
Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan



June 2015

Report to Congress

In accordance with sections 1224 and 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291); page 257 of House Report 113-102 accompanying H.R. 1960, the NDAA for FY 2014; and section 1531(e) of the NDAA for FY 2013 (P.L. 112-239), as amended by section 1531(b) of the NDAA for FY 2014 (P.L.113-66).

Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately \$207,000 in Fiscal Year 2015.
Generated on June 3, 2015,
Ref ID: 5-7B5DCF1

This report is submitted consistent with section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), which replaces the previous reporting requirement for reports on “Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, as well as a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This inaugural report is the first in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2017 and was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. The content of this report also responds to the report requested on page 257 of House Report 113-102 accompanying H.R. 1960, the NDAA for FY 2014, Report on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan Post-2014; and required by section 1531(e) of the NDAA for FY 2013 (P.L. 112-239), as amended by section 1531(b) of the NDAA for FY 2014 (P.L.113-66), Plan for the Use of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Through September 2017; and section 1224 of the NDAA for FY 2015, Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces Through September 2017.

This report covers efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2014, through May 31, 2015. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress; it is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2015, through November 30, 2015.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 1, 2015, U.S. and coalition forces began a new phase of their involvement in Afghanistan with the start of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission called Resolute Support (RS). After 13 years of combat operations, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission formally ended on December 31, 2014. Simultaneously, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) transitioned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), contributing to both the NATO RS mission and continuing U.S. counterterrorism efforts against the remnants of al Qaeda. In line with agreements at the NATO Summits in Lisbon in 2010 and Chicago in 2012, Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)¹ assumed full security responsibility for the country, supported by the Afghan people. This transition was the natural progression of the U.S. strategy over the last several years that directly supported efforts to improve Afghanistan's security, stability, and prosperity. Although the combat mission has ended, the ongoing TAA mission with the ANDSF demonstrates the international community's enduring commitment to Afghanistan.

Since 2001, U.S. and coalition forces have had a positive effect on progress in Afghanistan while protecting U.S. vital national interests. U.S. forces have supported the development of democratic governance, trained and equipped the ANDSF, and helped prevent the country from being used to launch terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland. Afghanistan has experienced economic growth over the last 13 years and notable improvements in other socio-economic and social indicators. Today, more children are in school, including more than three million girls. In addition, women are participating in the electoral process and are active in the workforce, including serving their country in the ANDSF. The United States remains committed to preserving the gains made over the last decade.

U.S. forces remain in Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan government, and their presence is governed by both the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)² and the NATO-Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which were both signed on September 30, 2014, and ratified by the Afghan Parliament³ on November 27, 2014. With support from the Afghan government and the Afghan people, U.S. forces are now conducting two well-defined and complementary missions to advance U.S. objectives to disrupt threats posed by al Qaeda, and to support the ANDSF in providing the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. First, U.S. forces are continuing a counterterrorism mission against the remnants of al Qaeda in Afghanistan to prevent its resurgence and external plotting against U.S. targets, including the homeland. Second, in coordination with NATO Allies and RS operational partner nations, U.S. forces are conducting a TAA mission to continue building the capabilities and long-term sustainability of the ANDSF.

¹ The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces is the official designation for the Afghan security forces used in the BSA and is the Afghan government's preferred designation for the overall force. The U.S. Government now uses this term instead of the previously used Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

² The Bilateral Security Agreement is officially called the "Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan" (SDCA).

³ Afghanistan's Parliament includes the *Wolesi Jirga* (lower house) and *Meshrano Jirga* (upper house).

Although the nature of the U.S. mission has changed, our strong commitment to an enduring partnership with Afghanistan has not. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter highlighted this during his February 2015 visit to Afghanistan, and during President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah's visit to Washington, DC, in March 2015. The Department of Defense's (DoD's) strategy over the next two years sets the stage to transition responsibly to a long-term security partnership with the Afghan government that will enable it to build its defense capacity and protect U.S. national security interests in the region.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES WITH THE NEW UNITY GOVERNMENT

The protracted 2014 Afghan election caused setbacks for the TAA mission. Last year's political impasse delayed the finalization of the BSA and SOFA, causing many Allies and operational partners to delay fulfilling their RS force commitments until a newly-elected government was in place, the bilateral and international agreements were signed, and the United States announced its own force commitments. The international community's uncertainty, coupled with setbacks in forming a new government cabinet, created a period of comparative stagnation in ANDSF development, with some incumbent Afghan leaders hesitant to make necessary decisions. This political uncertainty threatened to undermine the progress made by the ANDSF in the security domain. Economic growth was similarly stymied by a lack of investor confidence in the Afghan government and its prospects for the future.

At the same time, President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah committed to putting their country's interests above all else when they formed the national unity government. Encouragingly, both leaders have proven to be amenable to working more cooperatively with the international community, presenting an opportunity for the United States to deepen its partnership with Afghanistan. Both leaders are supportive of women's rights and their empowerment in Afghan society, and both are committed to addressing the challenge of corruption, as demonstrated by their strong reaction to the discovery of irregularities regarding the proper award and execution of fuel contracts within the Ministry of Defense (MoD).⁴ However, after almost nine months in power, the Afghan government remains in a state of flux as President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah determine how to distribute power and responsibilities, while key reform initiatives have been slow to be implemented.

The unity government faces many challenges both internally and externally. The forward momentum of the RS campaign has been stymied by delays in forming the full new 25-member Afghan cabinet.⁵ After months of delays, the first round of negotiated candidates was finally announced on January 12, 2015, and Parliament rejected more than half of those originally proposed, including the nominee for Minister of Defense, General Sher Mohammad Karimi. The next round of negotiated candidates, which did not include a new Minister of Defense nominee, was announced more than two months later, on March 21, 2015. By April 18, 2015, Parliament had approved 24 members of the cabinet; however, President Ghani and Chief Executive

⁴ In January 2015, the Afghan government found evidence of corruption in the form of collusion, price fixing, and bribery in MoD fuel contracts. The scandal resulted in the termination of the fuel contract, the suspension of several general officers involved, and brought almost all ANDSF procurement to a temporary halt.

⁵ The Afghan Parliament approved eight nominees on January 28, 2015, and 16 nominees on April 18, 2015. Of the 24 confirmed cabinet members, 4 are women.

Abdullah continued to negotiate a new candidate for Minister of Defense as the 2015 fighting season began. On May 21, 2015, President Ghani nominated Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai to be the Minister of Defense; the Afghan Parliament has yet to confirm the appointment. The delayed appointment has had a negative impact on the ability of the Afghan security ministries⁶ and their forces to exercise command and control effectively.

President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah will continue to contend with challenges as they delineate their respective responsibilities. Despite these myriad challenges, the fundamental partnership between the coalition and the Afghan government, including the Afghan security ministries and ANDSF, remains strong.

TRANSITION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE TO RESOLUTE SUPPORT

The gradual progress demonstrated by the ANDSF over the last two years, as they have increasingly led the security effort, has enabled the drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces, and the transition to a new phase in our relationship. The United Nations Security Council unanimously welcomed the RS mission by adopting Resolution 2189 on December 12, 2014. On December 28, 2014, General John Campbell presided over ISAF's end of mission ceremony at its headquarters in Kabul to mark the change from the ISAF to the RS mission. As planned, the RS mission officially began on January 1, 2015, with a focus on functionally based security force assistance (SFA), an advisory effort focused on functions, systems processes, and organizational development to achieve sustainable systems within the Afghan security ministries and their forces. U.S. and coalition advisors focus the TAA mission within the security ministries to generate, employ, and sustain capabilities, with advising extending down to the regional Afghan National Army (ANA) corps and Afghan National Police (ANP)-equivalent levels. Additionally, U.S. and coalition forces continue to provide tactical advising to the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF). RS advisors continue to emphasize and enforce financial transparency by the Afghan government and its accountability of donor resources.

The transition from combat operations to a non-combat TAA mission included the transition of the various regional commands to train, advise, and assist commands (TAACs). Coalition personnel supporting the RS mission are now located at four regional TAACs, or "spokes," led by "framework nations" in the north, south, east, and west, with one central "hub" in Kabul City. Framework nations are those NATO nations – currently the United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey – that are responsible for the oversight and command of the TAA mission within their respective TAAC. Personnel at each TAAC provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts depending on the need identified by the coalition and their Afghan partners. The TAACs serve as the principal connection and touch point between the ministries and their fielded forces. After six months, the RS TAA mission has made progress in some objectives and the command continuously evaluates the efficacy of its TAA efforts.

⁶ The security ministries include the MoD and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The National Directorate of Security (NDS) is not included in the term. DoD funds the MoD and MoI, but not the NDS, and international commitments made at previous NATO summits to fund the ANDSF do not include funding for the NDS. The Afghan government includes funding for the NDS in its own budget.

SHIFT FROM THE COMBAT MISSION

With the transition to Operation Freedom's Sentinel, the United States is no longer engaged in a combat mission in Afghanistan, and the Afghan government is responsible for its own internal security. As such, U.S. operations are more narrowly focused. In partnership with Afghanistan, U.S. forces conduct counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and its facilitator networks. Although U.S. forces no longer target individuals based on affiliation or association with any group other than al Qaeda, U.S. forces are permitted to take action against those individuals that pose a direct threat to U.S. and coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. For example, U.S. forces no longer target individuals solely on the basis of their membership in the Taliban; however, if a member of the Taliban threatens U.S. or coalition forces, or provides direct support to al Qaeda, U.S. forces may take appropriate action.

Additionally, as part of the continued tactical-level TAA mission with ASSF and AAF, U.S. and coalition forces may accompany Afghan counterparts on missions in an advisory role. All of these accompanied operations are Afghan-led operations. To ensure the safety of U.S. personnel who accompany Afghan forces, U.S. forces may provide combat enabler support (e.g., close air support), as necessary, to provide for the collective self-defense of those forces. U.S. forces are also permitted to provide combat enabler support to Afghan unilateral missions (conventional and special operations forces) only under limited circumstances to prevent detrimental strategic effects to the campaign. With the change in mission and the ANDSF's increased capabilities, the ANDSF have requested substantially less enabler support since last year at this time.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES⁷

As agreed at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the ANDSF now serve as guarantors of stability for the Afghan people. President Ghani has embraced his role as Commander-in-Chief, and on January 1, 2015, he led a security handover ceremony in which the ANDSF formally assumed security responsibilities for all of Afghanistan. The ANDSF conducted several large-scale independent operations around the country simultaneously during this reporting period, but their performance was uneven. Although not fully independent, the ANDSF continue to demonstrate that they are capable and can undertake relatively sophisticated operations with minimal coalition advice and assistance. The ANDSF planned and conducted several offensive operations to take the fight to the insurgency in Helmand, Ghazni, and Zabul Provinces. However, they struggled to react quickly to insurgent offensives in Kunar and Kunduz Provinces. In addition, many Afghan security checkpoints were temporarily overrun by insurgents during the reporting period, though in most cases, the ANDSF were able to retake the

⁷ The ANDSF consists of the ANA and the ANP. The ANA includes the AAF and special operations forces in the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), *Ktah Khas*, and the Special Mission Wing (SMW). The ANP pillars include the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP). The General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) is the special forces component under the MoI. The Afghan Local Police (ALP), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) are not counted in the authorized 352,000 ANDSF structure; the ALP and CNPA are on separate MoI authorization documents, and the APPF is a quasi-commercial operation under the MoI that provides security to contractors on a fee-for-service basis.

positions quickly. The ANDSF continue to demonstrate resilience in the face of heavy fighting and generally have performed well, but have suffered high attrition and casualties.

The ANP continues to perform traditional policing as well as counterinsurgency operations in the face of significant casualties. Challenges remain in force protection, command and control, training, maintenance, medical, force management and personnel attrition, and corruption. The brutal public beating and murder in downtown Kabul of an Afghan woman, Farkhanda Malikzada, who allegedly burned a Quran in March 2015, highlights challenges in enforcing the rule of law. Some Afghan police stood by and watched as the mob attacked her, and one policewoman who attempted to come to her aid was attacked herself. President Ghani immediately initiated an investigation and suspended the police officers involved, but the incident, nevertheless raised questions regarding the professionalism of the ANP.

Leadership issues continue to play an important role in overall ANDSF effectiveness. The ANA experienced significant leadership changes during this reporting period. In February 2015, to make room for the next generation of Army officers, President Ghani directed the retirement of 47 general officers who had exceeded the mandatory retirement age. In addition, he suspended multiple general officers involved in the fuel scandal. Although generally well-intended, these actions also caused some disruption when certain replacements were not readily named.

In advance of the 2015 fighting season, the ANDSF continued their high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and took the initiative by conducting the first major offensive operation of 2015 in northern Helmand Province. Under the leadership and direction of Lieutenant General Abdul Khaliq, the Director of General Staff at the time, the ANDSF conducted a joint, cross-ministry operation in northern Helmand to clear the area of insurgents and disrupt the insurgents' preparations for the fighting season. These operations were planned and led by the ANA's 215th Corps, with support from the 205th and 207th Corps, and included units from the AAF, ASSF, and ANP. The operation also demonstrated the growing capabilities of the ANDSF's organic air power, through use of Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters and PC-12s to provide mobility, aerial resupply, aerial fires, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The large-scale operation utilized considerable resources across the corps and security pillars that were involved, and it achieved gains in a traditional sanctuary for the Taliban-led insurgency, including the disruption of insurgent fighters and consolidation of checkpoints. The operation also highlighted some of the continuing challenges that the ANA faces with maintenance and logistics planning, and counter-improvised explosive device (IED) exploitation capabilities.

The operation, along with an earlier operation in a mountainous district in Kunar Province, demonstrated the importance of effective Afghan leadership. In December 2014, ANA units were ordered to Dangan District to reinforce local Afghan villagers who had resisted members of the Taliban who had attempted to gain a foothold in the district. The various ANDSF elements operating in the area encountered heavy fighting but lacked unity of command and effort, as there was no common understanding of who owned the fight. The fighting stagnated until the coalition provided air support to help the ANDSF gain momentum, and the ANA brigade commander was replaced. Similarly, in April 2015, an ANA corps that lacked an appointed commander struggled to respond quickly to a Taliban offensive in Kunduz Province.

