring you next a plan for reducing the members of staffs.

---

[a] See IV, Part A 115.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 401

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 20, 1941
TO: Ankara Circular # 2364.

Strictly secret.

1. Since the formation of the Cabinet, the Government has been in conference for successive days with the Imperial General Headquarters. They have given due consideration to the development of a fundamental national policy which will correspond to the urgent exigencies of the situation. Insofar as this is concerned, in the conference which took place on the morning of the 5th, decisions were reached covering fundamental policies having to do with the adjustment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States.

2. Insofar as Japanese-American negotiations are concerned, in proceeding upon these negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations on a just basis, conferences have been in progress since the 7th. In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is considerable doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations will be reached. Insofar as we are concerned we have lent our maximum efforts in order to bring about a settlement of the negotiations. However, the situations not permitting any further conciliation by us, an optimistic view for the future is not permitted. In the event that negotiations are broken off, we expect that the situation in which Japan will find herself will be extremely critical. The above is for your information alone.

This message is addressed to Switzerland, Turkey and Moscow. Switzerland will transmit to France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and South Africa. Turkey will transmit to Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 402

FROM: Shanghai November 20, 1941
TO: Amoy # 439.

Message to Tokyo # 2119.

Re my # 2103[a].

1. At the meeting of the United International Settlement Council on the 10th, it was decided that the plan suggested by the Administrative General Chief would be followed, of having the Military Training Bureau police assume patrol of the British section after the withdrawal of the (American ?) Marines, the volunteer corps serving as reserves. There were no objections to continuing the present (traffic control system ?). These decisions were then communicated to the Marines.

2. The position to be taken by the Military Training Bureau was decided upon (if a cooperative protection plan would be established ?) in which the organization structure would be determined by the various army groups participating. Doubtlessly, there will be communications from the marine command section giving today's decision and requesting your opinion.

---

[a] (See IV, 398.)

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 403

FROM: Peking — November 20, 1941
TO: Hsinking — Circular # 599.

Message to Tokyo # 740.

We have been informed by a reliable source that Missionary University and Rockefeller Hospital have received orders from the American government to evacuate. STEWART and all the other professors and employees are hurrying to leave by way of Shanghai. I will make further investigation and advise you later.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 404

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — November 20, 1941
TO: Havana — # 27.

To be handled in Government code.

Re message # 845[a] from the Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Minister.

Have you kept the $3,000.00 intact without using it for daily expenditures? Please wire me back.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 405

FROM: Tokyo — November 20, 1941
TO: New York — # 238.

From the head of the Trade Bureau to Mogami, Trade Bureau representative. Carry out preparations to close your office. Sell any of the furnishings that you can, and leave the rest with the consulate. It is all right to throw away unimportant things.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 406

FROM: Tokyo — November 24, 1941
TO: Washington — # 819.

Re your # 1152[a].

1. At noon on the 14th in the manner explained in my # 810[b] the foreign office officials published the statement that an understanding had been established between Japan and the United States regarding the dispatching of a second ship.
2. With regard to the schedule, etc., I shall wire you further at a later date.
3. In connection with the latter part of your caption wire the Home Office, too, is giving consideration to the dispatching of a second ship because of the ever worsening state of affairs. After you have taken note of the contents of this message please impress upon the leaders of Japanese residents in the United States that we are looking out for their safety.

Please transmit this wire and my separate wire to all our offices in the United States, Ottawa, Vancouver and Panama.

---

[a]Not available.

[b]See 406A in which Tokyo wires Washington the formal text (Japanese language) of a note for the British and Dutch envoys, as well as the text of an apparently expected reply from them.

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 406A

FROM: Tokyo — November 21, 1941
TO: Washington — #810.

(Part 1 of 2.)

(Separate wire.)

(Chief of Office routing.)

Formal note

"I have the honor of addressing this note to you to inform you that my home government has instructed me to forward you a copy of an agreement drawn up between the government of Japan and the government of the United States of America on the ----- (blank) ----- of this month. At the same time I have the honor to transmit to you the following information:

"For the purpose of assuring the maintenance of peace on the Pacific and through that to contribute to the recovery and promotion of peace throughout the world, this agreement was drawn up between Japan and the United States.

"The Imperial Government is firmly convinced that the government of your country, like the governments of Japan and of the United States, is vitally interested in the purposes indicated above. We, therefore, beg permission to draw your government's attention to the contents of this agreement, and particularly to Article One, Article Two, Article Three, Article Four, and Article Six, (Article Six, only if it is included), thereof.

"The various articles enumerated above concern, respectively, the political stabilization in the Pacific area; access to materials produced in the Netherlands Indies; the trade relations between Japan and the United States; the China Incident; and, the non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce, (this last, only if it is included in the agreement).

"The two governments have made a joint declaration including the above points. We feel that your government and mine could utilize the understandings in the same manner as between Japan and the United States.

"Therefore, in the hopes that the aims thus drawn up in this agreement may more fully be realized, the Imperial Government herewith wishes me to advise you that it is prepared to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your government and mine on the specific points enumerated above. We expectantly await your government's advice that it would be similarly disposed.

"Accept, Sir, these renewed assurances of my highest consideration," —formal close—

/s/

(Part 2 follows)

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 406A

FROM: Tokyo — November 21, 1941
TO: Washington — #810.

(Part 2 of 2.)

Formal reply

"I have the honor of addressing you in order that I may respectfully acknowledge the reciept of a copy of the Agreement on a Joint Understanding which has been drawn up between your government[a] and the government of the United States dated the ----- (blank date) ----- of this month and your accompanying explanatory note.

"Your explanation was to the effect that -----.

"I have the honor to inform you that I am in receipt of a reply from my government to the effect that the government of Great Britain (or the Netherlands Government) understands the objectives drawn up in this draft agreement, and in the hope that they may be more fully realized, is disposed to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your country and mine on the points specifically enumerated above.

"Accept, Sir, renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

(Leave some space, and then way down at the bottom place:)[b]

—formal close—
/s/

---

[a] Japan.

[b] This is Japanese language epistolary style.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 407

FROM: Tokyo — November 25, 1941
TO: Washington — #827.

In view of the changing times, in order to provide funds for the South American diplomatic establishments, it has become necessary to borrow the unfrozen dollar accounts of our residents there. There is no objection to having repayment made in Japan proper. As soon as you have ascertained the amount collectable by this method please wire the amount.

Please give study to the method of sending the funds so collected to the South American offices by courier mail.

Please transmit this as this Minister's instructions to New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 408

FROM: Washington — November 25, 1941
TO: San Francisco — Circular #378.

Outline of message #827[a] from Foreign Minister to Washington is as follows:

In order to use the unfrozen dollars owned by Japanese in the United States for official funds in South America, please arrange to collect these funds in a very secret way. It could

be arranged that payments for these dollars should be made in Japan. As soon as you have some idea of about how much can be collected let us know. After collection please confer on best way of sending this to South America.

---

[e] (See IV, 407.)

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 409

FROM: New York (Morishima) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #512.

It would be very convenient for the people here who expect to sail, because of connections and other reasons, if the Tatsuta Maru would come to a port here after leaving Balboa. As there are many who have expressed this wish, will you please consider it when approving its schedule?

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 411

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 26, 1941
TO: Washington #838.

Tatsuta Maru Schedule:

Yokohama		December 2
Los Angeles	arrive	December 14
	leave	December 16
Balboa	arrive	December 24

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 412

FROM: Panama (Akigawa) November 26, 1941
TO: Havana Circular #34.

(Message from Tokyo to Washington #837.)

Re my message #819[e].

The schedule for the TATSUTA MARU, as given in my #838 (Nov. 26):

Yokohama		December 2
Los Angeles	arrive	December 14
	leave	December 16
Balboa	arrive	December 24

is to leave Balboa on the 26th arriving in Yokohama January 15th. On the basis of conditions at the time, it may stop at Los Angeles again on the way home, but try to have the passengers from the United States board it on the outward trip. As far as possible, have all those who wish to sail from South America also come on the TATSUTA -----.

---

[e] See IV, 406.

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 413

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 26, 1941
TO: New York # 244.

Request Message.

As no plans have been set up to dispatch any other vessel than the Tatsuta Maru, please see to it that as many persons desirous of returning to Japan are advised to return by this ship. Wire me immediately the number who can be already to leave.

With regard to their evacuation please make your contacts with these persons in as safe a manner as possible.

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 414

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1185.

Re your # 788[a].

I sent TAKAGI to Chicago and San Francisco to transmit your instructions and he has notified me the result as follows:

1. Japanese residents all over America have already set up a mutual aid system and since in San Francisco they already have a fund of $6,000 there is little need for worry.

However in Chicago and elsewhere the Japanese residents are weaker financially and have practically no funds. I think if it comes to evacuation they will need some aid from the Japanese consulate. Please let me know what you think of this.

2. Although the F.B.I. on the west coast already have a practically complete register of names of the members of the Japanese Association and the Industrial Council, etc., there seems to be no stigma attached to the list.

---

[a] See IV, 400.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 415

FROM: New York (Morishima) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 511.

(Part 1 of 2.)

It seems that the proposition sent by the Treasury Department on the 24th to Finance Official NISHIYAMA, that we would permit remittances to the Sei Ro Ka[a] and the Womens College in Tokyo if they would loose 30,000 yen for the Cultural Association, was refused so it has come to the point that even such trivial amounts as this cannot be expected.

Judging from # 1117[b] from our Ambassador in Washington to your Excellency, there is no chance of the Cultural Association getting any expense money. (I have confidentially heard that the Secretary of State himself has come to be very suspicious of this organization's activities.) Now, we have no understanding with the United States concerning the continuance of this organization and China is complaining about American relations with Japan so I do not

believe that the Cultural Association can function much longer. If and when the worse happens it will be difficult suddenly to close it.

---

[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 416

FROM: New York (Morishima) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 511.

(Part 2 of 2.)

I want you, therefore, to immediately decide to close it and send a special ship to carry all its employees home. I think that this will be the best thing to do. It is necessary to hurry so please confer with the Cultural Advancement society and wire me back what they say. I imagine that President MAEDA will agree with me so I want to leave the decision up to Tokyo.

In case this organization closes down (a) I have already gotten an understanding with Columbia University that they will take over our curies and books. (b) This organization's position as an American institution will continue.

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 417

FROM: Washington November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1168.

Regarding your message # 788[a](1) and # 808[b].

According to Nishiyama, Commissioner, the staff of the Bank of Japan in New York have received orders that they are to act in accordance with the Embassy staff regarding evacuation from the United States.

This however does not coincide with your orders to us in message # 788[a] and # 808[b].

Will you please get in touch and explain matters to headquarters in Tokyo of all banks and companies with representatives in the United States.

---

[a] See IV, 400.
[b] Re exchange of funds.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 418

FROM: Washington November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1176.

(In 2 parts complete.)

Re your # 1906[a].

Our investigations regarding the various agencies are as follows:

1. Names of government organs, news agencies and newspapers which receive broadcasts.

A. Japanese affiliations.

Los Angeles

The Rafu Shimbun (Los Angeles News).

Kashu Mainichi Shimbun (California Daily News).

Beikoku Sangyo Nippo (American Industrial Daily).

San Francisco

Hokubei Jiji (North American Times).

Taihoku Nippo (North American Daily).

B. Foreign affiliations.

A.P. Globe Press Service and the N.B.C. Broadcasting Company. (Recently a short wave listening station has been established in North Hollywood.)

Also the U.P. LERTJU wireless, the New York Times, and the Herald Times, etc. have maintained listening stations from time to time, but at present this has been suspended.

2. Desires regarding improvement of broadcasts, etc.

A. For summer I think that 12 to 13 thousand kilocycles and for winter 7 to 12 thousand kilocycles is the best wave length to use. Reception is impossible for 16000 kilocycles and above.

B. Sensitivity.

Washington, 4–7 a.m.

New York, 6–10 a.m.

(Eastern Standard Time)

Pacific Coast, 3–5:30 a.m.

(Western Standard Time)

During the above intervals sensitivity is excellent but during the daytime reception is impossible.

C. Time.

Japanese newspapers, because of economic considerations, employ only one operator so please arrange the schedule so that plain language and English broadcasts do not come during the same hour.

3. Increasing the frequency and word content of broadcasts.

Japanese newspapers, for reasons stated in the preceeding paragraph, have their hands full under present arrangements.

4. Opinions regarding content.

A. While there are traces of improvement in broadcasts, opinion in general seems to be that at present the broadcasts are unnecessarily verbose and not sufficiently accurate.

B. More terse, up-to-the-minute broadcasts concerning conditions in Japan are desired.

C. News regarding the China incident.

A summary of the news gathered in the various quarters about once a week is sufficient.

D. Since the Japanese newspapers on the coast rely on Domei it is desired that Domei take the leadership in keeping the Japanese resident here informed regarding the course of Japanese-American relations in case of an emergency.

5. Conditions of use.

Newspapers utilizing the plain language and English broadcasts are the Japanese papers and also English papers which use their material as background in composing and editing their articles. The Globe offers Domei broadcasts to A.P. and I.N.S.

A.P., U.P., and I.N.S. make joint use of these special correspondents' news or some part of it, however it is very rarely that they give credit to Domei. Of foreign newspapers, the Tribune utilizes these the most.

---

[c] Not available.

No. 419

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 27, 1941
843.

Broadcast schedule as follows:

6:00 p.m.	To Pacific Coast	JVJ	12275
6:30 p.m.	To Western Hemisphere	JUO	9430 and
		JVJ	12275
7:00 p.m.	To the Coast	JVJ	12275
8:00 p.m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160
9:00 p.m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160
20:00 p.m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160
10:30 p.m.	To Europe	JHP	11980

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 420

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 10, 1941
1068.

Re my # 1039[a].

The sensitivity on the new wave length has been weak for a few days and reception impossible. Please change immediately JAU to 27.325.5 kilocycles.

[a] See IV, 384.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 421

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 13, 1941
776.

Secret.

Re your # 1068[a].

At present, change of Domei's broadcasting wave length is impossible.

As we understand it your caption telegram requested a change in the wave length of the broadcast of the overseas broadcast bureau.

Please wire as to just which broadcast of the general information broadcast bureau you wished the wave length changed.

[a] See IV, 420.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 422

FROM: Washington — November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1197.

Re your #798[a] and #843[b].

Due to reception of JUO and JVJ (general intelligence information—Morse code—broadcast) being weak, we desire that you change these to JAV (27,327.5 kilocycles) and JUP (13,605 kilocycles), the change to be made immediately.

Reception is also very weak on JHL (Domei news broadcast) so arrange to use above wave length for this, too.

Due to static, the JAP (European broadcast) cannot be heard at all.

---

[a] Instructions concerning talks on withdrawing.
[b] See IV, 419.

Trans. 11-2-41

No. 423

FROM: Tokyo — November 27, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular #2409.

(In 4 parts, complete.)

Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324.

(Washington send to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

Part 1. Handle as Chief of Office routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of dispatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

EXAMPLE: A message meaning:

"Japan and U.S.S. R. Military have clashed", will read:

"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered by your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell)."

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used.)

Part 2.

Code Word	*Meaning*
ARIMURA	Code Communications Prohibited.
ASAI	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
AZUMA	Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI	Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONA (?)	Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or consul) there.

Code Word	*Meaning*
HATAKEYAMA	Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . have been severed.
HATTORI	Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are not in accordance with expectation.
Part 3.	
HIZIKATA	Japan's and . . . (blank) . . . military forces have clashed.
HOSINO	Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI	Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAGAKI	Have you . . ? . . the (blank) matter?
ISHIKAWA	I have . . ? . . the . . (blank) matter.
KASHIWAGI	We are commencing *military action* against . . . (blank) . . .
KOBAYAKAWA	Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan to persons of . . (blank) . . . nationality.
KODAMA	Japan
KOMIYAMA	China
KOYANAGI	England
KUBOTA	U.S.S.R.
KURIBARA	France (?)
KUSUNOKI	Germany
MATUTANI	Italy
Part 4.	
MINAMI	U.S.A.
MIWATA	Canada
MIYAZAKI	Mexico
MOROKOSI	Brazil
MOTIZUKI	Panama
NAGAMINE	Argentina
NAKAZATO	Thailand
NANGO	French Indo-China
NEGI (?)	Netherlands EastIndies
OGAWA	Burma (?)
OKAMOTO	Malaya
OKUMURA	Australia
ONIZUKA	Union of South Africa (?)
ONODERA	Enemy country
OTANI	?Possibly:(friendly, or allied country?)
ONISI	Year
SIMANAKA	Day (?)
SAKAKIBARA	Tsuki: Month
SIGENOI	(KO) Paragraph
SANZYO	(Toki) Time
ITIRO	1
NISAKU	2
SANTARO	3
YOITI	4
GORO	5
MASAROKU	6
SIMETARO	7
YASOKITI	8

Code Word	*Meaning*
HISAMATU	9
ATUMI	0

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 424

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 28, 1941
849.

Re your # 1199[a].

There are over ten passengers from Hawaii among those who are going to get passports. Since the next boat will not stop at Honolulu (on the way home), they must either go to Los Angeles by an American boat because only American boats are allowed to carry passengers between Hawaii and the mainland, or they might get special permits as through passengers via the mainland. Please make this request to the State Department and let us know the result. We have taken up the matter with the American Consulate here on the 28th.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 425

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

December 1, 1941
1223.

Re your # 849[a].

A reply has been received from the official in charge at the State Department to the effect that there is nothing to hinder their changing from Los Angeles to Honolulu.

[a] See IV, 424.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 426

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

November 29, 1941
887.

Re # 1122[a] from Washington to Tokyo.

We have had another inquiry from Ambassador Nomura regarding the probable date of the release of the missionaries. Inasmuch as we are interested in making arrangements for the dispatch of the Tatsuta Maru it is necessary for us to maintain good relations with America so please get in touch with the army and then wire immediately the date of release and prospects for release.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 427

FROM: Washington
TO: Rio de Janeiro

November 29, 1941
11.

Strictly confidential.

From Terasaki.

Please wire immediately the address of two foreigners who are receiving American newspapers and magazines.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 428

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
TO: Washington

December 3, 1941
34.

Re your # 11[a].

(1) Dr. Borja D'Alumeida, CP 18--, Rio de Janeiro.
(2) Prof. Jose Santana do Carmo -- (ten letters missing) --- 713, Rio de Janeiro.

---

[a] See IV, 427.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 429

FROM: New Orleans (Ito)
TO: Tokyo

December 1, 1941
046.

New Orleans to Washington # 032.

Two persons employed in our consulate here are both dual nationality holders, but are reported to the State Department as only U.S. citizens. Both do not wish to remain in the United States at the time of closing this office.

According to your message # 2437[a] we are to discharge them and arrange for return passage on Tatsuta.

(1) Will they be able to obtain a departure visa as a Japanese?

(2) Is there any way that they can give up their U.S. citizenship in a day or so's time? (Their draft classification is Class 1-B and Class 4-F.)

(3) If the above is not possible, can I report them as part of the staff and have their official standing made into Foreign Office officials? Or can I call them persons in my employ and take them out as they are with their dual citizenship?

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 430

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 1, 1941
Circular # 2436.

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attaché's office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand for this purpose. The Attaché should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 431

FROM: Tokyo — December 1, 1941
TO: Washington — #860.

Have Courier Kosaka, who will arrive there shortly from Brazil, return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru leaving Los Angeles on the 25th.

If this schedule makes it difficult for Kosaka to go to Mexico as planned, have him abandon that trip. Establish communication with Mexico, if this is the case, and make some sort of arrangements with regard to Kosaka's business.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 432

FROM: Tokyo — December 1, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular #2444.

The four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my circular message #2447[a], the U.S. (office) retains the machines and machine codes.

---

[a] See IV, 436.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 433

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — December 2, 1941
TO: Havana — Circular #2445.

Strictly secret. Take great pains that this does not leak out.

You are to take the following measures immediately:

1. With the exception of one copy of the O and L code, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the code books for communication between the three departments and the code books for Army and Navy communication.
2. As soon as you have completed this operation, wire the one word HARUNA.
3. Burn all secret documents and the work sheets on this message.
4. Be especially careful not to arouse the suspicion of those on the outside. Confidential documents are all to be given the same handling.

The above is preparatory to an emergency situation and is for your information alone. Remain calm ----- ----- -----.

Also sent to Ottawa, Vancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Seattle and Portland.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 434

FROM: Tokyo — December 2, 1941
TO: Washington — #867.

REVISED TRANSLATION

1. Please destroy by burning all of the codes you have in your office, with the exception of one copy each of the codes being used in conjunction with the machine, the O code and the abbreviation code (L). (This includes other Ministries' codes which you may have in your office.)

2. Also in the case of the code machine itself, one set is to be destroyed[a].

3. Upon completing the above, transmit the one word HARUNA.

4. Use your discretion in disposing of all text of messages to and from your office, as well as other secret papers.

5. Destroy by burning all of the codes brought to your office by telegraphic courier Kosaka. (Consequently, you need not pursue the instructions contained in my message #860[b], regarding getting in touch with Mexico.)

---

[a]It was not previously known that Washington had more than one code machine. However, the following would indicate they held at least two:

(a) Paragraph 2 directs "one set" (Hitokumi) be destroyed.

(b) Paragraph 1 directs retention of 1 set of machine code keys.

(c) On 3 December, the day after this "destruction" order, there was normal volume both ways in machine traffic.

[b]See IV, 431. See 435 for alternate translation.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 435

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — December 2, 1941
TO: Washington — #867.

CORRECTED TRANSLATION

Strictly secret.

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

2. Stop at once using one code machine and destroy it completely.

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "HARUNA".

4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #860[a] is no longer recognized.)

---

[a]See IV, 431, in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAKA return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru which sailed on the 28th. If this makes it impossible for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to KOSAKA's business in Mexico.

Trans. 12-3-41
Corrected 12-4-41

No. 436

FROM: Berne (Mitani) December 2, 1941
TO: Ankara Tokyo Circular
2447.

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including Timore), Singora, Chienmai, and to all our officials in British (including our embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except one copy of O and "*L*".

Relay from Berlin to Lisbon, Helsinki, Budapest and Vienna; Relay from Rome to Bucharest, -----; relay from Berne to Vichy, Ankara, Lisbon, Madrid; relay from Rio to Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, -----, Mexico, Panama, Bogota; relay from Bangkok to Hanoi, Saigon; relay from Canton to Haihow, -----.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 437

FROM: Tokyo December 3, 1941
TO: ----- (Circular) Circular # 2461.

Secret.

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)[a] (Including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be re-sent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.

This message is as a precaution.

---

[a] "Hidden Word" code to be used in plain Japanese language messages.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 438

FROM: Tokyo December 3, 1941
TO: Washington # 879.

Re # 1091[a] from Washington to Tokyo.

From Vice Finance Minister to Financial Attaché Nishiyama.

Handle the matter in the manner you suggest after so instructing the Specie Bank.

---

[a] See IV, 395.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 439

FROM: Tokyo December 3, 1941
TO: Washington # 874.

There are about fifty or sixty persons in Mexico who wish to return to Japan. We would like to have the Tatsuta Maru stop at Manzanillo or Acapulco en route from Los Angeles to

Balboa to pick these people up. Will you please request the State Department's permission to change the ship's schedule accordingly.

Even if the ship does stop in Mexico, we do not intend to have it take on any general cargo. This is merely for your information.

Relay this message to Mexico City.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 440

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

December 3, 1941
#1241.

Re your Circular #2437[a].

It is not difficult to imagine that the employees who remain, both foreign and native, (the prospects are that few will return to Japan), will be placed in a difficult position both from the standpoint of the law, and socially, as potential enemies, in case of the unexpected happening. We feel especially sympathetic with those who have served for many years, and who have no prospects of finding other employment. Therefore, I feel that it would be rather too severe to carry out item 6 of your circular #1347[b], and that it would be far better to treat them with the magnanimity becoming a great nation so that they would be enthusiastic about helping us again directly or indirectly after peace is restored, rather than to make such an ado over the amount of retirement allowance they should receive. The various consulates are quite concerned over this matter as by the San Francisco message. I wish, therefore, you would give favorable consideration to the payment of allowances on the following basis, and advise by return dispatch.

(1) Making no distinction as to foreigners or native, in addition to the specified amounts, pay them one month's salary for each three years of service. (The portion of any incompleted three year period being counted as three years.)

(2) The minimum total of the above to be 2½ months of the salary.

(3) Those who have worked less than two years to receive two month's salary.

Relayed to all offices in the United States.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 441

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

December 3, 1941
#1244.

Re your #874[a].

We made a request of the person in charge at the State Department and were advised that there would be no trouble whatsoever. Since it is necessary to have it confirmed officially in writing, and because the State Department must notify the War Department, please advise us of the date on which the ship will arrive in Balboa and also whether arrangements with Mexico have been completed.

---

[a] See IV, 439.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 442

FROM: Washington — December 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1245.

Terasaki now in the midst of----- intelligence work at a most important time, would like to have him stay over a while and go by the sailing on the 19th. Takagi busy on Tatsuta Maru business. (Negotiating with State Department for securing space) ----- air plane.

(*Note:* Many gaps in this message.)

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 443

FROM: Tokyo — December 3, 1941
TO: Washington — # 875.

Chief of Office routing.

Re your # 1232[a].

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is, that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

---

[a] See IV, Part A 228.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 444

FROM: Tokyo — December 3, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 899.

Re your # 787[a].

(1) Are they to be ordered out of the country on the 6th or are they merely to be permitted to leave the country on that date?

(2) Are there any objections to going ahead according to my # 788[b]?

(3) At present to what area are the three restricted?

Please reply by return dispatch.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] See IV, 392.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 445

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Tokyo

December 4, 1941
#805.

Re your #887.[a]

In consideration of Japanese-American relations we have decided to pronounce sentence upon these persons one day earlier, tomorrow the 5th, on that day we will direct their banishment from the country to become effective.

The 3 men are at the present time on their way to Antō, therefore, in accordance with Paragraph 1 of your #788[b] after we have decided to have them sent back to their homeland we will again escort them to the border.

Furthermore, the Manchukuo authorities would like to have these persons, as a matter or principle, get in touch with the American Consul. However, should this be impossible they will permit the official maintaining surveillance over them to contact the Consul.

These persons and others who are anxious to return to the United States should be expatriated through Korea to Japan or to Shanghai by way of Dairen. However, there is the problem of securing boat passage. Please let me have your opinions in regard to this matter at as early a date as possible.

---

[a] See IV, 426.

[b] See IV, 392 in which Tokyo wires Hsinking that the American Embassy in Tokyo requests that, if the Americans concerned have been given a fair trial, before banishment they be permitted to come to Harbin in order to settle their personal affairs.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 446

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 3, 1941
#87-(?).

(*Abstract.*)

Have sent funds for return passage of families of Iguchi, Matsudaira, Takahashi, Horiuchi, Hori.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 447

FROM: Tokyo
TO: New York

December 3, 1941
#269.

(*Abstract.*)

Sending funds for return passage of families of following: Morishima, Inoue, Kondo, Amano, Hayasida, Watanabe.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 448

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Washington

December 4, 1941
#886.

Secret.

Re your # 1228[a].

Please acknowledge my # 885[b].

In regard to baggage for holders of diplomatic passports, on October 14th an officer of the American Embassy brought to the head of the American section of this office a dispatch saying that no permit would be required to take out personal effects, household effects, or personal baggage.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 449

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) December 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 883.

Message from Manila dated November 28.

-----[a], who is an acquaintance of Ambassador KURUSU, called and confidentially told me what he had confidentially heard on the 26th from the Shanghai Branch Manager of the Canadian Pacific, who was on his way back to the United States by a clipper. It is to the following effect:

All shipping via the Burma route is a monopoly of the Western Transportation Company. This company, being under the control of the Soong interest, uses only 10 or 20 per cent of the electric freight trains for transportation of materials for the Government and the principal capacity of the railway is being devoted to shipment of clothing and foodstuff intended merely to fatten Soong's coffer. Now, if Ambassador KURUSU suggests to the United States an investigation of this Company, that Government would be astonished with what the investigation will unearth and this might have the good result of dampening United States aid to China.

This is for your information.

Please keep the source of the information strictly secret.

---

[a] DoD Comment: Name withheld.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 451

FROM: Washington December 4, 1941
TO: Rio No number.

Best regards. If you want me to do any shopping for you, let me know by telegraph or air mail. (Eisei)

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 452

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

December 5, 1941
1268.

Re your # 867[a].

From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication Section:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing, I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of one code machine.

---

[a] See IV, 434.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 453

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

December 4, 1941
882.

Departmental secret.

Message # 748[a] from *Peking* to the *Foreign Minister*.

According to a spy report, the head of the American Marine group here, while at a send-off party given by a certain foreign friend of his on the 18th, revealed that all the American Marines are leaving very soon. However, a few who are versed in airplanes cannot return home. They will probably go via Manchu (sic) or ----- to Vladivostok as advance troops to lay the ground for the establishment of an American air base there.

---

[a] See IV, 454.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 454

FROM: Peking
TO: Net

November 27, 1941
Circular # 606.

Peking to Tokyo # 748.

Reports of reliability B.

According to secret information on the 18th a corporal of the Marine Corps stationed here let slip the information that the American Marines were to be evacuated from here in the near future, excepting a few who, because of their knowledge of aviation, were not to return home but were to go to Vladivostok by way of Manchuokuo and form the nucleus of an American aviation unit to be stationed there.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 455

FROM: Shanghai — November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #2126.

Re my #2119[a].

1. All the Marines are scheduled to evacuate on the President Madison on the 21st, or the President Harrison on the 25th.
2. On the 20th, "BNAURETAKVI" of the Joint Defense Committee, spoke to the Commander of the Japanese force regarding the matter of my #2103[b], saying that the Municipal Council had ----- in regard to the defense of the "C" area ----- that he would propose it to the President of the Municipal Council and to the Commander of the Italian force.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 398.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 456

FROM: Tientsin — November 27, 1941
TO: Nanking — Circular #295.

Tientsin to Tokyo #385.

Regarding the withdrawal of the Marines. We are investigating the matter further. From our inquiry of the railways all machine guns and other important movable equipment has already been moved to Chinwangtao and equipment not wanted has been sold by auction.

The exact time of evacuation does not seem to be settled definitely as yet, if appears that the U.S. Consular staff mentioned that it would probably be inside of the next month.

Also, transport ship HANFURE is expected in Chinwangtao around the end of this month, but it probably will only load the above ordnances, and the actual transporting of troops will no doubt not be until the middle of January.

Trans. 12-22-41

No. 457

FROM: Tokyo — December 5, 1941
TO: Washington — #896.

Re your #1245[a].

Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days.

---

[a] See IV, 442.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 458

FROM: Washington — December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1265.

New York to Tokyo #532.

From New York # 532.

Deniti Hikida—an authority on the Negro problem in the United States we have been utilizing in propaganda work among the Negroes, gathering general intelligence, investigations, and in various other capacities—expresses his desire to return on the Tatsuta Maru.

Recently, he is being subjected to strict surveillance by the authorities of this country, and for this reason, we feel that it is to our interest to have him return home. In view of his excellent record of cooperation with this office in the past, will you please give consideration to our advancing him his passage for his return voyage. (We are paying him his discharge allowance from our secret intelligence fund.) Because the time of departure is fast approaching, please advise us immediately.

Will you give consideration to employing this man upon his return home in our offices there. We feel his specialized knowledge will be of value to us.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 459

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

December 5, 1941
1264.

Re my # 1248[a] and New York's # 533[a] to you.

Incidental expenses, and secret expenditures at this office for the third quarter amounted to more than $41,000 of which $33,000 was for incidental expenditures. The telegraph fund, up to December, was not sufficient; the increase of $2,000 makes the total $35,000. Please permit the cable transfer of one month's allotment limited to the use of this office.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 460

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

December 5, 1941
1262.

Re your # 896[a].

From Kurusu to Secretary Tasiro.

I feel confident that you are fully aware of the importance of the intelligence set-up, in view of the present condition of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. I would like very much to have Terasaki, who would be exceedingly difficult to suddenly replace, because of certain circumstances, remain here until we are definitely enlightened as to the end of the negotiations. I beg of you, as a personal favor to me, to make an effort along these lines. I shall have him assume his post as soon as his work here is disposed of.

[a] See IV, 457.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 461

FROM: Tokyo — December 5, 1941
TO: New York — # 255 (?).

From Furumoto, managing director of Domei News to New York office of Domei News.

Yasuwo, Kinosita, Teranishi and Taguti are recalled to Japan. Have them make unnoticeable preparation to leave on Tatsuta Maru.

If passage is not available on Tatsuta will have to arrange for their going to South America, so please keep this in mind. At the last moment, Inamoto is to do as the Consul General does.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 462

FROM: Tokyo — December 5, 1941
TO: Washington — # 894.

From Domei's Manager Furuno to Kato.

We intend to transfer you to the Home Office, please make preparations as unobserved as possible, to return on the Tatsuta Maru. If you cannot make the Tatsuta Maru, we are considering having you go to South Sea areas; please have this in mind.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 463

FROM: Tokyo — December 5, 1941
TO: New York — # 275.

From Furomoto, managing director of Domei News to New York, office of Domei News.

Yasuwo, Kinosita, Teranishi and Taguti are recalled to Japan. Have them make unnoticeable preparations to leave on Tatsuta Maru.

If passage is not available on Tatsuta will have to arrange for their going to South America so please keep this in mind. At the last moment Inamoto is to do as the Consul-General does.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 464

FROM: Washington (Jap Ambassador) — December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) — # 1266.

Re your Circular # 2437[a].

Relay of New York to Tokyo Message # 530.

1. Okamoto, who is returning, has served here six and one-half years. His port of embarkation is Los Angeles.

2. ----- even if the situation should reach the worst will -----. (However, in the event of the evacuation and closing of this office, he would be in the position of having no responsibilities aside from looking after routine ----- and we have decided to continue his employ.)

3. We would send ITAMKSI home at this time, but because of needing him in our intelligence operations we intend to have him take same steps as the members of this Office staff.

Will advise later regarding Moriwaki and Hiramitsu.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 465

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #332.

For the coming trip of the TATSUTA MARU applicants for first class and second class passages already exceed the capacity number. I understand that a telegram has been received from Tokyo at the local NYK office asking to reserve first class passage for sixty odd persons. Will you please inform me for my own reference the reason for requesting this reservation since I must have the information in assigning staterooms.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 466

FROM: Tokyo December 6, 1941
TO: Washington #897.

(Urgent.)

Re your #1268[a].

To Counselor IGUCHI from KAMEYAMA.

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867[b] was that of the two sets of code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other.

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 225.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 467

FROM: Tokyo December 7, 1941
TO: Washington #909.

(Urgent.)

From Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO to Commerical Attache IGUCHI and his staff as well as to Secretary YŪKI.

I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our contry despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 468

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Canton

December 6, 1941
225.

Re your # 516[a].

Strictly secret.

You are to note the following points:

1. In your communication to the British and American Consuls, the statement, "We will take over the concessions and other interests", is not necessarily accurate so you had better change it to, "We will place the settlements and other interests under the control of the Imperial army."

2. The evacuation of the Consular Staffs and resident Nationals of hostile nations will have to parallel and coincide with measures concerning the departure of our Consular staffs and our resident Nationals, so when you receive orders from Headquarters you may proceed to handle this matter.

3. Public property of hostile nations, Consulates, and buildings will be seized or commandeered and after being sealed they will be in our custody.

4. Private property, even though it might serve us in some military way, cannot be seized. It might merely be taken over and kept under surveillance.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 469

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Net

December 7, 1941
Circular # 2493.

In 2 parts complete.

Secret.

Separate Message.

Policies:

In regard to our handling of enemy subjects and enemy property in Japan, we will approach this matter in the magnanimity of a great nation, complying with international law as far as possible, and exercising care not to give the enemy nations or other third party nations any occasion for taking retaliatory measures, or for making unfavorable propaganda.

Main points:

(1) Diplomatic officials of enemy countries:

(a) Evacuation. The evacuation of enemy diplomatic officials will be carried out on the basis of exchanges for our diplomatic and consular officials resident in enemy countries.

(b) Handling of the above until their evacuation. The inviolable rights pertaining to diplomatic officials of enemy countries, whose duties come to an end simultaneously with the beginning of war, will be respected as a general rule. However, telephones will be cut off, and the use of wave radios and wireless transmitters will be seized. Members of the staffs of embassies and legations, for the present, as a general rule will be allowed to live in the embassy or legation compounds, and no inconvenience will be caused in the matter of daily living.

(2) Consular officials.

(a) Evacuation. As far as possible consular officials will be handled under the same heading with diplomatic officials.

(b) The handling of the same until the time of their evacuation: The offices will be closed and sealed. Short wave radio and wireless equipment will be seized. Members of consulate staffs for the time being will be allowed to live at their present places of abode and as far as conditions warrant may use their official residences, with no restrictions upon their daily living.

(3) Enemy subjects residing in Japan: In addition to such police surveillance and protection as is necessary, individuals regarding whom there is ample ground for suspicion will be rounded up; and all military men, seamen, or aviation personnel as well as those qualified for these services, persons of special technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies, and all males between 18 and 45 will for the present be placed under arrest. However, in view of the fact that we have a very large number of subjects residing in enemy territory, we will exercise caution so that there may be nothing of the nature of ill-treatment occasioned for them.

(4) Publicly owned enemy property: Such public property, aside from embassy, legation and consular buildings, which can be used either directly or indirectly for military purposes will, if necessary, be confiscated.

(5) Privately owned enemy property: Privately owned property will not be seized or confiscated except in the event of general requisitioning.

(6) While no special restrictions will be placed upon the diplomatic and consular officials of neutral countries resident in Japan, those of quasi enemy countries (such as Panama, Iran, Norway, Belgium, Egypt, Greece, etc.) will be denied the use of codes.

The evacuation of the enemy diplomatic and consular officials who are in Manchukuo and China will be handled in the same manner as the above.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 470

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #793.

Re my #705*.

JIPPU is extremely concerned over the matter of the fine. Please make the arrangements I requested in my caption message immediately. If this is impossible I am wondering if there would be any objections to my making arrangements to remit the money from here. Please wire instructions immediately.

*See IV, 530.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 471

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

I know that you are doing your best to take care of my personnel problems, but Japanese-American relations are now so delicate that work in this office is becoming and will become heavier and heavier. We have to keep in contact with inner Government circles here in order to get military and other information. Moreover, we need competent personnel to handle our propaganda and machinations. As you can well guess, the prospect is that hereafter my troubles in this report will keep increasing. Furthermore, this situation was certainly rendered no better by the return to Japan of KIHARA and the change in posts of MORI. Doubtless you

thought it best to make these changes, but if things are left as they now are, no matter how hard I try, it will be impossible to carry out the duties incumbent upon me. Will you, therefore, please consider the following recommendations:

(1) You told me that KIHARA might stay in Japan for quite a long while. However, I must get in touch with the inner circles of the Philippine Government without loss of a day. We cannot be lax in this respect, so I want you to please have him return to his post just as soon as possible.

(2) In order that I may make contact without any trouble, if and when necessary, for the time being I will let MORI take office in Davao immediately, but, after all, matters concerning Davao have to be discussed directly with the Government officials here in Manila and from the very nature of the place, an aged man could handle the situation quite satisfactorily, so please appoint a consul for Davao and let me have MORI brought back here just as soon as practicable.

(3) Not long ago I informed you by letter how anxious I was to get to work on our basic investigation plans. You know, this is an excellent training ground for our aides and I would like for you to send me an aide who has been educated in the United States.

As soon as there is a ship, I will send KAWAMINAMI to his post. I think it will be about December 8th. Considering his family matters, I do not think it feasible to postpone his sailing any longer than that. Then, too, even though he stayed, it would be no substitute for my recommendations (1), (2), and (3) above.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 472

FROM: Tokyo — November 27, 1941
TO: Manila — #379.

The Osaka Steamship Company had on deposit the sum of 125,000 pesos in the Manila branch of the Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan, representing freight collections. From this they have paid the operating expenses of their branch office there and have about 83,000 pesos on hand which they wish to transmit to Japan. They have contacted the authorities there but as there are no prospects of an immediate settlement they have requested your assistance in this matter.

A. Are there any prospects of your being able to negotiate a permit for remitting this money.

B. If this is impossible there would be no objections to your borrowing this money as a secret fund to use there and then we would reimburse the company here in Japan. Is this feasible? Please wire immeidately.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 473

FROM: Manila (Nihro) — November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #802.

(Request Message.)

From NAGAWO, resident manager of the Osaka Steamship branch, to the Chief of the Finance Section in the home office.

In regard to the matter of remittance, we see no prospect of making purchases without a favorable change in the situation. Because of Sensasu[a] I will write you the details from the branch office.

[a] Kana spelling; probably means *censors*.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 474

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #803.

Re your #379[a].

(To be handled in Government code.)

1. The matter mentioned in my #772[b] has also to be considered. Though I am negotiating anew, I have no hopes that ----- permits can be secured. I see no recourse but to watch the development of the situation a little longer and then when a favorable opportunity arises, to make fresh representations to them.
2. In regard to withdrawals of deposits, permits are required but in view of the fact that these deposits are in the name of the local Osaka Shōsen branch office, it is virtually impossible to secretly make a transfer of these funds to this office.

[a] See IV, 472.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 475

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #806.

(Abstract) Nihro states that they have decided to destroy excess code books and that they were burned on the 29th.

Trans. 12-15-41

No. 476

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #809.

Due to the straining of international relations, we have destroyed in readiness for emergency, out of the codes kept at this office the ----- (it was, of course, reported in my #806[a] ( )) on the 29th.

As a result we find it impossible to decipher your message of the 29th (Yokohama Special Bank request telegram ----- number of words 18.)

Will you please wire the same in the Foreign Office code.

[a] See IV, 475.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 477

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #219.

Re my message #212[b].

(Part 1 of 3)[a].

1. Yesterday, the 17th, the entire diplomatic corps, including myself, acknowledged in writing the new government's assumption of power (the United States alone made a statement of acceptance without a moment's delay. The Italian Minister was the only one who hesitated for awhile, and even then he merely said that due notice had been taken of the matter. According to what the Colombian Minister, who filed a statement, told me confidentially, his country made an issue of the fact that GUARDIA was made president because the President designate No. 3 was Minister to Peru but was out of town. Colombia, however, made her statement of acceptance on the 17th.

2. According to the explanations of the Mexican Minister, who also filed a statement, a presidential discharge should be handled by the judiciary as a whole. A mere statement by the Supreme Court is sufficient. Therefore, there is not much wonder that the embassies of the various American countries should feel dissatisfaction with the whole thing.

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[a] For Part 2 of 3, see IV, 478.
[b] Not available.

Translator's Note: This message being very badly garbled, the translation has been made more on the basis of context.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 478

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #219.

(Part 2 of 3.)

3. Furthermore, the two ministers said in regard to defense of American rights that all Central and South American countries are acting strictly voluntarily in taking definite steps against the Axis, that they are not blindly following the United States.

4. The local government declares that the "veiled intervention" by the United States, mentioned in your wire #86[a] of the 11th, is not prevalent although any child knows that the events are based on a private agreement with the United States.

The Colombian minister told me privately that since America's Good Neighbor Policy was ineffective, the only course left open to her was stricter policing of Central and South America, and that new developments in the situation will make still more severe this type of pressure on Central and South America by the United States.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 479

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #219.

(Part 3 of 3.)

5. Furthermore, this administration, having assumed office, will cooperate fully with the United States in regard to the various questions having to do with relationships between Panamanian territory and the Canal Zone, the registration of merchant vessels, air bases, and the granting of additional advance bases. The government having decided to carry out this program, the Minister to Mexico City was appointed as the Ambassador to Washington on the 15th, and on the 16th the Minister to Germany, who had been rumored as being pro-Axis and had been recalled, was put on the inactive list.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 480

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 20, 1941
TO: Washington #62.

(Priority.)

(*Message to Tokyo #221*)

According to newspaper reports the new government in its cabinet meeting of the 18th has decided that vessels of Panama registry will be permitted to enter belligerent waters. Furthermore, the Foreign Office seems inclined to work in close cooperation with the United States since the relationships between Japan and the United States have become more critical. I have been given to understand that direct requests have been made by the United States for close collaboration for the defense of the Canal Zone and the maintenance of canal service. The new minister of education (attorney for the Japanese society) told IZAWA, on the 19th, that there were many evidences that the canal authorities were making countless preparations for war in the near future when war between Japan and the United States would break out. These preparations he said were on the basis of instructions from the American Government and in conjunction with the change in cabinet within Japan. He said, however, that he was not at liberty to disclose the basis for these statements.

Furthermore, after this cabinet meeting the Panamanian Government declared the German Commercial Representative here, who has been appointed Acting Minister, to be PERSONA NON GRATA because he had abused diplomatic privileges. According to the explanations made by the Acting Minister this is but the result of efforts made by the United States in the past to have the Arias Administration do the same thing.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 481

FROM: Panama October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #225.

Part 1 of 2.

(To be handled in government code.)

Re my #221[a].

In order to sound out the diplomatic policy of the new government, I called on Foreign Minister FABRIGA. He remarked, "The policies of the new government have been clarified in

official statements published in various newspapers (these I have summarized in my caption message). In order to avoid ----- ----- -----, Panama has decided to defend the various countries on the American continent, hand in hand with the United States, against Germany. In spite of the close friendship existent between Japan and Panama in the past, there now has arisen the question of Japan's stand as a result of her alignment with the Axis. Therefore, should unforetold events arise, Panama has no choice but to assume the same attitude the United States does toward relationships with Japan.

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[a] See IV, 480.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 482

FROM: Panama
TO: Tokyo

October 22, 1941
225.

Part 2 of 2.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

"Should Japan-American relations reach the breaking point, in order that she might render full assistance to the United States, she will take counter-measures against Japan. In such an event, Panama has no choice but to cooperate with the United States in accordance with agreements made between the two countries for the defense of the Canal." To this I replied, "The new cabinet in Japan is exerting itself for the improvement of relations between Japan and the United States. But, though I am not overly acquainted with the Russian question, should the need arise Japan will have to take definite steps in accordance with the 'merits' of the case. In order that Japan not participate in the war, thus expanding the sphere of the fight throughout the world, it is hoped that it will not be necessary for Panama at this time to cooperate with the United States."

The Foreign Minister then remarked, "Of course, the Panamanian Government has already decided to take such measures as are necessary to defend herself against Hitlerism."

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 483

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

October 28, 1941
234.

(Urgent.)

Part 1 of 3.

1. On the 20th by telephone I was advised by the Foreign Office that permits would not be granted for the continued operation of Japanese firms after the 28th. Though I tried to get a private interview with the Foreign Minister immediately, he stated that he did not wish to give further consideration to this matter and on this pretext avoided granting me an interview. However, I had IZAWA call on the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and discuss the practical questions arising from the sudden shutting down of Japanese business firms. IZAWA emphasized that the cancellation of long-term leases and the exercise of an embargo on Japanese business not only aggravated the crisis but because of the lack of ships, it is impossible to evacuate within so short a time all of the business people involved by this order. He, however, remained adamant, saying only that they could not grant permits for the continued operation of these firms.

Today, the 28th, the cabinet decided to veto applications made by Japanese business people for a postponement of the prohibitive regulations for a ninety-day period in order that they might dispose of such goods as they had in stock.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 484

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 234.

(Urgent.)

Part 2 of 3.

2. Not only does the attitude of the Panamanian Government reflect total discrimination against Japanese residents, but they are planning to exercise a complete boycott of Japanese goods. (As I told you in my # 157[a], there is considerable danger that they might conspire with the Canal authorities to prevent Japanese firms trying, at some date in the future, to move from Panama into some other country.) It is even thought that the situation might become so critical that extortion or plundering might ensue.

3. Insofar as other points are concerned, no objections are being voiced to the closing up of Japanese shops and stores on the 30th. (As you are well aware, should shops and businesses open again under the present conditions, penal regulations could be applied.) The Japanese here would like to make arrangements, therefore, so that they could go at their own convenience to Puntarenas[b], Buenaventura[c], or even Lima to board vessels for home.

Those who are planning to return home are as I detailed them in my # 171[a].

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[a] Not available.
[b] Sea Port of Costa Rica.
[c] Sea Port of Colombia.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 485

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 234.

(Urgent.)

Part 3 of 3.

4. In examining the position of the new Panamanian Government, it is wise to consider the fact that locally, some few days ago, American-financed newspapers published statements for the first time that Japanese nationals here were planning to evacuate whenever the opportunity presented itself. The statements also were made, quoting government sources as of the 28th, that permits would not be granted for the reopening of Japanese shops and companies. Nevertheless, when you consider the friendly consideration which they have given to all our problems in the past, such a course as they are now pursuing seems to indicate a fear of arousing the wrath of the United States, or possibly they have considered all along that flattery is cheap. In view of the present circumstances, insofar as friendly Japan-Panamanian relations are concerned, one cannot help but come to the conclusion that it is

impossible to place confidence in the intentions of the Panamanian Government (at the present time, Central and South American countries will not grant travel permits for Japanese resident here).

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 486

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

October 30, 1941
235.

(Priority.)

Part 1 of 4.

Re my # 225[a].

Strictly secret. To be handled in Government Code.

1. The recent control regulations for the conduct of business are being most rigorously enforced. The decision of the Arias Government to exclude one group of business men from the application of these regulations has been completely disregarded. Further they are taking the attitude that even though they grant permits, should war come they absolutely would not permit the evacuation of any Japanese Nationals from Panama. Looking at it from the point of view of its results, the manner in which they dangled the thought of the force of economic pressure against Japan seems to indicate that all this is at the instigation of the United States. Their tacit alignment with the United States in their hostility to us is tantamount to the exercise of economic sanctions directed toward Japan.

2. The President of the United States has even gone so far as to fabricate the statement that the Nazis are plotting the establishment of 5 separate dependencies in Central and South America. By recalling the incident which occurred during the last war, having to do with the publication of wires sent by the German Foreign Minister to ZIMMERMAN, which provoked difficulties between the United States and Mexico would seem to indicate that the American Ambassador and the Canal authorities are instilling in the Panamanian Government the thought of the possibility of a similar situation here.

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[a] See IV, 481.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 487

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

October 30, 1941
235.

(Priority.)

Part 2 of 4.

(The American Ambassador reflects the attitude of the Government of the United States which is determined that the Nazi regime must be overthrown completely.) I believe that my # 255[a] clearly reflected this tendency.

3. Insofar as my attempts to preserve my contacts with various Cabinet Ministers, the Foreign Office some few days ago made the statement that they would like to have me make all contacts through the Foreign Office. They do not trust our intentions and are most suspicious of my activities (it would seem that they were not only suspicious, too, of my contacts

with the diplomatic corps, particularly, the German and the Italian diplomatic officials, but also of my interest in the Canal). When I questioned the Foreign Minister by saying, "Do you object to my personal contacts?" an awkward silence ensued. It seems clear to me that the reason he avoided a direct reply was that as an ex-editor of the "Panama American," he was trying to attract the good will of the United States.

4. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that Panama is actually a dependency of the United States, in order that she might assume the role of an independent nation they were permitting her, like a child militantly waiving a famous Masamune[b] blade, to work in conjunction with the Canal military authorities.

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[a] See IV, 481.

[b] Famous swordsmith of early Japan.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 488

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #235.

(Priority.)

Part 3 of 4.

In order that she might preserve the present regime, she was being permitted in the name of democracy to take the fore, one step ahead of the United States, in her hostility to the Axis powers not excluding Japan. Not only this but there would seem also to be indications that she might even go so far as to bring about a severence of diplomatic relations. Not having the strength to do this she has called for the arming of her merchant vessels; recalled her diplomatic officials to Germany and is not considering their replacement.

5. On the 29th, when I called on the Foreign Minister in connection with other business, coming right to the point, he said, "Some few days ago when we were debating the question of arming merchant vessels, a group within the cabinet argued for the severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers including Japan but the majority vetoed the suggestion. Panama, as well as all Central and South American countries, at the insistence of the President of the United States, has ordered the dissolution of all Nazi groups. The fact that Japan was not included in the orders was not that they feared ----- ----- of Japan for Japan is nothing more than one form of Nazism.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 489

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #235.

(Priority.)

Part 4 of 4.

and blindly follows the lead of Germany." ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

6. The United States, in order to preserve her position in various countries in Central America, as well as in South America, seems to be experimenting by urging Panama into the lead. The tendency seems to be to point out that Panama's mission is to test the strength of Germany and Italy in Central and South America, as well as to measure the extent of our commercial inroads into South America.

On the 30th, the Panamanian Foreign Minister gave the Italian Minister the impression that the sinking of Panamanian vessels by Germany and Italy made more difficult than ever the continuation of diplomatic relations between the several countries and the Italian Minister said, "To date we have tried insofar as possible not to touch Panamanian vessels."

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 490

FROM: Tokyo — November 1, 1941
TO: Panama — #990.

(In two parts, complete.)

Re your #234[a].

1. Yamamoto, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, has sent an official complaint to the Panama Consul, and at the same time you will make a strong official complaint to the Panama Government. As this matter will have a big effect on other South American countries, and as it is also a chance to show the United States Japan's firm stand, our idea is to take a firm stand in future negotiations on this matter.

2. As a separate item from the above official complaint you will please make the following demands on Panama.

1. Payment for losses occurred by making them close their businesses.
2. Allow a time limit to make it possible to clear up "stock".
3. Arrangements for Japanese capital investments.
4. Request that Panama arrange for the entry of these Japanese into other South American countries.

3. Due to ship and fuel difficulties it is difficult to arrange for a special evacuation ship to be sent to Panama, but negotiations are being carried on here. However, the best plan for those who can not live in Panama would be to try and get into other South American countries.

Try to advise Japanese against returning to Japan, as it is most important not to break relations with the countries at this time. To leave would be to play into the United States' hands, therefore please wire developments on this matter, your actions in regard to the matter, and your idea on future developments.

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[a] See IV, 483.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 491

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) — November 5, 1941
TO: Washington — #65.

(In 3 parts, complete.)

(Panama to Tokyo #245.)

Regarding your #90[a] and our #243[b].

Special Secret.

(1) Although it can be said that they are really seriously thinking the matter over, (meaning Japan's protest to Panama regarding new law prohibiting Japanese to own or work in stores, etc.) there is also no doubt that they are trying to chase all Japanese out of the country.

The rumor that the present Panama Government has received funds from the United States since the political change indicates there is little doubt that Panama will be willing to cooperate with the United States in defending the safety of the Panama Canal.

For this reason, to make our protest a strong and effective one it will be necessary for us to take emergency measures. This measure, if we can not take over part of Panama as a *guarantee occupation (?)* to protect Japanese in Panama, should be enough of an emergency to act to make up for Japan's loss and to compensate for our prestige. For this reason I believe that this emergency measure should be to take over all ships now in East Asia flying the Panama flag. The time to be when most convenient to ——. Of course the above would have to be done secretly and if we plan this, we could not do what you ask in #92 as that would only serve as a warning.

(2) If the above emergency act is carried through, no doubt the Panama Consul in the United States will appeal to the United States and try to get in touch with our Embassy there, so they should be prepared not to receive this complaint from the United States. Also if the ships are seized no doubt complaints would be made from the ship-owner nationalities, all of which should be refused on the grounds that they should make their complaints through the Panama Government.

(3) Regarding making protests to Minister HERARI, please do this immediately and assist at your end by backing up my complaint to the full extent by demanding an urgent reply to your complaint.

(4) Regarding Japanese residing here this Consul will demand that the Panama authorities protect them and assure them of a living by helping them to reestablish themselves in business. At the same time we are instructing individuals to stay and make a complaint and are helping them in this.

According to investigations by this office there are about 200 cases, most of whom desire to go back to Japan but have no money, and there is none who wish to enter another country. For this reason we are trying to make them become interested in farming, etc. and stay here.

(5) Although we can not tell what attitude will be taken towards our complaint, I am sure they will not suggest an alteration regarding this law, so, to carry out my emergency suggestion suddenly and secretly is what I believe to be the best thing.

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[a] See IV, 490.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 492

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

November 6, 1941
#250.

(Urgent.)

Re your #92[a].

Strictly secret.

1. Due to causes given in my #249[b], Japanese residents are facing increasingly serious hardships in making their living. Therefore, on the 6th, I requested the Foreign Minister to allow all stores to immediately open for business.

2. It seems that the attitude of the Government here is partly attributable to instigations by the United States. Some Japanese residents, not realizing the political gravity of the situation, have been endeavoring to overcome the difficulties either by illegal business or by hiring lawyers, but I have warned them against such indiscretion inasmuch as they not

only are liable to be made victims of the avarice of lawyers and mediators but also might give the authorities a pretext for deportation.

3. For my own reference, I would like to be informed of the date on which Minister FUERARI sent his telegram.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 493.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 493

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #249.

Part 1 of 2.

Re your message #93[a]. Re -----.

In view not only of the fact that newspapers here are either owned or controlled by the family of the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, who is the real leader in this question, but also of the attitude of the new government toward the United States, as well as toward Japanese enterprises which it seems to be wishing to take over, we may expect that our announcements as well as their republication would be interfered with. Futhermore, their criticism will be based on the United States' dogmatic conception to which is applied the term "democracy". Therefore, I believe that at least the following facts should be used in enlightening (the people?) either by means of radio broadcasts or the Domei service.

1. First of all is the fact that the application of the control law is arbitrary. Despite the fact that the date on which the law was to have gone into effect was November 1, it actually was put into effect on October 28 and thus an attempt was made to drive out the Japanese on the strength of the right of prepossession. (I called the attention of the Foreign Minister to this point at the time of the interview on the 5th.)

2. On the 5th, when the ----- appealed to the minister of Agriculture and Commerce, he not only forbade the opening of Japanese shops even temporarily,

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[a] See IV, 495.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 494

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #249.

Part 2 of 2.

but also forbade -----, a very cruel thing to do, ----- the Japanese engaging in any other kind of work.

3. I pointed out to him that some of the Chinese people have been allowed to keep their shops open even from *(the very beginning?)*. To this he replied that it could not be helped if the law is understood to be applicable only to the Japanese. The fact is that this law has not yet affected the business of white foreigners. The resolution adopted in July was thrown overboard in so far as its application of the Japanese was concerned, but the Government has been applying it to some of the shops operated by the Chinese. In this respect, the manner in

which the law is applied by the present regime is the very opposite of that in which the former regime applied it. I have grounds to suspect that the former regime's attempt to issue licenses to the Japanese was one of the reasons contributing to its downfall.

4. The present cabinet is privately owned by the family of the present President GADEA[a], by the Minister of Agriculture, and Commerce and by the family of HABUREGA[b]. One of their present stooges, namely, the present Foreign Minister, gave his tacit approval to the (competitors ?) of the Japanese merchants to cause the Japanese shops to be closed by means of this law. These rivals are attempting to take over the Japanese businesses, the prosperity of which they greatly envy. More lately, the landlords have begun to demand, on the grounds of the Japanese being unemployed, that they hand back the shops or auction off the equipment.

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[a] GUARDIA
[b] FABREGA

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 495

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 6, 1941
TO: Panama #93.

(Message to Washington #64.)

Re your #245[a].

On the first, I had FERARI, the Panamanian Minister here, called and had Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO make a protest along the line given in my #91[a] with the request that it be transmitted to the Panamanian Foreign Minister. YAMAMOTO pressed him to get a formal statement from the Government of Panama and strongly demanded that he impress clearly upon the minds of the Panamanian authorities the fact that we consider this question a serious one.

The Minister stated in reply that he had not received any information from his country ever since the recent shake-up; that he would transmit the protest at once, and that he would do what he could in the matter.

Although we expect to urge them again to give us a definite statement, depending on what develops, I would like to have the details of this question as well as the protest pertaining to it published here as well as in Panama. I will wire you later as to when this should be done.

Please transmit this message and your caption telegram to Washington.

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[a] See IV, 491.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 496

Newspaper Item: New York Times

PANAMA REJECTS TOKYO'S PROTESTS

Japanese Expulsion From Canal Area To Be Continued

Panama, Nov. 8.—The government of Panama has refused to consider the protest of the Japanese Legation against the closing of all Japanese business because the note was phrased

in insulting terms and constituted intervention in the internal affairs of the nation, according to a report yesterday of a cabinet session, with Provisional President Ricardo Adolfo da la Guardia presiding.

The law nationalizing commerce prohibits members of a race not permitted to immigrate to engage in business and has resulted in the closing of all Japanese shops. Barbers at one time were even more numerous and were frequently considered potential spies.

Panama has been a distributing center for Japanese goods and now it will be difficult to dispose of large stocks reported here as, in addition to ending retail sales, the reexport of goods requires a license. Such a license is granted only when the entire proceeds of the transaction are deposited in a blocked account.

The Japanese note referred to these restrictions as "inhuman cruelty" and warned Panama of the responsibility she incurred. Repatriation of the Japanese here will be difficult since Japanese ships no longer call at the Isthmus.

Protests Strong, Tokyo Asserts

By Otto D. Tolishchus

Tokyo, Nov. 8.—The foreign office announced today that it has lodged strong protests with the government of Panama against allegedly discriminatory and "inhuman" acts which it charges are designed to drive Japanese residents from areas close to the Panama Canal by depriving them of their livelihood.

The protests which were made yesterday and last Saturday, both in Tokyo and Panama, were especially significant because the Japanese government undertakes to speak in this instance in the name of all Asiatic people and calls upon the government of Panama to "revert to a free, independent policy and settle this unpleasant question without being influenced in any way by any foreign power."

No. 497

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 270.

On the Panamanian Independence Day the Spanish Minister blurted out in a Club, "Panama is being trodden on by the iron boot of Uncle Sam. Panama can no longer hold her head high among the family of nations as a sovereign state."

On the 10th, it was published that he was a persona non grata. Judging from how he was taken up on what he said, I do not think he can do otherwise than resign. It is thought certain that the United States is back of this. (Please refer to my # 235[a].)

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[a] See IV, 486.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 498

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 272.

Regarding your cable of 11th, the Spanish Ambassador informed me of the following, confidentially.

That although the Ambassador might have been a little disorderly regarding this matter, it was not a question big enough to make an issue over, and that he had gone to the dean of the diplomatic service and asked him to ask the President of Panama not to make an issue of

it to the Spanish Foreign Office. However, the dean and the second in rank U.S. Ambassador shelved this request.

Accordingly the Spanish Ambassador claims that he was a sacrifice to the new Panama policy of being attached to the United States.

He also requests that if possible this truth be relayed to Spain through the Japanese Minister there.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 499

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 280.

(Priority.)

Part 1 of 2.

(Strictly Secret.)

On the 11th I heard the rumor that the Mexican Minister was returning home; therefore, on the 12th I had IZAWA talk to him confidentially. The Minister was extremely enraged at the new regime in Panama. The continued United States "tutorship" of Panama had made impossible his remaining in office any longer. His strong opposition to the restrictions against transfer of Japanese to all South American countries, with the exception of the United States, and the recent unfair and racial discrimination exercised against Japanese had made it imperative that he return home. This decision he had made of his own volition. This is as I told you in part 2 of my # 219[a].

[a] See IV, 478.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 500

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 280.

(Priority.)

(Part 2 of 2.)

He could not be sure whether or not the Panamanian Government would recognize the diplomatic passport approved by former President ARIAS or, through the meddling of the United States, an incident similar to that involving the Spanish Minister might occur. However, it seemed from the inquiries he made that decisions had been reached to revoke diplomatic rights in Panama. In conjunction with the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

Please do not publish the above. In your considerations of my # 274[a], please use this to supplement the information contained therein.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-8-41

No ÷ 501

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo #284.

Your message #990[a].

With an ulterior motive for item #3 and at the same time to make the United States realize fully the desperate situation that the Japanese here are in, I had Izawa ask KATA, head of the Panama Canal Defense Division, if there was not some work that could be given to Japanese in the construction work of the Canal. The answer was they would talk it over with those in command of this work.

Judging from reactions on this it seems as though they might give them some kind of work until Japan sends a ship for them, and thus get all Japanese out of Panama, and at the same time lessen the damage demand from the Japanese Government.

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[a] See IV, 490.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 502

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 15, 1941
TO: Washington #072.

Received from Tokyo as #105.

Regarding your (Panama's) #245[a].

The following are our ideas on methods to bring pressure on Panama.

(1) Not to give permits to Panama ships for sailing out of Japanese ports, and to seize or detain Panama ships in Japanese waters.

(2) To freeze Panama capital in Japan, making it impossible for business to be carried on.

(3) To carry out item (1) and (2) in Manchuria and occupied China.

In addition to the above there are other trade methods, however they would be of little effect, so they would not be worthwhile considering. Other methods to be used in the East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere are now being considered.

The only thing is that although to detain or seize Panama ships is advantageous to Japan against England, U.S., and China, the further development of U.S.-Japanese relations are to be watched first.

Relay to Washington.

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[a] See IV, 491.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 503

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 15, 1941
TO: Panama (Koshi) #104.

We will consider the expenditure of funds to help out the Japanese. On the other hand, in view of a time when the Panama-Japanese relations may even become more strained, if

possible before that time a way of moving out all Japanese to some other country should be studied.

Please also report on actual possibility of disposing stock belonging to Japanese companies in Panama.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 504

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #297.

The party including Lt. Col. Nakano and Com YOSHII left Cristobal safely on the 18th, flying direct to Lima. They will reach there at 5:30 p.m. and embark immediately for Japan. Please inform the Army and Navy authorities.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 505

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 19, 1941
TO: Havana Circular #22.

Among the merchants here who have been forced to close their business on account of the Panama incident, there are somewhere around ten young men, (single, about 30 years of age), who have the education equivalent to that of a graduate of a technical school. They cannot return to Japan and change to another country is extremely difficult. Until such a time as it is possible for them to get a ship for home, they would like to work in some capacity or other in our foreign diplomatic establishments, if such a thing as an appointment is possible. They are even willing to work without salary and furnish their own travelling expenses. In case there are any openings in your office, I can recommend them. Please reply as soon as possible.

Relayed to Tokyo.

Trans. 12-30-41

No. 506

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #311.

To be handled in Government Code. Strictly secret.

Re your Circular #2353[a].

As I have told you in my successive wires, it is imagined the attitude of Panama will follow hand in hand with that of the United States should war develop. There is danger that they might stop communications. Please advise me for my own information whether or not ----- ----- to the benefit of the Empire ----- -----. As far as I am concerned, though I have no foresight as to what course they will take, I believe there is no recourse but to align ourselves with Argentina, Chile and Peru.

I think that the business office is all we can continue to maintain.

---

[a] See IV, 148.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 507

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #322.

Re message from Washington #676[a].

We are now negotiating concerning the Panama trouble and are keeping the matter of the dispatch of vessels a strict secret from our Nationals. In all, we do not yet have 200 people to evacuate. Resettlement in third countries has considerably reduced the number and also there is the reason mentioned in my message #157[a]. In making preparations for these people to leave, we will need the cooperation of the Canal officials, therefore, in case this sailing takes place, will you please do your best to get the United States to order the Canal officials to handle the matter amicably.

Relayed to Washington.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 508

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1163.

(Priority.)

Re your #818[a].

The official concerned at the State Department told me that the military authorities would require that all expenses be paid in cash when the Tatsuta Maru is in Balboa and, therefore, if the boat does not have the necessary cash on hand, to arrange to have it supplied through the consulate in Panama.

Relayed to Panama.

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[a] Dated November 24th (appears unimportant).

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 509

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #335.

(In 2 parts, complete.)

Re message from Washington #952[a].

Regarding (Washington's) #1163[b].

As I have already reported to you there is no doubt that the Canal Zone and Panama officials do not wish even one Japanese to remain near the Panama Canal Zone, and in fact they have said as much in a round about way. In spite of having expressed great opposition to Japanese passing through the Canal they now ask repeatedly when we expect the Japanese ship to arrive here, and have mentioned that it is all right for it to dock at Balboa.

On the other hand among the Japanese living here in Panama there will no doubt be some who will make up their mind to stay here even if it means they might be interned, while also some who cannot clear up their business by the time that the Tatsuta Maru is due (for example Amano).

(Part 2)

When the ship does arrive for taking evacuees, is the N.Y.K. branch going to sell tickets of their own accord, with no tickets of any kind being issued by the Consulate here, (as it will no doubt be necessary to open a branch here to take care of business matters).

On the other hand there is the possibility of a problem arising due to the authorities here insisting that all Japanese must board the ship, and they might even hold up the sailing permit for the ship to leave port unless all Japanese do get on board.

In view of all of this please send full orders to us regarding business in connection with handling the evacuation ship. Also please avoid dollar bills which seem to have been obtained in Shanghai. Accounting on water, provisons, oil, etc. should be done in New York, but also please advise whether we should also make arrangements for this. Also there will be many among the returning passengers who will be taking dollars (bills) with them. Should they take these back with them, or what do you think of the idea of changing them at this end and using the dollars thus obtained for official expense at this end?

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[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 508.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 510

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — November 26, 1941
TO: Panama — #116.

Re your #322[a].

The fact that we are having the TATSUTA MARU dock at Balboa does not mean that we are carrying out a general evacuation. It means we are giving our citizens, who cannot stay in Panama and who cannot move into other countries, a chance to return to Japan. We are not, by any means, changing our policy of having these people move elsewhere wherever they can in Latin America, so please note and guide our people accordingly. Have those who are returning to Japan get their things together and those who are going to third countries get their passports.

To all of our Ambassadors and Ministers in Central and South America.

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[a] See IV, 507.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 511

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) — November 26, 1941
TO: Havana — Circular #34.

Message from Tokyo to Washington #837.

Re my message #819[a].

The schedule for the Tatsuta Maru, as given in my #838[b], is to leave Balboa on the 26th arriving in Yokohama January 15th. On the basis of conditions at the time, it may stop at Los Angeles again on the way home, but try to have the passengers from the United States board it on the outward trip. As far as possible, have all those who wish to sail from South America also come on the Tatsuta.

Transmit this message and my caption telegram to all offices in the United States, as well as Canada, Vancouver and Panama. From Panama send it to all Central and South American Ministers and -----.

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[a] See IV, 406.
[b] See IV, 411.

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 512

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Washington

November 29, 1941
#079.

Minister Sakamoto[a] will arrive in Washington on night of 29th.

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[a] Japanese Minister to Peru.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 513

FROM: Panama
TO: Tokyo

November 30, 1941
#352.

Limited distribution.

In reply to the three formal documents presented by IZAWA to the foreign minister at the time of the enactment of this law in March, saying that Japan is neither unreasonable nor without legal grounds in demanding reparations, the foreign minister made answer in formal documents on April 16th and May (June) 24th saying that the exclusion of Japanese was a matter of popular demand. Although it is unfortunate that it affects foreigners, no questions of race, etc. can be raised. (This is exactly what they declared before.)

Also, to our statement of July 7th, which I believe was on fundamental terms due to the efforts of our lawyer, the foreign minister as authorized spokesman for the government told Minister Yamagata and Chargé d'Affaires IZAWA the day before the announcement as given in my #79[a] that there was nothing to do but administer the law.

In the ten times IZAWA has seen him since he arrived, he has always opposed our claims and as I told you in my #95[a] the minister also will not give a satisfactory answer.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 4-12-42

No. 514

FROM: Panama — December 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #352.

Since I, also, was unable to obtain a license because of the above proclamation, I tried to get reparations on the basis of a previous understanding with Arias as suggested in your wire, but on the contrary, the former Foreign Minister testified that Japan had been properly notified many times of the enactment of the law through her ministry. Not only that, but last November Chargé d'Affairs ONO had already been given advance notice.

Then the present foreign minister said that we keep insisting that this was not given to the Japanese ministry as a measure formally passed by the cabinet. They have carried out the law in every detail; to demand reparations on the basis that they have acted illegally or even with illegal intentions in a very feeble basis for argument.

In view of these facts, as I told you in my #349[a], practically all except AMANO have sold out at fair prices and returned to Japan. Those remaining are utilizing the time remaining to look after their interests, sell their houses, and other advantageous matters.

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[a] See IV, 311.

Trans. 4-12-42

No. 515

FROM: Panama — December 3, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires — #011.

Please retransmit in the O code. From now on use the $\overline{GO}$ and L codes.

Trans. 12-24-41

No. 516

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) — December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #367.

Re your #134[a].

Reporting destroying by burning the code books in accordance with instructions.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 517

FROM: Panama — December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #371.

Due to the circumstances all miscellaneous expenses have increased. There is also the reason in #198[a] received October 17th. Speaking only of the shortage in my administration, as I am very reluctant to have the office work delayed, I request you to send at once my funds

up to March with a monthly special increase of $400. Please send the fourth period sum of $18,185 for propagation of information.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 518

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #374.

I am making the following report ----- ----- ----- the urgency of the present situation.

1. Income	
(1) Miscellaneous	921.349 yen
----- ----- -----	2,475.151 yen
2. Expenditures	
(1) Foreign Service, Living Expense	3,536.056 yen
(2) Foreign Service Rent	-,000.940 yen
(3) Foreign Service Telegrams	3,419.125 yen
(4) Protection of Nationals, including traveling expense	28.120 yen
(5) Trade promotion, including telegrams	2,199.738 yen
(6) Temporary diplomatic expense, including telegrams	3,978.660 yen
China incident expense, including telegrams	10,780.062 yen
3. Withdrawals from cash in custody	39,900.--- (Y.S.B.)
4. Temporary loans (Traveling expense and August salaries)	$ 1,585.34
5. In reserve (income, expenditures, secret funds and unaccounted funds)	40,633.20
6. Estimated furture expenditures.	
(1) Telegrams (cost of outgoing telegrams for November and December unpaid)	20,000.00
(2) Office rent (3 years)	7,560.00
(3) -----	-----

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 519

FROM: Honolulu October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #192.

Since there is a need to accumulate (a certain amount ?) of "----- paid" before the Tatsuta and Taiyo Marus enter this port, please wire these funds in order that we may receive them before the Tatsuta enters port on the 23rd.

DoD Comment: This message from Honolulu was originally placed in *Section (b) Panama*, for unknown reasons.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 520

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 20, 1941
TO: Honolulu #94.

The State Department, after completing arrangements, has informed us through the American Embassy in Tokyo that there is no objection to Official MAEDA landing in Honolulu and San Francisco. Please inform him of this when the Tatsuta Maru enters port.

Trans. 11-1-41

No. 521

FROM: Tokyo October 21, 1941
TO: Honolulu #095.

Upon the arrival of the Tatsuta Maru there, please give the following message verbally to administration clerk Maeda.

In absolute secrecy to the United States, bring back that money just as it is.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 522

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 21, 1941
TO: Honolulu (Riyoji) #096.

Foreign Office Secret.

The Tokyo correspondent of the -----[a], left for Honolulu on the Tatsuta Maru on the 15th. After meeting his wife there, he plans to return to his post on the same ship's return voyage.

In view of the fact that this man's actions and words have created various incidents while he was in Japan, will you keep him under strict surveillance while he is there. If he says or does anything untowardly, please advise us immediately.