Overall, the ANDSF's most critical gaps remain in aviation, intelligence, and special operations, all linked to the ANDSF's targeting capability. These gaps will endure for some time, even with the addition of key enablers. RS advisors are also working to address developmental shortfalls in the areas of logistics, medical support, and counter-IED exploitation. In general, the ANDSF are better trained and equipped than insurgent forces, and continue to demonstrate tactical proficiency as they work together across security pillars. When they collaborate, they have proven that they can defeat the insurgents when challenged. Maximizing their ability to employ, sustain, and maintain critical equipment, coupled with the identification and promotion of capable leaders, will be a near-term focus for Afghan and coalition leadership to maximize ANDSF effectiveness in the 2015 fighting season and beyond. Partly due to higher OPTEMPO, operational challenges, including the likelihood of high ANDSF casualties and attrition; logistics sustainment and maintenance issues; and the ANP's inability to "hold" cleared areas after the ANA offensives, will continue to detract from ANDSF operational effectiveness.

The 2015 fighting season is the first in which the ANDSF are battling insurgents without the full support of U.S. and coalition combat forces, and with very limited coalition air and ISR enablers. The ANDSF are learning to utilize their organic capabilities to maintain pressure on the insurgency. For example, with their existing Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters and the fielding of new MD-530 Cayuse Warrior helicopters, the AAF's organic capability to provide aerial fires continues to grow. However, the AAF continues to struggle with a shortage of pilots and aircrews, as well as the maintenance of air platforms. To address the pilot shortage, coalition forces are pursuing the addition of a second training program in the near future to increase pilot throughput. Additionally, the AAF demonstrated some improvement in light airlift, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), human remains recovery, and non-traditional ISR. In March 2015, the AAF provided critical support to the victims of a series of avalanches and ensuing floods in northern Afghanistan. AAF Mi-17 flights conducted rescue and relief operations, delivering medical teams and humanitarian supplies, rescuing survivors, and recovering remains. All this was conducted while supporting the offensive in northern Helmand and the ASSF's hostage rescue attempts.

With increased OPTEMPO, execution of more missions, and strong leadership, the ASSF have continued to demonstrate that they are among the best special operations forces in the region. Working together, commando units and the Special Mission Wing (SMW) are consistently running unilateral direct action missions against insurgent leaders and facilitators. Challenges remain in sustainment, SMW force generation, and targeting.

STATUS OF MINISTERIAL ADVISING

At the security ministries, RS advisors are focusing on building systems and processes that are critical to enabling the ministries to support the ANDSF. These efforts have been ongoing for several years but were a secondary focus when ISAF was conducting combat operations; now it is the main effort. Moreover, the postponement of a new confirmed Minister of Defense, and the suspension of a number of senior officials over MoD fuel contract irregularities, have slowed capacity building efforts over the last year within the MoD. Although some progress was made during this reporting period, gaps in the Afghan security ministries' ability to perform functions such as planning, programming, budgeting, and human resource management will likely persist

for some time. The most critical gaps in Afghan capacity are the lack of effective systems and repeatable processes to develop requirements properly, procure goods and services, and manage budget execution. Additionally, advisors are working to address developmental shortfalls in logistics, contracting, acquisition and life-cycle management, and financial management.

To ensure that the Afghan government tracks its personnel and pays them appropriately, DoD is developing an integrated personnel and pay system to support the Afghans as they address human errors, inefficiencies, poor record management, unverifiable data, mismanagement, and corruption in the pay system. Two audits by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) identified vulnerabilities in the ANA and ANP pay systems, and a DoD program manager has consulted with the SIGAR auditors to develop a plan to implement a system using an Afghan software contractor. In the meantime, advisors are assisting the MoD and the MoI to work towards gaining better accountability of their personnel by identifying all soldiers and police properly against their authorized positions within the national human resources system and payroll systems.

Logistics remains a challenge for the ANDSF that has been exacerbated by diminished coalition presence in the field. Since U.S. and coalition forces historically ordered supplies for the ANDSF, Afghan personnel have little experience doing it themselves. As a result, reported shortages in operational units typically result from the ANDSF's underdeveloped logistics system rather than actual system-wide supply shortages. Coalition officials have worked carefully with Afghan security leaders to address essential logistics functions, but progress is incremental. Additionally, the ministries' procurement systems have not yet matured in terms of efficiency and internal controls. The fuel scandal in January 2015 brought almost all ANDSF procurement to a temporary halt.

Overall, the TAA mission remains focused on improving the ability of the MoD and the MoI to provide appropriate oversight and accountability of international funding for the ANDSF, and developing Afghan capability in financial management. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) continues to work with the Afghan government to ensure appropriate oversight of direct contributions to the MoD and the MoI through bilateral financial agreements, known as commitment letters, which stipulate how the ministries allocate funding for the fiscal year and under what conditions CSTC-A will provide the funds. These conditions are intended to ensure the proper implementation and integration of financial accounting, payroll, human resources, and real property systems; and provide mechanisms to prevent funds from being misappropriated or otherwise misused. President Ghani's timely response to allegations of bid rigging in the ANDSF fuel procurement process demonstrated his administration's commitment to eliminating corruption and maintaining transparency in the application of donor funding, in order to maximize the impact of those funds.

The absence of effective internal control processes increases the risk of poor management and the existence of corrupt practices, which deprives the ANDSF of vital resources and could lead to a reduction in international contributions over time. To address these concerns, the MoD and the MoI began to implement Ministerial Internal Controls Programs (MICPs) during this reporting period. As coalition forces continue to draw down, CSTC-A has also begun to add

skilled contracted Afghan subject matter experts in the headquarters and corps to build capacity in financial management and internal control systems.

THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Afghanistan faces a continuous threat from the convergence of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks. In his address to the U.S. Congress on March 25, 2015, President Ghani emphasized that Afghanistan was a critical frontline nation in the war against extremism. The insurgency has already demonstrated that it intends to mount a significant challenge to the ANDSF during the 2015 fighting season, as these networks strive to test Afghan capabilities and maintain their relevance and prominence. Collectively, the anti-Afghan forces, including al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and others will continue to present a formidable threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces.

Over the last 13 years, U.S. forces have kept constant pressure on al Qaeda and helped prevent Afghanistan from being used to launch attacks against the U.S. homeland. The United States remains committed to disrupting al Qaeda and its key facilitators in Afghanistan and assisting the Afghan people in continuing their fight against extremists who seek to overthrow the elected government. Ultimately, the establishment of capable and sustainable ANDSF that can protect Afghanistan is the long-term security solution.

The Taliban-led insurgency remains resilient. The Taliban officially announced that it would primarily target foreigners and Afghan government officials during this fighting season, though civilian casualties still result often from Taliban attacks. The Taliban continues to test the ANDSF and has maintained its presence in some rural areas. It continues to attempt to convince Afghans that its temporary tactical successes are strategic victories. The group will likely feel emboldened by the coalition's transition from combat operations to a TAA role, and an accompanying reduction in combat enablers.

The emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or *Daesh*) activity in Afghanistan is of concern to U.S., coalition, Afghan, and other regional governments, as well as to extremist groups that have been operating in the region for some time. ISIL will likely continue to try to expand its presence in Afghanistan during the upcoming year, and it will compete for relevance with the Taliban and other extant terrorist and insurgent groups.

RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Pakistan remains critical to Afghanistan's security and stability. Since President Ghani's inauguration, Afghan and Pakistani leaders have conducted several high-level engagements and engaged in a cooperative security dialogue, representing a promising trend for regional security. During this reporting period, Afghanistan and Pakistan began to cooperate on shared security interests, especially in the wake of the terrorist attack on a school in Peshawar, Pakistan, on December 16, 2014. Afghanistan and Pakistan also share mutual concerns over the potential emergence of ISIL elements in the region. During a press conference in Kabul on May 12, 2015, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reaffirmed Pakistan's support of an Afghan reconciliation process,

condemned the Afghan Taliban's spring offensive, and vowed to take coordinated action with Afghanistan against militant hideouts along the border.

The military-to-military relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is also showing improvement, and plans for future engagement have been gaining momentum. Since December 2014, the Pakistani military has pressured extremists and terrorists operating in the border region through operations, such as Operation KHYBER II. While undertaking Operation KHYBER II, the Pakistani military attempted to coordinate bilaterally with Afghan military representatives instead of through U.S. or coalition channels. The ANDSF are now attempting to capitalize on the Pakistani military operations on their side of the border. Despite this progress, Afghan-focused militants operating from Pakistani territory could continue to serve as spoilers for Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation.

LOOKING FORWARD

President Ghani has made security his number one priority. The U.S. and coalition efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan will first and foremost depend on the strength of the Afghan government and the leadership of individuals in the Afghan security ministries. Improved leadership and accountability will be critical during the remainder of this fighting season and for achieving long-term success for the ANDSF.

The outcome of the 2015 fighting season, and the perception of the ANDSF's performance, will have a significant impact on the future threat posed to the Afghan government and the Afghan people. The Afghan government and its security forces face a multi-faceted adversary determined to test them now that the ANDSF are fully in the lead and coalition forces are taking a supporting role. The United States and the coalition do not expect that the ANDSF will fully defeat the insurgency within this fighting season, but they do expect that the ANDSF will continue to test the Taliban's skill and will to fight as the ANDSF prove themselves a formidable, increasingly independent force. The ANDSF will need to demonstrate resiliency and steady improvement to achieve more than a stalemate against the insurgency in the year ahead. High-profile attacks (particularly those in Kabul), assassinations, and continued checkpoint overruns will increase the public's perception of insecurity. By demonstrating their capabilities, the ANDSF will reduce the operating space for insurgents and may incentivize their participation in the reconciliation process. The ANDSF's efforts to provide security may also help to regain investor confidence and reverse the slowing economy. Success will also depend on the security forces' ability to maintain offensive momentum and regain quickly any lost ground from the enemy.

The Afghan government will continue to rely on the coalition's TAA support through the end of the RS mission, and on the international community's funding for many years to come. Although considerable challenges remain, Commander, Resolute Support assesses that the ANDSF's capabilities, capacities, and morale will be sufficient to set the conditions for Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation talks.

SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The U.S. strategy and its objectives in Afghanistan have evolved since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001. The International Security Assistance Force mission – established by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001⁸ – began with U.S. and coalition forces in a combat role. At NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010, Afghanistan and its international partners agreed that Afghan security forces would steadily increase their role in the security mission in Afghanistan and wholly own the mission by 2014. During that time, the United States committed to support a surge in Afghan force strength, increasing its size from approximately 230,000 to up to 352,000 personnel. By 2013, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces had improved to the point that they assumed the lead for most operations in the country, though with significant support from U.S. and international forces. As the ANDSF grew and coalition force levels declined, ISAF gradually shifted its mission from a combat role with a secondary mission of building Afghan ministry and ANDSF capacity to a primary effort focused on training, advising, and assisting the Afghans to institutionalize and sustain Afghan capability gains, while fighting alongside them when needed. In 2014, the ANDSF proved increasingly capable, demonstrating tactical superiority over insurgents and leading 99 percent of operations. Despite some improvements in capabilities, the ANDSF remained dependent on coalition support in advanced capabilities—e.g., aviation and intelligence—and on coalition support in further developing their ministerial and institutional capacity. On December 31, 2014, due to significant progress in Afghan force development consistent with the international decisions reached at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon and reaffirmed at the 2012 Summit in Chicago and the 2014 Summit in Wales, the United States officially concluded Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and NATO concluded the ISAF mission as the ANDSF assumed full responsibility for the security of their country.

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is to work with the international community to provide financial and advisory support to the Afghan government to enable well-trained, equipped, and sustainable ANDSF to secure Afghanistan; and to conduct U.S. counterterrorism operations to defeat core al Qaeda, disrupt other extremists, and ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists attacks on the United States, U.S. persons overseas, and Allies and partners. Afghanistan’s future and the security of the region depend on a stable government and well-trained, equipped, and sustainable security forces.

The U.S. strategy leading into 2017 and beyond sets the stage for the responsible transition of the mission that will allow U.S. forces to continue building the capacity of the Afghan government as a reliable defense partner, and to protect U.S. national security interests in the region. Reconciliation and a political settlement remain the surest ways to achieve the full withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan. A capable and sustainable ANDSF will provide the Afghan government a stronger position from which to negotiate an end to its conflict with the Taliban in a way that is favorable to U.S. interests. As a part of the outcome of an Afghan-led peace process, the Taliban and other armed opposition groups must end violence, break ties with

⁸ The ISAF mission was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001.

international terrorist groups, and accept Afghanistan's constitution, including its protections for the rights of women and minorities.

1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

As President Obama announced in May 2014, the current U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are to disrupt threats posed by al Qaeda, support the Afghan security forces, and give the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. In order to achieve these objectives and secure and build upon the hard-fought gains of the last 13 years, U.S. forces began conducting 2 complementary missions as part of Operation Freedom's Sentinel on January 1, 2015.

First, U.S. forces are continuing a counterterrorism mission against the remnants of al Qaeda in Afghanistan to prevent its resurgence and to defeat external plotting against U.S. targets or the homeland. Second, together with Allies and operational partner nations, U.S. forces are contributing to NATO's train, advise, and assist mission with the ANDSF, known as Resolute Support. This mission seeks to continue the development of the Afghan security forces. U.S. and coalition forces are conducting the TAA mission at the Afghan National Army corps level and Afghan National Police corps-equivalent, and are also focusing on the development of the security ministries to improve Afghan logistics, sustainment, and force management capabilities. These two missions are mutually supporting. As the ANDSF institutionalize gains, they become an increasingly capable counterterrorism partner and are able to provide a basic level of security in Afghanistan that deters terrorists from exploiting the territory.

U.S. forces began the reporting period with approximately 10,400 personnel in Afghanistan. In May 2014, President Obama announced that up to 9,800 U.S. forces would be in Afghanistan at the beginning of 2015. However, due to delays in the announcement of the U.S. force contribution to the RS mission, post-Afghan election government formation, and signing of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and the NATO-Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement, the force generation effort for the RS mission was delayed several months. Therefore, President Obama approved a delayed withdrawal of up to 1,000 U.S. forces to provide military commanders with the flexibility to manage the temporary force shortfalls in NATO manning requirements as coalition forces arrived in theater. By the end of this reporting period, approximately 9,800 U.S. forces were supporting the two missions under Operation Freedom's Sentinel.

Based on the requirements of the counterterrorism and RS missions, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan will undergo a phased reduction over the next two years. In March 2015, based in part on President Ghani's request for flexibility in the U.S. drawdown timeline, President Obama announced that U.S. forces will maintain their current posture of 9,800 forces through the end of 2015. The specific trajectory of the 2016 U.S. force drawdown will be established later in 2015 to enable the eventual consolidation of U.S. forces to a Kabul-based security cooperation element. NATO Allies and RS operational partner nations will undergo a similar phased reduction between 2015 and 2016. The security cooperation element will serve as the basis for managing and overseeing continued DoD funding for sustainment support of the ANDSF post-

2016 and for continued coordination with Allies and partners to develop the capabilities of the security ministries and the ANDSF.

1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

U.S. counterterrorism efforts during this reporting period remained focused on the defeat of core al Qaeda in the region to prevent an al Qaeda resurgence and to deny safe haven from which it can plot or stage attacks against U.S. targets or the homeland. To that end, the U.S. counterterrorism mission and the TAA mission with the ANDSF are mutually reinforcing efforts that are integral to achieving U.S. counterterrorism goals. Limited direct action, coupled with initiatives to build the capacity of the ANDSF so they can serve as a legitimate line of defense against terrorists exploiting their territory, seeks to preserve the security gains to date and contribute to a robust, enduring counterterrorism partnership. U.S. counterterrorism operations are conducted primarily in partnership with Afghan Special Security Force units to address shared counterterrorism interests. During President Ghani's visit to Washington, DC, in March 2015, he and President Obama agreed to continue a dialogue on U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism objectives, including the development of a joint counterterrorism partnership strategy through and beyond 2016.

Continued pressure on al Qaeda since 2001 has prevented another attack on the homeland. Approximately 2,000 U.S. forces continue to conduct the counterterrorism mission to disrupt al Qaeda and key facilitators in Afghanistan. As a matter of international law, the United States remains in an armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. However, U.S. forces no longer target individuals solely because they are members of the Taliban. To the extent that members of the Taliban or other extremist groups directly threaten U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, or provide direct support to al Qaeda, U.S. forces may take appropriate action against those individuals. Outside of the counterterrorism mission, U.S. forces no longer plan or conduct offensive combat operations. For force protection purposes, U.S. forces conduct limited security operations around the remaining 21 NATO bases. The majority of these are partnered with Afghan security forces. Closing additional bases will affect the ability of U.S. forces to conduct certain types of counterterrorism operations given the constraints of specific collection and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.

The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan supports U.S. counterterrorism efforts by continuing to train, advise, and assist the ASSF and by accompanying them in certain operations. The ASSF will continue to conduct operations throughout the country using their organic capabilities to address both insurgent and transnational threats. The focus of train, advise, and assist efforts remains on building capacity in logistics, command and control, intelligence sharing, and interoperability between Afghan special operations forces and conventional forces. Tactical-level advising of Afghan special operation units provides the opportunity for U.S. forces to assess the operational performance of those partner units to shape future training and development.

1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

As agreed at the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit and reaffirmed at the 2012 Chicago Summit, the 2014 Wales Summit, and during the December 2014 meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, NATO Allies and operational partners ended the ISAF mission on December 31, 2014, and transitioned to the RS mission. The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2189, which welcomed the RS mission, on December 12, 2014.

The RS mission is not a continuation of the ISAF mission but instead builds upon it and demonstrates NATO's long-term commitment to Afghanistan by aiding the development of a capable, self-sustaining ANDSF. The RS mission focuses on training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF to become increasingly capable. It focuses on the national security ministry level to develop Afghan security ministries and their capabilities further, with advising extending down to the regional ANA corps and ANP-equivalent levels. U.S. and coalition forces are no longer engaged in advising at the brigade-level and below, with the exception of tactical advising of the ASSF and the Afghan Air Force. In support of this mission, U.S. forces may provide combat enabler support to the ANDSF in limited circumstances to prevent detrimental strategic effects.

The cornerstone of the RS mission is functionally based security force assistance,⁹ an advisory effort focused on developing functions, systems processes, and organizational development connected between the ministry and operational levels. More than 1,000 military and civilian advisors work with their Afghan counterparts to resolve problems within Afghan organizations, systems, and functions. Functionally based SFA includes three levels of advising:

- **Level One:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis from either an embedded footprint or in close proximity.
- **Level Two:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a less frequent basis (determined by commanders) to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to and capability of their Afghan counterpart, the threat level to advisors, and coalition resources.
- **Level Three:** Advisors are no longer co-located with their Afghan counterparts and train, advise, and assist their Afghan counterparts from a centralized location. Expeditionary advising packages and visits are planned and coordinated with Afghan counterparts to assist periodically in terms of operations and/or sustainment.

⁹ Functionally based SFA is a term developed by ISAF in 2014 to describe its shift to a primary emphasis on capacity building as its combat mission was winding down. According to the *RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.12*, SFA is defined as a unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Authoritative DoD doctrine for SFA does not yet exist, but generally agreed-to fundamental guidance for joint forces conducting SFA exists in Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, *Security Force Assistance*, April 29, 2013. According to this source, SFA consists of "Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions" (Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, July 12, 2010). The activities described as SFA – particularly the advisory effort focused on "essential functions" – are elements of security cooperation activities normally defined by NATO and DoD as defense institution reform and defense institution building.

At the ministerial level, advisors are focused on closing capability gaps in planning and programming; multi-year budgeting and execution; transparency, accountability, and oversight; rule of law; sustainment; and force development. Advisors are also working to address developmental shortfalls that exist in logistics; procurement; acquisition; financial management; strategic plans and policy; and human resource management. To promote self-sustainability and professionalism within the Afghan security ministries, TAA efforts include the development of a National Maintenance Strategy; refinement of processes and procedures needed to manage personnel and funds efficiently and effectively; the development and implementation of concepts, policies, and plans; and the allocation of resources. TAA efforts also include developing the skills necessary to operate within a self-sustaining system and leadership development required to control and maintain processes and procedures effectively with special emphasis on defining requirements and financial controls. Finally, to reduce the potential for mismanagement and corruption, advisor efforts are focused on structural changes to the procurement system, processes, laws, and rules.

At the ANA corps and ANP equivalent level, advisors are focused on closing key capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, and special operations. DoD will continue to field equipment, such as the MD-530 Cayuse Warrior helicopters and the A-29 Super Tucano aircraft, over the next three years to help mitigate these shortfalls.

These combined efforts will enable the Afghan security ministries to conduct the various national-level functions that are crucial to generating, training, resourcing, and sustaining fielded forces (i.e., the ANDSF) in a professional and self-sustainable manner under appropriate civilian and political controls.

The RS mission is based on a limited regional TAA approach and is executed from four geographic “spokes” at the coalition train, advise, and assist commands in the north, south, east, and west, with one central “hub” in Kabul City. At the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO Allies and partners reaffirmed their intent to conduct the RS mission post-2014. Four Allied nations agreed to serve as “framework nations,” each leading a regional TAAC and responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. The United States leads TAAC-South in Kandahar and TAAC-East in Jalalabad; Germany leads TAAC-North in Mazar-e-Sharif; Italy leads TAAC-West in Herat; and Turkey leads TAAC-Capital in the Kabul area. The TAACs are a critical component of TAA efforts in 2015 because they serve as the principal connections and “touch points” between the ministries and fielded forces. Therefore, they play a central role in the coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial efforts and how well they support ongoing ANDSF security operations.

As of May 2015, the RS mission was supported by 40 troop contributing nations (25 NATO Allies and 15 partner nations), consisting of approximately 11,325 NATO and 1,900 partner personnel (see Figure 1) across 21 bases. The United States remains the largest force contributor to the RS mission, providing approximately 6,500 personnel to the mission, of a total U.S. force presence in Afghanistan of approximately 9,800 personnel. Troop contributing nations are responsible for equipping and sustaining their own forces. They retain national command authority over their forces in Afghanistan and incur costs when they utilize services and support not covered by NATO common funding.

Figure 1: Resolute Support Mission Troop Contributing Nations, as of May 2015*

Nation	Personnel	Nation	Personnel
Albania	42	Latvia	25
Armenia	121	Lithuania	70
Australia	400	Luxembourg	1
Austria	10	Mongolia	120
Azerbaijan	94	Montenegro	17
Belgium	43	Netherlands	83
Bosnia & Herzegovina	53	Norway	56
Bulgaria	110	New Zealand	8
Croatia	91	Poland	150
Czech Republic	236	Portugal	10
Denmark	160	Romania	650
Estonia	4	Slovakia	39
Finland	80	Slovenia	7
Georgia	885	Spain	294
Germany	850	Sweden	30
Greece	4	FYR of Macedonia	38
Hungary	97	Turkey	503
Iceland	4	Ukraine	10
Ireland	7	United Kingdom	470
Italy	500	United States	6,827
* Numbers of personnel are approximate as they change daily.		NATO	11,325
		Non-NATO	1,874
		Total	13,199

NATO Allies and potential operational partners plan to meet in June 2015 at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for the RS Mission Force Generation Conference to offer forces for the RS mission in 2016. NATO force generation planning and agreement to the Combined Joint Statement of Responsibility requirements process are critical to ensuring personnel are pledged for tasks including training, force protection, support, and out-of theater reserves before coalition forces begin to condense further to a Kabul-centric presence on January 1, 2016.

Following agreements by NATO and the Afghan government at the Lisbon, Chicago, and Wales Summits, NATO will continue supporting Afghanistan through a post-2016 Enduring Partnership. On May 13, 2015, foreign ministers reaffirmed that the Alliance will maintain a presence in Afghanistan after the end of the RS mission and asked NATO to begin planning for the Enduring Partnership, which will continue NATO’s ministerial and institutional level advising beyond 2016. The purpose of NATO’s Enduring Partnership will be to capitalize on and continue development of the Afghan security ministries and their forces. Planning to facilitate and coordinate the transition from the RS mission to the Enduring Partnership is underway. A small civilian-led NATO element, which will include a military component, will manage the Enduring Partnership effort, likely under the authority of the NATO Senior Civilian

Representative in Afghanistan, and will synchronize efforts with the U.S. security cooperation mission.

Functional Advising

To develop sustainable Afghan security ministries and forces, RS expanded ISAF's capacity-building focus from four "pillars" (sustainment and resource management; human resource management; strategy and policy; and transparency, accountability, and oversight) to eight essential functions and associated sub-functions. Whereas ISAF had a primary focus on combat operations and a secondary focus on generating, training, and equipping the ANDSF and building ministry capacity, these capacity-building efforts are the main effort for RS.

Essential Function 1: Plan, program, budget, and execute

Essential Function 1 advisors work with the security ministries to develop resource management processes that can translate to ANDSF capability and sustainability. Resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget that meets those prioritized requirements, and executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget and monitoring the status of funds being spent. Advising efforts focus on growing resource management and procurement capability in accordance with Afghan laws, policies, and regulations. Essential Function 1 has three priorities: build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; increase resource management capability within the ministries; and set conditions for the future.

Essential Function 2: Transparency, accountability, and oversight

Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. Essential Function 2 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to improve internal controls, as well as maintain accountability and oversight to lend transparency (*shafafiyat*). This affects oversight of Afghan financial and non-financial processes, including fuel and salaries. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan continues to administer measures, such as financial commitment letters (which establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over the contract management process), to ensure the Afghan government's proper use of funds from U.S. and international donors.

Essential Function 3: Civilian governance of the Afghan security institutions and adherence to rule of law

An ANDSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to the ANDSF's ability to provide for Afghanistan's security and retain public support for itself and other institutions of governance. Essential Function 3 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to ensure the ANDSF respect the rule of law and operate in accordance with Afghanistan's constitution, domestic laws, and international

obligations. Efforts are focused primarily on preventing gross violations of human rights (GVHRs) – such as extra-judicial killings – and significant acts of corruption. A weak and corrupt judiciary and unpopular detention policy by the Afghan administration have led some ANDSF to kill rather than capture insurgent operatives to avoid what they see as a pipeline from the judiciary system back to the battlefield. A capable, corruption-free, and accountable judiciary is critical to ensuring the ANDSF operate within the bounds of international laws and norms on human rights. RS advisors continue to engage with all levels of ANDSF leadership to reinforce the importance of preventing GVHR – not only to maintain long-term viability, but also to continue U.S. and coalition assistance to the ANDSF.

Essential Function 4: Force generation

Essential Function 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) is a system that the ANA and ANP use to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements.

Essential Function 5: Sustain the force

Essential Function 5 advisors work to help the ANDSF sustain combat power through maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. Essential Function 5 is divided into three parts. First, advisors advise and assist the ANP and ANA in logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons predominantly at the corps and national levels. Second, advisors advise and assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), medical logistics, equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Third, advisors advise and assist in the fields of communications, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communications infrastructure.

Essential Function 6: Plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns

Essential Function 6 advisors work to help the ANDSF effectively employ combat power in support of the Afghan government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors advise and support strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts are designed to develop the capability,¹⁰ capacity,¹¹ and maturity¹² of the Afghan leaders and the processes they oversee in these organizations. The end state will be reached when the MoD and the MoI coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn translated into operational plans supported by effective security campaigns.

¹⁰ *Capability* is defined as the ability to produce a strategy, or a set of policies, or a guidance document sequentially that is executable by another organization.

¹¹ *Capacity* is defined as the ability to produce strategy, policies, and guidance simultaneously within the same organization.

¹² *Maturity* is defined as having the ability to refine the processes that develop strategy, policy, and guidance to make them more executable by another organization.

Essential Function 7: Develop sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes

Essential Function 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with organizations, including the Assistant Ministry of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff (GS) Intelligence Directorate, and the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI). The goal of this effort is to ensure that the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations. RS intelligence advisors work at the national and regional levels to help Afghan intelligence capabilities mature. Additionally, advisors work with the ANP and ANA intelligence schools to develop a cadre of instructors to train future intelligence personnel. Advisors also work with analysts to prepare estimates in support of military and policing plans and strategies. The new National Threat Intelligence Center (NTIC) creates increased possibilities for cooperation between the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the MoI, and the MoD. Having these three entities work side-by-side and share intelligence is a major step forward in Afghan intelligence development.

Essential Function 8: Maintain internal and external strategic communication capability

Essential Function 8 advisors work with the Afghan government to counter insurgent messaging and offer a positive narrative to its people and the international community. Efforts seek to help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both within their own organizations, and externally to the people of Afghanistan. Afghan communication capabilities continue to improve, but challenges remain. Advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improved communications within the Afghan security ministries and forces while continuing to reinforce successes and look for those opportunities to improve.