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[a] DoD Comment: Name withheld for privacy reasons.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 523

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo Circular #51.

(Message to San Francisco #23.)

As it appears that there will be room for 50 first class and 80 second class passengers on the Taiyō Maru, it would be well, if possible, to assign the passengers for the Tatsuta Maru to the Taiyō Maru.

Relay to Tokyo, Washington.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 524

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 22, 1941
TO: Honolulu #100.

The Taiyō Maru, chartered by the Imperial Government, left Yokohama at 3:00 o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd. Consul HIRAKU IWANAGA, to take charge of the ship, and Communications Official TOMOYOSHI DOI, as a maritime management official, boarded the ship.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 525

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 22, 1941
TO: Honolulu #99.

Taiyo passenger list.

Nationality	*1st Class*	*2nd Class*	*3rd Class*	*Total*
Japanese	5	20	124	149
Japanese-American	1	28	150	179
American	2	11	0	13
English	1	0	0	1
Total	9	59	274	342

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 526

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 28, 1941
TO: Honolulu #118.

Re your #232[a].

To be handled in government code.

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being servered when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into.

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[a]See IV, 423., in which Tokyo sends a circular giving hidden-meaning words which will be broadcast in the event that code communication is cut off.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 527

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) December 4, 1941
TO: Honolulu #2466.

We here are giving a great deal of thought to the question of the return to Japan of your staff and their families. Therefore, wait where you are until I wire you at a later date. This message addressed to -----.

Trans. 12-12-41

No. 528

FROM: Manila (Nihro) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #694.

In the end, should war develop between Japan and the United States, I predict that Japanese residents on these Islands will be placed under extremely stringent surveillance by the American and Philippine authorities. In order to prepare for any unforetold event, I believe that it would be particularly expedient to repatriate as many Japanese as practicable who are well versed with the situation in various areas at as early a date as possible. Have you found among those who have already returned to Japan any who might be considered well versed in the situation here? Please wire me your opinions on this matter.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 529

FROM: Manila (Nihro) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #695.

1. The political shake-up in Japan was quite a shock to the people here from the High Commission down; however, after several news reports had come in announcing the appointment of the Foreign Minister, they seemed to have been put at ease. It is thought that Japan had taken one more step toward -----.

2. On the 20th the "Bulletin" printed the view that the newly formed cabinet does not appear to intend to take any great risks as yet because of the kind of reports being received regarding the European situation. Nevertheless, this cabinet is entirely one of the military and, therefore, it should be noted that it is in a position to carry out at once any decision it makes. Furthermore, the paper published an editorial on the Japanese-American negotiations, saying that, as in the past, nothing could be expected of them in the future. Now, this newspaper being one under American management and in close touch with the High Commissioner's office, its views may be considered to be reflecting those of one section of the people.

3. The following points regarding the present general situation deserve attention:

(1) The United States authorities are making military preparations in real earnest.

Although up until about May of this year information concerning movements of Government ships and arrival of American troops was made known to the public, lately not only is information of this nature kept from the printed page, but no one is allowed to enter the fortified zone.

Military supplies are being transported during the night and vigilance is being exercised over espionage.

(2) The American authorities are watching and directing more carefully than ever the Government of the Philippine Islands, as well as the Filipino leaders. Especially have they strengthened their surveillance of foreigners, more particularly the Japanese.

(3) The American authorities are instilling in the minds of the people the idea that the United States is a powerful country and that the ultimate victory will surely be of the democracies, while, on the other hand, they repeatedly point out that Japan needs to be watched because she is an ambitious aggressor, but since she has been exhausted by her war against China and has felt the blow of economic pressure put on her by both Britain and the United States, her actual power is declining; that this explains why Japan does not advance southward; and that if the Philippine Islands are to be saved from being the victims of Japan's southward advance, there is no way but to rely upon the United States and to build up the Philippine defense.

(4) The American authorities are endeavoring to strengthen the morale of the Philippine people. Both American naval and military officers and subordinates are observing strict

discipline and so when any of them, as a result of alcoholic intoxication, court a fight with the Filipinos or with other foreigners ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- (three lines blank) ----- ----- -----. This policy of the American authorities is increasing the sense of reliance which the Philippine people have toward the United States.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 530

FROM: Manila — October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #705.

Re your #323[a].

Although the payment of the fine was not his affair, GONZALO AKINO presented a check for 1,500 pesos and, while there is question of its payment because of the freezing of credits, it is on deposit at present. I think the best plan is to have MOROKUMA or one of AKINO's friends assume the responsibility and advance money for the fine and for his expenses to Manila, accompanied by his wife, and that the check be returned to AKINO.

Since MOROKUMA is at present home in Japan, will you please talk it over with him and wire your approval.

1. GONZALO AKINO, a powerful government official regards this man as his own son and assumes responsibility for the forthcoming fine, but considering the fact that he is waiting for a general election and considering his past attitude and future influence, it seems best to make him feel grateful by paying the sum.

2. As for his wife, the marriage documents are all complete at the American Embassy. We did not inquire into his lineage from his real father or from AKINO. His wife was in joyful accord with the above plan; she wishes ardently to accompany him to Manila.

3. In regard to money for the fine and expenses, it is necessary to go to the High Commissioner's office for permission to send any money whatsoever, and going to the High Commissioner's office would mean exposing private difficulties. AKINO is very anxious to avoid this.

Now, since the real father is worried over the prospect of going to jail over alimony payments, he hopes you can think of some other solution than for him to pay the fine by sending the money direct. The real father and AKINO will consider ways to pay the fine and travelling expenses when he returns home.

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[a] See III, 552.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 531

FROM: Manila (Nihro) — October 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #697.

Re your #26[a] and my #669[b].

I made request that the diplomatic mail pouch to be carried by Tsuchiya not be examined, however, they replied that according to orders from the head office it was necessary to examine the contents of the diplomatic pouch but that the sealed letters within would not be opened. Before affixing the seal of their office they desired to give the pouch the once over.

The responsibility for the above examination rested with the pilot of the aeroplane and it was desired to make examination before taking off. They could not consent to non-examination.

I applied to the High Commissioner to intercede with the company to have the mail pouch passed without inspection on the basis of international law and procedure but he said that before he could ask the company to waive the application of their rules in this case he would have to get the consent of Washington.

As a matter of fact there really is no objection to a cursory inspection such as was made previously when sealed letters are not opened. But the setting of a precedent in the matter of permitting the inspection of a diplomatic mail pouch containing official documents would be most unfortunate. Please wire by return dispatch as to whether there are any objections to adhering to this stand even if it means a delay in the departure of Tsuchiya.

Again, on Tsuchiya's British visa it is specified that he leave here on the 26th. In view of the situation if his departure is delayed we will have to go through the whole troublesome procedure again and this may require considerable time.

The above -----.

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[a] Reports that we have demanded opening of diplomatic mail pouches of U.S. couriers are untrue, and would be contrary to international practice. Ascertain if we are being accorded the same treatment.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 532

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 22, 1941
TO: Manila #333.

(Priority.)

Re your #697[a].

TSUCHIYA's departure postponed.

Inspection of pouch definitely refused.

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[a] See IV, 531.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 533

FROM: Manila (Nihro) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #709.

I was going to send to Hongkong by Clipper Courier YASHIRO TSUCHIYA who was sent here from the Home Office. However, it appears that the air transport company examines the possessions of passengers before they are allowed aboard plane. Mr. TSUCHIYA showed them how the documents were sealed but they would not listen, and, although he insisted that he be allowed to pass without censorship, he could get nowhere. Therefore, I took the matter up with the High Commissioner and he said that unless he got an order from Washington he was sorry to say there was nothing he could do. He said that in order for him to take the matter up with Washington, he would have to have a memorandum from us. So, we drew one up, stating that the aforementioned company had no right to take upon itself the prerogative of examining such possessions because this runs counter to international custom. We pointed out that it was necessary for all companies to respect such international customs and requested that measures be taken to avoid censorship in this case.

This is for your information. Details by mail.
Relayed to Tokyo.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 534

FROM: Manila (Nihro) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #718.

Re your #322[a].

There has recently been inspection of mail matter sent via Hongkong on foreign ships. It also appears that there has been seizure of the same. In order that no undesirable effects be experienced by lack of provision, please bring this to the attention of the respective authorities.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 535

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 30, 1941
TO: Manila #340.

Re your #718[a].

So that hereafter we may make what we send you absolutely secure, please wire me back immediately for my information the point of origin of all matter censored in Hongkong.

---

[a] See IV, 534.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 536

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 31, 1941
TO: Manila #343.

Re my #342[a].

The Asama Maru is scheduled to arrive in Manila November 10th, and leave the 11th. It is scheduled to pick up 700 passengers there. (By crowding the boat it would be possible to take on another 100.) Please make arrangements with the authorities concerned for the taking on of provisions, water and sufficient fuel for the return voyage. *Later the ASAMA MARU will make a trip to Britain but negotiations for this are taking time and in the interval the ship will make one round trip to Singapore.* Subsequent to this it will be probably impossible to dispatch Japanese ships. This is for your information.

---

[a] Not available.

Although it would have a stabilizing influence on the Japanese residents here to have the families of officials remain, it is not wise to delay too long if by any chance there should be an incident, so may I instruct them to return home by the *ASAMA*? Please reply.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 540

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #725.

Re your #344[a].

Will any of the seven or eight hundred accommodations of the Asama Maru be taken up by passengers from Singapore? Please wire immediately as to the number of accommodations of each class that will be available for Manila's use.

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[a] See IV, 538.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 541

FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington #729.

(Message to Manila #36.)

The *Asama Maru* (ostensibly to take on such cargo as might be available but in fact for evacuation purposes) is leaving Singapore on the 6th of this month and should arrive at your port on the 19th or 20th. In view of the ----- ----- ----- (please negotiate immediately with the ?) High Commissioner's office (for facilities ?) covering entrance and departure into Manila Harbor as well as the procurement of fuel and supplies. (As soon as you have secured some information on details ?) please wire me incorporating your opinions.

Note: The text of this message badly garbled.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 542

FROM: Manila November 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #730.

(Priority.)

Re my #721[a] and #724[b].

I believe that you are giving due consideration to the reduction of fares on the Asama Maru. With the passenger rates on the Asama Maru higher than on the Hakone Maru, we find it extremely difficult to get the local steamship officials to afford space on the Hakone Maru for those who wish to return to Japan from Davao. Then, too, there are a number of first and second class passengers on the Hakone Maru who requested third class accommodations but were refused and were forced to purchase first and second class tickets. As a whole these people have but scant means. An extremely heavy financial burden has been placed on them by these high rates.

After you have given due consideration to this matter, please by all means arrange to have the Asama Maru's fares for all classes, but especially second and third class, reduced to the level of the fares charged on the Hakone Maru. Please wire me your opinions on this matter at the same time that you advise me whether or not it will be possible for the Asama Maru to stop at Davao.

---

[a] See IV, 537.
[b] See IV, 539.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 543

FROM: Manila — November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #731.

Re your #36[a].

While I do not believe there will be any problems arising in connection with the ships taking on sufficient provisions and fuel for the return voyage, I called on Willoughby in the High Commissioner's office and asked for "confirmation" of the above. He said that he did not believe that there would be any problem about it but that he would confer with those concerned and then reply. I asked for an immediate reply and while I do not think there will be any question about it, in order to avoid any complications I asked for the "confirmation" in writing. Please be advised of the above.

---

[a] See IV, 541.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 544

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — November 6, 1941
TO: Singapore & Manila — Circular #2275.

The Asama Maru left for Singapore on the afternoon of the 3rd from Yokohama. KAKITUBO, an officer of the European American office, went on board as a representative from this office.

The passengers are as follows:

1. The wife and mother, en route to Singapore, of the British Consul General in Yokohama, AUSTIN; 5 employees of the English Rising Sun Petroleum Company and the Manager of the RKO, JULIAN; as well as 3 Japanese (Secretary KODAMA (?) and wife, and BUKKO (?) OKAZAKI)?

2. A third-class secretary of the Australian Legation in Tokyo, EKAAZUREE[a] who is making a round trip to Singapore.

3. A first-class secretary of the British Embassy in Tokyo, HENDERSON, who is going to Manila with his wife and family.

4. Those boarding at Singapore are the counselor of the British Embassy in Tokyo, YUSUTON BOSUUESU[b], wife and daughter as well as the Secretary, BASUKU[c] and wife.

---

[a] Possibly anglicization, ACARZURAY.
[b] Possibly HUSTON BOSWETH.
[c] Possibly BASK.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 545

FROM: Manila — November 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #756.

(Abstract) Manila unable to decipher Tokyo's #363[a].

---

[a]See IV, 546.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 546

FROM: Tokyo — November 13, 1941
TO: Manila — No number.

(Gogai.)

(Tokyo to Manila #363.)

Re your #756[a].

Retransmittng as follows:
#363[a]
The Asama Maru will take on 450 tons of Diesel oil, 1000 tons of water, fruit, vegetables, etc. there. The head office of the N.Y.K. have requested you to arrange for payment for the same from the fares and freight charges collected from the passengers. Please arrange for this.

---

[a]See IV, 545.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 547

FROM: Tokyo — November 9, 1941
TO: Manila — #357.

(Request message.)

Please convey to Lieut. Comdr. Hatakeyama, Medical Corps.
"You are ordered to return to Japan on the Asama Maru which sails from there about the 20th."

(Signed) Secretary to the Minister of the Navy

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 548

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — November 14, 1941
TO: Manila — #2323.

(Circular.)

There must be members of the trade promotion organization still in the Philippines. As there is no need or scope for their activities in the Philippine Islands at this time, please

induce them to return to Japan on the Asama Maru or the Fuji Maru which has been assigned to the Dutch East Indies for evacuation purposes. Furthermore, please keep in mind ships to the Philippine Islands.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 549

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 14, 1941
TO: Manila No number.

We find it necessary to discuss some very urgent business here in Tokyo. Please, therefore, have Consul KIHARA return home immediately, for a short stay, by airplane rather than wait for his scheduled accommodations by steamer.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 550

FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #770.

Request message. From Shirai to the Department of Commerce and Industry of *Aichi* ken.

Even the Consul General thinks it would be well if we would close this office temporarily and return to Japan because, as a matter of fact, there is no business at present.

Please wire instructions.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 551

FROM: Manila November 15, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

(Manila to Tokyo, Gogai.)

(Manila to Washington #83, 14 November.)

Because of a mistake in our telegram of the 14th we are retransmitting as follows:

#83

Re my #82[a].

Permits were received on the 14th from the High Commissioner for the two items for which request had been made.

A. The item of the loan.

B. The item of the receipt of the outstanding balance of my allowance and also that of the rest of the staff.

Furthermore in regard to cancellation of the freezing orders in regard to this office, Manila had as yet received no instructions from Washington, however according to your Circular #288[a], Washington has approved the sum of 25,000 pesos for operating expenses of this

offices and in addition to that has approved separate sums for myself and all officials above the grade of clerks. Please wire as to whether or not this is so.

Relayed to Tokyo.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-20-41

No. 552

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico City

October 21, 1941
215.

Secret documents for your office and for all the South American offices have been entrusted to Vice Consul Kobayashi who is returning to his post (San Francisco) on the Hikawa Maru which sailed from Yokohama on the 20th. As soon as you have notice of his arrival please arrange to have one of your staff go to San Francisco to get the above documents.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 553

FROM: Mexico City (Miura)
TO: Tokyo

October 23, 1941
420.

It has quite generally been believed, in the event of the United States becoming involved in the war, that Mexico will either follow their example or at least assume a status similar to being in the war. However, at an informal dinner party I gave on the 21st, former Vice Minister of Communications and Finance Rolland[a] expressed himself outspokenly as to the attitude Mexico should take in the event of war between Japan and the United States. The main points which might be considered representative were as follows:

(1) With the outbreak of war, the United States would immediately occupy Mexican ----- and strategic points within the country and also put forth every effort to strengthen anti-Axis actitivies in Mexico. Therefore even though Mexico should not declare war a condition would be brought about in which her relations with Japan would be the same as if war had been declared.

(2) The present government, which was formed to support the United States, naturally is following a course of out-and-out cooperation with the United States. (Under present conditions even a Carranza in office could adopt no other policy.) Accordingly, if the United States should ask them to declare war they would likely comply at once. But, as stated above, even without a declaration of war by Mexico their objectives could be realized, and therefore to hold down as much as possible the excitement of the populace, such a demand would likely not be made until it became necessary.

(3) While it is a fact that the populace in general have friendly feelings toward Japan, Mexican politics and foreign affairs are now manipulated entirely by the hands of a small number of politicians and military men, who are not worthy to be called military men, and the people are absolutely powerless, and it would be a mistake to expect anything of them.

(4) While it would make some difference in the attitude taken toward resident Japanese, whether or not Mexico declared war, in either case it is hardly to be expected that the Japanese would escape hardships and oppression on the pretext of "spies", fifth columnists, etc.

(5) The only chance of their being any change in Mexico's present policy would be if Germany should gain the supremacy in Europe, and Japan in Asia, while the United States

on the other hand would face a national crisis because of economic breakdown and other reasons.

Relayed to Washington.

---

[a] M. C. Rolland.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 554

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #422.

According to a confidential statement made by an executive of the Excelsior newspaper here, the statement on the 24th by Secretary of the Navy Knox in regard to the near approach of a crisis between Japan and America reached the said newspaper office at noon of the same day, and in it was the assertion that there would be "imminent action" in the Far East within 24 hours. However, about two hours later a follow-up message came through from the Washington Associated Press, based on a request from the Navy Department, that the words "within 24 hours" should be deleted.

Have relayed this to Washington.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 555

FROM: Tokyo October 27, 1941
TO: Mexico City No number.

There are no more than eight beds on the Terukawa Maru. They have all been taken and the vessel has already a capacity reservation list.

Besides that ship, there is the Hikawa Maru which is scheduled to sail from Seattle on 4 November. There may also be a possibility of finding space on the President Line vessels sailing from San Francisco to Shanghai where you could make connections. Please choose one or the other course, and upon making a decision, advise this office.

Announce your intention to return home to Japan only after you have made definite arrangements for your passage home.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 556

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) November 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

1. According to recent advice from San Francisco, in spite of efforts made through various channels, it has been impossible to obtain definite reservations. The only thing that could be done was to be placed on the waiting list and hope for a cancellation by a holder of a reservation. From past experiences, San Francisco advises, these cancellations are not made until right before sailing time—in extreme cases the prospective passenger has only an hour notice. All in all, therefore, chances are very slim that I shall succeed in getting accommodations.

2. Four to five days are required by rail from here to San Francisco. Moreover, about a week should be allowed to make my calls on the President, Foreign Minister, and other officials. Therefore, I would have to announce my intention to return by 14 or 15 November at the

very latest. If I do so and depart from this country I couldn't very well come sauntering back again because I could not get ship accommodations in San Francisco.

3. Even assuming that I were successful, by a stroke of good fortune, in finding accommodations at San Francisco, supposing there are certain developments in U.S.-Japanese relations, there is danger that I would become stranded in Hawaii or in the Philippine Islands.

4. In any event, I, as a Minister of the Imperial Government, would be placed in an exceedingly undignified position, particularly in view of the times and circumstances. There will no doubt be much criticism of the government if any of these eventualities materialize.

5. In the final analysis, therefore, would it not be better to apply openly and directly to the U.S. Government to reserve accommodations, (this, of course, can be done only if there is fair assurance that there will be no sudden change in the situation). As an alternative, would it not be better for me to remain here, although from my standpoint this is an exceedingly difficult thing to endure. Under these circumstances, I shall, of course, endeavor to carry out all of your instructions to the best of my ability.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 557

FROM: Mexico (Miura) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #435.

Re my #330[a].

1. As I have already reported, the Rayon Distributing Company had its import certificates cancelled by the Economics Department, and on the 10th of this month the system was dispensed with. According to the explanation just given me by the Minister of Economics, hereafter the importation of rayon will take place in a manner totally different from what I reported in my caption message. No subsidy will be given to a controlled distributing company, and the importation of rayon can be carried on at will by anyone who is willing to pay a tariff of one peso per kilogram (hitherto, of the 3 pesos 90 cents went for a subsidy). Thus, the subsidy system itself is gone. (In a few days this will be published in the official gazette.)

2. The reason why the system of importing rayon was revised in the manner described is that the distributing company, through its system of importation and distribution, never achieved the expected results and that this country is very hard-up for this material. Less and less is on hand, so finally they just had to let anyone import it from anywhere. Now as I pointed out in my #399[a], we should be very careful to see that no rayon is transshipped from China here. I even have a report that *Itoochuu* has shipped some 2,000 cases to Chile. Now I feel that this rayon may be going via Chile and Argentina to this country. Please find out anything you can about this and wire me back.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 558

FROM: Mexico (Miura) November 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #438.

On the 8th the Universal published a telegram from Panama stating that Japan had made a protest against the new trade laws which curtail Japanese business in Panama. The Panamanian (Foreign ?) Office replied that this protest (constituted ?) interference in the internal affairs of Panama. As yet no confirmation from other sources has been received. This had no noticeable effects here.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 559

FROM: Tokyo — November 13, 1941
TO: Mexico City — # 228.

RIERUGO[a] and ARAISA[a] were deeply grateful for the welcome extended to them everywhere. They were scheduled to return to their country on the Hikawa Maru which sailed from here October 20th but the American authorities refused to grant them transit visas on the grounds that RI was anti-American, so they had to disembark at Vancouver and return via Cuba.

Both of the men, but particularly RI, are exceedingly competent reporters and I feel that they will be of great help to you in your machinations there. Please direct their activities in the future.

Due to boat schedules, etc. they were not able to visit Manchuria and China. However, they met all the prominent men in Japan and have a very clear picture of Japan's position.

RI is under contract to the Yomiuri newspaper as its correspondent there.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 560

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) — November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 441.

Re # 426[a] from Brazil to Tokyo.

In harmony with the instructions in your # 125[b] and # 215[c], we are having Clerk Inoma make an official trip to San Francisco.

We have made reservations for Courier Kosaka for the 19th on the aeroplane. It would be very convenient if you could arrange for him to stop here on his way to Washington.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] Tokyo wires Mexico City to have Inoma go to S.F. to pick up some secret papers being brought by Courier Oshino; then to proceed to L.A. for explanations pertaining to these papers.

[c] Secret documents for your office and for all the South American offices have been entrusted to Vice Consul Kobayashi who is returning to his post (San Francisco) on the Hikawa Maru, which sailed from Yokohama on the 20th. See IV, 552.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 561

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) — November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 443.

Re your # 282[a].

On the 17th, ARAISA[b] visited a member of my staff in his private apartment and said, "I want you please to transmit to the Japanese, particularly the Investigation Bureau, my deep gratitude for the welcome and kindness which they showed me. LIERGO is sick in bed now. He and I went to Japan on the invitation of the Japanese, and since they gave us quite a sum of money to make the trip on, we were accused of being spies. Now, we don't have very much freedom to go about, so although I have been here for several days, I naturally hesitated to call at the Embassy or the Chancellery. You know, LIERGO together with his brother used to run Hoy, but nevertheless, while he was in Japan they fired him. Recently people here are more angry with him than they are with me. Consequently, for the time being, neither of us can write articles favorable toward Japan. We are awfully sorry. Of course, hostile writers will produce a good deal of anti-Japanese propaganda, and for the time being we can do nothing to offset it. However, when the time is ripe, we too will put our pens to work for your benefit."

---

[a] Not available, probably an error for # 228, see IV, 559.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-20-41

No. 562

FROM: Mexico
TO: Tokyo

November 18, 1941
444.

(Part 1 of 2.)

1. These passport restrictions have to do with questions of propriety, and those who have suffered persecution by the abolition of passports were political refugees. Therefore, the case drawn up by my Minister BU[c], with reference to Spanish exiles, has no bearing on the present question. Mexico now does not recognize the passport of laborers, and at last the only way to get in is as farmers or investors. In some cases, only 750 pesos to return home on need be put up, but in others, as much as from 60,000 to 110,000 pesos may be necessary.

2. So it boils down to whether or not the Mexican government wishes to exercise clemency where we are concerned. Lately, they have handled us roughly in this respect. Please refer particularly to my secret circular # 1 to our various offices in North America. Even important reporters have been denied entry. Take the case of special correspondents ASANO and NAKANO. We have negotiated, concerning them, for months, and there does not appear to be much chance for them.

---

[c] BRECEDA, Mexican Ambassador to Panama.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 563

FROM: Mexico
TO: Tokyo

November 18, 1941
444.

(Part 2 of 2.)

With a view to expelling all foreigners who have passports with flaws, they are continuing a searching examination. I even have a secret report that the number of Japanese who may fall

victim to this is in the neighborhood of 100. Heretofore, they have been extending the passports of our citizens whose time was up, but no more will they do this. All they will do is let them wait for the next ship. Naturally, all this is the result of present American-Mexican relations. As in the case of Panama, this is not a problem for humane considerations;. it is simply a question of their relations with the United States. Therefore, no matter how much I negotiate, I do not believe there is much chance of them considering what I say favorably.

3. The predicament of the Japanese involved is pitiful beyond words, and I know what a spot the Imperial government is in in this respect. Of course, I am not trying to escape any labor or embarrassment, but diplomats here must be careful not to say anything that would get the countries they represent in trouble. I know you are already trying to figure something out, so will you please wire me your views as soon as possible.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 564

FROM: Mexico (Miura) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 447.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my # 434*.

It was announced that the United States-Mexican Agreement concerning the oil question was to be signed in Washington on the 19th (as no doubt a report from Washington has given the details of this agreement, I am omitting them in this message). The final settlement of the oil question must be postponed because of its difficult nature as well as the necessity of settling other pending problems which cannot be postponed until after the settlement of the oil question. The United States could not afford to have a shadow of darkness fall upon her many relations with Mexico which plays the part of flagmen for the various countries of Central and South America due to her important position in American continental solidarity. Moreover, the United States finds it utterly impossible to acquiesce to any policy which would delay the completion of continental defense in Mexico. Not only this, Mexico has reached a condition of great uneasiness in economic and production circles because of insufficient raw materials and capital, as has already been reported. Added to this there has been a continual growing displeasure among the people in spite of the propaganda given out by the Government under the heretofore existing economic agreement. At the beginning of this year difficulty arose in supporting the value of the peso which state threatened to bring on adverse trade conditions never before seen in Mexico. The Government, of course, found this position untenable. It is seen that the United States cleverly took advantage of all this (for the conclusion of an agreement).

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*Not available.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 565

FROM: Mexico (Miura) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 447.

(Part 2 of 2.)

It can be said that the following points were clearly explained by PADILLA, the Foreign Minister, to the newspaper reporters. "In view of a united front for the conservation of demo-

cracy and the good neighbor policy, this agreement between the two countries removes those pending questions, possible sources of friction if postponed, which were obstacles to close co-operation. By the establishment of this agreement proof is given of the desire on the part of both countries for mutual understanding and by this the honest friendship between the two countries is manifest." According to the director of the Banco de Mexico, this agreement if the forerunner of coming prosperity and entails the furnishing of the military materials to this country by the United States and from this agreement, the economic results can really be discerned.

It is also well to note that important writers in this country have expressed that this agreement signifies, along with past existing conditions, this country's gradual yielding to the United States to the point that it is no longer possible to move either hand or foot.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 566

FROM: Mexico (Miura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.

In regard to the dispatch dated November 3rd for limited distribution.

Since I wish to get on the Tatsuta Maru, please reserve a room for me. Please send traveling expenses at once and let me know as quickly as possible if the boat will (1) go from Los Angeles to Balboa and directly back to Japan (2) stop at Manzanillo on the way down, or (3) stop at Manzanillo on the way back, since I must decide when to leave and when to announce my departure. In case of (1) it will be necessary to send my baggage and ----- ----- ----- -----.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 567

FROM: Mexico (Miura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 453.

(Part 1 of 2.)

It is virtually impossible to secure from American Consular Offices visas to enter the United States. They are extremely stubborn in their refusals.

Then, too, the only way that it is possible to go to Panama is by air. All other means are difficult to arrange.

It is impossible to evacuate a great number of persons. Those here anxious to be repatriated, it has been ascertained, are all members of various official commercial groups on tour who find it necessary to return to Japan, have voiced the statement that they have no objections to deck passage on a freighter. They all realize that should they not be able to board the Tatsuta Maru, there will be no means by which they can return to their homes. They have requested me to render my assistance to the end that they might board that vessel. After the Tatsuta touches at the port of Manzanillo, I anticipate that there will be twenty or thirty persons over and above the number I mentioned in my # 452 who will decide to return home.

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 568

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 453.

(Part 2 of 2.)

At the present time there is over 2,000 tons of miscellaneous freight being held in the port of Manzanillo for transportation to Japan. The NYK and other competent companies are most anxious that the Tatsuta Maru stop at this port to take on the above mentioned freight. Therefore, after you have given the utmost consideration to the situation and discussed the matter with the competent authorities, please arrange to have the Tatsuta Maru touch at Manzanillo. Furthermore, ----- ----- from the Naval Authorities to ----- ----- but they have wired again. This is for your information.

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 569

FROM: Mexico City (MXMRK) November 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN) (Head, Gen. Affairs Dept.) # 218.

Major -----[a], head of the information section, U.S. Marine Corps recruiting office for the southern area, addressed an officers' conference held in Dallas on the 26th. For your information.

1. The U.S. standing army is now 3,000,000 but 3,000,000 additional reserves are planned for, and production of armaments has been increased accordingly.
2. The U.S. Marine Corps personnel is now about 62,000 but 100,000 will be needed within one year.

---

[a] Name withheld.

Trans. 0-0-45

No. 570

FROM: Mexico City (MXMRK) December 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Autumn) (Head General Affairs Dept.) # 221.

1. According to a German language broadcast from London on the night of the 30th, England is again dispatching warships to the Far East.
2. According to an A.P. dispatch from Manila on the 1st, American pilots have recently organized, with American planes, an air unit to protect the Burma Road.

Trans. 1-20-45

No. 571

FROM: Tokyo November 29, 1941
TO: Mexico # 235.

Strictly confidential.

Re your # 448[a].

Your instructions in this matter are being sent by Courier Kosaka who, because of changes in his travel, must return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru from Peru via North America. The gist of the instructions he will communicate to you from the Embassy in the United States is:

A romanized digest of conditions in Japan and Manchuria will be broadcast daily.

Your office will use this material for reference purposes only; its distribution shall be limited to within your office and those of the Military and Naval Attache's.

The receiving set is strictly confidential, and shall be in the charge of a confidential code clerk.

These duties of the persons concerned must be kept secret from outsiders.

Broadcasts received shall be put into Japanese text and immediately forwarded to Colombia, Venezuela, Salvador and Panama.

Ordinary, urgent and personal messages shall be handled in accordance with established rules.

Operators shall, as soon as broadcasts are received, put them into Japanese text and submit them to the proper officer, and messages dispatched shall be handled as prescribed.

Operators are responsible for the maintenance and repair of apparatus.

Further, when required, reports must be made to the Foreign Ministry of the conditions of the reception of the broadcasts from Japan directed abroad, and of the Domei broadcasts.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 572

FROM: Tokyo — December 1, 1941
TO: Mexico City — # 239.

Your are to return by Tatsuta Maru.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 573

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) — December 1, 1941
TO: Washington — # 069.

Re circular # 2354 from Tokyo to Washington[a].

Reception conditions are bad here and occasionally it is impossible to get the general broadcasts. In case you should pick up a broadcast in the code of my caption telegram please relay it here immediately. (To Communications Clerk Horiuchi.)

Tokyo Circular # 2353[b] cannot be decoded. Please retransmit immediately.

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[a] See IV, 149.
[b] See IV, 148.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 574

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — December 1, 1941
TO: Mexico — Circular # 2438.

Regarding cable from Panama, Circular # 22[a].

In view of the special circumstances involved, please arrange for their employment on the spot or for a new appointment.

[a] See IV, 505.

Trans. 12-30-41

No. 575

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico

December 2, 1941
241.

Re your # 455[a].

Circumstances such as mentioned in my Circular # 242[b] have arisen.

The use of moneys in the custody of your office is to be within limits of permissions already granted.

[a] Not available.
[b] Gives instructions on the use of the Navy "S" code. See IV, 575A.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 575A

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: San Francisco (Riyoji)

February 6, 1941
Circular # 242.

(Strictly confidential.)

The Navy Ministry reports that the changes noted below will be made in the usage of the Navy "S" code. Please be advised of these changes. Regardless of whether your office is on the distribution list of the "S" code or not, you will get in touch with all Japanese vessels which come in to your port, and, making certain that they are on the distribution list, advise them of these changes.

1. Temporary Usage No. 5 will be discontinued on 30 June of this year.
2. Temporary Usage No. 2 will be put into effect (for the second time) from 1 July. Temporary Usage No. 3 and subsequent usages will be put into effect at intervals of three months each.
3. Upon completing the term for Usage No. 4, the various usages, in accordance with the instructions under paragraph 2 of this message, will be repeated, in rotation.

Trans. 2-12-41

No. 576

FROM: Mexico
TO: Panama

December 3, 1941
026.

In harmony with the instructions of your Circular # 2438[a] we wish by all means to add one member to your staff. According to a request from Panama there are persons there who are willing to pay their own fare and come to work without salary. However, we desire to use this person as an employee of the Legation here and hence there are objections to hiring him on this

basis. Please arrange to provide his travel expenses and a suitable wage after arrival. Please wire something in regard to these two proposals.

This telegram has been relayed to Panama.

---

[a] See IV, 574.

Trans. 12-30-41

No. 577

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico

December 4, 1941
244.

Re my # 243[a].

1. In order that the ship[b] may enter and leave port under the most favorable conditions, please contact the Mexican government.

2. No general freight whatsoever will be loaded. After contacting Los Angeles, arrange the question of passengers boarding as best you can. In making connections with the ship, please address your communications to MINORU TAKADA, the Foreign Office liaison official on board.

3. As he and his aide, TAKADE TOSHIYUKI, attached to the Foreign Office, have not obtained Mexican visas, please negotiate with the Mexican government for entrance permits. Wire results.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Tatsuta Maru (?)

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 578

FROM: Mexico (Miura)
TO: Tokyo

December 4, 1941
470.

Message to Washington # 74.

The Mexican government is reopening its Legation in China which has been closed for the last seven years, with the Minister in Japan holding two posts. MIGUEL ANGEL MENENDEZ has been named and will soon leave for Chungking. As an individual, he is well known as a radical. During the *Cardenas* period he was a member of the lower house. It must be noted that his appointment as Minister to Chungking clearly indicates the position of the Mexican government in relation to the present American-Japanese question.

Sent to the United States.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 579

FROM: Mexico City (Miura)
TO: Los Angeles

December 4, 1941
Circular # 98.

(Urgent.)

Message to Tokyo # 466.

Re the 1st paragraph of your Cir. # 243[a].

I think that there is some mistake about the TATSUTA MARU leaving Los Angeles and docking at MANZANILLO, however, so that I may be sure, please wire me back.

I have sent this message to Washington, Los Angeles, and Panama.

---

[a] See IV, 580.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 580

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) December 4, 1941
TO: Los Angeles Circular # 97.

(Urgent.)

Message from Tokyo # 243.

Re # 1244 from Washington to this Foreign Minister[a].

We have decided to have the TATSUTA MARU dock at MANZANILLO on its way from Los Angeles to Balboa. This ship is scheduled to arrive on December 19th and leave on the 21st, therefore, we set its arrival in Balboa on the 26th and its departure on the 28th.

Please wire this immediately to Washington, Los Angeles, and Panama.

---

[a] See 580A. Washington wires Tokyo, requesting that they advise the date on which the ship will arrive in Balboa and also whether arrangements with Mexico have been completed.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 580A

FROM: Washington December 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1244.

Re your # 874[a].

We made a request of the person in charge at the State Department and were advised that there would be no trouble whatsoever. Since it is necessary to have it confirmed officially in writing, and because the State Department must notify the War Department, please advise us of the date on which the ship will arrive in Balboa and also whether arrangements with Mexico have been completed.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 581

FROM: Mexico City December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 471.

Re your # 244[a], paragraph (3).

No objections to entrance to the country.

[a] See IV, 577.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 582

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico

December 6, 1941
247.

Re your # 467[a].

Both are possible and there are no restrictions, in fact, we would like to have money brought in.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 583

FROM: Mexico (Miura)
TO: Tokyo

December 7, 1941
476.

Secret.

(1) This office has burned and destroyed this day (7th) all telegraphic ciphers, code machines and safes, except one set each of ----- and -----[a] code.

(2) I pray that all members of the communication section will put up a good fight.

Received SENSAN from San Francisco. Will do likewise with telegraphic ciphers addressed to our various South American offices, which are now in my care. Please notify those concerned.

[a] Deleted.

Trans. 12-16-41

No. 584

FROM: Bogota
TO: Tokyo

October 24, 1941
191.

The Italian Minister came to see me on the 21st and spoke to me confidentially as follows: Our Ministry has got an intelligence to the effect that the United States has asked Columbia, Venezuela, and Brazil for the right to fly over their territory from the Caribbean Sea at Panama in order to concentrate war planes in Brazilian Natal in case it is necessary to attack French African Dakar. Venezuela and Brazil said "yes", but the Columbian Government said "no".

Substantiating this report, I have just heard the same thing from the German Minister. Judging from the instance mentioned in the last paragraph of my #157[a], I think this must be correct.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 585

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 21, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro #252.

Strictly Secret. Chief of Office routing.

----- (first line garbled)----- 9 wooden cases containing radio transmitter parts were loaded on the Tao Maru and were being shipped to the Naval Attache in Argentina. Since then, we were advised by the Ambassador there that this was undesirable goods (sic). We had not given this matter much thought and had left it all up to the people on the scene.

In view of the Ambassador's objections, the Navy now expresses its desire to have these goods sent to your office instead. The Navy states that it has already advised the Attache there of this possibility if the cases can be landed there without too much difficulty. (If there is no chance of landing it safely there, they are instructed to bring it back.)

Please be aware of the fact that I must differentiate between Argentina and Brazil in handling this matter.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 586

FROM: Buenos Aires October 27, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro #103.

Buenos Aires to Tokyo as #463.

Re my #444[a].

Toa Maru left here on the 25th for Rio de Janeiro with the radio on board.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 587

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #465.

In view of your instructions, we have gathered together a set of papers of this Embassy as well as from the Consulates and packed them in four wooden boxes. They were placed on board the Toa Maru and entrusted to the care of the Captain. The ship sailed from here on the 25th. Please make arrangements to accept them.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 588

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #467.

(In 2 parts, complete.)

Re your #228[a].

The Naval Attache here has complete charge of the goods which were to be loaded on the Toa Maru. Subsequent to the announcement of the order restricting exports, which I reported to you in my message #365[a], the Mitsubisi submitted an application for permission, on 9 September, to load the goods on the Yamazato Maru, which was at that time in port here. The Chief of the Interministerial Commission to whom this request was addressed granted permission in a note dated 10 September.

Unfortunately, however, because of certain circumstances involving shippers, the goods were not loaded on the Yamazato Maru. Therefore another request was made to load them on the Toa Maru, on 15 October. We failed to receive any reply to this one. For this reason the Mitsubisi came to us and requested that we make an effort to obtain this permit.

We already had had Nakamura go to the Chief of the interministerial Commission, Chief of the Trade Bureau, and the Vice Minister of Agriculture, to try to get this permit, but in each case he was told that the exporting of tungsten should have been prohibited immediately on the issuance of the export restriction order. However, in view of the fact that the Japanese vessel had already been in port, they said, they had made a special point of approving the export thereof if it were shipped out prior to about the middle of September.

Now, however, it was impossible for the Commission to issue the permit by itself.

In the meantime, the Mitsubisi people had their legal adviser get in touch with the Finance Minister, but he had no success. At the same time Naval Attache Yukisita, at the request of Mitsubisi, got in touch with the Navy Minister through the Chief of the Naval General Staff. The Minister replied that he himself could do nothing about it.

Recently, the United States entered into an agreement with Argentina to purchase two thousand tons of tungsten per annum for two years. From this fact, we believe that there may possibly be some recent agreement between these two countries whereby the United States has a monopoly on all tungsten exports.

As pointed out above, this matter involves more than a simple business and export transaction, but involves matters of a political nature. For this reason, even if we were to continue our negotiations, there is practically no hope of loading the goods on the Toa Maru.

(We received your message referred to in the heading on the 25th, the day on which the Toa Maru was to have sailed.)

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 590

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #447.

Part 1 of 2.

(Strictly Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code.)

Re my #434[a].

1. Naval Attaché SHIGEHIRO, who came to his post here from Argentina on the Toa Maru, confided to me that among his baggage there was the transmitter mentioned in your # 252[b]. I said to him, "For the Navy to act this way puts us Foreign Office officials on the spot. Sorry as I am, if you have already brought this ashore, I suppose I will have to let it go this time. However, hereafter, before you try anything like this, the Foreign Department and the Navy Department must certainly get together. If they don't, I will have nothing to do with such things as this." He replied, "Well, if you disapprove, I will not use it. For the time being I will put it in my office without even unwrapping it." He said this was a promise, and I let it go.

2. Concerning the prescribed goods mentioned in my caption message, because of their shape and weight I could not very well put them in wooden boxes, so, fitting them as best I could, I packed them in trunks. There are about 200 articles.

A certain Japanese dealer in diamonds and other jewelry reports that the Treasury Department has informed the customs secretly to watch out for whatever may be concealed in exports to Japan. I have heard that the customs officials have been advised, if necessary, to punch holes in such trunks.

---

[a] Too garbled for translation.
[b] See IV, 585.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 590A

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 447.

Part 2 of 2.

(Strictly Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code.)

From a certain other source I have heard that this sort of a trick was played: A bundle for Japan was allowed purposely to fall from the winch in order to have it burst open, revealing the contents.

Well, in this case we were at a great disadvantage because Ambassador STAHMER was going on board. However, the members of my staff handled the customs officials with gloves on, and we were able to get everything safely on board. However, in view of what I mentioned above, I feel quite sure that the Brazilian officials know quite well what this freight consisted of. I believe that this time they merely overlooked it, but I believe firmly that if this sort of reckless attempt is made again, we are going to be put to shame, and our relations with this country irretrievably damaged. Now I am willing to continue to work with the Navy, and they are going to need my help. However, there is a limit to what can be expected of me. Therefore, although I have already given a good talking to the Attaché, will you please explain the situation here to the high naval officials so that hereafter they will understand and refrain from sending any such hazardous orders to their representatives abroad.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 591

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 20, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires # 26.

Re your # 24[a].

Is it possible for Tanakawa to get accommodations for one of the Terukawa Maru? If possible, (you) must (reserve) a cabin for him.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 592

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 20, 1941
TO: Bogota #93.

Re your #180[a].

It is still undecided whether the Terukawa Maru will touch at Callao. As instructions have been sent to the Kawasaki steamship agent in Santiago, make arrangements directly with the agent there about loading the Ambassador's baggage.

[a]See III, 711.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 593

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) November 5, 1941
TO: Mexico #029.

To Naval Attaché in Mexico.

The certain matter which was to be shipped on the Terukawa Maru which was scheduled to stop at Callao, we now hear cannot be loaded as this ship is not coming in port at Callao. Due to the importance, I have cabled Tokyo to arrange for the ship to change its course and stop, but will you also wire the Navy Department in Tokyo asking them to order the ship to stop and take this cargo.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 594

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #203.

(Abstract.)

Asking for Terukawa Maru to be ordered to stop at Callao to pick up special matter.
Refers to Bogota's #175[a].

[a]Not available.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 595

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) November 13, 1941
TO: Caracas #004.

From Hamanaka, Attaché, Mexico.

The party of four headed by Commander Yosii expected to arrive in Trinidad from England and were first expected to sail from here. However, due to change in plans they are now to board the Terukawa Maru (scheduled to sail on 19th) from KAYAO (Callao ?). We can not make contact with them to tell them of this change so will you please give them this message when they pass through your city.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 596

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) December 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo Unnumbered.

To Mizuno. (Secret.)

Regarding item # 2 of your message # 219[a].

Have arranged to have *4600 kilo (?)* put into the personal baggage of the new ----- ambassador going to Japan (KANZIOTI) on the Terukawa Maru and have told the Ambassador that it is canned goods which I wish him to take to my eldest son NOBUO.

When this Ambassador arrives in Tokyo, get in touch with my son, and receive this, then pass it on to the Navy Department. My vacant home in Tokyo has instructions and will expect you to call asking for "The 1941 English Year Books that were sent by "A" Ambassador" and they will understand.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 597

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) November 7, 1941
TO: Mexico City Circular # 299.

Rio de Janeiro to Tokyo # 446.

We are commencing the use of the code machine from the 6th.
Relayed to TON[a], Buenos Aires, Berne.
Berne relay to PFX[b], Ankara.

[a] Washington and Mexico (?)
[b] England, France, Germany, and Italy (?)

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 598

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) November 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 164.

(Circular) Message to Tokyo # 480.

We have begun using the code machine in this office. I have transmitted this message to the United States, Brazil, Mexico and Switzerland.

Please have this transmitted to England, Germany, France, Italy, and Turkey from Switzerland.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 599

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 208.

As the telegraph companies in South America are principally of British and U.S. capital (All-American and Marconi) in case of an emergency, it will probably be impossible to carry on communications by wire between our Foreign Office and the various consuls, etc., in South America.

At such a time, the Japanese broadcasting stations' broadcasting will be the only means of direct communication so that it seems advisable to arrange now for using this activity (to advantage). For example, a code call sign for each Japanese embassy and Legation could be arranged and a code (romaji) message could be included in the Japanese news. This is one suggestion.

Also please send my cable # 209[a] arund to the broadcasting station in Tokyo.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 600

FROM: Rio (Ishii) November 4, 1941
TO: Bogota, Caracas Circular # 298.

(Part 1 of 2.)[a]

(Message from Tokyo Circular # 2256.)

Sometime ago Panama revised her laws concerning immigrants so as to proscribe the yellow race and practically annihilate the businesses of such immigrants in Panama. We Japanese, however, remained mild and unruffled. Through pleas and persuasion we got the former President to promise to see that we were treated friendly. Nevertheless on October 8, came a coup d' etat and lo, a new President marched on to the stage. The whole picture suddenly changed then and immediately Panama's relations with us turned bitter. The affable relations of the previous President were replaced by the exact opposite and on October 28, it was announced that the continuation of Japanese business was to be stopped on the 30th. Thus we were not allowed time even to dispose of the stock of Japanese goods which we had ordered and as a result 300 Japanese are out in the cold. If they cannot go elsewhere in South America or return to Japan, they will lapse into the condition of beggars or vagabonds.

---

[a] For Part 2 of 2, See IV, 601.

Trans. 11-11-41

No. 601

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Rio de Janeiro

November 4, 1941
Circular # 2256.

(Part 2 of 2.)

The nefarious scheming of the United States is, without any doubt, back of this. Now in order to stop this sort of pressure against other countries and to reflect our dauntless demeanor toward the United States, it is our intention to deal with this with a relentless attitude. Will you, therefore, pick a good opportunity and inform the government to which you are accredited as well as the government to which you additionally represent us, that this measure of the Panamanian Government is a wretched scheme which has overlooked all humane considerations. Say that no matter what sort of special relation Panama enters into with the United States, such plots as this make us doubt her friendship, and by this token, if the war turns out favorably for our side, when this great fray is over Panama will lose out in the markets of East Asia. Point out that she will be snubbed by the East Asia co-prosperity sphere and will incur other disadvantages. Emphasize strongly that it would be inevitable that such acts on her part will remain in memory through years to come and thus do everything in your power to prevent them from taking a series of steps like these.

Please wire me back immediately what reverberations resulted form this in the country to which you are accredited.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 602

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
TO: Buenos Aires

November 15, 1941
307.

(Circular.) (Circular message # 2321 from Tokyo to Mexico.)

The attitude of the Panamanian Government has become exceedingly uncompromising, even rude, for our representations and protests were denied. Moreover, permission was not given for a temporary reopening of the stores. We made representations regarding the following four points:

1. Compensation for damage.
2. A suitable period for the disposition of stocks held by our nationals.
3. Preservation of Japanese property and, lastly,
4. Regarding the pressure upon Japanese to move to nearby countries, to which points they gave no heed whatsoever. The activities left in which our nationals may engage are those of laundries, domestic help and chauffeurs. Not only is it unjust to (make the change to other commercial activities difficult?) ----- ----- ----- ----- there is nothing left for some 300 Japanese to do but move to some neighboring country and suffer financial ruin, so please approach the government there in connection with obtaining entry permits for them although I believe the immigration officials will be reluctant. ----- ----- ----- ----- After you have made these representations, please inform me of the manner for obtaining permits to enter the country (if it is not propitious for them to enter as barbers there would be no objections to their engaging in agriculture).

Trans. 4-30-42

No. 603

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #494.

Recently American exports to South America have become more and more evident, with purchases of essential materials being made in this country now. Because the European war is proving to be of long duration, the increased influence of the United States in Latin America is inevitable.

If American-Japanese relations were adjusted, it would be possible for Japan to take advantage of the margin and in this way restrict the increasing North American influence and infiltering into South America. It has been evidenced in my conversations with the Foreign Minister and the Acting President that Argentina, in all matters, has complete confidence in Japan. It is seen that only with successful adjustment of Japanese-American relations the present negotiations for a commercial agreement will be able to effect an exchange of necessary materials by both parties on the large scale which has previously been the case. I explained clearly to the Foreign Minister and he concurred that no matter what the provisos of the purchase agreement may be, with an outbreak of hostilities between the United States, the execution of the agreement would be terminated. It was also agreed that there was necessity for the negotiations.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 604

FROM: Asuncion (Koseki) November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #14.

My codes have been burned in accordance with your instructions to the Ambassador to Brazil #379[a], and I have already forwarded the list, so I sent your caption telegram to our ambassador in Argentina to be deciphered.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 605

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) December 2, 1941
TO: Santiago Cicular #329.

(In 3 parts complete.)

(Tokyo to Rio as Circular #2432, on 29 November.)

Re my Circular #2409[a].

The following are added this date to my Circular #2409[a], for special use in your area. Please use them together with the others (after making them up in a table).

(Translator's Note: Underlined values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable correct value added below in parenthesis.)

Code Word	*Meaning*
ASAHINA	From ----- (blank) ----- (date), Japanese ships stopping here will not be allowed to take on fuel.

DATE	Please telegraph probable amount of ----- (blank) ----- that can be imported.
KAWAHARA	I estimate we can probably import about ----- (blank) ----- tons of ----- (blank).
NIWAGUCHI (Kawaguchi)	It is impossible to carry out ----- (blank) -----.
NAKAMUTA (Nakamura)	Are in the process of arranging for importation of ----- (blank) -----.
SATUNAKATA (Munakata)	Send communications via ----- (blank) ----- (country).
KAZAMA	Communications will be through offices stationed in ----- (blank) ----- (country).
TOKUSIMA	Japanese ship should arrive in ----- (blank) ----- (country) on ----- (blank) ----- (month) ----- (day).
TAKENOUTI	It is possible for Japanese ships to come to ----- (blank) ----- country?
YA GI (Yanagi)	It is not possible to send Japanese ship to ----- (blank) ----- (country).
TONEGI	It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to ----- (blank) ----- (country).
Part 2	
TAKAGI	Minerals
SAWAMURA	Lead
SUMI (Kasumi)	Mercury
IWASAKI	Petroleum
HIROHATA	Diamonds for industrial use.
ITAMI	Platinum
KADA	Copper
NAKAGAWA	Carat
MAEHATA	Peru
MASUKO	Chile
SENEDA	Colombia
TAKENAKA	Paraguay or Uruguay (?)
SIMAZU	Paraguay or Uruguay (?)
IMAZAWA	Venezuela
FUJIKAKE	San QINY[b]
HASIMOTO	Cuba
SINDŌ	Havana
TIBA	Rio de Janeiro
TOZAWA	Sao Paulo
Part 3	
HASEGAWA	Riberao Preto
IRIFUNE	Santos
ENOMOTO	BAURŪ
BEPPU	Curityba
TIKAMATU	Belem
SUETUGU	Buenos Aires
OKIZUMI	Santiago
YAMATO	Lima
UMEGAWA	Bogota
HARA	Caracas
ISONO	Montevideo (?)
FUKAMATI	Asuncion

Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT[c], Lima, Sao Paulo. Mexico City relay to Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota.

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[a] See IV, 423.
[b] Code value in QINY (probably Salvador or Domingo.)
[c] Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago."

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 606

FROM: Rio (Ishii) December 10, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires Circular # 352.

(Japanese Plain Text.)

Special report. Outline of the war situation.

The Imperial Army and Navy engaged the American and British armies in war from before dawn on the 8th and the situation up to noon on the 9th has been ascertained as follows:

1. The Imperial Navy carried out a withering air attack on the American fleet and air force before dawn on the 8th, at Hawaii, sinking 2 battleships, seriously damaging 4 battleships, seriously damaging about 4 large cruisers (the above has been confirmed), shooting down and damaging many enemy planes. Besides an aircraft carrier is believed to have been sunk by one of our submarines outside of Honolulu Harbor but this is not yet confirmed. We suffered a slight loss in planes and no loss to the fleet.

2. The combined Imperial Army and Navy Air Corps attacked on the 8th the Philippine Air Force and strategic air bases, shooting down 40 planes at Iba and 50 to 60 planes at Clark Field. Our loss was two planes.

3. Early in the morning of the 8th, the Imperial Navy bombed military objectives in Davao, Wake and Guam, inflicting heavy damage. In Guam, the warship Penguin was sunk. Also a detachment of the Navy subjected Midway to heavy fire on the afternoon of the 8th, burning down an airplane hanger and fuel reserves. Our losses were nothing.

4. Before dawn on the 8th, the Imperial Navy air corps carried out night bombing of the Tengaa and Seretaa air bases near Singapore as well as the aviation headquarters and other important military objectives. There appeared to be great damage inflicted but since it was dark this is not confirmed. Although the enemy countered fiercely we suffered no damage.

5. The Imperial Army and Navy, under unified command, easily occupied Thailand on the afternoon of the 8th.

6. In southern China the Imperial air corps attacked an enemy air base north of Hongkong in the early morning of the 8th. It was subjected to fire from low altitudes and 12 of the 14 planes there were burned. Also before dawn on the 8th, the Imperial Navy sank the British gunboat Jeitoreru and the American gunboat Wake surrendered. In Peking and Tientsin the American Marine Corps was disarmed. The Shanghai international concession was completely occupied by the Army and Navy under local leadership by noon on the 8th, and the English concession at Shamen was completely occupied during the morning of the 8th.

Please inform Argentina, Peru, Chile, Sao Paulo, Mexico, Cuba, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 607

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #478.

Re my #473[a]

For your information investigations subsequent to the dispatching of the said boat are as follows:

1. As stated in my caption telegram the obtaining of commodities here is becoming more and more circumscribed. However, it is still possible to purchase wool, hides, quebracho, linseed, etc. Also with the exception of tungsten there are prospects of our being able to purchase the positive metals. (At present Japanese merchants have on hand for shipment in December more than 3500 tons of borax and linseed, etc.)

2. The gold purchasing power of local Japanese merchants is at present 2,000,000 yen. It would be well to increase exports of Japanese merchandise to Argentina as much as possible, especially high priced commodities such as raw silk, in order to increase our reserve purchasing power. In case this does not suffice there is nothing else to do but ship gold bullion.

3. Furthermore in regard to loading, etc. with the exception of the Toa Maru, which was requisitioned by the Navy, this office has been responsible for all the arrangements made by the merchants. And even in the case of the Toa Maru many awkward situations developed. Hence in the future I think it would be advisable to have this office responsible for all the transactions inasmuch as we are responsible for directing the merchants and also for the contacts with government offices. So, in the future regardless of whether the ship in question is a naval vessel or not, as soon as arrangements are completed for dispatching a ship, please notify this office as soon as possible, giving all the details pertaining to loading, such as good to be loaded, amounts, firms concerned, etc.

We will get in touch with the attaché if circumstances require.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-20-41

No. 608

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #457.

Argentina's September trade with Japan:

Exports	7,162,614 pesos
Imports	3,391,523 pesos

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 609

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 24, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires #226.

Nothing is known of arrangements with KAWASHIMA for Foreign and Domestic Commerce (officials) TANAKA and KATO. As it is difficult to get accommodations, please help them to get places on the next boat.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 610

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) November 12, 1941
TO: Washington #18.

(Circular.) (Message to Tokyo #277.)

----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----. The Argentine Minister, KARUDE-WOTEI, on the 11th at a luncheon given by me, told me that his home government had instructed him to return home in a hurry before a Japanese-American war started. Since the outbreak of war in the Pacific seemed to be inevitable, they did not care one whit ----- ----- -----. Consequently, he told me confidentially that he was going to fly home by clipper.

This is clear corroboration that Argentina will not participate in the war, it seems to me. It seems likely that they intend to watch the development of the situation.

Furthermore, Argentina is understood now to be burning several million tons of surplus wheat.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 611

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #484.

An account of what the Foreign Office officials said about the Panama question appeared in all the newspapers as an A.P. dispatch from Tokyo. However, no one paid any attention to it. Furthermore, up to now the atmosphere in this country has been calm so far as Japanese are concerned. Not only that, but the Government, too, has stuck to a neutral policy. I take this, however, as an indication that they may be going to apply pressure against us, so I have decided to make representations to the Government of this country and, if possible, prevent an unfortunate course of events.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 612

FROM: Buenos Aires (BUEAS) November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff) #017.

1. The progress of the negotiations between Japan and America, and the movements of our troops from Central China, point to the fact that America has decided to declare war against Japan soon.

This appears plain in the reports received from America.

2. Recently Britain has been rapidly calling up all British male citizens in Argentina (up to about 40 years of age).

Details of their number, destination, etc., are unknown.

Trans. 1-14-45

No. 613

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #505.

Re your #246[a].

On the 8th, I had a talk with the Foreign Minister in regard to negotiations to foster an understanding (see my #487[a]), and the next day LA RAZON not only published the fact of my talk with the Foreign Minister, but also reported as having been confirmed by the Foreign Office that negotiations to foster an understanding between Japan and the Argentine

were already in progress. After this the English and American newspapers ----- ----- bill for America to purchase all of Argentina's surplus products for three years. (Axis ----- ----- ----- ----- -----) ----- ----- government acts as though it were not very enthusiastic towards reaching a settlement. Although they did not say that Argentina had announced its refusal to cooperate, they left a false impression from the above details that it had been announced.

On the 20th NAKAMURA went to the Vice-Chief of the Commerce Bureau to try to verify the source of this report and of leaks regarding the contents of our conversation. (On the 19th a U.P. writer told NAKAMURA that he knew from Foreign Office sources that the purpose of these talks was trade negotiations). He said that if the Foreign Office was the source of these reports, we considered it very deplorable, but they replied that they knew nothing about it. Afterwards the Foreign Minister told me privately that he was accustomed to give light replies in press conferences, but that he would request a thorough investigation as to the real source of the report in the Foreign Office.

I believe that it is important to realize that publicity is not desirable in this problem of approaching a commercial settlement, and that the forthcoming reopening of negotiations be kept strictly secret. I plan to request when the conferences open that if any announcement must be made, it be made with the approval of the members of the Argentine and Japanese committee.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 614

FROM: Buenos Aires — December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #520.

On the occasion of my conversations with the Foreign Minister on the 5th, we referred to Japan-American relations. I said bluntly, "In the event Japan and the United States find themselves unfortunately in a state of war, what will Argentina's attitude be?" The Foreign Minister replied, "The attitude of Argentina will be restrained by Article 15 of the Havana Protocol (the declaration calling for joint defense of the American continents). That is to say in the event of hostilities arising between Japan and the United States the various countries of South America certainly will be asked by the United States to make application of this article. At that time various countries of South America will treat the United States as a so-called non-aggressor nation (Japan will naturally be treated as an aggressor nation). Nevertheless, in the event that the United States requests aid from us, we will be forced to grant facilities to that country. But, insofar as Argentina herself is concerned, no ill treatment will be meted out to Japan. Though this is but qualified neutrality, it is the interpretation we apply to the above mentioned declaration."

In regard to this interpretation there is some doubt. Therefore I said, "After I have duly studied the matter, I will request an early interview." Thereupon I left.

Since the situation has radically changed, I have transmitted the above as it stands to Brazil.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 615

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) — December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #521.

Re your #258[a].

On the 8th, I interviewed the Foreign Minister and reminded him how Japan and Argentina have maintained amity for many years and how we respect and trust his country. I went on to say that we regard Argentina always as the leader of all South America and then told him what you advised me to in your preceding telegram. He replied, "Yes, we have been friends a long time and what you say is all right so far as I am concerned. However, I must talk it over with the President directly and I will give you a reply today or tomorrow. You know, London, Ottawa, Canberra and Chungking have all made the same statement that you have to us. However, we have not received any solicitations from Washington or Rio."

(According to a radio report, Brazil has announced solidarity with the United States.)

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 616

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) — December 8, 1941
TO: Rio — Circular # 181.

Message from Tokyo # 259.

Simultaneously with the outbreak of war between Japan and America and England, it may become impossible for us to get in direct contact with Mexico, Central America, Panama and Cuba so will you be ever on the alert to gather any information possible about the activities of these nations particularly any Japanese measures, declarations of war, detention of Japanese, and etc.

Wire me back whenever you know anything.

Please send, as this Foreign Minister's instructions, to Rio, Valparaiso, Lima, Bogota, and Caracas.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 617

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — October 24, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular # 2222.

(Strictly secret.)

At the end of September we changed the direction, time, and contents of our foreign broadcasts. Will you, therefore, think back in the past and make any suggestions you deem wise concerning technique, contents, priority and so forth.

Relay to San Francisco, Rio, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Panama, Honolulu.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 618

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) — November 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 453.

Re your Circular # 2222[a]

Judging from reports from the various districts, of late reception conditions have improved considerably and all are happy over it. In view of the fact that communications with Japan have almost been cut off, and it is impossible to secure newspapers and magazines from home, we would like to have "news" in Japanese broadcast as much in detail as possible. Also because of the present situation, in broadcasting the daily news in Spanish and

Portuguese I think it is very important that discussions of the principal events and problems of the day be added in order to make this country and all South American quarters understand the fairness of our position. Please take steps to see that this is done immediately.

[a] See IV, 617.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 619

FROM: Rio (Ishii) October 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #439.

Courier KOSAKA arrived here the 29th. According to the last mail received, he is to return to Japan via the U.S. It is desired that a member of this office accompany him to New York.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 620

FROM: Rio (Ishii) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #456.

From KOSAKA to the Chief of the Courier Department.

I intend to arrive in Washington on the 4th or 5th of December and will be in San Francisco by the middle of the month. It would be well for MAO, in Mexico, to make connections with me at that time (as far as I am able to tell here, Washington would be the best place).

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 621

FROM: Rio (Ishii) November 18, 1941
TO: Mexico #8.

Message from Tokyo #264.

Re your #456[a].

KOSAKA[b] is to stop over in Mexico. Please transmit this to Mexico.

[a] See IV, 620.
[b] Courier from Rio, November 19, 1941, to New York, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, Mexico and Tokyo.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 622

FROM: Rio (Ishii) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #464.

Re your #264[a].

Please give permission for Courier KOSAKA, sailing for New York, on the 19th, to go to Mexico after arriving at San Francisco. His supplementary travel allowance is to be sent to Washington.

[a] See IV, 621.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 623

FROM: Tokyo (TIXNS) (Head, Gen. Affairs Department) November 12, 1941
TO: Washington (RIKUGUN) #052.

Have Army Surgeon Major HAYAKAWA (his status is a secret) sent immediately to Brazil.

We would like to have him act as a non-career specialist, (serving in Brazil only), connected with our Embassy in Brazil, and under the orders of the attaché resident in Argentina. Major YANO knows of the activities of this officer.

His traveling expense will be furnished him from the resident expense fund already granted. Have him report the amount of his actual expense.

This is addressed to America, (and to the attaché resident in Brazil for reference).

Trans. 1-31-45

No. 624

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) October 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #438.

Re paragraph 10(a) and 14 in my #341[a] and my #361[a].

According to reports from all the Consuls under this office, recently England and the United States have been buying newspapers in the interior, spreading general propaganda against the Axis countries, and influencing the feeling toward Japan so that our countrymen are in disfavor and are even called up before the Brazilian authorities. These results are hard to overlook and we are trying to decrease them as quickly as possible by negotiations.

Since there is danger of an emergency we are urging our Consuls to be diligent in collecting general information on the current situation. In regard to the payment mentioned in my caption telegram we have already received your remittance for BELEM, but we hope you will also be able to manage the distribution of funds for the new term and increases for propaganda in Sao Paulo, Curitiba and Ribeirao Preto. At least we ask speedy payment of one-half of this year's sum, 1,000 yen for each of the above offices, and a half year's sum, 1,000 yen, for office expenses in Recife, a total of 4,000 yen.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 625

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #474.

The government of this country has recently conferred upon U.S. Chief of Staff Marshall the title of Supreme Commander of the Brazilian Army, (an honorary title with no real authority involved). This is said to be an expression of appreciation of the said General's assistance to Great Britain in securing the reloading of German arms (anti-aircraft guns) that were consigned to Brazil, at Lisbon, on the request of Chief of Staff GOEZ.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 626

FROM: Rio (Ishii) November 26, 1941
TO: Caracas Circular #320.

The local Yokohama Specie Bank at the instruction of its Home Office is dispatching ----- ----- ----- to Caracas, Bogota and Panama in order to negotiate a scheme to temporarily transfer their funds used to cover import transactions to the account of the Imperial Government's Ministry in each of those places. This is being done because of the critical situation. He will be in Caracas on the 30th of November; in Bogota on the 4th of December; and in Panama on the 10th (he will stay in each of those places three or four days). In view of the current situation and because passports are extremely difficult to secure, after conferring with the Home Office, we have decided to send him on a diplomatic passport, giving him the title of an extraordinary official attached to his office. After you have given this message your consideration, please arrange to have all facilities extended to him.

Relayed from Bogota to Panama.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 627

FROM: Rio — November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 479.

(To be handled in government code.)

British and American pressure upon Brazil is becoming more and more violent with the development of the international situation. In opposition to this, if we are going to bring about any restraining influence on the Brazilian authorities, in view of the difficulties of carrying out our machinations we must with great secrecy and delicacy use only the most effective plans. I have done my very best in taking advantage of opportunities to the point that I now am very much pressed for funds, as you are well aware. Therefore, I would like to have you appropriate temporary secret funds with which we can combat the present critical turn of events. As soon as you have appropriated these moneys, please wire it immediately by the most secret and appropriate manner possible. Furthermore, though I have utilized the intelligence dissemination fund which you sent me in the manner prescribed, it has been completely disbursed. This is for your information.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 628

FROM: Rio (Ishii) — November 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 482.

I am making a general test of the reception of dispatches, and find that at present we cannot receive the 10:30 P.M. (Japanese time) transmission at all. At present the only one we can hear is the 6:30 P.M. (Japanese time) transmission from JVJ to the United States, so please bear this in mind. Argentina reports the same.

As I would like to find out whether conditions are favorable here for reception between 4:00 and 6:00 A.M. (Japanese time), it seems best to send to South America at that time over a wavelength of from 10 to 15 megacycles.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 629

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) — December 1, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular # 334.

(In 2 parts, complete.)

Rio de Janeiro to Tokyo # 486.

Re my # 458[a].

1. In my conference with Foreign Minister Arania today, the 1st, I explained to him the difficulties involved in the Japanese-American negotiations, and then went on to sound him out by saying that Japan was not entirely satisfied with the previous interview reported in my telegram.

To this, Arania replied that he had not fully explained his position. To go into details regarding Brazil's policy, if an American country got into war with a non-American country, Brazil would not make a declaration of neutrality, but would attempt to treat both countries as if no war existed. However, on the other hand, if war broke out between two non-American nations (for example Japan and England) Brazil would issue a declaration of neutrality and would treat both countries as belligerents.

2. I brought up the question of the possibility of a breakdown in the Japanese-American negotiations. To this A. replied that even on his trip to Chile it was only natural that the matter would weigh heavily on his mind. However, he declared emphatically that as far as Brazil was concerned it was her earnest desire that Japan and the United States compose their differences. Then, he went on to say that, in case worst came to worst Brazil would not apply pressure or any inequalities on Japan or on Japanese residents in Brazil. This policy does not represent my viewpoint alone, but is the intention of every Government department. And not only that, but the President, himself, has expressed the same to your ambassador, he said.

Therefore, I went on to inquire what Brazil's attitude would be in the event that America should publish a Black List of Japanese firms in Brazil and also about the problem of the freezing of Japanese funds in Brazil.

The Premier said that the Black List was the United States' problem and that while it might be difficult to carry out, as far as relations within the country of Brazil itself were concerned, Brazil would ignore such a Black List just as she was ignoring the Black List published concerning German and Italian firms. As a matter of fact, you can judge for yourself what the policy of Brazil is from the fact that I am making my trip to Chile on a Condor plane. And as for freezing funds, Brazil has absolutely no intention of adopting any such measures.

3. In the above interview the Prime Minister tried very hard to plead his case. However, through secret information, I have learned that the President cautioned him regarding the former interview and that certain quarters in the Army department criticized him also. Further, that the government and the people had planned a celebration of Prime Minister Arania's return to his post, but the army interferred and it was called off, it appears. At any rate, it was very evident that the Prime Minister was modifying his attitude and attempting to plead his case in the above interview. However, in regard to the neutrality he mentioned in paragraph 1, I think that Brazil is only "Neutral in favor of U.S.A.".

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 630

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
TO: Santiago

December 2, 1941
Circular # 328.

Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular # 2431, 29th November.

Re my Circular # 2409[a].

Additions to the list already sent; please use with others.

Code Word	*Meaning*
KASIMA	Have Japanese living there been interned?
KANO	Japanese living here are all safe.
KIKUTI	Japanese living here have all been interned.
KATUNO	Some of Japanese living here have been interned.
KAWASIMO	The wave length of General Information broadcast will be changed to ----- kilocycles from ----- (day) ----- (month) -----
KAKAO (Kayao)	Reception of General Information broadcast bad, please change wave length.
TUJIKITA	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a shorter wave length than the present wave length.
TABUSE (Tabuti)	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a longer wave length.
SAITO	The time of General Information broadcast is to be changed starting on ----- (day) ----- from ----- (time) ----- to ----- (time) -----
HAYASAKI	Please change time of General Information broadcast, starting on ----- (day) to, from ----- (time) ----- to ----- (time) -----
ISEZAKI	100 (hyaku)
WANAMI	1,000 (sen)
YASUNO	10,000 (man)
UNO	100,000 (jyu man)
ITIOTA (perhaps ITIOKA) (probably UTIOKA)	1,000,000 (hyaku man)

[*] See IV, 423.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 631

FROM: Rio (Ishii) December 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 489.

Re my # 278.

When we considered the reconstruction of the Naval Attachés office we thought a total of 512 contos would be sufficient. Unfortunate as it may be, we have increased our estimate by 19 contos. Of this latter amount, 9 contos additional expenditure is unavoidably required as a result of the construction work. Futhermore, since the drawing up of the estimate, the Naval attaché has increased the personnel of his office by 3 persons. In addition, in order to secure security equipment in order that we may protect our secrets and insure the security in view of the troubled times, we will require 10 contos. After you have negotiated with the Naval authorities, please do your utmost to arrange for the disbursement of this amount.

I have already conferred with the Naval Attaché in this connection.

The Naval Attaché has wired the Naval authorities.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 632

FROM: Rio de Janeiro — December 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #491.

Re my #339[a].

In view of the critical situation we have arranged for the loan of 5,000 conto from the Specie Bank. This is being held in cash and this together with the amount mentioned in my caption telegram makes a total of 6,000 conto we have in cash on hand at present.

In case conditions take a turn for the worse we have arranged for a further loan of 10,000 conto.

Please be advised of the above.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 633

FROM: Rio (Ishii) — December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Our man, KUSANO, is very industrious in his telegraphic work and has always done his best, however, the shortest trip by boat always nauseates him and such things as the heat, which to most people are mere trivialities cause him undue suffering, therefore, he finally decided to come to me and ask to be relieved of his duties. It would be hard to say for just what reasons it is, but lately he has been suffering from insomnia and seems in agony day and night. His limbs tremble and it seems that he can hardly hold anything in his hands. The doctor says that he is getting so weak that if he continues his telegraphic work here, he is bound to grow worse. Now, I expect this type of work gradually to increase and if I keep him at work, I fear that he will break down. Therefore, if you would be good enough to authorize his return to Japan, I will be very glad. Commercial Official NAKAMURA of ----- is leaving on the 8th, so if you will issue orders for his recall sometime on the 7th, I will appreciate it.

I want you to immediately appoint a successor to KUSANO and this time be sure to make it a strong fellow well versed in telegraphy and particularly in machinery.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 634

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) — December 7, 1941
TO: Panama — Circular #338.

Originated Tokyo.

1. Regardless of what it is outwardly called, the recent occupation of the Netherlands Guiana by the United States armed forces, is a military occupation—the first of its kind in the South American continent. In view of the Havana agreement, the occupation, in the near future, of French possessions is well within the realm of possibility. Heretofore, under the so-called "good neighbor" policy, the United States has been limiting its influence to obtaining air bases and aviation rights, and certain amounts of political and economic control in the Latin American area. In the face of the approaching crisis, however, the United States is beginning to uncover its true military motives against this area. We should carefully note this new trend.

2. The United States has been claiming that our occupation of the southern part of French Indo-China an act of aggression, in spite of the fact that it was carried out in accordance with the terms of a joint defense agreement between Japan and France. The United States, however, has occupied the Netherlands Guiana under the pretext of joint defense. This is proof that the United States will do anything it pleases in Latin America, allegedly in behalf of joint defense measures. It is quite apparent that the United States intends to constantly threaten all of the various countries in Latin America in this manner.

Please seize every opportunity that presents itself to call the attention of the Government and the people of the country to which you are accredited to this fact. In this connection, will you please make investigations of the following points and advise this office:

(a) Besides those which have been made public, is there any agreement or understanding between the United States and the Netherlands government in exile, with regard to the Netherlands Guiana? If so, what is the duration of its effectivity? Does it permit acts of a military nature? Does it affect the territorial rights, the property rights, etc?

(b) What is the attitude of the Government of the country to which you are accredited with regard to this occupation? What is the reaction of the public to it?

Please relay this message, as this Minister's instruction to the various Embassies and Legations in Central and South America and to Sao Paulo.

A copy has been sent to Washington.

Trans. 12-20-41

No. 635

FROM: Rio (Ishii) December 8, 1941
TO: Bogota Circular # 344.

Message to Tokyo # 498.

Re your circular # 2505[a].