Gender Integration

Gender issues cross all functions listed above and therefore are not restricted to one essential function. The RS Gender Office seeks to train, advise, and assist Afghan leadership to ensure that a gender perspective is incorporated into planning for all policies and strategies within the security ministries and through implementation at the corps level. This effort is conducted in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325¹³ and supporting resolutions that recognize that including women within the security forces and in conflict resolution enhances the stability and security of communities and society. Although Afghan society is segregated and divided by gender, participation and empowerment of women has increased over the last 13 years, helping to enable Afghan women to secure their own future.

The Afghan constitution states that all citizens of Afghanistan, men and women, have equal rights and duties before the law, including volunteering for public service. The ANDSF have set a goal to recruit and retain women to fill 10 percent of the force over 10 years. RS currently advises and assists the Afghan security ministries and forces in reaching this goal. There has been a slow increase in the number of women serving in the security forces since 2001. There are many roles within the security forces that women can undertake that cannot be undertaken by

¹³ In 2005, the United Nations Security Council called upon member states to continue implementation of Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security, including in Afghanistan.

men, particularly with the cultural sensitivities of conducting searches and the reporting and resolution of human rights violations and domestic disputes.

The conflict in Afghanistan has shown that the roles of the women serving in the security forces has changed, with female pilots flying missions in support of operations against insurgents. Afghan women have deployed, fought, and died alongside their male colleagues in an attempt to secure their country. However, women are still hesitant to join the ANA and ANP, with additional resistance shown from their elders and family members. According to a recent survey, only 28 percent of respondents think that it is appropriate for Afghan women to serve in the ANDSF.¹⁴ With support from President Ghani and Afghanistan's First Lady Rula Ghani, leaders of the MoI and the MoD are becoming more aware of how important it is for capacity building in Afghanistan to have women serve in the ANP or the ANA.

Protecting women within the security forces is as important as women contributing to the protection of Afghanistan. Many women within the security forces are threatened merely because they wear a uniform and often have to wear civilian attire to and from work to avoid detection and threats to them and their families. Prevention and protection can only be provided through the enforcement of laws and codes of conduct put in place by the Afghan government and the security ministries. It is essential that those entrusted with enforcing these laws do so.


The FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act directed that \$25 million of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) be made available for requirements that support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANDSF. These funds are an incentive to help the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior integrate women into the ANDSF. Coalition gender advisors have developed a list of requirements that support this effort, which include pay incentives, facility improvements, public relations and advertising, and training courses and seminars. U.S. personnel are appointed as contracting officer representatives to provide oversight on projects in support of this effort. To date, approximately \$4 million (or 16 percent) has been obligated with several building modification projects planned over the next quarter. The current spend plan obligates 100 percent of the appropriated funds by later this year.

1.5 INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS

Within the RS organization, typically a general officer or a member of the DoD Senior Executive Service is the lead for each of the eight essential functions (EFs). The EF leads are responsible for providing training, advice, and assistance at the corps and police equivalent echelons and above. All EF advisors (see Figure 2), whether at the corps, institutional, or ministerial level, are aligned under an EF lead to unify advisory efforts at all echelons. When an issue is identified within an EF, the intent is to resolve that issue at the lowest possible level. While working to improve performance throughout the Afghan security ministries, RS advisors focus their efforts towards a self-sustainable and credible ANDSF that is capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan under responsible and efficient Afghan security ministries. Annex A lists indicators of effectiveness that each EF lead uses to assess capability development progress.

¹⁴ Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey, Wave 27, April 2015.

Figure 2: Resolute Support Advisors by Essential Function



Each EF lead is accountable for progress in ministerial development through actions identified in a program of actions and milestones (PoAM). Assessments of ministry progress are built around the completion of the mutually agreed processes, or outcomes, with the associated ministry. Each PoAM is developed by the EF lead in conjunction with Afghan counterparts in the associated ministry. Each PoAM consists of five categories of information: essential function, system, organization, process, and action.

Each essential function lead identifies critical processes to develop milestones to measure progress across the eight essential functions. These processes are completed over time by the execution of a series of supporting actions, or tasks, that achieve the desired effect or preclude undesired effects. Progress toward each milestone depends on the progress made within each of the listed actions or tasks, which correspond with effects. Objectives define progress with respect to each milestone.

Ministerial progress toward actions and milestones is evaluated through a sequential five-stage system that reflects the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively. All processes and associated series of actions listed in each EF PoAM are rated against a capability and effectiveness scale:

- 1) The action (task) is scoped and agreed to by the Afghan government.
- 2) The Afghan government initiates the action.
- 3) The Afghan government outcome is “partially effective.”
- 4) The Afghan government outcome is “fully effective.”

5) The Afghan government outcome is “sustainable.”

The last three stages are based on the subjective assessment of the essential function lead. The milestone is not considered “sustainable” until all listed tasks have achieved that level of progress.

TAAC commanders account for ANA corps and ANP development through assessing warfighting functions and five functional pillars: leadership,¹⁵ combined arms integration,¹⁶ command and control,¹⁷ training,¹⁸ and sustainment.¹⁹ During this reporting period, the Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report (MAAR) replaced the Regional ANSF²⁰ Status Report (RASR) to assess the ANDSF’s capability and effectiveness for the eight essential functions related to each unit’s warfighting functions.²¹ Similar to the PoAMs, there are five capability/effectiveness ratings for the MAAR (see Figure 3). TAAC input is aggregated to produce an assessment for the monthly Campaign Assessment Board.

Figure 3: Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report Capability Rating Definition Levels

Rating	Meaning	Description
1	In Development	Tasks/milestones (conditions) scoped and agreed to between advisors/advisees; efforts to develop baseline capability and measures in progress, but not complete.
2	Partially Capable	Baseline design to achieve capability and associated measures initiated by ANDSF unit; plan to move forward is sound and ready for implementation.
3	Capable	Development conditions in progress/incomplete; ANDSF unit is partially capable/effective. Measures have been designed and partially implemented, but are neither fully operational nor adequately effective. Conditions can be achieved by the end of RS; advising will continue.

¹⁵ *Leadership* is the ability of the commander and subordinate leaders (including staff primaries) to demonstrate a mastery of their functional area; provide purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish all assigned tasks and missions while being accountable for their actions and responsibilities.

¹⁶ *Combined arms integration* is the ability to field and integrate new systems and develop the capability to bring all available forces, assets, and enabler systems to bear effectively.

¹⁷ *Command and control* is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over all assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.

¹⁸ *Training* is the ability to conduct individual and collective mission-focused training, institutional training, and to assess and maintain proficiency on all critical tasks.

¹⁹ *Sustainment* is the ability to sustain training and operational missions independently.

²⁰ The ANDSF is the official designation for the Afghan security forces used in the BSA and is the Afghan government’s preferred designation for the overall force. The U.S. Government now uses this term instead of the previously used ANSF.

²¹ More specific information about units’ assessments is included in the classified annex accompanying this report.

4	Fully Capable	Developmental conditions nearly achieved/incomplete. ANDSF unit fully capable but still requires attention to improve effectiveness and to solidify the day-to-day use of processes and systems that will lead to sustaining capability. Condition on track to be achieved by the end of RS; advising will continue.
5	Sustainable	Condition fully achieved. ANDSF unit possesses requisite capabilities and actively employs them effectively, taking time to refine and improve associated processes and systems as needed to drive continued growth/progress. Advising will only continue on this effort as requested by ANDSF counterparts and as opportunity and resources permit.

Each EF directorate maintains and updates their individual PoAM assessments using the tracking methodology maintained by the RS Security Force Assistance Center, which is responsible for the integration, coordination, management, and synchronization of functionally based SFA across the coalition. Advisors at all echelons deliver their assessments of progress through the SFA Center, which then synthesizes them into an overarching assessment of the ministry and Afghan security force as it relates to the campaign plan. The analysis is conducted through a series of weekly, monthly, and quarterly assessments, based on each EF's milestones.

Progress is reported during weekly meetings, such as the Commander's Update Brief and the EF Update, and the Campaign Assessment Board meets monthly. Every third month, the Campaign Assessment Board is replaced by the Quarterly Campaign Review Board, where leaders assess progress against campaign objectives. Commander, Resolute Support, receives an update on two of the EFs weekly.

Issues that involve action across the EFs require horizontal coordination and synchronization. Horizontal coordination is accomplished through SFA working groups and in formal tasking; synchronization is achieved through command lead boards that can issue a formal tasking. Horizontal coordination and synchronization occur at every echelon and, when possible, actions are resolved at the lowest level. Strategic-level issues are passed from one echelon to another until they can be successfully resolved in collaboration with Afghan counterparts.

SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist networks, including the Taliban, al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and other insurgent and extremist groups, which continue to attempt to reassert their authority and prominence. Favorable weather in the winter prolonged the 2014 fighting season and allowed critical facilitation routes, which would normally have been snow-covered, to remain open. The ANDSF prevented the insurgency from gaining the control of key terrain through both defensive and offensive operations. Although some checkpoints were temporarily seized, insurgents failed to retain any territory or achieve their strategic objectives during this reporting period.

The convergence of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks is pervasive and constitutes a threat to Afghanistan's stability. Revenue from opium trafficking continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, some areas of Afghanistan have seen a recent increase in extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains an extremist safe haven providing sanctuary for various groups, including al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These extremist sanctuaries remain a security challenge for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and pose a threat to regional stability.

2.1 IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The role of Pakistan remains critical to stability in Afghanistan. Since President Ghani's inauguration, Afghan and Pakistani leaders have conducted several high-level engagements to discuss regional security. President Ghani has taken steps toward improving relationships with several countries in the region in an effort to help Afghanistan move forward on a more stable platform of physical and economic security. The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan attack on a school in Peshawar, Pakistan, on December 16, 2014, allowed the leadership of both countries to engage each other on counterterrorism issues. This has led to some progress in the Afghanistan-Pakistan military-to-military relationship. The day after the school attack, General Raheel Sharif, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, flew to Afghanistan to meet with President Ghani. By the end of December 2014, the Pakistani government created a National Action Plan to eliminate terrorism from inside its borders; this remains a long-term plan that will have to overcome significant obstacles. Headquarters, Resolute Support facilitates a constructive and effective relationship between the Afghan and Pakistan militaries when necessary.

On May 12, 2015, a Pakistani delegation led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chief of the Army Staff General Raheel Sharif visited Kabul, where Prime Minister Sharif publicly condemned the Taliban's spring offensive, insisting, "The enemies of Afghanistan cannot be friends of Pakistan." President Ghani reinforced this message by similarly saying that the enemies of Pakistan cannot be the friends of Afghanistan. General Raheel and President Ghani have also pledged to support each other in their fight against terrorism. Afghanistan and Pakistan also share mutual concerns over the potential emergence of elements of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in the region. Pakistani Army operations in the last several months, such as Operation KHYBER II, have applied pressure on extremists operating in the border

region. The Pakistani military attempted to coordinate these operations bilaterally with Afghan military representatives, not via U.S. or coalition channels. The ANDSF are now attempting to capitalize on the Pakistani military operations on their side of the border.

President Ghani is matching General Raheel's initiatives to encourage rapprochement between both countries. Encouragingly, both appear to be pushing for political reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban. During the May 12, 2015, meeting between Prime Minister Sharif and President Ghani, Prime Minister Sharif publicly reaffirmed Pakistan's support of an Afghan reconciliation process and vowed to take coordinated action with Afghanistan against militant hideouts along the border.

Both the Afghan and Pakistan governments have indicated a desire to coordinate cross-border security and are in the process of finalizing a Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). Although the previous trilateral border SOP expired on December 31, 2014, both militaries are still operating under those procedures until the new SOP is signed.

On December 23, 2014, Afghanistan's Army Chief General Sher Mohammad Karimi met with General Raheel Sharif in Pakistan to discuss coordinating Pakistan-Afghanistan military and counterterrorism operations on both sides of the border. General Raheel and General Karimi agreed that their subordinate commanders would begin meeting immediately to coordinate border area security operations. The goal of these meetings is for Afghan and Pakistan military units that regularly operate near the border to work together in a combined effort to eliminate terrorist threats while bringing security and stability to the people of the region.

The subsequent consultations between Afghan and Pakistani corps commanders showed some promise. Notably, Afghan and Pakistan corps-level commanders met on January 18, 2015, in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, and talked about the mutual benefits of building a cross-border network to root out terrorism and bring safety and security to the region. ANDSF and Pakistan Army operational commanders, and a delegation from RS headquarters, participated and openly discussed recent operations in their respective areas, provided intelligence assessments, and talked about future operations. All groups agreed that sharing operational plans and coordination between tactical units is both feasible and necessary along the border. On January 22, 2015, a second meeting occurred that included higher-level Afghan and Pakistani leadership to discuss how to improve security and border cooperation. The parties further discussed the common enemy they face and emphasized the close geographic and cultural ties between the two countries. Additional bilateral security meetings have occurred, including a visit by Afghan Border Police (ABP) leaders to Pakistan to discuss improving border security, including the establishment of common SOPs, sharing intelligence, and conducting joint operations; and a visit by Afghan National Army corps commanders to meet with their counterparts at General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

The Pakistani military also re-extended an offer to provide military training for Afghan security forces. Unlike his predecessor, President Ghani accepted their offer and sent members of the ANDSF for formal training in Pakistan during this reporting period. In February 2015, six ANA cadets arrived to attend an 18-month long course at the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad. In April, General Karimi was invited to serve as the guest of honor at a ceremony at

the academy. During the ceremony, General Karimi emphasized that Afghanistan and Pakistan face a common enemy, which requires cooperation between the two countries. Pakistan and Afghanistan have discussed expanding training opportunities to include other ANDSF branches and capabilities.

With considerable time and political will, Afghanistan and Pakistan can build upon the meaningful progress made during this reporting period to make further progress on resolving key bilateral disputes. Afghan-focused militants may continue to pose a threat to this progress from remaining safe havens in Pakistan.

2.2 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

The Taliban-led insurgency does not currently represent an existential threat to the Afghan government but continues to test the ANDSF as the coalition draws down, often using indiscriminate, high-profile attacks that harm innocent civilians. Despite an uptick in violence before the fighting season, the ANDSF have proven largely capable of defending against direct insurgent attacks.

Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups

Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continued to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces during the reporting period. In 2014, the insurgency modified its tactics, launching direct attacks against ANDSF checkpoints and smaller garrisons to test the responsiveness of Afghan and coalition forces. However, the overall capability of insurgents remained static while the ANDSF continued to improve and adapt to the drawdown of U.S. and coalition support.

Al Qaeda activities remained more focused on survival than on planning and facilitating future attacks. The organization has a sustained presence in Afghanistan of probably fewer than 100 operatives concentrated largely in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces, where they remain year-round. In the border districts between Kunar and Nuristan provinces, al Qaeda received support from local Taliban and at least tacit support from the local populace. Outside these provinces, the number of al Qaeda fighters fell during the winter, in line with seasonal norms; however, these fighters began to infiltrate back into provinces, including Ghazni, Zabul, and Wardak in the spring.

The resilient Taliban-led insurgency remains an enduring threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces, as well as to the Afghan people. The Taliban has been weakened by continued pressure, but has not yet been defeated. Politically, they have become increasingly marginalized. Continued doubts about whether the Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, is still alive may have caused some disagreement within the organization. Other senior Taliban leaders disagreed on the prioritization of their political and military efforts.

Although the Taliban spread its footprint across the country, it suffered considerable casualties and did not accomplish any of its major strategic or operational objectives in 2014. Early in the reporting period, insurgents emphasized high-profile attacks against soft targets—particularly in

Kabul—in order to undermine perceptions of improved security and increased public confidence in the Afghan government. These strikes garnered considerable media attention, while requiring minimal resources and entailing little risk; however, many of these attacks killed innocent bystanders. These attacks slowed precipitously in January and February 2015. Insurgents continued to seek to conduct high-profile attacks in other population centers – as well as against remote outposts – to garner media attention, to project an image of robust capability, and to expand perceptions of insecurity.

Many Taliban fighters suffered from acute resource shortfalls. Numerous Taliban fighters continue to fight and die at high rates while their senior leaders remain in safe havens in Pakistan. The absence of coalition combat units on the battlefield has also weakened one of the principal propaganda lines for the Taliban armed struggle: that they seek to rid Afghanistan of “malevolent foreign influences.” Now they are fighting almost exclusively against their fellow Afghans.

The Taliban officially announced the beginning of the fighting season as April 24, 2015, stating it would target foreigners and Afghan government officials. In preparation for the fighting season, insurgents sought to prepare the battle space by attempting to secure safe havens and facilitation routes throughout the country. Yet insurgents had to contend with independent and advised offensive ANDSF operations over the reporting period, specifically ANDSF shaping operations in northern Helmand, as well as Pakistani military operations that likely disrupted some Pakistan-based insurgent sanctuaries. Additionally, the insurgency mounted coordinated attacks but was generally overmatched when engaged by ANDSF; it could not capture or destroy well-defended targets and was unable to hold key terrain. Nevertheless, the insurgency remained determined, maintained or consolidated its influence in traditional rural strongholds, and carried out attacks with a similar frequency to a year ago. Although of limited tactical effect, these attacks allowed the Taliban to reap potential publicity gains. The Afghan government will continue to struggle to compete with the Taliban in the information space.

Of the groups involved in the Taliban-led insurgency, the Haqqani Network remained the greatest threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces and continues to be a critical enabler of al Qaeda. The Haqqani Network and affiliated groups share the goals of expelling U.S. and coalition forces, overthrowing the Afghan government, and re-establishing an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network led the insurgency in the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost, and demonstrated the capability and intent to support and launch high-profile, complex attacks across the country and in the Kabul region. Recent Pakistani military operations have caused some disruption to the Haqqani Network; however, it has still been able to plan and conduct attacks. In response to several dangerous threat streams against U.S., coalition, and Afghan personnel—particularly in Kabul—U.S. and Afghan special operations forces increased security operations against the Haqqani Network during this reporting period. These operations disrupted several dangerous threats streams that sought to inflict significant casualties on the force.

The coalition and the Afghan government watched closely ISIL’s attempt to expand its reach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The potential emergence of ISIL has sharply focused the ANDSF, NDS, and Afghan political leadership. All are collaborating closely in order to prevent this

threat from expanding. Thus far, U.S. forces have seen some evidence of limited recruiting efforts, and a few individuals formerly associated with other militant groups have “rebranded” themselves as members of “ISIL of Khorasan Province.” This rebranding is most likely an attempt to attract media attention, solicit greater resources, and increase recruitment. Yet ISIL’s presence and influence in Afghanistan remains in the initial exploratory phase. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has publicly expressed support for ISIL as the leader of the global jihad; however, the Taliban has declared that it will not allow ISIL in Afghanistan.

Security Trends²²

The insurgency remained resilient during this reporting period. Security incidents²³ declined to relatively low levels during this winter, but have begun to increase in line with previously observed seasonal trends (see Figure 4). RS leaders expect to see a continued increase of reported incidents until mid to late summer.


Headquarters, RS has become increasingly reliant on ANDSF operational reporting, as the ANDSF have increased their responsibility for providing security, and coalition unit presence alongside Afghan units has diminished. The ANDSF have developed a working system to compile and consider national security trends, which RS staff monitors. Due to the different collection and input methods, the data’s quality differs than during previous years when Afghan forces were typically partnered with coalition forces. A large proportion of Afghan reporting must be translated from Dari into English, which introduces reporting delays and translation errors. Yet overall, the data collected and compiled by the ANDSF is still considered useful and valid when compared to previous years’ metrics.

Very few of the incidents from this reporting period involved coalition forces. In line with historical trends, direct fire and improvised explosive device attacks made up the majority of security incidents. Insurgents also continued to conduct high-profile and complex attacks against individuals, population centers, and remote outposts.

²² Note: In general, reports that involve coalition forces are more detailed. Additionally, ANDSF reports of incidents within the Kabul security zone are typically detailed and accurate. Outside of that area, ANDSF reporting is generally limited to the district level (i.e., the incident’s location is only identifiable down to the district) and is generally limited in detail. Reviewers of all other reporting and derived metrics (e.g., security incidents, casualties) should consider the significant reduction in coalition presence and increase in Afghan reporting. Coalition and Afghan forces continue to improve data collection and management processes to capture all available reporting.


²³ *Security incidents* are insurgent-initiated attacks and potential attacks against U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces. Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED and mine explosions. Security incidents also include events where IEDs and mines are found and cleared (including premature IED detonations and IED turn-ins).

Figure 4: Weekly Reported Security Incidents*



* Data as of June 8, 2015

Figure 5: Kabul Security Zone



Overall, during this reporting period, there was an increase in incidents both within Kabul Province and within the Kabul security zone (see Figure 5) when compared with the same timeframe in 2014. Although IED incidents increased within these strategic areas, high-profile attacks involving suicide bombings (either person-borne IEDs or vehicle-borne IEDs) did not. The strategic value of Kabul is well known to the insurgency, and RS leaders expect continued attempts to demonstrate insurgent strength through violence in Kabul.

U.S. Casualties²⁴ and Insider Attacks

During Operation Enduring Freedom, from October 2001 through December 2014, 2,215 U.S. military personnel died in Afghanistan; 20,027 U.S. military personnel were wounded-in-action (WIA), and 1,832 were killed-in-action (KIA). Several times during his March 2015 visit to the United States, President Ghani publicly thanked U.S. forces for the sacrifices they have made for his country.

Although U.S. and coalition casualties have dropped significantly, the RS mission's designation as a non-combat mission does not eliminate risks. Despite the change in the character of the mission, Afghanistan remains dangerous, and the Taliban-led insurgency continues to present a threat to U.S. and coalition forces. The ANDSF now provide the first layer of defense for U.S. and coalition forces, and force protection remains the number one priority as forces operate from more consolidated locations. A coalition partner was the first fatality of the RS mission when he was killed in an IED attack in Kabul in February 2015. As of May 31, 2015, 24 U.S. military personnel were WIA, and one was KIA in Operation Freedom's Sentinel. For this specific reporting period, from December 2014 through May 2015, 38 U.S. military personnel were WIA, and 4 were KIA.

The insurgency continues its attempts to inspire Afghan soldiers and police to conduct insider attacks (also known as "green on blue" attacks) as a means to undermine trust between the coalition and its Afghan partners. Although insider attacks have declined since their peak in calendar year 2012, they remain a serious concern that continues to represent a strategic threat to the campaign and jeopardizes the relationship between coalition and Afghan personnel. From December 1, 2014, to May 31, 2015, U.S. forces suffered 4 confirmed insider attacks, which resulted in the death of 1 U.S. soldier and 3 U.S. contractors, and the wounding of 12 more personnel.²⁵ In 2014, 7 insider attacks were conducted on U.S. personnel, resulting in 4 KIA and 20 WIA.

Although the insurgency encouraged and influenced many of the insider attacks, the attacker's true motivation is unknown for the vast majority of attacks. Regardless of motivation, the insurgency continues to encourage insider attacks to drive a wedge between coalition and Afghan forces. The consolidation of bases and improved force protection measures have made insider attacks more difficult to execute. Moreover, although it is impossible to prevent all insider attacks, coalition forces, the ANDSF, and the Afghan government continue to take a comprehensive approach to mitigate insider threats through a series of measures seeking to

²⁴ Casualties include both WIA and KIA.

²⁵ For the purposes of this statistic, U.S. contractors on a U.S. military contract are considered U.S. forces.

increase understanding of the threat, improving force preparation through cultural and situational training, supporting ANDSF vetting and other efforts, and enhancing force protection measures. This multipronged approach is assessed to have mitigated the threat of insider attacks during this reporting period. Many of the previous ISAF measures remain in place for the RS mission. For example, RS forces continue to employ “guardian angels,” NATO military force protection personnel consisting of NATO military members whose sole responsibility is providing security during engagements with the ANDSF. In addition, the Theater Force Protection SOP and the Mitigation of the Insider Threat SOP provide specific direction to counter the insider threat and establish procedures for investigating and reviewing insider attacks.²⁶

Investigation and analysis of insider attacks will continue to shape coalition forces’ approach to mitigating the insider threat. Headquarters, RS continues to employ Joint Casualty Assessment Teams following insider attacks. These teams seek to determine the causes of the attack quickly, wherever possible, and to identify any lessons learned for immediate dissemination throughout the battlespace. The Joint Casualty Assessment Team report is the foundation for a more in-depth analyses conducted by the Insider Threat Assessment Board to determine causation, motivation, and additional lessons learned.

Afghan security forces also remain at risk for insider attacks within their own forces (otherwise known as “green on green” attacks). RS advisors continue to engage both the MoD and the MoI on the requirement for formal personnel screening to be included in official policy at the national level.

Civilian Casualties

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 10,548 civilian casualties in 2014, the highest on record in a single year with a particular increase in casualties among women and children. UNAMA attributed this increase in overall civilian casualties to more frequent and larger ground engagements between the ANDSF and insurgents in populated areas. In the first three months of 2015, civilian casualties from ground engagements rose by eight percent compared to the same period in 2014. RS advisors continue to work with the ANDSF to prevent civilian casualties during operations. Efforts include refining training for the ANDSF on the use of force, fielding explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, and the MoI’s implementation of a 119 emergency call line for civilians to contact the ANP with information about suspicious or dangerous activity.

UNAMA also attributed the increase in civilian casualties to an increased use of indiscriminate IEDs, such as pressure plate IEDs, which remained the second leading cause of civilian casualties. Unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other explosive devices, are a widespread, latent threat to civilians resulting in an average of 95 deaths and injuries per month. This threat has accumulated from a number of sources over 35 years of war. The Soviet invasion left a substantial amount of landmines and UXO in Afghanistan. The ensuing civil war resulted in more UXO, and all parties in the conflict used landmines. Additionally, the last 13 years of

²⁶ *ISAF Insider Threat Handbook 2.0: COMISAF’s Guidance on Combating Insider Attacks*, July 2014, provides guidance from Commander, Resolute Support, on insider threat training and mitigation, lessons learned, and best practices for countering the threat.

combat operations in Operation Enduring Freedom and the ISAF mission have left another layer of UXO on battlefields and high-explosive training ranges connected to U.S. and coalition military bases across Afghanistan. Since 2010, 122 civilian casualties (36 killed and 86 wounded) have been attributed to UXO on high-explosive training ranges, of which more than 80 percent were children.

Despite guidance from Taliban leadership in its various codes of conduct (*layeha*) to protect civilian lives, insurgent actions continue to be responsible for the vast majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. The findings of the most recent UNAMA report on civilian casualties are consistent with Afghans' views that insurgents are overwhelmingly to blame for these events.²⁷ From December 1, 2014, to May 22, 2015, insurgents caused approximately 87 percent of all civilian casualties; ANDSF caused approximately 4 percent; coalition forces caused less than 1 percent; and the responsible parties for the remaining incidents are unknown.

Unlike the Taliban and associated groups, Afghan and coalition forces take extensive measures to avoid civilian casualties. Coalition forces apply a diverse range of techniques, methods, and weapons to target the insurgency, while limiting civilian casualties. This includes targeting procedures that reinforce tactical restraint, training to apply the minimum level of force, and calling off operations when there is an assessed risk to civilians. In a UNAMA release during this reporting period, UNAMA reported that civilian casualties from U.S. and coalition forces' aerial operations declined 42 percent compared to the first quarter in 2014.²⁸

In addition, RS leaders maintain close communication links with Afghanistan's Presidential Information Coordination Center in order to gather information and cross-validate civilian casualty reports received through the Afghan government's reporting chain. Overall, reducing the number of civilian casualties remains an objective for both RS leaders and the Afghan government. RS advisors continue to assist by mentoring and monitoring the full implementation of the Afghan Civilian Mitigation System. The RS staff also works closely with UNAMA to share information.

During this reporting period, the RS headquarters updated its SOP for investigating civilian casualties, which includes identifying organizations and establishing procedures for managing civilian casualty information and its reporting processes.

2.3 ANTICIPATED SECURITY CONDITIONS

The stability of the Afghan government and the performance of the ANDSF throughout the 2015 fighting season will have a significant impact on the future threat posed in Afghanistan. Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups will continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan forces as they strive to maintain their relevance and prominence. The insurgency's strategy will likely remain unchanged in 2015, and the conflict will likely continue to intensify over the next few months as warmer weather prevails. The proactive actions of the ANDSF

²⁷ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, *2014 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, February 2015.

²⁸ "Press Release: Latest UNAMA Figures Show Continuing Record High Civilian Casualties," UNAMA, April 12, 2015.

prior to the traditional fighting season have helped set more favorable conditions, and RS leaders expect the ANDSF to maintain a steady OPTEMPO into the summer. Strong ANDSF performance will have an impact on potential reconciliation efforts. Overall, it is unlikely that the Taliban will be able to defeat the ANDSF on the battlefield in 2015. However, insurgent propaganda will remain challenging to counter, as the insurgents advertise the perceived “inevitability” of their victory and the coalition’s perceived “abandonment” of the Afghan people.

The Taliban-led insurgency will likely feel emboldened by the coalition’s transition from direct combat operations to a TAA role and an accompanying reduction of coalition combat enablers. As a result, the Taliban will likely continue to test the ANDSF aggressively in 2015, as it did in 2014, to ascertain the limitations of the RS mission. Insurgents will likely focus on traditional areas of operation (such as in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces) and will likely employ indirect fire and small arms attacks against targets of opportunity. Most insurgent-initiated violence will likely continue to occur away from populated areas. However, complex attacks are projected to increase during this fighting season. The Taliban will continue to portray localized, temporary tactical successes as strategic victories through the media.

In 2015, al Qaeda will likely attempt to rebuild its support networks and planning capabilities with the intention of reconstituting its strike capabilities against Western interests. It likely believes that the recent reduction in coalition force presence in Afghanistan is a precursor to reduced regional counterterrorism operations against the group, which would allow it to regenerate some of its lost capabilities. The ANDSF will require continued assistance and support to conduct operations against members of al Qaeda. It will be critical that, in coordination with Afghan partners, our comprehensive counterterrorism efforts continue to apply pressure against al Qaeda in order to prevent its regeneration. Future U.S. counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan will be affected by the threats and requirements in Afghanistan and around the world.

RS leaders will continue to monitor the potential threat of ISIL establishing a credible presence in Afghanistan. The Afghan administration is particularly concerned about the potential rise of ISIL, which they see as a serious looming threat in the region as part of what President Ghani has referred to as the “ecology of terror.” ISIL represents a competitor with other groups that have traditionally operated in Afghanistan, which may result in increased violence between the various extremist groups.

SECTION 3 – OVERVIEW OF AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

To address current and anticipated security challenges, the ANDSF are now fully responsible for providing security for the Afghan people in accordance with the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit agreement that the ANDSF would wholly own the security mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The International Security Assistance Force formally handed over this mission to the ANDSF during a ceremony on January 1, 2015.

Although capability gaps and shortfalls remain, the ANDSF have a distinct advantage over the insurgency in their training and equipping and are demonstrating an increasing ability to employ this advantage as part of a counterinsurgency strategy. The ANDSF possess impressive materiel capabilities, including howitzers, Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and cargo aircraft, which the insurgents lack. The ANDSF will, however, require more coalition assistance to close key capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, special operations, and the Afghan security ministries' ability to conduct tasks such as planning, programming, budgeting, and human resource management. In part because of the higher operational tempo, operational challenges will continue to plague ANDSF operations this year, including the likelihood of high ANDSF casualties; logistics, sustainment, and maintenance issues; and the inability of the ANP to retain cleared areas after Afghan National Army offensives. Additionally, major operations will likely require political will from Kabul, persistent resource allocation, and ministry-level leadership's direct involvement. Resolute Support advisors are focusing their efforts on maximizing ministerial capacity within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) over the course of the 2015 and 2016 fighting seasons.

3.1 STRATEGY

The Office of the National Security Council is developing and refining the national strategic documents, which include the *National Threat Assessment* (NTA),²⁹ *National Security Policy* (NSP),³⁰ and *National Security Strategy* (NSS). RS advisors are mentoring the ONSC staff in the development and production of clear, concise, and coherent documents that provide strategic direction and guidance. These documents are intended to provide the national strategic guidance, direction, and vision of Afghan political leadership, and influence the creation of ministerial strategies, plans, and policies. The last published NTA and NSP were signed in 2010. In fall 2014, President Ghani directed the addition of the NSS to establish the ways in which the Afghan government will achieve the vision and pillars of the NSP by setting achievable strategic goals, objectives, and tasks to meet Afghanistan's security needs.

²⁹ The NTA analyzes the strategic threats facing Afghanistan and describes the operational environment of the Afghan government's policies, strategies, and plans, forecasting trends over the next five years. The NTA informs the development of the NSP and the NSS.

³⁰ The NSP articulates Afghanistan's national interests, national vision, and the pillars of national security, both within the borders of Afghanistan and externally to the international community for the next five years. Together, these describe the long-term ends that the Afghan government seeks for its people. The NSP provides direction for the implementation guidance set out in the NSS.

The new national strategic documents are exclusively Afghan products and represent a considerable improvement over the previous coalition-drafted editions. In addition, an *Afghan National Campaign Plan* is also under development in order to detail the coordination and development of security requirements across the security sector and prescribe the means to translate the goals, objectives, and tasks of the NSS into an executable plan over the next five years. The MoD and the MoI are responsible for implementing security-related elements of the national security strategy by generating, training, commanding, controlling, and sustaining forces that can perform the tasks that support attainment of national objectives.

3.2 FORCE STRUCTURE AND SIZE

The Secretary of Defense announced at the Camp David strategic security session with President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah in March 2015 that the U.S. Government intends to seek funding to support the ANDSF at the current authorized “surge” level of up to 352,000 personnel through at least 2017. The current authorized end strength is 195,000 ANA personnel (including 7,800 Afghan Air Force personnel) and 157,000 ANP personnel. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) are authorized an additional 30,000 personnel, but these positions are not included in the overall ANDSF structure.³¹ Due to attrition and other factors, the actual on-hand ANDSF force level fluctuated between about 91 and 92 percent of authorized levels during this reporting period.

3.3 BUDGET

At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, international donors agreed to fund an initial force level of 228,500 personnel, subject to periodic reviews based on security conditions and other factors, at an annual estimated cost of \$4.1 billion. At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, international donors affirmed pledges to provide \$1 billion annually to supplement U.S. funding, with the Afghan government pledging \$500 million annually to support their security requirement. The anticipated fiscal year (FY) 2015 cost for the current ANDSF force structure is \$5.4 billion, which is expected to decrease to \$5.0 billion in FY 2016.

The Afghan government is able to fund only \$2 billion of its total annual government budget of approximately \$7.6 billion; international donors fund the remainder. To cover the FY 2015 cost of the ANDSF (\$5.4 billion), DoD is providing \$4.1 billion (\$2.9 billion for the MoD and \$1.2 billion for the MoI) through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. Of the \$4.1 billion provided by the ASFF, approximately \$2.0 billion is provided “on-budget” (\$1.5 billion for the MoD and \$0.5 billion for the MoI), which includes ANA salaries and incentive pay and fuel costs; and \$2.1 billion is provided “off-budget.” The remaining \$1.3 billion of ANDSF costs are funded by international donors (\$923 million for ANA salaries, information technology, aviation training and maintenance, uniforms, and medical supplies) and the Afghan government (\$411 million, primarily for food and subsistence).

³¹ The ALP is not counted in the authorized 352,000 ANDSF structure and is instead on a separate MoI authorization document.

Direct “on-budget” ASFF contributions to the MoI and the MoD primarily fund salaries, consumables, equipment, recurring services, and facility repairs. CSTC-A has taken steps to increase Afghan capacity and capability to manage direct contributions responsibly. These steps include improving fiscal transparency and oversight with a conditions-based financial program and the growth of financial and procurement advisors to train, advise, and assist the MoI and the MoD to improve Afghan financial processes. In addition, CSTC-A is increasing transparency and accountability by developing an integrated pay and personnel system for the ANDSF and aggressively deploying Afghan subject matter experts throughout the ministries to help build capacity and capability. These efforts will enable CSTC-A to help their Afghan counterparts in the MoI and the MoD build capacity to ensure oversight of Afghan financial systems by developing planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition systems and processes.

3.4 LONG-TERM PLAN FOR SUSTAINING ANDSF EQUIPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE

The Department of Defense has fielded nearly \$14 billion in equipment and built \$9 billion in infrastructure for the ANDSF using ASFF funding. This equipment and infrastructure will be sustained responsibly using a mix of organic Afghan capacity and DoD-provided contracted logistics support, in combination with appropriate levels of DoD oversight and engagement. Over time, capacity development and defense institution building efforts under the current RS mission and the follow-on DoD mission will allow the gradual transition of responsibility to Afghan-managed efforts as they are able to absorb these tasks. The ANDSF will continue to rely on U.S. and other international funding to sustain their equipment and infrastructure for at least the next five years, assuming current operational usage remains constant. The total annual sustainment cost for ANDSF equipment and infrastructure is estimated at \$800 million per year, depending on the operational environment.

Equipment Sustainment

Proper sustainment of equipment is critical to ensuring adequate operational readiness rates for the ANA, AAF, and ANP units to conduct their missions. During the ISAF mission, DoD efforts focused on the expedited fielding of equipment required to keep pace with the rapid expansion of the ANDSF, while simultaneously maintaining operational readiness during active combat operations. In particular, wheeled vehicles, weapons, and other ground equipment were provided to the ANDSF, without the “total package approach” traditionally used for foreign military sales (FMS) with security cooperation partners. As a result, the standard array of initial spare parts, maintenance manuals, support equipment, training, technical assistance, and follow-on support was not provided for ANA and ANP equipment. Instead, the ANDSF relied on a patchwork combination of contractor maintenance support, organic Afghan maintenance ability, and U.S. and coalition-sourced parts. The limited contractor maintenance support was insufficient for the scale of the requirement, organic maintenance practices were insufficient for the more complex U.S. systems, and coalition maneuver units were frequently called upon to bridge shortfalls in critical inventory items and provide maintenance training to their Afghan counterparts.

In 2012, DoD re-scoped the ground maintenance mission with the intent of transitioning maintenance to an organic Afghan capability under Afghan control. Although sufficient spare parts, support equipment, and repair manuals were provided, this approach proved to be ineffective for the long-term sustainment of ANDSF equipment. The ANA has shown it is not yet able to assume the complex maintenance management and effective supply chain operations necessary to retain high operational readiness and prolong service life of its assets. Over the last year, as fielding was largely completed, DoD has shifted to a more robust approach to sustaining ANDSF equipment, which will be a key element of DoD's long-term security cooperation partnership with Afghanistan, given projected limitations of organic Afghan capacity to perform complex program management, contracting, and maintenance functions consistent with DoD standards. Without this support, the ANDSF will struggle to maintain acceptable operational readiness rates, given the quantities and complexity of the equipment provided. Current efforts are focused on addressing these gaps by involving DoD program managers in sustainment reviews; developing an Afghan life cycle management structure in the MoD and the MoI and ensuring these organizations are linked to U.S. counterparts; and building a demand-based supply system that ties into the DoD supply system to ensure availability of parts based on actual requirements. This ability to leverage the expertise of DoD program managers for specific end-item support through FMS (and pseudo-FMS, using ASFF funds) sustainment cases will ensure that the ANDSF have access to critical technical and training support.

In addition, RS advisors are building Afghan capacity to enable the Afghans to work with DoD counterparts to develop life cycle sustainment plans for equipment that will identify the right mix of contracted versus organic sustainment support. Moreover, RS advisors are working with Afghan counterparts to develop an Afghan ability to articulate operational requirements and usage rates, forecast requirements for maintenance and replenishment of equipment when it reaches end of service life, and ensure their sustainment force has the training and tools they need. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue to conduct semi-annual program management reviews involving the military department program managers, security assistance experts, and Afghan leadership to identify challenges and develop solutions to ensure the ANDSF have the operational capabilities needed to meet operational requirements. The major issues identified in this forum will be addressed in the Secretary of Defense's annual Security Consultative Forum with the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior.

Infrastructure Sustainment

Afghan army bases, police stations, and airfields have relied primarily on contracted support to maintain complex facility operating systems, such as water lines, electric generators and lines, and sewers and waste treatment. ANA bases have facility engineers who provide a limited organic facility maintenance capability using their Afghan staff, and ANA corps have the ability to contract locally for some maintenance projects. Efforts are underway to expand these organic capabilities in both the ANA and the ANP. However, over the next five years, there is an expectation of a continuing requirement for U.S. and coalition assistance, particularly in the maintenance of complex electrical and other systems. Infrastructure sustainment will also include site improvements and minor construction projects such as roof and battle-damage repairs. The ASFF will continue to fund minor construction projects and site improvement projects at permanent Afghan facilities. DoD will not expend funds for U.S. and coalition bases

that were transferred to the Afghan government because those bases were generally not built as permanent infrastructure and were intended to be completely removed or replaced with permanent infrastructure at their end of their lifecycles. DoD does not, however, plan to fund major new infrastructure projects at ANDSF facilities.

3.5 CAPABILITIES

Operational Capabilities

Although considerable challenges remain, the coalition continues to support the development of the ANDSF's capabilities and ministry capacity and provides limited enabler support to help generate motivated forces to provide for Afghanistan's security. In 2014, during their second fighting season in the lead, the ANDSF proved proficient at providing security for the Afghan people, fighting their own battles, and holding the gains achieved by the coalition over the last 13 years. ANDSF OPTEMPO was four times higher in 2014 than in 2013. They independently planned, led, and executed numerous combined-arms operations, often simultaneously. Both ANA and ANP units showed increased tactical flexibility and endurance. During the reporting period, the ANDSF demonstrated that they are tactically capable of providing security and were not defeated operationally. In addition, regular polling reveals the vast majority of Afghan respondents hold a favorable view of their soldiers and police. According to recent surveys, Afghan opinions regarding the ANDSF remain steady and positive.³²

Collectively, the Afghan Special Security Forces have demonstrated improved proficiency as a capable strike force against insurgent and terrorist networks. The ASSF consist of more than 18,000 highly trained operators divided into the MoD's Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), the *Ktah Khas*, and the Special Mission Wing; and the MoI's National Mission Units (NMUs) and Provincial Special Units (PSUs) under the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). During this reporting period, the GCPSU and ANA Special Forces and Commando units conducted more than 2,800 independent operations, which accounted for 82 percent of all missions. More than 92 percent of all missions by special security forces were Afghan-led. Commando units now conduct night raids independently using their own intelligence to drive their operations. The SMW is also executing long-range, full-mission profiles in low illumination. Working together, the commando units and the SMW are consistently conducting unilateral direct action missions against insurgent leaders and facilitators. Most notably, intelligence collaboration, joint planning, and coordination increased as evidenced by several multi-pillar operations consisting of forces from both the MoD and the MoI. Coalition advisory efforts emphasized intelligence development, operational planning, human capital development, logistical sustainment, and special operations forces aviation to ensure the ASSF remain a viable, long-term counterterrorism partner.