In accordance with instructions and bearing a note, I called on the Under Secretary of State on the afternoon of the 8th and had a confidential conversation with him (the Secretary of State, having another appointment, could not see me). I briefly explained—then questioned him regarding the Government's attitude toward war between the United States and Japan. The Under Secretary answered along the lines of my # 497[b] and insisted upon the importance of hemispheric solidarity. I asked him, "What do you mean by that? Are you going to sever diplomatic relations with Japan?" "The exact details", he continued, "have as yet not been decided. I do not think that diplomatic relations with Japan will be broken off, however."

Relayed to -----, Lima, Bogota, -----.

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[a] Statement that a state of war exists between Japan and the Allied powers as of this date. The request is made to all diplomatic offices to ascertain the attitude of the countries to which they are accredited toward the war.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-20-41

No. 636

FROM: Rio (Ishii) December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 500.

(Priority.)

There follows a report I put together from what I heard from the local officials concerning the attitude of Brazil toward the opening of hostilities.

1. The solidarity spoken of in my #497[a] means political and economic and has no particular military implications, however, if the United States should demand military cooperation, Brazil will not refuse.

2. The Brazilian government is paying close attention to the attitude of Japanese workers and has issued orders to the Chief of the Second Division not to allow them to be thrown into confusion by Fifth Column Agents.

3. If the United States demands that the property of the Japanese in Brazil be frozen, Brazil will comply.

4. On the 8th, the Press Control Office issued instructions to the local newspapers that the following types of articles are to be shunned:

a. Articles containing opinions or interpretations of the Japanese-American war, and photographs.

b. Articles about conferences between the diplomatic officials of the belligerents.

c. Articles which might anger the Nationals of belligerents.

d. Articles which might provoke Japanese.

e. Furthermore, the articles must be so written as to please the United States.

Of course, this advice from the Press Control Office is very vague but still we can see that it supports solidarity. This morning two or three newspapers printed my interview in which I explained why we had to fight but this evening none of the newspapers printed it. This is because the control office forbade it.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 637

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Rio, Mexico

December 8, 1941
Circular #2518.

(Priority-Strictly Secret.)

(Abstract.)

Tokyo gives instructions for burning codes and confidential papers at the recipient's discretion.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 638

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Rio

December 8, 1941
Circular #2519.

Strictly Secret.

(Abstract.)

Similar to Tokyo's #2518[a].

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[a] See IV, 637.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 639

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #295.

Strictly secret. Re my #293[a].

Since the President of the Chileno is a good friend of mine, I conferred with him and asked him what the source of the article was. Prefacing his explanation with a request that he would like to have this matter kept strictly secret for sometime, he said that the information had been brought to him by a member of the Foreign Office from the Chileno's intelligence network; that he was not clear exactly which of the bases the United States asked for but he supposed that there were two or three places in addition to the Pasukua[b] Island; that on the 16th the American Ambassador had formally submitted a request to the Foreign Minister on condition that the United States would grant economic favors in return; and that the Foreign Minister, in order to discuss the matter, had decided to call immediately on the President who was then convalescing at a summer resort.

The demands for air bases made to this country are as I have already given in my telegram. Nothing definite has been decided at this time, but the fact that these demands were made almost simultaneously with the occurrence of an economic crisis deserves our attention in that it throws a light on the United States' general attitude toward Japan.

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[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 640

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #310.

(In 3 parts, complete.)

(Abstract.)

Report from Chile on conditions there and asking Japanese Government to back plan to send Japanese ships (trade) to Chile, and to try and continue negotiations for new trade treaty.

A general protest against the cancelling of Kaku Maru sailing to Chile, and the fact that Japan has not arranged for another ship to take Kaku Maru's place.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 641

FROM: Santiago November 6, 1941
TO: Rome #2.

The next available boat is the *Naruto Maru* from Valparaiso on November 15th. Since sailings are to be approved by the home office, please communicate directly. There are no foreign ships sailing from here to the Far East at present.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 642

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Tientsin

November 10, 1941
223.

Tokyo to Peking # 617.

Re your # 716[a].

On the request of the Army it has been decided to cancel the trip of the Chilean newspapermen to Shanghai. Please make arrangements for them to sail from Dairen to Moji on the 19th.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 643

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

November 10, 1941
132.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re correspondence # 1261 of the 5th.

At the request of the military authorities the visit of the Chilean newspapermen to Shanghai has been cancelled. For this reason their visit to your city has also been held up.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 644

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Panama

December 2, 1941
128.

Secret outside the Department.

The six Chilean newspapermen whom we employed to come here for the purpose of enlightening South America are returning home on the *Tatsuta Maru*, leaving Yokahama December 2nd.

Since it is impossible for them to carry along a large sum in American dollars to pay their way from Panama to Valparaiso on account of the exchange control regulations, we are sending $2,160 to cover this boat fare, expense money while waiting in Panama, and an allowance for expenses on the boat. Send them by the earliest sailing (on any but an American boat).

Names: (1) Alburuto[a], (2) Vuiaru[a], (3) Iglesias, (4) Purane[a], Barii[a], (6) Labarca.

Expense money: Boat fare—about $300 apiece; $1800 for the six. Allowance on the boat (from 10 to 20 days)—about $50 apiece; $300 for the six. Expenses while waiting for a boat (about 10 days)—about $10 apiece; $60 for the six.

Total—$2,160.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 645

FROM: Rio (Ishii) November 18, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires Circular # 310.

Message from Tokyo # 265.

Not long ago the Colombian Foreign Minister visited the South American nations and now the Brazilian Prime Minister and the Peruvian Vice-President have visited Chile. The Chilean President has been ousted, thus all sorts of political maneuvering is going on. This does not necessarily mean that a Latin America bloc has been consolidated, however, it is rumored that conversations are taking place among the various nations as to what policy they, themselves, shall take independently in case the United States enters the war. On the other hand, it would appear that Brazil, for example, is trying to change the mind of the United States.

Such activities as these are very important when it comes to our relations with the United States, so will you please investigate and wire me back what conclusions you come to.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 646

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) November 21, 1941
TO: Toyko # 470.

Re your # 265[a].

According to a member of the Foreign Office here, during a conversation several months ago, a trip by the Foreign Minister ARANIYA to Chile was scheduled to take place even at that time. However, according to the German Ambassador who called on me on the 21st (today) he says that the Foreign Minister's trip to Chile, includes an act for the United States, which is to act as a negotiator between Chile and the United States for Chile to supply the United States with a military base. I have not heard of this from any other source, but cable it to you for what it might be worth.

As the German Ambassador is very close to the President, I asked the following in a roundabout way.

I tried to find out, in a roundabout way, the President's ideas on the interview (covered in my cable # 458[b]) of ARANIYA. According to the German Ambassador, the President had said that he was the one who determined the Foreign policy of Brazil.

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[a] See IV, 645.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 647

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) Novermber 25, 1941
TO: Toyko # 501.

The principal object of this visit of Brazilian Foreign Minister Aranha to Argentina and Chile was an informal exchange of opinions with the Foreign Ministers of these two countries regarding matters of defense of the Americas and the question of creating military bases. The said Foreign Minister in a newspaper interview in this city emphasized the necessity of all the American nations cooperating in joint defenses. However, according to

information secured by an agent of this office, as the result of his conference with the Argentine Foreign Minister, Aranha is said to have concurred with Argentina's foreign policy, and the two agreed upon: (1) the preservation of neutrality, (2) the defense of the southern portion of South America to be undertaken by the countries involved only. These countries on the request of Brazil will add Colombia and Peru to Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the three that Argentina had insisted on. (Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Bolivia are excluded because of U.S. pressure upon them being so strong.) (3) The establishment of military bases in Uruguay for the purposes of American joint defenses, is to be prevented by the cooperative efforts of Argentina and Brazil, which are the guarantors of this country's safety.

Relayed to Washington and Brazil.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 648

FROM: Rio
TO: Santiago

November 28, 1941
Circular # 326.

(Message from Tokyo Circular # 2416.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

Concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the counter proposal presented to us by the United States on the 27th, overlooks all we stand for; therefore, of course we disregard it. There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn. The above is for your information only.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 649

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata)
TO: Tokyo

December 6,1941
360.

On the 6th, I called on the German Ambassador. When I questioned him regarding the details of his conversation with the Secretary of State on the 4th, he told me that the Secretary of State had said the following to him in confidence:

"The National Defense Council (please refer to my # 355[a], this Conference met on the 2nd and then again on the 4th) decided on the defense of the Straits of Magellan. In that area, sufficient quantities of cement and oil, etc., are stored. However, as old as the cannons may be they have to be used. In addition, we have decided to take the big guns off the Chilean warships, O'Higgins and Platt. As the defense of the Magellan Strait involves Argentina, arrangements are progressing for an early meeting between myself and the Argentine Secretary of State in Mendoza. Though I hardly think that the Straits of Magellan will become an object of attack, on the basis of the provisions already made, we have decided to preclude any North American demands for the use of these Straits as a base."

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-17-41

No. 650

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) December 2, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 75.

(Secret)

Message to Tokyo # 354.

At the time of the meeting mentioned in my # 353[a], in answer to my questions the Foreign Minister, after asking me to keep it strictly secret told me confidentially that the principal object of the visit of Foreign Minister ARANHA of Brazil had been to determine the attitude of the "ABC" countries towards the war and the results had been that the three countries agreed to preserve neutrality. However, while Argentine and Chile (especially Chile) are resolved to preserve neutrality in the old meaning of the word, Brazil already has an understanding with America to assist her as a "non-belligerent." He expected to have further talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister on this subject at Mendoza and other suitable places, but that he would do his best to see that in the matter of neutrality Chile maintained the status quo and that his friends were working to persuade the President to a similar view.

Relayed to Mexico, Buenos Aires, Lima, Bogota.

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[a]See IV, 656. YAMAGATA wires Tokyo stating that he called on the Foreign Minister and explained to him the three questions regarding visas for Japanese.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 651

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) November 22, 1941
TO: Mexico Circular # 72.

Part 1 of 2.

On the 21st, I called on the Foreign Minister and handed him a translation of the Foreign Office note (your # 99[a]), asking him to peruse it. Then I recounted to him the various tribulations caused us by Panama as described in your various messages. He appeared not to believe this, but I continued that things were just that bad, and because of the inhumane measures taken by the Panamanian government, those of our citizens who were affected are in a fair way to starve to death. He listened to what I said with an air of incredulity, horror, his mouth open, and he suddenly grasped the significance of the situation. "Well," he said, "I can't tell you anything for sure, but let me talk this over immediately with the Vice-President, and maybe we can make Panama change her attitude." I replied, "Alas, sir, that will be impossible, but you see what we are up against, so I have received instructions from my Government to ask the Chilian government to let in as many as 300 Japanese. I hope, therefore, that I will be able to wire them good news."

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-15-41

No. 652

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) November 22, 1941
TO: Mexico Circular # 72.

(Priority)

Part 2 of 2.

Message to Tokyo # 331.

The Foreign Minister said, "Hasn't your Government considered evacuating them?"

I made my explanation as follows: "The majority of Japanese resident in Panama have been there for many years. Because of this fact, they do not welcome the idea of leaving Latin America." The Foreign Minister continued, "I can well understand that. We have no particular race prejudice here, but recently we have discontinued issuing immigrant passports. Now, should we radically change this, it would be interpreted as definite discrimination in favor of Japan. Regrettable as it may be, we cannot afford to show such partiality. However, as I have told you, I will discuss the entire question with the Vice-President." I then continued by saying, "Yes, by all means discuss the question with him. But remember that our petition is not a request to satisfy the daily requirements of our immigrants, but is rather a petition for the invocation of humanitarian principles in view of an exceptional situation. See if you can make some sort of an arrangement in their behalf."

Though the Foreign Minister received me in all sincerity, I have little hope that large numbers of our people will be permitted to enter this country. Therefore, the matter of representations to the Panamanian Government may ----- ----- -----. This is for your information.

Trans. 12-15-41

No. 653

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) November 22, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 73.

Message to Tokyo # 333.

Re your # 263[a] to Brazil.

On the 22nd, I went to call on the Apostolic Delegate who is confined because of sickness. I told him just what I had told the Foreign Minister and went on to say that the way Panama is treating our Nationals is certainly not Christian-like. I asked him if he would not do something to influence the Panamanian government in our behalf. He replied that, personally he would like to do all he could to help us, but Panama is not under his jurisdiction, therefore, he would like for me to appeal to the Pope.

I thanked him and went on to ask if he could not do something for us about the matter of our Nationals (traveling?) in Chile. I told him that I had already spoken to the Foreign Minister about this, and although it might be a little delicate, I would appreciate it if he would put in a word for us. He said that he could well understand how I felt and at a good opportunity he would speak to the Foreign Minister.

I have sent this to our Ambassadors and Ministers throughout the Americas.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 654

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) November 25, 1941
TO: Panama #017 (?)

Tokyo to Santiago #169.

(Received from Tokyo)

Re message #016 to SPZ[a].

Regarding cable to you (Santiago) from Panama #10[b] dated 15th. Although many days have passed you have not obtained entrance visas for 26 persons. These visa requests are for the staff of Amano and Company in Panama and they are entering Chile to be employed in the Amano branch there. As circumstances differ from general applications for Japanese entering Chile, the visa for these employees should be handled separately and not as one of a group.

Relay to SPZ[c].

---

[a] Santiago to Panama (?)
[b] Not available.
[c] Probably Panama.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 655

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) November 26, 1941
TO: Santiago Circular #319.

Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro #371, 25th.

Make all necessary arrangements for Japanese wishing to return to Japan on Tatsuta Maru leaving Japan end of November. They should board the ship at Balboa or Los Angeles.

Please relay this message to all Japanese Embassies and Legations in Central and South America, and also to Sao Paulo.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 656

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) December 1, 1941
TO: Panama (Koshi) #027 (?).

Santiago to Tokyo #353.

Re my #343[a].

I called on the Foreign Minister today and started by explaining that there were the three separate questions of:

1. Entrance visa for Japanese in general.
2. Entrance visa for employees of our Embassy.
3. Entrance visa for staff of Amano, to be transferred from Panama to a branch of the same company here; and I specially explained the situation of the staff of Amano.

The Foreign Minister mentioned that due to the President's being very busy, he had not had a chance to bring this matter up, but he, himself, had thought of trying hard to obtain this permit. However, on reconsidering the matter, he believes that due to the conditions of

present days, he does not think that to allow Japanese to enter the country (Amano staff and Embassy employees are included in this) would be a disadvantage to both of our countries. After which, he repeatedly asked to keep this matter confidential and continued.

Relayed to Panama.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 657

FROM: Santiago
TO: Panama

December 1, 1941
027.

(Revised and completed translation.)

Sent to Tokyo as # 353 (3 parts, complete).

Re my # 343[a].

1. I called on the Foreign Minister this day, the 1st, and prefacing my remarks with the statement that I wished to talk with him about three things, i.e., the reference message[a], matter in general, and the question of the entry of the Amano party and employees of this office. I then proceeded to give him the particulars of the Amano matter along the lines of your suggestion.

The Minister replied that due to the confusion resulting from the death of the President he had not yet had time to talk with the Vice President about our recent request. Despite this, he himself had at first thought that he would like to comply with our request as far as possible. However, he added, as a result of further study of it, he had now reached the conclusion that in view of the whole situation it would not be for the best interests of either country to admit Japanese (either the Amano party or the employees of this office).

Then, after repeatedly requesting that this be held in strict secrecy, he told me in confidence that the British and Americans have been scheming to get him out on the grounds of his being pro-Axis, but that thus far they had been unable to discover any excuse. He has taken every precaution so as not to give them any "chance", but the American surveillance net is drawn so closely that even the officials in the Foreign Office must constantly be on the alert. Therefore, he suggested that all matters should be brought directly to himself alone, because, as we are well aware, it is because of his feelings toward Japan and because of his attempts to remove the obstacles to Japanese-Chilean trade that at present the Japanese in Chile are placed in such a favorable situation. If he should, at this time, when Japanese-American relations are strained, give permission for Japanese to enter the country, the Americans and British might resort to slander and calumny in connection with the Presidential campaign that is opening. He, himself, is convinced that the Amano party and the other Japanese are not "spies", but, in view of past machinations by Britain and America, one cannot tell what regrettable situations might be stirred up.

Previously, when the German Minister in Columbia was allowed to remain in Chile ----- was made the object of slander and an attempt was made to oust him from office. At present, there are but very few true friends of Japan in the cabinet, and when he once leaves the Foreign Office, the one who will succeed him is 100% pro-American. He further stated that it is true that at present Chile is friendly to Japan, but when he once leaves his present position it is impossible to guarantee that this will be true. Therefore, while he regrets not being able to comply with our request, this is due to his not wishing to give any occasion of which the British and Americans can make use. But, for Japan to ----- Chile, which is a friend of Japan's, just because of the matter of the entry of a few Japanese, would be most regrettable ----- for both countries.

2. The attitude of the Foreign Minister was most gentlemanly and sympathetic, and it would be to the disadvantage of the Empire to put him into a difficult position, as Kawasaki well knows.

---

[a] IV, 653.

Trans. 12-18-41

No. 658

FROM: Lima (Sakamoto) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #290.

The feeling here toward Japan will develop in direct relation to the course of Japan-American negotiations. In so far as Ambassador KURUSU'S mission is concerned, the officials and the people here have no great expectations of success. I would like to go to Washington as soon as Ambassador KURUSU has arrived there so that I might tell him of the situation here and discuss with him our policies for the future, as well as to secure his opinions concerning our plans. I think that three weeks will cover the entire trip from the time I touch at Panama. Please wire your permission immediately.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 659

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 15, 1941
TO: Lima #188.

Replying to your cable #290[a].

As relations with South America are now very critical, we permit your request of travel only on condition you are not gone for more than ten days.

---

[a] See IV, 658.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 660

FROM: Lima (Yodokawa) December 8, 1941
TO: Bogota (Koshi) Circular #064.

Minister Sakamoto[a] has been in Washington since 26 November.

---

[a] Japanese Minister to Peru.

Trans. 12-24-41

No. 661

FROM: Lima (Yodokawa) December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #307.

There follows a report on the situation in this country since the beginning of the Japanese-American hostilities:

1. On the 7th (in Japan on the 8th), at midnight, an extraordinary session of the Cabinet was held and the questions of the attitude of the Peruvian government and the handling of Japanese citizens were discussed. I have a spy report to the effect that Peru will decide its definite attitude after she sees the decisions of the other South American countries, however, it appears that certain of our properties may be expropriated.

2. Police activities within the city are very likely and strict surveillance is being maintained. The publication of Japanese newspapers has been forbidden.

3. I heard that there is going to be another cabinet meeting very soon so I asked for a private word with the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs. I asked him in the interest of Nationals, that the Japanese newspapers be allowed to continue publication under my supervision. He said that after he had taken this up in the Cabinet he would reply.

Concerning the attitude of the Peruvian government, the Under-Secretary said that differing from the other South American countries Peru has a large number of Japanese and at the same time is in such a special position as to be highly important to the joint defense of the United States, therefore, he said it would be very difficult to maintain neutrality.

4. The people in general are resigned saying Peru has no alternative but to fight. I fear that Peru may enter the war sooner than anyone might imagine.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 662

FROM: Lima (Yodokawa) December 8, 1941
TO: Bogota Circular # 67.

(Urgent)

Message to Tokyo # 308.

1. Concerning the European war, editorials have avoided taking sides and remain relatively neutral. However, practically all the newspapers, as soon as they heard of the opening of hostilities between Japan and the United States, took a hostile attitude toward us and in editorials stressed Peru's need for assistance from the United States. They further advocated the breaking off of relations with Japan.

2. According to spy reports, the Peruvian government has advised the various newspapers confidentially to print all reports in a manner favorable to the United States and to lead public opinion in the direction of participation in the struggle.

3. They have forbidden us to travel in sections not frequented by our residents and taken away from us the right of assembly.

4. According to spy reports, tomorrow, the 9th, they have decided to freeze our funds in banks and to stop purchasing Japanese goods.

5. Telegrams to Panama will not be accepted unless they are in English.

6. It is rumored that this is considered an excellent time to rout the APRA Party Wing which took part in the riots last year.

Relayed to -----, Santiago and Panama.

Trans. 12-22-41

No. 663

FROM: Lima December 8, 1941
TO: Bogota Circular # 68.

Message to Tokyo # 309.

On the 8th, the Peruvian government broadcast a statement that, now that Japan and the United States are at war, the Peruvian government will take no steps prejudicial to solidarity and joint defense and that the money the Japanese have in banks cannot be withdrawn. This will probably appear in the papers tomorrow, however, I have a confidential report from a close friend of the President to the effect that, although among the cabinet members some argued vigorously, the President remains cool and calm. According to my informant, this statement followed the lead of the declaration of Brazil and Argentina and so long as there is no strong pressure from the United States, we can expect no particular difficulties. I was given to understand that the police officials have been instructed not to do anything dishonorable to Peru which might jeopardize the lives and property of the Japanese. Peru has even gone so far as to suppress news of how we Japanese have been treated in Panama, Mexico and so forth, for fear of arousing the population, however, at the request of the American Amabassador, two Japanese in the northern fishing town of Talara and four fishermen at Chorillow outside the port of Lima, which is where the cable comes up, have been ordered to move elsewhere, but all else that has been done was to deny us the right of movement and assembly in the country, so it would seem that Peru is merely acting with deference toward the United States and judging from the President's way of thinking and acting, I don't believe that we need expect any sudden and drastic action on the part of the Peruvian government.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 664

FROM: Lima — December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 066.

(Priority.)

I have got an understanding with the local German and Italian ministers that, in case the telegraph office here refuses to accept our telegrams, they will handle them for us. Will you please make the same arrangements at the other end?

Relayed from Tokyo to Ottawa, Rio, Bogota.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 665

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — October 20, 1941
TO: Singapore — No number.

From Vice Minister AMAU.

I first intended to have you come on home, but then this customs question had to come along. A few days ago I talked to Ambassador CRAIGIE and explained "You know, before this customs question came up TSURUMI was scheduled to return to Japan. I am awfully sorry it had to happen." Things being as they are, however, we had to issue that order. On the other hand, the Army says that you have been giving considerable assistance to their attachés over there, and asked why you wanted to come back to Japan before making any arrangements. I explained the state of affairs to them.

For your information. Please tell this to Ambassador TSURUMI.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 666

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

October 22, 1941
1071.

Re my # 1028[a].

Consul General TSURUMI has wired us that he had received a written notice under the date of the 14th from the Chief of the Administration that the latter would permit the loading of saaten kotoon[b] which had been landed from the Star of Egypt, but that the Chief neither specified the quantity nor referred to the machinery.

This is for your information.

---

[a] See III, 775.
[b] Kana spelling: "certain cotton"?

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 667

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

October 28, 1941
1091

Re your # 1882[a].

The two types of raw glycerin, # 50 and # 70, have already been shipped. Please wire us at once after you have investigated.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 668

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

October 29, 1941
1978.

Re your # 1091[a].

Both were sent on the Dutch ship Tjimanok (to Batavia) on the 9th.

---

[a] See IV, 667.

Trans. (No date)

No. 669

FROM: Madrid (Suma)
TO: Tokyo

October 24, 1941
151.

(Part 1 of 2.)

I just got an opportunity to talk with Spanish Ambassador to London, ALBA, who came back for a short visit last week. He has quite a good reputation in England and spoke to me as follows:

1. The general situation in England is much better than as of April this year and is improving. As a matter of fact, the standard of living there is much better than at present in Spain.

2. The British officials expect quite a war in the Atlantic and figure that the conflict may last until 1946. They are making every preparation for a long war, and in particular, the defenses of the British Isles are near completion.

3. Great Britain earnestly desires the actual participation of the United States. That is why they sent DUFF-COOPER; they want him to stir up war fever throughout America. The United States, however, saying that public opinion, particularly that of the Isolationists, is too strong, is hesitating to make the leap. Therefore, we are not likely to see the entrance of the United States during the present war.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 670

FROM: Vancouver (Kawasaki) October 28, 1941
TO: Ottawa #44.

(Priority.)

Re your #79[a].

We have made inquiries from the Empire Shipping Company here and from King Brothers in Victoria (the representatives of the Mitsui branch in Seattle), but the scrap iron has not yet been unloaded. The date of unloading and other details are still entirely unsettled.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 671

FROM: Tokyo October 31, 1941
TO: Singapore #323.

Re your #686 (?) (or 666).

An N.Y.K. ship will call there soon. Please wire immediately the number of evacuees and the requisite procedure for leaving the country as it is necessary for arranging the schedule of the above ship.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 672

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 31, 1941
TO: Singapore #324.

Re my #325[a].

The Asama Maru is scheduled to sail from Japan November 7th, arriving in Singapore the 15th and leaving the 16th to return to Japan. It is scheduled to take on about 500 persons there. Please make arrangements with the authorities concerned for taking on provisions, water, and sufficient fuel for the return trip. Later the Asama Maru will make a trip to Britain but the negotiations are taking time and in the interval the ship will make one

round trip to Singapore calling at Manila enroute. Subsequent to this it will probably be impossible to dispatch a Japanese ship. This is for your information.

---

[a] See IV, 671.

(*Note:* Same text sent to Manila as #343 on 31 October with following modifications: "Ref my #342—arrive Manila November 10th and leave the 11th—pick up 700 passengers ——")

Itinerary		
Lv Japan	11/ 7/41	
Ar Manila	11/10/41	Embark 700–800
Lv Manila	11/11/41	
Ar Singapore	11/15/41	Embark 500
Lv Singapore	11/16/41	

Trans. 11–4–41

No. 673

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Singapore

November 5, 1941
#336.

Because of her calling at Manila, for the sake of safety we have had the Asama Maru sail as a vessel pressed into the service of the Imperial Government. (Sugiyama of the Ministry of Communications is on board as in charge of the ship.) Regardless of this capacity of the ship, the matter of how she is to be handled in your port is to be arranged on the basis of the Japanese-British agreement.

Trans. 11–13–41

No. 674

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Singapore

November 5, 1941
#330.

1. As I mentioned in my #261[a], paragraph (1), the fare of those embarking on the Asama Maru will be collected by you, and held as a special account and you will pay all expenses incurred by the above boat while in port from this account. Please get in touch with the authorities there immediately regarding this. We have contacted the British here regarding it.

Please have all money carried by evacuees in the form of exchange drafts. Expenses incurred enroute can be paid after arrival in Japan.

---

[a] See III, 761.

Trans. 11–12–41

No. 675

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Singapore

November 5, 1941
#328.

Re your #672[a], paragraph 1 and 2.

In order to avoid any difficulty, the Asama Maru will take on food, water, and fuel enough for the round trip, therefore you will not need to negotiate for these supplies. We are contacting the British Ambassador in Tokyo in regard to having arrangements for payments of harbor taxes in the same way as in the case of the Fuso Maru. Furthermore the above mentioned vessel will leave here on the 6th one day earlier than the plans given in my #324[b], to arrive at your place the forenoon of the 14th and depart the afternoon of the next day. Is there any objection to this change? Please advise by return dispatch together with the item in my #323[c].

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 672.
[c] See IV, 671.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 676

FROM: Shanghai — November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #2026.

Re my #1988[a].

(To be handled in Government code. Secret outside the Department.)

Two or three days after the Kitō Maru arrives it will leave for Yokohama. Since the matter of the Tomisurafu, as I have told you in my successive wires, has been repeatedly mentioned in newspaper articles, they have decided to go directly to Japan and have abandoned the trip to Dairen, at least until the public excitement has somewhat subsided.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 677

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — November 6, 1941
TO: Singapore — #332.

Re your #658[a].

(To be handled in Government code.)

1. The secret fund is included in the ordinary expense fund. Please report only the total figure for the month to the authorities. (The same procedure is being carried out in so far as our banks in Singapore are concerned.)
2. We, here in Japan, are not permitting the withdrawal of British diplomatic funds or the bank deposits of the members of the staff. In case drafts are made against British or American banks, legally permits can be issued each time to make withdrawals from their accounts (we do not permit them, however, to draw upon these accounts secretly.) We are now conferring with the competent authorities so that no special permits will be granted henceforth.
3. In view of the fact that the question of drawing drafts against Japanese and British diplomatic bank accounts is now thoroughly deadlocked, for the time being, continue negotiations with the competent authorities in your place for permission to defray necessary

expenditures from frozen accounts. After you have negotiated at length, wire me the results.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 678

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #22(9).

On the 5th I had one of our staff present the request in your wire to the official concerned, but he replied that calculating in American dollars, the latest New York buying rate for 100 yen was $23.44, the selling rate $23.57, making the average rate $23.50½. Adding to this the fixed average rate for exchanging money orders between America and Canada at a premium of 10½% gives a rate of $25.97; therefore, they could not accede to our proposition. Our man replied that in this case the exchange between America and Canada should be at the New York market rate instead of the Canadian fixed rate. The Canadians insisted firmly that we must use the fixed rate, that there was no precedent for taking the New York price, and we replied that if they insisted on the above calculations, it would be impossible to settle the matter. Since we must make some reply to Canada, please wire at once the basis for your figure of $26-3/8.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 679

FROM: Tokyo November 6, 1941
TO: Shanghai #1122.

Re your #2002[a].

In regard to your approval of the appointment of WATARU as a Commercial Attaché, we are waiting for an application from him addressed to the Minister (he must know the proper form to use). Please send at once the decision of the head of the Industrial Section and the above application by air mail.

Wire reply on the following points:

1. Period of Employment.
2. At the end of this period is he automatically raised without any further indication?
3. Basic salary; schedule of raises, exchange allowance; living allowance; and other supplementary allowance.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 680

FROM: Shanghai November 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo #2047.

Re your #1122[a].

We are sending the *application (?)* by air mail on the 11th.

In regard to paragraphs 1 and 2 of your telegram, unless it is specially desired on our part we will not specify the period of employment. Please wire immediately if it is necessary to specify "Permanent Employment" in order to comply with the regulations within the country.

In regard to paragraph 3. The basic salary is 1800 dollars national currency. Exchange allowance, 1316.57 dollars. Living allowance, 2605 dollars. Total 5721.57.

However, the exchange and living allowances vary from time to time and the above is the rate for October of this year. Promotion will be after three years -----.

---

[a] See IV, 679.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 681

FROM: London
TO: Washington

November 11, 1941
084.

(Part 2 of 2, Part 1 not available.)

London to Tokyo # 735.

3. British attitude toward Japan is of course to a great extent conditioned by the vicissitudes of the German-Soviet war. However at present the war has reached an extremely critical phase. German losses have been far greater than anticipated and Russian resistance has not yet collapsed and during this interval, the Atlantic war and the bombing of England have been considerably slowed down. British imports of commodities and accumulation of commodities have increased along with the expansion of British production, and the British at last have confidence in their preparations to resist a German invasion. Operations in the Mediterranean and the Near East have been more favorable than anticipated and British morale is steadily improving. The British have confidence of an ultimate victory and are manifesting a willingness to carry on the war if necessary seven years in order to attain it. The results of the contributions for the Army Drive exceed all expections. Three weeks after the 2¼ % Military Bond Issue was placed on the market over 80,000,000 Pounds had been subscribed. In view of the above the attitude of the British toward Japan is stiffening.

Hence in case worse comes to worst and there should be breakdown in the negotiations that are in progress between Japan and America it would merely serve to spur the British Government and people on in their attitude toward Japan. It is recognized that there is danger that relations between the two countries have come to a desperate pass. Again it has at last become an established fact that the European war will be a long drawn out affair. Cooperation between England and America is becoming more and more close. Hence it is my earnest desire that at this time the Imperial Japanese Government will formulate a far reaching national policy so that it will not be be circumscribed by future developments and that it will face the Japanese-American negotiations with an epoch making plan and a resolute determination.

4. After I had composed the above, Churchill made a special broadcast (on the 10th). He took the occasion of the dispatching of Kurusu to utter a final warning to Japan it appears. And while it might be considered as an address to the Japanese Government and people in order to cause us further anxiety, still in view of the way it fits in with the conditions obtaining at the present it is impossible to think that he was bluffing, and I think that his reference to the strenuous efforts of Chiang Kai-shek following his consideration of the Japanese situation was a hint that he had no intention of seeing a rapprochement made with Japan at the expense of Chiang.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 682

FROM: Ankara
TO: Tokyo

November 11, 1941
224.

(Abstract.)

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo, enroute to his home, passed through here on the 10th and made the following comments regarding the situation in Egypt.

1. German successes in the war have tended to increase anti-British attitude but the positive policy of the British has so far kept this down.
2. Since the establishment of the Tojo Cabinet the increase of Australian troops has been deferred, and it is rumored that some will return to Australia.
3. Between 170,000 and 180,000 British troops are stationed in the Libyan border region.
4. The British have recently stationed troops in Syria near the Turkish border as a warning.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 683

FROM: Canton
TO: Net.

November 13, 1941
Circular # 237.

Canton to Tokyo # 476.

On the 12th the British Consul General called on me and after handing me a written document dated the 11th, he went on to say that on the 5th a Japanese Naval reconnaissance bomber made a flight over the southern part of Hong Kong harbor as far as the Stanley fortifications and then headed north. However, as a result of the protest lodged concerning a similar incident which occurred on September 28th (29th) (see my secret circular # 946[a] of November 1st), Japan promised to issue strict instructions so that a reptition of that did not occur. This recurrence was indeed most unexpected and hence he was lodging a strict protest. He requested that we contact the military authorities immediately.

Relayed to Shanghai, Nanking, Hong Kong.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 684

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Net.

November 13, 1941
Circular # 2312.

Re your # 451[a].

Tokyo to Canton # 208.

On the 11th the British Embassy in Tokyo also lodged a strong protest giving a resumé of the November 5th incident[b]. At the same time they said that they reserve the right ——. Please wire as soon as the conversations between the British and the corps on the spot have been completed.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] Jap military plane flies over Hongkong.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 685

FROM: Tokyo
TO: London

November 13, 1941
375.

Re your # 174[a].

Tokyo to Rangoon # 184.

When British Ambassador Craigie called on the Foreign Minister regarding some other matter, the question of HOMMA was brought up, and the Minister criticized the British for their action in this matter. The attitude of Craigie was similar to that shown to Nishi of this office the other day. The Minister then explained that the Japanese Government on its own had already issued a recall to HOMMA, whereupon Craigie declared that in that case the deportation by the British Government would automatically be dropped, so that at this point the matter is closed. During the above interview the matter of returning all evidence gathered for this case was not discussed; however, as England has dropped their deportation order it seems as though to return all evidence would be the natural course, so please demand that the evidence material taken from your office be returned.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 686

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TO: London

November 14, 1941
377.

Re your # 726[a].

Although since the freezing order permits have been issued for family remittances from designated British residing in Japan proper, as well as British subjects working to Japan's benefit (for example, British instructors), no other permits have been granted as a matter of principle because it was reported that Great Britian has refused to permit family remittances to Japan.

Please make it clear to them that Japan would cooperate in allowing such remittances if Japanese Nationals residing in England and the Colonies (India and the Straits Settlements) were accorded similar privileges.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 687

FROM: Hongkong (Yano)
TO: Ottawa

November 17, 1941
No number.

Hongkong to Tokyo # 542.

There have been rumors to the effect that Canadian army troops would soon be sent to the Orient.

On the 16th (morning), a Canadian Pacific line steamer came in port guarded by a British warship. This ship had on board about 1000 Canadian soldiers, who were entered in the Kuryushinho[a] barracks.

These troops are Canadian volunteers and are of mixed nationality. They are keeping the strength, etc., of this division a secret, but according to reports another 2000 are expected.

Relayed to Canton, Ottawa. Relay to Shanghai and Nanking.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 688

FROM: Hongkong (Yano) November 17, 1941
TO: Ottawa No number.

Re my # 542[a].

Hongkong to Tokyo # 543.

A news correspondent, who visited the ship which had Canadian soldiers aboard, let it slip out to me that Brigadier KEIRAWSON[b] has 2000 men who are untrained, and training will start after they land here.

---

[a] See IV, 687.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 689

FROM: Shanghai November 21, 1941
TO: Nanking Circular # 1007.

Shanghai to Tokyo # 2132.

According to a JK dispatch the warship "Canada", which has recently arrived at Hongkong has one regiment of 3000 soldiers.

Furthermore, there are three more regiments on the way to Hongkong.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 690

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 18, 1941
TO: Singapore # 352.

Strictly secret.

To MAKINO of the JOHOL rubber plantation.

Take care of matters relative to the management of the plantation and arrange to come home, together with all employees who can possibly be spared, by way of Thailand, or by any other possible route. I leave it up to you to take care of all Japanese non-residents.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 691

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Ankara

November 18, 1941
101.

(Priority.)

Diplomatic relations between Iraq and the Japanese Imperial government were broken as of November 16, our assistance to El Gailani[a] being the excuse given by the Iraq government. At the request of the Turkish Minister in Iraq, please contact the Turkish government with respect to caring for the legation property in Bagdad (no one representing our interests there).

---

[a] Leader of the quelled anti-English revolts.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 692

FROM: London
TO: Washington

November 19, 1941
85.

London to Tokyo # 755.

According to an announcement made on the 15th, Chief of Staff John Dill (59 years old) was transferred from that post to Governor of Bombay. He was succeeded in the post he vacated by General Alan-Brooke (58 years old). Lt-General Pownal (age 53) was transferred from the post of Assistant to the Chief of Staff to some other key position, and Major General A. E. Nye (age 45) succeeded him.

The newspapers comment that Dill will be sixty years old in December, which is the age of retirement. This opportunity was taken, says the press, to put some young blood in the army and, hence, a 45 year-old Assistant Chief of Staff.

General Dill and Lt-General Pownal (particularly the latter, who was brought up in Japan, and who understands the Japanese language) were both known as authorities on Japan. The General Staff was the only organ of the British government which could correctly evaluate and understand matters pertaining to Japan. It is quite possible that with Japanese-British (U.S.) relations in the critical condition that they are, the removal of these men from their posts is part of a program to purge all those persons who may have leanings toward Japan.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 693

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa)
TO: Tokyo

November 18, 1941
246.

On the 18th, we had a telephone call from (N.Y.K.?) saying that the "Boris" had arrived in Seattle, but that because the captain had no bills of lading he was not allowed to unload his cargo. They asked us to arrange at once for the removal of this obstacle. Therefore, after talking with Mitsui, please wire us at once when you have taken the necessary steps.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 694

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #247.

Re your #81[a].

(To be handled in Government code.)

It is absolutely impossible to raise any funds here. In accordance with New York's wire to the Foreign Minister #502[a], we made arrangements with them recently to secure $3,500.00 in American money for this office. After approval had been received in your message #76[a], I sent a member of my staff to New York and received $10,000 in American currency, but of the amount $3,000 is required by the Consular Office in Vancouver. In order to get this latter sum of money to Vancouver, we have arranged to have Clerk KIHARA, who is soon, on the 25th, leaving New York for Seattle, deliver this money for us. The amount of money on hand in this office at the present time is $10,500.

In the event of war, as we have not been able to arrange any payments out of frozen funds since August, we are raising another $20,000 in New York. Providing you sanction our receipt of this money, we believe that we can struggle through without receiving any more funds from any other source.

Relayed to Vancouver.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 12-16-41

No. 695

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #248.

The funds have been transferred in accordance with my administrative telegram #247[a], and also the instructions have been carried out as part of the policy due to the critical situation here. If it becomes necessary to evacuate, the assignment of our interest here, the Legation and office, would preferably be taken over by Brazil, but if that is not possible, Argentina would be suitable. Please contact the officials in Tokyo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, and, if possible, wire instructions direct to the Minister in Ottawa.

Furthermore, there is the question of Italian interests which we have taken over. Please wire your instructions.

---

[a]See IV, 694.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 696

FROM: Vancouver (Kawakasi) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #111.

Re your message to Ottawa #80[a].

The local Nissō Company branch has lumber to ship to Japan which cannot be sent because about $65,000 in Canadian money remains unpaid. As the local manager wants to have the money paid from Japan, get the facts of the case from Mr. AIDA who has just

returned to Japan. After you have discussed the matter of supplying this money with the head office of Nissō Company, have them notify their branch officer here. (limited distribution.)

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 697

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 20, 1941
TO: Singapore #355.

Strictly secret.

After evacuations have been made on the Asama Maru, please wire immediately in accordance with the following outline information concerning remaining Japanese residents.

1. The number of Japanese remaining in Singapore (list separately men, women, children, ages, and their places of residence).
2. Give details as to how many of those who remain are engaged in farming, mining, export and import, retail, miscellaneous enterprises, as well as their financial condition.
3. Should it become impossible for those Japanese residents to carry on business activities as a result of the freezing legislation, advise me approximately how many months they will be able to carry on their affairs.
4. Foodstuffs ----- ----- ----- by Japanese residents.
5. Should it be possible for some of these persons to move into Thailand or French Indo-China at this time, advise me of their condition and prospects.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 698

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 24, 1941
TO: Singapore #358.

Re your #729[a].

Strictly secret.

As the situation becomes increasingly more difficult, we find ourselves sympathizing more than ever with the unhappy lot in which the remaining Japanese residents find themselves. The truth of the matter is, however, that it will be very difficult to bring about an evacuation of large numbers of Japanese persons after the sailing of the Asama Maru, but we are now doing what we can toward arranging for the dispatch of another vessel. However, should the situation become worse, the Government will continue to make the best possible arrangements in order to protect the interests of Japanese residents who remain. Therefore, please urge the Japanese singly and collectively to realize that as subjects of the Empire they, individually, must conduct themselves with extreme circumspection.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 699

FROM: Peking — November 21, 1941
TO: Tsingtao — No number.

(*Translator's note:* message somewhat garbled.)

Clues have been obtained here regarding telegraphic codes used at present by the British embassy. These codes apparently are used for communication between Shanghai, Chungking, Hongkong, and London. It is possible that these have already been decoded by the North army, however, they may have some value. The codes are:

1. Diplomatic code.
2. Plain language abbreviations.
3. Numbers code.

Please wire immediately.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 700

FROM: Tokyo — November 22, 1941
TO: Peking — # 644.

Re your # 741[a].

Since there is a great deal of British code material coming in now, which we cannot read, please investigate. Even though your investigation is cautious, please make it complete and thorough.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 701

FROM: New York — November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 507.

In 2 parts complete.

U Maung Saw, Premier of Burma, who for the past few weeks has been in London for the purpose of obtaining an independent status for his country, called at this office the 18th on his way home, having failed to accomplish his mission. Points of interest in the conversation between U Saw and Hirasawa, (I was away in Washington at the time), are as follows:

1. The Premier was very disgruntled over Britains' refusal of Burma's requests. (When he boarded the Clipper, the 14th, he expressed this dissatisfaction to a reporter of the New York Times in the presence of the British Premier.) He wishes to interview President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and "appeal" to the British government through the "press".

2. The Premier plans to arrive in Bangkok about December 7th, going by way of Canada, New Zealand, and Manila. He will remain in Bangkok a few days before returning to Burma. Since he will be under the strict surveillance of the British, after his return, he desires to confer with some influential Japanese during his stay in Bangkok and has asked for an introduction. He suggested that he meet Counselor Saito and so Hirasawa gave him his calling card, it appears. (However, the calling card ----- in case of necessity -----.)

3. In view of the present world situation, the Premier appears to ardently desire to oppose British might by means of Japan's strength and therefore desires to get in touch with Japan. (In the above-mentioned interview with the reporter of the Times, a question was asked as to whether ----- in regard to Britain, however, the Premier withheld "comment".)

4. The U.S. is establishing an airport 200 miles north of Lashio in MYITKYINA, it is reported.

Trans. 6-10-42

No. 701A

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) December 2, 1941
TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN) #511.

(Part 1.)[a]

On his way home from America Premier U SAW of Burma is stopping at Bangkok for a few days around December 7 and has asked for an interview with some of the Prominent Japanese at that time. We have gotten together with the navy and the foreign office on this matter and have agreed on the following policy which you are to carry out in giving guidance to the Ambassador. You will also keep in touch with the navy representative and with Col. SUZUKI on this matter.

To wit: U SAW's present position is very delicate and we will therefore attempt first of all to hide from him our plans for the whole southern area and for Burma.

---

[a] Part 3 same number; Part 2 not available.

Trans. 7-9-45

No. 702

FROM: Shanghai November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #2151.

Message from Hongkong #72, dated November 22.

Re your circular #941[a].

1. The influence on economic conditions here: On the 20th of November, there was not more than about 10,000 bales of cotton thread and 4,000 bales of cotton cloth in the warehouses. The sudden rise in prices is as follows (taking #20 Sōma cotton thread in Hongkong dollars as a standard): At the end of September—$345; at the end of October—$10; on November 13th—$480.

The factories have all accepted orders for their output up to February of next year, but since import of cotton to Japan and Shanghai is prohibited from now on, and since the receipts of "bombi (?)" thread are also unsatisfactory, it will be impossible to get much of the aforementioned cotton from the warehouses at as reasonable a price as had been expected, so the factories will be seriously embarrassed.

2. The pressure of control regulations: On October 22, it was decreed that the amount of cotton goods on hand must be reported each month; on November 12th that any sale or shipment of cotton must have the authorities' permission; moreover, a maximum selling price was fixed.

3. Prospects for the future: When control is enforced, since there are no sellers at the unreasonably low fixed price (for instance $350, for #20 Shanghai thread), there are many illegal transactions at high figures. Also, there is not more than enough for two months'

----- ----- ----- in the warehouses now, and soon there will even be difficulties created in sending khaki clothes to England.

4. Suggestions for a plan of operations: It seems best to enforce a strict and thorough embargo, obstruct transportation of Hongkong products to England and the South Seas, and when Hongkong finally gives in, suggest a plan of barter transactions in rice, flour, sugar, etc.

---

[a]See 702A. Shanghai wires Nanking and Tokyo a resume of the enforcement of the centralized exchange control in China.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 702A

FROM: Shanghai — November 5, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 387.

Shanghai to Tokyo # 2022.

Special message.

The following is a resumé of the enforcement of the centralized exchange control in China.

1. There is no intention of expanding the scope of the export permit system beyond the current list of commodities.
2. A summarized list of commodities needed for export to Japan is assured -----.
   a. cotton manufactures.
   b. metal.
   c. explosives.
   d. paints and dyes.
   e. foodstuffs.
3. Destination of such exports is limited principally to non-"frozen" countries—French Indo-China, Soviet Russia and Far Eastern countries.
4. Exchange transactions in piastres and bahts.
5. Exchange to be concentrated in the Yokohama Specie Bank.
6. Out of deference to the Chinese Government, there has been no public announcement of this system. We would like to expand the system as a means of overcoming present difficulties arising from the fact that in each regional office miscellaneous articles are included under cotton goods and metal manufactures.
7. Even though we can not expect to amass a large volume of local exchange, the amounts collected will at least cover living costs at places of supply and to cover incident purchases if it is stipulated that equivalent amounts of expense funds are provided, and they seem disposed to comply with our demands.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 703

FROM: Tokyo — November 26, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular # 2400.

I have had ZETSUMON (?), our telegraphic official in London, devise a new keying for the cipher machine for messages between London and Tokyo, and have had him furnish you with this. Presently we will begin to use it temporarily. Therefore, for my information

and in order that I may know you understand, please wire back in clear text without message number the one word "ASADA."

Washington will send to Mexico; Stockholm will send to Vichy, Berlin, Italy and Ankara.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 704

FROM: Tokyo
TO: London

December 1, 1941
Circular # 2443.

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

In regard to the disposition of the machine, please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram, wire the one word SETUJU in plain language, and as soon as you have carried out the instructions, wire the one word HASSŌ in plain language.

Also at this time, you will, of course, burn the machine codes and the YŪ GŌ No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 705

FROM: Berne (Mitani)
TO: Ankara

December 2, 1941
Tokyo Circular
2447.

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including Timor), Singora, Chienmai, and to allow officials in British (including our Embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except one copy of OITE and L.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 706

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Singapore

December 2, 1941
Circular # 2450.

5 parts complete.

Re my Circular # 2409[a].

We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of your localities to supplement the already given list.

Code Word	*Meaning*
KIKUTI	Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road?) are now very lively.
KAGEYAMA	Shipments along the road whereby CHINAG receives assistance (the Burma road?) have now virtually stopped.

Code Word	*Meaning*
(DE?) GUTI	----- (blank) ----- ----- (blank) ----- has been forced backward at (blank).
AYAOKA	The Burmese Independence movement is gradually gaining momentum. The officers are endeavoring to quell this with every resource, however, the movement is gradually growing more fierce.
ITAGISI	On the ----- the Burma (blank) ----- was attacked by the Independence wing with pistols (or dynamite).
FUKUNISI	On the -----th in the (blank) ----- area rioting broke out.
MIYAMOTO	I will continue the action I described to you until advised by you to do otherwise, then I will end it immediately.
Part II	
KITAMURA	Recently ----- (blank) ----- American military planes arrived at (blank).
MUTO	----- (blank) ----- and pilots numbering ----- (blank) ----- arrived at ----- (blank).
NAGAOKA	----- (blank) ----- divisions of ----- (blank) troops arrived at ----- (blank) ----- and left for ----- (blank) ----- and left for ----- (blank) ----- on the -----th.
INABA	----- (blank) ----- divisions of ----- (blank) troops are reportedly concentrated on the (blank) border.
YASIROEN	The Independence movement at ----- (blank) and negotiations thwarting England are now progressing smoothly.
TUMURA	At present there is a total of (blank) enemy merchant men docked at (blank).
HINO	Merchant ships now docked at (blank) are as follows: American (blank); British (blank); Netherlands (blank).
NAGAI	----- an merchant ships left for (blank) loaded with arms.
HIGUTI	Our means of communication with Burma and the South Seas is disrupted and we cannot receive.
SEGAWA	Our resident Nationals have been camped.
Part III	
YASUI	It is reported that riots are breaking out.
NARUSE	Progressing with preparations to bomb oil fields.
KUBOTA	Oil fields bombed.

Code Word	*Meaning*
NIBA	The residents of ----- area are preparing to flee.
MOORI	Orders issued to residents of ----- (blank) ----- area to flee.
SEKYA	Morale wavering.
TUKAMOTO	Japanese Nitta Natives.
KURIBARA	Japanese.
NISIYAMA	-----.
YAMANOUTI	Premier.
NOSE	Specialists' Commission.
KURODA	High tide (?).
HIRAI	Some officers and private citizens -----.
INOYAMA	Telegraphy.
ENDOO	The Yamashita Agency.
ATUKAI	The Nakamura Company.
KOIZUMI	India.
ABE	Java.
EDOGUTI	Sumatra.
HIROSE	Celebes.
HUKUI	Borneo.
INOUYE	-----.
FUKA-----	British India.
KASAURA	Ceylon.
IKAWA	-----.
Part IV	
HUJIMURA	Hainan Island.
IIJIMA	The Spratleys.
ARIASA	Singapore.
HURUYA	Pinan.
NIWA	Bangkok.
KAMIYA	Chien mai[b] Singora.
ISIDA	Saigon.
NINOMIYA	-----.
HOSOKAWA	-----.
NEZU	Tonkin.
YOKOTA	Cambodia.
NUMATA	-----.
WATANZAKA	Manila.
NOZAKI	----.
KERI	Batavia.
SEKINE	Menado.
SERISAWA	Makassar.
SONE	-----.
ANDO	Pankaran-Brandan[b].
DOBASI	Pankan Susu[b].
FUKUSIMA	Mandalay.

Code Word	*Meaning*
HAKAMATSU	Palembang.
Part V.	
ISTUMOTO	Jambi.
NAKINO	Tarakan.
MAKINO	Pa----- Pan.
SAKURAI	Sageirinda[b].
TAKANO	Sanga Snaga[b].
UEDA	Puura[b].
YANAGIYA	Banka[b].
WATAGI	Biriton[b].
EGAWA	Sunda[b].
AIDA	Malacca.
BANDO	Sumaran[b].
FUNABASI	Timor.
IKEDA	New Guinea.
KATAGIRI	Lashio.
MIZOGUTI	The Peruri su[b] region.
NUKADA	The Geta[b] region.
SAWAKAWA	The Kota Bharu region.
TAKESITA	East.
UTSUNOMIYA	West.
YAMANE	South.
ARAMAKI	North.
DOOKE	Island.

[a]See 706A in which Tokyo sends out a circular containing hidden-meaning words to be used as an emergency system for dispatches.

[b]Kana spelling.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 706A

FROM: Tokyo — November 27, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular # 2409.

(In 4 parts, complete.)

Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular # 324.

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

(Part 1)

Handle as Chief of Office routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

EXAMPLE: A message meaning:

"Japan and U.S.S.R. military have clashed", will read:

"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA clerks, have both been ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell)."

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used).

(Part 2)

Code Word	*Meaning*
ARIMURA	Code communications prohibited.
ASAI	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
AZUMA	Pressure or Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI	Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?)	Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA	Relations between Japan and ----- (blank) ----- have been severed.
HATTORI	Relations between Japan and ----- (blank) ----- are not in accordance with expectation.

(Part 3)

HIZIKATA	Japan's and ----- (blank's) ----- military forces have clashed.
HOSINO	Japan and ----- (blank) ----- are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI	Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAGAKI	Have you ---?-- the ----- (blank) ----- matter?
ISHIKAWA	I have ---?-- the ----- (blank) ----- matter.
KASHIWAGI	We are commencing *military action?* against ----- (blank) -----
KOBAYAKAWA	Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan to persons of ----- (blank) ----- nationality.
KODAMA	Japan.
KOMIYANA	China.
KOYANAGI	England.
KUBOTA	U.S.S.R.
KURIBARA	France(?)
KUSUNOKI	Germany.
MATUTANI	Italy

(Part 4)

MINAMI	U.S.A.
MIWATA	Canada
MIYAZAKI	Mexico
MOROKOSI	Brazil
MOTIZUKI	Panama
NAGAMINE	Argentina
NAKAZATO	Thailand

Code Word	*Meaning*
NANGO	French Indo-China
NEGI (?)	Netherlands East-Indies
OGAWA	Burma (?)
OKAMOTO	Malaya
OKUMJRA	Australia
ONIZUKA	Union of South Africa (?)
ONODNRA	Enemy country
OTANI	? (Possibly: friendly, or allied country ?)
ONISI	Year
SIMANAKA	Day (?)
SAKAKIBARA	Tsuki) Month
SIGENOI	(KŌ) Paragraph
SANZYO	(Toki) Time
ITIRŌ	1
NISAKU	2
SANTARO	3
YOITI	4
GORO	5
MASAROKU	6
SIMETARO	7
YASOKITI	8
HISAMATU	9
ATUMI	0

No. 707

FROM: Canton — December 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 512.

Secret outside the department.

If hostilities are to begin we here are all prepared. The army has completed all preparations to move immediately upon Thai. Should the British resist to the bitter end, it is understood that the army is prepared to go so far as to militarily occupy the country.

Trans. 12–11–41

No. 708

FROM: Shanghai — December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 2220.

We have not yet issued any official orders for physical examinations, etc. However, we are going to do so as of the 1st. This may be handled as though the order were confidentially sent on the 1st.

Trans. 12–9–41

No. 709

FROM: Peking — December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #625.

Circular number. To be handled in government code. Re my secret military communication #262[a] of November 30th.

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy countries.
2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland consulates.
3. In case war breaks out with Holland, we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.

---

[a] Not available.

DoD Comment: Date of origin and text as given.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 710

FROM: Peking — December 5, 1941
TO: Shanghai — Circular #626.

Peking to Tokyo #770. To be handled in Government code. Re your Circular #2467[a]. Strictly confidential.

1. It is recognized that the treatment accorded to the property and staff of the consulates of Britain, America, and Holland in North China should be, as a matter of policy, comparable to that accorded them in occupied territory. We have gone ahead with our preparations on this basis. This is for your information.
2. Is there any objection to our adopting the policy of recognizing a suitable person of a third power (say for instance, Belgium, Spain, or Brazil) as custodian of the interests of Britain, America, and Holland in North China.

Relayed to NANJO (GAISIN), Shanghai.

---

[a] See IV, 867.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 711

FROM: Tokyo — December 6, 1941
TO: Canton — #225.

Re your #519. (Not available.)

1. -----.
2. The evacuation of the Consular Staffs and resident nationals of hostile nations will have to parallel and coincide with measures concerning the departure of our Consular Staffs and

our resident nationals, so when you receive orders from headquarters, you may proceed to handle this matter.

3. Public property of hostile nations, Consulates and buildings will be seized or commandeered and after being sealed they will be in our custody.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 712

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #264.

We surmise that the gist of your current instructions is that, fearing if the worst comes it may mean war, we should cut our staff to the last possible man, but it goes without saying that we already are working on a so-called "skeleton staff" leaving no further room for reduction. If the worst comes to the worst, we will use only our diplomatic staff. Since we are afraid that SUZUKI ----- ----- ----- ----- would prove an obstacle to the accepted plan, we ask you to take this into consideration.

Trans. 12-16-41

No. 713

FROM: Tokyo December 7, 1941
TO: Circular telegram Circular #2494.

(Plain Japanese language using code names.)

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.
DoD Comment: See special section Volume 5, concerning this subject.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 714

FROM: Tientsin December 8, 1941
TO: Nanking, Hankow and Shanghai Circular #307.

Message to Tokyo #402.

On the morning of the 8th, the local Military Commander called on me. At this time he told me that the French Consul had called on him in the name of the Chief of the ----- Defense Headquarters in regard to the recent incursion of troops into the British concession. At that time, the said Consul made the statement that though France would maintain her neutrality, she would, as a matter of fact, cooperate with us insofar as possible.

Trans. 12-31-41

No. 715

FROM: Hsinking December 9, 1941
TO: Peking, Nanking, Shanghai Circular #239.

(Hsinking to Tokyo #814.)

Immediately subsequent to the opening of hostilities, the steps taken against nationals of our enemy countries and semi-enemy countries, in this country and in Kwantung, were as follows:

During the morning of the 8th, in accordance with prearranged plans, the telephone wires of the U.S., British, and semi-enemy country consulates in Harbin, Mukden, and Dairen were cut, and their radios and automobiles were disposed of in the manner previously prescribed.

Trans. 12–10–41

No. 716

FROM: Berlin (Osima) October 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.

It is a source of much gratification to me that Your Excellency has been entrusted with the exceedingly responsible post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in this, a most critical moment in the history of our Empire. I fervently pray that you shall be blessed with good health.

This Minister has had the extraordinarily good fortune of having had Your Excellency's friendship for the past many years, for which he feels much gratitude. I fully realize that as an individual, I am in a position to be of assistance to you, however insignificant my capabilities may be, in the pursuit of your policy. However, as I pointed out to former Foreign Minister Matsuoka, (please glance through my correspondence with regard to this matter), under present conditions, it is essential that all of the Empire's diplomatic representatives abroad have a perfect understanding of and be in absolute harmony with the Imperial Government's policies.

As you may be aware, I once requested of Foreign Minister Matsuoka that I be permitted to resign. Your Excellency is perfectly aware, I am sure, that Your Excellency and I have differed in our opinions. It is feared that under these circumstances for your ambassador to continue at his post may hinder Your Excellency from pursuing your policy to the end. For this reason, your ambassador feels that he should be disqualified as a public figure.

I shall appreciate your giving this matter your consideration.

Trans. 10–23–41

No. 717

FROM: Tokyo October 30, 1941
TO: Berlin No Number.

Your position in Berlin is at present a very important one and a Chargé could not hold it down so I want you to stay there. You know our two countries are now up against great difficulties and we could not possibly change Ambassador at this pass, so for the time being please yield your own desires to the common good.

Trans. 11–3–41

No. 718

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 20, 1941
TO: Berlin # 889.

(Part 1 fo 2.) (Message from London # 699.)

1. The German army has been advancing with surprising speed, and as Moscow began to face increasing danger, impatience of the British became undeniably apparent. The Parliament and other circles have all of a sudden stepped up their aid to Russia, and there has been an increasing number of people who argue that Britain should take some aggressive

military action for the purpose of lightening the pressure being put on the Soviet army by the German forces. On the ----- at the time BEAVERBROOK broadcasted, the Government had him make known in a direct way its opposition to taking such a step. It had also endeavored to express the same attitude through the Times and other organs of public opinion. As Moscow finds itself in greater danger, the advocacy by the amateur strategists among the people tends to become increasingly vociferous. A demand for a debate on this question was made in the lower house on the 14th, to which CHURCHILL maintained throughout an attitude of opposition and hinted that the government will devote its energy to the prosecution of the established policy of giving military aid to Soviet Russia and carrying out stronger air raids against Germany without listening to the arguments of amateur strategists.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 719

FROM: London (?) October 16, 1941
TO: Washington #81.

(Part 2 of 2.) (Message to Tokyo #699.)

2. This attitude of the government may be explained by the fact that while on the one hand Great Britain found it impossible to launch an effective and aggressive military action against Germany, her ambitions were increased by Soviet Russia's proving herself capable of stronger resistance than had been anticipated just at the moment when Britain had been considering that the Russo-German war was a God-send for the reason that—though she knew the occupation by the German Army of Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities was a matter of time—Russia, even after western Russia had been taken, would cause Germany considerable difficulty, as she had done during the first World War, by persistently harrassing Germany by "partisan" warfare, and by thus not only preventing Germany from attaining her original objectives but also keeping her in a war of attrition. Moreover, Britain has been able to make use of the four months which have elapsed since the opening of the Russo-German war in order to store up military, food and other supplies and strengthen herself to the extent of being undefeatable. Under the circumstances, even if the fall of Moscow proves to be a severe blow to the Russian Army, as we may naturally expect it to be, this would not affect the general situation very seriously if viewed from the standpoint of British-German war.

3. This view of the situation is that of not only the government and the influential classes but also the majority of the people themselves. Therefore, they endorse the reply which CHURCHILL made in the Parliament on the 14th. In the existing situation in which both the invasion of England by Germany and the invasion of the continent by England are impossibilities, the war is becoming more than ever one of indefinite duration; at present, there is nothing to indicate when it will come to an end. Some people even believe that the war might continue to be one in which Germany and Great Britain will oppose each other in such a manner that no opportunity whatsoever will be found through which its end might be brought about.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 720

FROM: Tokyo — October 22, 1941
TO: Berlin — #893.

Telegram from *Capetown* to the Minister #59.

The following is a discussion of the three routes for sending materials to Russia given in form of three numbered points, the conditions of shipment, etc., having been taken from reports obtained by Times on the spot.

a. Basra[a] route.

At this time there has been unloaded in Basra a large amount of war materials for Russia which are to be sent through Iran. These materials are being sent by railroad and truck through Iraq and Iran to the Caucasus.

b. Transiranian route.

There is a railroad starting from Bandar Abu Shehr[b] passing through Teheran to Bandar Shan[c]. The amount that could be transported by this route is not large. It is not possible for more than two large boats to draw along side wharves at the first port. The depth at the last port is less than six feet and is not suitable for operation. Moreover the Teheran-Kazvin[d] railroad (reportedly extended to Tabriz[e]) reaches Tabriz and trans-shipments are made there for the Caucasus. They are hurriedly putting forth all efforts to deepen the water sufficiently at the first port as well as repairing the railroad facilities in order to increase the amount of shipments. Also Ahwaz[f], lying inland (unreadable) miles, is being used as an auxiliary port ----- -----.

c. Third route.

There is a single-track railroad extending from Mirjawa on the Indian border to Zohedan in Iran with trans-shipments by motor road to Meshed[g] but a couple of months will be necessary before shipments by this route can be increased.

If necessary, retransmit this to Germany.

---

[a] Seaport in Iraq on the Shatt-al-Arab.

[b] Iranian seaport at the head of the Persian Gulf.

[c] Iranian seaport on the Caspian Sea.

[d] Iranian town lying to the northwest of Teheran, approximately one-thrid of the distance to Tabriz.

[e] In the extreme northwest part of Iran with railroad connections through the Caucasus to Brivan and Tiflis.

[f] In Khuzistan (Kurdistan) province, southwest Iran, on the Karun River, 40 miles southwest of Shuster (Shushtar).

[g] (Mash-had). Northeast corner of Iran.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 721

FROM: Hsinking — (No date)
TO: Tokyo — #68.

(*Translator's note:* Part 1 missing; Part 2 garbled, hence translation is approximate.)

(Part 2 of 2.) (Part 1 not available.)

C. In spite of the fact that the U.S. and Britain have promised the Soviet aid, the help has been very meager and Stalin himself has expressed dissatisfaction with the delay. It turns out that the Soviet has to carry on the war against Germany singlehanded and the result is that the country is being destroyed for the benefit of England and America.

In view of the above facts if some way could be found to save Stalin's face and summarize Germany's demands it would be to Russia's advantage to make peace with Germany. For instance, after Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, Talleyrand succeeded in getting a place for

France at the conference table and in mitigating the peace terms toward France. More recently Marshal Pétain is standing between his country and Germany and Italy is working with a view to securing mitigation of the peace terms imposed upon France. At present there is need of someone to perform the same office in this conflict between Germany and Russia.

4. Now if after the fall of Moscow, Japan would propose a peace conference to be held in Nanking, Japan acting as a mediator, she would be performing a great service in paving the way for peace if she were to propose terms that would be acceptable to both parties.

5. America of course would oppose such an action inasmuch as Japan would reap the benefits of such a conference. The conditions would include:

A. The holding of a large scale conference next summer.

B. The Soviet would relax her ties with Britain and the United States and would not interfere in Japan-China affairs.

C. If possible ----- Russia would supply Japan with oil from -----.

6. In view of the desperate situation that Japan is confronted with this matter of Russian-German peace machinations is the one and only scoop left to Japan in the direction of foreign diplomacy. I have given this matter a great deal of thought and herewith submit my humble opinion.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 722

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

September 20, 1941
1163.

Re your # 814[a].

I had the matter taken up again with the German Government and they agreed that this agreement should be concluded between the two broadcasting associations and that the governments of the countries concerned should give recognition to it by exchanging memorandums. In such a case in reference to clause # 5 they propose that: (a) It is necessary that those engaged in the work of broadcasting should reserve to the Government the ultimate right of censorship in matters of political importance; and (b) a clause should be included, as the Japanese Government proposed, to the effect that officials engaged in exchanging broadcasts should follow instructions given by the Ambassador. However, they insist upon deleting these conditions, giving as their reason the fact that since the agreement is one existing between the two broadcasting associations, these conditions have no binding power and are inconsistent as a matter of form. I understand also that they insist, even in case the 5th clause is to be made effective, that the agreement should be one concluded between the two governments. Since a great deal of time has already been spent in discussing this matter, it would be well to put the plan into practice at once by compromising on this point. Please discuss the matter with them and wire me your reply.

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[a] See III, 865.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 723

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

September 25, 1941
846.

Re your # 1163[a].

I have taken this matter up with the authorities concerned as a result of which it has been decided to (1) conclude the agreement between the broadcasting associations of the two countries based on our proposals regarding the exchange of broadcasts between Japan and Germany, and (2) to exchange a memorandum between the governments of the two countries in order to validify the above, also to eliminate Clause No. 5 of the proposals. However, the broadcasting association here desires, if there are no objections, to have the signing of the agreement take place in Tokyo. If this meets the mind of the Germans, we plan to appoint Komori the head of the broadcasting association here as the representative of this broadcasting association and we would like to have the Germans select their representative and notify us. Further if Tokyo is to be the place of signing then the memorandum will be exchanged between myself and Ambassador Ott. Please ascertain Germany's desires regarding this and wire. Please be informed that the above memorandum will be patterned after the official document exchanged between Minister Arita and the German Ambassador resident in Tokyo on June -th. 1939 in connection with the Japanese-German medical science agreement.

---

[a] See IV, 722.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 724

FROM: Tokyo — October 23, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 896.

Re my # 846[a].

Please wire immediately the result of your negotiations with the Germans.

[a] See IV, 723.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 725

FROM: Berlin — October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1269.

Re your # 896[a].

German Foreign Office has practically agreed, but their formal reply will be next week as they must confer with other departments involved.

[a] See IV, 724.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 726

FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya) — October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 306.

The following was ascertained through a visit to the war area in and around Viipuri (Viburg) made by Marshal MANNERHEIM together with members of the diplomatic corps stationed here.

1. Although the Russians retreated in a disorderly fashion to the south towards *Baruko*[a], they were able to explode, during and after their retreat, ground mines in the streets by means of radio waves from Leningrad. About 60% of the houses were damaged. Afterward a control machine (literally—sending out machine (?) transmitter (?)) (stimulated by radio waves from Leningrad) was discovered and precautions appeared to have been taken.

It seems that Finland is now in the process of taking in this district and Karelia District as a result of the devastating war. The question has arisen as to just what should be done in the way of establishing defense districts and the position to be occupied by Viipuri. It was very plain in this district, devastated by a scorched earth policy, that the Russians constructed fortifications and trenches on a large scale during the last year.

[a] Kana spelling—perhaps Biark (Bjorko), on coast south of Viipuri.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 727

FROM: Tokyo — Octobe 24, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 732.

300 from Helsinki to this Foreign Minister.

Taking advantage of the Russo-German war, Finland set out to regain the territory seized by the Soviet. Finland had her own objectives in this attack. They were: First, *to regain what was lost*; and second, *to make her own defenses safe*. In the Karelian area, the Finnish army has already passed the old borderline and has invaded Russian territory. It is at present cooperating with the Germans in the surrounding of Leningrad. The Finnish forces have also cut the Murmansk Railway and are cooperating with the Germans in the invasion of the northern part of the Kola Peninsula. Southern Hanko, however, which was left to the Soviet, is still in Russian hands. However, rather than suffer any further sacrifice, it seems likely that a compromise will be reached upon this area. Finland had hoped to leave Germany to her own devices after the fall of Leningrad and Kronstadt. However, she found it practically necessary to assist Germany in the hard struggle on the Kola Peninsula. However, wishing to avoid any future difficulties which the Germans may encounter, in all probability Finland will soon quietly retire from the struggle. In short, Finland in her war with Russia has already achieved her objectives; that is, so far as she is concerned. Now all that remains, I think, is the question of a few compromises to be followed by reconstruction work.

Trans. 10–29–41

No. 728

FROM: Tokyo — October 24, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 731.

(Part 1 of 2.)

185 from *Bucharest to the Minister.*

1. In the attack upon the fortified district of Odessa, the Roumanian Army's losses were (small?) The enemy exaggerated the losses caused by the innumerable land mines and other surface defense equipment employed in the battle. The Roumanian Army lacked large guns and had only a few flame throwers. It appears that Roumania, from the first, encountered mechanized forces and in spite of all that they could do losses increased and so consequently they tried to avoid direct encounter for that reason. Also in the Perekov region innumerable land mines were employed. Transmit this to Vladivostok as of possible reference value.

2. ----- Northern coast of the Black Sea ----- the Roumanian Army and the Hungarian ----- ----- ----- are cooperating with the Germans. Not only are they cooperating in the suppression and annihilation of Bolshevism for the future peace of these countries but also it appears that they must obtain considerable success to receive a favorable position in the new European order as a consequence of this cooperation with the German war effort. (For example, the Transylvanian question has not been settled between Hungary and Roumania and so it is hoped that Germany will, sometime in the future, favorably decide upon the borders of these countries.)

Trans. 11–5–41

No. 729

FROM: Tokyo — October 24, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 731.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. Now in the southern part, the Soviet has carried out the scorched earth policy to a great extent in Bessarabia but after that the amount destroyed progressively lessened.

The amount of damage in the Ukraine was unexpectedly small as it appears that they did not have explosives or sufficient time but again on the other hand the "Red" authorities manifested a demoralized "Nitchevo" feeling of heedlessness which was said to have had a ----- influence (the number fleeing to the woods with grains and stock was large).

4. Of course, there are not a few in this country, who were in power under the old order, who desire an England-American victory from the depth of their hearts. Recently there have been some who believed that Germany, but winter, would have completed her job. Many imagine that by next summer the whole question will be settled by employing the air force and submarines in an attack upon England proper. The opinion is widespread that a direct and positive war between the United States and the Axis is not far off, in which case the United States would be completely run off the continent. (It appears that the Americans in Hungry, Bulgaria and here have been confidentially advised by the diplomatic offices to evacuate.) The newspapers have become exceedingly unreserved and pert in their comments. American aid to Europe and Russia is an impossibility and so is a question of little importance. Contempt is shown for English and American coquetry in tolerating Bolshevism, in spite of having held themselves out to be protectors of religion, humanitarianism and justice, (Roumania is a particularly religious country and no doubt other religious countries are affected in the same way). Their uproarious continuation of the war is nothing more than English-American bluff and consequently they will be in a very precarious position (when the bluff is called).

5. Not only has this country been maltreated by the Soviet since last year but it has been fully aware of long time war machinations. With the speeches of HITLER the feeling has deepened that not only has Germany saved her (Roumania) but all of Europe. The feeling of confidence and affection for Germany generally felt in this country is quite spontaneous.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 730

FROM: Tokyo — October 23, 1941
TO: Hsinking, Peking, Nanking, and Shanghai — Circular # 2216.

Message from Berlin # 1250 on the 16th.

(Part 1 of 2.)

On the 16th Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP'S man came and told me the following:

1. After the fall of Moscow the German forces will by all means continue the campaign in the Caucasus throughout the winter. Then they will turn to the invasion of the Near East, including Syria, Iraq and Iran. The eastern Mediterranean will be cleared of all British influence, but, as for the battle of Africa, that will have to wait until later because at present Great Britain's strength in the Mediterranean is considerable.

2. The better Germany has been doing in Russia, the more Turkey has turned in favor of the Reich. In fact, the Turkish Military has always favored HITLER. Now they have gradually begun to play up to him. Now that we have recently concluded a commercial pact with Turkey, erelong through the good offices of Germany a similar commercial treaty will be concluded between Rome and Ankara. Turkey has never hated any country more than she has Italy, so this is a tremendous diplomatic victory for Germany. The object of our activity in Turkey is to have Ankara participate in the Three-Power Pact. Even in case

this is not immediately realized, it will be demanded that, just as in the case of Bulgaria, the passage of troops be permitted and sooner or later Ankara will join our ranks.

Trans. 10–24–41

No. 731

FROM: Tokyo — October 23, 1941
TO: Hsinking, Peking, Nanking, and Shanghai — Circular # 2216.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. In order to win the battle of Africa, Great Britain's influence in the western Mediterranean must be destroyed. To do this it will first be necessary to enroll completely France and Spain. Negotiations with France are proceeding excellently and Germany has just made her Consul General in Vichy, KRUG VON NIDDA[a], a Minister. In return France will soon send SCAPPINI (?) to act as a diplomatic representative to Berlin. Thereupon some fashion of diplomatic relations will be established between the Reich and France. Concerning the basis of the peace treaty, the general outlines have already been worked out. Prisoners will be released. Captured arms will be returned. Corsica, Savoy, Nice and the North African colonies will be left to France. MUSSOLINI has agreed to this but he still seems a little reluctant to give up Tunis, so that has not been settled yet. In Vichy all of them from DARLAN down are sure we Germans are going to win this war so we are getting along fine with them all. Once we get everything fixed up with the French, Spain too will court us, I venture to say. However, Germany has never trusted that fellow, WEYGAND. Therefore, she is agitating to have HUNTZIGER go to Africa in order to bring about the voluntary resignation of WEYGAND. Doubtless Germany will succeed in this demand. Then HUNTZIGER or DENTZ will get an opportunity.

4. Once Bolshevism is finished off, I suppose we will offer Britain peace. Even now, because of split opinion in England and America, we are spreading peace rumors to keep opinion confused. But, as a matter of fact, as far as we are concerned a compromise peace is out of the question, as you know.

5. Chancellor HITLER is whipping up the enthusiasm of the people for victory. He is taking great care not to let the fervor wane. With respect to the administration of the conquered territories, he is being just as generous as he possibly can so as to win the hearts of the people. He has sent orders that the administrators are to be most considerate. With respect to the Church, he is taking a very mild attitude which is giving the Vatican an extremely fine impression.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10–24–41

No. 732

FROM: Tokyo — September 24, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 844.

Re your # 1171[a].

1. The date of departure of the Asama Maru is planned for the beginning of October.
2. Characteristics of the Asama Maru:

(a) It has two masts. The water line on the hull is red, and above it are shadings (?) of black and white. The super-structure is white, and there are three upper decks from stem to stern. On both sides, just in front of the ——— there are derricks. ———

3. Markings on the Asama Maru:

(a) Above the water and in and below the water.

On both sides of the hull (to the rear of the foremast, and to the rear of the back funnel) are painted the insignia of the national flag which will be illuminated at night. Near the stern will be constructed a flag board (wooden), which will be illuminated at night.

(b) Flags on decks to be seen from the air.

On top of the deck, in front of the foremast and on both sides of the bridge, respectively, the national flag will be drawn. Furthermore, one each will be painted on both sides of the upper deck to the rear of the back funnel, and one on the deck to the rear of the large mast. These, too, will be lighted at night.

4. After leaving Lisbon.

Going by way of (1) North latitude 42 degrees, west longitude 13 degrees (2) north latitude 50 degrees, west longitude 14 degrees (3) North latitude 53 degrees, west longitude 12 degrees 30 minutes, it will head for (Kaususaundo[b]) in (Gooruuei[c]).

---

[a] See 732A, in which Berlin asks Tokyo if it has been decided to dispatch the Asama Maru October 4th, and asks for a report on the distinguishing features of the ship.

[b] Kana spelling, probably Bohus Bay.

[c] Kana spelling, probably Norway.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 732A

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

September 23, 1941
1171.

Re your # 843[a].

Has it been decided to dispatch the Asama Maru October 4th?

Please report immediately as to the distinguishing features of the above ship. (See my # 1131[b]).

---

[a] Not available.

[b] Germans must be given full information on the Asama Maru before they can guarantee safe passage on the proposed voyage to Europe.

Trans. 90-24-41

No. 733

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

October 21, 1941
891.

Re your # 1260[a].

1. The Asama Maru is scheduled to sail about November 1st.

2. The course outlined in your # 1194[a] is considered difficult by the caption because it takes the ship into the combat zone. The course outlined in my # 844[b] paragraph 4 is that followed by the Suwa Maru and the Fushimi Maru. This is considered dangerous by Germany

but the steamship company says they would like to know the reasons why Germany feels this to be so. I have ordered the company to give further study to the problem.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 732.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 734

FROM: Berlin — October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1268.

Re your # 891[a], paragraph 2.

I think the question raised regarding navigating within 100 kilometers has reference chiefly to waters adjacent England, and, in view of the fact that the Germans have promised to give favorable consideration to this matter, if the danger seems too great, I think there is still time for negotiating with Germany for a change of route that will shorten the distance for the said ship to navigate, following a route specified by Germany while passing through the waters adjacent to England only. Please decide upon a definite request for us to make, and advise at once.

---

[a] See IV, 733.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 735

FROM: Bucharest — October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSYO War Office, Senior Adjutant) (FOKKAN) # 196.

1. I think that it would be a good idea to send to Japan on the ASAMU MARU some of the Poles who have been working here for some time (1 officer expert on anti-Russian espionage; 1 ---1G---[a] 1 espionage activity expert and cryptanalyst.) I have communicated with the attache in Germany on this matter. It has been the hope of myself and the Kwantung (? representatives?) for some time that we do this, so please contact the Kwantung army authorities and look into the matter.
2. I haven't yet asked the Polish General Staff or even the men in question what their thoughts on the matter are but there is not much time, so please let us know promptly what you wish to do.
3. These men already have Manchukuo passports.

---

[a] Perhaps "man connected with "NE" Intelligence".

Trans. 4-21-45

No. 736

FROM: Berlin — October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1217.

The film Association is now conducting conversations with us regarding the transportation (approximately 20 reels) of German Soviet war pictures on board the Asama Maru. In addition, however, the German Foreign Office has requested us to transport, (50 or 60 reels) cultural and war films. Both of these organizations have indicated their desire that we transport these as official baggage in our trunks because they believe that it will be impossible to secure permission from the British Government for the transportation of these films.

Have you any objections to this manner of handling? Please wire me at once. Furthermore, please arrange for the transportation of as large a quantity of motion picture film as is possible in accordance with my # 1146[a].

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-8-41

No. 737

FROM: Tokyo — October 27, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 907.

Re your # 1217[a].

No objections to taking it as personal baggage of diplomat.

[a] See IV, 736.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 738

FROM: Rome — October 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 693.

Newspaper reporters feel that Japan's not deciding on a date to send the Asama Maru shows a certain vacillation in attitude.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 739

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — December 4, 1941
TO: Berlin — No number.

It is impossible to make shipment of the decorations mentioned in my # 728[a], # 500[b], etc., because the ASAMA MARU is unable to sail. Although I believe that there is perplexity over the manner of delivering them to the respective persons there at this time, please see what the railroad chief has to say about it, as referred to in my # 500[b] and telegraph me as a matter of reference.

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-12-41

No. 740

FROM: Tokyo — October 25, 1941
TO: Berlin — #906.

Re your #1090[a].

Ambassador Ott called on the East Asia Bureau Chief and suggested that ----- five year extension of the Anti-Comintern pact, on orders from his home government. (----- conditions for extension about as per your message.)

We will send them word as to the attitude of the Imperial Government before long.

For your information.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 741

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — October 24, 1941
TO: Berlin — #899.

On October 17th a German newspaperman connected with the Frankfurter Zeitung named SORGE and another German were arrested by the judiciary officials for a series of Communistic activities. SORGE has been in the closest contact with the German Embassy in Tokyo. Personally he has been gathering intelligences for Ambassador OTT. Never before had he been heard of in connection with the Communist Party. Still the judiciary officials say that there are many circumstances which make the accusation valid. They are continuing their investigation. Now, when SORGE was arrested the amazement of Ambassador OTT knew no bounds. He called me up and frantically asked to be allowed to interview the correspondent. In view of our particular relations with Germany, I made an exception and let him talk with SORGE in the presence of police officials. While we are investigating this matter fully please keep it in the strictest secrecy.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 742

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — October 31, 1941
TO: Berlin — #917.

Re my #906.

When I talked to Ambassador Ott (today ?), I told him that the Imperial government was not opposed to convening a conference to discuss the extending of the effective period of the Anti-Communism Pact. I added that if *(the ? a ?)* secret supplementary pact is to be discussed, we would like to give it our careful consideration in the light of the Anti-Communism Pact and the Tripartite Pact.

Please, therefore, start conferring with the Germans immediately concerning the text of the proposals.

Relay this message to Italy.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 743

FROM: Tokyo (Arita) November 14, 1936[a]
TO: Washington No Number.

Utterly and strictly secret.

Minister Mushakoji, accredited to Germany, having been vested with the proper authority, has initiated some negotiations with Germany for a Japanese-German pact. There follows the substance of the text which, upon the conclusion of the discussions, will be signed probably near the end of this month. This is for the information of our higher officials.

I. An Anti-Comintern Agreement and a Codicil.

Text of the Agreement:

(1) To confer on measures for the exchange of information regarding, and defense against, the Comintern.

(2) To provide for the participation of any third power sharing the same aims; and, as a codicil (so that both powers may effectively cooperate) to provide for measures against persons connected with the Comintern, and the establishment of standing committees.

This Agreement and the Codicil become effective immediately upon signature, upon which we are agreed with Germany.

II. A secret appended agreement and its official text, as an agreement appended to the Anti-Comintern Agreement.

(1) If one of the contracting powers is attacked or threatened with an attack, regardless of circumstances, the other must uphold her position and take whatever measures are necessary to uphold her position, and both nations will immediately confer on what measures are to be taken for the common good.

(2) Opposition to the spirit of this agreement and its appendices will be politically resisted by contracting with foreign countries.

In connection with the preceding Clause (2), Japan and Germany will exchange the official texts of the pending Japanese-Soviet Agreement, the German-Soviet Rapallo Agreement, and all other agreements involving these countries.

III. Both agreements are effective for five years.

This telegram is addressed to our foreign embassies.

---

[a] Note date.

Trans. 11-12-37[a]

No. 744

FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Berlin #921.

Re your #1283[a].

1. As for this secret appended pact, now that a Tripartite Treaty has been established, it may be argued that the secret appended agreement is no longer of any use. Well, at least from a legal point of view, we find it hard to accept the thesis that under Clause 5 the Tripartite Treaty does not apply to the Soviet and now that there exists the Three-Power Treaty, the secret appendix to the Anti-Comintern Agreement is no longer necessary. Nevertheless and notwithstanding time has passed since the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Between then and now, Japanese-German relations have changed, and German-Japanese relations with the Soviet have likewise changed. Therefore, I cannot see any sense in continuing the secret appended pact, so we are going to agree to abolish it. When I say we must "think all this over deeply," I mean that we might have to take this question

up with the Privy Councilors and that I would like the view of the Germans to be made much more clear on this subject.

2. Of course, in some way or other, some distinction should be drawn between the original signatories and subsequent participants either in the preface or introduction, but to draw this distinction it is not necessary to compose two protocols. This would only confuse our thinking. One would be enough, and we believe that the basic text of the protocol should be in all three languages—Japanese, German, and English.

3. Go ahead, therefore, and begin negotiating with the Germans, and tell them we want to make it easier by having new participants enter under this formula.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 745

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

November 11, 1941
#476.

(Separate telegraph.)

The Foreign Office to Your Excellency,

The Nanking Government hereby expresses its desire to join the Anti-Comintern Pact the validity of which is being extended by means of the protocol of November 25, 1941.

Year. Month. Day.

From the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

To His Excellency Von Ribbentrop.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 746

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

November 11, 1941
#475.

We wish to handle the problem of the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and China's participation in it through Minister Hidaka. However the protocol extending the validity of this pact is to be signed in Berlin on November 25th. According to Article 2 of the said protocol a third country desiring to join the pact shall express its intention in writing to the German Government and such participation shall become effective from the date that the German Government receives it. (As explained in the text which is contained in a separate telegram, after the 25th will be the earliest opportunity. It might be possible to date it as of the 25th.)

The Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Nanking government has sent a telegram in German and English text to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, the gist of which is my separate telegram #476[a]. Please arrange for a copy of the above telegram to be delivered to the Charge d'Affaires of the German Embassy in Nanking.

Furthermore, in regard to this matter it is necessary, from the provisions of the new protocol, to have participation in the pact formally confirmed by Japan, Germany and Italy. Please ascertain the intentions of the Nanking Government and reply.

---

[a] See IV, 745.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 747

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 11, 1941
2296.

(Circular.) (In 2 parts, complete.)

Protocol.

The Imperial Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government together with the Hungarian Government, the Imperial Manchurian Government and the Spanish Government, recognizing that the protocol signed by the above governments is a most effective means of combating the activities of the Communist "International" and believing that the common interests of the above governments are best served by close cooperation between them, do hereby agree to extend the effective period of the said protocol. For this purpose the following stipulations are agreed upon.

Article 1.

The agreement in regard to the Communist "International" which was formed on November 25, 1936, and later made into a protocol of November 6, 1937, which was joined by Hungary on February 24, 1939, by Manchuria on February 24, 1939, and by Spain on March 27, 1939, shall be extended for a period of five years beginning November 25, 1941.

Article 2.

The agreement regarding the Communist "International" shall be entered into by the three original signatories namely, the Japanese Government, the German Government, and the Italian Government. Other countries desiring to join the agreement shall signify this desire in writing to the German Government and the German Government shall in turn notify the other signatories. Such participation shall become effective from the date that Germany receives the document signifying said desire to join.

Article 3.

This protocol shall be drawn up in Japanese, German, and Italian and these three texts shall constitute the official text. This protocol shall become effective from the date of signature.

The contracting governments shall have the right to ask for an extension of the protocol above the designated five year period at a suitable time before the said period shall have elapsed.

In witness whereof I do hereby affix my signature having been duly authorized by my government to do so.

The ----- day of November of the 16th year of Showa that is the year 1941 or according to Fascist history the year 20.

Six copies of this protocol will be drawn up in Berlin.

This is my message to Berlin, Hsinking, Nanking. Berlin relay to Rome.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 748

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 11, 1941
939.

I have the honor to present this written document.

What I wish to say is that I have instructions from my home government to state to Your Excellency that the Japanese Government is in complete accord with the German Government in regard to the following points in connection with the signing of the protocol extending the validity of the anti-Comintern Pact.

That the provisions of the supplement[a] to the anti-Comintern Pact entered into by the Japanese Government and the German Government on November 25, 1936, are hereby nullified by this protocol of November 25, 1941, as provided for in Article 3 of the same.

I request that Your Excellency use your influence to see that the German Government concurs in this.

I wish to take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to Your Excellency.

Respectfully submitted:

Showa 16 (1941) 11 November ----- day in Berlin.

---

[a]This supplement is SECRET and not available. Japan's position is that Article 5 of the Tri-Partite Pact supersedes this Secret Supplement.

Article 5 of Tri-Partite Pact

"Japan, Germany, and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia."

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 749

FROM: Tokyo — November 11, 1941
TO: Berlin — #941.

On the 10th the German Ambassador in Tokyo acting on instructions from his government, called to request the concurrence of the Japanese Government in the matter of including the governments of Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia in the expanded anti-Comintern pact. To this I replied that while I agreed in principle I would instruct the ministers of Roumania, Bulgaria, and Finland, who were resident in Tokyo, to get in touch with the German and Italian ministers regarding inclusion in the pact. And that only in the cases of Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia would the concurrence of Japan with Germany and Italy be sufficient to include them in the pack.

Please relay to Italy

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 750

FROM: Berlin (Osima) — November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1315.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

Re your Circular #2296[a].

For your information, I have wired the Japanese text as my separate wire #1316[b]. Should you have any objections to any part of it, please wire me immediately.

I have changed the expression "the Hungarian Government," mentioned in the preamble of your message, as well as your expression "the Italian Government," mentioned in the preamble and also in Clause 2 of your message, to read "all European Governments." In

addition I have changed the expression "Japanese Government" in Clause 2 to read "The Great Japanese Imperial Government."

[a] See IV, 747.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 751

FROM: Tokyo — November 13, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #798.

Re your #725[a].

1. This protocol that is to be signed on the 25th is a protocol between the six countries of Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchuria, Hungary and Spain. Manchuria will also sign at the same time through her Minister resident in Berlin.

2. The Japanese text and the German text have already been determined as ontained in my #782[a] and 783[a] and Circulars #2296[b] and #2235[a] (which text please see). The official Italian text has not yet been received but will be wired to you as soon as received.

3. It is desired to alter the official text as follows so please make these corrections.

A. The date according to the foreign calendar will be 1936.

B. In the German text in the latter part of Article 2 after the words SETZEN WIRD insert the words DER EINTRITT.

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 747.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 752

FROM: Tokyo — November 13, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #799.

Tokyo to Berlin #945. (Action.)

Re my #942[a].

Will you please establish contact with the Manchurian Minister resident in Germany by handing him the proposed text and other suitable means.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 753

FROM: Hsinking (Umezu) — November 13, 1941
TO: Berlin — #11.

(Secret.)

In regard to the instructions which Manchoukuo should issue to its Minister concerning the signing of the protocol extending the Anti-Comintern Pact:

Please hand the text of the protocol to our Minister and instruct and guide him with regard to the red tape concerned in the signing of the said protocol.

Please relay to Tokyo.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 754

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 14, 1941
948.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Re your Circulars # 2296[a] and # 2305[b].

Re the term of the Anti-Communist agreement.

The Manchukuoan Government has no objections to the text as given in your caption message but are very desirous that the date be put in as "eighth year of Kotoku." (The date according to the Fascist calendar should also be entered.) Please handle the matter accordingly.

---

[a] See IV, 747.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 755

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

November 13, 1941
800.

(Separate wire.)

Tokyo to Berlin # 946. (Action.)

In regard to the method of writing the date in the text of the protocol, Manchuria is very anxious to have the phrase, the 9th year of KO, inserted in the text, and while we have not as yet received any communication to that effect we are sure that Spain also will desire that the date of their new era be inserted also. At any rate when you write in the date in western style please by all means insert the date of the Manchurian era also. Please give this immediate consideration. In case it is inserted please wire the text with the revision immediately.

Relayed to Manchuria.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 756

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 14, 1941
952.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Re your # 1321[a].

There is also the consideration that we had the Manchukuoan Government withdraw their insistence on a Manchurian version of the text. Furthermore, although it is not easy to do, we are very desirous that the text be drawn up in all three languages. Please let me have the final decision by the 16th.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 757

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

November 15, 1941
815.

I wired Ambassador Oshima immediately instructing him to add the phrase "The 8th year of KŌTOKU" to the date of the protocol extending the effective period of the Anti-Comintern Pact. However, Oshima wired that he had proposed this to the German Foreign Minister but the Foreign Minister said that Spain had requested that a text of the treaty in Spanish be prepared but that due to the extreme shortness of time they were trying to persuade Spain to wait and that at present texts would be drafted in only the three languages Japanese, German, and Italian. He fully appreciated Manchuria's viewpoint but -----.

If we press the matter of saving the face of the countries which wish to participate in the pact there is danger that we never would get the problem settled. If we drag out this problem again it will cause Germany's policy toward Spain to fall through and will be like bringing a hornet's nest about our ears, so I think we better drop the matter.

Please explain this to Manchuria and get them to see that in view of the complications involved they will have to relinquish their aspirations in this respect. Then please wire the result immediately.

Furthermore, in view of the late date we will have to adhere to this position. Also from a technical standpoint this matter is impossible. This is for your information.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 758

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

November 13, 1941
1320.

Secret. Re your # 942[a].

As far as Germany is concerned she wishes to keep the matter of the extension of this pact and the participation of the various countries in it a strict secret until November 25th. Then the sudden announcement of it will have great value for propaganda purposes it is believed.

It is a fact that this pact has run its course. However, if this matter should leak out from our side or from China (for instance, your caption telegram was to be relayed to Nanking) it would be most awkward. Therefore please exercise extreme caution in this respect.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 759

FROM: Berlin (Osima) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1326.

(Priority.)

Re your 941[a].

On the 14th, we learned from German sources that Roumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Croatia are all at last displaying a desire to gladly join in with Germany's wishes. ----- is also expected to make a move to join; Finland's reply is expected within two or three days; and as for Denmark, they will wait until after Finland's approval is received and then plan their course.

Please wire a reply to my #1314[b].

---

[a] See IV, 749.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 760

FROM: Tokyo November 14, 1941
TO: Berlin #954.

(Urgent.)

Re your #1314[a].

I had not favored permitting any further nations to join the pact until we had signed the new protocol, but Germany has insisted so hard that Rumania and the other countries join simultaneously that I have agreed. It has been decided that the Peoples Government will join immediately. I have had our Ambassador to China find out the intention of this government, and although no formal reply has come in, we have been given to understand that no objections will be raised. We have advised Nanking, as soon as they have made their decision, to have the Chief of the Foreign Department of the Nationalist Government advise Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP by telegram just when and how the signing will take place in Nanking. As soon as the Peoples Government is prepared to join, I will wire you more, but this is all for the moment.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 761

FROM: Tokyo November 14, 1941
TO: Berlin #950.

In the signing of the protocol, following the precedent set in the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tri-Partite Pact, etc., you are to submit my telegram (in German) empowering you to sign. I believe the original will be given to the German Ambassador here. After having made arrangements, please reply by wire.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 762

FROM: Berlin — November 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1333.

(Urgent.)

Strictly Secret.

Re my #1325[a].

On the morning of the 16th, WOERMANN[b] said to KASE[c], "We pressed the Spanish Government for a reply, and this morning we got a wire from the German Embassy in Madrid. According to this telegram, the Spanish government will send us a definite answer by Monday night, the 17th." KASE said, "Well, please let me know what the answer is as soon as you find out, because I want to get in touch with Madrid by telephone."

This is all for the moment.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Assistant Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs.
[c] Counselor at Embassy in Berlin.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 763

FROM: Tokyo — November 17, 1941
TO: Berlin — #956.

As explained in my #954[a] since we have the informal consent of the Nanking government to participate in this anti-Comintern Pact, please have the government to which you are accredited send instructions immediately to their Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy in China to get in touch with the Japanese Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy there, and then state to the Nanking government that Japan, Germany, and Italy jointly urge the Nanking government to take the necessary steps for formal entry into the Pact.

---

[a] See IV, 760.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 764

FROM: Tokyo — November 17, 1941
TO: Nanking — #492(?).

(Badly garbled, approximate translation.)

Secret. Re #-----6 from Tokyo to Berlin.

We wish to have the Nanking Government make formal application for inclusion in the Pact. Please arrange for the application to reach Berlin during the 25th.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 765

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

November 17, 1941
1336.

(Parts 1, 2, 3, of 3.)

Re my # 1331[a].

Translator's note: For English translation of Japanese text see (IV, 747).

In addition to the German text, the Italian is sent herewith for comparison. In translating, please note that ZZ represents a grave accent, and the KKK represents a small o at the upper right of a numeral.

Protocollo

Il Regio Governo Italiano, il Governo del Reich Germanico ed il Governo Imperiale Giapponese come pure il il Governo Reame Ungherese, il Governo Imperiale del Manciukuo ed il Governo Spagnolo,

Riconascendo che gli accordi internazionali da essi conclusi per combatter fattivita dell Internatzionale Communista hanno dato nigliori risultati, come pure nella persuazione che i concordanti interessi dei loro paesi richiedono anche per favvenire la loro stretta collaborazione control il comune nemico,

hanno deciso di prologare la durate di validita dei detti accorde ed hanno all nopo convenuto quanto segue.

Articolo 1. Il patto contro d'internazional communista, che resulta dall accordo e dal protocollo complementare del 25 Novembre 1936 e dal protocollo del 6 Novembre 1937, ed al quale hanno aderito l'Ungheria col protocollo del 24 Febbaio 1939, il Manchiukuo col protocollo del 24 Febbraio 1939 e la Spagna col protocollo del 27 Marzo 1939, viene prorogato per cinque anni a decoirere dal 25 Novembre 1941.

Articol 2. Gli stati che in seguito ad invito del Regio Governo Italiano, del Governo del Reich Germanico e de patto control l'Internazional Comunista, si propongono di aderire a questo patto, transmetteranno per iscritto le loro dichiarazioni di adesione al Governo del Reich Germanico, el quale dol canto sco dara notizia adesqualtri, stati aderenti al patto della ricezione di tale dichirazione l'adesione entra in vigore il giorno della ricez ione della dichiarazione di adhesione da prte del Governo del Reich Germanico.

Articolo 3. Il presente protocollo redatto in lingua Italiano, Tedesca e Giapponese ad ogui testo vale come originale. Il protocollo entra in vigore il giorno della sua firma.

Le Alte Parti Contaenti si concerteranno tempestivamente prima della scadenzae del termine di cinque anni previsto nel articolo sui modi ulteriori della loro collaborazione.

In fede di che i scottoscutti, debitam ate autorizati dei loro governi, hanno firmato il presente protocollo e li hanno opposto i loro sigilli.

Fatto in sei exemplari a Berlino il 25 Novembre 1941 dell' Era Facista corrispondente al giorno 25 ----- dell' 16 anno dell' Era Showa.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 766

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Tokyo

November 21, 1941
755.

Secret.

The exercises to be carried out on the 25th, on the occasion of the signing of the protocol extending the anti-Comintern Pact have been fixed as follows:

1. On the evening of the 25th, the Minister of State will -----.
2. There will be a special broadcast of greetings from the Minister of State and the German and Italian Ministers of minutes each. (Japanese and Machukuo translations of the above two Ministers' speeches will be made.)
3. In the morning edition on the 26th, the conversations between the Japanese Ambassador, the Minister of State and the Head Office will be published.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 767

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 21, 1941
968.

Secret.

This afternoon, the 21st, the German Ambassador called on the Vice Minister and proposed that signing of the protocol be postponed till the 28th. I had the Vice Minister explain to him that to do so would necessitate a revision in the text of the protocol, that as far as we were concerned, this had been decided by the Privy Council, that there was no method of revising the text and, as a matter of fact, that it would be impossible to postpone the date of signing.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 768

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

November 21, 1941
1354

Secret

Re my # 1349[a].

On the morning of the 21st, I told WEAMAN that the Japanese government had absolutely no intention of changing the date for signing the protocol and asked him to convey that to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and also requested an immediate answer. This much for the present.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 769

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

November 21, 1941
1355.

Re my # 1354[a].

At 5 p.m. today, the 21st, Weaman told me that he had been ordered by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who is at present at the Imperial Headquarters, to inform me that in view of the critical situation with which Japan was faced, it had been decided to go ahead with the signing on the 25th.

I inquired regarding the matter of inviting the Foreign Ministers of the various countries concerned. To this, he replied that after the technical experts had completed their part, they would be summoned.

---

[a] See IV, 768.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 770

FROM: Tokyo — November 21, 1941
TO: Nanking, Hsingking — Circular # 2369.

The consent of Manchukuo, Hungary, and Spain has now been secured in regard to the new protocol dealing with the anti-Comintern Pact, and, at present, the necessary procedures within those countries are being pushed, so that the affixing of signatures can be carried out the 25th in Berlin as per plans.

On that day, Germany and Italy will likely put on a large scale propaganda effort in regard to the war with Russia, but in view of the entire situation here, we plan not to make too much over the extension of the pact. Accordingly, the government will not arrange for any banquet or other functions, but will merely announce in a simple manner that there has been a five year extension of the existing pact. Of course, this will lead to some speculation as to whether it might mean non-participation on our part, so you will please have the above facts in mind.

This message addressed to Manchukuo and Nanking.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 771

FROM: Tokyo — November 22, 1941
TO: Net — Circular # 2380.

At present, the new nations due to join the anti-Comintern Pact are the Nationalist government, Roumania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Slovakia, Croatia, and Finland. Denmark is the only one that appears somewhat uncertain; however, all the others are to sign for sure on the 25th.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 772

FROM: Berlin — November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1359.

(Urgent.)

To be handled in Government code.

Re your # 966[a].

1. The signing is to take place in a suitable building. The time is to be 10:30 p.m. the 25th, or at 6:00 p.m. on that date (as soon as this point has been definitely decided, I will advise you). The signing of the protocol and the acceptance by the participants will be taken care of in the speeches to be made by Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop and the representatives of all the participating powers. Newspaper and radio representatives will be present at the signatory ceremony. Insofar as radio broadcasts to Japan are concerned, I will wire you at a later time.

2. The signatories are to be: Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP for Germany, Foreign Minister CIANO for Italy; Minister RO[b] for Manchukuo and Foreign Minister BARDOSSY for Hungary. This visit of the Spanish Foreign Minister to Berlin as yet has not been decided.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 773

FROM: Berlin (Osima) November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1362.

Re my # 1359[a].

1. The time decided upon is 12:30 p.m. on the 25th. There were no objections to newspaper publication along the line of your # 966[b]. It is expected that the Hungarian, Manchurian, Spanish representative and myself will make speeches at the time of signature.

2. The adherence of Denmark and attendance of ahe Spanish Foreign Minister were assured. All of the representatives from the various European countries newly joining must have arrived already.

---

[a] See IV, 772.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 774

FROM: Tokyo November 25, 1941
TO: Hsinking Circular # 2391.

Denmark also has decided to participate on the 25th. The signing will take place the 25th at ----- p.m. (Berlin time).

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 775

FROM: Berlin November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1364.

Secret outside the Department.

Re your # 966[a].

It was reported in the newspapers on the 22nd, that negotiations between Japan and WOERMAN[b] had been completed as was expressed in your telegram. Extreme secrecy had been maintained until that very day, but on the 24th, the Germans, through the newspapers and the interview of reporters with the Foreign Office Press Bureau, disclosed the contents of my # 1363[a]. This, of course, reached all the various foreign offices, giving rise to the fear that this information would be used by the enemy against us. In order to prevent similar disclosures—I believe this one to be unavoidable.—I had KASE[c] protest to WOERMAN and I,

myself, brought the matter up in my interview with RIBBENTROP. Please acknowledge this message.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Assistant Under-Secretary of German Foreign Office.
[c] Counselor at Japanese embassy in Berlin.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 776

FROM: Berlin (Osima) November 26, 1941
TO: Hsingking No number.

Message to Tokyo # 137 (2 or 4?).

Re your # 971[a].

Order of signing: Japan, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Manchukuo, Spain,
Signatures: OSHIMA HIROSHI: RIBBENTROP: CIANO: BARDUSSY DLOLASZIO; RO GI-BUN; SERRANO SUNER.
Now, the Manchukuon Minister and my names are written in the German and English texts as "OSHIMA" and "LU I-WEN."
The order of signing and signatures will be exactly the same for the copy kept by Manchukuo.

---

[a] See 776A in which Tokyo asks Berlin to wire at once the order and manner of signing the anti-comintern pact.

Trans. 00-00-00

No. 776A

FROM: Tokyo November 22, 1941
TO: Berlin # 971.

Secret.

Since we have received your approval today (22nd), we wish to have the document in my # 964[a] signed after the date has been set. After it has been signed and the general meaning and date of entry have been announced, please send accurate copies in plain text here and to Manchukuo.
Please wire at once the order and manner of signing the copy which we have here, and wire directly to Manchukuo the order and manner of signing their copy.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 777

FROM: Berlin November 27, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 12.

I think that your #12[a] was sent at the same time that our #1374 to Tokyo[a] was relayed to you. However the order was as follows:

The signed document for Manchuria is printed the same and bound the same as the document held by us. (The Japanese, German, and Italian texts are all bound in Japanese style. When you open it up you have first the Japanese text, turn it over and you have the German with the Italian in the middle.) Hungary and Spain will have texts the same as the Germans, also.

The order of the signatures is in all cases to have the three original contracting countries sign first. (In the German text, Germany signs first then Italy and then Japan. In the Italian version the order is Italy, Germany, Japan), followed in all cases by Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain, always in that order. (For example, Spain's signature comes last in all six documents.) Hence the order of signatures and the manner of signing the Manchukuoan document is that contained in your telegram to the Minister and is exactly the same as that held by the Japanese government.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 778

FROM: Berlin (Osima) December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1414.

Re your Circular #2336[a].

We informed the Foreign Office on the 27th. On the 29th, by means of a note, they made their reply of acknowledgment.

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[a]See 778A, which states that Croatia's participation in the protocol was approved as of the 15th and that there should be an announcement to Croatia direct from the Italian Embassy to that effect.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 778A

FROM: Tokyo November 17, 1941
TO: Rome Circular #2336.

Croatia's participation in the protocol was approved as of the 15th. Hence you will please announce that the words "add referendum" are to be deleted as of the 17th.

There should be an announcement to Croatia direct from the Italian Embassy to this effect.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 779

FROM: Berlin November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1366.

On the morning of the 25th the exchange of official documents abolishing the secret auxiliary agreement was completed.

Because of the fact that this item had been made a dead letter it was his desire that it be made perfectly clear that the fact that such a secret understanding had existed should con-

tinue to be kept secret. Realizing that this was a very natural request I had Kase and Gauss exchange notes to that effect.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 780

FROM: Tokyo — November 4, 1941
TO: Berlin — #924.

Re your #1282[a].

We wish as soon as possible to dispatch ships to the United States and are now negotiating with the departments concerned. However, as yet no arrangements have been made. Recently American shipping service between North America and Shanghai has stopped at Manila. Consequently, it is practically impossible to return to Japan from the European continent.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 781

FROM: Berlin (Osima) — November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1291.

Re your #924[a].

I have received a telegram from businessmen here expressing the desire for one boat from Japan to touch port (in Germany) once a month even if the schedule is irregular. I have also received a number of telegrams from Minister -----[b] to the same effect. Please reply regarding this matter. Moreover the assignment of boats in this manner affords the only method of my return to Japan.

[a] See IV, 780.
[b] Japanese.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 782

FROM: Hsinking[a] — November 6, 1941
TO: Hong Kong — #1.

The following is to Ambassador KURUSU:

I wish you well on this trip you are taking to help us solve this unprecedented crisis which our country faces. I pray that you will have a safe trip and that you will succeed in your grave mission. I will, to the best of my ability, assume the responsibility for carrying out the work you left for me when you were in Berlin March last year, so please rest easy on that score. Moreover, for your information, I am wiring you the Soviet situation.

[a] Amb. Lt. Gen. Toshijiro Umetsu.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 783

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Hong Kong

November 6, 1941
#3.

(Strictly Secret.)(To be handled in Government Code.)

The following is to Ambassador KURUSU:

Separate Message B:
Outlook for the Russo-German War.

1. The Soviet Union and China have the following points in common:
a. Their territory is so vast that the government can flee anywhere.
b. The population is so numerous that the military forces have unlimited reserves.
c. The living standard is low, and the people are inured to suffering privation.
d. They have the most skillful of leaders.
e. They have natural fortifications (take, for example, the Urals and the three provinces to the north).
f. The Russians are politically indoctrinated.
g. In addition to all this, the Soviet has an extremely cold winter, and, moreover, in that she has the equipment necessary for production, she has a great advantage over China. In view of all this, there is a great possibility that the Russo-German war may, just like the China incident, turn out to be a long, long struggle.

2. If the Germans do not stop after the fall of Moscow, the Russians will keep on resisting, and even if Germany should be any chance occupy the whole territory west of the Urals next spring, the Soviet still has about 40% of the whole resources, population, and industry east of the Urals, and even though her striking power might be lowered, she can still keep fighting and fighting.

3. The foundations of the Stalin regime are very firmly fixed, so it is extremely precarious to bet on its downfall any time soon.

4. To sum this all up, because of her war with Russia, Germany is restrained very much from attacking England, and gradually the outlook for any early close to hostilities in Europe is fading.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 784

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

November 6, 1941
#771.

(Part 1 of 2.)[a]

(#95 from Budapest to this Foreign Minister.)

An official in charge at the Hungarian Foreign Office spoke thus confidentially to INOUE[b] on the 30th:

1. When Moscow falls, the Soviet Government will be totally removed to a place east of the Volga and finally to the Urals. The Stalin regime, however, is not likely to dissolve, and the productive power of the Ural area is unknown.

2. Summing up all our spy reports, Germany's next trend of conquest will be the Caucasus, Iran, and Iraq. The objective will be to cut off the supply of petroleum to the British forces; then when Germany takes over these areas, next will come Syria and Egypt. (For the British to get petroleum from the United States or elsewhere, a vast number of ships would be necessary, and this is out of the question.) If it turns out this way, Turkey, too, will have no alternative but to bow to Germany, and France's raw material and food problem will thus be solved. The Balkan economy will also be bolstered.

3. Not more than 20% of the Ukrainian industries have been destoryed; reconstruction is already proceeding nicely, and resumption of work is taking place on a surprisingly large scale.

[a] See IV, 785.
[b] Ambassador in Budapest.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 785

FROM: Tokyo — November 6, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #771.

(Part 2 of 2.)[a]

(Message from Budapest #95.)

In this booty there is plenty of arms, ammunition, and gasoline, but Soviet gasoline, untreated, will not work in Hungarian motor cars; likewise, Hungarian gasoline will not work in Soviet motor cars. This has been only lately discovered. The Hungarian army fully equipped one mechanized brigade with Soviet-made arms, tanks, motor cars, cannon, cannon balls, and three months' supply of fuel.

d. The national goods of Galicia could all be brought back to Hungary, but those of the Ukraine had to be left as found for want of means of shipping. Very little, however, was destroyed. It seems that the Germans are cultivating in that area plants used in manufacturing rubber substitutes, but the results are not clear.

e. Foodstuffs in the Balkans are better than last year, when the crops were lean; in fact, this year's crop is quite normal, and the winter brings no particular anxiety. Ukrainian agriculture cannot hope for much next year because of the war, but after next year it will probably prosper.

f. It seems that the United States may soon enter, if, indeed, she has not already entered the war in an active way. Her next step will probably be to secure more military bases as the price of the arms she lets the Allies have. It seems that the United States expects to get bases in Scotland, North Ireland, and the Azores, but if she occupies the Azores by arms, Germany will invade Portugal and attack Gibraltar.

g. As I said in my #88[b], guerilla warfare in Serbia is very fierce, and the rails between Nish[c] and Belgrade have been rent in sixteen places. The Ukrainian Danube fleet is near Belgrade protecting navigation on the river.

This message has been transmitted to Berlin.

[a] For Part 1 of 2, see IV, 784.
[b] Not available.
[c] City in southeastern Yugoslavia.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 786

FROM: Tokyo — October 29, 1941
TO: Berlin — #914.

Re your #976[a].

We would like to be advised of the methods employed and the successes attained by the Germans with regard to bringing about order in occupied Russia. Also, as to the means they are using to transport troops, means of operating farms, etc. Please advise us as soon as they become known to you.

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[a] See III, 810.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 787

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

November 10, 1941
1303.

(Part 1 of 2.) (Strictly Secret.)

Re your # 914[a].

Summing up what a dependable German told me, although I will investigate and wire you later, I am sending you the following information for the time being.

1. ROOZE[b] is already in Riga and is handling the affairs of the three Baltic countries as well as a part of White Russia. KOCH[c] also took office in Kiev on October 31 (KAUFMANN[d] quit). These men are seeing that the administration of the occupied territories is being carried on according to the peculiarities of the several districts, in brief, about as follows:

a. In the three former Baltic countries and in the Ukraine, quite a few of the intelligentsia still remain, and they show their willingness to cooperate directly with the Reich in its administrative policies. The influence of these people is by no means to be despised. They are indigenous, and Germany finds it to her advantage to put them to the fore, so KOCH and ROOZE are acting as *stadthaelder*, and directly under them come district commissars. All these are German. However, the *landraeter* (which probably means prefectural justices of the peace or military offices) are filled with natives. Justices of the peace are, for the most part, natives. Save for the political gendarmes, the police are practically all Russians. Of course, the Germans do, in all these cases, pull the strings, but they find it more practical to keep in the background. The technical skill, the knowledge of agriculture, and organizing ability of the Germans are standing them in good stead in these areas.

b. In other former Russian territories, the learned aristocracy is all gone, and the people are long used to sheep-like obedience. They are too helpless to act on their own initiative and seem to have lost all ambition. The Germans merely direct them as best they can. Of themselves, these people would never offer any direct resistance, and once leaders are deposed there is scant prospect of any trouble with them.

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[a] See IV, 786.
[b] Kana spelling; probably ROSENBERG, who is to be appointed Minister of State in European Russia.
[c] Acting Director of ROSENBERG's office; to be appointed a leader of part of Russia under German occupation.
[d] Present Director of Hamburg; to be made leader of Ukraine under German occupation.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 788

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

November 10, 1941
1303.

(Part 2 of 2.) (Strictly Secret.)

2. *a.* Before the outbreak of hostilities, Germany had already placed a substantial railway crew in the border parts, and as the warfare progresses they are changing the rail gauge. In some cases, when necessary to mend damaged rails, the advanced reconnaissance units have traveled along with the rail crew; so it seems Germany wishes most of her supplies to go by rail and so far, through her preeminent organizing ability, her success has been conspicuous, and I understand that already through trains are going to Pushkov, Smolensk, Kiev, and Odessa. In his speech on October 3, Chancellor HITLER, as you know, said that the Germans were plying more than 25,000 kilometres of railway in Soviet territory, of which 5,000 kilometres have been changed to the German gauge. On November 2, civilian travel in Germany was practically stopped. This was probably to concentrate on shipments to Russia and to transport soldiers.

b. Of course, the truck is playing a large role in the transportation of front-line supplies. In order to facilitate such transportation already starting within the Reich, Germany has completed a supply road to the battlefields. Already sign posts marked "To Kiev" can be seen along the road here in Germany, and they are endeavoring to put up enough gas stations to serve the automobiles.

c. If the warfare along the Black Sea and the Baltic turns out favorably for the Germans and if the Soviet fleet is routed, Germany will assuredly try to use ships also. Germany, it is true, has been endeavoring to displace the Kolhoz system and to replace it with Nazi agriculture, but so far it has proven very difficult to uproot the Kolhoz. Once, however, the right of private ownership is recognized, German technique can naturally produce much finer results in agriculture than that of Russia ever did.

Trans. 11–13–41

No. 789

FROM: Berlin — November 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

(Part 2 of 2.)

----- (First two thirds missing)---------

4. The shortage of labor on farms and in factories is being made up by prisoners and foreign laborers. It is estimated that there are about 2,500,000 prisoners and 3,000,000 foreign laborers at work now. Foreign laborers from 19 different countries are being used in the Herman Goering factories, and already Russian prisoners are beginning to be used in the Rhine area. Even though this does not fully compensate for the shortage of laborers occasioned by the war it is estimated that about 70% to 80 % of the peace time labor strength has been made up by this shifting of labor.

5. While it may be said that there is a scarcity of labor and materials on the farms there are in general no other weak points. There is not the slightest sign of impoverishment.

(*Translator's note:* Remainder of this portion of the message badly garbled; translation only approximate.)

Ample provision has been made for the laborers and this is impressing even the Russian soldiers. Industries in the occupied area of Russia are being reorganized and no problem is anticipated in that respect.

Trans. 11–14–41

No. 790

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 11, 1941
2291.

(Circular.) (In 2 parts, complete.)

5 Report on European conditions. Secret.

(1) The last major attack by Germany for 1941 was started on October 2nd, aiming at occupation of Moscow and complete breaking up of remaining Russian field forces, and thus lead to the occupation of European Russia before extreme winter. This is now well on the way towards being completed, the greater part of important European Russian forces having been smashed and the surrounding of Moscow and its fall now seems to be only a question of time. Defeat of U.S.S.R. forces has had a great morale effect on the people of Russia; however, to jump to the conclusion that this means the fall of Stalin's government would not be correct. Depending on material from the U.S.S.R. territory east of the Volga and on aid from America and Britain, preparations for a spring war are being made and it looks as though the U.S.S.R. will continue with their defense.

After completing this major drive the Germans probably plan to leave a small force on their new line running along Leningrad-Moscow-HARRIKOFF and ROSSENTOFF, and the greater part of the air and army forces will be called back to Germany. However the attack on the Caucasus will no doubt be carried on.

Material aid will be given by combined British and American sources to Russia, battling against the severe attacks of Germany, but little results are expected of this.

There are some rumors of a Russian-German peace negotiation, however, judging from the aforementioned Russian defense plan, it is judged that Russia will not give in in the near future and from a German standpoint it seems improbable that this would be the case unless Bolshevism has been completely wiped out.

(2) England has been able to catch her breath since June and the starting of the German-Russian war, and has time to strengthen their defense powers of the Island. While Germany on the other hand is hardly expected to make an immediate attempt of a landing, but will probably continue with air raids on Britain and the blockade of the seas, and make an attempted southern drive. Britain also guessing this to be the German's next move, is busily increasing manpower in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and other Near East areas and is trying to bring these governments into her camp. On the other hand the supremacy of the Mediterranean is still in England's hand, making the supply route to German and Italian forces in North Africa unsafe. Germany's next step in this direction therefore will no doubt be one aimed to make this supply route a safer one.

(3) Parts of German occupied countries (Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia) have had uprisings and sabotage by Communists, however Germany's overbearing methods and the power of the police, have succeeded in suppressing most of this, and at present do not seem to amount to anything which would interfere with Germany's fighting powers.

America started by designating neutrality zones and issuing shooting orders (in these parts) of German and Italian ships, and by occupying Greenland and Iceland, and now is taking further steps by trying to give up the neutrality act and is aiming to arm all ships, while on the other hand she is working on obtaining military bases in Central and South America, and is concentrating in wiping out Axis influence in these countries.

The reason that although apparently the United States should be in the war, they seem to hesitate, is due to the military preparations and public opinion in the United States which does not, as yet, allow their entering the war.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 791

FROM: Berlin (Osima) November 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1311.

(In 2 parts—Part 2 not available.)

From Administration Official Mutō, to the Home Minister.

During the half a year that has elapsed since I assumed my post here, I have made tours of inspection of conditions in various parts of this country. The resume of my findings follows:

1. Naziism is something that almost automatically rose up among the German race. I could find no tendency among the German people throughout the country, of dissatisfaction or opposition to that party's organization and activities. The people will undoubtedly continue to be completely confident of their Fuehrer's leadership. The party will undoubtedly continue to hold complete sway over the people and progress onward together with the people.

2. Of course, traces of hopes that the war will be concluded speedily, and of anxiety over air raids, can be discerned among the people. However, these are but natural phenomena of a people whose country is at war. It would be a very definite error if these traces were interpreted to mean the forerunner of general internal distrubances. Present victories on the fields of battle and the excellent propaganda work has very effectively unified the people.

3. It is true that the food situation falls below that of normal times; however, it is not anywhere near a critical stage. There is still food to spare in the farming areas. I cannot picture a German downfall through lack of food for at least several years to come.

4. The shortage of labor in the factories and farms is being overcome by using war prisoners and foreigners, of which there are about two and a half million of the former and about three million of the latter. The Hermann Goering plant is employing workers of 17 foreign countires. Prisoners captured in the Russian campaign have already been put to work on the farms in the Rhine area. It is true, however, that these do not completely overcome the war time labor shortage. However, this shortage is made up by transferring workers from peace time industries to those of war time industries. Through these various means between 70 and 80 percent of labor shortage caused by considerably stepped up industrial production has been overcome.

5. Although there is some labor shortage and shortage of raw materials in the farming area, there are no other discernable weaknesses. There are no indications that the nation as a whole has been weakened. Apparently, the various organs which were created to keep the laborers amused, have been effective, for the morale of the people behind the fighting lines is very high. There are no disturbances in the larger factories, and because they have been well organized, there seems to be very little unrest even in the medium and small plants.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 792

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) November 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1308.

According to reliable information, Germany in order to give England and America a demonstration of her leadership over all of Europe, is planning a congress of all European nations, including the neutral ones also, to be held in Vienna late this year or early in next year, and is making preparations to that end. Vichy, Spain and Finland have already signified acquiesence. Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey, however, still appear reluctant. England and America seem to have gotten wind of this and it cannot be said for certain that it will be held. However, it will be interesting to watch developments.

Germany for the present is not making any startling diplomatic moves because of the state of the Russo-German war. However, concurrent with the fall of Moscow some positive diplomatic maneuver can be expected. Particularly in German-French relations can some new development be anticipated.

I have not as yet had any answer to my #591[a]. Please give some instructions at this time.

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[a] Not available, dated between 22 and 26 May 1941.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 793

FROM: Tokyo — November 13, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #804.

(Helsinki to Tokyo #324.)

No. 324[a] from Helsinki to Tokyo.

Because of the sharp reduction in exports and imports, the scarcity of labor (over 10% of the population have been sent to the front; all schools except primary schools have been closed), the fact that the cold season came a month earlier than usual, a failure in crops this year, etc. the economic situation of the people, the scarcity of all commodities and of foodstuffs in particular, is beyond belief. All food and clothing are rationed by tickets but their procurement is difficult. The only hope of getting flour for making bread is to import it from Germany. Prices of all commodities have advanced sharply. If we use July 1939 as a standard, foodstuffs in July of this year were 144 in August 15. Other necessary commodities advanced from 123 last year to 145 in the same month this year.

The above are the official quotations but because of bootleg transactions, etc. the market price is many times this price, and in the future bids fair to go higher and higher. There is grave danger that there will be a scarcity of foodstuffs. Living conditions for the populace in general are very precarious.

The anti-Soviet feeling of the people in the front line is very strong. However, living conditions back of the line are as pictured above and if the war is a long drawn out affair the plight of the people will be sad indeed. It is a matter for conjecture as to whether British and American pressure will offer any obstacle to the continuation of the war.

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[a] Not otherwise available.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 794

FROM: Tokyo — November 13, 1941
TO: Hsinking, Nanking, Shanghai, Peking — #2306.

(Circular.) (Message *from Berlin* #1298 dated November 8.)

(Secret.)

The following is a confidential report given to a member of this office by a certain German of a reliable character on the 8th:

1. Excepting the area north of Kalinin, the weather is still very bad in Soviet Russia—the ground freezing at night but melting during the day. Extreme difficulties are being

encountered along the lines in the neighborhood of Moscow in the Ukraine and in Crimea. Although the German spearhead has already reached Rostov, since the successive detachments have not been able to keep up with it, the city has not yet been taken. Also all along the line near Kerch the advance has been stalemated on account of mud.

2. Along the line extending from Kalinin opposite Moscow to Tula, powerful German detachments have been massed in greater concentration than has been seen so far on any front. Thus preparations have been completed for the final offensive. However, for reasons given above they are unable to take action. Although the Soviet Government has transferred from the Far East 16 regiments of fresh troops in addition to 15 regiments and has furthermore a citizens' army of 200,000, the Germans on the other hand have ready an army superior to the Soviet Army in number, as well as, in quality and equipment. The informer firmly believes that the German forces will begin a rapid advance as soon as the weather conditions improve.

3. As may be seen from the speech made by STALIN, Soviet Russia is asking England to commence landing troops on French soil, but Britain, of course, would not listen; she merely promised to bring chaos within Germany by means of her air forces. Air raids conducted all over Germany, including Berlin, on the night of the 7th is an indication of this. 117 British planes flew over Germany (in addition to this number, 16 Soviet planes flew over East Prussia) and splitting into groups flying respectively to different destinations, scattered bombs. 10 planes in formation of 5 each came over Berlin, but the damage they did was out of question, only 3 persons having been killed. These raids have had no military value but served merely to furnish figures used in propaganda concerning the activity of the RAF. However, since the raids are being carried on with the purpose just described, it is expected that they will be continued in the future on successive nights.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 795

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

November 21, 1941
1350.

On the 19th, a German of high reliability reported on the outlook of the German-Soviet war as follows:

1. On the 14th, favorable weather returned at last and major campaigns along the entire front were resumed. They are progressing according to schedule at present. A frontal attack on Moscow will be avoided, and instead the strategists are planning to encircle it and put it under a siege. If the present ideal weather conditions last for about one more week, this encirclement should be completed in about ten days. In the north, that force which is proceeding from Kalinin has already moved southeastward.

This strategy is being adopted because of the lessons learned in Odessa and Kharkov of the dangers of land mines. Simultaneously, with the encirclement, ——— (two lines garbled—contents guessed at) the city will be treated to aerial bombardment and artillery fire.

This coincides with political guidance organ's claims that the U.S.S.R. is going to be split up and the main cities of Moscow and Leningrad destroyed. It is true that even after Moscow is encircled, it will be able to hold out for awhile; but this fact will in no way affect Germany's strategy. It will not alter the fact that the Russian compaign will have been brought to a close. The fact that Hitler announced the appointment of Rosenburg to the post of Minister of the eastern occupied area (see my message # 1342[a]) indicates that this phase of the campaing is changing from one of a military nature to a political nature.

2. On the southern sector, the German forces are making scheduled advances to the southwest of Rostov. Their objective is that part of the Caucasus which lies to the north of the Caucasian mountain range. Because of a military campaign during the winter months

in these mountains is an exceedingly hazardous undertaking, the attempt to cross these mountains and carry the war into the Near East will probably not be made until next spring.

3. In the north, with the exception of completing Leningrad's encirclement, (the communication line across Lake Ladoga will shortly be cut off), the campaign has been completed. About two thirds of those forces shall be withdrawn to Germany very shortly.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 796

FROM: Berlin — November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1353.

(*Translator's note:* Message very badly garbled.)

Re my # 1350[a].

The following is what that same person related to a member of my staff on the 21st:

1. In the war against the Soviet Union, the major developments were in the Kalinin sector. In the vicinity of (Kalinin?) fresh infantry and artillery forces crossed the Volga. In the Tula area, after capturing the town of Tula itself, the Germans are forcing their way northeastward. Mopping up?) has been completed in the RONETH BEKKEN area, too, and the Germans are continuing their advance.

2. The Germans have been anticipating the British counterattack in North Africa. However, in view of the fact that the British forces in the area consist of about twelve divisions, which is about four to one, the Germans are probably in for a fairly tough fight. However, the Axis forces will not be crushed speedily. The only concern is that in the event that the fighting is prolonged, some difficulty may be encountered in getting supplies to the Axis forces. Through increasingly close relations with France, and because of other factors, the British probably will not win the victories that they anticipate.

3. Weygand's retirement was delayed because of the accidental death of Huntziger in an airplane crash. Germans consider his retirement a diplomatic victory in view of the fact the Weygand was being supported by the United States to prevail upon Vichy to recognize the De Gaulle faction. As for his successor, the French suggested Raulet, but the Germans turned him down and let the post go to (ZYUHN?). This man had been captured by the Germans but had been released by special request of the Pétain Government. The Germans have confidence in him.

This incident is very significant from a political viewpoint in view of the critical situation in North Africa. Militarily, too, much significance should be attached to it, since it comes at a time when the Germans and Italians are bent on strengthening their positions in North Africa and since, in the future, the Axis forces may find it necessary to secure supplies from Algeria and Tunis.

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[a] See IV, 795.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 797

FROM: Berlin (OSIMA) November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1384.

(Part 1 fo 2.)[a]

Secret.

The following is what a reliable German told a member of this office on the 27th.

1. In the vicinity of Moscow, the German forces have reached, from the north, a point about 25 kilometers to the city. On the south side, the Germans have advanced as far as RYASUMA[b], but it seems that the Russian force, including eight Far Eastern divisions (actually probably two divisions), are putting up a stiff resistance. Although the war is not progressing as rapidly as planned, the fact nevertheless remains that the fall of Moscow is a matter of time. Also in the vicinity of KUURUSUKU[c] and ROSTOV the Russian forces are making strong and courageous attacks.

2. As to the war in North Africa, the Axis forces have been able to fight more successfully than they at first thought they could and seem to have practically eliminated the crisis. Out of the three mechanized detachments, they have completely annihilated one detachment and have dealt serve blows on the second. Although the third detachment attempted to attack from the rear, the German forces have now cut off its rear. (Complete destruction of this detachment also is a matter of time.) In addition to the above, four divisions of Infantry troops stumbled upon the German-Italian line, but after being dealt with severely, retreated. A section of SORUME[d] has been occupied by the British forces, but the principle sections of the city are still in the hands of the Axis forces; nor has Bardia fallen. At present, due to sand storms, considerable difficulties are experienced in reconnoitering and so it is impossible to tell whether the forces enumerated above comprise the entire army or whether there are additional two or three units held in readiness behing them. This is why the German authorities are issuing conservative reports. If the number given above is the entire number, the Axis forces might well say that they have won the victory. This success is due to the fact that the Italian forces fought as bravely as the German forces. It may be said to be due to the fact that ROMMEL, at MUSSOLINI's request, commanded the entire German-Italian Army. It was proven that the Italian Army could be an excellent one if rightly led.

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[a] Part 2 not available.
[b] Ryazan (?), southeast of Moscow.
[c] Kana spelling.
[d] El Sollum; west of Alexandria.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 798

FROM: Tokyo November 13, 1941
TO: Hsinking #805.

(Alexandrovsk to Tokyo #96.)

Retransmitting #96[a] from Alexandrovsk to Tokyo.

(1) Someone observed armed soldiers and horses and vehicles loaded on three sampans (made of steel about 500 tons capacity) being transported from Alexandrovsk to the opposite coast around the 1st of the month.

(2) It seems that the populace are giving up their shirts, piece goods, warm clothing, etc. even including their new purchases.

(3) The distribution of bread is being further restricted. Workmen get 600 grams and all others 300 grams.

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[a] Not otherwise available.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 799

FROM: Tokyo — November 14, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #812.

(Message # 167 *from Sofia* addressed to this Minister.)

1. The two chief anti-German factions in Serbia are the Nationalist party and the Communist party. The former number about 10,000 and occupy the Rodoniku[a] Mountains south of Belgrade; the Communists number about 20,000 and are scattered through the towns and cities of the interior, active chiefly from the direction of Bosuo[a] to Rumania.

2. About two division of LISZT's army, a detachment of Austrians, 30,000 armed Rumanians under General NEDITCH, as well as young men's associations and national guards are operating against the above factions and all remaining anti-German agitators, but since the German army has had little experience in partisan warfare, the progress is not favorable.

The craze for assassinating German soldiers still continues. (Recently the Empress returning to this country from Italy and the Rumanian Premier visiting Budapest both went via Rumania since it was felt unsafe to cross Serbia.) Consequently, the German retaliation becomes more and more severe. On October 17th in the city of Kureguekutsu[a], because students again murdered some German soldiers, more than 2,000 teachers, students and others were executed. Again on November 3rd, 30,000 people were arrested at one time. (The Education Minister, YŌNICHI[a], who had just resigned that day, was among the 3,000 arrested in Belgrade alone.)

3. From private sources we learn that if the progress of Germany's power politics continues unfavorable, she is considering commencing operations against Serbia and enlisting the services of Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Croatian troops in this country against them. They made this suggestion to the Bulgarian king, but he politely refused. Under these circumstances, the Serbian people find German oppression becoming unbearable and view the future with pessimisim. There seem to be some now who even think it would be better to be annexed by Bulgaria.

4. According to the report of Lt. Col. SAKABIHARA who has just returned from a two-weeks' trip through Macedonia, Albania, and Greece, although the peace and order in occupied Greece appear to be preserved practically as usual, the food shortage especially in the southern portion, is becoming acute. Unless some relief measures are taken at once, the national distress after the autum will be beyond description.

There is no apparent increase or new activity of the German Army.

Transmit this to Germany, Italy, Turkey, etc.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 800

FROM: Berlin (Osima) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1328.

Specialists among those here at this time have unanimously agreed on the following objectives and organization to be utilized in the study and investigation of the steel industry in Germany:

1. Japanese technicians now resident in Germany are all in accord with the plan to utilize their utmost abilities in order that a tehcnical investigation can be made possible and are prepared to assist in the acquisition of new technicians and the necessary equipment.
2. They will work in close liaison with German officials and industrialists.
3. In order that this can be done, they propose the organization of a central office here to serve as the Berlin branch of the Japanese Steel Production Control Association.
4. This organization will work in close communication with the head office of the Steel Production Control Association in Japan.
5. They propose the installation of a necessary number of persons to serve on the staff in order to take care of clerical duties, as well as technical experts.
6. Their lowest estimate of the amount of money necessary to make this possible is: 15(000 ?) yen.

We here in this office feel that this is an exceptionally profitable set-up.

Please transmit the details of this to the Minister for Commerce and Industry, as well as to HIRAO, Chief of the Steel Production Control Association. Please lend your good offices so that the required number of men and funds may be made available.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 801

FROM: Berlin October 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo #024.

Committee Wire #80.

Please transmit this to the Chief of the Army Fuel Bureau and the Chief of the Fuel Department.

Please report to us immediately your opinion concerning the three (ck. 3) men, YOSHIDA, HANAOKA, and KINOSHITA, mentioned in your wire #972[a] (Committee wire #76), obtaining experience in the method of manufacture of high grade lubricating oils at the *RUAHEMI* Company's (?plant?).

[a] Not available.

Trans. 1-31-45

No. 802

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN) (War Offices, Sen. Adjutant) #026.

To the Chiefs of the Technical Headquarters and of the General Affairs Department.

I have received the (? photographs ?) of the 75 mm. powder chamber and cartridge case —1G— they are extremely clear. Furthermore, please wire me immediately the plans for the

7 mm. (? gun ?) and the 47 mm., since they will be necessary for the execution of the contract.

Trans. 4-21-45

No. 803

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN) (War Office, Senior Adjutant) #027.

(Parts 1—4.)[a]

Part 1:

Committee wire 81. Please transmit to Air Headquarters.

As a result of investigations on the purchase of materials for study based on the plan for import of technicians, except for heavy articles such as planes, engines, etc. we can get the following articles within one year after ordering. Since there is a good chance of being able to use return transport for goods which can be delivered in four months or less, let us know at once the goods you wish and also, clarify the question of payment.

Furthermore, it's impossible to get an actual RHEINMETALL 13 MM machine cannon. However, the Germans wish to sell us the manufacturing rights, so what shall we do?

Part 2:

One month or less (after the number of articles, the price is given).

1. RE VI-12-C sighting apparatus for firing and bombing use; one; 3460 yen.

Automatic bomb sight LOTFE-7-Q; one; 18790 yen.

Precision photometer; two; 266 yen.

20 cm. high angle continuous air camera "RB" 20-30; 89700 yen.

Part 3:

KERUBIN flying oxygen respiratory apparatus M-38 type; three; 8-6 yen.

Electrically heated flying clothes; three; 750 yen.

—RUFURI-U-I —2M—; one; 23-5 yen.

2. Four months or less:

ASKANIA —1M—automatic pilot device; three; 56238 yen.

U-YU-UTA KAMERA: one; 9472 yen.

60 ton (? repetition ?) testing apparatus; one; 4814 yen.

Part 4:

60 cm. continuous air camera "RB"-30-301; one; 81810 yen.

Ultra-photo apparatus; one; 2878 yen.

3. Over five months, under one month (sic). (The number of months is given in parentheses.)

(? Optical ?) type (? wave length ?) recording apparatus; one; 22698 yen.

5 ton (? fatigue ?) testing device; one (12); 11965 yen.

Visible and infra red ray wave length spectrometer; one (6); 8435 yen.

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[a] Part 5 not readable. Text of parts 3 and 4 imperfect.

Trans. 3-19-45

No. 804

FROM: Berlin — November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #061.

Please communicate this to the Air Headquarters.

If you want 50 or fewer of the HK-19 Type (13-18), which the German Air Force is now using widely as an aerial camera, I can get them immediately. If it is necessary to manufacture them, please send instructions that a pre-payment be made.

Price, each (including film magazine): 1245 marks.

Interchangeable dry plate holder: 260 marks.

Trans. 2-28-45

No. 805

FROM: Tokyo (JTXRYR) — November 25, 1941
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN) — #000.

Air service headquarters wire #1609.

2nd. The order in which we wish to purchase is as follows (the numbers correspond to the paragraphs and the articles listed in order in your wire #27[a].) However, we wish to purchase the manufacturing rights to the RHEINMETALL 13 mm. machine gun and the articles is paragraph 1 #1 and paragraph 2 #3.

Paragraph 1 #4, 2 #1, 1 #5, 1 #2, 3 #4, 1 #6, 1 #7, 1 #3, 2 #5, 2 #2, 2 #4, 3 #5, 3 #1, 3 #2, 4 #1, 3 #3, 4 #2.

From the Chief of General Affairs Bureau of Air Service Headquarters.

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[a] See IV, 803.

Trans. 4-25-45

No. 806

FROM: Berlin (Gmbrk) — November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Rikygunsho Fukkan, War Office, Sen. Adjutant) — #049.

Parts 2 and 3[a].

The performance of the ME-210 (particularly its speed and maneuverability) has won it a great deal of praise. It will soon replace the ME-110 type. However (? no ?) detailed descriptions of it have been given. Our plan of developing a similar plane in cooperation with the Germans will depend upon the establishment of accurate performance, practicability, and production data for the ME-210. Its practicability will be confirmed within a year or two from now.

Part 3:

It is believed that Japan's requirements can be fulfilled by installing a new type motor (said to be the DB-605 or the DB-611, but this is not certain). In that case, its possible performance would be more or less as follows:

(1) Speed about 640 km.

(2) Cruising range—same as that of the ME-210. In case it can carry a (? belly ?) tank, the HP of the motor will be increased. Because of the increase in fuel consumption. . .

[a] Parts 8, 9 and 11-17 same number, no other parts available.

Trans. 3-31-45

No. 807

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 049.

Parts 8 and 9[a]

Construction varies in accordance with the different purposes to be fulfilled. It is not the so-called (? standard system ?) of our country.

(1) Interceptor
(2) STUKA
(3) Long range reconnaissance plane

2. Performance as an interceptor.
Engine DB-601F
Wing area—36.2 sq. meters
Speed—580 km
Cruising range 2200-2500 km.

Part 9.
Ceiling—9500 meters
Total weight—8800 kilograms
Armament:
in the front of the fuselage
two fixed MG17
two 20mm guns (—1G— 15mm)
Above the fuselage, on both sides
two remote control twin
13mm MG

Since the crew consists of 2 men, in two fuseage turrets, to the bottom and to the rear . . .

[a] Parts 2, 3, and 11-17 same number; no other parts available.

Trans. 3-31-45

No. 808

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN, War Office Sen. Adjutant) # 049.

Parts 11-17[a].

4. Performance as a long range reconnaissance plane.
Two continuous air cameras are fixed in the bomb bay at the bottom front of the fuselage. Other data are the same as for the (? preceding type ?).

5. A comparison of the ME-210 with the ME-110, showing the progress in design, is as follows. (This information was offered to us by the ME Company, in order to show the capabilities of the new type.)

Maximum speed—from 545 km. to 620 km. (conditions unknown).

Part 12

(? low level ?) speed—from 460 km. to 510 km. Climbing speed to 6,000 meters—from 10.9 minutes, at 7 tons, to 12.3 minutes, at 9 tons.

Ceiling—from 9200 meters, at 7 tons, to 8900 meters, at 9 tons.

Cruising range (combat time—30 minutes) from 1100 km. to 2540 km. In particular, the bullet proofing has been (increased ?). It is noteworthy that much importance has been attached to this point.

Part 13

Construction time in mass production—from 16 hours to 11 hours.

Kinds of accessories—from 637 to 201

Kinds of bolts—from 340 to 156.

6. Some reference data obtained at the time of this interview are as follows:

(1) The question of whether air cooling or liquid cooling is better in a high speed plane has not yet been settled. However, the Germans have the opinion that air cooling is difficult at high altitudes, of 10,000 meters or so.

Part 14

For this reason, they are studying a special cooling (? fan ?). However, this has not yet become successful, since it results in the loss of a great deal of thrusting power. They say it would be all right to use it with Japan's very powerful air-cooled engines, if the HP is (? sufficient ?).

(2) The ME Company is studying the Spitfire which was recently obtained. Its speed, according to the Germans, is up to 520 km., and its performance is superior to that of the old ME-109E type.

Part 15

However, no comparison has been made between it and the present day ME-109F type (it has been said that this plane has actually attained a speed of about 600 km.). (The German Air Force believes that its fighter has a definite superiority in speed of 60 to 70 km. per hour.) It is said that the proportion of losses of this type in recent Anglo-German air battles has been from 1 to 7 to 1 to 10.

Part 16

(3) According to statements made by officials of the ME Company, the expansion of the front in Russia has resulted in a great expansion of aircraft activity, and this has increased the number of losses.

Moreover, losses caused by deficiencies in airfields necessitate a far greater number of replacements than do losses incurred in air battles.

(4) My question as to whether or not the FOCKE WULF single-seat fighter (FW-190) is being used at the front was answered in the affirmative.

Part 17

Although its performance, etc., is not known, I believe that it is about the same as the ME-109E type.

Our proposals in regard to such cooperative planning of (? fighter ?) planes as may be necessary have been stated above. After giving full consideration to the performance data concerning the ME-210 type plane, which the German Army is about to complete, please give in advance full instructions to the technicians who will be sent in the future for cooperative planning. To make demands which cannot be fulfilled. . . . .

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[a] Parts 2, 3, 8, and 9 same number; no other parts available.

Trans. 3-31-45

No. 809

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) November 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN) (War Office, Sen. Adjutant) #006.

(2 parts complete.)

From the Chief of the Technical Headquarters section in Germany.

To the (? Technical ?) headquarters and Ordnance Administration headquarters.

A report on the results of a visit to the *MŌZERU* factory, made for the purpose of learning methods of constructing rifle stocks from laminated materials.

1. Laminated material stock.

(a) Laminated stock materials consist of beech boards about 1 mm. thick put together with a glue material. We are going to make a study of the glue material (TEGO-LIME FILM) and of the lamination process.

Part 2

(b) Its weight in the finished rifle is 100 to 150 grams more than that of walnut.

(c) The laminated materials need not be given ordinary air drying, but can be dried by hot air in eight hours; the water content is 9 to 10%. Its degree of (warping ?) is small in comparison with that of walnut.

(d) Its (? time of bonding ?) is the same as that of walnut —1G— RINGUMAITO[a], but it is about 4 times as —1G—.

2. Walnut materials are also used. Their drying consists of 8 weeks of hot air drying after a minimum of 6 months of ordinary air drying. —1G— is lowered from 22 to 7%. The room temperature is 25° and the humidity is 60%.

3. In testing the stocks, emphasis is placed on the use of external type cohesion testing devices at the time of completion. Together with seeking —2G— they carry out complete drying, as described above, —2G— barrel housing. Since they are endeavoring to improve the degree of —1G—, they have made it possible to use (? extraction ?) tests during firing tests.

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[a] "RINGU" may refer to "RINGO", part of trade names used by WILHELM SURING, Dresden resin lacquer manufacturer.

Trans. 3-29-45

No. 810

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) November 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKYGUNJIKAN) (Vice Minister of War) #156.

(Part 1.)[a] (Committee Wire 97.)

The Japanese and Manchukuo cargo which is to be loaded on blockade-runner number 1 after this will be increased more and more to amount to a gross tonnage of about 2700 tons.

Japanese authorities about 1700 tons. With these items—MITSUI—about 891 tons.

MITSUBISHI—about 159 tons.

OKURA—about 443 tons.

The other companies—187 tons.

Manchukuo authorities—about 1000 tons—about 30 tons being Swiss cargo.

The increase in goods is at present progressing satisfactorily and by December 15 all of the freight will be assembled at certain places in Germany, whereafter special trains —2M— (will bring) the freight to the port of departure.

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[a] Parts 3—6 same number, part 2 not available.

Trans. 4-25-45

No. 811

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) November 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN) (Vice Minister of War) #156.

(Parts 3—6.)[a]

Part 3.

Furthermore, the ILLIES Company, in accordance with the Japanese Army's plan, will operate the transportation of the agricultural and industrial cargo for Germany. Regarding the cargo only that which is acceptable to the German Economic Ministry will be shipped. The ILLIES Company will assume responsibility for the damage to the cargo, within the limits referred to in the insurance.

2nd Contract (? data ?). The ILLIES Company which is handling the cargo will send a notification from —2M— to the manufacturer. Because the ILLIES Company is handling the agricultural and industrial cargo and its transportation they will take charge of the shipping of the cargo (? in behalf of ? —2M—) the manufacturer and will notify SHOWA Commercial Company of the receipt. The ILLIES Company will have nothing to do with the payment of the unpaid freight.

Part 4.

3rd—The fees for storehouse expenses and land and sea transportation will be temporarily advanced by the ILLIES Company, then at a requisite time they (ILLIES) will transfer said account to SHOWA Commercial Company. The SHOWA Company says they will pay immediately.

Since the plan is to have the bill of lading drawn up with SHOWA Commercial Company as consignor, when the said cargo arrives in Japan, only the Manchukuo authorities and SHOWA Commercial Company will possess the disposal authority.

Part 5.

4th—The ILLIES Company will attach conditions to the entire transportation insurance up to Manchukuo (? and ?) Japan at which points the lists of goods will be delivered from the manufacturer's warehouses. The insurance reates will be 1.5 per cent for Japan, 1.75 per cent for Manchukuo and on these fees a tax of 3 per cent will be levied. War risk insurance was not affixed but the commission charges for the above-mentioned transportation insurance will be loaned the account by the ILLIES Company, and these should be paid back immediately.

5th—Commission charges, storages and transportation expenses, together with the transportation insurance and other expenses add up to 3 per cent of the miscellaneous expenses loaned by the ILLIES Company.

6th—The special account which includes the charges of Parts 3, 4, and 5 are to be paid immediately and in addition should be paid in Inland Marks. Payment to be made not more than 4 weeks at the latest after the appointed date for payment.

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[a] Part 1 same number, part 2 not available.

Trans. 4-25-45

No. 812

FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY) (War Office, Senior Adjutant) December 7, 1941
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN) # 000.

Reply to your wire # 218[a].

Please get at once the 2 (ck 2) Universal Parallel[b] Testing Machines, made by the ROSENHAUSEN Company, from the SIMON EVERS Trading Company and send them by return YANAGI.

Army Technical Headquarters, General Affairs Department Chief.

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[a] Not available.
[b] HEIKO.

Trans. 5-16-45

No. 813

FROM: Tokyo November 18, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 829.

226 from Ankara to this Foreign Minister.

1. During the ceremony attending the opening of Parliament the other day, the President of Turkey made a speech, in which he referred to the question of peace, saying that if Turkey could be instrumental in using its good offices to bring about peace, it would be indeed a fine thing. Since then it has been rumored that a conference may be held in Vienna and on the 10th, "The Times" argued that although peace rumors are afloat in various neutral countries, all such stories were merely German propaganda. On the 13th, Ambassador PAPEN said to me, "At the present time, Germany has absolutely no intention, as you should know, of making any peace proposals. The article in "The Times" is, of course, nothing but first-class British propaganda. What the Turkish President doubtless meant was that for England to continue her losing struggle would be merely to prolong it to no purpose. He probably hopes very sincerely to see peace come, therefore, I fancy that this British propaganda has served no purpose but to offend Turkey."

2. Further, in connection with the President's speech, it is rumored here that after the fall of Moscow, Turkey will act as mediator. However, there is no indication that the belligerent nations are in any wise beguiled by them. Still Turkey, on the excuse of offering her mediations and peace talks, may find a way to change her foreign policy. We must watch this course of events.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 814

FROM: Tokyo November 18, 1941
TO: Shanghai # 1163.

(Priority.)

The Italian naval attaché in Shanghai is negotiating with the Mitsui Company there to buy through the branch office of Taiseri[a] 2,000 tons of Siamese rubber to be shipped C.I.F. during December and January; the price of 4,000,000 bahts to be paid in Shanghai dollars.

Since the question of Siamese rubber has been settled in accordance with my #1159[b], please instruct Mitsui to refuse.

Please get in touch with the port authorities.

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[a] Kana spelling.
[b] See IV, 1157.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 815

FROM: Shanghai — November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #2111.

Re your #1159[a] and #1163[b].

As a result of our investigations here, we have learned that the "Esso" (Panama register, due to arrive in port about the 20th), carrying a load of rubber of which the German firm of Karlwitz receives 320 tons (value in military script about 2,000,000 yen), the Japanese Continental Trading Company 203 tons (value about 1,300,000 yen, certified by the Chinese authorities), and a balance of about 70 or 80 tons (value about 500,000 yen; please verify the above conjectural amount of goods for Japanese merchants with the Teikoku Fire and Marine Insurance Company).