During recent operations in southern Afghanistan, particularly in pre-fighting season offensives such as Operation ZILFAQAR in northern Helmand Province, the ANDSF have begun to demonstrate cross-pillar coordination between the ANA and the ANP. They also recognize the importance of follow-up efforts within the "hold" phase to maintain gains from security

³² For example, see the latest ANQAR survey, Wave 27, April 2015.

operations. From February to April 2015, the ANA, ANP, and NDS conducted a cross-pillar, multi-corps operation to disrupt insurgent activity prior to the 2015 fighting season. Lieutenant General Khaliq, the Director of the General Staff at the time, commanded the operation and unified the various ANDSF elements, including 215th Corps, 205th Corps, and 207th Corps from the ANA; the Special Operations Division; 111th Capital Division; 2nd Mobile Strike Brigade; the AAF; the Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP); and the ALP. Jointly, the ANDSF cleared areas, destroyed insurgent bunkers and strongholds, and found and cleared a large number of IEDs from the upper Sangin Valley to Kajaki. In support, the AAF provided organic air support with Mi-35 and Mi-17 helicopters, which increased the morale of ground forces while targeting insurgents. Notably, the ANDSF asked for few coalition enablers. Coalition forces provided non-point of injury MEDEVAC support for only one multiple casualty event. Otherwise, the ANDSF effectively used organic casualty evacuation support via vehicle and air. Ultimately, the operation allowed a 20-vehicle convoy, operated by a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implementing partner, to deliver repair parts to the Kajaki Dam in northern Helmand.

Although the operation highlighted many positive developments, it also exposed continued challenges, particularly in logistics, intelligence-operations fusion, counter-IED exploitation capabilities, and air platform management. RS advisors provided assistance during the planning and implementation of the operation through periodic expeditionary advising visits. The ANDSF continue to coordinate in the region after agreeing to post-operation tasks and responsibilities.

However, more defensive operations, such as those conducted in Dangam District in Kunar Province, a mountainous region near the Pakistan border, highlighted other remaining challenges, primarily in leadership. In Dangam, the ANDSF did not have as much time to plan and were somewhat taken by surprise. From December 2014 to January 2015, the ANDSF battled insurgents in Dangam. The fighting began in December 2014 when local Afghan villagers stood up to members of the Taliban who had attempted to gain a foothold in the district. The ANA sent in reinforcements as part of Operation TOFAN DARASURK and encountered heavy fighting. Yet due to the various ANDSF elements operating in the district, there was no common understanding of who owned the fight, resulting in a lack of unity of effort. Senior Afghan leaders did not empower the corps commander and subordinate officers to achieve their mission. The Afghan government asked the coalition for aerial support multiple times and were granted shows of force and close air support on just a few occasions. Over time, the ANA brigade commander was relieved and replaced, which improved leadership. This change, combined with support from Afghan commandos, turned the tide, and ANDSF eventually cleared the valley and restored control. Several months later, an ANA corps in Kunduz Province that lacked an appointed commander similarly struggled to respond quickly to a Taliban offensive.

As an example of the result of positive leadership within the ANDSF, in March 2015, a series of avalanches and floods struck northeastern Afghanistan. The ANDSF responded by providing critical support to the victims of the natural disasters, including Mi-17 flights delivering medical teams and humanitarian supplies to Afghan civilians, clearance of dozens of blocked roads,

rescue of survivors, remains recovery, and care for displaced personnel. This was in addition to the ongoing offensive in Helmand Province and hostage rescue attempts.

Attrition

Consistent with its high OPTEMPO, the ANDSF suffered a high attrition rate – which accounts for losses to the force³³ – that has had an impact on combat strength and readiness. The ANDSF's monthly overall attrition rates decreased this reporting period, averaging 1.8 percent per month compared to the same period last year, which averaged 2.1 percent per month. If present rates continue, attrition will pose challenges to creating a professional force. The primary causes of ANDSF attrition are generally attributed to poor leadership, high OPTEMPO, inadequate care of personnel and poor quality of life, alternative work opportunities outside the ANDSF, and poor force management.³⁴ President Ghani and ANDSF leaders are taking steps to address some of these factors, including making leadership changes within the ANDSF, enforcing leave policies, and reviewing retention incentives.

RS staff estimates that ANDSF casualties were approximately 59 percent higher during this reporting period compared to the same period last year. The increase in ANDSF casualty figures was highest during the first few months of 2015, reaching approximately 80 percent higher than the same period last year. Due to the seasonal nature of conflict in Afghanistan, RS staff expects ANDSF casualties to increase in the next several months. The combination of an increased OPTEMPO, assumption of greater security responsibilities, drawdown of coalition forces, and an aggressive pursuit of the insurgency have all contributed to the increase in casualty rates. Increased casualties have been borne primarily by the ANP and the ALP. Overall, the ANP and the ALP are the most frequently engaged elements of the ANDSF and continue to suffer the majority of ANDSF casualties, primarily because they are often employed at isolated checkpoints and are not as well armed or trained as the ANA. Although this is a matter of serious concern, the ANDSF remain cohesive and do not show indications that they will fail under the strain as they continue to demonstrate tactical superiority over insurgents and maintain consistent control over Afghanistan's populated areas.

Leadership Challenges

One of the critical shortfalls across ANDSF pillars is a lack of competent leadership in key positions. This is not due to a shortage of well-trained, experienced, and talented officers, but is instead due to political pressure for ethnic balance and patronage in senior positions. Although some of these leaders are courageous and experienced fighters, they lack formal military education and are unable to lead a large, complex, and technology-enabled modern military force. President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah are driving meaningful transformation and merit-based appointments in the Afghan security ministries and their forces. Notably, in

³³ Attrition rates account for losses to the force, which take into account killed in action, non-hostile deaths, separations, retirements, and dropped from the rolls. Individuals are dropped from the rolls when they leave their units without authorization for more than 30 days. Some personnel who leave without authorization, including those dropped from the rolls, eventually return to their units. The dropped from the rolls category of attrition is the largest source of ANDSF attrition and KIA is the smallest source of attrition.

³⁴ There is no legal penalty for Afghan military and police personnel who decide to quit the force before their term of enlistment is complete.

February 2015, President Ghani directed the mandatory retirement of 47 general officers whom he considered ineffective.

ANDSF soldiers and police perform well when they are well-led. Yet they remain severely tested due to gaps in a range of areas, most notably in logistics, sustainment, equipment maintenance, medical care, personnel attrition, mobility, and offensive combat power, and with significant challenges in leadership accountability and endemic corruption. These issues are, in part, symptomatic of ANDSF reliance on coalition support and enablers over the preceding 13 years.

Capacity Shortfalls

The ANDSF's capacity to execute large, combined combat operations across the country with minimal coalition assistance is expected to continue to improve. The ANDSF will require less coalition assistance to conduct security operations; however, they will continue to need support for years to come in developing the systems, processes, and institutions necessary to run a professional, self-sufficient, and self-sustaining army and police force.

In general, the ANDSF are not ready to transition from contracted logistics support to organic, Afghan-only support. Supply shortages in operational units are most often the result of the ANDSF's underdeveloped logistics system, rather than actual aggregate supply shortages. Historically, when the coalition ordered supplies for Afghan forces, the ANDSF had little involvement in the process. They are increasingly involved today, but their logistics warehouse managers are often unaware of inbound shipments, and units in the field may lack the ability to requisition necessary items. Since the supply and demand signals do not match, supplies can sit in warehouses unsorted. To support self-sustainment, RS advisors and their Afghan partners are conducting a reassessment of the National Maintenance Strategy, along with the integration of a vehicle and equipment replenishment program.

3.6 ROLE OF THE TRAIN, ADVISE, AND ASSIST COMMANDS

In an attempt to close some of these gaps, RS advisors continue to work with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and police equivalent levels through train, advise, and assist commands. The United States leads TAAC-South (TAAC-S) in Kandahar and TAAC-East (TAAC-E) in Jalalabad; Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N) in Mazar-e-Sharif; Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W) in Herat; and Turkey leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area. In addition, the Advise and Assist Directorate (AAD) provides oversight on each of the regional advise and assist cells (AACs) which continue level three advising in regions without collocated coalition partners. TAAC-Air is a functional advising command that continues the TAA mission with the AAF.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital

TAAC-C includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District) and includes eight contributing nations that are led by Turkish forces. TAAC-C provides functionally based SFA to the 111th Capital Division, Operations Coordination Center – Regional in Kabul, Kabul City Police, the Afghan Border Police, and ANCOP elements operating in Kabul to enable a credible, capable,

and increasingly sustainable force. The Afghan security ministries and forces in Kabul are working hard to protect the capital, both during the 2015 fighting season and in future years. During this reporting period, TAAC-C efforts helped prepare these elements for the 2015 fighting season. The focus of TAAC-C efforts is to ensure that systems for Afghan security ministries and their forces allow the ANDSF regional level headquarters to secure the Kabul security zone; train, advise, and assist the 111th Capital Division and Afghan capital police units to appropriately respond to security incidents within Kabul; and coordinate the defense of the Hamid Karzai International Airport base.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East

TAAC-E, which includes U.S. and Polish forces, covers the provinces of Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nuristan. TAAC-E began this reporting period conducting functionally based SFA with two ANA corps: the 201st and the 203rd Corps.

At the beginning of the reporting period, TAAC-E advisory teams conducted level three advising with their Afghan counterparts by flying to the region as needed. Most of the advising with 203rd Corps was conducted via telephone and email correspondence. Based on the continuing progress and capabilities of the 203rd Corps and the security forces in the region, TAAC-E split in early 2015 with the development of the Advise and Assist Cell – Southeast (AAC-SE). AAC-SE, discussed more below, now provides level three advising focusing on sustainment issues to support the 203rd Corps and Paktiya provincial headquarters from the RS headquarters in Kabul.

TAAC-E continues to support the 201st Corps. Priorities in preparation for the 2015 fighting season included developing the 201st Corps Regional Military Training Center and the Gamberi Regional Medical Facility, logistics planning, and force optimization. The fully functional regional military training center, which provides the 201st Corps with the force generation capacity required to sustain and train its forces, was completed on March 1, 2015. Additionally, the Gamberi Regional Medical Facility was completed on February 1, 2015. Advisors will continue to train, advise, and assist their ANA counterparts on manning, equipping, and acquiring supplies to enhance medical capacities within the 201st Corps. Additional preparations for the 2015 fighting season included TAA efforts on logistics planning, maintenance, and force optimization. The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) focused on maintaining security in the district centers and increased efforts to secure key walkways and streets throughout the city and highway security to reduce the threat of high-profile attacks, specifically in and around Jalalabad. Their secondary effort was to conduct community policing through local districts stations.

In addition, TAAC-E and AAC-SE advisors provided support for the ANDSF's Operation BADAR, which began in April 2015. The major multi-corps and cross-pillar operation took place along the border between Zabul and Ghazni Provinces and involved the ANA 205th and 203rd Corps, and various ANP and ASSF units. Similar to Operation ZILFAQAR in Helmand Province, RS advisors helped advise this effort via expeditionary advisory teams.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West

TAAC-W, led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces. TAAC-W also includes forces from the United States, Spain, Lithuania, Slovenia, Hungary, Albania, and Ukraine. TAAC-W conducts functionally based SFA with the 207th Corps ANA.

The 207th Corps carried out some operations during the winter season, many of them jointly with other components of the ANDSF. Operation TOFAN KOHISTAN and Operation KHANJAR are long-standing operations that the 207th Corps conducted to maintain freedom of movement and contribute to a secure environment.

TAAC-W now only provides trainers for highly specialized training, usually in connection with the fielding of new equipment or systems. Qualified ANA trainers provide the vast majority of the 207th Corps training. In another promising development, the 207th Corps closed and reorganized many of its checkpoints to free its forces from fixed positions, allowing them to deploy and maintain these forces as a reserve.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South

TAAC-S, led by U.S. forces with seven additional contributing nations, includes the provinces of Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul. Through daily interaction with their Afghan partners, TAAC-S advisors provide functionally based SFA to the 205th Corps ANA to enhance their capability to conduct effective combat operations and provide security. During this reporting period, TAAC-S focused on objectives to prepare the ANDSF for the fighting season and develop sustainable capabilities. Additionally, TAAC-S provided specific low-density specialty skill sets to enable the Advise and Assist Cell – Southwest (AAC-SW) expeditionary advisory package to support operations in northern Helmand Province.

TAAC-S assesses 205th Corps to be capable of providing security to most of southern Afghanistan. The leadership in place is disciplined, effective, and ready to prove their ability to provide security independently. The 205th Corps remains connected with MoD staff through visits, audits, inspections, and the use of emerging national processes. However, the 205th Corps requires further development in the areas of planning, enabler integration, and some sustainment functions.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North

TAAC-N, led by German forces, includes the provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e Pul, and Takhar. However, current TAA efforts are limited to the Mazar-e-Sharif area. TAAC-N works with the 209th Corps ANA to improve key functions such as logistics; personnel affairs; military security; planning and execution of operations; infrastructure management; and communications. Advisors focused their TAA efforts on transitioning checkpoint responsibilities from the ANA to the ANP. In addition, the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System was locally installed to enable better personnel management; once AHRIMS is fully implemented, the MoI intends to connect it to the Electronic Payroll System (EPS). Additional advising efforts will continue ANA development in

intelligence-driven operations, logistics sustainment, and conducting financial management and contracting actions.

During this reporting period, TAAC-N advisors observed improvement in the 209th Corps' ability to plan, coordinate, and execute security and combined operations with all ANDSF pillars in the area. In March 2015, the ANDSF effectively provided security for the Nowruz New Year's celebration in Mazar-e-Sharif. Additionally, RS advisors continue to focus on the development of intelligence capabilities within the ANCOP, which includes more involvement in the operational planning process. Finally, the ABP 806th Zone conducted cross pillar training with the ANA, which included counter-IED training.