Our official contacted Karlwitz and the German Trade Attaché in an effort to have their portion of the above rubber released to Japan, but they said that since, in accordance with the contract, payment had been made by the German government some months before, they had no authority to handle the matter. Therefore, please negotiate with WOHLTHAT in Tokyo. This is all for the moment.

The following is strictly secret outside the department.

Although there is much supervision by our office of movement on the list of rubber export permits, we would like, as we suggested in our #1988[c], to release customs permits, under the protection of our Government, and, without any stricter supervision than is necessary to insure equal distribution of important goods, prevent Italy from buying any rubber here as suggested in your caption telegram.

Although there may be violent protests from the Japanese firms, we think it best not to have the rubber unloaded to the wharf until the central and local authorities have established adequate control, in order to prevent foreign firms from acquiring it.

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[a] See IV, 1157.
[b] See IV, 814.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 816

FROM: Berlin — November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1351.

Re my message #1350[a].

1. The political aims of the war against the Soviet Union is not so much the destruction of Bolshevism as it is the dismemberment of Russia as a nation. The fact that the Soviet put up

a stronger fight than was expected, paradoxically strengthened Germany's determination to attain her basic aim.

The German strategy with regard to Leningrad and Moscow involves considerable cruelties, but in view of the Soviet Union's determination to pursue a war of complete destruction, it is an unavoidable one from Germany's position.

2. British forces in the Near East and Egypt now number 31 divisions, of which only 11 divisions have modern equipment. The remainder are composed of second rate forces. Therefore, when once the German campaign in that area is launched, speedy developments are predicted in spite of the vastness of the area involved. Please be convinced of the fact that Germany is not falling for the British attempt to divide Germany's forces and thus get herself involved in a long term war, which is Britain's aim.

3. In view of the circumstances described in paragraph 2 of my message referred to in the heading, there is no immediate rush to do anything about the Turkish problem. The matter will be given thorough consideration from all angles, so as to prevent a second Yugoslavia.

4. Settlements have been reached on practically all major points of German-French relations. Germany has promised the opening up of many places and the lessening of the load in the occupied areas. Moreover, Germany has guaranteed not only French retention of her African colonies, but the handing over of certain parts of Central Africa to be taken from the British, to the French. Mussolini has concurred in withdrawing Italian demands for Tunis. Italy will be amply rewarded by Egypt and Syria. There have been absolutely no talks between Germany and France pertaining to any area outside of Europe and Africa. Nor has Germany made any guarantees outside of the above-mentioned area.

5. The German navy has been strongly advocating the dispatching of German submarines to the Mediterranean Sea. In deference to Italy, however, Hitler has been refraining from doing so. However, his patience came to an end when recently German ships were sunk in the vicinity of Sicily. As a result, 12 German submarines were sent into the Mediterranean. The sinking of the Ark Royal was the fruit of this decision. These submarines are based at Corsica. (Please keep this point a strict secret.)

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*See IV, 795.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 817

FROM: Tokyo — November 21, 1941
TO: Berlin — #969.

At present, the possibility of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union seems remote. However, it may be that Germany would prefer to avoid being faced with a long term resistance by the U.S.S.R., so that she—Germany—may transfer her entire fighting forces to some other part. On the Soviet side, it seems possible that sentiment for peace may develop when she views the situation from the standpoint of reconstruction.

Our relations with the United States may have considerable effect on our southward program, depending, of course, on what turns those relations take. In other words, our relationship with Great Britain and the United States has a great bearing on the future of our national greatness.

For this reason, we would like to avoid the rise of any violence at this time. At the same time, we would like to break up the policy of British-U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint action. We would, therefore, welcome, if anything, peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. For the purpose of enhancing our position, we would not be opposed to mediating in a peace, if such a course is possible.

Will you, therefore, bearing the above in mind, keep an eye on developments ----- (message unfinished).

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 818

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

November 25, 1941
869.

Received from Ankara as # 228 on the 19th.

Re my # 226[a].

A few days ago the London radio broadcast the news that Ambassador (von) Papen had given an interview to a Spanish newspaper correspondent during which Papen was reported to have said that concurrent with the conclusion of the German-Soviet war Germany intended to propose peace terms to Britain.

In response to my questioning on the 19th the Ambassador said it was his policy not to grant interviews to anyone. However, it was a fact that he had had a conversation with the above correspondent but that the talk had been limited to a discussion of miscellaneous matters. However, the correspondent apparently let his imagination have free play and basing his observations on the fact that German bombings of Britain were scarce and also on the President's parliamentary speech (see my caption telegram) he drew the conclusion that the chances of war being prolonged were rather remote and so reported to his head office. British and American correspondents resident in Spain seized on this report and made it the basis of the above broadcast. As far as he was concerned he wished to negate the whole thing.

At present both Germany's military and economic power are exceptionally strong and she has not the slightest intention of proposing a compromise peace. Germany has supreme confidence in ultimate victory and the attendant peace to be attained in the future. Papen concluded that it was his earnest desire that Japan have absolutely no misgivings on this point.

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[a] See IV, 813.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 819

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

November 26, 1941
874.

337 from Helsinki to the Minister.

It has been ascertained confidentially from Finnish acquaintances that Tikhvin[a] has recently fallen and that the number of Soviet soldiers coming over to the Finnish Army is increasing with the completion of the Leningrad encirclement. When the number deserting is large, they are driven away with machine guns; when small, they are taken prisoner and interrogated. Putting these confidential conversations together, it is clear that Leningrad no longer receives foodstuffs. There is insufficient fuel for mild engagements or even for severe cold. There is an increasing number of deaths from freezing. Horses are being used as food and those remaining alive, because of fodder shortage, fall down dead while working. The rivers both inside and outside the city have become frozen and cannot be used for transport. Moreover, there is difficulty in transport because of fuel shortage, such as benzine, etc. Factory workers have at last been rounded up and sent to to the front. Those factories of military importance escaping damage lack workers, and there is not enough ammunition. The sup-

plies already on hand are being used against the Germans in the south. For several days there has been no answering fire to Finnish attacks. Although conditions are such that Leningrad could readily be taken by a rush movement, there remains the problem of feeding the three or four million people. The Finns or Germans do not want to assume this responsibility, leaving it to the Russians.

You have already been informed regarding the German inactivity in northern Finland. According to what has been said by important military coming from that district, there is the rumor that German military circles give General RORANTSU[b] a bad reputation in view of the idle condition of the army there, the recent large number of deaths from freezing, incomplete military preparations in this district, as well as the ignorance shown in the difficult German representation set-up.

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[a] East southeast of Leningrad, on railroad to Vologda.
[b] Kana spelling (Probably LORENTZ).

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 820

FROM: Tokyo — December 2, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 897.

I am herewith sending you message # 807 from Vienna to this Foreign Minister:

Minister NEUBACHER, who was formerly Mayor of this city and up to now was Financial Plenipotentiary in Roumania, and who has just been ordered by Goering to take charge of all German oil interests from the Baltic nations to the Caucasus, has just visited me and told me the following:

1. Down the Volga, we are going to attack Stalingrad[a] and Astrakhan[b] from Rostov[c] and cut off the Caucasus. On the other hand, along the Black Sea we will also attack Batum[d], then after occupying Baku[e], just as soon as possible, regardless of the winter, we will seize the Caucasus.

2. No matter if the oil fields are fired, although it will be difficult to reconstruct them, Germany has used every resource in preparing to reconstruct them and to make new drillings.

3. My main headquarters will be in two places—Berlin and particularly Tiflis[f], however, I am soon going to Rostov. I am leaving for those places soon by a military plane.

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[a] City of Lower Volga region.
[b] City on Island in Volga River.
[c] City on Don River of N. Caucasus region, Soviet Russia.
[d] Seaport on Black Sea of Ajaria Republic, Georgia, Transcaucasia.
[e] City of Azerbaijan Repulbic on West coast of Caspian Sea.
[f] City, E. Georgia, Transcaucasia on Kura River.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 821

FROM: Tokyo — November 28, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 782.

(Corrected to # 882.)

1. We have been communicating with the German representatives here, giving them much of the Manchukuoan opinions and, as a result of a talk between OTAKI and WOHLTHAT, the final draft for a new German-Manchukuoan pact is proposed by Germany as follows:

(a) The title of the pact is "A provisional agreement for extending German-Manchukuoan Economic Relations."

(b) This pact is effective until the last day of March next year.

(c) The balance of 85,000 tons of soy beans shall be delivered before the end of March at the old price although the agreement expires the end of January.

(d) 4,500 tons of soy bean oil, including the undelivered balance on the contract for jimson, shall also be delivered by the end of March.

(e) Exchange permits shall be given for the unused balance of German contingent goods specified in the pact of May 31, 1941. (Minister WAGNER must have a list of about one million marks' worth of goods in Japan, Manchukuo, Shanghai and other Far Eastern points.)

(f) Export permits shall be given for German goods which are now held or may in the future be held in Manchukuo at the convenience of the holders. If a state of emergency should arise, these goods shall not be confiscated nor seized. The above should be administered on a rational basis.

(g) The application of this contract will be acted on by specified conferences of local tradesmen.

(h) The term for repayment of the "W" account shall be extended to May 31, 1942. However, this understanding shall be made directly with the bank at the same time the pact is set up: it will not be mentioned in the pact.

(i) 1,000,000 marks shall be appropriated at the end of November and December respectively and 1,500,000 marks at the end of January and February respectively from the "B" account for repayment of the "X" account. (Although their representatives have already expressed their wishes to WAGNER, when I talked with WAGNER on the 21st I did not mention this. As he believes it should be handled from special funds, I think it is best for Manchukuo to negotiate for necessary funds on short term credit under this measure.)

(j) Germany will offer credit to a maximum of 10,000,000 marks, because of the reduction in amount of shipments of Manchukuoan products (soy beans and soy bean oil). For this credit a new account, "V" will be set up. Thus, the "X" account should be liquidated during the term of the new pact through the 5,000,000 marks from account "B" and soy bean payments, and account "W" should be reduced by at least 1,000,000 marks from soy bean payments.

(k) The balance of account "B" shall be used for payments to Germany. Manchukuo is at liberty to make payments under heading (e) from any account whatsoever.

(l) The second section and the second paragraph of the third section of the pact of May 31, 1941 (means for conversion of obligations not yet settled at the expiration of the pact) shall be left unchanged.

2. Although Manchukuo will probably want to pay Germany through regular channels, because of the obstacles to transportation I think it would be better to deduct German payments from (e) together with a suitable rate of interest. Moreover, believing that the terms of this pact are reasonable since Manchukuo's credit responsibilities are greatly increased, as soon as they get Manchukuo's approval Germany will send it to Berlin. As they wish to have it returned to Tokyo with the signature WOHLTHAT, SPINDLER and the Manchukuoan representatives not later than Christmas, they demand speedy consideration by Manchukuo.

Please press the Manchukuo government for prompt adoption of the above pact and please wire a reply. Since Japan and Germany are virtually in agreement on the Chinese text, please urge them again to let us know at once their opinion of the German-Manchukuoan understanding mentioned in our secret message #474[a] dated September 27th (German edition: German text).

This telegram has been discussed with military authorities and Vice-Minister MIURA.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 822

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

November 29, 1941
1393.

(In 3 parts complete.)

By his request, I was supposed to have called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during the evening of yesterday, the 28th. Suddenly, however, he requested that the time be postponed and it was not until 10:30 at night that I finally saw him.

This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long conference of the bigwigs of the government and military, from Goering down, was being held at the official residence of the Fuehrer. The war against the Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be unerringly foretold. Next year's campaigns were mapped at this conference, taking into consideration the points brought up at the conference of the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Europe. It is an absolute certainty that Japan's moves were also given discussion at this conference.

1. Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

Ribbentrop: "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.

"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself."

I: "I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?"

Ribbentrop: "Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do."

Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops[a], and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

(Part 2)

2. I made inquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet Union.

Ribbentrop: "The Fuehrer has stated that he is now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than he had planned at first. He is now bent on completely wiping out that state and went on to announce that practically all of the main military objectives had

been attained and that a greater part of the German troops would shortly be brought back to Germany.

"Following up those campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be launched in earnest. Next Spring Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia."

I: "Approximately when do you expect that?"

Ribbentrop: "The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules."

I: "According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time."

Ribbentrop: "That is an item that Germany has been considering for some time. By summer of next year I do not believe that air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility."

3. I then asked him about the campaign against England proper to which he replied that before launching landing operations against England, Germany will probably completely wipe out Britain's influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea. I got the impression that more emphasis is being placed on this area than heretofore. So, I asked whether it was Germany's intention to conclude the war without attempting to go through with the campaign against England.

Ribbentrop: "Germany has, of course, made all necessary preparations for this campaign. However, Germany is in receipt of intelligences which would seem to indicate that all is not well within England herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives; that Churchill's influence is on the wane; that Bevin, Chief of the Labor Party, is advocating revolutionary measures. All of these are tending to make the preservation of order there increasingly difficult.

Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe all of this. However, I am convinced that things are getting bad in England. Under these circumstances, it may be that Germany's various other campaigns may cause England to fall even without our going through with our landing operations against England herself.

(Part 3)

"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control European Russia."

4. In conclusion, I said: "I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy but also have all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?"

Ribbentrop: "We would like to end this war during the next year. However, under certain circumstances it is possible that it will have to be continued on into the following year.

"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point."

In closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please, therefore, exercise particular caution in handling this message.

I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval attaché's, Lt-Gen. (Vice Adm. ?) Nomura, and Maj-Gen. (Rear Adm. ?) Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too.

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[a] DoD Comment: This is originator's footnote: (In the last section of the first part of this message, we wrote . . . "the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops" . . . That should have read: "the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war".)

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 823

FROM: Berlin — November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1370.

I plan to have an interview with HITLER at 2:00 p.m. on the 27th. Please reply if you have any ideas to be presented.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 824

FROM: Tokyo — November 27, 1941
TO: Berlin — #981.

Re your #1370[a].

(To be handled in government code.)

Please convey to him confidentially and in a suitable way the following.

"Japan is going ahead with the Japanese-American negotiations with a dauntless attitude knowning that there may be many difficulties in the future course of the negotiations. However, Japan is exercising every care to see that these negotiations do not in any way affect the validity of the Tripartite Pact."

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[a] See IV, 823.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 825

FROM: Tokyo — November 30, 1941
TO: Berlin — #985.

Re my Circular #2387[b].

(Part 1 of 3.)[a]

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986[c].) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination.

Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

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[a] Part 2 not available.
[b] Not available.
[c] See IV, 828.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 826

FROM: Tokyo — November 30, 1941
TO: Berlin — #985.

(Part 3 of 3.)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 827

FROM: Berlin — December 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1396.

Re your #985[a].

In parenthesis at the end of paragraph 2 of your message referred to in the heading you make reference to a note from the German Ambassador in Tokyo concerning what is to be done in the event of an Anglo-Japanese and an American-Japanese war.

Of the various notes exchanged between Japan and Germany at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, I have copies of three notes on hand. They are:

(1) The note from the German Ambassador regarding the meaning of Article 3 of the Pact:

(2) The note from the (Japanese) Foreign Minister regarding what to do in the event of an Anglo-Japanese War; and

(3) The note from the (Japanese) Foreign Minister regarding status of former German colonies in the South Seas area.

I shall be able to encode these three and take them with me. However, I am not able to locate anything like a copy of a note from the German Ambassador in Tokyo pertaining to what to do in the event of an Anglo-Japanese and an American-Japanese war, referred to by you. Will you please send a copy of it to us immediately.

---

[a] See IV, 825, 826.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 828

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 30, 1941
986.

(Strictly Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code.)

(Part 1 of 2.) (Secret outside the department.)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of the diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 829

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 30, 1941
#986.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 830

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

December 5, 1941
#1421.

Re your #986[a].

Chief of Office routing.

I relayed the general outline of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations to the Germans. The United States will, no doubt, attempt to bring about a split between Japan and Germany by publishing the details at some time in the future. It is quite possible that they will try to utilize them in an extensive propaganda program.

I believe that it would be to our interest to advise the Germans and Italians in a very direct manner the contents of the Konoye message which received much publicity at the time, and all other matters that we can.

It may be more convenient for you to do this through the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo.

---

[a] See IV, 828.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 831

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

December 2, 1941
#1405.

(Priority.)

Re my #1401[a].

1. In an interview held at 7 p.m. on the 1st with Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP at his invitation (GAUSS sat in), VON RIBBENTROP said, "It is extremely unfortunate that Chancellor HITLER is not in the city, which makes it impossible to contact him. Though I

believe I will confer with him some time on the 4th, it may not be until the 5th that I actually get to talk to him. As far as the German authorities are concerned, we understand Japan's desire for haste. Therefore, I will do my best to secure as early an interview as possible."

2. Just then GAUSS said, "With regard to the question of immediate participation in the war against the United States, it seems to me more advisable that we do so jointly." I made a statement of affirmation and then continued, "In regard, too, to the matter of a declaration precluding a separate peace, I think that should we conclude it between Japan and Germany and then Japan and Italy, it would be too legalistic and there is not a little fear that there might not be enough restraining influence."

VON RIBBENTROP said, "Since we haven't ascertained as yet the detailed opinion of the Chancellor, please do not wire this to Japan." Please be advised of this.

3. Now the fact that Chancellor HITLER has not yet been contacted is as I have told you above. As soon as an interview has been arranged, which I believe will be possible within a few days, I will pass on to him the instructions you have given me.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 832

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

December 3, 1941
1408.

Secret.

At the time of my interview with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop reported in my # 1407[a] the Minister told me the following:

"Britain and America have been making much of the German defeat at Rostov. However, this is all a fabrication. The facts in the case are that the inhabitants of Rostov were so violent in their antipathy and resistance, and the Soviet army was so persistent in its attacks on the German army where it had broken through that General Kleist, who had captured the place in order not to inflict unnecessary losses on his mechanized forces, retired voluntarily to prepared positions in the west.

"I am in receipt of a report to the effect that operations in Libya are proceeding very satisfactorily and only recently Rommel's army has completely annihilated one division of New Zealand troops, which came to the aid of the Tobruk garrison. Also I have a report that the encirclement of Moscow is progressing favorably."

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[a] See IV, 833.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 833

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

December 3, 1941
1407.

Re my # 1405[a].

In compliance with his request, I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 3rd.

He said that Dictator Hitler was at a distant place at present. He further said that he did not like to use the long distance telephone, and, because of snow, planes could not be utilized. There is nothing for him (Ribbentrop) to do but to go the military headquarters himself and await the Dictator's arrival there. (He is expected to return to the headquarters tomorrow, the 4th, but if he could not be reached on this occasion, he would be on the 5th), to establish contact with him. Although it is regrettable, he said, the delay cannot be avoided.

Ribbentrop: "As I have told you before, we cannot make an official reply until the Furhrer has given his approval. The Japanese Government is undoubtedly very anxious to have our reply as soon as possible, I, myself, am in agreement with it and I have no objections to your advising your home government of this fact. Moreover, I am of the opinion that the Fuehrer will be in agreement too, but we cannot say so definitely until the Fuehrer's return."

I told him that the situation is more critical than is imagined, and therefore, we are very anxious to have the formal reply as soon as is possible.

From my past experiences with Ribbentrop I feel fairly confident when I say that you will not be mistaken if you assume that there will be no objections.

Arrangements have been made for a direct telephone wire connection between Ribbentrop at the General Headquarters and here. However, he said that whenever possible he would come back here and contact me.

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[a] See IV, 831.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 834

FROM: Berlin — December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1416.

Regarding my # 1409[a] (COR).

At his request, I called on Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP at 3 p.m. on the 5th. He formally announced that Germany was in agreement with the two points suggested by us. I shall forward the text of the alliance proposed by the Germans.

---

[a] See IV, 833.

Trans. 12-24-41

No. 835

FROM: Berlin — December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1427.

Regarding my # 1416[a].

On the 5th, "Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent his representative (it has been arranged that (GOTTOFURIITIEN) take the place of (SUTAAMAA)) to see me, and mentioned the following.

As this matter is of a very secret nature Germany has not notified their Ambassador to Tokyo of this matter. Also the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo has not been informed either. So, please keep this in mind and please take special care to guard secrecy at your end.

---

[a] See IV, 834.

Trans. 12-24-41

No. 836

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

December 6, 1941
1000.

Re ----- of your # 1419[a].

To be handled in government code.

Parts beginning with the second clause of the text in your # 1417[a] have not reached us (2:00 p.m. the 6th). They will not be here in time for signature on the 6th. On the assumption that the document will be initialed, will you please arrange matters so that either RIBBENTROP's departure will be postponed or the initialing will be done by some representative.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 837

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

December 6, 1941
1431.

Re my # 1429[a].

Restricted distribution.

At 7:00 P.M. on the 6th, in response to German request, I has KASE and USHIBA call on GAUSS and conduct negotiations with regard to the "initialing" of the agreement. The results were as follows:

A. With the view of speeding up the "initialing", we will use only the German Language in the text.

B. The order of "initialing" will be as follows:

The text which we keep, I, Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP and the Italian Ambassador will sign in that order. The German and Italian texts will be in the following order: Germany, Italy, Japan; and Italy, Germany, Japan, respectively.

C. The concluding portion of the agreement is as follows(German language text): We will use the letter X to represent -----. In witness whereof have the undersigned by their governments only authorized this agreement signed and with their seals provided. Done in triple originals in German, Italian and Japanese language in Berlin on the ----- December, 1941, in the 20th year of the Fascists (era?), corresponding to the ----- day of the 12th month, the 16th year of Showa (era?).

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 838

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

December 6, 1941
No number.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Re your # 1417[a].

Parts following the second clause have not reached us. Please wire them again at once.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 839

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

December 6, 1941
999.

Part of your # 1417[a] has not reached us.

Furthermore, because of omission (156 words) from the 220th word on, the message is not clear. Please rewire.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 840

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

December 7, 1941
1004 (or 1006).

We agree completely with the idea presented by Germany, and we will immediately pass on it here and there is no objection to signing it officially as soon as this is done. However, developments are taking a fast turn and it might even be that before the official signing is completed the crash may develop. It might be that the wording of the agreement as worded now by Germany would not fit the circumstances at the time of signing. (For example, the first item would not be necessary if Italy and Germany joined the war immediately.)

So will you call on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and tell him this confidentially, and also make it very clear that Japan is expecting Italy and Germany to go to war against Britain and America before this agreement is officially signed.

Regarding the wording of the agreement bring up the point of no separate peace negotiations. Regarding the contents please understand my cable # 987[a], and plan to make the agreement public after official signing. Talk this over with the German side and notify us of results.

(*Translator's note:* Last paragraph badly garbled.)

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 841

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

December 8, 1941
1432.

(Urgent.)

Restricted distribution.

Having received the radio report at 11 p.m. on the 7th that Japan-American hostilities had started, I forthwith called on Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP. VON RIBBENTROP said, "According to intelligences available to me, this can be viewed as authoritative. Though

I have not ascertained Chancellor HITLER's decision, Germany and Italy's immediate participation can be assumed to be a matter of course. Therefore, since the secret agreement has already become superfluous, we will cancel it forthwidth. ----- ----- ----- -----[a]. With regard to the manner of Germany and Italy's participation and the issuance of a declaration, I will confer at length tomorrow the 8th."

Now, while I was in the room, VON RIBBENTROP immediately passed on the gist of our conversations by telephone to CIANO.

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[a]This message is incomplete, last portion appearing at this point.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 842

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

December 8, 1941
1437.

(Priority.)

Limited distribution. Re my # 143 (9?).[a]

At 1:00 p.m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them.

It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. (Not dated.)

No. 843

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

December 8, 1941
1440.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Part 1 of 2. Re my # 1432[a].

As a result of joint study with the Germans, the following text was evolved, explanations in a supplementary telegram.

In the immutable determination not to lay down their arms until the common war against the United States of America and England has been brought to a successful conclusion, the German government, the Italian government and the Japanese government have come to an agreement on the following points (?):

Article 1. Germany, Italy and Japan will conduct the war forced on them by the United States of America and England with all means at their disposal to a victorious conclusion (working in common).

Article 2. Germany, Italy and Japan pledge themselves not to conclude an armistice or peace with either the United States of America or with England without complete, mutual understanding.

Part 2 of 2.

Article 3. Germany, Italy and Japan will collaborate most closely after the victorious conclusion of the war for the purpose of bringing about a just New Order.

Article 4. This agreement comes into force (becomes effective) when signed. In witness whereto the undersigned, duly authorized by their governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.

Executed in triple originals in German, Italian and Japanese language in Berlin on ----- (of) December, 1941, in the 20th year of the Fascists, corresponding to the ----- day of the 12th month of the 16th year of Showa.

---

[a] See IV, 841.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 844

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

December 8, 1941
1441.

(Extremely urgent.)

Re my # 1440[a].

1. For two hours beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the 8th, I, Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, KASE, USIBA and GAUSS discussed and studied the question of non-separate peace. (Please revise the expression to declaration of non-separate peace) from the standpoint of ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- as a result we drew up a draft of a treaty given in my caption telegram. Our proposal for a promise of non-separate peace (paragraph 2) was used. Furthermore, in paragraph 1 was expressed the adamant determination of the three nations to fight side by side against Anglo-American aggression until the end.

2. In the third paragraph we promised to cooperate in the establishment of a new order following the conclusion of the war.

Thus, this paragraph makes clear the objective of the war. It also is an advantage to us in that on the strength of this paragraph we could get both Germans and Italians to cooperate with us in the establishment of the Far Eastern Sphere of Co-Prosperity. I believe this is in accord with the views of our Government. Barring unexpected obstacles arising, I would like to have this proposal attempted and all procedures for its immediate signature entered into.

Later we were informed by the German Government that the Italian government was in hearty agreement with this proposal.

2. RIBBENTROP wishes to announce the conclusion of this treaty on the 10th, and at the same time ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----. He emphatically stated that ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- is impossible but since it is something which will greatly profit Japan, I would like, by all means, to have it signed on the 10th and so ----- replied that it would be possible to do so providing that the treaty would be ----- ----- procedure in Japan. Since it would be well for us to cooperate with Germany in compliance with her wishes, I would like to have all procedures in Japan gone through with quickly so that the treaty may be signed as soon as possible. If you think that it is impossible to sign the treaty on the 10th, please let me know by return wire on what day it can be done.

3. Fortunately, during this conference RIBBENTROP received the announcement given out by the general headquarters concerning our having sunk American steamships and warships and he expressed great elation over the victory. He at the same time praised highly the bravery of our Navy.

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[a] See IV, 843.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 845

FROM: Berlin (Osima) December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1442.

Due to the urgency of this matter, I am telegraphing the Japanese text of the agreement which will be used if there are no objections. Please telegraph any suggestions you may have.

The Japanese government, the German government and the Italian government are bound together by their firm decision to carry out concerted warfare against the United States and the British Empire which shall continue until victory has been obtained.

Article 1. Japan, Germany and Italy by means of all power of warfare at their disposal are to cooperate until victory has been achieved.

Article 2. Japan, Germany and Italy agree that no armistice or peace shall be made with England or the United States without complete and mutual approval.

Article 3. Japan, Germany and Italy are to closely cooperate in the establishment of a just new order after victory has been achieved.

Article 4. This agreement shall enter into effect upon signature.

In manifestation of their sincerity, this agreement has been signed in accordance with the proper authority granted the representatives by their respective home governments.

This agreement is executed in the Japanese, German and Italian languages at Berlin on the ----- day of December of the 15th year of Showa, that is 1941, and on the ----- day of December of the 20th year of the Fascists.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 846

FROM: Tokyo December 9, 1941
TO: Berlin # 1010.

On this, the 9th, the German Ambassador called twice with a proposal. You have no doubt been advised of this proposal. In view of the fact that we requested the deletion of the first part of Article III of the Tripartite Pact[a], if by some chance the Germans insist upon preserving it, please have them insert[b]:

"In accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact signed on 27 September 1940."
(1940 NEN 9 GATU 27 HI TEIKETU SERARETARU SANGOKU ZYOYAKU NO IGI NI OKERU)
preceding that part which reads:

"a just New Order." (KOSEI NARU SHINTITUJO).

At the same time revise article 4[b] to read:

"This agreement will be put into effect simultaneously with the signing thereof. The period of its effectivity shall be the same as that of the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940[c]. (HONKYOTEI WA SHOMEI TO DOJI NI JISSI SERARUBEKU KATU 1940 KUGATU 27 HI TEIKETU SERARETARU SANGOKU ZYOYAKU TO DŌITI NO KIKAN YOKO TARUBESI).

We told the Ambassador that we would make every effort to complete all arrangements here, in the event that the above is accepted, by tomorrow the 10th. Therefore, we requested that the German and Italian texts be sent immediately upon the arrival being approved.

Will you also arrange to send the texts?

---

[a] "III. Japan, German, and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines." i.e., mutual recognition of leadership in the New Orders in Europe and Asia, respectively.

[b] In the new treaty. (See IV, 843.)

[c] Tripartite Pact is effective for 10 years from 27 September 1940.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 847

FROM: Berlin (Osima) December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1436.

As a result of the outbreak of war it has become necessary to get reports on the progress of the war and other important news from Japan as speedily as possible. In order to do this I have gotten the permission of the German authorities to have a daily talk with the (news office?) official in your Department for about 5 minutes from 11:00 a.m. Berlin time (6:00 p.m. Tokyo time). Please have this official assemble the latest news and facts which should be communicated at this very time every day, and arrange for the approval of the Japanese authorities for a conversation at this time.

As I am also asking the German authorities to extend the present time limit for telephone communication between Japan and Germany to permit talks from 4 to 6, please have the responsible authorities investigate the possibilities at once from the Japanese end.

Trans. 12-18-41

No. 848

FROM: Ankara December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #239.

On the 5th, members of the German and Italian Embassy staffs told me the following concerning arms furnished to Turkey by Lend-Lease.

This was the idea of England and the United States. In answer to an inquiry from a German Counselor, the Turkish Vice-secretary of Foreign Affairs replied that Turkey considers this only a very small scale deal without any political significance. As a matter of fact, he explained, the United States proposes a joint declaration on the part of London, Washington and Ankara about this but Ankara refused as a result of which the United States went ahead and published it alone. The German Counselor, however, replied that to his way of thinking it wouldn't be advisable for Turkey to even give the outward appearance of going over to the Anglo-Saxon camp just like the Soviet, Chungking, and etc., and asked him to think the matter over.

The members of the Embassy staffs, however, went on to point out that in any case just as soon as things begin to get hot in the near East next spring, Turkey will have to cast her lot with the Axis, and what is being published at the present signifies nothing and consequently Germany and Italy are not noticeably worried.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 849

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) Circular # 104.

1. Piecing together the statements of a German ABWEHR officer, I have noted the following:

There are a lot of rumors among Arab agitators to the effect that GAILANI has very little interest in the movement and is just concerned with maintaining his own position and gaining political and economic (?power?). The Germans are not going to permit him to do too much. His trip to Germany has been (canceled?).

On the other hand, EMIR HUSSEIN is very diligent and has had experience in underground activities. Plans are being made to conduct such activity with this man as principal figure. He was recently summoned from Rome to Berlin.

2. The Italians are very concerned over the above-mentioned activities and have decided to turn the matter over to the Germans and to cooperate from the sidelines. The Italian liaison officer who was sent with EMIR HUSSEIN has returned to Rome from Berlin.

Trans. 4-21-45

No. 850

FROM: Sofia (IZUMI) November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 173.

Intelligence report (of secondary order).

----- ----- the American Ministry ----- informed ----- that ----- carried a proposal for a non-aggression agreement between the United States and the Soviet. This proposal visualized the possibilities that after the German forces occupy Moscow, Japan would immediately abrogate the Tokyo-Moscow neutrality agreement and take over Vladivostok and promises to guarantee Siberia. America does not like to make such an agreement with the Soviet, however, it would seem that this is a proposition to give Russia, in addition to England and the United States, a voice in the problems concerning the Pacific, thereby preventing RIBBENTROP's proposal from every being realized.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 851

FROM: Hsinking December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Part 2 of 2.

3. As I had explained above, there are those in the army who strongly advocate aggressive action against Soviet Russia. However, in view of the fact brought out in my # 79- addressed by the Ambassador to Your Excellency, Germany's supply of material aid to Japan is possible only upon the assurance that Japan will not attack Soviet Russia. I believe it is necessary for the central authorities to inform the Kwantung army this and also that it is the immutable policy of the Japanese government not to attack -----.

4. In the eventuality, however, of the United States' constructing air fields in Far Eastern Russia, irrespective of this fact, the relation between Japan and Soviet Russia, should always be that of neutrality. Thus, we shall be able to endeavor to avoid a general clash between these two countries. In my opinion, in this question, the fact that China maintained a neutral relation toward us at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, despite the fact that the fighting took

place in the Chinese possession of Manchuria, serves as a precedent (after reading this telegram, I would appreciate your acknowledging what is in it).

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 852

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

December 6, 1941
1003.

(Urgent.)

Re *2* of your # 1418[a].

1. From the standpoint given in *4* of my # 985[b], we would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it; and so get the German government to understand this position of ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question.

In doing this, explain to them at considerable length that insofar as American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither of high quality nor of large quantity, and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia. Please endeavor to come to an understanding on this line.

2. However, should Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP insist upon our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have no other recourse, make a ----- statement to the effect that we would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia via the Japanese waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this out thoroughly.

3. In case the German government refuses to agree with *1* or *2* and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear in mind.

4. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 825.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 853

FROM: Peking
TO: Nanking

October 20, 1941
53.

Message from Taiyuan[a] as circular # 26.

Message from Taiyuan[a] to Tokyo as # 75.

In order to expand the enlightenment of the Northwest and Outer Mongolia information network and to give them an opportunity for glorious activity, on November 1st we want to

hold a Northwestern information round-table discussion by gathering together all the chief officials residing in Mongolia, together with the official concerned from this office. We hope you will accept and wire your approval. Inform Peking, Kalgan, Tatung and Paotow.

---

[a] Capital of Shansi Province, China.

Trans. 11-1-41

No. 854

FROM: Taiyuan — October 22, 1941
TO: Shanghai and Hsinking — Circular # 028.

(Message to Tokyo # 077.)

Strictly secret outside the department.

The following is a correlation of the regular reports of my secret agents.

Recently the Outer Mongolians have been violating the border of Inner Mongolia, increasing their observation posts in Inner Mongolia and sending many spies. They are illegally entering our occupied territories creating incidents such as the present PORACHI incident. Besides, they have sent in four groups of communist party members to the (Fularki?) district, based on Tokumin about 70 kilometers north of Shiramuren. Organizing Monogolians as agitators they have used this as a pretext for sending the Russian army into Inner Mongolia. Planning communication with Outer Mongolia, they intend to carry on positive international activities in occupied Inner Mongolia. From Ulan Bator to Ningsia Province using the Red route they intend to contact the ----- armies and Mohamedan armies stationed in unoccupied Inner Mongolia and the Wingsia area.

Trans. 4-12-42

No. 855

FROM: Hsinking — November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 780.

To Councilor HANAWA from YOSHITOMI.

I want to get an understanding with our various officials in Manchukuo as to how much intelligence and enlightenment money is to be requested of our department for the next fiscal year. In order to study the present situation in Manchukuo, I would like to hold a meeting in this office on December 30. It will be an unofficial counsular conference. Wire me back if this will be all right. The consuls have informed me that this coincides with their desires. For your information.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 856

FROM: Hsinking — October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 697.

Re message # 1234[a] from the Capital of U.S.S.R.

1. Soviet troops were seen in the vicinity of ITIRYŌZAN (about 16 km. south of KONSYUNZYŌ) at about 1800 on the 23rd. Our border patrol therefore dispatched Lieutenant Tange and

six subordinates to investigate. Without warning, they were attacked by Soviet forces, clearly within the Manchukuoan border. Our men, therefore, unavoidably returned fire and finally succeeding in forcing them beyond the border line. Lieutenant Tange was killed in action.

2. This was but one of the many border incidents which have occurred in the past. The Soviets, however, issued very exaggerated reports of it, apparently in the hope of making use of it to advantage in the United States and Great Britain.

The Kwantung Army, on the other hand, has absolutely no intention of using this incident as an excuse for any action. We wish to minimize this incident and merely issue a formal protest from both Manchukuo and Japan, and let the matter be forgotten.

3. At his press conference yesterday, the Chief of the Information Section, being unfamiliar with the details of the case, merely denied the Soviet charges. A formal statement regarding it will be issued shortly.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-1-41

No. 857

FROM: Tokyo — November 6, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #770.

I am transmitting #1250 addressed to the Minister from Soviet Russia. Re your #844[a].

Since we would like to have the information before submitting a protest, will you please wire me by return wire the circumstances which led to Manchukuo negotiating with the Soviet authorities despite the fact that the airplane(s) in question was a Japanese scout plane.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 858

FROM: Hsinking — November 4, 1941
TO: Shanghai — #221.

(Message to Tokyo #708.)

1. The following points have been uncovered with the written confession of YOSHIHIDE, KIYONO, a Communist recently arrested here.

a. The Comintern has established a far eastern office at Khabarovsk.[a] The representative of the Japanese Communist party, KENZŌ, YAMAMOTO, and in previous years YOSHIKO OKADA, as well as RYŌKICHI SUGIMOTO are at this office. The Comintern from this office through the directive Communist office in the French concession in Shanghai carries out its Communist program in Japan.

b. The "Committee for Reconstructing the Japanese Communist Party" with which TAKASHI OKABE, (arrested in June 1940) was connected, was instigated by the same KENZŌ YAMAMOTO. The organizing head of this committee, TADAO, HIRAGA, mustering the Leftist elements among the Japanese in Manchuria, organized the Communist Party and as well as giving support to Japanese political movements was planning union with the Chinese Communist Part. As a development of political activity in Manchuria, a Manchurian supreme directive organization machinery was created through Kyowa Kai (republican association).

2. As an outcome of this confession the military police today, the fourth, arrested 3 persons here as well as about 60 others who were connected with them. The idea gathered from the suspects was that through the Western Division of the Kyowa Kai the Communists were to be united, supporters of the movement being quite numerous. It even extended to the Leftist elements in Northern and Central China.

3. As you know, on October 18, some 380 persons belonging to the Leftist elements were arrested in Japan. This and the activities in Manchuria, I believe, makes entirely clear the Communist policy of the Comintern in Japan, Manchuria, and China.

Due to the political significance of this, please do not let it leak outside the department.

Transmitted to Peking and Shanghai.

---

[a] City of Far Eastern region Soviet Russia, on Amur River, near Northeast border of Manchukuo.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 859

FROM: Hsinking — November 6, 1941
TO: Hong Kong — # 2.

To Ambassador KURUSU: Separate Message A.

The Manchukuoan-Soviet Border Situation.

1. Since the beginning of hostilities with Germany, the Soviet has uniformed about 100,000 more soldiers for the Far Eastern forces, and it is estimated that they now have in this region approximately 1,000,000 men, 2700 airplanes, 2500 tanks, and in the neighborhood of 1,000 armored cars.

2. Compared to this, the Kwantung army has about 800,000 men. Now with that number of soldiers and the mechanized units of the Kwantung army, it is to be regarded as impossible to make a *blitz* attack on the Soviet (the German *blitz* employed three times that many soldiers). There is the danger that a struggle with Russia would turn out to be a long one. Thus, since the Far Eastern area is so vast, and since about one-third of the year the temperature hovers about forty degrees below zero, and since railroads are scarce and communications poor, and since the Soviet people are so idealogically indoctrinated, to occupy this oriental territory would be an undertaking of gigantic difficulty. All in all, therefore, I would say that before we have finished with the China incident, it would be impossible for us to fight the Soviet Union unless something unforeseen happens.

3. The Kwantung military command also is fully aware of these facts and is restraining the forces there from any rash action. The Soviet, on the other hand, is also endeavoring not to antagonize our country, so since everything is fairly quiet in the north, depending on the results of the German-Soviet war, in case of necessity it would be possible for us without any trouble to move the military forces of Kwantung southward.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 860

FROM: Bucharest (RUMAN) — November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) — Circular # 223.

The Red Army is transporting army troops from Leningrad to Moscow by air. This seems to prove that the Red Army lacks crack reserve units. (German attaché.)

Trans. 4-21-45

No. 861

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) November 11, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires Circular # 301.

(In 2 parts, complete.)

Tokyo Circular # 2292.

5 Report. (Far East situation in relation to Japan.)

(U.S.S.R.)

1. No conlclusion was reached on our request to U.S.S.R. that they reconsider the shipping of U.S. plane gas to Vladivostok. We also called the attention of the U.S.S.R. to the fact that floating mines made in the U.S.S.R. were discovered in the Japan Sea (outside of the designated danger area) and the U.S.S.R. has let this matter drift too, taking no action one way or the other.

It is evident from this that the U.S.S.R. is taking the stall policy, relying meanwhile on their Asia army and the strong defense they have been maintaining in Europe. Recent reports that the East Asia and Mongolian Russian troops are fighting in Moscow confirms the fact that since the 1st of September, believing that Japan does not intend to attack them in the East, they have been shipping troops westward. It is also a fact that the general tension on the Russia-Manchuria border line has been lessened, and antagonistic actions by Russian troops against Japanese and Manchurian troops at the border is being checked.

However, of course, secret military preparations against a sudden crisis on the border, are being continued.

(French Indo-China)

2. Since Japan and French Indo-China defense agreements were signed, equipping and organizing of southern French Indo-China is being carried out. It is a fact however that since the middle of September the French Indo-China Government has been showing anti-Japanese policies in a conservative way, (such as reluctance in issuing import and export permits). They seem to show a fear that Japan might, through the Chinese, start agitation between the Chinese and Annamese. As a result a stall policy is seen in the solving of several questions regarding Japan and French Indo-China.

However, on the whole it can be said that Japan's control over French Indo-China is progressing well. Yoshizawa and his company left for their new post in Hanoi during the latter part of October. They will make their headquarters at Hanoi and will plan to penetrate all fields from there.

(Thai, Singapore)

3. Thailand is at present busy concentrating on the business of being neutral as it finds itself between Japan and England. England having recently begun a more definite policy with Thai as she fears that to allow Thai to come under Japanese control would mean danger to her Malaya, Burma, and Singapore.

The feeling in the Dutch East Indies is that Japan will attack them through French Indo-China, and will not believe our word that we will not attack them, unless this is backed with positive actions such as removing all of our forces from French Indo-China. For this reason they will not agree to our offer of a "barter" system on each ship load which we trade with them, as they feel that they are only sending us material to strengthen our military which might be used against them.

Singapore and Malay have been active since spring with defense preparations against a Japanese attack, and now it is rumored that the preparations are nearing completion. On the other hand it is generally believed there that due to the prolonging of the Russian-German battles, the German-British war will be a long one which means eventual victory for Britain.

Also they believe that Japan, weakened by the long China incident, will further be weakened by the U.S. economic pressure.

For the above reasons the attitude of the government has recently become more strong, and even definite anti-Japanese attitudes are shown towards our ships, people, and Japanese being evacuated.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 862

FROM: Tokyo — November 15, 1941
TO: Hsingking — #817.

According to a telegram from Vice Minister Ida, Manchuria is suspending the issuance of entrance and exit visas to nationals of third countries for a time effective as of the 9th. Also all visas already issued will be cancelled.

Please wire as to the reason for Manchuria suddenly deciding on the taking of such a step.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 863

FROM: Hsinking — November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #745.

Secret.

Re your #817[a]

The Kanto army in Manchuria has a very special reason for forbidding the entrance and exit of nationals of third countries at this time, but this reason will disappear within the next few days and then this restriction will be removed by the end of the month.

---

[a] See IV, 862.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 864

FROM: Tokyo — November 19, 1941
TO: Mukden (?) — #57 (?).

The three Norwegians of your #51[a] have made reservations on the American ship sailing from Shanghai, November 27th and paid their fare in advance. They have also made reservations for the run from Dairen to Shanghai and have obtained permission for the trip from Fushun to Dairen and they desired to leave during the middle of this month. However, in spite of the situation referred to in my #817 to Hsinking[b], if they do not leave Fushun immediately, they will not be able to make connections with the American ship in Shanghai. The Norwegian Minister resident in Tokyo requested that in view of the above circumstances special consideration be given to the matter of a permit for them to leave Manchuria. Inasmuch as the contract for these men has expired and they are leaving Manchuria for good, it seems that they are deserving of special consideration. Please contact the quarters concerned in this and try to arrange for an exit permit for them immediately and wire the result.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 862.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 865

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Peking

December 5, 1941
#31.

Re your #21[a].

It is reported that Manchuria issued orders two or three days ago to grant them visas to go by way of Shanhaikwan on condition that they report their itinerary beforehand.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 866

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Tokyo

November 28, 1941
#781.

To be handled in Government Code.

In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of British and American nationals in Manchukuo in the event that war breaks out with England and the United States are as outlined below. We are unanimously agreed on these matters. Should there be any question regarding them, please wire me at once.

I. *Policy.* On the outbreak of war with England and the United States, after you have at the appropriate time gathered all these nationals together, they are to be returned each to his own homeland at as early a date as possible. However, until this return can be arranged, they are to be interned in places of concentration in Manchukuo.

The control of such property as they might leave behind will be administered by the Manchukuo Government.

II. *Detailed Outline*

1. Persons to be interned.

a. British nationals—339.

b. American citizens—81.

c. Of these, consular officials and Catholic missionaries are to be given preferential treatment.

d. Nationals of the Soviet or other third powers observed to be obnoxious characters with pro-British and American leanings are to be suitably taken care of.

2. *Time and Method of Internment*

a. Persons mentioned in the paragraph above are to be advised to get in touch with the Japanese Chief of Detention. They are to be concentrated in the three areas, Harbin, Mukden, and Chokinshu.[a]

b. Then, depending on negotiations, they will be returned each to his own country. When evacuation is through the Soviet, we will release them at Manchuli, and when they are to be transported to Shanghai, they will be released in Dairen.

c. This will be carried out by the Manchukuo Police authorities (In Kwantung Province the procedure will be controlled by the Provincial Police Office.)

d. All property left behind is to be administered through legal measures by the Manchukuo Government.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 867

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Net

December 4, 1941
2467.

Departmental secret to be handled in Government code. Strictly secret outside the Department.

On the 4th, the Government held a conference for control and liaison and decided on the policy which Manchukuo must follow in case of a sudden change in the international relations. It is as follows:

Policy

When Japan enters a war, Manchukuo for the time being shall not enter it because of Manchukuo's relation to Japan and her policy. Manchukuo shall treat Great Britain, the United States and Netherlands Indies as enemy countries, and shall take measures to that end.

The Principal Points

1. Manchukuo shall not recognize either the consuls and ----- or ----- as enjoying ----- privileges and shall forbid them to carry on their duties. (The use of code telegrams and short wave radio sets shall be prohibited.) Furthermore, in regards to the treatments to be accorded, performance of their duties. Manchukuo shall accord treatment in the spirit of fairness following the methods employed by Japan in dealing with latest -----.

2. Manchukuo follows the same methods as Japan in dealing with public and private properties of ----- and the ----- -----.

3. Manchukuo shall not recognize any request addressed to any third power for the protection of consulate buildings and the interests of the residents. However, Manchukuo shall carry out her legal measures following the methods employed in Japan for dealing with ----- and do so in the spirit of fairness and justice.

4. In the treatment to be accorded the citizens of Soviet Russia residing in Manchukuo, in view of the existence of a neutrality treaty between Soviet Russia and Japan, she shall keep in step with Japan and take every precaution so as not to provoke Soviet Russia.

This message sent to Peking, Nanking, and Shanghai.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 868

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

December 4, 1941
909.

Strictly Secret. Re my # 892[a].

On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my # 873[a] our policy was changed as follows:

"When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate. Because Manchukuo is closely bound up with the Japanese Empire and because England and the United States and the Netherlands have not recognized the Government of Manchukuo, as a matter of fact, Hsinking will regard those three nations as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly."

Wherever "England and the United States" and "English and Americans" occur in the text, we changed them to "England, the United States, and the Netherlands" and "English, Americans and Netherlanders."

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 869

FROM: Hsinking — December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No Number.

(Part 1 of 2.)

1. Formerly the Kwantung forces numbered 850,000 ----- ----- ----- has reduced them now to about 700,000. I have been informed by a certain source that these troops are being held in readiness for an attack against the Red Army, but on the other hand, if we would merely content ourselves with a sort of negative defense of the Manchukuoan border against the Soviet, we could reduce that number by half.

2. The command of the Kwantung Army seems faced by the following problems: (a) Those who advocate a direct attack (principally people who have connections with Moscow) say that the Soviet will probably erelong give the United States all the military bases she desires and that a clash with the Soviet is inevitable. They declare that with the probably opening of hostilities, it will be necessary to have the Kwantung Army at its present strength, ever-ready to begin any necessary military operations.

(b) Countering the argument, there are those who advocate passivity, holding that since this Soviet is not treating us as an enemy, half of the present troops can be moved to the south.

(c) The highest officials seem theoretically to find a middle way between the two extremes, considering it quite possible that, even though asked to fight us by the United States, the Soviet would not comply; however, realizing that theory and fact are two different things, they figure that it is best to stay on the safe side and keep the present forces intact.

Trans. 12-12-41

No. 870

FROM: Tokyo — December 6, 1941
TO: Hsinking — Circular # 2487.

On December 4th, Vice-Minister NISHI made the following proposal to the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo:

The Japanese petroleum and coal rights in Northern Sakhalin have, because of various obstacles, not been exercised to any appreciable extent. We would like to return to the status quo of at least five years ago because we have not worked out a new and better plan. The understanding we reached with Russia five years ago will run out the 14th of the month, and, in all that time, mining work on our part has scarcely been even undertaken. The reason why was that our industrialists lacked facilities for embarkations and shipments. Therefore, the Imperial government requests that this understanding be extended five more years and would like to obtain the agreement of the Soviet government immediately. The Soviet ambassador promised that he would communicate this to Moscow.

Trans. 11-4-42

No. 871

FROM: Nanking — December 7, 1941
TO: Hsinking — Circular # 369.

Action Tokyo # 862.

Please observe Central organ's instructions as to disposition of enemy's people.

Trans. 1-6-42

No. 872

FROM: Rome — October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #670.

Today, the 18th, I asked for an interview with President ALOISI of the Society of Friends of Japan and he spoke to me thus:

1. Now, let us take Japan and the United States. You know ROOSEVELT has been wishing for some time to get into this war, but your great naval power stands in his way, and the United States simply can't fight. Therefore, the best thing for the Axis would be for you Japanese to stay out of war with America. In doing so thus far you have done us an outstanding service. If you Japanese will continue with a resolute attitude not to fight the United States, you will help us a great deal and I think this would really be the wisest course because you can thus better restrain the United States from participation.

2. Of course, your mission is to found a sphere of co-prosperity in East Asia and you must fulfill that high calling. However, with respect to the Soviet question, the time for your entry into the Soviet war is near at hand and that will be the beginning of your mounting to your place in the sun. Now, just as soon as Moscow falls, I venture to say that the question of your joining us in crushing the Soviet will arise.

Trans. 11-1-41

No. 873

FROM: Rome — October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #673.

Re your circular #2120[a].

On the 20th PRUNAS[b] had a conversation with ANDO[c] in which he said, "Recently Japan has prohibited the distribution of printed propaganda material issued by belligerent countries. Nevertheless, by so doing she has permitted the British to disseminate propaganda freely by sending it through the United States. Consequently, this has had an extremely unsatisfactory result insofar as the Axis powers are concerned. Therefore, in order that the Japanese Government immediately revise this, I wish that you would transmit this formally to the Imperial Government that they might take some sort of direct measures." ANDO replied, "We have had a wire recently to the effect that the Imperial Government is giving special consideration to the matter in order to make more advantageous the dissemination of propaganda by the Axis powers. Since this concrete step, in my opinion, should have been communicated to you by Ambassador INDELLI[d], I would like to delay transmitting this matter until you have found out whether a report has not already come in." PRUNAS acknowledged the advisability of this. ANDO then replied, "This fact is for your information and I would like to have you see to it that it does not go beyond your ears."

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[a] See III, 794.
[b] Director General of Transoceania Bureau, Italian Foreign Office.
[c] First Secretary, Japanese Embassy in Rome.
[d] Italian Ambassador in Tokyo.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 874

FROM: Rome — October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #679.

On the 22nd, I had an interview with CIANO, and he told me the following. In general:

"_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____, but as far as I am concerned, I have nothing in particular at this time to say with regard to Japan's new cabinet except that I hope that the relations between our two countries will again be close.

"I am not in any position, if it is a question of military conditions, to judge the pros and cons of Japan's problem of entering the war. Although I have the impression that Japanese-American negotiations have reached a deadlock, after all it being a situation pretty far removed from here, if I do not understand conditions fully, I am unable to judge the right or wrong of it. With regard to maneuvers, after Russia has been disorganized, the Italian Army will be very busy in the southern part.

"Tomorrow, the 23rd, I am going to see HITLER at his headquarters, and my plan is to return at the end of the week. I will tell you whatever information there is based on his remarks."

I have transmitted this to Germany.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 875

FROM: Rome — November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #716.

There has been a rumor here for the last few days that MUSSOLINI has left to have an interview with HITLER because of the anxiety due to the recent Mediterranean developments.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 876

FROM: Rome — November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #715.

Recently the organizations for the discussion of diplomatic questions here in this country have been demonstrating a very friendly attitude toward Japan. They are doing their utmost in developing this spirit among the principal newspaper correspondents here in this city. The newspapers, too, are continually printing articles received from Japanese sources. Therefore, I would appreciate having you communicate insofar as possible as much information on Japan and East Asia as is convenient.

Furthermore, on the 3rd of this month, the Minister of Propaganda PABORINI, in an interview given to Italian newspaper correspondents, said, "Though a prohibition has been issued against discussing the political situation in Japan, this does not imply, as a matter of course, that you are to lose interest in Japan's close alliance with Italy. The Italian Government has complete confidence and common interest in the attitude of the Japanese Government. I suggest that it would be wise for you to print without any restrictions whatsoever articles which come from Japanese sources.

Relayed to Berlin.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 877

FROM: Rome — November 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #694.

Re your #251[a].

In regard to the matter of carrying official documents from Italy to Rio de Janeiro without charge, the Foreign Office replied in an official statement as contained in my separate telegram #695[b].

---

[a]Explain to Italians that currently we are handling all their diplomatic mail and parcels to South America free of charge and under Jap seals. (*Note*: Japs are trying to get more ready availability of Italian South Atlantic air mail.)
[b]Not available.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 878

FROM: Rome — November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #727.

As the submission of the record of my travel experiences has been delayed, I am holding it to send by the Asama Maru as #261 ordinary communicated 3 September.

There is quite an amount of other correspondence that we have not been able to send. I would like to send it to Rio de Janeiro by Italian air mail from here if possible, as I suggested in my #694[a], but have you made arrangements for having it sent on the Japan from Rio? Please advise.

---

[a]See IV, 877.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 879

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — October 24, 1941
TO: Rome — #291.

In regard to settlement of claims between Italian subjects and the East Asia development company, a draft for $108,564 was sent by S.A.N.E. last December for 190 bales of Khaki drill, F.O. B. Osaka, the unfilled balance of their second year's order. Since then, the purchaser has wished the guild to take responsibility for completion of the order. On the 22nd, the Italian trade commissioner asked us to ship this balance to Dairen[a] as quickly as possible as they wish to trans-ship from there to Italy on a German boat, and we agreed.

Kindly notify S.A.N.E. of the above.

---

[a]Treaty port of the Japanese leased territory of Kwantung, S. Manchuria.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 880

FROM: Rome (ITRRK) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN, Vice Minister of War) #420.

1. (?Report on?) the 210 millimetre howitzer. The first group of part 1 was delivered on the 10th of this month to the German attaches' office.

2. Since the second group will be completed on 10 December please arrange for immediate payment of 2,000,000 lira.

3. Since the manufacture of this gun at the ANSALDO Company has stopped, and (the manufacture) transferred to the ODERO TERNI Company in Spezia, and since it will be necessary for the acceptance inspection to be done at both companies, please make arrangements for revising the purchase travel expenses in Italy, wire #404 (check 404)[a], and for the official tour of Lt. Col. OGAWA.

a. In order to take care of paragraph #1 of this wire, it should be revised by adding the ZENOBA official tour of Major SIBA from Rome to Berlin on 8 and 9 November.

b. For the second group add the second acceptance inspection of the ODERO TERNI Company covering 15 days and the round trip of Lt. Col. OGAWA from Berlin to Rome covering 20 days.

4. Since it will be necessary to revise the termination of contracts due to the transfer of manufacturing companies, we are now negotiating these matters.

---

[a] Not readable.

Trans. 5-10-45

No. 881

FROM: Shanghai December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #2224.

We have a request from Italian naval circles here for permission to ship 7469 kilo tons of tin scrap valued at 52,160 yen to Japan on the Kobe Maru leaving here on the 6th.

(This is to be shipped to Italy via Japan.)

Our Navy is backing this request so please consider it favorably.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 882

FROM: Rome (Gaippone) November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #728.

On the 17th, Ando had a conference with Gayda, the editor of the "Gionnale d'Italia". The substance of what Gayda told Ando at this time is as follows:

1. The Gionnale d'Italia has taken the position for the past month or so that Japan should be the sole arbiter of her destiny, and in order to facilitate Japan's decision, has refrained from publishing articles referring to Japan's attitude. (However, Gayda himself has frequently urged that Japan adopt a more positive attitude toward the Anglo-Saxons, or that she expand Southward. He has also frequently expressed dissatisfaction with Japan's attitude as you are well aware from my successive telegrams.)

2. This present war, Japanese efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, is becoming a revolutionary war against the old order of British and American imperialism. The war is gradually spreading, and it is inevitable that it eventually will engulf the whole world. Hence, we may as well reconcile ourselves to the fact of the war's being prolonged for several years.

3. The time for the war against the Caucasus is drawing near. At the time that the German army breaks through Kerch and invades the west bank of the Caucasus, other units of the army will carry out landings in the face of the enemy, employing boats that are now being assembled in Roumania and Bulgaria.

And thus, this phase of the campaign will be brought to a successful conclusion before winter is over.

4. I have been thinking recently of the European federation of States that will be set up after the war, and I believe it will work out as follows: Germany will take the leadership in the South and Balkan Peninsula, and these two countries in mutual cooperation will be able to solve all European problems.

Furthermore, Ando took this opportunity to say that he had observed that there were many among the Italians who seemed to think that Japan could settle all her problems by Southward expansion, and who did not hesitate to say so. Japan, however, is not a country to move rashly, and Ando called Gayda's attention obliquely to the fact that this transparent desire to utilize Japan as a member of the Axis was an evidence of superficial thinking.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 883

FROM: Rome — November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #752.

Re your cir. #235[a].

Mail going and coming between Japan and Italy is, as a matter of principle, censored. Although letters mailed to Japanese here are often sent in care of the Embassy, they have been censored. Mail addressed to us, however, has not been opened. In spite of the fact that censorship is so strict, it is understood that mail sent by members of my staff stamped with their names will not be touched. However, there have been no such occasions. Mail dispatched by airplane from the local Japanese Club is merely looked at by the censors and then dispatched unopened. In other words, Japanese mail is not receiving any preferential treatment. Picture postcards on which there are photographs of cities and possible military objectives, such as buildings, cannot be sent out of the country. Likewise, the importation of foreign newspapers and magazines is forbidden. Furthermore, matter printed in this country cannot be sent away without special permit. Official mail of our Foreign Office is not touched. Mail leaving this country is more strictly censored than mail entering.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 884

FROM: Rome — November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #745.

(Part 2 of 2[a].)

Strictly Secret.

To be handled in Government code.

"Furthermore, the matters which I have told you above could be carried out by means of secret radio propaganda, or by the dropping of propaganda pamphlets to Hindus in the several

provinces by airplane, or this propaganda material could be distributed among Hindus by Hindus. Furthermore, in order to propagandize revolt at the same time we send secret representatives out among them, instructions of military import could be given to members of the Hindu revolutionary party who would be in a position to lead in acts of guerilla warfare, sabotage, etc. Furthermore, they could be instructed by these secret representatives whom we would send in the technique of secret wireless communication." He went on to say that these representatives could help along communications between Hindus both in and out of the country.

When this man told me this, he said, "On occasion we have been aided by the Soviet along lines of propaganda technique in the bringing about of revolution, and financially by the German government.

"At the present time in North and South America there are approximately 2,000 followers who do our bidding. In addition, currently, there are a great number throughout India who act in accordance with our instructions. There are those who carry out sabotage instructions passed on to them by radio. In addition, among the Hindu prisoners of war, we have many adherents. Through the cooperation of Germany and Italy, we plan to send these prisoners back again to India to be used for the dissemination of propaganda within the country."

In the event that our relations with England are ruptured, needless to say the destruction of India is of major importance to us. These opinions are not the youthful dreams of a mind embittered by hatred. I, therefore, think that we from today on should begin gradually through appropriate means to develop our propaganda machinations toward India.

Have you any objections to our using this man along the lines of paragraph 4 of the opinions expressed above? Please wire me at any early date.

---

[a] Part 1 of 2 not available.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 885

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Rome

November 27, 1941
318.

Re your # 745[a]

We are considering your opinion in regard to utilizing this individual in connection with our machinations toward India.

In order that we may continue to maintain contact with him and in order that we may put Shanghai and French Indo-China in touch with him please wire his name and address.

---

[a] See IV, 884.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 886

FROM: Rome (Horikiri)
TO: San Francisco

December 2, 1941
2.

(Part 1 of 2.)

SHIEDAI, a leader in the Hindustan Gadaru[b] party (Indian Independence Revolutionary Party), is now here receiving active aid from the Italian government. He is being utilized in radio propaganda activities for Indian consumption and in other ways. I, too, with the Minister's approval, have undertaken to contact him with regard to our propaganda endeavors

among Hindus. It is understood that he would like to secure the names and addresses of party members with whom he could get in contact who now reside in Shanghai, French Indo-China and Thai. In order to pass on instructions to leaders of the Party in your place ----- ----- -----.

The above is to be maintained a strict secret.

Relayed to Tokyo.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 887

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) December 2, 1941
TO: San Francisco #2.

(Part 2 of 2.)

Please deliver this note immediately and arrange for liaison with this fellow.

PU RAN — LINGH
League of Nations Hindustan
Gadar Party, Gadar Ashram
5 Wood Street

Japanese Empire cooperation with -----[b]. Please talk with -----[b] Consul General in your town. Organize our comrades in Lithuania, Georgia, Manila, Singapore, Siam, Indo-China, et. Cooperate with -----[b] district for mutual participations and against our enemies. More powers will be soon sent.

---

[b] All blanks represent same country which is unknown.

Trans. 12-14-41

No. 888

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) December 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #772.

Strictly secret.

Restricted distribution.

Re your #318[a].

On the 1st, I had conversations with the Indian, SHIYEDAI. I discussed with him the questions of cooperation in the future, but for the time being, at least, he has undertaken to insert Japanese propaganda in his radio broadcast to India. In his first broadcast of this type the gist of his statement was as follows:

Asia stands in the shadow of Japan's "leadership". The freedom of India is the basis for Japan's ultimate victory. That is to say, Japan's aim is to restore the lost freedom of the people of India. Japan, not motivated by any political ambitions, insofar as India is concerned, solely desires the freedom and independence of the people of India who are the people of Asia. She desires but to work in close economic and cultural relationship with the people of India.

Now, SHYEDAI has charge of the European Area. Names and addresses of agents in Shanghai, French Indo-China and Thai could be secured from his fellow-workers in San Francisco and Buenos Aires should that information be desired.

Telegraphic instructions from this man to his followers could be arranged through wires to the Consul General in San Francisco and the embassy in Argentina.

---

[a] See IV, 885.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 889

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

November 22, 1941
#743.

Secondary importance.

According to a report from the Vatican, on the 20th, the Pope had a secret meeting with Mr. CHITMAN.[a] He asked Mr. CHITMAN to transmit to Mr. ROOSEVELT at once that he hopes the American President will give careful consideration to Ambassador KURUSU's new proposal and investigate every possibility of peaceful means to prevent an outbreak with Japan, since America's reply will have grave results in deciding whether or not there will be war in the Pacific.

---

[a] Kana spelling—Tittman.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 890

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

November 28, 1941
#766.

(Primary importance.)

According to reports received from the Vatican through CICOGNANI, the Papal representative in Washington, many indications are evident that Japan forms a great obstacle to the United States' early termination of the present anti-Axis war. Public opinion in the United States is that America would be able to achieve victory for Great Britain simply by large-scale production of military supplies if it were not for this obstacle. In the event of a Japanese-American clash, assistance to England and the Soviet would decrease, making necessary American military intervention by means of forces on the European continent. Moreover, there are a great many who believe that during American-Japanese negotiations Japan put forth stipulations encroaching upon American interests and honor and so causing conditions to become extremely delicate. There were also reports to the effect that the difficulties of Japanese-American negotiations constrained the Interventionist faction headed by the President and strengthened the position of the Isolationists.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 891

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 765.

(Intelligence of secondary importance.)

According to intelligences from the Vatican, the extension of the Anti-Comintern Agreement and the participation of new adherents has made quite an impression upon the Pope. MONCHIINI[a] and (TALGINI ?), leaders of the anti-Nazi wing at this decisive stage, feel that the continued adherence of Japan and Spain to the Axis is a remarkable achievement brought about by HITLER. In opposition to this, PIO ROSSINI,[a] private secretary to the Pope, who heads up the pro-Fascist group, holds that this will have a great effect upon the proselytization of the Catholic faith in the Near and Far East, through its anti-Communistic acitivities. He considers that in this regard the fact that the Pope has not made clear his intentions is extremely regrettable. Furthermore, CHITMAN, the representative of the President of the United States attached to the Vatican, feels that the extension of the Anti-Comintern Agreement makes the current Japan-American negotiations extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Furthermore, the British representative, OSBOURNE, feels that as a result of this the war will expand greatly and last much longer. However, he is understood to have said that the fact that Turkey, by virtue of British and American diplomatic means did not participate in the signing of this treaty will make possible a British and American victory. Nevertheless, regrettable as Vatican opinion may be, at the present writing, though the opportunity is favorable for actions to persuade the Pope, one cannot say what his intentions are in this regard. The world-wide effect of this agreement however, according to PIO, has had an enormous effect upon the Vatican.

---

[a] Kana spelling

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 892

FROM: Rome November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 756.

Intelligence report of secondary order.

According to a report from a Vatican source the Grand Mufti of Palestine has been spending a lot of time in Rome and Berlin conferring with Italian and German officials on the set-up of Arabia and the Middle East when it comes presently under the domain of the Axis. Turkey is also participating in these talks so it seems and since Palestine is called the Holy Land, the German Government has notified the Pope that it might be a good idea for him to send a representative to the parleys too. Now in India there are a lot of Moslem areas and since Japan is to be the leader in East Asia, we too are to be invited to participate in the conferences. The report goes on to say that Germany and Italy are going to assist the Arabs to the utmost of their ability in order to help them throw off the yoke of the English and forestall any American machinations.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 893

FROM: Rome — November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #706.

(Report of Secondary Order.)

Re my #687[a].

On the 4th, the Grand Mufti went to Berlin, and I have an intelligence report from Vatican circles to the effect that the American representative to the Vatican, TITTOMAN, having received word from President ROOSEVELT on the 4th, had a strictly secret interview with the Pope. TITTOMAN argued as follows: Now that the Grand Mufti is in exile in German and Italy, he is sending all sorts of pro-Axis propaganda to the Arab world. This is evidently jointly encouraged by Germany and Italy, and the United States is gravely concerned. This propaganda will do Christianity great damage, and if the Axis fights in Palestine and central Asia, Germany and Italy will have to acknowledge the superior position of the Arab race. Now if this happens, all Christianity, let alone the Catholic Church, will be in danger. TITTOMAN went on to say that as the Pope knew, the democracies take the stand that the Arab world should continue its *status quo* and that the other peoples of the world should live together in harmony and justice. Therefore, would His Holiness countenance such a scheme as this on the part of Germany and Italy? TITTOMAN concluded that he certainly hoped not and that His Holiness would lodge a protest. The Pope, however, replied, "That is not a realistic problem. Until it becomes a fact that the Arab race becomes a menace to the interests of Christianity, I am not interested in those matters."

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 894

FROM: Rome — December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #786.

Re your #324[a]

On December 1st, the Government of this country made representations to the Turkish government for the establishment of ——— agencies. As yet, however, no reply of acceptance has been received. As soon as this reply comes to hand, it is understood that they will inform me.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 895

FROM: Rome — November 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #705.

Repeat of our message on the 6th.

Recently reception from JUP has been irregular and on the 6th it became very weak with much interference. Therefore, please change your wave length at once. We have informed Germany and Switzerland and asked Switzerland to notify France.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 896

FROM: Rome — November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #740.

Due to the instability of general conditions recently, JUO was changed on the 20th. JAP sensitivity has become progressively weaker, static interference making reception impossible. Due to recent international conditions, the nature of reports has become increasingly important. In order to guarantee reception during the season of instability, one wave length will hardly be sufficient. Therefore, I strongly feel that concurrent broadcasts in two to three wave lengths are required. Domei has recently changed the time of their English broadcast to exactly the same time as that of yours. Therefore, please make all efforts to see that these two broadcasts are (not?) transmitted at the same time. For your reference, a report of reception conditions will be made about the third.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 897

FROM: Berlin — November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1381.

Re your Circular #2357[a].

Sensitivity of JAP is very poor. If there is no other suitable wave length to broadcast on, please arrange immediately for it to broadcast simultaneously, for the time being at least, with JUO, (recently its sensitivity has improved).

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 898

FROM: Rome — November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #760.

Conditions regarding reception:

On the 25th and 26th sensitivity was weak and static and interference was so bad that reception was impossible.

On the 27th in spite of bad static, sensitivity was excellent and the complete message was received.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 899

FROM: Rome — November 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #768.

Re my #762[a].

In regard to the Japanese language radio broadcasts to Europe recently, JLT cannot be heard at all and while JVW can be heard fairly well still there is interference from other wave lengths during the news broadcasts and static, etc. Added to this is the fact that the announcer apparently speaks in a low tone, very rapidly and swallows the ends of his words, and the occasions when we do not get good reception are numerous. There is great danger that we may miss some important announcement such as was referred to in your telegram. Please take up the following points that I am going to mention and please arrange to do something about it, temporarily at least.

1. Select an announcer who can speak slightly louder than the present one and who can enunciate clearly, one who does not intone and who can pronounce even the last syllables of his words correctly and clearly.

2. In selecting the news please continue to place the most important news first followed by items of lesser importance. However as some time is usually consumed in adjusting the machine, sometime the important news is missed so please repeat this again at the end of the broadcast even if this requires cutting down on the entertainment features.

3. Before the Japanese news broadcast please be sure to always play several minutes of Japanese patriotic music by way of introduction.

Relayed to Berlin.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 900

FROM: Rome — December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #785.

The general intelligence broadcasts (IPPAN JOHO), of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th, were absolutely inaudible. What considerations are being given to our request of a simultaneous broadcast and the changing of the present wave length to that of JUO? Please advise.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 901

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) — November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #739.

According to a conversation that a staff member had with an Imperial ----- in Trieste on the 20th, there is little confidence in the new Croatian government. The new Government through forceful methods has barely been able to maintain public order. As a condition of continual assassination is carried out against invading Italian troops, (they are to be withdrawn ?) from that district, as well as Ustasia[a]. Although the Italian government appears on the surface to be very friendly with the Croatian government, there is really very little confidence. It appears that several old wooden ships which were (repaired ?) at Trieste are being used for transport along Italian and Greek coasts. The food situation in Croatia is extremely critical. About the only thing that is plentiful is timber, but, transport facilities being difficult, there

is very little movement in that line, and so, consequently, the economic situation there is serious.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 902

FROM: Rome — November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # ?

(2nd section.)[a]

Although supply movements are beset with difficulties, including occasional sinkings of convoys, these supplies are continuing and they are optimistic of the final outcome[b]. Furthermore ----- (remainder of section 2 unreadable).

(3rd section.)

As regards Italian-French relations, up to now independent conversations between the French and Italians have not taken place. However, with the elimination of Weygand it is being said in various quarters that a great increase in use of Tunis army transportation facilities is contemplated.

[a] Section 1, not readable.
[b] In Libya.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 903

FROM: Tokyo — December 3, 1941
TO: Rome — # 322.

Re your # 753[a].

I made inquiry of our Ambassador resident in Russia, the results of which are as follows:

On the occasion of translator Takahashi's leaving Russia the Ambassador made an official request in writing. On the 30th, he received from the Chief Secretary of the Foreign Office in Moscow a memorandum dated the 21st saying that Japan's custody of Italian property was recognized and that the Soviet would render any assistance required in connection therewith. Furthermore, the stationing of a foreigner to watch the property would be allowed.

However, the evacuation of the diplomatic staff of Sweden and of three or four other countries is only a matter of time and so if they were intrusted with guarding this property it would only be a temporary arrangement.

Please report along these lines.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 904

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

December 3, 1941
No number.

Re your #985[a] to Berlin.

I, together with Ando, am scheduled to have a conference with Mussolini and Ciano at 10:30 a.m.

---

[a] See IV, 825, 826.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 905

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

December 3, 1941
#985.

Re your message #985[a] to Berlin.

On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I, accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano ws also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986[b] to Berlin.

Mussolini: "I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U.S. talks from the very beginning, and, therefore, am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bullheadedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature.

"As your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area."

I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop).

With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i.e., that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked in the Mediterranean.

Mussolini: "Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now."

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: "Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point."

With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message #987[c] as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador MAKKENZEN.

Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all.

[a] See IV, 825.
[b] See IV, 828.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 907

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) December 2, 1941
TO: Rome #320.

(Priority.)

Re my #985[a] to Berlin.

The text to be used at the time of conclusion of the treaty mentioned in parentheses in paragraph 2 concerns only Japan and Germany, so will you please keep it absolutely secret from the Italians.

[a] See IV, 825.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 908

FROM: Rome December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #784.

Re your #323[a].

1. We have had confidential report from the Embassy in Berlin that it is in progress. Therefore, it is said that separate declarations between German-Japan and Italy-Japan, or a joint declaration, is desired.
2. (Too garbled to read).

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 909

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

December 5, 1941
#782.

Regarding my #775[a].

On the 5th, following request from (TIANO) Minister of Foreign Affairs, I called on him taking "ANDO" with me. (TIANO) says ----- then referring to the three party alliance texts (Which has no doubt, already been sent to you from Germany)[b] mentioned that if Japan were agreeable to this point, Italy would sign any time. As to the agreement in detail, they would leave it up to Japan and Germany to arrange it and did not care whether it was to be signed in Japan or Germany.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Message garbled, but pertains to the agreement not to make separate peace.

Trans. 12-24-41

No. 910

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

December 8, 1941
#2237.

UYAMA, Japanese Vice Consul went to see the Italian Consul General to tell him of our invasion plans and to solicit the cooperation of the Italian military in controlling the situation.

The Italian Consul General gave his consent but in his turn requested that we would see to it that their needs for gasoline would be supplied.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 911

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

October 18, 1941
#564.

Re your #455[a].

On the 17th I had HARADA go and talk to ARNALD about the market value of Chungking money as we understand it. ARNALD said, "That's all right, but I will have to take it up with the finance officials." HARADA then said, "well, now that we are agreed, let's exchange notes right away so that you can let us have the military expense money for September and October." ARNALD, however, argued thus: "We French pay our officials in China with this Chungking money. Also, we have been considering buying some things in Shanghai with it. Now, until the question of lifting the export embargo is settled, what good is this Chungking legal tender anyway? No, I'm afraid we can't let you have the piastres." HARADA retorted: "Well, now, we Japanese have accepted all the terms you French have proposed. You keep proposing more and more new problems. You have already put this off so long that we are getting angry." ARNALD, however, answered, "I've got instructions to confer with HENRY on the lifting of the export embargo in Shanghai and I can't let you have the piastres."

---

[a] See IV, 912.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 912

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

October 16, 1941
455.

Re your # 555[a].

1. There is no objection to the exchange rate for gold.

2. Nor is there any objection to the exchange rate for the Chinese currency. However, with regard to the latter, please make the following two points clear to them:

(1) The rate in Shanghai in relation to the American dollar should be the official quotation applying to telegraphic transfer to the United States (the present rate is 100 Shanghai dollars to 5-3/9 U.S. dollars).

(2) The exchange rate for the piastre in relation to the American dollar should be the official quoted rate effective in Saigon (at present 100 piastres to 22-3/4 U.S. dollars).

Furthermore, as to the question of lifting the Shanghai export embargo, since it would affect the situation in various ways, we cannot at present effect it for French Indo-China alone. Please see to it that the French authorities do not make this an excuse for dragging out the negotiations concerning the defrayment of military expense (the question of lifting the Shanghai export embargo is a delicate one; I will wire you later concerning it).

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 913

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Saigon

October 20, 1941
350.

(Priority.)

According to wires received here on the 19th, as no instructions have been forthcoming from Vichy, permits cannot be granted on the exports of the 3,000 tons in question. It is understood that arrangements are now being made for the loading of other products by the shipping company which was to have carried the cargo in question. Today, the 20th, the official in charge told the German Commercial Attaché in Tokyo that, in view of the matter of convenience of loading this material, we would like to secure permission to load this freight by the 24th. The Commercial Attaché said that he would wire NOKUMAN and ----- immediately.

Trans. 12–4–41

No. 914

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Saigon

October 20, 1941
351.

To ENOUE branch office from the Chief of the South Seas Bureau.

Article 6, clause 1 and 2, are in accord with the text of the Mekong agreement, but not clause 2 (which says ----- the temporary increase of police troops).

On the one hand, Articles 5 and 6 and clause 1 stipulate the establishment of an unfortified zone. Besides, Article 6 and the latter part of clause 2 contain the reservation (transportation of troops and material through the unfortified zone). Therefore, in view of all this, it is clear that the Thaiese claim of reinforcement by means of military troops violates the agreement.

However, as no special prohibitions are stipulated, should the French Indo-Chinese authorities approve, we have no objections to your handling the matter as you suggested in your wire.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 915

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 20, 1941
TO: Vichy #456.

Re your #561[a].

It is not clear to us whether we can go ahead at once with our plans to land planes in Saigon waters or whether (the Vichy authorities) wish us to take up the matter again with the French Indo-China Government in negotiations next January. Please answer at once.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 916

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 24, 1941
TO: Vichy #467.

(Urgent.)

Message to Hanoi as #5.

Part 1 of 2.

1. The Shanghai permit system, as I told you in separate message #46-, is a retaliatory measure against what was described in my #441- part 2[a]. Since then French Indo-China has (a) stopped the export of French Indo-China produce to Japan (see my #462[a]); and (b) declared that unless we pay a higher price for coal and zinc, as well as rice, they do not think they will be able to let us have them. Now, this attitude absolutely tramples under foot the MATSUOKA-HENRI economic agreement, as well as the principles laid down for joint defense. Unless the French Indo-China officials amend their attitude, we cannot satisfy them on the matter of the Shanghai permit system. Furthermore, to cope with the situation we will be forced to cancel the permits of French dealers in Japan for exports to French Indo-China and absolutely prohibit any exports leaving Japan. Politically, also, this intransigent attitude makes some measures inevitable.

2. However, if the French will approach the matter in a friendlier spirit, stop the steps they have taken against the importation of Japanese goods mentioned in my #441- (part 2)[a], cooperate wholeheartedly with us, put into effect the terms of the treaty for the exportation of French Indo-Chinese produce to Japan, and recognize the recommendations made in my #453[b] concerning payments for rubber mentioned in my #463[a], then the exportation of Japanese goods will hereafter be carried out without obstruction. Moreover, we are prepared then to consider seeing that the Shanghai permit system is managed in a way favorable to French Indo-China.

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 917

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 24, 1941
TO: Vichy #467.

(Urgent.)

Part 2 of 2.

Will you, therefore, please go and tell the French officials that at the present time the resistance which French Indo-China is putting up is very annoying to us Japanese, and, if they go one step further, an irremediable situation will in all probability ensue. Tell them that they do not know how the French Indo-China officials on the spot are acting up. Please negotiate along the lines laid down in (2) and have them wire the Governor General instructions.

Now, when we were all just about agreed on the payment of military expenses, the French officials brought up the question of the Shanghai permit system (an export embargo is not meant) and refused to pay the piastres necessary immediately. This is angering the people concerned extremely, so please try to have this settled in a separate category.

I have sent this message, together with the separate message, to Hanoi. Will Hanoi please send it to Saigon?

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 918

FROM: Tokyo October 24, 1941
TO: Hanoi #6.

(Urgent.)

Message to Vichy as #468.

Part 1 of 2.

1. As early as April 7th, before the export license system was introduced in Shanghai, in order to stop the flow of materials to CHIANG, we had the customs officials in Shanghai devise means of placing an embargo on shipments of 29 important items destined for French Indo-China, Burma, Hong Kong (Kiulung?), Kwangchow-Wan leased territories, Macao and unoccupied sections of South China. However, on July 26th, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands effected the freezing of assets also in the occupied areas. As a counter measure, we began to restrict business dealings with foreigners, in the case of Japanese residents in China, by means of a Japanese order and, in the case of the Chinese, by means of Chinese authorities exercising their control. Simultaneously, as a supplementary measure, we had the authorities institute an export license system having to do with fourteen items of important materials. (This list is a broad one covering nearly all of the aforementioned 29 items, with the exception of petroleum and similar products.) This, of course, was aimed principally at the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. Insofar as exports to French Indo-China were concerned, we followed a policy of issuing as many licenses as possible for articles flowing both from Japan and China. Following the institution of an embargo on the 29 items, the French Consul General in Shanghai requested that he be allowed to issue permits by means of signature for articles which are without the scope of those which may be re-exported and therefore not likely to be allowed to pass into the hands of the Chungking authorities; for, articles being shipped to French Indo-China were under the strict control of both Japanese and French commissions.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 919

FROM: Tokyo October 24, 1941
TO: Hanoi #6.

(Urgent.)

Message to Vichy as #468.

Part 2 of 2.

Consequently, in order to comply with this request, we made an exception of articles destined for French Indo-China and in case applications for licenses were submitted after the introduction of the license system, we have endeavored to issue these licenses in as large a number as circumstances permitted insofar as they had to do with articles being shipped to French Indo-China.

2. However, due to the fact that from the list of articles which came under either the embargo or the license system, cotton threads and cloth, as well as cotton goods in general, were excluded, dealers began to corner the market for these articles on the assumption that the license system would sooner or later be applied to them as well and the outflow of these articles began to show a sudden increase. We saw in this the danger of large quantities eventually reaching the Chungking authorities by way of the unoccupied areas in South China. Added to this was a tendency on the part of French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies to purchase from Shanghai those very materials which they had been depending on us to supply them. Especially French Indo-China authorities began to show an increasing attitude of resisting our efforts and there resulted frequent violations of the treaty. Therefore, on September 25 (?) we extended the embargo affecting the aforementioned 29 items so as to apply to all shipments destined for the unoccupied areas in South China. Furthermore, we added on October 8th to the list of articles coming under the license system, cotton thread and cloth and cotton goods in general. Because of these circumstances, we have of late been following the policy of minimizing the number of licenses issued for the purpose of shipments to French Indo-China.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 920

FROM: Hanoi (Hayasi) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #430.

(Foreign Office Secret.)

Re your #328[a].

The DAIETUTŌ[b] was formed in July of last year in Tonking and Annan as the result of the Amalgamation of the KŌETUTO, KOKUSYATŌ, and other scattered political parties which stand for race differentiation. There are about 150 active members whose central figures, for the most part, are newspaper men. Its object is to get the area out from under the domination of the French and to join forces with the Asiatic bloc, or, in other words, to join up with the Japan-Manchukuo, China bloc. They are relying upon the Japanese military forces to aid them in attaining this goal.

During September and October, the number of those party members who were arrested by the French Indo-China authorities, was in excess of 70. As you said in your message, by these arrests the party lost most of its guiding elements and as a result it is at present almost completely inactive.

We have been advised that heretofore none of the Japanese organs—the army, navy, and the Sumida organizations—has had any connection with this party. However, there are rumors that the leader of the party GEN SHO-SAN, is at present under the protection of the Japanese military. We are at present investigating this. We shall make a detailed report by mail.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] A political party.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 921

FROM: Hanoi (Hayasi) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 12 (Sigen)[a]

The investigating party has no telegraphic code, so that they are relying on the Consulate General for sending and receiving messages. As the consular office is some distance away this is very inconvenient. Therefore please arrange to send a copy of one or two simple codes and a code address book by the earliest connection.

---

[a] Natural Resources investigating commission.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 922

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 27, 1941
TO: Hanoi # 5 (Sigen).

Re your Sigen # 12[a].

One copy each of the five codes[a] are being sent by Ambassador Yosizawa's party which is leaving Kobe on 31 October. Please deliver them to the Survey Commission. Will you have that commission dispatch to us the one word STUZA upon its receipt of these codes, and at the same time, obtain from them a receipt for the codes.

It should go without saying that all messages involving matters of a very secret nature must continue to be sent through your office.

Is there a separate cable address for the Survey Commission? If so, please inform us.

The following is an extra:

That part of my message # 5[b] dated the 24th (to Vichy), which could not be decoded, follows: (the 9th and 10th lines).

"Have the French thoroughly understood it. (As stated at the end of my message # 441[c], point out that the attitude of the French Indo-China officials on the scene is beyond their imagination.)"

---

[a] See IV, 921.
[b] See IV, 916.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 11-1-41

No. 923

FROM: Tokyo — October 27, 1941
TO: Vichy — # 478.

Re your # 561.

It is not to our interest to bring up the subject now, for that will give them time to think up excuses before the negotiations which are scheduled for January of next year. Please, therefore, limit yourself to repeating our demands for a landing place for our hydroplanes. Otherwise, maintain silence and watch developments.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 924

FROM: Tokyo — October 27, 1941
TO: Hanoi — # 360.

Passengers on the Saigon-Bangkok airline have increased tremendously of late.

At present we are negotiating with the French Government in regard to air connections, but because of the interminable delays we would like to have you negotiate on the spot independently, as a temporary measure to meet immediate emergency requirements.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 925

FROM: Tokyo — October 28, 1941
TO: Hanoi — # 363.

(Message from Vichy on the 24th, # 569.)

Re your # 183[a].

WAGNER, who returned to France during the last part of last month, gave a detailed report to French Government circles regarding future propaganda and elements that are endangering Franco-Japanese cooperation by GAULLIST inclinations within the Governor-Generalcy. He gave a report covering a long period of time to the Colonial Office. The Colonial Minister PLATON was summoned and concurred with the ideas expressed. This Minister will soon send several persons to French Indo-China for an investigation in order to completely extirpate injurious elements. He was secretly informed that not only GAUTHIER and DE LASALLE of the Governor-Generalcy were representative of the injurious elements, but also the Chief of Eduation and Propaganda Department CHARTIN, Governmental Office Representative MONTOVANI, and newspaperman SAMUEL DE SACY. It appears that PLATON is to return to French Indo-China by the MM boat, and from there he plans to return to the home country.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 926

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 28, 1941
TO: Hanoi #364.

(Also to Vichy from the Foreign Minister.)

A Frenchman by the name of WAGNER, a contributor to L'Illustration and a close friend and companion of ROBIN[a] and PETAIN, wishes to see the trouble between Japan and Vichy over French Indo-China settled as soon as possible, so we have sent him home to talk the matter over with influential Vichy officials. Steamship accommodations make it more convenient for him to go by Brazil. He will stop in your city about the middle of next month. Meet him and use him in whatever way you can. Also, keep me advised whenever the occasion warrants of WAGNER's actions.

---

[a] Plenipotentiary from Vichy to French Indo-China.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 927

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 28, 1941
TO: Hanoi #10.

Message to Vichy as #484.

Re the first paragraph of your #575[a].

I have continued negotiating with the French Ambassador in Tokyo, but he says that he has instructions from Vichy to the effect that the investigation commission must reduce its personnel. HENRY shows not the slightest sincerity. Well, even if we can't get visas, I am going to have the whole troupe leave according to schedule (see my #483[b] concerning the troupe of Ambassador YOSHIZAWA). Still, I would like for you again to tell the French Officials that we would like for them to issue the desired instructions.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 928.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 928

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 28, 1941
TO: Vichy #483.

Re my #476[a].

On the 28th when the Vice Minister conferred with HENRY, the Ambassador told him that he was in receipt of instructions to limit the number of visas to about 20, since, if the personnel accompanying the special emissary was too large, it would have the unwholesome result of provoking the ill feelings of the people of French Indo-China. To this the Vice Minister replied that an agreement had already been effected between the two governments regarding the dispatching of a special emissary and the question of its personnel being a matter for the Japanese to decide (the Ambassador recognizes this), it is hard to understand why there should be any complaint on the subject; that he would like to have the visas willingly issued since the party consists of those who have been entrusted with the mission of bringing about cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China industrially, economically and otherwise; and that although the group contains a considerable number of persons who are men of knowledge and experience in their lines, it does not include a single military man. However, the Ambassador repeated what he had already said and would not agree to the request.

I understand the words "after discussing the matter with the Japanese authorities" in your #576[a] to mean that the personnel of the party was one of the subjects discussed and since the personnel consists of the absolute necessary minimum, should the visas not be issued in time for their sailing (by the evening of the 30th) I am of the intention of having the party leave without visas. Will you, therefore, put the pressure on the authorities again following the line of the request which the Vice Minister made to HENRY and get them to wire immediately to HENRY instruction to issue the visas.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 929

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 28, 1941
TO: Vichy #481.

Message #36 from Minister UCHIYAMA in Hanoi to this Foreign Minister.

On the 22nd and 23rd, I visited the Secretary of General Affairs and said, "Now in spite of the fact that we are agreed in principle, you all continue making excuses bringing up all sorts of technical details and not all of the September installment of military expenses have been forthcoming. If this sort of delay keeps up our Army will inevitably have to take a hand. Won't you please at least let us have the remainder of the September installments?"

The Secretary answered, "I have already taken this up with Vichy and they informed me I would have to wait for an order." He continued to euphemize along this line and I said, "Well, I will have to take this up with the Army. Won't you at least give me some idea of the date?" I pressed him hard and finally he said, "I will ask Vichy for instructions and send you some answer on the 27th."

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 930

FROM: Vichy October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #577.

Re my #574[a].

On the 27th, ARNALD[b] told HARADA that he had issued orders to the officials concerned: (a) that the November and December running expenses should be settled in a lump, and (b) that he had issued orders to the French Indo-Chinese officials on the spot to undertake an investigation in cooperation with the French military officials.

On our part, we must take the proper measures with respect to (a) and at the same time, in connections with (b), we must put our military officials in touch with the French and have them explain the urgent necessity of funds and thus expedite the decision of the French to let us have this extraordinary expense money. Will you, therefore, please communicate this in some suitable way to those concerned.

[a] Not available.
[b] Minister in Vichy.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 931

FROM: Vichy October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 579.

(Separate message.)

(Beginning of message missed.)

1. With respect to Japan's third demand, France agrees to accept payment in gold in case payment in American dollars is impossible. With respect to *4*, France will reserve 23,000 tons of the French Indo-China crop for herself and will furnish Germany and Japan with the total remainder on terms of payment in either dollars or gold.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 932

FROM: Vichy October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 580.

Re your # 483[a].

In order to make sure, I contacted the French Foreign Office and they explained to me that, although at first they had given instructions to issue visas for about 20 persons, consequent to their receiving our request, they issued, on the afternoon of the 27th, instructions along the line given in my # 576[b] and that this meant that they have accepted our demands in principle.

Since I thought that there might be a misunderstanding, I asked them to wire again to HENRY so that he will issue visas to all the members. They replied that they would comply with our request.

---

[a] See IV, 928.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 933

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 29, 1941
TO: Vichy # 485.

(Part 2 of 2, Part 1 not available.)

It is expected that Ambassador Yoshizawa will leave here the last of this month and take up his duties early in November, however with his arrival in sight, as long as such an atmosphere exists at the scene, (even in the matter of the special envoy's ----- and living quarters the officials there showed no sincerity, and there was a special issue of ----- containing wild remarks about not welcoming the special envoy), all our efforts in sending a special envoy and trying to adjust matters in an amicable manner will amount to nothing. Not only will the earnest desires of both Japan and France to see a satisfactory adjustment of the Japanese-French relations not be realized, but it is feared the troops stationed there may finally become exasperated and an unfortunate situation be brought about.

Therefore, will you please see Darlan, state the import of the foregoing frankly so as to arouse his attention, and then suggest that instructions be send to the French Indo-China authorities making plain to them the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and urging upon them

that in view of the coming of the special envoy they cooperate in a positive way and make common cause with us. Advise by return dispatch as to results.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 934

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

October 30, 1941
585.

(Urgent.)

Re telegram from Hanoi to the Minister # 438[a].

An exchange of diplomatic notes was made on the 28th regarding payment in one lump sum with settlement being arranged. At this time there is no argument. The French text is as follows: "Instructions have been sent to Hanoi in view of advanced payment of the monthly amounts for November and December."

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 935

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

October 31, 1941
496.

(Saigon to Tokyo # 488.)

The gist of # 488[a] from Saigon to Tokyo is as follows:

Re your # 368[a].

On the 30th the Indo-China Bank placed at the disposal of the Specie Bank the September balance of 1,500,000 piasters and the October allotment of 4,500,000 piasters, a total of 6,000,000 piasters. At present the Specie Bank is negotiating regarding the balance of 9,500,000 piasters.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 936

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Vichy

November 1, 1941
501.

(Hanoi to Tokyo # 442.)

Gist of message # 442[a] from Hanoi follows:

Re my # 440[a].

In a note dated the 29th, the Chief of the General Affairs advises that he has been notified by the French Government that Japan has agreed to confer with regard to the disposition of

the 66,000,000 piasters. The French experts will include one person from the Financial Ministry, three officers (military), two technical experts.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 937

FROM: Hanoi — October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #16.

My Vice-Consul, IIDA (en route to post), accompanied by ITO, plans to leave Hanoi by rail for Saigon where he will stay for about a week, returning by plane. Please wire approval or disapproval to each of us.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 938

FROM: Hanoi (Uchiyama) — November 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #39.

I, with Secretary ITŌ, arrived at Hanoi on November 3. IIDA, Vice Consul, arrived the 1st.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 939

FROM: Hanoi (Uchiyama) — November 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #40.

Since head of the bureau HARAGUTI is leaving Saigon for Japan on the 3rd and not stopping at Hanoi, he cannot continue his uncompleted talk with OKURA.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 940

FROM: Tokyo — November 4, 1941
TO: Vichy — #505.

Message #445 from Hanoi to this Foreign Minister read about as follows:

Re your #376[a]. On the 31st, the Secretary of General Affairs told me that he had ordered the Bank of Indo-China to pay out to us 15,000,000 piastres.

I replied, "Well, I thought it was 15,500,000. How about the other 500,000."

He replied, "You fellows certainly like to quibble over small amounts but I will wire for instructions." He continued, "We said that we would pay 1,500 dollars (I mean piastres) providing a conference of experts was held concerning the provisional expenses. That was the idea of the Governor General's office, however, since our home Government has already ordered this quick payment, I suppose that this term has been eliminated."

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 941

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 5, 1941
TO: Hanoi #393.

We are sending code machines for your office and also for Saigon by Courier Harada who is returning to his post on the Kokuryu Maru which sailed from Kobe on the 31st of October. (The numbers of the machines are as follows: For your office, printer #64, transposer #43; for Saigon, printer #80, transposer #50.)

These machines and the accessories are contained in four wooden boxes and five suitcases.

Please handle this as Ambassador Yoshizawa's baggage when it comes there. When you have received it wire the one word ASADA in plain language as an unnumbered telegram.

Please dispatch the machine for Saigon immediately by some safe and reliable means.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 942

FROM: Tokyo November 5, 1941
TO: Vichy #510.

(Saigon to Tokyo #474.)

The gist of #474[a] from Saigon to Tokyo is as follows:

Re my #488[b].

On the 4th of November the *Vichy (?)* bank placed at the disposal of the Specie Bank the sum of 9,500,000 Philippine dollars covering military expenses for November and December and the unpaid balance of 500,000.

---

[a] Not otherwise available.
[b] See IV, 935.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 943

FROM: Hanoi (Uchiyama) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #45.

Re your #363[a].

Strictly Secret.

WAGNER, who claims to have been sent out by MANDEL,[b] was undoubtedly mixed up in the collapse of France. It is understood that he came to French Indo-China not so long ago. As a result of our current investigations, we have learned that he is of Jewish extraction and that the local press doesn't have the confidence of the government and the people it used to enjoy. Last year, when he was asked to quit French Indo-China suddenly, he stopped off in Japan on his way home.

In view of the above circumstances, and in the light of the cold shoulder the French Indo-Chinese gave him, I do not see why we should place any credence in intelligences given by him.

This is for your information alone.

---

[a] See IV, 925.
[b] Former French Minister of Colonies.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 944

FROM: Tokyo — November 7, 1941
TO: Hanoi — #12.

Regarding your SIGEN (resources) message #7[a].

I have conferred with the Navy and the Army. However, Ambassador YOSHIZAWA will go there, shortly, bearing my instructions. He will act in the capacity of a supervisor of your Resources Corps. The Navy and Army men accompanying him will assume the liaison work between your resources corps and us. Therefore, there is not need of appointing a liaison official.

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[a] Abstract of contents is: Please appoint Liaison Officer for SHIGEN CHOSADAN.

Trans. 1-2-42

No. 945

FROM: Tokyo — November 7, 1941
TO: Vichy — #515.

Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary Kenkichi Yoshizawa, as indicated in my special message #516[a] (cancelling my message, index number 03177) has absolutely full powers, especially to conduct negotiations, (see the gist of my message #485)[b]. Take up negotiations with the French Government at once in the matter of matching this by granting to the Governor General of French Indo-China full powers to negotiate with him.

---

[a] See IV, 946.
[b] See IV, 933.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 946

FROM: Tokyo — November 7, 1941
TO: Vichy — #516.

You are being sent to Indo-China as Special Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

You will be charged with the following responsibilities:

In performing your duties in Indo-China you will supervise the secretariat, and cooperate freely with the ranking military and naval officials in carrying out our policies toward Indo-China;

Execution of matters relating to government in general, especially those of every type deriving from the functioning of the Matsuoka-Henri agreement;

The joint defense of Indo-China, revision of matters relating to places selected for joint defense, matters related to the quarters and supplies for our troops stationed there, their movement on maneuvers, the use of air and naval forces, and the complete establishment of Japanese-French Indo-Chinese joint defense; matters under the direct supervision of the ranking army and naval officers are excluded;

General economic matters, especially the execution of the Economic Agreement, investigation of economic resources, including supervision of investigating parties, development enterprises, and protection of the economic activities of Japanese;

Intelligence and propaganda, except military intelligence and propaganda, and cultural enlightenment;

Our policies regarding Chinese in Indo-China and Thailand, and our plans concerning organs of the Chungking party in Indo-China, stopping aid to Chiang Kai-shek, supervising investigations of commodities sent to aid Chiang;

Supervision of our nationals in Indo-China and their education and health.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 947

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

November 7, 1941
594.

Re your # 492[a].

An announcement has been issued stating that the officials[b] concerned had arrived on the spot and that there are more than 100 in the party. One group of the party which arrived definitely did not plan to return. The negotiations with the Colonial Ministry are difficult so if there are any among the party already dispatched who plan to return, please wire me at once.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] Economic investigating committee to French Indo-China. The French have been objecting to the size of the Party, but the Japanese have sent the full party regardless of protests.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 948

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Vichy

November 10, 1941
525.

Re your # 594[a].

The two parties from the Agricultural and Forestry Ministry, consisting of 7 persons each, 6 parties, consisting of 6 persons each, from the same Ministry, 5 parties of 5 persons each from the Commerce and Industry Ministry, are scheduled to leave French Indo-China for home about the middle of January.

One party of 12 persons from the Agricultural and Forestry Ministry, 3 parties of 6 persons each from the same Ministry, 4 parties of 6 persons each, from the same Ministry, and 4 parties of 7 persons from the ----- Ministry are scheduled to leave early in February.

The remaining investigation groups consisting of 5 parties made up of 8 persons each from the Agricultural and Forestry Ministry, the party of 11 persons from the quicksilver industry, 4 parties of 8 persons each from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as well as the 6 parties of ----- persons each from the Agricultural and Forestry Ministry and the party of 3 from the Commerce and Industry were to leave on the Kokuryū Maru about the ----- of -----. However, in view of the present situation in French Indo-China, we have decided to delay the sailing of this ship. Should any further delay be necessary it would become impossible for these parties to continue their investigations because of the rainy season (particularly if all of these remaining parties are to wait for the sailing of this ship). Should there be any who find it necessary to sail earlier, please do what you can to arrange sailing for them on a mail boat.

After you have discussed this matter with them and issued such instructions as might be necessary, please wire me the results.

[a] See IV, 947.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 949

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

November 9, 1941
523.

Re # 482[a] from Saigon to this Minister, and re my # 476[a].

(a) A contract for 2,900 tons was made between them and the dealers on the 6th, but on the 7th, a note from the Governor General stated that the 2,900 tons could not be delivered until permission is granted by the home government, and requested that the Japanese send no ships until further written advice shall be received from the authorities.

(b) It seems to us that there is some underhanded design back of this note from the Governor General, and that if the loading of the above is unduly delayed, it may have serious effects on the negotiations for the 10,000 tons, and on its delivery.

Please see that instructions are sent immediately from Vichy to the Governor General to make it possible to load the 2900 tons at once.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 950

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

November 9, 1941
524.

Re my # 523[a].

Please negotiate with them to have instructions issued to the Governor General at once. Also please do your utmost to come to an agreement in regard to my # 517[b].

[a] See IV, 949.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 951

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Hanoi

November 10, 1941
23.

Re your # 47[a]. For TASHIRO, Counsellor, to OGAWA, Consul General.

The Chicago Maru which your party intend to board, will arrive at Canton on the 16th of this month, and after staying at anchor for seven to ten days is to go direct to Haiphong or Saigon. However, since its course after leaving Canton is not settled, please get in touch with Canton directly for definite information.

We expect that if the boat goes first to Haiphong it will be at Hanoi for three days from December 4th, and if it goes direct to Saigon it will be at Hanoi for three days from the 16th.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 952

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

November 10, 1941
526.

(Priority.)

(*# 476 from Saigon* to this Foreign Minister.)

Concerning purchases of French Indo-China rubber.

1. On the 3rd the *Kanju Maru* sailed with the specially marked 3,000 tons.
2. Saying that they have no permission from the Vichy Government, the French Indo-China officials held out on the permit for the remainder of the second contract consisting of 2,100 tons, but we pinned them down, and with the guarantee of payment by the Yokohama Specie Bank just as in the previous case, we got a permit and have decided to ship the rubber on the *Seikai Maru* and the *Melbourne Maru*.
3. Mitsui and other companies requested us to purchase the 2,900 tons remainder of the 15,000 tons contracted for, and although the price set by the French Indo-China officials is 2,230 piastres per ton, much higher than in the last instance, in view of the fact that Germany is paying this much I suppose we will have to accept.
4. As for the 10,000 *additional* tons, the French Indo-China officials say that they would rather we would get in contact with Vichy on the price. Now what I want to know is why Germany would ever consent to pay such an outrageous price. Only recently between September and November, Germany has been paying 3,000 piastres a ton, for what reason heaven only knows. Now I think it is up to us to negotiate directly with Berlin and set a definite future price in order to keep both Germany and Vichy from robbing us.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 953

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

November 12, 1941
528.

In the face of the ever-straining international situation, the army is endeavoring to perfect as quickly as possible military facilities in French Indo-China. As a result, they now face a great need of making certain preparations in North Indo-China which would be in violation of the NISIHARA-MARUTAN agreement, especially the clause which forbids occupation by the army of the area south of the river Auju[a]. The French Indo-China authorities, I understand, claiming that they could not permit the Japanese Army to make such preparations because they consider the restrictions stipulated in the agreement still valid, refuse absolutely to recognize the demands of the Japanese Army. However, at the time the treaty for the joint defense was concluded, in anticipation of just such a case as this, we saw to it that a clause was inserted to the effect that the treaty includes cancellation of the restrictions stipulated in the NISIHARA-MARUTAN agreement. Therefore, urge them to issue at once definite in-

structions to the French Indo-China authorities to withdraw their claim and then wire me the results.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 954

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 12, 1941
TO: Hanoi #30.

The gist of my #515[a] to Vichy is as follows:

Instructions have already been given to Ambassador YOSHIZAWA.

Comparing this with the gist of #485[b] (re the matter of improving the French Indo-Chinese attitude towards Japan) the extensive powers granted to you as Ambassador are clearly shown. Negotiate with the French authorities for the granting of corresponding powers of negotiation to the French Indo-Chinese Governor General.

[a] See IV, 945.
[b] See IV, 933.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 955

FROM: Vichy November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #601.

Re your #517[a], #523[b], and #524[c].

After a series of negotiations with the French authorities, ARUNARU[d] on the 12th made the following definite promise to HARADA:

(1) They will provide by the end of this year 10,000 tons of additional supply in accordance with our schedule.

(2) They will issue instructions to the French officials on the spot to supply us with 12,000 tons of the remaining 15,000 tons which is to be shipped within this year, provided that the payment is made in gold (this includes the 2,900 tons mentioned in your #523[b]).

(3) As to the method of payment in gold, they have no objection in principle to that suggested in your #507[a], but they are contacting the local officials at present with regard to the details.

----- With regard to the remaining 3,000 tons, although we have been negotiating on the assumption that the payment should be made in yen, the French authorities have begun to show some reluctance, giving as a reason for their attitude that if payment in yen is permitted they would have to permit the Germans to pay in marks. I, therefore, have decided to continue my negotiations on this phase of the question.

[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 949.
[c] See IV, 950.
[d] ARNALD, Minister at Vichy.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 956

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Singapore

November 13, 1941
345.

Regarding your # 698[a].

Referring to the last part of paragraph 7.

Broadcasts directed to Singapore and French Indo-China are:
I Directed to the South Seas:
JVZ; 11,815 kc; 25.39 meters
JJI; 9,535 kc; 31.46 meters
Broadcasts on Japan time from 7 pm to 9:55 pm
From 7:00 pm, not less than 10 minutes, news in English
From 7:30 pm, news in Mandarin
From 8:20 pm, news in Cantonese
From 8:40 pm, news in Fukienese
From 9:00 pm, news in Japanese
From 9:10 pm, interpretation of current events
From 9:20 pm, lecture in Japanese, Mon., Wed., Fri.
From 9:20 pm, news from home, and music; Tues. & Thurs.
From 9:30 pm, news in Mandarin.
II Broadcasts to French Indo-China and Thailand:
JVWZ, 11,725 kc; 25.59 meters
JVZ, 11,815 kc; 25.39 meters
From 9:55 pm until 12 midnight:
10:00 pm, news in French
11:00 pm, news in Thai
11:20 pm, news in Cantonese
11:40 pm, news in Burmese
III Broadcasts to the Dutch East Indies and Malaya:
JZI, 9,025 kc; 31.46 meters
From 9:55 pm until 12 midnight:
10:00 pm, news in Dutch
10:30 pm, news in English
11:00 pm, news in Malay
11:30 pm, news in Fukienese

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 1-8-42

No. 957

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

November 14, 1941
608.

Re your # 528[a].

On the 14th I had HARADA transmit to Vice-Minister ROSIYA[b] the purport of your instructions. I understand that the Vice-Minister replied that he would at once look into the matter and then reply.

---

[a] See IV, 953.
[b] Kana spelling, Roshier.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 958

FROM: Hanoi
TO: Tokyo

November 15, 1941
#081.

Regarding my #077[a].

Messages of a special nature which are best not seen by staff members should be sent addressed to Consul General and at the head of the message put GAISIN[b] as is the case with messages addressed to our Embassy in China.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] "Reply requested."

Trans. 1-15-42

No. 959

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hanoi

November 15, 1941
#040.

Tokyo to Vichy #538.

(1) The amount of trade and the type of trade is, according to negotiation #15, to be settled by the end of this year, and according to item #8 the fishery right must also be arranged for soon. The Japanese government wishes to put all matters connected with trade in French Indo-China in the hands of Special Ambassador Yoshizawa, who is now ready to carry on negotiations with French Indo-China's Governor General. Will you please ask the French government to cable authority to negotiate to the French Indo-China Governor.

(2) Regarding the Japanese demand on these questions, a full outline is as separate cable #537[a] and if France wishes to carry on negotiations regarding rubber in Vichy, please do this, following the lines in cable #536[a], so that your negotiation there will be the same as that carried on in French Indo-China.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 960

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 16, 1941
#955.

Re your #1288[a].

With regard to French Indo-Chinese rubber bound for Germany, we have accepted the task of transporting this material as far as Japan. We contacted and arranged with the German Commercial Attaché to transport the balance of the contracted amount (10,885 kilotons) in the following manner.

1. About the middle of October (by the Kanju Maru) 3,000 tons. (The boat has already arrived.)

Early in November (by the Hibari Maru) 2,000 tons. (This has already been loaded.)

Late in November (by the Sydney Maru) 3,000 tons.

Early in December (as yet the boat has not been designated 2,885 tons. (All of the above figures are in kilotons.)[b]

2. When the Kanju Maru had completed loading, the sailing of the ship was delayed by roughly one week because the German authorities had not received export permits from the French authorities. The great handicap of a shortage of ships notwithstanding, we have gone to great lengths to dispatch these vessels. The German authorities, therefore, should be made to well understand the great lengths to which we have gone.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] DoD Comment: As in text, probably metric tons.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 961

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

November 17, 1941
#614.

Re your #539[a].

Has this question of the allotment[b] been taken up with the Germans yet?

Recently a German member of the Armistice Commission, who was resident in Paris, told Harada[c] that first Germany and Japan would have to reach an agreement on the amount of French Indo-China rubber to go to Europe (including the amount to go to both Germany and France), and the amount to go to Japan out of next year's production.

Furthermore, according to the 1939 report of the Hanoi Agriculture and Forestry investigation Bureau's "Le-Caoutohoue-en-Indo-China" by VAXELAIRE, the estimated production of French Indo-China rubber for this year is 75,000 tons, and for next year 80,000 tons. This is for your information.

Both this and the reference telegram have been relayed to Germany.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Of French Indo-China rubber.
[c] Japanese Counselor of Embassy in France.

Trans. 11-30-41

No. 962

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

November 18, 1941
#1160.

(Secret.) Re your #2020[a].

The planning committee had planned to deliberate four or five days on a bill for a new import and export permit system, but under our direction they have drawn up the bill with the contents practically the same as the former one.

1. Goods sent to French Indo-China and Siam are divided as follows:

(a) A definite list of goods guaranteed by China and Japan.

(b) A list of conditional permits, only issued for goods exchanged for supplies necessary to China or Japan, such as cotton textiles and cotton products.

(c) A list of unconditional permits, including other goods except for the cotton textiles and cotton products mentioned in your #2021[a].

2. A list of items and the amounts is determined from among the goods listed in (b) and (c) which must be prohibited or restricted for re-export to the Dutch East Indies, etc.

3. If foreign money is used to purchase exports, it is being considered to supply goods from Japan.

4. Further provisions will be based upon the standardization of exchange at the time. However, in regard to the application of the above plan to French Indo-China, it is planned to wait for the time being and watch the progress of our present negotiations with them.

Since we would like to allow permits on the basis of past experience for conditional permit goods even if there is nothing to import in exchange, please wire us at once in regard to this bill after investigating to find out the amount and value of goods to be exported from Shanghai.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 963

FROM: Tokyo — November 19, 1941
TO: Vichy — # 545.

Part 2 of 2, part 1 not available.

As far as Japan is concerned, by some method or other she must assure herself of an adequate supply of French Indo-China rubber. French Indo-China for her part can report the amount exported. Then, we must have an understanding with France regarding the minimum amount that we can get along with as reported previously.

3. As for next year's production, that is being estimated at present. However, in case the production exceeds 70,000 tons, we desire to have a suitable "formulae" worked out for the distribution between Japan and France and Germany.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 964

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — November 20, 1941
TO: Vichy — # 550.

Re part 2 of my # 534[a].

Please make representations with the object of having instructions sent to HENRI in connection with the pending question of passport visas for Envoy YOSHIZAWA and party, as well a, the Border Delineation Committee. Wire results.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 965

FROM: Tokyo — November 21, 1941
TO: Hanoi — # 621.

According to a report from the army, their Governor General DOKUU, under the guise of going to call on the wife of Governor General DARATOO from the 9th to the 12th of this month, has actually taken an aeroplane to the west bank of the Mekong River, where the BEREGOTO KAAKU rubber company is located. It is rumored that he is in secret collaboration with the

British and Americans there. If this is true, it goes without saying that it is a matter of the utmost concern to the Japanese Imperial government. Please contact the army authorities there regarding the veracity of this and wire the results of your investigations immediately.

This has been relayed to Vichy. Please relay to Saigon.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 966

FROM: Vichy — November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #623.

On the evening of the 19th, the resignation of General WEYGAND was published. Lately because of political considerations, the General's position had become very delicate. He always said that the establishment of military bases by Germany in North Africa would violate the Franco-German truce agreement and opposed this. Not only that, but he was getting supplies from the United States. He was falling more and more into disfavor, and already his resignation had been prophesied from time to time. WEYGAND, however, was trusted implicity by the colonial forces, and the hearts of the people were with him uniformly. Moreover, he has played a great part so far in keeping North Africa out of the general mess. Therefore, it was with great reluctance that old Marshal PETAIN let him go. The main reason why Minister of War UNTEMERU[a] made a trip recently was to settle the question of American assistance. Thus, the French government, by its recent act, has made up its mind that it must sacrifice American supplies in North Africa. Then, too, it is regarded as quite possible that Great Britain might invade that territory. The advocates in the French government of stronger relations with Germany, principally DARLAN and Minister of the Interior PUCHEU, have won a great victory, and I suspect that Franco-German cooperation will be much stronger henceforth.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 967

FROM: Vichy — November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #624.

On the 17th, I told the Vice-Minister what you said in your #538[a], and on the 20th, ARNALD told HARADA that since the Colonial Minister is on a trip to Africa, it will be impossible to settle the matter immediately. France cannot, by any means, leave these negotiations up to her representatives in French Indo-China. Furthermore, the colonial officials have never been allowed to handle such negotiations as these. Therefore, he said he would like for Japan to choose either Tokyo or Vichy, and if we consider the rubber question to have any connection with the Armistice Commission, he would like for us to hold the negotiations here in Vichy. HARADA replied that those negotiations are different from those held in the spring and are designed primarily to elaborate in a definite way on the terms of the treaty. Furthermore, during the spring negotiations, the French officials were principally in charge. Then, too, the situation in Japan is now tense. HARADA concluded by saying that he would like for him immediately to reconsider the matter and issue the pertinent instructions. ARNALD promised that he would reconsider the matter and in two or three days send a reply.

[a] See IV, 959.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 968

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

November 22, 1941
#625.

Re your #546[a].

On the 21st, ARNALD told HARADA that he had sent instructions to the Governor of French Indo-China to the effect that this matter should be discussed among the Japanese and French officials, and perhaps it would be a good idea to leave it up to the military headquarters of both armies. He added, however, that in accordance with our request he would promise to send further directions to the Governor-General.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 969

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

November 24, 1941
#556.

Re telegram from Saigon on the 24th concerning the purchase of rubber.

The French Indo-Chinese authorities (have not received?) instructions from Vichy since last month, no arrangement having been made with the Yokohama Specie Bank for payment or contract made with the Section Chief. Only 5,000 tons of the 10,000 tons previously agreed upon are available. (7,000 tons were mentioned in the telegram from Vichy #601[a].) In order that there may be no delays, the policy should be adopted of having merchants contract these 5,000 tons. They desire that Japan assume the export tax of the supplementary amount supplied at this time. As a result of MINODA'S[b] (conversation ?) with MARTAN[c], it was agreed that, as previously has been the case, Japan would assume only an amount of 200 (600?) piastres (approximately half of the amount). The above-mentioned amount of 5,000 tons was contracted on the 21st.

Though it was only possible to load only 2,900 tons during November, it will be necessary to assign the Akamine Maru because all available bottoms are filled.

Section Chief UOKA will assume the expense of loading the 5,000 tons.

Transmitted to Hanoi.

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[a] See IV, 955.
[b] Japanese representative in Saigon.
[c] French Indo-Chinese economic representative.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 970

FROM: Hanoi (Yoshizawa)
TO: Tokyo

November 24, 1941
#117.

Message to Bangkok as #8.

Regarding the arrival of specialists to be attached to your office, TOSHIRŌ SAKAI and IRAKAME OKUDA, they left by land for Saigon as air service was not available. They will travel by first available plane from Saigon, notifying you from there the date of their arrival.

Relayed to Tokyo.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 971

FROM: Hanoi
TO: Tokyo

November 25, 1941
118.

(Strictly secret.)

We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two. It goes without saying here, of course, that if the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various enterprises shall be launched in accordance with the plans which have been laid down in advance.

Should, however, the negotiations not end in a success, since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day.

Under these circumstances, however, there shall have to be some alterations in the program we have laid out for the various enterprises. We shall, undoubtedly have to establish organs and conduct negotiations which will not conflict with the campaign. The thing that we are most concerned about is whether or not, in the event of war, the status quo will be maintained as far as French Indo-China's governmental set-up is concerned. I feel that it is essential that we not only be advised of this, but it must be done immediately as we wish to make all prearrangements as far in advance as possible.

If you have any opinions as to the outcome of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations, will you please inform this office of them together with whatever other pertinent information you may deem wise to impart to us.

Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance. According to press reports, however, the United States conferred with the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and even of China, in Washington, and hence the governments of these countries are now aware of the matters being discussed in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. Moreover, by means of (Courier ?) service, the military here are aware of not only our stand in the negotiations but also of the general atmosphere of the said negotiations.

We feel as if we, a Foreign Office organ, alone have been left out of the picture. As you pointed out in your circular message # 2355[a] the situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Please, therefore, make arrangements to advise us on these points by means of either cable or by special messenger services.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 972

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Vichy

November 26, 1941
564.

(Message to Hanoi # 79.)

Re my # 78[a].

As a result of a conference between the central army authorities and myself, it has been ordered that, since we do not expect that France will easily concede to our demands in regard to this problem of the local army although we have reiterated to them at former negotiations, we will disregard this and act on the basis of our demands. Bearing this in mind, when similar problems occur in the future, reply accordingly to the French Indo-China authorities.

This has been sent to Vichy.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 973

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Saigon

November 26, 1941
#014.

(To be handled in Government code.)

Please investigate the dynamiting of the American Consulate and wire me back.
Relayed to Hanoi.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 974

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Vichy

November 26, 1941
#565.

Re my #550[a].

The two secretaries, KIMIO MURAI and KIKU MURAKAMI, used by the Imperial Consul, HIROTA, a member of the YOSHIZAWA party, have visas for direct travel only. The French Embassy here, upon our again contacting them today, said that they could not issue the visas (round-about travel visas). Not only does this hinder the activities of the Imperial Envoy, but due to present shipping conditions, it will necessitate a wait of about a month. Please contact the French authorities in order that instructions may be sent their Ambassador. Wire results.

---

[a] See IV, 964.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 975

FROM: Vichy (Kato)
TO: Tokyo

November 28, 1941
#630.

Re my #624[a].

As a result of subsequent negotiations, the French authorities have accepted the suggestion that these negotiations as a matter of principle be conducted in Hanoi.

On the 27th, ARNALD told HARADA in connection with the rubber question and the purchase of rice (particularly having to do with the method of payment) that he would like to see negotiations undertaken immediately but ----- ----- -----

No. 976

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

November 29, 1941
#571.

Re your #630[a].

While there is no objection to your negotiating there regarding rubber, the method of making payments for rice are contained in Article 22 of the agreement.

Details regarding amounts and price will have to be worked out on the spot. We are going ahead with the preparations to make negotiations regarding price, etc. at Hanoi. Please use your influence there to get them to accept this arrangement.

---

[a] See IV, 975.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 977

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Hanoi

November 26, 1941
#83.

(Restricted Distribution.)

----- brought me a communication to the effect that in case war broke out in the south, in order to coordinate news and propaganda in French Indo-China, it would be a good idea to attach OGAWA to the military forces. He asked my opinion. I want to reply along these same lines, however, I first want you to wire me your opinions.

1. OGAWA might well be semi-official attached to the general army.

2. However, his contact with the army forces should be for the purpose of making our relations with them more intimate and does not mean that we are infringing upon the prerogative of the military forces to handle enlightenment and propaganda in French Indo-China during war times.

3. Propaganda matters save where the army is concerned are entirely within the province of the Embassy office; therefore, so long as war does not break out there is no change in the duties of the Embassy office.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 978

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Peking

December 4, 1941
Circular #1153.

Message to Tokyo #2217.

On the 4th, a U.P. report from Vichy stated that on the evening of the 3rd the Saigon Radio Station broadcasted a report that Japan had ordered Ambassador YOSHIZAWA to inform Governor General DE COUX that Japan promises no further increase of troops into French Indo-China and that she will not use French Indo-China as a base for attacking the Burma Road.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 979

FROM: Hanoi (Yokoyama) December 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #044.

Re your #016[a].

Regarding the question of gasoline, I have conferred with Captain KAKIUCHI of the Navy but we received only a vague order from the Navy Department to ship the 24,000 liters of gasoline to the Hainan Islands. The order which we received was only a copy, and did not mention what method to transport it by and the gasoline was not designated, (place of storage or purchase).

At the time when Horiuchi went to Saigon he talked to the Fleet on this matter and they claimed that due to closeness of the danger it was not possible for them to carry this gasoline. Please have the Navy Department send more complete orders on this immediately.

Also due to the approaching emergency, it is suggested that the Shigen Chosa[b] who is here now, complete the most urgent metal problems and leave the things which are not so urgent and finish up their business here at once.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Natural resources research group.

Trans. 12-16-41

No. 980

FROM: Tokyo December 4, 1941
TO: Hanoi #22.

Re the 1st paragraph of your #44[a].

I inquired at the Navy Department and found that, as I said in my #16[b], they have sent instructions to the Chief of the Munitions Section on Hainan Island and wish you to get in contact with the representative of the Munitions Section at Saigon and to obtain supplies. (The Navy informed me that about 24 mines will appear in the Gulf of Saigon or in the Gulf of Camrahn.

---

[a] See IV, 979.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 981

FROM: Shanghai December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.

Departmental Secret.

The question of what policy we should follow in regard to the French Concession in the event of complications arising between Japan and Soviet Russia should be decided by bearing in mind the general relations existing between Japan and France. We would like to have the French Ambassador informed in advance as follows: Japan would, of course, have to take various militarily necessary measures in the French Concession, including the suppression of enemy activity. However, if the French Government would

agree to refrain from applying laws of protection to ----- ----- ----- and enemy property, we will not station our troops in the concession. Even in that case, we would like to have the French promise to agree to stationing properly uniformed Japanese military police in the concession as in the ----- concession in case the army demands it.

If the French authorities would make such a promise, we shall be able to exercise with a degree of effectiveness supression of enemy activities and disposition of enemy ----- ----- property without following the procedure customarily used in concessions; that is, without enforcing our military orders and regulations; otherwise, all the control will be directly exercised by our military police. In either case, there would be no need of stationing troops. However, if the French authorities refuse to agree to this, since it would mean our losing an opportunity now present before us, we shall have to pour in our military police without any regard to the attitude the local French authorities may take, for to do so would help to eliminate large scale conflicts. It goes without saying that an occupation of this kind should be accomplished after the central authorities have decided on it. However, I would like to have you bear this in mind and submit the matter to the French ----- at some opportune moment later.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 982

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

December 5, 1941
579.

(Abstract.)

Re your # 535[a].

The French authorities in Indo-China must cooperate fully with the Japanese in putting a stop to the sabotage efforts of the Chungking sympathizers in Indo-China.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 983

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

December 7, 1941
582.

Tokyo to Hanoi # 129.

Urgent.

Refers to Tokyo to Vichy # 582[a].

After conferring with the military authorities, steps should be taken with the French Indo-China authorities to deport the insolent Chinese Consul (of the Chungking government) and to exterminate Chungking influence.

Relayed to Vichy.

[a] This message numbered 582.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 984

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

December 7, 1941
583.

Tokyo to Hanoi # 130.

Referring to # 581[a] from Tokyo to Vichy.

With regard to the British and American consuls, the Minister should promptly confer with the French Indo-Chinese authorities. Then, after having contacted our military authorities, (preferably at about noon on the 8th), proper action should be taken. However, it should be made to appear that this action is taken at the instance of the French Indo-China authorities.

The gist of this message should be transmitted promptly to Saigon.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 985

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Vichy

December 8, 1941
585.

Message to Hanoi # 133.

Restricted distribution.

1. Major General NAKAMURA brought into actuality the local agreement having to do with joint defense a few minutes past midnight December 7th.

2. At dawn on December 8th important enemy agencies and establishments in French Indo-China (business offices, banks, offices of communication, consular offices and steamships) were simultaneously taken over and commandeered and important persons interned. However, we are giving particular consideration to diplomatic officials. And, as we are taking utmost precautions in order that humanitarian problems will not arise, put your mind at rest on this score. The Commander of the combined forces, having been issued marching orders to undertake the invasion at 3:20 on the 8th, immediately ordered the invasion of Thai to get under way.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 986

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Vichy

December 8, 1941
586.

Restricted distribution.

The following is a gist of Hanoi's wire to the Foreign Minister # 171[a].

On the morning of the 7th, IYŌ, Military Attaché, and HORIUCHI, Naval Attaché, called on me. Upon orders from the Imperial Headquarters and as representatives of the Imperial Army High Command and Imperial Naval Command they plan to negotiate immediately and directly with Governor General DECOUX early on the morning of the 8th in order to conclude a secret military agreement with the French Indo-China authorities (an agreement calling for the joint defense of Indo-China). They showed me the text of the

proposal and earnestly requested that I lend my efforts to persuade the Governor General to accept them.

The agreement calls for general, specific, and detailed cooperation with us by all French Indo-Chinese agencies. Furthermore, if necessary, it demands that French Indo-Chinese lend its strength of arms against our enemies. When Military Attache IYŌ presents this to them he is to clearly state that we have decided to fight England and the United States and demand from them an immediate answer.

I asked, "I believe that it will be impossible for DECOUX, at his own discretion, to make a decision in this matter."

IYO then replied, "Should the French Indo-Chinese authorities avoid giving us an immediate reply and state that it is necessary to receive official instructions from Vichy we will carry out the details of this agreement by means of the strong arm of the Japanese army. In fact, should it be necessary we will go so far as to militarily occupy French Indo-China." Both attachés were strongly insistent upon this.

As the above request, made by the two attachés is based on the orders of the Imperial Headquarters, and it is therefore to be assumed that it is the decision reached in the joint conference, I plan to secure the unequivocal acceptance of the Governor General in an interview which I have requested for the afternoon of the 8th.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 987

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) December 8, 1941
TO: Vichy #588.

Restricted distribution.

The gist of my wire to Hanoi #135.

Re your wire #172[a]. Immediately upon receiving of your wire, incorrectly sent to the Home Office, the Vice Minister telephoned the Chiefs of Military and Navl Affairs Bureau the gist of the message. Neither of these persons had any knowledge at all of the matter. Both of them insisted that in accordance with the decisions reached in the joint conference of the 6th that this matter was to be carried out as planned. There was no truth in the statement that orders had subsequently been issued by the Military since that date changing the destination. They requested that you be immediately informed to this effect.

It seems that the Military authorities have received a wire similar to the separate wire of the 8th from the southern army (that one arrived at 7:40 a. m.).

This is all for the time being.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 988

FROM: Vichy December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #641.

Re your #581[a].

On the 8th I passed on to Vice Premier DARLAN the gist of your instructions. DARLAN said, "After I have taken note of each item, I will call the details to the attention of Colonial Minister PURATON[b], because I am scheduled within the next two or three days to confer with the Premier. I promise to give you a reply at as early a date as possible.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 989

FROM: Vichy — December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #642.

Re your circular #2505[a].

I called on Vice Premier DARLAN on the 8th and carried out your instructions. DARLAN told me, "I will confirm this in a written document. The French government will take the neutral position of maintaining, as heretofore, the friendly relations which have existed between France and Japan.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 990

FROM: Shanghai — October 20, 1941
TO: Peking — Circular #911.

(Message to Tokyo #1925.)

From ----- we learn that the Chungking Government, finding no other way to extricate themselves from their financial difficulties except to have the treasury apply for a foreign loan, have instructed T. V. SOONG to negotiate with the United States for $200,000,000 worth of armaments (equipment for new soldiers and military supplies) on credit. The talks are completed, and America has agreed to grant them about $100,000,000 worth of material, to be supplied in two installaments. They intended to furnish the first $50,000,000 by the end of the year, but because of the grave new developmens, Chungking is now asking to have the full amount paid during November.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 991

FROM: Tokyo — October 25, 1941
TO: Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton. — Circular #2229.

Hong Kong to Tokyo #511.

Re my #496[a].

The financial conference between Britain, United States, and China was held for four days from the 12th in this city. According to undercover reports, the British and U.S. delegates urged that the dollar currencies be withdrawn, and requested accurate

information on the amount of currency that was at present in circulation. It is said that in reply, the Chinese delegates made the following proposals: (Details will be sent in a subsequent message.)

a. For the purpose of adjusting trade relations with Britain, United States, and other nations, an International Trade Bureau be established.

b. Revise the U.S. China silver agreement for the purpose of strengthening the currency exchange mart. Through the revision, the United States would continue its silver purchases at a uniform high rate. The U.S. delegate advised the conference that the U.S. Government showed no particular interest in this proposal, but said that he would forward the suggestion to the government.

c. Acceptance in Hong Kong of the Chinese legal tender (Chungking currency) and prevention of its inflation by the Hong Kong Government.

d. For the purpose of making the United States' asset freezing against Japan even more effective, the South American countries should be influenced by the United States to follow its example.

e. To have the British and the United States turn over all of the Chinese properties they have frozen, to the Chungking Government for investigation and fair distribution.

f. The establishment of an orderly trade relationship with Chungking and the floating of a new loan in the United States, (100,000,000 U.S. dollars).

The subjects proposed in paragraphs d, e, and f, are to be taken up and further discussed in Chungking, it is reported.

---

[a] See III, 1065.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 992

FROM: Tokyo — October 31, 1941
TO: Shanghai — # 1108.

(Messege from Hong Kong # 508 dated October 22.)

Re your # 490, part 1[a].

According to ----- the Soviet has continued supplying of military goods to CHIANG but have advised that for the time being they will have to discontinue the process.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 993

FROM: Shanghai — November 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 2045.

According to rumors apparently being originated from the United States Consul here, a secret agreement was drawn up between the National party and the Chinese Communistic Party on October 21, (my cable # 1941[a]). However as the full contents of this was unkonwn to the army, disputes continued. However, recently realizing that this fighting would only

hasten the downfall of the Chungking government, orders have been issued to stop these fights, so that it is noticed that tension here has been greatly lessened.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-20-41

No. 994

FROM: Shanghai — November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 2182.

It is said that there are now over ten armies in Yunnan. CHIANG KAI-SHEK is making peace with the Central Communist party. There are supposed to be 400 American planes and more than 300 volunteer pilots on the Tenmen Route.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 995

FROM: Shanghai — November 10, 1941
TO: Net — Circular # 970.

(Message to Tokyo # 2058.)

I received a telegram from JK today that says that CHUNGKING, through certain of its representatives is negotiating for peace with Japan in order to fool us. It seems that the object is to make us slow up our progress and to bring up stronger resistance.

Sent to Hong Kong.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 996

FROM: Shanghai — November 13, 1941
TO: Peking — Circular # 981.

Shanghai to Tokyo # 2082.

RATIMOA[a] gave an official report from his government to Chiang Kai-Shek as follows: The reason that America agreed to enter into a negotiation with Kurusu regarding American-Japanese relations, was to arrange for an agreement between Japan and the United States for only a certain period, and there will be no change in the future Far Eastern policy of America.

Also, although there is a rumor abroad that the United States made special preparations for the airplane which carried Kurusu to the United States, this is not the case, and it is only a rumor started as part of Japan's propaganda.

[a] Latimore ?

Trans. 11-20-41

No. 997

FROM: Tokyo (The Foreign Minister) November 14, 1941
TO: Hong Kong (The Japanese Consul-General) Circular # 2319.

(To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher. Not to be divulged to persons outside the Department.)

Although the Imperial Japanese Government is making a last effort in the Japanese-American negotiations, the outlook does not permit of optimism. If the negotiations end in failure one may expect a sudden change in that part of the international situation which revolves 'round Japan. To meet that eventuality, the following special measures in regard to China, which is the crux of the question for Japan, have already been decided at a Cabinet Council:

(a) The complete expulsion of British and American military and naval strength in China.

(b) Bring completely under our power the enemy concessions and enemy important interests in China (Maritime Customs, mines, etc.).

(c) Seize as required such enemy interest in China as are connected with the National Government.

In effecting these measures towards China our Foreign Office will take every care to avoid exhaustion of the national strength, and it is, therefore, our fundamental policy to make sure that we have enough war potential to face up to a lengthy world-war, and to make plans to meet a future diminution in military strength. We must, therefore, be careful to lighten as far as possible the burden on our manpower and on our material resources. We must also encourage as much as possible the activities of Chinese leaders in occupied territories and thus possess ourselves of the popular sentiment on the basis of Japanese-Chinese cooperation. Thus, while making peace a reality in those areas under our power, in our economic relations with China great stress will be laid on the acquisition of commodities (especially from unoccupied territories). For this reason stress has been laid on a reasonable adjustment of existing limitations, and it is with this in view that all these (? points ?) have been decided.

As regards the foregoing, as there is a precedent in the event of freezing of funds, a special telegram on this has been sent to you for your information. You should, however, keep absolutely secret from persons outside the Department the existence of the decisions notified above and the fact that you have received a communication on the subject.

This telegram is addressed to Nanso[a] (Gaishin)[a], Hokudai[a], Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Hankow, Canton, Hong Kong.

Hokudai[a] will circulate to Chang Kiakow and Tayuan.

Tsingtao will circulate to Sainan[a] (? Hsinan ?).

Canton will circulate to Amoy.

The above circulation should be effected without delay.

TOGO.

---

[a] Kana.

No trans. date.

No. 998

FROM: Nanking October 18, 1941
TO: Berlin # 5.

Re your # 7[a].

At first it appeared that there were only two weeks to prepare for the sailing of the Asama Maru, so I could not line up all the officials to take office in Europe. However, I am now hurrying and have put the personnel you mentioned in order. LI SHENG-WU is at present Chief of the Education Department. When he was appointed he could not leave in too big a hurry because it would have upset the personnel of his office too much, so two First Secretaries in his service were appointed and we were going to send them. However, I talked it over with some high officials and we decided that they had had too little contact with Japan and too little experience in politics for such an important mission. Therefore, we decided to have LI FANG, Minister to Rumania, also fill the post of Commercial Attaché in Berlin and named a Charge to take his place. After Minister LI FANG presents his credentials, he will take up residence in Berlin.

LI FANG has long been an associate of Chief WANG. He has always endeavored to fight Communism and is a great friend of Germany's. We have been in touch with him since long before the incident. It was on my recommendation that he was appointed. As for the matter of a Charge taking office, the Chief of the Foreign Section has already gotten an understanding with Acting Ambassador FISCHER. Rumania does not have a full-time Minister here so there can be no objection.

Well, the Nanking Government is now pressed for personnel, particularly in the Foreign Section, so this is the best the People's Government could do. However, when LI FANG takes office, I want you please to give him plenty of instruction.

Relayed to Tokyo.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 999

FROM: Berlin
TO: Nanking

October 20, 1941
#8.

Ambassador STAHMER[a] and Minister BOLTZE[b] (each unaccompanied) left here the 18th bound for their new posts via South America. (They expect to arrive in Pernambuco the 23rd.) They expect to stop over in Tokyo for about two weeks. After they arrive at their posts while ----- ----- ----- -----, I want you to use your good offices in arranging various and sundry matters for them, in particular, convenient arrangements with regard to living quarters.

---

[a] Newly appointed Ambassador to the Nanking Government.
[b] Newly appointed Minister to the Nanking Government.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 1000

FROM: Nanking
TO: Net

October 20, 1941
Circular #320.

Message to Tokyo as #741.

Re my #735[a].

On the 19th LIN PAI-SHENG, Chief of the Propaganda Section, spoke confidentially to a member of my staff as follows: "At first the general resignation of the KONOE cabinet

shocked the People's Government. However, the appointment of General TOJO, who has long understood clearly the position of the People's Government and who has worked for a settlement of the China Incident, has reassured us. We know that he will devote himself to the effecting of a brilliant national policy. Therefore, although the People's Government had considered making some statement about the establishment of the new cabinet, we have now decided that any declaration of ours might be too forward and superfluous, casting suspicions on us, so we have declined to make any official statement at all."

Relayed to Peking, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Hsinking.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 1001

FROM: Canton — October 22, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking — Circular # 227.

(Message to Tokyo # 433.)

The recent resignation of the Konoye Cabinet at first caused a great shock and uneasiness to such high officials of the Chiang Government as are in this area, however, as soon as the Tojo Cabinet made its appearance people here came to the conclusion that it was a Cabinet which would break the deadlock in Japanese American negotiations succeed the influence of the Chungking Government, which is backed up by the United States, will extend hither[a]. If they fail, Japanese military operations in China will be reduced and the Japanese forces will leave Central and South China. In either case the Nanking Government will suffer. Such is the pessimistic view entertained here. All lower class Chinese consider that the present change in administration makes war between Japan and the United States inevitable. They feel that this will give CHIANG KAI-SHEK a chance to wage a counter offensive. They are all gloomy thinking that if such a war occurs its conclusion will be far off.

Relayed to -----, Peking. Mailed to Hong Kong.

---

[a] DoD Comment: Sentence as in original translation.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 1002

FROM: Tokyo — October 20, 1941
TO: Peking — # 590.

Though I shall handle the matter of partial revision within the law of temporary control of currency as you indicated in your secret wire # 1077[a] dated September 19th, and in your letter of instructions, I want to do it in such a way as to be in complete accord with the control by the Chinese authorities. Therefore, after you have delivered it to the Chinese authorities please wire me their remarks and what you think would be the best plan for the present.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 1003

FROM: Nanking — October 31, 1941
TO: Peking — #333.

Nanking to Tokyo #771.

(Abstract.)

A conference was held to discuss the fall of the legal tender's value. Many are of the opinion that it should be kept at a certain rate, but thus far no agreement as to when to put this into effect. Another meeting is to be held the 4th.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 1004

FROM: Nanking — October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #746.

(Message to Hong Kong #167.)

Re your wire #65[a] to Shanghai.

Since the beginning of July, the following newspapers for enlightening the Chinese—Chūō Denji (Central Telegraphic News), Chūhō (Central News), *Minkoku Nippo* (Republic Daily News), *Zen-Nankin Shimpo* (Old Nanking Newspaper), and *Tsuka Nippo* (Transit Daily News)—are being sent out by ordinary mail with three days' issues packed together in large envelopes. We have stopped sending them sealed.

However, copies addressed to Singapore, Siam, Saigon, and Hanoi go in care of our military authorities there, and those for Manila only we are still sending through the facilities of this department.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 1005

FROM: Nanking — October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — Extra #13 (or 19).

(Strictly secret. To be handled in Government Code.)

Your wire of the 21st received. When I come to Tokyo I hope to have a talk with you.

I want to come to Japan by any boat available about the (13 ?) of November accompanied by SHIMIZU (a secretary), TSUTSUJI (attached to the department), and one undersecretary. I hope this suits you.

I am bringing along SHIMIZU so that he can tell you directly details of the political intrigues which he is commencing here.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 1006

FROM: Rome — October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #689.

(Intelligence of Secondary Importance.)

I have an intelligence report from the Vatican saying that Apostolic Delegate ZANIN at Peking has sent a communication to the Vatican to the effect that the Chungking Government has notified him through the Catholic Bishop of Chungking that CHIANG's Government will have nothing to do with that of WANG. Therefore, it will be impossible to recognize one delegate dispatched to both governments. Consequently, unless the Nanking Government is left unrepresented, hereafter no apostolic envoy to China will be recognized. In this case, Catholic interests in the sphere of the Chungking regime could not be guaranteed, so added the communique.

His Holiness figures that this is just a trick to force him to recognize Chungking as the real government of China, but now that China cannot get any help from the Soviet, the China affair will soon be over. Hence, this question will be settled automatically ere long. ZANIN is to stay with the WANG people, and the Bishop of Chungking will continue to take care of Catholic interests in that area without being given the status of Apostolic Delegate. I think we ought to investigate and find out whether or not this report is true. Please do what you can and wire me back what you find out.

Trans. 10–30–41

No. 1007

FROM: Rome — November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #700.

Re my #661[a] and #689[b], last part.

It goes without saying that the Vatican pays particular attention to the sources of its secret information in view of the fact that it is the target of the propaganda of the various nations. I sent my caption telegram with this in mind, feeling that this was an excellent opportunity of ascertaining the accuracy of the secret informer. Inasmuch as this is absolutely essential in regard to our future machinations, please make investigations and wire the results.

---

[a] See III, 955.
[b] See IV, 1006.

Trans. 11–7–41

No. 1008

FROM: Tokyo — November 10, 1941
TO: Peking — #616.

Re my #606[a].

I have again been requested by Ambassador ----- to investigate the reliability of the secret agent who reported the matter transmitted in my caption message concerning the Papal envoy in your city. Please, therefore, look into the matter and wire me back if the report is according to the facts.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11–14–41

No. 1009

FROM: Tokyo — November 14, 1941
TO: Rome — # 306.

Re your Nos. # 689[a] and 700[b].

From COUNSELOR -----DA to Peking:

You know North China is now territory occupied by our forces, so since Germany and Italy recognized the Nanking Government, I have been particular to observe the activities of German and Italian economic representatives and missionaries. Concerning the matter mentioned in the caption messages, I had Professor HOSOI of the local Catholic University, who is very intimate with the Apostolic Delegate here, inquire very privately of the latter. As a result of this investigation, I found that there have recently been several very secret meetings of Catholic dignitaries headed by Apostolic Delegate ZANINI. The subject of their discussions was whether or not they would recognize Nanking as the seat of their ecclesiastical administration. The view that Nanking should be supported won out, and a report of the minutes has been sent to the Pope.

This is all I know now, but I will let you know more after I have investigated further the contents of this report and looked into whether or not the Pope has replied.

---

[a] See IV, 1006.
[b] See IV, 1007.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 1010

FROM: Tokyo — October 24, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 458.

(Message to Shanghai # 1081.)

According to a report addressed to the Central Military Authorities from the Military Headquarters in your city, an understanding has been effected that in having Commercial Attaché WATARI join the Municipal Council, he has consistently held the second position in the Police Department of the Council (the first position is held by a British inspector; sometimes by an inspector acting in his place. However, while the first inspector is at his post, WATARI has always held the first place among vice-inspectors) and that, with reference to the position of the Chief of the Secret Service Department, any Japanese who is appointed to that post should be accorded equal rank with the Chief of the Detective Department. I understand that the military authorities in your city would like to nominate Major GOSHIMA to the position of Chief of the Secret Service Department in accordance with the above understanding. I have been informed that the Central Military Authorities have no objections to this nomination. Has such an agreement been effected? Please wire me the details.

Relayed to Nanking.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 1011

FROM: Shanghai — November 13, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 120.

Shanghai to Tokyo # 2080.

Re your # 1142[a], latter part.

Inasmuch as Lt. Comdr./Major Gōtō has the qualifications of an assistant chief of police he has been made a non-official employee of the Foreign Office and the Consulate General here. His salary and automobile, etc. have been arranged so as to keep a balance with that of Kakekawa and others here. This has been taken up with the military authorities (including the Sung army), so please be advised of this.

The gist of this has been wired to the Nanking Consul General.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 1012

FROM: Shanghai — October 28, 1941
TO: Nanking, Tientsin, Peking — Circular # 933.i

(Message to Tokyo # 1976.)

(Strictly secret.)

In view of the present international situation and the reduction of trade due to the order freezing British and American assets, money is lacking for the pursuit of our ordinary activities. The various expenses of the people's government also are swelling and we have to work out some definite policy to get funds immediately. I suppose that the people's government is working out some revisions of its own tax scale. As far as the customs are concerned, I have drawn up some suggestions which I hope you will consider because I want to put them into force right away. Please look them over and wire me back immediately.

1. A revision of the tax rates. (A better ratio between necessities and the superfluities. An increase on tariffs on luxuries.)
2. Return to the gold standard.
3. Taxation of items hitherto exempt, (principally goods which might be used militarily—chemicals for military use, dyes and a few textiles are all I can think of.)

Relayed to Nanking, Tientsin, and Peking.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 1013

FROM: Peking — October 26, 1941
TO: Shanghai — Circular # 554.

(Message to Tokyo # 692.)

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re my # 642[a].

HAYASHI reported to our office on the 24th as follows:

1. RYO JO CHIN, a man from Shansi and delegate to the Sino-Japanese mixed council, came to En An on the 21st and complained to HAYASHI in regard to decisions of the above meeting providing for transfer of General YEN HSI-SHAN's army and supply of war materials and funds from Japan. They argued back and forth but did not reach any agreement, CHO SHO JU keeping in touch with General YEN by wire. The Japanese scolded YEN for not having yet moved his troops and for delaying his announcement of peace, while YEN complained that because Japan had not supplied the September and October quota of arms and funds they could not carry on. As a result of this mutual suspicion they asked HAYASHI to come to Tai Yuan in person.

2. Accordingly, HAYASHI and RYO called on Chief of Staff TANABE the same day and as a result of their conference it was decided that IWAMATSU, Chief of the 1st Army, should meet YEN directly near Kogi and try to find a solution to the above problems. Tanabe would explain the arguments of the 1st Army, and RYO would take the side of General YEN.

At this time TANABE assured RYO that 10,000,000 yuan, owing from Japan for YEN's military expenses in September and October, and ----- ----- (which have been promised to the En An army) are now being assembled, and that he wanted YEN's followers to accept this as a proof of Japan's sincerity in the negotiations.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 1014

FROM: Peking — October 30, 1941
TO: Net — Circular # 565.

(Message to Tokyo # 704.)

Re my # 692[a].

LIN reports confidentially as follows:

RYO JO SHUN met with Chief of Staff TANABE and discussed this matter. As a result, they both got in contact with CHAO CHEN SHOU of the 1st Army, and all differences between the Japanese and Chinese were cleared up. At noon of the 27th, a final agreement was satisfactorily concluded.

---

[a] See IV, 1013.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 1015

FROM: Nanking — October 30, 1941
TO: Peking — Circular # 329 (?).

Message to Tokyo as # 766.

On the 28th, on resuming his post, Minister HIDAKA went to call on Chief Wang, on which occasion the latter spoke as follows concerning the effect of the Japanese-American conversations:

"I would like to see the conversations between Tokyo and Washington concluded one way or the other. If Chungking and Nanking remain eyeing each other until these negotiations are decided, it may be very difficult for us ever to make up. That is why we are at a standstill now. What I would like to see is a fusion of the CHIANG KAI-SHEK regime with that of my own, and if these negotiations prevent those of us who desire to see their resulting in peace here in China keep CHIANG KAI-SHEK from seeking conciliation, it will be regrettable. Now, we are taking a very friendly attitude in trying to convince the other side that it would be best for us to make up and from a joint administration, the heart of which will be the People's Government. I am endeavoring to convince the other side that any thought of our being overthrown by Chiang Kai-Shek is a mere illusion.

Relayed to -----.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 1016

FROM: Shanghai — November 1, 1941
TO: Peking and Nanking — Circular # 942.

Action Tokyo as # 1996.

Strictly confidential.

Referring to # 766[a] from Nanking to Your Excellency.

According to a message from JK on the 1st, when Yen Hsi-Chan broke off, Chiang Kai-Shek got in touch with Wang Ching-Wei and reached an understanding that they would connive at the appointment of the chairman of the North China Affairs Board. Wang's letter to Yen has already been forwarded to Chiang. Chiang wishes to use Chang Hsueh-Liang as Yen's successor. It is suspected that this is a clever bit of propaganda, done in collaboration with Pai Chung-Hsi. It should be thoroughly investigated at once.

---

[a] See IV, 1015.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 1017

FROM: Tokyo — November 1, 1941
TO: Shanghai and Nanking — Circular # 2247.

My message to -----[a].

The Cabinet Council decided on August 12th on the establishment of Japanese administrative organs in China. Thereupon the General Affairs Secretariat of the China Affairs Board, the Foreign Office and the Welfare Ministry agreed as follows: The Control of affairs by the China Affairs Board shall be revised and the new administrative system enforced from November 1st ----- with the following changes: The local offices of the China Affairs Board will take over the functions of the former Trade offices; employees of the China Affairs Board shall be taken over by the Welfare Ministry and this change of status shall be arranged by joint conference between the China Affairs Board and the Welfare Ministry; employees having important duties in relation to Japanese trade may communicate directly with the Welfare Ministry,—the method and scope of such communications to be determined by conference between the China Affairs Board and the Welfare Ministry.

Home Minister Order No. 7 of 1929 guaranteed the rights of third class employees of Japanese Organs in China to be given good conduct ratings as consulates. Such low salaried employees may be used as temporary (locally hired) consular clerks.

Overseas officials shall make reports to the Welfare Ministry regarding local sanitary conditions.

This message addressed to -----[a]. Relayed to Nanking and Peking.

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[a] Unrecovered address.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 1018

FROM: Nanking — November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 778.

(Strictly secret outside the department.)

I have just been informed by the East Asia Development Company that during the regime of Ambassador ABE they kept in close contact with us Foreign Office officials through Minister HIDAKA; for example, on the question of a loan for shortwave radios, and on propaganda, enlightenment, etc. Therefore, they would like to continue their intimate contact with us and on matters which would be to our mutual advantage, seek our assistance and support.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 1019

FROM: Rome
TO: Nanking

November 4, 1941
#5.

(Message from Madrid to Nanking #5.)

Re your #7[a].

As it is feared that the Chungking representative in Lisbon will create difficulties, it would be well to establish a Chinese[b] Legation here as soon as possible. Please inform the Nanking Government.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] The Nanking regime.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 1020

FROM: Nanking
TO: Canton

November 10, 1941
#40.

Re your #215[a].

Return wires from the various officials may be summarized as follows:

1. *The Embassy in Bangkok:* It is desirable that the People's Government send just the right man. By this is meant not necessarily an influential man, but if possible someone related by blood or otherwise with the Chinese population or omeone who has many acquaintances here. It would be very advantageous to have such an individual to carry on here activities in behalf of the new government and to do propaganda work for it.

2. *Saigon:* When the representative of the People's Government arrives at his post, we should concentrate on the leadership of the Chinese population, principally under his guidance and direction. Also, it would be much to our advantage to try to make the French Indo-China officials take a magnanimous attitude in permitting the Chinese population to be organized into pro-WANG groups.

3. *Rangoon:* (a) The Insular Government is in collusion with Chungking, and our activities here will be very difficult. It will be up to us to endeavor to divorce the proponents of CHIANG from Chungking and through our assistance seal their relations more intimately with Nanking.

(b) It would be a very good idea to have Nanking use high-powered radio broadcasts to inform the people here of its ideals, activities, prospects, etc.

4. *Batavia:* (a) All information possible should be gathered concerning the attitude of the Chinese population as a result of the pressure exerted by the Netherlands Indies Government (for example, this data might be furnished the *East India Daily News*). Aside from this, there is not much that can be done.

(b) However, by cooperating with officials in Bangkok and Saigon, good results might be achieved indirectly. Also, I think it would be a fine idea to have some influential man sent

here who has the right ideology and plenty of knowledge and intelligence. It would be a good idea to have him, without maintaining any connection whatever with us, talk with the Netherlanders, natives, and Chinese inhabitants.

5. *Singapore:* England, the United States, and China have been conspiring together economically, militarily, and politically against us here. Therefore, I would suggest as the activities of the Peoples Government: (1) The use of radio broadcasts; (2) the cementing of close relations between the Chinese in the occupied areas and the Chinese population; (3) Chinese who enter this country should by preference be expert propagandists: (4) activities in French Indo-China should be extended to this country.

6. *Manila:* Here we should concentrate on propaganda by news and radio and have representatives of Chinese merchants in Taiwan gather intelligences.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1021

FROM: Tokyo — November 21, 1941
TO: Hong Kong — #270.

Tokyo Circular #2371.

Secret outside the department.

Please have Japanese agents who are to work among Chinese residents abroad (including those agents who may not engage in this work at present, but can be made use of eventually) sent, at once, for one reason or another, to Macao, French Indo-China, Thailand, and other Japanese occupied territories.

Also please send Koizumi to Saigon.

Trans. 1-5-42

No. 1022

FROM: Nanking — November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #775.

(Secret.)

According to confidential information given us by the Military Police in Shanghai, they have arrested CHIN KYO JU[a], Chief of the Shanghai Branch of the Blue Shirts and head of the Chungking terrorists. (He is a Major General, having graduated with the fifth class from the ----- ----- Military Academy, and is the assassin of SO CHU MEI[b].) As a result of this, some information has been uncovered regarding the background and affiliations of those who have been engaged in terrorism in Shanghai since the first part of this month and it is expected that this information will be effectively used in preventing further activities.

Furthermore, upon RI SI GUN[c] guaranteeing his safety, we intend to use this man to frustrate the plans of the Chungking authorities. (Since this matter is still in the stage of planning, please do not let it out.)

---

[a] Kana spelling.

[b] TSENG CHUNG-MING, formerly a member of the Central Executive Yuan. He was also the Chief of the Political Secretariat.

[c] LI SHIH CHUN.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 1023

FROM: Shanghai — November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #2133.

Shanghai to Nanking #413.

A summary of a dispatch of the 20th is as follows:

1. Because of the total collapse of the Blue Shirts' activity in Shanghai and Nanking, connections with Chungking have been cut off. Chiang Kai-shek desires to strengthen the TAIRYU unit and it is said that he has recently sent one of his subordinates into Shanghai secretly to investigate the actual conditions existing there.

2. The ----- unit has been ordered to the ----- frontier district to participate in the defense of that area.

3. KOSONON is working actively in the Japanese army in disseminating propaganda, and ----- asked Chiang Kai-shek for his unit to be moved to the east. It appears that Chiang has concurred in this.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 1024

FROM: Tokyo — November 22, 1941
TO: Kalgan — Circular #2605.

Let me know at once the method, channels, means of transportation, and time required for sending your prisoners to Nagasaki.

Trans. 12-30-41

No. 1025

FROM: Berlin (Osima) — November 10, 1941
TO: Nanking — #9.

Re your #5[a].

Well, now we don't know when the Asama Maru will sail and I imagine it is uncertain when LI SHENG WU will start for his post. Various considerations are making it imperative that we have a representative of the People's Government here. Don't you think that we could get him here by some route or other, say via South America on an Italian plane? Please think about this and wire me back.

If this wouldn't work, read over my message #2[b] and #3[c], confer with the Government offices, and wire me back what you think about our future policy.

Relay to Tokyo.

---

[a] See IV, 998.

[b] See 1025A. The Japanese Ambassador says that due to the adverse propaganda of Chinese residents in Berlin, he recommends that there be appointed an honorary Consul supported and advised by Japan. The German Government is thoroughly in accord with this idea.

[c] Not available.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 1025A

FROM: Berlin — September 2, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 2.

Re your # 572[a] to the Foreign Minister.

It seems that the German Government sent in the agreement about LI SHENG-WU on the 1st. Ambassador LI will still be delayed for a very considerable length of time because of the present state of traveling facilities, and, in the meantime, Chinese residents here, among whom there are many depraved anti-Japanese rascals, will keep up their adverse propaganda. So I think for the time being we had better appoint an honorary consul in Berlin, supported and advised by Japan, and let him deal with them.

I also think it would be quite appropriate to continue this sort of consular service even after Ambassador LI takes office. I went to the German officials and told them that it was my own idea and that Nanking knew nothing about it, and asked them what they thought. They said that the German Government was thoroughly in accord and, if Nanking wished, they were ready to pick out three or four Germans zealous for the New Order and, of course, not anti-Japanese, to help the Nanking representatives to work out a good basis of cooperation between Japan, China and Germany. If Your Honor agrees with me on this, please negotiate with Nanking and arrange to realize this plan as soon as practicable.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 1026

FROM: Tokyo — November 13, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 2314.

(Circular.)

It is desired to recognize the first anniversary of Japanese recognition of China and also of the announcement of Japanese-Manchurian-Chinese collaboration by means of a special exchange of broadcasts between the three countries at 7:20 p.m. on November 30th.

Please contact the authorities of the countries to which you are accredited regarding this and see that the broadcasting department gets in touch directly with the broadcasting association.

(From 7:20 p.m. each of the three countries of Japan, Manchuria, and China, in that order respectively, will be allowed ten minutes each for their broadcast and a translation thereof.)

This telegram is addressed to the Ambassadors in Hsinking and Nanking.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 1027

FROM: Shanghai — December 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 2198.

(Secret.) (Secret outside the Department.)

To Consul Sone.

The chief points in deciding whether or not we will take the step of occupying the International Concession are the demands to be enforced on citizens of third countries (seizing of

businesses held in the name of third country nationals and control of wireless, mail, newspapers, and other details not under the authority of the municipal council) and the attitude we take toward the consular group.

We understand that the Nanking army headquarters are anxious to avoid taking the step, but although we have some latitude for action here, the occasion may arise when it will be necessary to insist on occupation. Therefore, we would like headquarters to make its decision as quickly as possible.

We have notified Nanking (extra message).

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 1028

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

December 4, 1941
143.

Re your # 2198[a].

Message to Shanghai # 1231.

Departmental secret. Strictly secret.

The joint concessions, although they have been a part of our occupied territory, have been respected, however, for various reasons we have never been able to get as good results from them as from other places. Accompanying a sudden international crisis, it would be very much to our advantage to tighten our grip on them through military occupation, however, we should soft pedal as much as possible the manner in which we gain ingress. It is, furthermore, our policy, insofar as possible, to prevent destruction and terror and afterwards under the well directed policy of our country, to guide the fate of the settlements in as harmonious channels as possible and to maintain the present set up, equipment, and personnel. (The military headquarters has wired its field officials particular instructions on this point so will you please hear the details from them.) Thus, I do not think we need to make another decision concerning this matter but if you wish, we can have a joint conference and listen to what the officials concerned have to say. (I, for one, would like to see the French concessions left alone), but if you have any other desires concerning this matter, please wire me back what they are.

I have wired this to Nansoo (Gaishim).

---

[a] See IV, 1027.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 1029

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

December 1, 1941
2192.

(*Abstract.*)

From Fujishima to Consul General Nagai.

The KOMONKAI[a] is to be brought under Japanese domination and used to further Japanese southward expansion plans. Japanese must first gain control over societies in China, and, through them, those in Thailand and Malaya. Means to be used include domination over

leaders of the societies, through mutual credit and banking associations, propaganda, and trade associations. The matter is being studied so that a concrete policy may be worked out.

---

[a] Untranslatable; apparently an organization of Chinese, having branches throughout southern Asia.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 1030

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Peking

December 2, 1941
665.

Re your # 754[a].

Strictly secret. 2 parts complete.

1. For the time being, in order to prevent enemy juridical persons, particularly financial representatives, from fleeing with their documents, coins, valuable specie, gold and silver trinkets, etc., suitable measures may be taken in the pertinent places. However, naturally, we cannot seize personal property.

2. Such buildings belonging to enemy juridical persons as are now deemed necessary for military purposes may be taken over. However, in the case of those whose use must be decided upon, leave them alone because it is not right, with the beginning of hostilities, to make a general seizure of buildings with a view toward future use.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 1031

FROM: Peking
TO: Net

December 3, 1941
Circular # 616.

In 3 parts complete. Peking to Tokyo # 763.

Most secret outside the Ministry.

Kitazawa, Commander Army of North China.
Arisue, Vice Chief of Staff.
Nishimura, 4th rsection, Staff Headquarters.
Kazayama, Chief of Staff.
Shiozawa, Liaison Officer, Chinese Development Board.

At a meeting on December 1st and 2nd, of the above five, the following conclusions and decisions were reached.

"If this war does start, this will be a war which will decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. For this reason, it goes without saying, do not have small, or local, insignificant matters, occupy you. Instead quiet such things immediately and settle in a most advantageous way to us. In addition, all administrative control of these districts should be carefully planned anew with the above in view. (For example, 'the fact that this war is one which is unavoidable for the existence of Japan and the maintenance of peace in East Asia' should be made very clear to all foreign nations and thus internally strengthen the unity of the people while guiding the world's public opinion in a direction beneficial to Japan.) Thus, both during the period of war and at the end of the war during the peace negotiations the greatest benefit will accrue to Japan.

"Especially on the minds of the southern native peoples we must make an impression so as to draw them toward us and against the United States and Britain. For this purpose, when this war starts all district and regional authorities must as much as possible adhere to existing international laws, etc., and under no condition should any action which would look like stealing while the house burns to foreign countries be taken which might result in the loss of the main issue for a small immediate local profit.

(PART 2)

"In order to end this affair in a profitable note for Japan, one need but remember that in the Russo-Japan war it was necessary to have President Roosevelt act as peace mediator, to appreciate that for the expected coming war the only one who could imagine as an intermediary is the Pope. This fact should be kept in mind in any step which is taken in the occupied territory. And, for this reason too, the enemy's position should be considered, and the handling of enemy churches etc., in China should be carefully studied.

"It is evident that Japan will have to put everything that they have in the coming war, and for this reason it is only natural that our burden in China be made as light as possible, so that our strength must be saved. For this reason, matters other than political or economic, that can be handled by China, should as much as possible be left to China to manage and thereby get credit for this from the Chinese, too.

"It can be imagined that the next war is to be a longer one than the China incident, so that in this region the main issue should be the obtaining of materials. For this reason the question of closed trade and methods of gathering material should again be thoroughly studied.

(PART 3)

"The military will, of course, try to handle matters as much as possible according to the International code. They will increase even more their close cooperation with the Legations, especially regarding protection of churches. In this regard they have already planned a complete education of the soldier groups stationed in the occupied territories."

Arisue mentioned that he was on close terms with the Vatican here ----- (2 lines garbled) -----.

(Arisue mentioned that he had always approved of allowing the Chinese to handle their own affairs and as a matter of fact he had been acting with that in mind. However, he was only worried that by handing over the management of things to the Chinese, that they might get the mistaken idea that the Japanese had become weakened. This point should be kept in mind and any action of this kind should be done in such a way as to not let them get such a mistaken idea.)

"It is, of course, important to obtain materials, but regarding easing the ban on free trade in enemy territory, this subject should be studied from various angles."

Shiozawa expressed his agreement with most items mentioned, and declared that very close touch has been kept with military forces and different methods of leading North China politically were being studied.

Trans. 12-26-41

No. 1032

FROM: Tsingtao
TO: Shanghai

December 6, 1941
229.

The local Naval officials have informed me that many Jews are, as a matter of principle, against us and that in case worse comes to worst, we will have to shackle them. Among them there are many German Jews, for example, here there are approximately 40. The Navy consequently has requested that we either get an understanding with the German Consuls that there will be no village gossip about this sort of military measure or inquire whether or not there will be any protest on the part of Germany against such measures.

Remember what was said in Circular #1036 from Shanghai[a] as well as in Circular #300[a] from Tientsin. I feel that arrangements for this action will have to be made at least by all of our officials in North China. Will you, therefore, negotiate suitably with the Germans and please wire me back immediately what they say.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 1033

FROM: Hsingking
TO: Tokyo

December 6, 1941
No number.

To Chief TAJIRI of the Investigation Section from HANAWA.

On November 19, the Chief of the Main Headquarters of Military Police submitted "an outline of emergency measures against espionage." In addition, for example, this outline not only stipulated males between the ages of 19 and 45 in connection with measures to be taken against the Nationals of enemy countries, but also made reference to people with special attainments, and people with exceptional talents. It also included stipulations for measures against diplomatic offices and their staffs, the property of enemy nations, and for ships. Now, in many respects there are wide differences between this outline and the one agreed upon by the Investigation Department of our own home office not long ago. It is claimed that all departments concerned agreed on this plan, so I suppose that the Foreign Office did too, however, in any case, we want to know exactly how to handle enemy Nationals so wire me back as soon as possible.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 1034

FROM: Nanking
TO: Hsinking

December 7, 1941
Circular #370.

In 3 parts complete.

Nanking to Tokyo #863. (Supplementary message; strictly secret.)

(1) Disposition to be made of matters pertaining to the enemy.

(a) Termination of work of the consulates of enemy nations: In the event of hostilities between us and BLANK, the Consul General, (or Consul; hereinafter referred to as the Consul General), shall instruct the Consul of the enemy in Nanking to cease business in accordance with the form contained in my separate message #864[a] (such notification shall be delivered in the presence of a military representative of Japan) and at the same time take the following steps:

1. Prohibit the use of all radio apparatus which may be in the Consulate (or Embassy; hereinafter referred to as "the Consulate"), immediately. At the same time, put seals on all radio equipment.

2. The receiving and dispatching of all coded messages shall be prohibited.

3. Permits must be obtained for the dispatching and receiving of all plain text telegraph messages, (consult with the Consul General).

4. We shall send our people to the offices to adequately protect and watch the personnel. (Both the military and the Consulate General will send persons to do this.)

5. The Consulate offices shall be closed.

6. The use of telephones shall be prohibited. (Central will cease operating for those numbers.)

PART 2

7. The displaying of the colors shall be prohibited.

8. The Consuls and the staff shall reside as before within the Consulate buildings. Permission must be obtained for making contact with persons outside, (including those nationals of the enemy country and also of neutral countries). A Japanese official shall be present during such an interview.

These persons shall be allowed out only under surveillance. A permit from the military must be obtained by them to travel.

9. Chinese clerks and interpreters shall be required to obtain permits to come and go from the building.

10. Identification cards shall be issued by the military for Chinese servants, cooks, etc. (They shall be strictly watched to see that they do nothing except tend to their actual routine duties.)

11. The Consuls and their staffs shall comply with our officials' instructions with regard to their evacuation.

12. The offices and residences shall be sealed after they have been evacuated.

PART 3

(b) Civilian Enemy Persons in General.

1. Make them swear that they will not in any way take action that will be harmful to Japan, and allow them to keep residence. In case of travel outside of the city, permission must be obtained from our military authorities.

2. Mail is to be censored and telegrams in plain language can be sent with special permission.

3. Prohibited to fly their own flag.

4. Careful watch is to be kept over actions of all such persons.

5. Gatherings, meetings, or public speeches by such persons are prohibited.

6. Orders are to be issued to all religious preachers that they are not to discuss current events, and permission is given to continue operation of churches, school, etc.

7. To those persons employed by enemy persons, special identification cards will be issued, and they are to carry on as at present.

(2) Regarding Civilian enemy property:

1. ----- are not to be used for our military purposes.

2. Of enemy property, that which is of military value to us, can, at such times as needed, be confiscated. However those that are not designated as ----- are not to be touched.

3. Schools, churches, and hospitals are to be left as they are.

(3) Regarding neutral foreign countries:

1. The third power which is to look after enemy diplomatic interests, is to be notified of their duty orally.

2. Persons of such countries are not to be treated in any other way then heretofore. However, those who are among the specially watched group of those known to be bad characters are to be treated accordingly.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 1-5-42

No. 1035

FROM: Tokyo — December 7, 1941
TO: Net — Circular # 2495.

It has been directed not to have the Nanking government to participate in War.

Trans. 12-24-41

No. 1036

FROM: Tokyo — December 8, 1941
TO: Shanghai — # 1239.

Secret outside the Department.

At the same time that you take joint action in close harmony with German and Italian authorities in order to secure a shortwave broadcasting station in Shanghai to be used for our internal and external propaganda endeavors, I would like to have you take immediate steps in order that we commandeer a powerful broadcasting station belonging to the Chinese, or any enemy power. Please arrange to use as agent a national of a neutral country (I might suggest a Frenchman).

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 1037

FROM: Tokyo — October 23, 1941
TO: Batavia — # 663.

Re your # 1030[a].

While on the one hand there are those matters pertaining to the negotiations and to evacuation of our nationals, on the other hand we are exceedingly anxious to receive a direct report from Consul General Asada as to conditions on the scene, and therefore wish to have him come to Tokyo immediately. Will you please, therefore, postpone your departure until his arrival. He will assume his post as soon as he finishes his work here. There is no objection to your family returning in accordance with the schedule contained in your message.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 1038

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) — October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1149.

Re your # 663[a].

(Foreign Office Secret.)

1. On the 8th of this month I told Hofstraaten that the N.E.I.'s reply was most unsatisfactory. I went on to say that it was so ridiculous that it seemed absolutely useless for me to make any further efforts on behalf of attempting to adjust Japanese-N.E.I. relations. I could discover no reason whatsoever, I told him, for my remaining here and therefore I plan to return

home as soon as I am permitted to do so by my government. I did this in the hopes that it might make the Dutch reconsider the matter.

Since there were no indications that the N.E.I. would in any way change their stand, I announced that I would return to Japan upon the arrival of Consul General Asada who was returning to Japan for a short visit first. Subsequently, I learned that Asada's trip to Japan had been cancelled and that he was coming straight here to assume this post. I therefore announced that I would sail for home on the Takatiho Maru and at the same time had the newspapers carry this report. Moreover, I have now about half completed my rounds of farewell calls and have completed arrangements to have my luggage shipped.

To again postpone my sailing after matters have been carried thus far is exceedingly embarrasing. In view of the developments described above, I can hardly bear this humiliating experience.

2. With regard to the matter of evacuating our nationals, the time for expressing sympathies has now passed. 1700 persons are being evacuated on the Takatiho Maru and the Nissyo Maru. Most of the remaining small and medium Japanese merchants have decided to stay here a while longer. They are gradually resigning themselves to "wait and see" attitude and to await further developments before deciding on any definite course of action. Most of these people are solid citizens and would be willing to see things through if there is any hope for them at all. If there is a chance that the economic and commercial relations between the two countries can be stabilized, even to a limited extent, and if it is probable that miscellaneous goods will arrive from Japan at regular intervals, they are willing to take a chance and stay on. If they cannot obtain these goods, they will practically all have to close shop by the end of the year anyhow, so would just as soon begin to close out and put things in order in preparation for evacuation.

We can do nothing to change the determination of these people. Should matters develop to where they will have to be evacuated, there will not be the confusion which has accompanied the procedure to date, because these people will be well prepared.

People engaged in agricultural and fishing enterprises show no signs of any excitement as yet. There will be no worries as far as they are concerned, at least until such a time as the actual breaking off of relations between the two nations.

3. In view of the above described circumstances, I would like to return to Japan on the Takatiho as scheduled. If it is unavoidable that Asada return to Tokyo before assuming his post here, I would like to arrange with Kotani and have him take over this office temporarily pending Asada's arrival. I shall then have ample opportunity to discuss matters with Asada in Tokyo. Kotani has much experience in taking charge of this office, for he has been Acting Consul General here on three different occasions in the past. Since the trade negotiations much of the important conferences with the Dutch has been entrusted to him, and they thoroughly respect his ability. There would, therefore, be no cause for anxiety.

Please give your approval to handling this matter in this manner.

---

[a] See IV, 1037.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 1039

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 2, 1941
TO: Batavia #687.

Re your #1160[a].

In addition to the things I pointed out in my last message, you must remember that the world situation is very delicate so I do not see how you can be permitted to leave there for the

time being. True enough, things may not have gone very well for you in the past, but please stay a while longer.

[a] See IV, 1042.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 1040

FROM: Batavia — November 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1176.

(Urgent.)

Re your #687[a].

In the last mail I was given to understand that it was necessary for me to remain here until ASADA arrived. As it is necessary to give the Dutch authorities a report etc., please wire back immediately.

[a] See IV, 1039.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 1041

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) — November 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1173.

Re my #1149[a].

Strictly confidential.

The date for the sailing of the Takachiho Maru is drawing near, i.e. the 8th. Please wire instructions immediately.

[a] See IV, 1038.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 1042

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) — October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1160.

(Urgent.)

Secret.

Re my #1149[a].

Recently I told the Governor-General that my time for returning to Japan was approaching and asked for an interview to pay my respects. He invited me and my wife to lunch on the 30th, and I replied today, the 28th, that we would consider that our farewell.

Now if I miss the *Takachiho Maru* and the *Nissho Maru* in order to wait for ASADA to arrive at his post, not only is the next sailing undecided but also it is now impossible to get

British visas to come by airplane (the only way is through Singapore). If I remain here a good while longer, even though it is unavoidable, it will certainly seem strange to the Dutch officials; therefore, I urgently request your permission to return to Japan on the Takachiho.

---

*See IV, 1038.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 1043

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

October 27, 1941
Unnumbered.

The other day, while conferring with the Chief of the East Asia Bureau, RO (Rofinck) on other matters, he suddenly said that compared to other consular offices, the staff of the Japanese Consulate General seems to have increased enormously of late. The government of the Netherlands East Indies can't help but feel that this is rather strange. He added that he understood that our staff included two naval officers and inquired as to the reason for their being here.

I therefore replied that I was under the impression that the Netherlands East Indies Government had no right to question the character or number of my staff. However, the truth of the matter is that even subsequent to the end of the trade negotiations, there has been much business to attend to and for this reason, the retaining of a large staff was unavoidable.

While the conferences were being conducted, the delegates had included military men as was well known, I said. Today, however, there remains only one officer who is a language student.

Rofinck said that after the breakdown of trade negotiations and the further limitations put on trade relations through the freezing of assets, as well as because of other developments, trade and personnel traffic should have taken a downward swing. It seemed strange that in spite of these facts the Japanese Consulate retained such a large staff. If this staff included military men camouflaged as Foreign Office men, the N.E.I. Government could not remain silent, he said.

I did not go into the matter too deeply but rather resorted to making concise replies and thus the subject was dropped. However, in view of the methods recently adopted by this Colony's government, it is hard to foretell what steps it will try to put into effect next.

Trans. 10-29-41

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

October 18, 1941
#1126.

(Secret outside the Department.)

The Borneo Petroleum, the South Seas Development, the South Seas Forestry, the Borneo Trading Companies, and the Pearl Button Company are greatly worried about necessary funds required in the conduct of their enterprises and maintenance funds. In my opinion these enterprises, from the point of view of their rights and interests, must be continued even though it be difficult. In compliance with necessities, therefore, we would like to have the Yokohama Specie Bank urged to release the funds for the purposes outlined above.

In this connection, IMAGAWA has already wired headquarters, but no definite answer has yet been received. Would you, therefore, please immediately take such steps as may be necessary to have the Finance Ministry urge the Yokohama Specie Bank to reach a general understanding on this point. Wire me back what you find out.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 1045

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1133.

The local representatives of the Borneo Trading Company (Borneo Bussan Shokai) have asked us to establish telegraphic connection with their head office in Kobe. It seems best to handle this in the same way as for other companies listed in your wire #570[a]. If this is all right please wire us a code indicating word for that company as the local branch say they have no code.

---

[a]See IV, 1045A. Codes are listed for the various companies and it is stated that the indicator for the Borneo Trading Company is "OXBIZ".

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 1045A

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 10, 1941
TO: Batavia #570.

Re your #934[a].

Code Word	*Company*
OTFUV	Takeda Chobei
OVDAW	Nanyo Kaiun
OSGOT	Nomura Kaigaijigyobu
IFTIG	Daido Trading Company
IGSON	Iwai Sheton

As to messages having to do with B.O.M., those whose content ----- requires strict secrecy should be sent in machine code or in some secure Foreign Office code. However, messages not so secret should be sent in code, applying to them the method explained in my caption telegram.

---

[a]See IV, 1045B.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1045B

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #934.

Secret outside the Department.

Re telegraphic matter.

1. Will you please devise code words and send them by return wire for the following firms in addition to the list which you have given in your Circular #1907[a] and your separate telegram #531[b]:

B.O.M.; Takeda Chobei; Nanyo Kaiun; Nomura Teindo Shokusan; Daido Boeki; and Iwai Sheton.

2. There are two of your messages numbered #544[b]. One deals with a German Consul embarking on a Japanese ship and the other has to do with the loading of ships in Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies. Please be informed that we have filed the latter as your #549[b].

---

[a] Re new code procedure for commerical firms. Urgent messages.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1046

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 24, 1941
TO: Batavia #666.

Message sent for the Borneo Bussan Company.

From YUMAGA TO YAMAMOTO of the Borneo Bussan Company.

I have been asked to issue letters of credit, but this would take some time, because it is necessary to get permission from the Finance Ministry and to arrange for assignment of ships. After discussing the matter with the ----- Specie Bank, I made arrangements to apply to the Finance Ministry for 45,000 gilders in the form of a temporary loan for the period ending on the last day of December. I expect that this loan will be granted in a few days. Please inform the Specie Bank in your city of this.

I am now consulting with YUKIMOTO of the South Seas Forestry Company regarding our future policy. I shall inform you definitely on the 25th of such matters as assignment of a ship to Shanghai.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 1047

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1136.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Re your #650[a].

Since today and tomorrow are holidays, we are unable to hold negotiations with the Dutch authorities; therefore, may we trouble you to arrange for postponement of the Nissho Maru's sailing.

Although we can load miscellaneous goods while the negotiations are still uncompleted, it is impossible to unload any cargo.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 1048

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 24, 1941
TO: Batavia #667.

(Urgent.)

Strictly Secret.

Re your #1136[a].

I consulted with the head of the department concerned in regard to postponing the sailing date of the Nissho Maru, but it is impossible to change their schedule. Therefore, please understand that further shipments of miscellaneous goods on this trip had to be cancelled.

We planned to ship Shoyu[b], Miso[c] and Konbu[d] (The Knobu ordered only by UMENO) but since the Miso was not ready in time, we have loaded only enough for your office. However, if there are requests from OTOMI and WADA in Soerabaja and Makassar, there should be more than enough to supply them in the ship's stores; also we want them to leave whatever is convenient for UMENO in Medan. Please let Soerabaja, Makassar, and Medan know about their shipments of foodstuffs.

---

[a] See IV, 1047.
[b] Soy sauce.
[c] Slightly fermented soy bean mash.
[d] Agar-Agar.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 1049

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 23, 1941
TO: Batavia #661.

We are forwarding Y15,000 for the October to December allotment of the fund to counteract Chinese activities.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 1050

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) October 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1138.

(In 2 parts, only 2nd part available.)

3. As you pointed out in your message, it is quite true that the Netherlands merchants and banks are suffering and also that they themselves brought on this suffering. However, upon viewing our relations in general with the Netherlands East Indies, I find that my warnings since my assumption of the post here, as well as of those of the Minister Plenipotentiary, have failed to awaken our officials in Japan. With complete disregard of our warnings, cotton textile and other goods were shipped here without restriction, and because of that eighty millions of our yens have been frozen here. On the other hand, the amount of N.E.I. money held in Japan is in only an insignificant amount. In spite of the fact that there are vast sums invested in N.E.I. by our merchants and industrialists, there is only a very small amount invested in Japan by the Dutch. For these reasons, we have been placed in an exceedingly disadvantageous position.

Under these circumstances I am forced to say that if the government has no interests in protecting our rights and properties, there is no particular use in our making any efforts whatsoever. If, on the other hand, it is interested, it is my opinion that our only course is to comply with the wishes of the Dutch merchants in Japan and through such means to do everything in our power to protect our interests here.

With regard to the matter of shipping that part of the cargo left behind by the Tjisalak by Japanese vessels, on the strength of your message #539[a] in which you stated that the matter was being carefully studied, I went ahead and committed myself that they would be shipped

on Japanese ships as I reported in my message #936[b]. The Dutch, taking my word for it, agreed to ship materials necessary to Japan on the *Kitano Maru* and the *Johore Maru*.

In spite of these developments the Tjisalak upon arrival in Japanese waters, wasted much time trying to obtain permit to enter port, and because of other red tape, as a result of which, she was forced to sail away empty. Then, you say in your message, that you are not responsible for the cargo left behind and at the same time you bluntly state that you find it impossible to give your consideration to that matter of 1,200,000 yen. Under such circumstances, it is but natural that the Dutch should refuse to fulfill our wishes. Moreover, there will probably be drastic limitation or complete abolishment of all the various courtesies and convenciences that our merchants in the N.E.I. have been enjoying. (As a matter of fact the following instances, subsequent to Imagawa's reporting that the 1,200,000 yen was refused, have already occurred: Transferring of his deposits in the Netherlands Bank to the Specie Bank was refused Nomura; depositing of proceeds from the sale of its products to the Specie Bank was refused Nagonku; INTAA refused to approve the SAIZARU transaction by the Kawanami Farms on the ground that it was in accordance with the wishes of the Economic Ministry.)

As a consequence, it has become exceedingly difficult for our nationals to continue their various business enterprises. There seems practically no alternative for Japanese wholesale and retail merchants other than complete ruin.

Does the government have any plans or policy to counteract these evils? Or, do you take the stand that because of inevitable future developments, you do not care even if the above described situation come to pass? I would appreciate being advised on this point.

Up until now, you have consistently refused to keep me posted on such fundamental points as the one referred to above. In spite of being handicapped in that manner I have done my best to argue the Dutch out of assuming the worst. Repressing the growing resentment, I have been doing everything in my power to bring about releases of frozen assets from a practical standpoint. Moreover, I have resorted to every possible means to obtain export permits for materials vitally needed by us. At the same time, I have been doing everything that can be done to prevent the complete ruin of our nationals' business enterprises. However, if the course you outline in your message is pursued, there shall remain absolutely no means of indirect settlement. Consequently, there shall be nothing left for me to do but to give up in despair.

4. I have already reported in my various messages related to this subject, that the Netherlands have practically given up hope as far as trading with Japan is concerned, and that she is strengthening her ties with the British, U.S. and Australians. I am sure that you are well aware of this situation. For the materialization of this, it is deemed necessary here, that Vice Minister Hofstraaten assume the responsibility. Hofstraaten, however, had been of the opinion that insofar as is possible, trade relations with Japan should be adjusted. Apparently, he has given up this project in despair, for he has announced his intention of leaving for Australia on the 31st. He is traveling there at the Governor's orders, and is planning to be gone for a considerable length of time.

After Hofstraaten is gone, the only persons I shall be able to confer with will be Van Mook and the newly appointed Chief of the Trade Bureau SUHINMERU.[c] Unfortunately, Van Mook has recently become exceedingly anti——? and SUHINMERU[c] is very indecisive and leaves one with nothing concrete to seize upon. For these reasons, it will probably be impossible to make any progress.

Please, therefore, give this matter your reconsideration and determine your basic policy with regard to the Netherlands East Indies. I shall appreciate your advising me of your decision prior to Hofstraaten's departure.

---

[b] Not available.
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 1051

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Re my # 1138[a].

There is not much time before HOOGSTRATEN leaves. Also I do not know what to do even though it has been decided to assign Takachiho[b] and the Nissho[b] because the number of nationals leaving here is so large. Please reply by telegram any suggestions that you might have.

---

[a] See IV, 1050.
[b] Boats leaving Dutch Indies for Japan.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 1052

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 29, 1941
TO: Batavia # 682.

(*Abstract.*)

Re your # 1138[a].

The British are actively promoting trade with the Netherlands East Indies and remittances in pounds sterling are increasing, see Tokyo to Batavia # 633[b].

The Foreign Ministry believes that the Dutch do not realize the desperate situation of their branch banks and firms in Japan, and are making no efforts for their relief.

Very little cargo has been booked for the Nissho Maru.

The Finance Ministry states that if the funds of the Dutch banks (in Japan) are adequate, loans may be made to Dutch firms upon guarantees, even though they may have no deposit, just as Japanese firms in the Netherlands East Indies use the Industrial Bank.

We do not expect normal shipping conditions to be resumed until world conditions are settled; each consulate should so inform the Japanese residents in their area.

Although we cannot at present conclude the Y1,200,000 barter agreement, and counter proposals are impossible, please ascertain from Hofstraaten if a fundamental Japanese-Netherlands East Indies trade policy cannot be suggested.

---

[a] See IV, 1050.
[b] See IV, 1079.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 1053

FROM: Tokyo October 22, 1941
TO: Batavia # 659.

To Major Kuriya from the Assistant Chief of Staff.

Will you please inspect and report on the air force in the Dutch Indies in regard to
1. Training, formation, and aerial combat methods.
2. Organization, types, number and location of planes.
3. Types and number of planes being sent from England and the United States.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 1054

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

October 25, 1941
1150.

Secret within the Foreign Office.

Secret within the Military.

Please convey to Assistant Chief of Staff: (Very secret.)

----- message # 25.

As complete and reliable information regarding the N.E.I. air forces is not yet in hand, I will merely report the main items:

(1) Items concerning pursuit plane units:

(a) Formation ----- 3 planes in small triangle formation (sometimes 4 planes in a diamond shaped formation) and three of these formations making one unit.

(b) As for their combat methods, they have been observed to work on the plan of having three pursuit planes attack light bombers from behind and below, attacking one plane at a time, but aside from this particulars are not known.

(2) Items concerning organization.

(a) Aviation headquarters ----- in the army ----- at Bandoeng. The first Bandoeng air force is at Malang in western Java, and the second air force seems to have charge of eastern and central Java (its symbol is "LFX"). The number of planes stationed there seems to be combat planes 9 (?) 2 planes ----- light bombers -----

(b) Types of planes: (The number of planes given in brackets are very unreliable).

Combat (destroyer) planes: ZATAISUHUOOKU and Curtis interceptor ----- reconnoiter and bombing plan—Curtis—Falcon. (About 5 (?)).

Light bombers: Glen Martin and Lockheed (about 150).

Flying boats: DONIERU (about 20) and recent Catalina 5 seaplanes (medium and small types, about 50).

(c) The number of planes for both army and navy total about 500 of first line planes, and adding second line planes it would come to between 700 and 1000 (including training planes). During the review of troops on 1 September, about 100 planes were flying over Batavia.

(d) Points at which planes are stationed: (numbers given are very unreliable). Also see Java message # 18[a] in regard to stations.

(1) Aviation force # 1 Bandon.

Light bombers, 30

Combat planes, 70

KARIJATE "LFX"[b] and ----- parachute troops (temporarily created).

TIRIRITAN[b], Combat planes, 12; light bombers. "LFX" BOITE SPORUHU[b], combat 70, light bombers, 6.

PUMXNBUKKU[b], (on south coast) ----- some light bombers.

(2) Aviation force # 2. "LFX".

AARAN[b], quite a number of light bombers.

SOERABAJA, (nrth field), combat planes, 40; scout planes, 30; light bombers, 30.

MAOSTIMATOI[b], (west of MAJION), light bomber "LFX".

JOKUJA[b], light bomber, combat plane.

(3) Naval planes:

SOERABAJA, flying boats, 20, (including some Catalinas recently arrived) Seaplanes, "LFX".

TANJONPURIOOKU[b], flying boats, "LFX".

(4) Outlying territories.

Meando, flying boats on the lake to the south, "LFX". Anbon, flying boat, "LFX" Barikupapan, light bomber, "LFX".

(3) The situation as regard replenishments and arrivals.

(a) Two Catalina flying boats were ferried from the United States in early part of September, and three the latter part of October.

(b) Others, it would seem, are being imported from time to time by American and Dutch ships, but the actual facts are not known.

(c) According to newspaper reports contracts have been made in the United States amounting to $24,000,000 for the purchase of two-motored medium weight bombers of the B type.

(d) The supplementary naval appropriation just passed provides 14,340,000 guilders for plane purchases for the purpose of creating a torpedo plane force.

(e) There seem to be supply depots at each of the flying fields at Soerabaja and Bandoeng; and assembling and repair of planes are done at these places.

(4) Other items:

(a) Of late volunteer flying corps are being organized in various places for the purpose of training second line pilots, and there are already about 40 each in training at Batavia and Soerabaja.

(b) Of late there has been an increase of plane accidents (especially light bombers) in the Netherlands East Indies. This is thought to be a result of these efforts of expansion. ——

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[a] Not available.
[b] Place name.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 1055

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

October 29, 1941
1162.

Please relay to Vice War Minister and Chief of General Staff.

Java Message # 26.

1. On 23 October, Lieutenant-General TERUPORLUTEN was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands East Indies army. He had been Chief of the General Staff. The Lieutenant-General was born in 1887 in BOITENZORUFU on the island of Java and is of pure Dutch ancestry. He is from the artillery corps and, while a lieutenant, learned aviation. As such, he pioneered the science of aviation in the Netherlands East Indies. Subsequently he was attached to the various artillery corps and to the General Staff until today.

The Lieutenant-General is an authority on aviation and is endowed with a very scientific mind. He is probably the one most responsible for machinizing the N.E.I. army.

He is an officer of an exceedingly high caliber, both as a gentleman and as a strategist. He has won the complete respect and confidence of his subordinates. He is the possessor of a brilliant mind and at the same time is an excellent mixer, socially. He enjoys a good reputation in general, although some are of the opinion that he leans somewhat toward Naziism.

2. The former assistant to the Chief of the General Staff, colonel BAKKARSU, was promoted to the rank of major-general, and to the office of Chief of the General Staff. He is of pure Dutch descent and was born in 1894. He is ex-infantry. He is an unbending officer and has little consideration and sympathy for his subordinates. He does not enjoy much popularity in general.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 1056

FROM: Batavia — October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1161.

(Foreign Office Secret.)

Please relay the information contained herein to the vice Minister of War and to the Chief of the General Staff.

Java Message #27.

1. Under the order drafting natives to military service, the first group of about 1500 were inducted into the army day before yesterday, 27 October. (For details, please refer to messages addressed to the Foreign Office.) With regard to this, the East India Political Federation issued a statement along the following lines: "The people of the East Indies have come to realize their duty to serve in the armed services. The people of East India shall act as one in behalf of building up the strength of their land, through their legislative and political parties."

Because of the pressure from the government, however, it is not believed that this organization will carry much weight.

2. There are numerous indications that every effort is being made in this area to build up a war time strength. According to the report of a legislator connected with the mobilization, who inspected the establishments at TIRACHZPPU (?), both the equipment and defense organizations are satisfactory, and military supplies are ample.

The Acting Chief of Economics, Hofstraaten, and Duff-Cooper of England, are going to visit Australia simultaneously. It is believed that they will confer on obtaining supplies while there.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 1057

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) — October 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1168.

Strictly confidential. To be transmitted to the Chief of the General Affairs Section of the General Staff.

Java Message No. 28.

According to newspaper reports, coast defense maneuvers were held in the 3rd Army District on a large scale on the 27th and 28th of last month. The landing points (to be ascertained later) were at unnamed points on the south coast of Java south of the Rumajan region, and at unnamed points on Bali and Madura.

There have been especially extensive maneuvers west of Batavia in the Mawok and Tangeran regions.

There are small ferry landings on the Chi Tarom river (on the west branch of the Bandoeng-Kulawan river) and on either bank of the Bandoeng-Chanjuru river in the mountainous region north of Bandoeng, the river being about 10 meters wide, about 20 kilometers north of Chanjuru, at Manisu. There are almost none at other points.

Investigator's reliability "A".

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 1058

FROM: Batavia — October 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1169.

1. On the 30th I attended a farewell dinner arranged by the Governor General, but before the dinner I had an opportunity to talk with the Governor General alone in his study on his invitation. Our conversation was directed entirely toward sounding out the attitude of the Dutch. (I had previously asked you for instructions as to points on which I should put emphasis, but I received no reply.) The main points of the conversation were as follows:

(a) I first told him that ever since our advance into southern French Indo-China, relations between Japan and the Netherlands have been entirely deadlocked, but that on my return home I wish to represent aright to our authorities the attitude of the Dutch toward the international situation. The Governor General being an old acquaintance of Foreign Minister Togo, I told him that if he had any "message" to send I would be glad to receive it. The Governor General replied that the policies being pursued by the N.E.I. are just as we have been hearing them from the Dutch authorities in our daily contacts with them, and that we also understand the spirit of the Dutch people that forms the background for these policies, and therefore he would add nothing more. In other words the policies of the N.E.I. government are decided upon, and they have no thought but to follow out those policies. He further stated that in regard to future turns in the international situation and in regard to the position of the N.E.I., he of course is not too optimistic, but neither is he pessimistic.

(b) Upon my inquiry as to his opinions on the future of Japanese-Dutch relations, he replied that when the first opportunity shall have arrived when it will be possible to build upon a new foundation in improving relations between the two countries, he will seize upon that opportunity as he has not lost his desire to advance in a constructive manner.

2. From the calm, reassuring attitude manifested by the Governor General during our conversation, the impression received was that the N.E.I. have already made all preparations for resistance, even though Japan should resort to the use of force, and that they have no reason to be afraid, and therefore that there is no need for the Dutch to make any advances in seeking to effect an understanding with Japan at this time.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 1059

FROM: Tokyo — October 27, 1941
TO: Batavia — #674.

Most Secret.

Re your #1147[a].

1. Concerning my #657[b], it is desired that all evacuees for the Hawaii (Maru), totaling up to 1700 or 1800 persons including those from Sumatra, be accommodated in the Takachiho Maru. Furthermore, since the Nissho Maru will be unable to call at Sumaran, the passengers from there should also be put aboard the Takachiho Maru at Surabaya.

If accommodations prove to be insufficient in that ship, the excess which cannot be embarked should be put aboard the Nissho Maru. However, in case the total number of evacuees increases further, but does not exceed 2000 passengers for the Takachiho Maru, please consult with the ship's captain when it arrives at Surabaya.

2. The Nissho Maru is equipped with accommodations for 450. As indicated in my (#657[b]) however, allocations have been made for only 50 passengers from Makkasar and Menado, and for 120 from Sandakan. If these quotas are not exceeded there should be considerable remaining accommodations in her. In this case, persons assigned to the Takachiho Maru may,

if they so desire, be assigned passage in this excess space in the Nissho Maru for their return passage.

3. It is unnecessary to say this, but please pass on to the passengers that they must provide themselves individually with blankets, as well as clothing, etc. for cold weather.

4. The following limits on personal baggage have been set:

A. In the Takachiho Maru, 1 ton maximum. ½ ton is free, while above that will be paid for as freight (at the rate of 28 yen per ton).

B. In the Nissho Maru, 2 tons maximum of which 1 ton is free, and any excess at usual freight rates.

5. The price of tickets (there is no difference in food in the different classes) is as follows:

A. In the Takachiho Maru:

1st class 180 yen.

2nd class 130 yen.

3rd class 90 yen.

B. In the Nissho Maru:

1st class 130 yen.

2nd class 90 yen.

6. Furthermore, for your information the Takachiho Maru is scheduled to pick up baggage at Keelung for Moji on its return trip.

7. Referring to your #1148[b], the new accommodations should meet the requirements set forth in paragraph 1 above, though necessarily limited by the fixed accommodations in the ships. However, the head office of O.S.K. agrees that they can accommodate up to 1800. The Takachiho Maru normally takes 35 first class, 130 second, and 771 third class, but by squeezing in, doubling up, etc. you should in consultation with the captain be able to manage.

Please reply pertinent parts of this, priority, to Surubaya, Makassar, Menado, and Medan.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 1060

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1156.

(Urgent.)

Strictly secret.

Re your #674[a].

1. Evacuees from central Java number about 200. If we sent them to Soerabaja, it would take 20,000 guilders for traveling and living expenses. Now, at Sumaran the customs officials have always treated us Japanese particularly well when it comes to our baggage. There our people would receive much better treatment. I don't think it utterly out of the question to have the Nissho Maru dock there. In any case we have to consider the welfare of our people who are so hard put to it, so please arrange to have the Nissho Maru dock at Sumaran. If you have to, cancel the Batavia docking and let what was to be unloaded there be unloaded at Sumaran instead.

2. The Takachiho used to take on two tons apiece for the passengers, but you have just decided it can handle only one ton. (The South Seas company here has just advised the people concerned that they can take two tons.) The Takachiho, on the other hand, will have to take

on baggage at Keelung[b], so will you please duly consider the baggage of this ship's passengers and permit me to let ome other ship handle it. Wire me back.

[a] See IV, 1059.
[b] Keelung—Seaport in N.E. Formosa.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 1061

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 12, 1941
TO: Batavia #706.

(Urgent.)

(Departmental Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code.)

Re your #1195[a].

As I tried to tell you in my #685[a] and my 131[a] to Soerabaja, the *Takichiho* and the *Nissho* were especially dispatched in order to accommodate all those who were waiting. We sent those ships only after getting the consent of those concerned with great difficulty. But you did not understand the real intention of our department. How regrettable it is that we got half as many people as were expected. Now this department has lost face with the other departments concerned. I suppose that you, in looking over the situation, had your own reasons for holding them back, but the international situation is now delicate and in order to accommodate all those who were left behind by the *Takichiho* and any others who may wish to return to Japan, we are sending the *Fuji Maru*. It will arrive in your city on or about the 22nd of this month and leave Soerabaja on the 28th. It is being sent in strictest secrecy. Now those with whom we dealt in sending this ship at great personal loss consented to let it go, so this time I want you to have everything in readiness. Will you, therefore, with greatest urgency—and I emphasize those words—please get in touch with Soerabaja, Medan, and Menado.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 1062

FROM: Batavia November 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1177t

Recently, because of the evacuation of nationals, the Japanese language newspaper in the East Indies has had a decrease in income from subscriptions and advertisements and, recently, when the Nissho Maru and Takachiho Maru took away a large group of evacuee, the income dropped alarmingly. In order to keep going they have decreased the issues and also cut down on management as far as possible. While the Japanese language paper is decreasing, the Chinese language papers continue just as before and, because of the suspicions of the island government, more difficulties are presented which have resulted in further decreasing the issues of the paper. From the above decreases, they will save about 900 guilders in expenses of all kinds, but at the same time they expect to lose in income 1,100 guilders from subscriptions and 300 guilders from advertisements—a total of 1,400 guilders. This leaves a deficit of 500 guilders. We ask your special consideration to supply 2,500 guilders in order to cover

this deficit for the five months from November to the end of the fiscal year. Please wire your answer.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 1063

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 6, 1941
TO: Batavia #693.

(Strictly Secret.)

Few telephonic conversations are passing between Japan and Netherlands Indies. Lately calls in Netherlandish from Netherlanders have been falling off. We intend to curtail international telephone conversations and are now studying the matter (in order to diminish whatever effect might result, we might either limit the conversations or arrange to stop them temporarily, reestablishing them later if the situation demands). Will you please wire me back your opinion.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1064

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1188.

Re your #693[a].

In view of what I said in my #968[b], I think you might well go ahead and officially advise PABST that such telephonic communication is being stopped.

---

[a] See IV, 1063.

[b] See IV, 1064A which states that in view on the prospects of permission to use the Japanese language being meager, it was though best to suspend the international telephone service.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1064A

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #968.

Re your #543[a].

Thinking it would be well to sound out the attitude of the Dutch once more, I explained to ROOFINKU the official in charge of the bureau, Japan's friendly attitude in allowing the use of the Dutch language, and stated that it would be to the advantage of both parties for the international telephone service to be continued on the condition that the use of the Japanese language be permitted in return. RO replied that with martial law in force now, the prospects of permission to use the Japanese language are meager.

Accordingly I think it is best to suspend the international telephone service. If it is suspended please have your office advise Minister Pabst, or else have the Ministry of Communications advise the communications authorities of the Netherlands Indies, and report the results to me by dispatch.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 1065

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1184.

Recently I have had to write KUROKI in Dilly, Timor on frequent occasions as well as receive messages from him. Because of the telegraphic work involved, please arrange to send him (in care of the Japanese Consul in Dilly) code books, abbreviated transmission code, as well as telegraphic addresses at as early a date as possible.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 1067

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 6, 1941
TO: Batavia #695.

A telegram from Staff Headquarters.

The Vice Chief Manager wishes you to pass on the following orders to Lt. KURIYA.

1. You are ordered home for the time being. You will come by airplane, contacting the military attache at Bangkok in Siam and the wealth ("tomi") group in Saigon.
2. Your successor will be Lt. TOYOAKI YAMAUCHI. Since Lt. YAMAUCHI's arrival at his post may be delayed in order to acquire his papers, no matter what the progress of the above papers you are permitted to leave your post.
3. Until the arrival of your successor, we are asking SATORU SHIMPO, a Domei news service man in Batavia, and YOSHIO MATSUGAKI, the Consul in Soerabaja, to take charge of your research.

The above are the balance of the orders.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1068

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1186.

(Military Secret.)

Please transmit this message to the Vice War Minister and to the Vice Chief of Staff (please transmit to Military Attache TAIWA).

Java Message #30. (Strictly Secret.) (Urgent.)

From KURIYA.

1. I am in receipt of your order.
2. I shall return on board the *Takachiho Maru* sailing from Batavia on the 10th, since there is considerable danger of my losing the opportunity by being interrupted by the British if I should go by way of Bangkok. I expect to arrive on the 24th or the 25th. Please be so informed.

Furthermore, if I am to take up my new work immediately from Formosa, I would like to receive your instructions at Keelung (about the 20th).

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 1069

FROM: Medan (Hyasaki) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #151.

(Part 1 of 2.)[a]

Reports from Malaysians became uncertain, so I had RAJAMURA through his friend ISUNAIRU[b], an employee of the Forestry Department under MANDERINGU[b], make inquiries of PAZUAKIMU[b], who is preparing to destroy the Pururа[b] oil refineries.

1. The destruction forces are divided into two groups, both of which get double pay.

2. They are ready to destroy all the oil fields in Susu[b] and Brandan when advised so to do by telephone. The refineries at Susu, Brandan and Rantoo[b] are fully mined and ready to explode. At present Dara-[b] and Pururа are being prepared.

3. Preparations to destroy Susu are as I have already told you. However, the wire net is very near the machinery.

4. The machinery at Brandan is connected to the post office on the premises of the workers' barracks by a short wire. Three short wires ----- from those three places ----- ----- ----- -----.

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[a] Part 2 not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 1070

FROM: Medan (Hayasake) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #152.

1. RAJYAMURA[a].

a. The Netherlands East Indies authorities are understood to have turned over to all Sorutan[a] sealed secret orders, the sealing wax of which is to be broken in the event of war. When we inquired of RANKATUTO, Chief of the Emergency (Bureau) of this matter, he said, "I do not know for sure whether the Sorutan[a] is to keep these instructions in his possession, but the office in charge will do its best to quiet the unrest of the people within their jurisdiction and make preparations for the laying in of foodstuffs.

b. In front of the Emergency Bureau there is a sign which says that in the event war becomes imminent, the people are to cease their labors and must not congregate unnecessarily.

c. They are preparing 100 swords which are to be placed in the fields ready for harvest along the eastern seacoast. The scabbards for these swords are being constructed by Chinese. In the event of war, they will be given to persons of trust to be used in the protection of the natives.

2. Re the village I mentioned in my #142[b].

a. This village has been given the charge of constructing an automobile road into the mountains from the oil wells. This virtually has been completed. The fact is that these roads have been constructed in order to avoid congestion on the national highways.

b. In Borneo, too, they have constructed similar roads, cannon have been placed at strategic points, and mines have been laid.

---

[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 1071

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1206.

1. On the 11th I visited SUPITTAI[a], Vice Governor-General, for an hour, and we went over the developments between the two countries.

I stated, "Japan has joined in with Germany, and Holland became allied with England. The object of the German-Japanese union was clearly expressed in the treaty signed by them. It was to prevent the spread of the European war to the whole world, and that the agreement was no direct threat to the Dutch East Indies. I have been endeavoring since arriving here to realize my conviction that an improvement of diplomatic and economic relations between Japan and the Dutch East Indies could be achieved by my driving home to the Dutch East Indian authorities the fact that they were not threatened as a consequence of Japanese advancement in southern French Indo-China. The Netherlanders, feeling a direct threat to the Dutch East Indies, changed to an anti-Japanese political policy, and I regret that such a state of affairs had been reached which makes reconciliation difficult."

SUPITTAI said, "All of the Dutch East Indian authorities have remarked that you have been struggling to the fullest, from the beginning to the end, to improve relations between the two countries, but with the advance of the Japanese into the southern part of French Indo-China, there was a sudden hardening of the Dutch East Indian officials and people. Although the mother country is Holland, I as an individual pursue an independent political course. I realize the difficult questions facing Japan. The Japanese idea is to establish a new order in East Asia and to be the leader of the peoples in that area. The Netherlanders do not desire that new order, as they do not wish to come under Japanese domination and tutelage."

I replied, "I must emphasize that such is not Japan's plan. The idea of the Japanese people at any time or place has always been based upon justice. Great Britain, the United States and Holland have been selfish in using the resources of the world, and we cannot allow that to continue. How is it possible that the Dutch East Indies cannot understand our idea?"

SUPITTAI answered, "Holland has not been selfish. She has supplied the whole world with her resources. We understand the Japanese idea, so we refuse to accept it."

I asked, "Just what is meant by that statement?"

SUPITTAI explained, "The intentions of Japan are exactly the same as those of Germany, as shown by the invasion of Chosen, Manchuria, China, Hainan, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands, Spratley Islands and French Indo-China. It must be known that French Indo-China did not like Japan's idea but they gave in finally."

I retorted, "I am shocked by this. Throughout many years of history our intentions and aims have always been based upon justice." (I emphasized that compared to England, American and Dutch invasions, Japanese expansion is justified.) SUPITTAI replied in this manner: "It is as you say but judging from the historic actions and trends of Japan, her policy is exactly the same as the German theory of racial supremacy. Consequently there is now a threat to the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch East Indies do not want to fight, but they are not afraid to do so."

2. The essence of this interview must not leak outside the Department.

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[a] Kana spelling, spit.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 1072

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #1209.

Re your # 706[a]: Strictly Confidential.

With reference various problems in connection with the dispatch of the Fuji Maru, there is no hope of any business in the future, and the retail merchants and others should be evacuated. They are preparing to close their shops and withdraw by the end of December. I have been keeping in touch with the Army and Navy authorities, and about the 10th we agreed that a steamer should be sent here late in December or early in January. If the international situation should compel the Government to sacrifice our nationals here—and there are many who want to leave—this would rapidly become a serious problem. Please let me know your wishes so that I can be competent to give advice to the local Japanese who want to withdraw.

In order to give the right advice, and proper orders, definite instructions are necessary. If this office should have conflicting orders it would be like a thunder-storm in a clear sky to our nationals here. Local travel is becoming increasingly inconvenient, and the many Japanese nationals living in scattered areas are closing their houses and gathering in Batavia, in anticipation of the Fuji Maru's arrival on the 28th. If it is absolutely impossible to dispatch the vessel until mid-December, please inform me at once by telegraph, and also as to the passenger capacity of the ship and any other information.

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[a] See IV, 1061.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 1073

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

November 13, 1941
707.

Chief of Office routing.

Japanese nationals familiar with conditions in the Dutch East Indies and those knowing the languages should now return home.

(1) This group of Japanese should include those engaged in farming, and employees of firms, leaving behind only the head officers most essential. The Consul at each place should give each case careful consideration on its own merits, deciding as to whether or not those remaining behind are absolutely essential. This is important to our policy of withdrawing Japanese nationals and the assignment of a steamer for that purpose. The order for the withdrawal to Japan will soon be issued to you by way of precaution, which will include the foregoing points.

(2) When this occurs, the men should be selected promptly and those going to Japan on this steamer be advised promptly of the necessity of this. Further, the evacuees should pay careful attention to making it seem to both natives and foreigners that the evacuation is a spontaneous withdrawal.

(3) The gist of this message should be secretly transmitted to Medan, Soerabaja, Menado, Makassar, as soon as possible.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 1074

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

November 14, 1941
1213.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Re your # 707[a].

Until I received your telegram the other day, I could not begin to guess wherein lay the policy of our department, so I was very much worried. When I received this message of yours. for the first time I knew what your policy was. Of course, I will do my best, but I do not believe that it would be at all possible for me to have as many people board ships as you expect. Please look at the facts and consider the difficulty I face. This telegram left the encoder's hand at 5:30 local time.

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[a] See IV, 1073.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1075

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

November 16, 1941
716.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Part 1 of 2. Secret. Re my # 707[a].

As a result of conferences which we have held with the interested companies, please transmit the following with the utmost speed and secrecy to the various company managers. While we sympathize with staffs of the firms, they are urgently requested to endeavor to maintain business as usual under present conditions.

1. Medan District.

(a) Tozan Agricultural Products. If possible without interfering with the maintenance of business, on the discretion of AJIYAMU[b] three or four men may return to Japan.

(b) Showa Rubber. On the discretion of PUROMANDE[b] about two members of the staff may return to Japan.

(c) Sumatra Colonization. On the discretion of ZUSUNWURUU[b] make the necessary arrangements for one or two men to return to Japan, leaving a proper person in charge and employ YOTO.

(e) South Seas Rubber. Since TANAHITAMUHIRIRU[b] has not enough strength left to evacuate, work hard together.

(f) Tropical Industries. After effecting a contract for management of the Mitsui New Tropical Rubber Plantation through a dependable agent, it is all right to evacuate. However, arrange that the contract may be cancelled on from three to six months' notice after management is actually transferred. Other details are left to you.

---

[a] See IV, 1073.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 1076

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

November 16, 1941
716.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Part 2 of 2.

(g) Nomura. After setting up a contract between Nomura Supply Company and Guthrie, commence turning over the business. List the trust items transferred from the accounts of the Medan Trading Company to Karanyine[a]. We will wire again about future details.

2. Batavia district.

(a) Ogura. It is all right to send back any from the South Countries Company whom you think should return. Plan to entrust all our deposits to ESUKONTO[a], and if it is possible to make the preparations, go ahead. We leave it to you whether or not you stay.

(b) Nomura. Set up a contract between the Nomura Supply Company and HONDERUSU[a], including general management and the Meteor (?) steel works and commence turning over the business. Even though they again propose the purchase of both factories, make a strong effort to secure loans of trade articles and raw materials. Encourage talks with the aim of getting HONDERUSU[a] to take over a simple lease on a friendly footing. Arrange the above details also in Batavia, Pontiana, and Surabaya. We will wire further details later.

3. Surabaya District.

To KONDO of the Dutch East Indies Development Company in Bandjermasin. After making suitable arrangements for management of the business return to Japan on the first available boat. As for KODAMA, we leave it to him whether he stays or not.

Please make the necessary connections with Surabaya and Medan at once.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-21-41

No. 1077

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 14, 1941
TO: Batavia #712.

(Urgent.)

(Strictly Secret.)

The negotiations about which I told you in my #711[a] are going to be precarious. If the fact that we are holding them leaks out to our residents, they might get the impression that the outlook is very hopeful and decide not to leave the country. We might not get as many people as we expect on the Fuji Maru so please be careful not to let any of our residents learn anything about these negotiations.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-20-41

No. 1078

FROM: Batavia November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1182.

Request telegram.

To the President of the Specie Bank from Imagawa.

In today's conference the question came up as to why the 5000 yen that should have been paid to the Dutch Consul General in Kobe on October 16th had not yet been paid. Since it is necessary to give an answer please wire the circumstances immediately.

Furthermore, let me request again an answer to my plain language telegram #30[a]. Please wire an answer immediately to my plain language telegram #31[a].

A proposal was made to approve the wiring of 100,000 yen to cover the expenses of the Dutch merchants for permitting the export of 4000 tons of maize loaded on the *Takachiho Maru* and *Nissho Maru*.

Please get the details from the Foreign Office.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 1079

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

November 11, 1941
633.

(*Abstract.*)

Re your # 1084[a].

Re N.E.I. trade. We can't even consider the insincere proposals made by the Netherlands. Conduct negotiations for bartering of each ship load of goods as independent transaction.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 1080

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

November 21, 1941
1245.

Re your 697[a].

From the director of the Exchange Control Bureau to Imagawa.

It is said that the telegraphic money order (for 60,000 yen) of the 12th, sent to FUWAKU-TORAI has not yet been paid, and the Director inquired as to the reason for this. If this is actually a fact, it is highly to be deplored as it is concerned with the obtention of the permit for the export of the maize loaded on the Tokatiho Maru and the Nissho Maru. Please get in touch with the Finance Ministry immediately regarding this and if it has not been paid, please arrange for the carrying out of our promises.

Please ascertain at the same time as to whether the 40,000 yen for the Handels Bank has been paid and wire a reply immediately.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 1081

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Dili, Port Timor

November 21, 1941
028.

Sending Y10,000 from secret fund. Await instructions as to its disbursement.

Trans. 1-5-42

No. 1082

FROM: Tokyo — November 21, 1941
TO: Menado — #053.

Sending Y5,000 for secret fund. Retain it in cash, and await subsequent instructions as to its usage.

Trans. 1-5-42

No. 1083

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) — November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1248.

Re my #1220[a].

Please wire a reply as to the reason why you sent a plain text message to IMAGAWA saying that permission has been refused for the payment of the 5,000 yen by the Specie Bank in Kobe to Consul-General "PE".

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1084

FROM: Dili — November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #69.

Re your #28[a].

By way of information, I wish to tell you that it is impossible to draw out much of the 140,000 or 150,000 PATAKA worth of redeemable notes in the possession of the bank here.

[a] See IV, 1081.

Trans. 12-30-41

No. 1085

FROM: Dili — November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #072.

There are about ——— hundred tons of exportable manganese. In payment for it they wish to have wire netting which may be used for sifting ore. Is there a possibility for arranging this trade? I suppose that unless a ship is dispatched especially for this purpose there is no way for transporting the material. I understand that they can supply a considerable quantity if in the form of ore. Although I received the reply concerning this matter in the name of a certain member of the MITSUI and the JOSHI NICHIKO Companies, I am reporting the matter to you immediately.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 1086

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1229.

(Departmental secret. To be handled in Government code.)

1. On the 17th, the Chief of the East Asia Bureau called on me and reported to me the intentions of the Netherlands Indies government. This is a summary of our conversation:

The Chief: "The international situation is now very tense, and the Netherlands Indies government is greatly concerned over the future of our relations with Japan. Therefore, the Japanese consul here ought to fully understand the attitude of the Netherlands and be well-versed in the situations here in these islands. We ought to have a wise and intelligent man. This would be very advisable from the standpoint of both of our countries. Now, for you to go home at this point would, I think, be very regrettable. I have heard that your successor will be Consul ASADA. Inasmuch as he has for some time been in Bangkok and from what we have learned about him, we do not think that he is, by any means, a suitable person for this post, so can't you please have his appointment rescinded?" I: "The reason why I asked my superior to let me return to Tokyo was because you Netherlands officials kept sending me replies which were entirely too insincere. I finally came to the conclusion that there was nothing I could do about it; that is why I am leaving. Why on earth do you imagine that I could do anything about having Mr. ASADA's appointment rescinded?" The Chief: "Well, we have heard some things which were none too complimentary to Mr. ASADA from his associates in the diplomatic corps representing a number of nations as well as the consular corps." I: "Well, let us grant that his appointment was somewhat irregular. You, yourself, say that the relations of our two countries are very grave, that you are concerned over their future, and that the situation is very delicate. Now, the reason why we are at sword's end with each other and nothing can be done is because you have connived with England and the United States and are blockading us economically. Therefore, it doesn't matter whom we place here in Batavia, he can't do anything anyway, but perhaps by what you say today you mean that there is some chance for us to reconsider Japanese-Netherlands relations in general and perhaps take a new outlook." The Chief: "That isn't what I mean." I: "Don't you think you are a little presumptuous in saying that Mr. ASADA isn't a suitable man? I am to await his arrival here, and then I thought I would return to Japan to report to the Government and to the people the real intentions of your Government. I would like you to tell me, please, just what is the main reason why Japanese-Netherlands Indies relations have lately grown so bad." The Chief: "Japan has allied herself with Germany. Her policy is to establish a new order within a greater East Asia coprosperity sphere. She has set up military bases in southern French Indo-China." I: "Yes, on the basis of this Tri-Partite Alliance, we Japanese have already concluded that for the sake of our people we will have to establish a new order. This is the ideal of our race. England, America, and the Netherlands have already got all the places rich in resources. Naturally, you all like to sit back and enjoy the *status quo*, but look at us—we are expanding; our birth rate is increasing; we must settle this population problem because we've got a hundred million people. England, America, and the Netherlands deny us any leeway and have waged a relentless warfare against our economic progress. You abolished our commerce, and now you bend us down with an economic blockade. We are by no means satisfied with this old unjust order of things. Isn't that natural? The reason why Japan got military bases in southern French Indo-China was to break this Anglo-American economic blockade and to get necessary materials. We first negotiated with the French government, which, from considerations of its own protection, joined hands with us. You may say that our stationing of troops there constitutes a joint threat against England and the United States, but on the other hand, what are Singapore and Manila but threats to us? It all amounts to the same thing, doesn't it? Haven't you all recently concluded what is tantamount to a military alliance with London and Washington? It cannot but be concluded that you have abandoned even the semblance of neutrality."

2. As I have wired you a number of times, the Netherlands Indies officials have always insisted that they were neutral, but this time the Chief of the East Asia Section did not even take the trouble to deny my accusation, and I could see from what he said that they do not have any intention of compromising with us. We must look out from now on. During the last administration, the Netherlands officials were given the benefit of the doubt, so now, at the last moment, in order to determine their intentions and actions, I have visited many of them, telling them that I had come to say "good-bye" before returning home. I sounded them out, and I feel that it is a fact that they have no intention of compromising with us and that if worse comes to worst, they will be ready for war.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 1087

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1225.

In 2 parts, complete.

On the 15th and 16th, a meeting was called for the various groups of importers, banks, retail and wholesale shopkeepers, and the arrival of the Fuji Maru and the purpose (for evacuation of Japanese from Batavia) was explained.

As a result, the banks and companies have decided to leave only two or three persons in charge and cut down their business to the minimum. There are three or four stores which are determined to stay and see the thing through but the majority have decided to leave, closing down their business here. However, many of these wholesalers and shops do not believe that they will be able to straighten out their business in the short time allowed them before the sailing of this ship. For this reason, it has been decided to appoint a few trustworthy persons to take combined charge of these shops and finish up their business for them.

On the other hand, there are several retail and wholesale stores who need cash to close their business and leave, or, although they will be able to sell their stock and leave, will not be able to obtain cash for this sale until later.

To help these stores and businesses the matter was discussed with the Specie Bank manager here and he suggests a loan by the bank, taking the stock, which will be left here on consignment, as collateral on a loan to be made by the bank as expenses for evacuation. For this it is necessary, however, for the bank to get a special permit from the Department of Finance. Will you please arrange for this permit, the total sum would be about 20,000.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 1088

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 18, 1941
TO: Batavia #721.

Strictly secret. Re my #276[a].

To NOMURA and MORITA.

If you have already completed transfer, have the employees of the Borneo[b] plantations evacuated. Ship accommodations being extremely congested, should it become impossible for all to leave, permit only those who must stay to remain and evacuate as many as possible. Those who remain should return to Japan by a mail steamer or by mail plane as soon as possible thereafter. Should it become necessary for all managers, including those of the Borneo

plantations to remain for a short time, impress upon them the necessity of returning to Japan at the very earliest opportunity. I have already wired the Karaninu[c] plantation.

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[a] Not available.
[b] This refers to the Borneo Rubber Company.
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 1089

FROM: Tokyo — November 20, 1941
TO: Batavia — #728.

Secret outside the department.

I want KONDO of the Toindo Nippo to be sent back to Japan aboard the *Fuji Maru*.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 1090

FROM: Batavia — November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1243.

Strictly confidential.

To the Vice Minister.

Translator Aratame is a very promising youth and faithful in carrying out my commands. However, I have ascertained that a certain place in Japan is sending code messages directly to him. If an emergency required it, I would be very glad to have him used in this capacity. However, to send code messages direct to him from this place without going through my hands is a violation of the existing contract. Please arrange to have those concerned in the sending of these dispatches suspend their activities and wire the result.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1091

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) — November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1246.

To be handled in Government Code.

Broadcast wave lengths were changed in general on the 10th. I was completely unable to receive the broadcast at 10:30 from JAP because of weak signals. Due to present conditions, I am very desirous of receiving this broadcast so please arrange to use JUO (9430). There is good reception of JJ and JUO at 6:30.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1092

FROM: Batavia — November 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1241.

Strictly confidential.

1. That surveillance over Japanese fishing boats in the vicinity of Gaspar and Biliton is becoming more and more strict is being reported by the captains of the various vessels reaching port recently. According to their reports, it appears that the ships are stopped at least once or twice a day by flying boats and subjected to intimidating inspection. Most of these flying boats are tri-motored (with a crew of six or seven). However, northeast of Barka occasionally a four-motored boat is encountered. (It is thought these are British boats.)

2. Although no warships are encountered in these areas there are always two or three in the vicinity of Etna 50 miles north of Batavia; these are patrol boats on duty at night. On the night of the 18th, several of these were recognized.

3. The person in responsibility here was summoned to the local police station and subjected to various questions and investigations regarding his intentions to go to -----. He said that return to his country was dependent upon permission from the Government authorities.

The person in charge of the Oshiro Company was investigated regarding the matter of a loan to the harbor master.

The fact that our fishing vessels have thus become the objects of strong suspicion and oppression by the Government here deserves our attention.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 1093

FROM: Shanghai — November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #2131.

According to a JK report on the 20th, a Dutch newspaper concern is negotiating for the purchase of the newspaper "Minseihō"[a] of which Yeh Chin-Tsan is editor.

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[a] The Voice of the People.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1094

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) — November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1253.

To be handled in Government code. Departmental secret.

The activities of KOO CHOO SUI, backed up by the CHI GOO KAI and the KOO HOO (an intelligence society and a publication), is working hard in our behalf to stamp out anti-Japanism. Several incidents have occurred lately and his opponents are rather belligerent. Consequently, Governmental surveillance over KOO is rather close. From April to September of this year we afforded KOO a subsidy for the KOO HOO and a fund for collecting intelligence, amounting to from 2,000 to 3,000 guilders. KOO is so familiar with the Chinese and natives here that in case of emergency he can do much to help us. That is why I have employed him so far. He is ready at our direction to start the distribution of pamphlets designed to win over as many of his consanguinaries and the natives as possible. I think that we should continue to avail ourselves of his services. He has a family of eight. Therefore, I think we should let him have 3,000 guilders for operating expenses; 15,000 guilders for living expenses, and 12,000 guilders as a subsidy for the KOO HOO as of from October 1st to the end of the year. Will you please, therefore, arrange to appropriate and remit that amount, namely 30,000 guilders.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 1095

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

December 1, 1941
1297.

Takada had recently been under suspicion, and was closely watched by government authorities here, so that we cannot expect much from his activities.

He has already left ----- and connections with him could not be made, and, in addition, I was not told what activities he is carrying out or with whom he is to make contact. Also the funds which were sent to me for him from the Consul General have not been received here. In all, I did not have any means of carrying out your orders in regard to this matter.

It is thought that he boarded the Fuji Maru at the last moment on his way back to Japan.

Trans. 1-3-42

No. 1096

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO: Batavia

November 22, 1941
Unnumbered.

(Priority.)

The German authorities are earnestly desirous that we arrange the evacuation of German women and children now resident in the Netherlands East Indies (it is understood that there are approximately 119 of them) on the *Fuji Maru*. We, here, think that it would be wise to do so if there is room. Therefore, after you have contacted the local Swiss consul immediately (if the Swiss consul has as yet not received instructions from his home government, the German authorities should take the necessary steps toward making this possible), please investigate the possibilities of carrying out this evacuation. Insofar as is possible, please take such measures in line with the desires of the German authorities.

Furthermore, the German embassy in Tokyo has assumed the responsibility for steamship fares, etc.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 1097

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

November 17, 1941
1224.

Strictly confidential.

To the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Third Division.

We wish to dispose of the furniture and office supplies and automobile used by the Naval Office. Please wire instructions.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 1098

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Soerabaja

November 21, 1941
151.

The General Staff has asked, and you are hereby requested, to obtain automobile road maps used by the MŌTŌ KURABU (Motor Club) members and send them in the Fuji Maru. If there is any difficulty in obtaining them, copies will do.

Trans. 1-14-42

No. 1099

FROM: OPNAV
TO: CINCAF, CINCPAC

November 21, 1941
211833 CR 0155.

Information given us by the Dutch Legation to the effect that they have received a dispatch which is herein quoted "Info received by Governor General of Dutch East Indies that a Jap expeditionary force has arrived near Palau. This force is strong enough to constitute a threat to the Dutch East Indies or Portuguese Timor, and should it move beyond a line between the following points, Davao-Waigea-Equator, it will be regarded by the Governor General as an act of aggression and will be considered by him as having opened hostilities, and he will act accordingly."

Army authorities should be informed of the foregoing.

Your evaluation of the foregoing is requested, and request also any info you may have concerning the development of this Jap threat against the Netherlands East Indies.

No. 1100

FROM: Medan (Hayasaki)
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
163.

According to the confidential report of a native soldier, Australian troops numbering roughly 150 are stationed in Medan (of this number, 1- are at Pangkalan Susu and at the harbor of Puro--ran).[a] According to what RAJYAMURA heard confidentially from a native policemena, 220 Australian troops are thought to be on the Island of Shunbiram.[a] On the island of ----- -----, Netherlands Indies troops are stationed according to intelligences which we have received.

The above is, on the whole, authentic.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 12-16-41

No. 1101

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

December 2, 1941
1307.

To Menado # 68.

Re your # 180[a].

In accordance with your suggestions, we here in this office have taken the following steps.

1. Expense funds are being converted into cash as rapidly as possible. The balance on hand will be taken care of in the manner you described under 1-B in your message.

2. The secret douments described in 1-B of your message will be burned (we have already completed burning our files of secret diplomatic correspondence).

3. With regard to the matter you mentioned in 2-B of your message there seems to be no course available but to leave the measure in the hands of another. In order that we might secure the approval of ----- in regard to this procedure since our policy with regard to the handling of Dutch Ministerial, Consular and Subordinate Officials as well as civilians is now being considered in the Foreign Office ----- ----- ----- -----.

4. With regard to the manner of disposing of telegraphic documents in this office, I am advising you in my wires # 1302[b] and # 1306[a] to the Foreign Minister.

Relayed to Tokyo.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] See IV, 1103.

Trans. 12–13–41

No. 1102

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) December 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1307.

Secret outside the Department.

Restricted Distribution.

All copies of wires dispatched or received by this office up to and including the first of this month (including telegraphic communications) have been burned. Henceforth, at the end of each day we will burn all copies of wires received or dispatched by this office during that day.

Furthermore, please be advised that we will send you an itemized list of everything destroyed either by a Japanese vessel or by the next courier reaching Batavia.

Trans. 12–13–41

No. 1103

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) December 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1302.

With the following exceptions, all our charts have been burned:

New Guinea: Kasetooka
Peru: iru. ruto "M" ruheeha.
New Zealand: noka. kasese "K" kaseiini.
Turkey: nikani "K" nikahaai.
Germany: kanowa. irunaai.
Netherlands: kahatooka.
China: Toheeka
Honduras: iseha. niharuui
Columbia: fuji iseha. sensento. niharuuni.
-----: kasena "S" kaseheei.

Total _____

Trans. 12–19–41

No. 1104

FROM: Tokyo December 4, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, Hsinking Circular # 2468.

Separate wire. Restricted distribution.

Secret outside the Department.

1. Until a state of war develops between Japan and the Netherlands, the Netherlands government will be considered a quasi-enemy power. Already they have put into force prohibi-

tions regarding the use of codes and are exercising rigid control and surveillance of our officials (consequently it is indicated that they are positively working in conjunction with enemy powers).

2. In the event the Netherlands declare war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands. In the event that a state of war exists between our country and the Netherlands before the Netherlands has actually made a declaration of war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands. Otherwise, in accordance with international Law, we will treat her as an enemy nation.

A. The advantages accruing the Netherlands government through repudiation would be that at the same time she carried out her repudiation she would declare the Minister to be persona non grata. Though there are indications that she had gone beyond this, there will be no need to handle the situation any other way but in accordance with (1) above.

B. Should the Netherlands government repudiate this, there will be no responsibility under International Law for the Netherlands to protect our nationals in the Netherlands East Indies. Then, too, even after a state of war has been brought about in her relations with us, she will be forced to stand in the position of not accepting a protest under International Law. Then again, she could bring about great inconvenience by demanding the evacuation of our Consular officials.

C. To date the Netherlands government has actually maintained her position under International Law, but should she reputdiate this, there would be no advantage in any other plan but A, mentioned above. Then, too, in the event that the Netherlands government begins hostilities, this would indicate her intention to repudiate our relationships and there would be no necessity to handle her in any other way but as a quasi enemy nation.

Translator's note: Translation sketchy due to garbles.

Trans. 12–11–41

No. 1105

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief General Staff) # 289.

(2 parts complete.)

(Part 1.)

Secret—personal.

1. With the critical international situation, the Siamese governing class is determined to preserve the neutrality of Siam and is directing all its efforts in this direction. In view of the development and success of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, we must consider Siam's position as a member nation and also pay careful attention to her wishes. We must see to it that our policy toward Siam leaves no cause for regrets later on.

No matter how weak a country she be, if we were to make an enemy of Siam, it would create great difficulties for our Burma operations for which we need transit through Siamese territory, and also for our use of the southern Siam RR lines for our Army operating in Malaya. In addition it would cause untold difficulties from the point of view of establishment of our ultimate goal.

(Part 2.)

2. The completion of strategic preparation for the invasion of the Bangkok plain on the Siamese eastern border area front, is very important. However, the selection of the time and method of use of this strength must be tempered by the above considerations, and we must not allow ourselves to be dazzled by some strategic advantages and thereby commit ourselves to a shortsighted policy. Namely, whereas the use of southern Siam is extremely vital, central

Siam has no great strategic value assuming that the Burmese operations are completed before too long. Hence, as explained in wire # 288[e], I feel that the best idea is to prepare a plan of operations so that southern Siam be sacrificed if unavoidable but that the neutrality of the greater part of Siam be preserved.

[e] Not available.

Trans. 4-30-45

No. 1106

FROM: Chiengmai (Harada) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #5.

According to reports here, the (Thaiese ?) are constructing roads in Chieng Mai Prefecture through Muan and Fuan to the border. An air field is being built 20 kilometres from the frontier. (Soldiers) are (being dispatched ?) to that area, with regular (camps ?) at several points between Fuan and Muan.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 1107

FROM: Tokyo October 20, 1941
TO: Bangkok #684.

Re your # 720[e].

Since we must secure the understanding of the British Government, please ask the Siamese authorities to have their Minister in England report at once to us the names of Siamese residents there who wish to sail for home.

[e] Not available.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 1108

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #729.

Re my # 703[e].

1. Please send me immediately the necessary 5,000 baht.
2. All preparations complete. Send on the dope, together with the needles. Telegraphic address: JOHN DISPEN, Post Office Box # 182. Name and address both registered.

[e] See III, 1314.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 1109

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 21, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 688.

Re your # 703[a].

Strictly confidential.

Remitting 8000 yen for expenses of paragraph 2.

Acknowledge paragraphs 3 and 4.

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[a] See III, 1314.

Trans. 10–25–41

No. 1110

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, General Staff) # 297.

We have sent by air the propaganda data for Indian troops which has been worked up by the Japanese and Indians for Malayan operations.

Please study it. We hasten to inform you also that it can be polished up greatly, as we are sending it in unrevised form.

As it is in the Punjab language, we would like you to have BOSE or SOHAN SINGH revise it.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 6–16–45

No. 1111

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, General Staff) # 298.

To Lt. Col. KADOMATSU.

At this time when we are to begin activities among the Indians we should increase the Indians here (unfortunately some of them were interned by the Thai authorities under the emergency) and have them infiltrate into all parts of Malaya to begin activities among the Indian troops or maintain liaison between the disturbance units (HANRAN BUTAI) and the Japanese Army. For this purpose we should select the right men from among Indians in China and Japan and secretly get them to Saigon, where they could be assigned to the important units. Please give this study and wire your answer.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 6–16–45

No. 1112

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 21, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 686 (?).

(Secret.)

Vice Consul Hatiya proposes a plan to install a short wave radio set to receive Japanese broadcasts for rebroadcasting. Please see whether such a set can be purchased there. Also, please check up and advise me as to the possibility of putting into effect the above plan.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 1113

FROM: Tokyo — October 22, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #690.

From ONO, Chief of the wireless department, to HASHIMOTO, engineer.

A 50(40?) kilocycle apparatus is now being prepared. I am waiting completion and hope to send it soon.

A telegram from the Japan Electrical Company strongly recommends remodelling the positive pole screen without affecting the zero phrase-sequence installation, but there are no other objections.

Please negotiate with the Siamese authorities for permission to import an apparatus with remodelled pole screen.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 1114

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — October 22, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #691.

From Chief Ōno of the Wireless Section to Engineer *Hashimoto*

An invoice in English of the Beacon Instruments has been sent by air from the main office of the Nikko to Chief KOJIMA of its branch in your city. I suppose they have also sent a list of prices of the parts necessary. However, if you also need a list of the prices of the parts and vacuum tubes used in the transmitter, we will send it by air. On the 2nd of next month, Engineer KUROKAWA and another man will leave here on a mail plane, so please take care of everything.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 1115

FROM: Bangkok (2nd) (SIAMD) — October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff) — #303.

Part 1[a]

I was present at a conference on the 21st with the Ambassador, the naval attache, and Pibul.

The essential points of their talk:

(Ambassador) The policy of the new Cabinet is similar to that of the former Cabinet and it intends to increase friendly relations with Siam in the future.

(PIBUL) Hearing this pleases me very much. (Ambassador) According to rumor, the Siamese government is striving for a guarantee for a new military pact with England and America with Siam as the 3rd country. If this comes about, I fear it will engender misunderstandings between Japan and Siam. It is regrettable.

(PIBUL) Absolutely not. The Siamese government is carrying out measures (?to effect?) a pact guaranteeing Japanese, Siamese friendly relations as well as a Siamese-English inviolability pact.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

---

[a] Only part available.

Trans. 4-25-45

No. 1116

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #731.

I would like to postpone my return, planned for the end of the month, for the time being due to conditions here. Please consider the assignment here of a proper person as greater secrecy must be had with the authorities at this time.

Please answer by wire.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 1117

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #732.

In spite of the fact that recently the Thaiese Government has been definitely following a policy of neutrality, it is now conjectured that the pro-English faction may be carrying on a movement laying the (basis ?) for (uncertainty and doubt ?) thus giving the impression that with the Japanese-American conversations and the developments of the German-Soviet war, Thailand will become a "storm center."

On the 22nd, with the object of introducing ----- Naval and Army Attaches, I visited PIBUL[a]. After the Attaches had withdrawn the two of us held conversation. PIBUL started out by asking about the policy of the new cabinet. I replied that (not only ?) was the (make-up ?) and basic policy unchanged but that I believed there would be no change whatsoever regarding observance of (Thaiese ?) territorial integrity, sovereignty and policy of neutrality. I continued by clearly stating that recently there had been rumors of the possibility that England would (soon) issue a statement guaranteeing Thaiese neutrality and that this would have a bad influence upon the good relations between Japan and Thailand. PIBUL replied that these rumors were definitely without basis and that Thailand was assuring continuance of her neutrality by means of the Amity Pact with Japan and the Non-aggression agreement with Great Britain, counting upon the support of Japan in their Thaiese concentration of the establishment of permanent peace. Then PIBUL said that the people of Asia greatly appreciated the difficult fight Japan is making as a leader in East Asia and that it would be impossible to forget the beneficial position taken by Japan recently in the Thaiese Indo-China border dispute. Thailand greatly desires that Japan, after the war, will secure a foothold not only in the Pacific but in the whole world, he added.

---

[a] Prime Minister of Thailand.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 1118

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 24, 1941
TO: Bangkok #695.

Re my #693[a].

The Army has requested that Major KUBO be assigned to your office as secretary. After deliberate consideration in view of our previous telegrams and due to conditions, orders have been given that he will be assigned under the name of "TARŌ ISHII" as explained in previous telegrams. After his arrival, he is to take formal charge. Application for visa is now being made and he is to leave by plane on November 2nd.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 1119

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #742.

Engineer Otowa of the Communications Department is being sent to French Indo-China for about two weeks, as a result of a cable from the Army in French Indo-China and from Yamaguti.

Trans. 12-3-41

No. 1120

FROM: Bangkok (Siamd) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) No number.

(Part 4.)[a]

4. We have been reading at our Army and Navy attache offices here the British Navy Burma and Malay) air wireless We have been able to learn their wireless communications system as well as the disposition and movement of their air units (BUTAI). —2G—required for the collection of air intelligence from the point of view of the organization of the wireless section (HAN) at our attache office. Therefore, in order to help in the carrying out of our air operations, we must set up a special air wireless section at once and station the first one at Saigon. This section should come under the jurisdiction of the —1G— Air Commander.

Note date translated.

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[a]Parts 1, 2, 3 not available.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation. Trans. 8-18-45

No. 1121

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #743.

When he stopped here en route to Manila the other day, Duff Cooper met with Pibul. We are in receipt of information that he submitted the following three points to Thailand:

1. Abandonment of a pro-Japanese policy.

2. Make the Thailand market a free market.
3. Acceptance of British guarantees for Thailand's safety.

We therefore made some investigations. Wanitto insists that such rumors are entirely false, and our other investigations seem to substantiate his denials.

The above is for the sake of reassurance.

Trans. 10–28–41

No. 1122

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER, Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) # 359.

Impressions from Bangkok with regard to recent public opinion in our country.

I feel very strongly that as a result of our regrettable and undue cowardice in the face of "ABCD" maneuvers, our country is in a very disadvantageous position. Not only are we weakened with regard to our leadership of the Siamese and other peoples of East Asia, but are encouraging the "ABCD" powers, —2G— to an even greater pitch of arrogance.

Address to the Vice Chief and to Saigon.

DoD Comment: Note date translated. Trans. 3–16–45

No. 1123

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (WINTER) (Head, General Affairs Department) # 354.

From Major *AOYAMA*. Reply to your wire # 592*.

We and the Naval attache office are not working on the solving of (the) British Air Code(s). However, the Naval attache office is studying the British Air Force communications system by wireless espionage (i.e. air bases and their call-signs; flying units and airplane call signs, etc.) We are devoting all our efforts to the collection of intelligence on the Burmese Army right now and have no personnel to spare. In view of our future air operations, I feel that it is vital that we set up immediately a new air wireless espionage agency at Saigon.

It is necessary that we take positive steps on this matter.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

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*Not available.

Trans. 3–3–45

No. 1124

FROM: Tokyo October 27, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 702.

(Abstract.)

From Chief of Radio Section to Engineer Hasimoto.

Will send book of explanations for the "Beacon" set by next mail plane. Will also send cable wires for receiving transmissions as soon as obtained. . . . . .

Trans. 1–7–42

No. 1125

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 29, 1941
TO: Bangkok #715.

Re your #717[a].

We assume that you have studied this matter from all angles, but we feel, after conferring with the business men involved here, that it would be better if WANITTO had no apparent connections. Instead, we feel that WANITTO's trusted subordinates should be the only ones, from all outward appearances, to be stockholders for Thailand. If you think that the matter can be handled in this manner please guide Yamasita along those lines.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 1126

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) October 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #756.

Re your #686[a].

1. Now that reception is possible, we need instruments equipped with metal tubes and loud speakers made by the Phillip Company, price about 200 baht each.
2. At present there are hardly any people here save the Japanese who are interested in receiving broadcasts from Japan, so I think we ought to see that private Thaiese citizens be furnished radio sets and that sets be placed in mixed residence quarters. If these people hear over loud speakers, it will be much more effective.
3. Will you please, for the present, arrange to purchase ten large radios (in Thaiese money, 2,000 baht).

---

[a] See IV, 1112.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 1127

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) October 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #755.

Re your Circular #2171[a].

Lately so many Japanese merchants have been coming here that there are more than we know what to do with. They have doubled since the beginning of the year. While our retailers are so hard-up financially and are unable to keep in touch with importers, I cannot see any reason for having any more shops opened. Rather than do that, would it not be better to assist those already here? Secretary NISHIYAMA, who will soon return to Japan, will explain all this to you.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 1128

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) October 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #759.

Re #1907[a] from Shanghai.

According to a rumor, the local British Minister has just advised the Government of Thai that he has orders from London to request them not to permit WENDLER (?) and HOOVER (?) to enter the country becasue they are fifth columnists for Germany.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 1129

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) October 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo #765.

The local Mitsubishi has obtained iron manufactured goods required by the government to the amount of about 4,400 tons valued at about 1,300,000 bahts.

The head office in Japan is negotiating with the authorities concerned for an export permit. Please inquire about this from them and use your influence to see that this is realized.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 1130

FROM: Tokyo October 31, 1941
TO: Bangkok #719.

According to a Domei dispatch from your place on the 30th the Thailand Economic Ministry has placed restrictions on further exportation of rice. Please wire by return dispatch as to whether or not there is any truth in this. If it is true report the reasons.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 1131

FROM: Bangkok November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #772.

(In 2 parts, complete.)

The details of the proposal of the gold liquidation plan arrived at between Fukuda of the Specie Bank and the representatives of the Thailand Banking Consortium are as follows:

1. The balance outstanding on November 2nd, 1941, shall be liquidated by the sale and earmarking by the Consortium of its equivalent in gold bars conforming to the New York or London market standard.[a]

2. The price of gold shall, for the above-mentioned purpose, be fixed at U.S. dollars 35 per fine ounce, the Consortium having agreed to waive the requirement of any "handling charge", such waiver being without prejudice to any agreement that may have to be arrived at for the settlement of any outstanding balance in the course of any future agreement for the sale of gold to the Thai Government. Conversion of the U.S. dollar ----- (5 groups garbled) ----- sale at the rates of U.S. dollar 4.03 *equall* 1 pound *equall* 10.80.

3. The gold sold to the Consortium shall be earmarked as its property and kept in safe custody on its behalf, or on behalf of any subsequent Thai transferee, at the Bank of Japan and no charge whatsoever shall be payable for such custody. A certified statement giving the details of each bar of the gold earmarked, ICFPS. The number, stamp, gross weight, fineness and net weight, shall be delivered as soon as possible to the Consortium and a duplicate thereof to the Thai Ambassador in Tokyo.

(Part 2)

4. The Thai Ambassador in Tokyo may appoint any official of Thai nationality to inspect the gold, kept in safe custody as aforesaid, at any time that he may see fit. Such inspection may include UMLINTERALIAL, ascertainment of the gross weight of each bag of gold and examination of the stamp and other markings thereon. The inspector shall be granted every facility to enable him properly to carry out his duty.

5. The Consortium will in due course request for the gold to be transported to Bangkok and, in the event of such transportation taking place, even in the case where the Consortium shall have transferred the gold to the Thai treasury, the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. undertakes to secure the delivery thereof to the Consortium or the subsequent Thai transferee as the case may be, the cost of transportation and insurance to be borne by the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd.

6. When the gold shall have been transported to Bangkok, its price will be subject to immediate re-adjustment in accordance with the result of the weighing and assay to be carried out by the Thai treasury and the Thai Department of Science respectively upon arrival of the gold. The Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. is entitled to appoint a representative to be present at the weighing and assay.

---

[a] English text from this point on.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 1132

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #771.

Re your #697[a].

As for your instructions to purchase 700,000 tons of Thai rice, I have placed our request with the Thai Government for a contract formally specifying the entire amount and the price, but judging from present conditions it will be impossible for the Thai Government to give outward consent to this. I think it would be possible for Thai to give secret consent to Japan's request for 700,000 tons, and then we should plan to make successive small purchases and shipments as rapidly as possible resulting finally in the securing of the 700,000 tons.

WANITTO also believes that this is the only possible and feasible plan, and he is confident that it can be worked out. Please ask Consul General Asada, who expects to return to Japan shortly, about the situation.

On the basis of such a plan, I could make contract at once for an additional 50,000 tons for the same loading month, the same price and ----- as the 150,000 tons already contracted. Is it all right to make such a contract?

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 1133

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 5, 1941
TO: Bangkok #728.

(Secret.)

Re your #756[a].

We are remitting the money for the purchase of ten large instruments. Please *purchase (?)* them and wire the results immediately. We wish to arrange for an increase in this equipment.

---

[a] See IV, 1126.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 1134

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #773.

Re your #663[a].

The Economics Minister told me as follows:

"The Sumatra Maru contains much freight (including armaments) for British possessions. We have been impartially prohibiting re-export of such things but recently as a result of consultation with the Foreign Office we are considering permission for the re-export of this whole shipload. We have presented the case to the Premier and expect his approval but intend to press him again for a quick decision."

This is all for the present.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 1135

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #777.

From Consul General ISONO in care of Courier TSURUMI who arrived from Rangoon on the 6th: At 3:00 a.m. on the 5th a detachment of special officers (Burmese and Chinese policemen under British direction) invaded the home of Vice Consul HOMMA while he was asleep and after a hard search found and seized his diary and some Japanese Government publications (nothing in the latter to worry about). Moreover, on the same night a number of policemen broke into the home of UDAMAN, the Burmese chief clerk of the Japanese Consulate and arrested him and took him away.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 1136

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #778.

(Urgent.)

From Consul General ISONO by the same routing as my #777[a].

I suspect that the officials of this country are typing up code messages sent to and from this office. Will you please wire me whether #455[b] sent from this office on the 5th has been received by the Foreign Office.

---

[a] See IV, 1135.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 1137

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) November 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER, Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) #385.

(Part 2.)[a]

From a military point of view too, it will be advantageous to convince the governing classes here of our superiority by utilizing our special knowledge to propagandize the following opinions.

1. The English (? military force ?) in Burma and Malaya is definitely inferior.
2. If Japan and England were both to send military forces to Siam, our force would be definitely superior.
3. The forces of the "ABD" would be isolated from their homelands at the outbreak of the war and their fate would be ready destruction.
4. Our relations with Russia are progressing favorably in leaps and bounds.
5. The Imperial Army is definitely superior.

---

[a] Only part available.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 3-16-45

No. 1138

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo (—M—) #396.

To Vice-Chief of Staff and Saigon:

According to "A"[a] intelligence here, the British Army is rushing plans for the defense of LASHIO. This fact, taken together with the piling up of aeroplane gas at each airfield around LASHIO, as reported in (? Bangkok ?) wire #379[b] is a piece of information which is of interest in estimating enemy plans.

---

[a] Sent as the English letter "A".
[b] Not available.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 2-14-45

No. 1139

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 398.

In my conference yesterday, the 3rd, with the attaches of the German and Italian legations in (? Bangkok ?) I questioned the effectiveness of the British forces in Malaya and Burma. The attaches were of the opinion that, considering the present greatly reenforced strength of the British troops, and especially in view of the superiority of their flying instruments, if an enemy attacked Malaya or Burma it would be impossible to avoid a pitched battle. According to the attache's study British shipping is also considerable.

The above is for your reference. Please communicate to Vice Chief of Staff IIDA.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 2-13-45

No. 1140

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 6, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 730.

(Message to Shanghai # 1119.)

(Departmental Secret.)

To help along with our special activities in Thai, we have completed our preparations to open a Chinese drug dispensary, rather one ostensibly Chinese. In order to secure just the right fixtures, I am sending Mr. YOSHIZUMI KURIYA of the Tokyo Ooki Drug Store to your city as a special agent. I want him to work out certain details with a store he deals with called the Miyayoshi Dispensary. Will you also have Vice-Consul IWAI join them in their discussions.

1. The exportation of Japanese goods is under control. We will have them sent from the 6th Section of the Investigation Division to your office, and you will re-export them.

2. I am sending you 16,500 yen. Have Mr. KURIYA of the Ooki store buy such Chinese and other foreign drugs as he sees fit, and have them all sent immediately as pure Chinese exports to Bangkok. Please give Mr. KURIYA 1,500 yen for travelling expenses.

3. The name of the Bangkok dispensary and its location are as follows: John's Dispensary, 128 Wokhumgin Hwasomphone, Bangkok, Thailand. A copy of this message has been sent to Bangkok.

Note: The above address given also in Chinese, Thaiese, and Japanese.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 1141

FROM: Tokyo November 6, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 767.

Re wire # 762 to the Foreign Minister from our Ambassador to Thailand.[a]

Please negotiate with the Manchurian authorities for the immediate dispatching of this man to Thailand as a formal representative to take up residence there.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 1142

FROM: Tokyo — November 7, 1941
TO: Bangkok — No number.

Would you like to give Ministry of Communications Secretary, Yokota and Engineer Hasimoto, ranks of Secretaries to Embassy, so as to coordinate the various functions under the Foreign Office as has been done in French Indo-China. What do you think of that?

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 1143

FROM: Bangkok — November 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Re your #687[a].

Clerk Fujishima ----- ----- to the Chief of the Personnel Section from Consul General Nagai.

In connection with our plans regarding Chinese in the Philippines, and, after every consideration we wish to have the services of that clerk (Fujishima) if there is no objection. If Clerk Shinokawa cannot be used, in view of local conditions, Clerk Kayahara is qualified for the work. If possible, the foregoing changes are desired, though the trouble involved is regretted.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 1144

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) — November 8, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #736.

Everything considered, it is important that we obtain from Thai and French Indo-China all the rubber and tin we possibly can. We will purchase the scheduled amounts of rubber and tin. In Thai, during November and December, we will purchase 3,000 kilotons[a] of rubber and 800 kilotons[a] of tin. We will complete our scheduled purchases of rice during the first ten days of December. Please get in touch with all our merchants concerned and have them press to make these purchases. In order to facilitate the transactions, payment will be made easy through some arrangement with the Yokohama Specie Bank or by direct remittances.

[a] DoD Comment: Metric tons?

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1145

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) — November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #786.

Re your #715[a].

We have been somewhat delayed in this matter because of the unexpected occurrence of this affair of WANITTO, but now that the results of the investigating committee have been published we can once more take up the activity where we left off. Following the line suggested in your caption telegram we are guiding YAMASHITA and have gone so far for the present as to

register the name as the Tai Sho Un Company, Ltd. (In English, the Thai Industrial and Commercial Company.)

---

[a] See IV, 1125.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1146

FROM: Bangkok — November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #787.

WANITTO said that DIRECK wished to talk to me and Minister FUTAMI about the establishment of a commission in accordance with Article 2 of the Tokyo-Bangkok treaty of amity, but I was sick and sent FUTAMI alone to the Foreign Office to talk with DIRECK. The latter, however, never once referred to the establishment of the committee mentioned by WANITTO. He just wandered in his talk, saying what a fine thing the treaty really was. Confused, FUTAMI broke off the conversation. I wanted to see what was at the bottom of this and made an investigation and found out the following:

1. On the 6th WANITTO told ASADA that PIBUL had instructed him to say that if Ambassador TSUBOKAMI had no objection to proposing it to the Japanese Government, he would like to see a commission officially established on the basis of Article 2 of the treaty of amity. I got in touch with the military and naval attaches and had ASADA tell WANITTO that we would be pleased to consider this.
2. On the 7th, as I said, WANITTO called me up on the telephone, and I sent FUTAMI to talk to DIRECK.
3. DIRECK did not even mention such a thing to FUTAMI, and I have discovered that the reason why was because he feared that such a proposal on the part of Thai might arouse England and that he considered the time as not yet ripe.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 1147

FROM: Bangkok — November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #788.

(Secret.)

Recently rumors are rampant throughout the country that the Japanese Army is about to begin a campaign in Burma. Newspapers, printed in Thaiese, English, as well as Chinese languages, are publishing sensational reports on the subject and creating considerable uneasiness among the officials as well as the peoples of Thailand and Chungking. The whole affair gives one the impression that the people are being made to dance to the tune of appeals radiocasted by anti-Japanese countries, especially Great Britain and the United States, and to that of systematic propaganda carried on here. There are not a few reports dealing with the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations; the increasing tenseness on the part of the United States; and the possibility of the European war spreading into the Pacific; and Japanese activities in French Indo-China. All this is instilling ----- in them. Taking together the reactions of both Government officials and the people toward this, we have the following:

We find that there are various causes for this. Among these are the stagnation of the Japanese-American negotiations since the latter period of the third Konoye Cabinet; anxiety over wholesale purchase by Japan of Thaiese materials; American and British policies toward Thailand, and the uncertainty of Japan's policy toward the southern Pacific area. The feelings

of the Thaiese people in general have changed from friendliness to aloofness and are now changing from aloofness to opposition. Since the formation of the TOJO Cabinet, more propaganda and speculations have been circulated and as a result there has been a worsening of Thaiese feeling toward Japan. More recently they have come even to believe that Japanese invasion of Thailand is almost certain. There are now those who loudly proclaim that a Japanese-Thaiese war is inevitable and that the Thaiese should fight to the very end against the Japanese invaders. Furthermore, the Autonomy Society, which is one of the secret societies in the country, has been distributing hand bills exposing Japanese plans for invading Thailand and has been sending its members out for a door-to-door canvass asking the people, "Who should Thailand depend on in case it becomes no longer possible for her to maintain her neutrality?" They are trying to get the people interested in a plebiscite and ——.

In the meantime, although the Thaiese Government has been endeavoring to maintain an attitude of calm by expressing its determination to follow the policy of neutrality, it has been feeling an increasing fear of what Japan might do.

According to what a —— of Thaiese newspapermen had recently told me, the following activities have characterized recent action on the part of the Thaiese Government.

A secret order has been issued forbidding the printing of articles and editorials concerning:

(1) Speculations concerning the situation in the South Seas.
(2) Sounding out the intentions of the new Japanese Cabinet.
(3) Commenting on Japanese, American, British and Soviet views on Thailand.

A Government organization has issued secret instructions ordering Thaiese employees of Japanese residents to observe and report the action of persons who contact Japanese residents and who frequent the homes of Japanese residents.

In the extraordinary session of the Parliament now being held, PIBUL's faction is showing a tendency to acquire greater dictatorial power in order to cope with the emergency.

The chief of police has issued a secret order to all of the police officers to reward those who have exposed foreign espionage organizations.

A bill is being drafted for recruiting 100,000 Thaiese volunteers.

Of course, to say that all this activity is anti-Japanese in nature is to jump at conclusions. However, it is true that the country is gradually getting on a war basis under the pressure of circumstances abroad and is becoming concerned over (her ability ?) to maintain neutrality.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1148

FROM: Tokyo — November 11, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #745.

(Secret.)

There has been a request from the Army department to have Army communications experts sent as non-career clerks under the Foreign Office as follows:

Two to Bangkok and one each to Singora and Chiengmai.

An exception is being made in this case and we are sending the men subject to the same conditions that applied to Secretary Shimizu and others. Please see my —— (?).

This has been approved and notice of the appointment has been issued as of the 11th to the various offices concerned and the men are scheduled to leave by air on the 13th. We are arranging for their visas with the Thailand Government. Their names, destinations and status are as follows. Upon their arrival please instruct them in their duties, particularly the use of the machines and caution them strictly regarding not letting anything leak out to the outside.

To Bangkok: Kameo Okudaira (Communications Clerk 3rd grade—however this will not be announced. The following the same).

To Singora: Toshio Sukai (the same, 5th grade).

To Chiengmai: Jitaro Taniguchi (2nd grade).

To Bangkok: Hideo Yuhi (An Army employee).

Furthermore the machines will be sent in seven wooden boxes (5 large and 2 medium size) as official baggage from the head office to the Embassy there. One box will be sent along by aeroplane on the 13th. Please arrange to receive it as though it had no connection with these men.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 1149

FROM: Tokyo (WOTNS) (Head, General Affairs Section) November 10, 1941
TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN) #924.

On 8 November (check 8—11) the revised setup of the communications network for Army use in Siam was sent by air.

If there needs to be any practical change —2G— we would like to have you go ahead with the preparations.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 1-30-45

No. 1150

FROM: Bangkok November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #794.

(Strictly Secret.)

Intelligence Report.

On the 3rd of October, DUFF-COOPER, accompanied by the British Ambassador returning here, flew to Bangkok from Singapore. Premier PIBUL secretly went to see him at the airport, and COOPER said, "Japan is likely to invade your country, so

(1) You should have nothing to do with her;

(2) You ought to close avenues through which American and other raw materials go to Japan;

(3) You ought to drive out the Japanese."

PIBUL, it is understood, said that he would consider these things, and if invaded by Japan Thai would resist vigorously and would cooperate with the British forces; however, Great Britain should not, under any circumstances, militarily occupy any Thaiese territory before a Japanese invasion. In conclusion, he told COOPER that in any case he would not be taken in by Japan and not to worry.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1151

FROM: Bangkok November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #774.

On the 10th, CHURCHILL made a speech in which he boasted that he was ready to fight Japan. Lately the Thaiese officials and people have been growing nervous, and this statement has given them the impression that Great Britain is very strong. I would say that there is quite a danger that as a result they may turn against us. Therefore, the Imperial Government ought to answer CHURCHILL strongly. You will remember that the British Prime Minister

said that Great Britain had such a large navy that she could now spare some ships from the Pacific. Well, what do you think of my telling the Thaiese officials that this is merely a pump-priming trick to get an American fleet concentrated at Singapore and is obviously to be taken as a confession of England's impotence in defending her own interests in the Orient. What do you think of my telling them that coolheaded politicians of third countries are not surprised by such statements as this which really amount to nothing.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1152

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 12 1941
TO: Bangkok #746.

Re my #728[a].

Sending 3,200 yen.

[a] See IV, 1133.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 1153

FROM: Tokyo November 13, 1941
TO: Bangkok #753.

Re your #771[a].

As result of consideration by Department of Agriculture and Forestry it is decided to proceed along lines of your suggestion. But the matter of the contract for purchase of additional 50,000 tons as per last part of your message will be dealt with after Shiba's arrival at his post.

[a] See IV, 1132.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 1154

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #801.

Re your #736[a].

It is now the rainy season, and the market is extremely poorly supplied with rubber. Foreign companies have recently been making such vast purchases that Japanese companies have been finding it hard to keep pace. Under the present circumstances, I doubt if we could even get a thousand tons per month. I am still doing my best to secure it at one baht, 10 satann, which is the price set by the Guild, but it has already become just about impossible to purchase at that figure. I am watching the situation very carefully, and it may be that we will have to purchase rubber regardless of the price. Will you please see that the Guild fully understands this situation.

[a] See IV, 1144.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 1155

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #805.

The plans for the establishment of the jointly managed shipping company are proceeding along the lines you have suggested, and the situation is accordingly encouraging. Please wire your views on the following points which have been raised by the authorities here:

1. The stockholders and the directors who also own preferred stock will not use Japanese personal names but 55% of the stock will, by fixed policy, be held by Japanese. ----- ----- 5,000 shares to the nominal president TIEN.

2. The board of directors, of seven men, shall include two Thais. The remaining five ----- shall be selected so that the Japanese can work harmoniously in this partnership. Further, the Japanese directors shall receive salaries as such ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- charged with auditing (under Thai company law the directorate has full right over auditing of funds) to the members present at the stockholders' general meeting and meetings of the directors.

4. Although Japanese ships will be purchased after the company is established and conditions are suitable, for the time being ships of neutral registry will have to be used on a charter basis.[a]

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[a] Paragraph 3 not given in the original.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 1156

FROM: Tokyo November 17, 1941
TO: Bangkok #761.

(*Abstract.*)

For the time being do not take any action regarding the Thai government's recent refusal to permit participation of foreign nationals in jointly managed enterprises.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 1157

FROM: Tokyo November 17, 1941
TO: Bangkok #763.

Tokyo to Shanghai #1159.

In view of the critical international situation, it is essential that 1600 tons of rubber be imported from Thailand by the middle of December. However, according to a report from Thailand, it appears that Chinese and British interests are buying up the rubber and Japan is experiencing difficulty in purchasing the scheduled amount.

It is reported that the ESSO, which sailed from Bangkok, November 10th (said to be of Panama registry), had 1400 tons of rubber for Shanghai. Inasmuch as we also are interested in purchasing this rubber, please investigate as to who the purchasers are and wire immediately.

Trans. 11 25-41

No. 1158

FROM: Tokyo — November 17, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #764.

Please reply at once regarding the truth of a special message to the Yomiuri that the Thai government announced on the radio on the 16th that PIBUN (Pibul) wishes to resign.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 1159

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) — November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #818.

(Priority.)

Re (2) of your #706[a].

The following are the desires concerning financial activity on the part of the Yokohama Specie Bank. It seems indispensable in carrying out our measures toward Thailand that we have a considerable amount of baht funds made ready early. Especially is this so in view of the financial strain ordinarily felt toward the end of the year as well as of the necessity of purchasing necessary materials. Notwithstanding all this, the attitude of the Thaiese government regarding the question of raising the desired amount of baht remains indefinite. With regard to the Bank Syndicate's application for future credit, they have been following a policy of procrastination and have so far accomplished nothing. Although we are doing whatever is within our power, the negotiations concerning the sale of gold to Thailand are such as not to permit any optimism. Furthermore, these negotiations may be expected to require many days for their consummation. I understand that the Finance Ministry already has a plan of its own for negotiating this question. We may expect that the attitude of the Thaiese government would automatically become clear to us as these negotiations proceed but, since it may become necessary, after all, for us to resort to political means for reaching a solution of the question, I would appreciate your informing us at once the policy which is to be followed in that case.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 1160

FROM: Tokyo (TIXNS (HEAD, GEN. AFFAIRS DEPT.)) — November 15, 1941
TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN) — #136.

In view of the present critical situation, even in the code messages be careful in the use of terms that might reveal our operational plans. Take care to see that perfect secrecy is maintained regarding our plans.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 3-16-45

No. 1162

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #822.

Message to Hanoi #35.

(To be handled in government code.)

In view of present circumstances, I wish to send the Imperial portrait to you for safe keeping for awhile. Secretary TANIGUCHI will take it by airplane, leaving here on the 21st. Will you please send someone to meet him at the airfield.

Departmental secret.

Address Saigon.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1163

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #825.

Spy report. (Secondary.)

KO BUN KO[a] recently sent the Thaiese government a letter saying that, in case war broke out between Thai and Japan, the Chinese residents of Thai would join hands with the natives and fight the Japanese to the finish. In this letter, the writer requested that the natives be given full instructions and drill. On the 10th, in an extra meeting of the cabinet, the Thaiese government is said to have questioned this and on the 11th, the British Minister in Bangkok interviewed PIBUL[b] on the subject. I reported this to you as I heard it.

---

[a] Kana spelling for Chinese Nationalist leader.
[b] Prime Minister of Thailand.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 1164

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo #834.

Secret.

On the afternoon of the 20th, I spent over an hour in conference with Prime Minister Pibul.[a] I first emphasized the critical international situation and repeated to him the substance of my talk with you.

Pibul said that the Anglo-American position is very unreasonable and that Thailand wished, to the extent of her ability, to supply needed commodities to Japan.

He added that Great Britain could freeze Thailand's funds in Britain (160 million bahts) and forbid the export of oil and hemp bags, and this would be intolerable.

However, no proposal for an accord has been received from the British. Thailand does not consider any nation an enemy; there are no defense works on the eastern frontier, and air defenses in the south are little more than preparations.

He stated that, as contrasted with the American-Japanese conversations, the British authorities in the Far East wished to draw that region into the conflict in order to preserve the

status quo. It was his earnest wish that Japan should remain powerful until the end and that after the war she should occupy a position of power in the world.

---

[a]Pibul has been the chief Thai Japanophile. He, almost single-handed, engineered with the Japanese the Thai seizure of parts of F.I.-C in Cambodia, and west of the Mekong last winter. Japan is carefully supporting his powerful position in the Thai government, countering behind-the-scenes efforts of pro-British-American elements in the Thai government to stop further cooperation with Japan. Pibul is biding his time, but favorably considering a Japanese proposal of several months ago for a Jap-Thai military alliance. Only Pibul and one or two of his men know of this.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 1165

FROM: Bangkok — November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

----- (missing about 150 groups) -----.

I explained to him that while Japan would strive to the last to effect a solution of the problem, America was unreasonably opposing our legitimate demands and that there thus appeared to be no way to reach a solution. There is grave danger that the aftermath of the international holocaust will engulf Thailand. The thing to be really concerned about, is that this may put some obstacle in the way of the establishment of the new order in East Asia and the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples -----.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 1166

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) — November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #832.

I have a spy report that on the 18th the British Minister called on PIBUL[a] and made the following four observations:

a. "On October 27th, Great Britain proposed a secret treaty with Thai and promised to furnish Thai with arms. Well, on the 17th, I got instructions from London to the effect that we are ready to furnish those arms.

b. "Great Britain is sorry for the mistake she has made concerning Thailand in the past.

c. "There are a great many Japanese Fifth Columnists in Thailand at present.

d. "In a speech in the Diet, Premier TOJO talked belligerently and the military budget has been greatly increased. Japan may now carry out her well-laid plans for an invasion of the southern Pacific, but, before the Japanese forces invade Thai, Thai ought to tie up with England, the United States, the Netherlands Indies and China in a joint defense camp. This ought to be announced both at home and abroad. Thus, by a war of nerves we might weaken Japan."

In reply, PIBUL said, "Well, we have never yet been invaded by the Japanese Army and Thai is at present sticking to strict neutrality." The British Minister interposed, "What if the Japanese attack Burma and pass through your country?" PIBUL answered, "Well, for all I know, the British forces might pass through my country, but, if the Japanese forces do not

pass through Thailand, we would have to give an account to the Axis for having danced to England's fiddle."

[a] Prime Minister of Thailand.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 1167

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #839.

Re your #762[a].

I had UCHIYAMA[b] meet with WANITTO[c] and WANITTO told him as follows:

1. During the three months, August, September and October, of rubber shipments, Japan held back from purchasing and during the same period there were purchases by Shanghai, Soviet Union and "E.A.C." Now, material is scarce even here; moreover, during November and December on account of the weather, actual shipments from the plantations will be 50% less than in ordinary years. Although there is no decrease in aid from the Department of Commerce, there will certainly be a shortage.

He went on to say that from the beginning of the year to the end of October, the total export of rubber amounted to 38,000 tons, of which 21,400 went to Japan, 7,300 to Shanghai, 1,200 to Manchukuo, 7,600 to the Malay States, etc.

Therefore, I want to call your attention to the fact that the amount of rubber shipped to Japan will not be equal to our requirements.

[a] Not available.
[b] Japanese Consul, appointed representative to French Indo-China with headquarters at Saigon.
[c] Chief of Thaiese Trade Bureau.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1168

FROM: Shanghai November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #2147.

Re your #1119[a].

Secret.

We have completed arrangements to send the drugs which are now in port directly to Bangkok the latter part of this month by a *Toa Kaiun* East Asia Maritime Transport boat.

The details will be given you by AWAYA, who is bringing them with him when he returns to Tokyo by the *Kobe Maru* on the 21st. The bills of lading, etc., are being mailed.

[a] See IV, 1140.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1169

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 22, 1941
TO: Saigon #78.

Extremely urgent.

I want you to assist the five men sent by Nichi Nichi while in your territory; KOICHI YANASHITA, HIROSHI NAKANO, HIDEO ISHIBASHI, TAKASHICHI SARUWATARI, and RYOSUKE TANIGUCHI, so that there is no delay in obtaining visas.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 1170

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo #831.

There had as yet been no concrete proposal advanced by the Consortium regarding the purchase of gold. However, on the 19th, a proposal was made by them in writing to the Specie Bank stating that in harmony with the understanding of August 2nd of this year, they desired that a shipment of gold to the amount of 10,000,000 Bahts be made, of which 500,000 Bahts be sent by air. (The freight and insurance differential only to be borne by Thailand.)

Fukuda replied that this was a matter that would have to be referred to the head office, but inasmuch as considerable difficulty could be anticipated over the matter of air transportation, he desired to know the reasons which necessitated such action.

It is necessary for us to begin negotiations regarding the purchase of gold soon. I think that we will have to ship the amount that they have requested. Please wire instructions.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1171

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 22, 1941
TO: Bangkok #777.

Re your #820[a].

In connection with renewal in February next year, the price of gold in Thailand (is?) 11 baht. Previously in the agreement made between the bank authorities and the Yokohama Specie, the price agreed upon for the purchase of gold was 10 baht, 80 satan. Due to the difference between 10 baht, 80 satan, and 11 baht, the bank authorities assumed the cost of shipment from Japan. Now, at the time of delivery in Bangkok, it amounts to 11 baht. Please refute them by asking if there would be any objections to setting the price at 10 baht, 80 satan, upon delivery in Bangkok if Japan assumes the cost of shipment.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 1172

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) Nolember 24, 1941
TO: Bangkok #784.

Re your #831[a].

As they request, we will send 10,000,000 bahts by the earliest boat. Since it is not convenient by air because of overcrowding and for other reasons, please arrange for a suitable ship.

---

[a] See IV, 1170.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 1173

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 24, 1941
TO: Bangkok #782.

Strictly secret.

Am sending you 60,000 baht. Keep it in cash. It is called a special secret fund. You are to spend it as we direct.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 1174

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #844.

Re your circular #1868[a].

I have received your instructions and so with utmost secrecy, I have packed the two "Matsu" (machines) of this office in a large suitcase (one machine dismantled). This suitcase will be entrusted with the Captain of the Batavia Maru leaving port on December 1. Please arrange for passage through customs without inspection, etc.

The suitcase is marked "Matsu".

---

[a] See IV, 1174. Tokyo directs the discontinuance of the Matsu and the complete destruction of the machines.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 1174A

FROM: Tokyo August 21, 1941
TO: Washington Circular #1868.

The use of the old machine shall be discontinued herewith.

The Matsu equipment in the offices in China, Manchukuo, Batavia, and Singapore, shall be shipped back to Japan by the earliest safe means of transportation. The persons in charge in the offices shall give their careful attention to the manual containing notes on how to handle code machines, after which the machines shall be completely destroyed and, if possible, the parts thereof shall be melted. After this has been done, Tokyo shall be notified.

At present the following offices are equipped with the new machine.

London, Vichy, Berlin, Rome, Ankara, and Berne; Washington and Mexico City; Bangkok, Hong Kong, Hanoi, Singapore, Manila and Batavia; Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, Canton.

This message shall be relayed to Mexico from Washington; from Berne to London, Vichy, Berlin, Rome, and Ankara.

Trans. 8-25-41

No. 1175

FROM: Bangkok — November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #849.

(In 2 parts, complete.)

In the event of the Empire's taking decisive action in a southward advance, it will of course be necessary in the exercise of a belligerents rights to make clear the relations in sovereign and subjects. On the one hand it will be absolutely necessary to bring Thai into our camp. My conversation with Pibul as reported in my #834[a] was undertaken with this as the underlying motive. If and when Japan at last does make her proposals of joint defense, the following three points should be made especially definite, and Thai should be led to voluntarily take an attitude of cooperation with us.

(1) In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malay, there would of course be a temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand, but after our objectives have been attained, restoration would immediately be made, and the independence of Thai would be respected even more than at present while Thai is maintaining neutrality.

(2) In case she cooperates in a positive way with Japan, full assurances will be given that Thailand's swamp lands will be reclaimed in the areas concerned.

(3) In the event of Thai's assets in England being frozen great fluctuation would result in the value of Thai's money, but Japan would make available sufficient funds to create a foundation for a yen "bloc" money system, and also give every consideration to providing petroleum and other essential commodities.

To summarize: By cooperating with Japan the racial longings of Thailand will be realized, and with indivisible relations with Japan her existence as an independent nation will be strengthened ----- ----- (three lines missed) ----- stop with as simple a ----- as possible to the effect that "will cooperate in every way for the realization of the objectives of East Asia co-prosperity and stability", while the particulars as necessity may require will be put into a secret treaty -----

Furthermore, in the light of Japan's basic national policy which has for its purpose the establishment of an East Asia co-prosperity sphere, and the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples, it goes without saying that Thailand's sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the minimum limits of necessity, and that her standing as an independent nation must be maintained to the very last; while strictest military discipline must be used to reassure the Thai populace and strict control should by all means be exercised over any attempts at profiteering.

Have sent ----- by the hand of Consul General Asada who has returned to Japan, but to make doubly sure I am also cabling it to you.

---

[a] See IV, 1164.

Trans. 11-27-41

No. 1176

FROM: Bangkok — November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #855.

Secret.

According to reports from reliable sources after the conference between myself and Pibul, which I reported earlier, inner circles of the Thailand government, feeling that the pressure of the international situation did not permit a course of neutrality, were taking a serious view regarding Thailand's foreign diplomatic policy. This matter was discussed for several days in successive meetings. The new pro-Japanese party particularly felt that as one means of

maintaining their independence Thailand should for her part propose closer collaboration between Thailand and Japan. On the 23rd a secret meeting was held between Pibul, Tamuron, Min, Pijitto and Wanitto, at which time it appears that concrete plans were laid for military operations.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 1177

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 25, 1941
TO: Berlin #979.

(Message from Bangkok #841 dated November 24.)

It seems that for some time PIBUL and PUROMU have been at odds over the WANITTO question and the unlimited vacation of National Defense Minister PUROMU. As further proof of this PUROMU did not attend the opening of the Diet on the first of November and, though invited to the birthday party of Mrs. PIBUL recently, he did not attend. It seems quite definitely established that lately the two men disagree over questions of policy. PIBUL says that the Thaiese policy should be one of strict neutrality. PUROMU, on the other hand, says that under present world conditions such a policy is entirely unfeasible and that in case of neutrality Thai might be attacked from either side and completely over run but that if she would definitely tie in with either side she would be safe. He contends that it would be better to fight than to maintain such a dangerous center position. PIBUL wanted to know of him which side he would join and PUROMU replied that this could not be decided now that the best thing to do was to wait and see which side won out in the Russo-German war.

I have wired this to Ambassador YOSHIZAWA. Will you please wire it to our Minister in Saigon.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 1178

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #847.

Re my #728[a].

Please wire the requested machinations fund immediately.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 1179

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 25, 1941
T: Tokyo #850.

From Tsurumi:

It seems it would be difficult for the fishing vessel belonging to Nagafuku of Singapore, and her crew, to make a get-away as first planned, but we think it would be well for arrangements to be made at once for at least half of them to escape to the Saigon district. Therefore, if, after

you have contacted Secretary Tahira who has returned by the Asama Maru, you think this is proper, please issue orders as soon as possible. Have conferred with Attaché Tamura.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 1180

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

November 25, 1941
#788.

Re your #818[a].

After considering various factors related to the gold purchase negotiations, the Finance Ministry has agreed to the total of 25,000,000 bahts. It is desired that the negotiations be adjourned. To judge from the volume of goods we have received from Thailand on indent purchase, it will be clearly necessary to have the equivalent baht funds available for many months yets.

Credit of 20 million bahts has not, for some time, been adequate for trading purposes, so that, in February or March, arrangements ----- (garble and omission of 27 groups) ----- according to advices, in Thailand the requisitioning of foreign currency accounts is not possible if there is any objection in the country of origin. In view of the recent international situation there is danger of freezing. As a matter of good will, it is advised that a careful consideration of the Thailand currency policy when actual transfer of gold takes place. We should not export any gold to foreign countries unless there is no objection here.

It is hoped that the Thai authorities permit the actual transfer of the balance of 12 million bahts so that the sum provided for in the agreement may be transferred in full. ----- (garble) ----- silver ----- as in my message #784[b].

The supply of commodities provided for in part 2 of your #819[c] is, from the Japanese consideration, a friendly consideration but it must not be confused with the gold purchase question, and must be taken care of through a special reserve fund. The Thai Government must be prevailed upon to promise further arrangements for the solution of this question.

---

[a] See IV, 1159.
[b] See IV, 1172.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 1181

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami)
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
#852.

Re your #777[a].

We have always insisted that it is only logical that the rate should be 11 baht when the Yokohama Specie Bank transfers the bullion. However, because of the fact that the Banking Bureau of the Thaiese Government and the Bank Syndicate are two distinct organizations, they would decline to consider our proposal, giving for their attitude the following reasons:

1. According to the currency regulation, the percentage is 11 baht when gold is actually purchased from the various banks, and, when the gold is sold, the rate is 11.20 baht. Although formerly when we sold them 25,000,000 baht, the transference having been effected in Japan, the percentage was 11 baht, inclusive of the cost of transference, this was an exceptional case. They say that when the Banking Bureau purchases gold from the Bank Syndicate in Bangkok there is no way but to invariably charge 10.80 baht.

2. Inasmuch as heretofore the Bank Syndicate objected to the payment being made in gold, the Yokohama Specie Bank preferred to sell the gold first to the Thaiese Government and to make the settlement in baht with the price so obtained. However, if this is impossible, there is no way but for the Yokohama Specie Bank to make the sale directly to the Bank Syndicate.

3. The Bank Syndicate must sooner or later sell the gold to the Thaiese Government (namely, to the Banking Bureau), but since the exchange rate is, as already pointed out, 10.80 baht, they would lose if they purchased the gold at 11 baht. (To be sure, insofar as the Banking Bureau is concerned, since in this case, contrary to the case in which it makes a direct purchase it is relieved of the payment for the transference, the transaction is to that degree profitable to the Bureau, however, this does not mean that it is profitable also for the Banking Syndicate.)

4. In short, the Bank Syndicate insists upon the payment of the rate paid at the time of the credit settlement in November; namely, on the basis of the transference being effected at Bangkok, at 10.60 baht (estimating the shipping expense at 20).

Because of the reasons enumerated above, there is no point in continuing our argument over this question; we should rather resort to a political solution. This question should be settled by February next year; this is, by the date on which the credit agreement expires. Since we shall have to commence our negotiations in the near future regarding the purchase of gold, I would like to have the negotiations concerning this particular question taken up again at a suitable moment. I believe it is, after all, a question which should be decided according to how the negotiations for the sale of gold to the Thaiese Government mentioned in my #818[b] turn out.

---

[a] See IV, 1171.
[b] See IV, 1159.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 1182

FROM: Bangkok
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
#853.

Strictly Secret.

Re your Circular #2358[a].

1. Letters going and coming between Japan and Thailand seem to be frequently censored.
2. Letters passing through this country appear not to be touched.
3. Letters from the local French Ministry and the Government of French Indo-China were not accepted by the Thaiese post office during the border trouble. Since then, however, they have been routed through this office and dispatched and received by Japanese and Thaiese airplanes. Otherwise, they received no discriminatory treatment.
4. Photographs and picture post cards may be mailed at will.
5. Documents between the Foreign Ministry and this office are all sent in Japanese and Thaiese planes and do not go through the Post Office, so they are not censored.
6. I am trying to find out the basis on which Thai conducts this censorship.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 1183

FROM: Bangkok — November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #857.

Message to Shanghai #19.

Re your #21[a].

Although there probably will not be much advantage in other cases of this type, looking at the present situation in a broad way it would seem to be a very advantageous thing for Japan to have the Siamese Railway completed quickly. Moreover, because of conditions in our country we may not be able to supply this type of goods to Siam, therefore if we can permit it without causing difficulties for our own transportation facilities it will be beneficial. Please bear in mind that we have had personal requests from "Taineyomu," president of the local agency, Minister of the Interior, and president of the Japan-Siam Society.

It will be well if you can insert an item impressing on the Japanese companies and the responsible authorities in Siam that in this and future similar cases the companies handling foreign trade should obtain permission through me.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 1184

FROM: Tokyo — November 26, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #799.

Re my #762[a].

1. In connection with your #826[b] the following changes have been made.

Military ----- Maru (----- sailing the 13th of December) rubber 1,500 tons; tin 600 tons (after the rubber figure (has been reached general cargo?)).

Akagizan Maru (24th) rubber 1,500 tons; tin 600 tons.

As it would be necessary to assign additonal boats should there be a surplus remaining, please wire regarding conditions for favorable purchasing.

2. According to the Thaiese reply in your #839[c] the general total of imports by the end of October amounted to 38,000 tons. I imagine that a limit of 10,000 tons is still possible. As arrangements have been completed by us regarding the purchase price and payments, you may go ahead and spur on the merchants from now on.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Dated November 26, too garbled for translation.
[c] See IV, 1167.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 1185

FROM: Tokyo — November 27, 1941
TO: Bangkok — Circular #2412.

It has become necessary to make an investigation regarding the supply and demand of raw opium in the country to which you are accredited. Please investigate immediately the follow-

ing statistics in regard to raw opium for the past three years giving each year separately and then make a report on the same.

1. Amount consumed within the country. (If possible list separately the place of origin.)
2. Amount produced within the country. (Place of production separately.)
3. Imports. (Countries that export this separately.)

If possible report also on the price at which the purchasing bureau purchases raw opium and also the price at which it is retailed.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 1186

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

November 27, 1941
807.

Foreign Office Secret.

Regarding your message # 849[a].

Although a report on results of secret negotiations with Pibul has been held back until now, Asada, Consul General, now on his way back to Japan is carrying papers regarding this matter, (in code).

Please ask and have Asada help you in any matter pertaining to this territory.

---

[a] See IV, 1176.

Trans. 12-5-41

No. 1187

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami)
TO: Tokyo

November 27, 1941
859.

The associate editor of the Bangkok Times, ADO a Burman-Dutch half-caste, reported to a secret agent the following gist of the remarks of a high ranking Thai:

1. The Thai Government is in sympathy with the aims of the Japanese army, and the recent strict observance of neutrality is merely a gesture toward Great Britain and America.
2. The aims of the Japanese army should be considered as of primary importance.
3. Several days ago the British Minister talked with Prime Minister Pibul for an hour and a half. The subject of this conversation is believed to be important.
4. Even though the Japanese army should invade this country we are not prepared to repel it. If the invasion were tactfully carried out, the people would probably settle down peaceably in three or four months, and would feel safe.
5. The disparity of power is so great, just as in the case of Holland and Great Britain, that Thailand would not offer any effective resistance to the Japanese army.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 1188

FROM: Bangkok (Siamd)
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff)

November 28, 1941
572.

As I previously reported, Siam has recently started drafting men. As a result of investigation by this office on the 27th of the draft of Siamese working for Japanese firms, we discovered that out of 232 persons in 9 companies, 7 have been drafted.

Trans. 1-13-45

No. 1189

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo #864.

Re your #788[a].

In order to speed up the negotiations, Fukuda of the Yokohama Specie Bank, together with Minister Futami, Uchiyama, and the Finance Ministry advisers, conferred with Prince Aitsu regarding the transfer of 25,000,000 bahts and the stipulation that we wish to continue the purchase of gold until the end of next March.

He informed the Banking Bureau accordingly, stating that he had passed on the gist of part 2 of your telegram referred to, and stated that the Banking Bureau was anxious to have this matter settled promptly.

The Finance Minister is to take up this case at the Cabinet meeting of December 3rd. A reply will be made on the 4th.

At that time it is hoped that the Finance Minister will urgently request the transfer of American dollars only, and that Thai funds be held in reserve.

The question in making actual transfer if no steamer is available was also discussed, and also the cost of transfer of large amounts. Upon concluding this interview Fukuda sent a letter immediately to the Director of the Banking Bureau.

---

[a] See IV, 1180.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 1190

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #870.

(To be handled in Government code.)

We would like to enlarge upon and carry out, the best we know how, the propaganda policy which has been previously decided on by the Foreign Office. However, in view of the eventuality in which remittances from Japan might cease, we would like to have 100,000 yen sent us at this time to be extended for intelligent and enlightenment purposes. This is a special request.

As to our written plan, we shall send you a copy later.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 1191

FROM: Bangkok November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #869.

Re my #865[a].

The aim of PIBUL's broadcast of the 27th, reflecting the atmosphere described in my #855[b] and #845[a] was to put the brakes on people who argue that neutrality is somnolent and opiate and to lay the ground work for a diplomatic about face to come. I think that he was issuing a warning to a people already caused, by British propaganda, to regard Japan, in fact, as an

enemy. When Minister FUTAMI talked with PIBUL on the morning of the 27th, PIBUL was particular to refer to this point. I tell you about this in my #871[c].

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Bangkok wires Tokyo regarding Thai's foreign diplomatic policy.
[c] See IV, 1192.

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 1192

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #871.

On the 27th, on other business, FUTAMI had an interview with PIBUL and the following conversation took place.

PIBUL: "Lately foreign propaganda in this country has been right. Frankly, British propaganda has been flourishing and not a few Thaiese have been in the pay of Great Britain. I am going to broadcast over the radio from my home a warning to my people telling them that it is our policy to stick to neutrality to the end and advising them not to be taken in by propaganda from foreign sources. I know that you Japanese understand the position of Thailand will do nothing to upset our neutral policy.

FUTAMI: "I can well understand why Thai is taking a neutral attitude. As your Excellency well knows our occupation of French Indo-China was not aimed at Thai herself. Supposing that in the future our forces in French Indo-China should have to embark on some military course of action, I want you to realize that it will not be maimed per se at Thai. What I mean to say is that any action that we take will actually be in your behalf and I hope you will cooperate with us."

PIBUL: "As a matter of fact I had hoped that the Japanese Army would occupy French Indo-China and I myself entertain no misgivings, however, I did not dare inform my people that I had hoped for that event. You know only six years have past since the reformed government was set up and since then I have never been able to make my position as secure as I would like to. No matter how much, under certain circumstances, I would like to cooperate with Japan, we are now taking a neutral policy and if this were threatened by some Japanese act and I took your part I would be cut off—isolated—a lone man. That is what I fear most."

Trans. 12-7-41

No. 1193

FROM: Bangkok November 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #872.

(In 2 parts, complete.)

Re my #855[a].

As a result of my conversation with PIBUL[b], I have been able to ascertain his attitude to a large degree, and therefore through Yoshioka who as the outside agency of the Naval Attache's office, we have suggested to SIN and WANITTO[c] that, in the event of Thai's abandoning her neutrality policy in the future, it would be better both from the standpoint of face and also for material reasons for her to go through the formality herself of requesting cooperative action from the nation concerned, rather than to be put in the position of being compelled to consent to it because of pressure brought to bear. The shifts within the government mentioned in my caption message, are a result of the above. When SIN heard this from Yoshioka,

he said that this is a matter he has been concerned over the past two years, and as he feels that he himself is the most suitable person to handle the matter he promised to put forth every effort for its realization. He is also said to have told WANITTO that the matter should be left to him. WANITTO and SIN are keeping in touch with us through Yoshioka in regard to subsequent developments within the government, and we are giving them appropriate guidance under cover. The main points of the same are as follows: (Yoshioka's mediation in this puts him in a "delicate" position in relation to the army attaché so this should be kept absolutely confidential within the department.)

(1) Whenever there is discussion in the cabinet the points raised are, the real intentions of Japan, that is, the meaning of the East Asia Co-prosperity plan, the involvements of the southward expansion policy, the extent of commodity supplying, and the duration of time of stationing troops. Great Britain seizes upon these points and furnishes all kinds of contradictory material with which to keep the pro-British elements busy. To meet this WANITTO presents the absolute necessity of union between Japan and Thai and this has already become the firm conviction of the pro-Japanese group, and there thus is no need for further discussion as far as they are concerned. However, the opposition have been bringing up troublesome arguments and hold tenaciously thereto. Since it was so difficult to convince them an appeal was made to us for material with which to counter them and their arguments.

(2) Since then the pro-Japanese group have been having better success in their attempts, and their position has become more favorable. As a result the opposition, since about the 25th has kept silent. However, the matter has not been concluded.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 1194

FROM: Bangkok
TO: Tokyo

November 29, 1941
#872.

3. The question of joint military action between Thai and Japan has already been brought up by the pro-Japanese faction, but up to date, they have expressed a desire to pursue a course of strict neutrality. They had taken a fairly firm stand that the first one, regardless of whether this be Britain or Japan, who makes the first move shall be considered Thai's enemy. Therefore, for Japan to be looked upon as Thai's helper, she should put Britain in a position to be the first aggressor. For the purpose of accomplishing this, Japan should carefully avoid Thai territory, and instead, land troops in the neighborhood of KOTAPARU in British territory, which would almost certainly force Britain to invade Thailand from PATANBESSA. The consequence would be Thai's declaration of war on Britain.

This strategy is being given careful consideration. Apparently this plan has the approval of Chief of Staff BIJITTO. Our naval Attaché has advised the Naval General Staff, also, I think.

4. WANITTO and SIN are both considerably concerned of the weak character of PIBUL. As a means of making PIBUL make a decision, they think that it would be well to have some outside pressure brought to bear on him. As one means, they suggest that some undesirable Japanese be forcibly removed from Thai by Japan, and then to publicize this as the forerunner of a general evacuation of Japanese nationals from Thai.

From the above and from other considerations, including that of the tone of PIBUL's radio broadcast which was reported in my message #871[d], the situation here may show some unexpectedly speedy and favorable developments. I feel that we should not fumble this situation, but should proceed carefully and take the best advantage of it.

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[a] See IV, 1176.
[b] Premier and Foreign Minister.
[c] Actively in charge of Foreign Office.
[d] See IV, 1192.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 1195

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) December 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) #616.

Secret.

In view of the present situation of the German forces and general sentiments on the matter, it will be difficult to (?make peace?) or even limit the conflict, if the method of presenting an ultimatum —3G— is used. Details will be reported to you through Staff Officer YAHARA.

To IIDA, the Vice Chief of Staff, and the Vice-Minister, for reference.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 1-19-45

No. 1196

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #883.

(Department secret.)

In view of the emergency, we would like to destroy all codes except the telegraphic codes. Please inform us by return wire whether you have any objections.

Trans. 12-11-41

No. 1197

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) November 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #884.

In order to counter British propaganda, will you arrange at once to have published as newspaper editorials in English and in Thaiese the following:

1. Both in Australia and in North America, all of the colored races are subjected to disgrace in connection with the immigration question. Both Britain and the United States, while allowing the other races to make a small profit, have no intention of revising their attitude in regard to the fundamentals of this question.
2. Japan's objective is not Thailand (quote PIBUL's speech).
3. In the war between Germany and Britain, small nations have been made victims of British propaganda and schemes.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 1198

FROM: Tokyo December 1, 1941
TO: Bangkok #814.

Re your #870[a].

Sent Y100,000.

[a] See IV, 1190.

Trans. 12-12-41

No. 1199

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) December 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #886.

(Urgent.)

Restricted distribution.

In preparation for all eventualities, I have acquired secret wireless communication facilities between this office and the Domei Press Office in Saigon. In the event that communication is cut off between Japan and Thai, please communicate with me through the Saigon -----.

Relayed to Saigon.

Trans. 12-14-41

No. 1200

FROM: Bangkok December 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #892.

In order to meet an emergency situation it is most important that we have our currency arrangements for Thailand in readiness. Therefore, please have the Finance Minister appoint a suitable person as a member of the Embassy Staff, and send him out as soon as possible.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 1201

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) December 2, 1941
TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN) #519.

Re: Siam Attache's wire #567[a].

Since withdrawing Japanese fishing boats from Singapore now would be inadvisable from the standpoint of concealing our plans, we feel that, for the time being, this action should not be taken.

To Singapore from the Foreign Ministry.

Addressees: Saigon, Siam.

---

[a] Not available.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 6-9-45

No. 1202

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #898.

(Secret.)

Not to be let outside the Department.

WANITTO confidentially informed me that on the 3rd PIBUL made a 3-hour speech in a regular cabinet meeting. He declared, "The time is come when we must cast our fate with that of Japan." This was immediately approved by a standing vote and the following men arose:

SIN, BORIBAN, RWANKURIEN (Vice-Commander), RUANSWERI (Minister of Defense and the political enemy of PUROMU), RUANBITITTO SONGHRAM (Chief of General Staff) The others remained silent.

Furthermore, WANITTO said that he thought that in two or three days Thai would suddenly switch over to Japan.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 1203

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) #625.

Reply to —1G— wire #11[a].

On the 26th, the Siamese government sent the following 2 men by international railway to have a talk with the Commanding Officer of the British Far Eastern Army at Singapore. (Reliability "A" (KŌ).) Their purpose is to observe the condition of the British forces and to deal with the matter of purchasing material.

Army Lt. Col. *RUAN SURENARON*
Navy Lt. S. G. *RUAN DEP[a] DAMURON*
Wire addressed to Saigon, General Staff.

---

[a]Not available.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 2-2-45

No. 1204

FROM: Bangkok December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #903.

Re my #890[a].

On the 4th, Minister FUTAMI, accompanied by UCHIYAMA and FUKUDA, had a conference with BIBATTO at the Treasury Department. BIBATTO handed them a memorandum, a resume of which follows, as the official reply of Thai:

(1) It is agreed in principle that the Specie Bank shall transfer 25,000,000 baht in gold to the Treasury Department.

(2) In this transaction, the Currency Section of the Treasury Department will be dealt with. (Last time what was sold to the Bureau of Banking was taken over by the Currency Section.)

(3) The gold will be transferred at Bangkok, meaning that after the cash has arrived at Bangkok, purchase will take place. If, however, the Yokohama Specie Bank should not have that much money on hand, it will be possible to discuss a loan of 4,000,000 baht with the Bureau of Banking. (In this clause they have a wordy statement to the effect that buying gold causes inflation and Thai needs American dollars, etc.)

(4) As for the purchase price of gold, it will be computed as it was last time; however, since this gold is to be sold to the United States, in accordance with the stipulation of that country, a fee of one-fourth of one per cent will be deducted from the current price. (The text has been sent from the Yokohama Specie Bank to its home firm.)

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[a]Not available.

Trans. No date

No. 1205

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) December 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #905.

(Strictly Secret.)

The Japanese special correspondent here is sending some communications to Japan which might well be used as propaganda here, so will you please arrange to broadcast them in English and Thaiese so that they can be heard by the populace.

Trans. 12-9-41

No. 1206

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) December 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #909.

British and American residents are beginning to evacuate here but the number going to British Malyaya so far is not large. But many are going to the vicinity of HOANIN and South Thailand.

Also it is reported that a conference was held in the British Legation on the 3rd with the delegates of the evacuees.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 1207

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) December 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff) #611.

Report from the consul at Chiengmai.

About thirty Americans living in Chiengmai, Lampang, Prae, etc., met at the *SEI*[a] Hospital in Chiengmai on 30 November, and discussed the present situation.

The question considered was (? whether all should be evacuated ?).

This is addressed to the Vice Chief of Staff, IIDA.

---

[a] Meaning of this term uncertain.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 2-21-45

No. 1208

FROM: Bangkok December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #915.

The Batavia Maru sailed for Kō-chan on the 5th for Osaka by way of Saigon and Keelung carrying the following:

Rice	1,000 tons
Tin ore	283 tons
Tin	17 tons
Wolfram	34 tons
Hides	227 tons
Miscellaneous articles totaling	3,433 tons
Passengers	29

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 1209

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

December 6, 1941
852.

(Urgent.)

The (-----)[a] day (X Day) decided by the -----[b] liaison conference on the *6th (?)*[c] is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be given is the 7th (?) (Sunday). As soon as you have received this message, please reply to that effect.

Translator's assumptions:

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[a] "Proclamation" or "declaration".
[b] "Ambassadorial" or "China".
[c] This word is garbled and could be either the word "6th" or the word "November".

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 1210

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

December 7, 1941
No number.

(*Translator's note:* Message badly garbled.)

Re -----.

The imperial government wishes to make an announcement in the event of our occupation of Thailand (our separate wire (A?) in the event of our occupation of -----; our separate wire B in the event of our occupation of -----). We plan to announce one of these as soon as the Imperail government's decision becomes clear. After perusing them, will you please arrange to defeat Britain's plots. At the same time, choose the most appropriate statement to clarify our attitude toward ----- as the Embassy's statement.

Exercise every precaution not to expose the Imperial force's objectives in making these announcements. Keep in close contact with the service organs there.

Trans. 12-8-41

No. 1211

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

December 7, 1941
855.

(*Note:* This message referred to in IV, 1210.)

Separate message (A). (In the event of a peaceful occupation.)

On 12 June of last year, a friendship pact was signed through which the basis of amity between Japan and Thailand was solidified. Early this year, Japan voluntarily acted as mediator between Thailand and French Indo-China, when they were locked in border disputes, and brought about a peaceful settlement. This brought the friendly relations of Japan and Thailand closer.

In order to meet the exceedingly critical situation in the Far East, (and at the same time, to further strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries), Japan and Thailand, on ----- (blank) ----- day, ----- (blank) ----- month, reached an agreement of joint defense of Thailand; (or "reached an agreement of a certain kind of an alliance"; or, "Thailand agreed to join the Tripartite Pact"; or, "Thailand agreed to permit the passage of Japanese troops through Thailand").

Through this, (it may now be said that the relations between Thailand and Japan have reached the highest point of the friendship), the two countries shall together strive toward the stabilization of the Far East and toward the creation of a co-prosperity sphere. That we are proceeding along this path together, is the source of much gratification.

Note: The words "(a) in the event of a peaceful occupation" shall be deleted.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 1212

FROM: Tokyo — December 7, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #856.

(*Note:* This message referred to in IV, 1210.)

Separate message (B). (In the event of a forceful occupation.)

For some time past, the British have been massing large numbers of troops on the Malayan and Burmese borders, under the pretense of defense. In view of the fact that, these British troops attacked Thailand, the Imperial Government of Thai, conferred with the Thai government and at the same time, as an emergency defense measure, a portion of the Japanese forces have begun to occupy Thailand.

The above is strictly a measure to counter the British attack upon Thai. Japan has absolutely no intention of conducting an invasion or to interfere with Thai's independence. We expect sympathetic and full cooperation from the officials and people of Thailand.

Trans. 12-10-41

No. 1213

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) — December 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #933.

(English Text.)

Separate wire. First translation into European text.

The undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, agree as follows:

1. In order to cope with the urgent situation in East Asia, Thailand shall give to Japan the (protection?) of passage by the Japanese forces through the Thai territory and giving of all necessary facilities for the said passage as well as immediate execution of measures to avoid every possible conflict which may arise between the Japanese and Thai forces.

2. The particulars for the execution of the precedent paragraph shall be agreed upon between the military authorities of the two countries.

3. Japan shall guarantee that the independence, sovereignty and honor of Thailand be respected.

Done in duplicate, at Bangkok on December 8, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador (Signed).

The Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs (Signed).

Trans. 12-13-41

No. 1214

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) (Vice Chief, General Staff) December 9, 1941
TO: Lapaz, Lima, Rome, Vichy, Helsinki, Madrid, Stockholm, Beyoglu, (RIKUGUN) Circular # 735.

Part 1[a]—War situation—report # 2.

1. As of 8 December our units which landed in Thailand, Malaya, and Kota Bahru, at the northern end of British Malaya were making good progress in setting up their bases as preparations for advancing.

We have lost one transport in this area.

Our air units have damaged 44 enemy planes and shot down 15.[b]

We have lost 11[c] and several fighter planes.

2. The invasion of eastern Thailand took place on 1230 hours on the 8th. The advance —3G—. Our units which landed south of Bangkok are advancing toward the city.

3. On the 8th our units occupied Bataan Island north of the Philippines. The Army has been bombing northern Luzon, the Navy the central and southern part of the island.

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[a] Part 2 same number.
[b] Imperfect text permits 11.
[c] Possibly men, but not specified.

DoD Comment: Note date of translation.

Trans. 2-21-45

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