Advise and Assist Directorate

The Kabul-based AAD provides oversight to each of the regional AACs. The AAD conducts level three expeditionary advising to assist the ANDSF in regions without collocated coalition partners to facilitate processes focused on key essential functions, advocate for ANDSF requirements, and facilitate the integration of independent ANDSF operations.

The AAC-SW became the first of its kind when it replaced the previous ISAF Regional Command – Southwest in October 2014. AAC-SW continues to train, advise, and assist the 215th Corps ANA and Helmand provincial headquarters, and supported the cross-pillar Operation ZILFAQAR in northern Helmand. AAC-SE was established during this reporting period to support the 203rd Corps and Paktiya provincial headquarters.

AACs will continue to assume level three advisory responsibilities from each of the TAACs currently partnered with the ANDSF. Current plans call for AACs to conduct advising for all ANDSF from Kabul during 2016.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air

NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan was renamed TAAC-Air in January 2015. The name change does not change the unit's mission or its chain of command under NATO Air Command-Afghanistan (NAC-A). TAAC-Air is a functional command that spans all of Afghanistan. Air advisors continue to work with the AAF from the Minister of Defense level down to the AAF wing level.


Kandahar will remain an area of focus for TAAC-Air advisors for the remainder of 2015. Kandahar is a strategic location for the AAF, as it provides a centralized operating and logistical support location in close proximity to areas considered decisive terrain in maintaining security and stability in Afghanistan.

SECTION 4 – MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

4.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The MoD manages the ANA (see Figure 6). On May 21, 2015, President Ghani nominated Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai as Minister of Defense; however, the Afghan Parliament has not yet confirmed his appointment during this reporting period. The postponed appointment of a new Minister of Defense has negatively affected planning for the 2015 fighting season and the ability to exercise command and control. Political delays in naming senior leaders, from the Minister of Defense down, exacerbated the tendency for incumbent leaders to postpone tough decisions pending the appointment of permanent leaders. As these delays continue, they will increasingly affect the ongoing development of various Afghan strategic documents.

Figure 6: Ministry of Defense Organizational Chart



The army, with its police partners, continues to have a pivotal role in maintaining security and stability across Afghanistan following the first peaceful democratic transition of power in Afghanistan’s history. While planning and resource allocation continue to improve, RS advisors continue to help address the significant challenges that remain. These challenges include strategic and operational planning, logistics, budget execution, structural efficiency, transparency, and internal organizational control. Additionally, modern human resource

business practices are required to ensure that professional development of the ANA continues to improve, and that it is employed appropriately.

Resource Management and Procurement Capability

The resource management and procurement process starts with funding provided through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. These funds are transferred to the Afghan government on a quarterly basis, or as otherwise required, and overseen by the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan. To disburse funds, CSTC-A requests a transfer of direct assistance to a Ministry of Finance (MoF) account at Da Afghanistan Bank – Afghanistan’s central bank – using the Defense Finance and Accounting Services. The MoF provides budget authority to the MoD, which then coordinates with MoF branch offices to make salary payments to the ANA and vendors for goods and services. Prior to the funds transfer from the MoF to the MoD, the MoF provides CSTC-A with an acceptance letter, stating that MoF accepts and confirms the purpose and amount of funds to be disbursed and the bank account to be used in facilitating the actual transfer. To help protect these funds from fraud, waste, and abuse, CSTC-A has instituted several controls, including the requirement for formal agreement with the Afghan government, establishment of funds disbursement conditions and reporting requirements, and the development of a risk mitigation strategy.

Within the resource management function, the most critical gaps in Afghan capacity are the lack of effective systems and repeatable processes to develop requirements, procure goods and services, and manage budget execution properly. In addition, stove-piped organizational structures and centralized decision making authority, in conjunction with poor communication among the security ministries, further increases capacity gaps. Without improvement of these key resource management practices, the ministries will be unable to develop common and consistent policies, processes, and procedures in areas such as the procurement of goods and services. The procurement process, with its fragmented authority lines and multi-ministry involvement in approvals, allows corruption, inconsistent practices, and restrictive growth in procurement capacity.

This was highlighted in February 2015, when President Ghani terminated a three-year MoD fuel contract after the Oversight Committee on MoD Contracts, a committee consisting of high-level officials from the Afghan government, in concert with relevant U.S. parties, including the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and CSTC-A, found evidence of corruption in the form of collusion, price fixing, and bribery. The Oversight Committee recommended the following actions:

- 1) In accordance with Afghan Law, the violators be terminated from their positions and prosecuted and punished;
- 2) The MoD fuel contract be advertised for re-bidding;
- 3) RS advisors be requested to assist in vetting the bidders;
- 4) The National Procurement Authority be responsible for the bidding process on large contracts, with cooperation from the international community; and
- 5) Investigations continue against conspiracy cases and the exchange of money as bribes.

President Ghani's timely response to allegations of bid rigging in the ANDSF fuel procurement process demonstrates his administration's commitment to eliminating corruption and maintaining transparency in the application of donor funding in order to maximize the impact of those funds. However, the incident also caused President Ghani to suspend the MoD procurement processes.

RS advisors have taken additional actions to enforce transparency and accurate reporting. CSTC-A temporarily withheld part of the 209th Corps' fuel allocation due to inaccurate consumption documentation. This method of accountability should help ensure that the ANA accurately reports fuel usage.

The MoD's procurement system requires significant coalition support for major procurement initiatives that will enable the long-term sustainability of the MoD. With only the Afghanistan Reconstruction Development Services procuring complex and high dollar actions, ministry procurement offices have not yet learned comprehensive procurement planning, true aggregation and consolidation of common services, services, and works, or sound business rules and decisions. In general, ANDSF personnel are more comfortable with paper and simple Microsoft Excel worksheets that do not provide instant feedback on available resources, which often results in the over-execution or under-execution of funds. Resource visibility is being improved through careful introduction of automation.

The MoD has delegated many spending responsibilities to budgetary units with functional responsibilities. These functions include supply, maintenance, information technology, and base operations. Thus far, the budgetary units have demonstrated weak performance in articulating purchasing requirements and contract deliverables in a manner that can be put out for bid, which has resulted in weak budget execution. Furthermore, MoD budgetary units operate in an extremely risk-averse manner. Administrative errors in purchasing or forecasting often result in delays in planning and executing support missions.

The objectives for developing resource management capacity in the MoD are to build donor confidence by developing transparent, accountable, and effective Afghan government processes; increase resource management capability and capacity within the MoD; and set conditions for 2017 and beyond by building effective systems and processes today. RS advisors seek to achieve these objectives by enforcing conditionality and fiscal discipline outlined in CSTC-A commitment letters (which implement internal controls over the contract management process to improve transparency and accountability), establishing a procurement technical working group to address procurement and contracting issues, conducting regular execution and financial management reviews, increasing MoD budget execution, implementing integrated pay and personnel systems, and adding skilled personnel in the headquarters and corps to build capacity as coalition forces draw down through the Ministerial Advisory Contract Services and subject matter expert programs. Senior RS advisors are also supporting the Afghan government through a Procurement Approval Board initiative, designed to address shortfalls with the procurement process. These programs increase financial management capacity and internal control systems, and provide western-educated Afghan citizens as subject matter experts and technical experts to train, advise, support, and enhance the operational and strategic capabilities of the MoD in the functional areas of human resource management; logistics and sustainment; resource management; information, technology, and engineering; and communications and procurement.

The overall goal of these efforts is to develop an MoD capable of performing resource management without excessive coalition oversight, and execute a transparent and systematic resource management process for an annual budget of more than \$1.8 billion.

The MoD Acquisition Agency enthusiastically accepted responsibility and leadership of the bi-weekly procurement technical working group, which provides an opportunity to discuss challenges with requirements generation, contract approvals, and processes. Meetings have been on hold since early February 2015, when President Ghani suspended the MoD procurement processes, but will resume once procurement responsibilities and authorities are more clearly defined. In the “programming” function of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process, MoD principal leaders have taken ownership of the mission, with assistance from advisors. During the programming phase in 2014 (Afghan Solar Year (SY) 1394 requirements), advisors and Afghan contractors performed much of the validation and analysis of requirements for 2015. During the ongoing 2015 phase (SY 1395 requirements), Afghans are in the lead, which is a positive sign of improvement for MoD development.

Continued financial support from the international community depends upon a transparent and accountable resource management process that enables oversight by third-party organizations. Priority of effort includes unifying and synchronizing the RS resource management and procurement advisor network to encourage leaders of the Afghan security ministries to embrace transparent and accountable processes while providing effective oversight. The absence of effective internal control processes increases the risk of poor management and the existence of corrupt practices, which deprives the ANDSF of vital resources and could lead to reduction in international contributions overtime. To address this shortfall, the Ministerial Internal Controls Program was signed by the acting Minister of Defense in April 2015 (as well as an anti-corruption policy), and is being implemented within the MoD. RS advisors assisted with developing MICP guidelines, which will lead to process maps, auditing plans, and the development of effective and sustainable control processes for items such as fuel, ammunition, salaries, and food. The MoD Inspector General (IG) and the ANA General Staff IG have accepted responsibility and leadership for the implementation of the MICP and have adopted a leadership role in the transparency, accountability, and oversight forums, such as the Counter Corruption Working Group and the Senior High Commission Anti-Corruption Council.

As work on the MICP progresses, the focus will shift to strengthening the organizational inspection program, enhancing the counter corruption reporting structure, and improving the effectiveness of the associated policy boards and inspection plans. The goal of this effort is a comprehensive and sustainable MoD MICP that forms the foundation for an effective counter-corruption system and informs the Afghan government, NATO, and international stakeholders of transparency, accountability, and oversight in accordance with best practices. This should lead to improved Afghan government ability to demonstrate fiscal stewardship and progress towards investigating suspected offenders within the MoD and prosecutions in accordance with Afghan law.

Other indicators of progress include MoD and GS IG annual inspection plans. Corps inspections have been re-invigorated, and there is a noticeable reduction in complacency associated with oversight.

Legal Affairs

Corruption in Afghanistan is an obstacle to building trust and confidence in the Afghan government. Coalition advisors train, advise, and assist MoD personnel to respect the rule of law and to operate in accordance with Afghanistan's constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations, with a particular focus on resolution within the Afghan criminal justice system of gross violations of human rights – including extra-judicial killings – and significant acts of corruption. Advisors assist the MoD in developing appropriate processes to prevent, track, investigate, and prosecute GVHRs and significant acts of corruption. Other advisor priorities include mentoring the MoD to prevent and prosecute corruption, report and prosecute GVHRs, and improve investigation processes; re-empowering the Major Crimes Task Force as the premier corruption investigative organization; and establishing advisor/liaison presence within the Attorney General's Office (AGO).

In its efforts to assist the MoD and the ANA in achieving these milestones, coalition advisors have aided in identifying and filling in gaps in Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and human rights training, as well as gaps in the processes for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting GVHR and significant acts of corruption. In addition, advisors have focused on mapping out GVHR and corruption case tracking in processing from the initial report to case or trial completion.

The ANA General Staff Legal Office has demonstrated that it is capable of addressing incidents of GVHR. The ANA has demonstrated the willingness and ability to adjudicate GVHRs using the military justice system through its prosecution of three cases during this reporting period. In each case, the ANA's Criminal Investigation Division conducted thorough and fair inquiries. Notably, all three cases resulted in convictions and significant sentences.

In addition, the ANA Training and Education Command Legal School offers a human rights and LOAC course, which conforms to relevant international law standards. However, these courses are only provided to a limited audience and miss a larger group of ANA junior leaders and soldiers. Instead, the ANA heavily relies on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to provide human rights and LOAC training at the corps-level. The ICRC's program is limited in terms of class length, ANA personnel trained, and corps covered. In order to help resolve this training gap, coalition advisors are assisting the Legal School in developing a plan for its Kabul-based instructors to establish mobile training.

The ANA GS Legal Office has the investigative processes and institutional capacity in place to investigate major acts of corruption. However, its will to investigate corruption allegations is problematic, and the adjudication of major acts of corruption in the ANA and the MoD is not functional. The current legal system prohibits the MoD/ANA GS Legal Office from prosecuting ANA personnel for such crimes within the military justice system. All corruption cases must be transferred to the AGO for prosecution. Based on decrees by the Afghanistan Supreme Court High Council and the AGO, the Afghanistan civilian courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over major corruption crimes. Coalition advisors are attempting to develop a relationship with AGO entities in order to help bridge the gap between AGO and MoD/GS entities and track movement of cases referred to the AGO.

Personnel Management

The MoD does not yet have integrated personnel and pay systems. Currently, the MoD requires the ANA to record personnel attendance—present- and not present-for-duty—on a daily basis. ANA unit commanders are responsible for personnel verification within their unit(s) and base their daily attendance reports on check-in and check-out signatures from each individual under their command. Once ANA personnel and payroll data is collected, it is entered manually into a series of data systems. Officials at the ANA Recruitment Center and Kabul Military Training Center collect new recruit data and create a personnel record for each recruit in the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System, a system that the ANA and ANP use to store human resources information. Human resource officials at the ANA corps headquarters are then responsible for updating AHRIMS records to reflect changes in status, including rank, duty location, and training. Payroll data is then entered into the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS), the Afghan government’s budget and accounting system, managed by the MoF, which determines the total salary amount to be sent to each ANA location and disburses funds monthly to one of four banks. The banks then electronically transfer salaries directly to individual bank accounts. The MoD does not have an electronic direct deposit pay system.

The MoD is working towards gaining better accountability of its personnel by having all soldiers properly slotted against their authorized positions in AHRIMS. During this reporting period, AHRIMS slotting progressed from 57 to 89 percent against ANA strength, and MoD leadership continues to emphasize its importance. AHRIMS implementation challenges include sporadic losses in connectivity and power at AHRIMS sites. CSTC-A is seeking support from the Department of the Army to establish a forward provisional non-standard information technology program management office with reach-back under the Program Executive Officer, Enterprise Information Systems. Given the nature of the problem and its complexity, RS advisors believe that a proper information technology system can be fully operational by April 2017. Ultimately, this system will facilitate the reduction of several existing problems, including human error, inefficiencies, poor record management, unverifiable data, as well as mismanagement and/or corruption.

Civilianization, an increased role for non-uniformed personnel in the administration of the MoD, has slowly progressed during the reporting period moving toward the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit agreement that the ANDSF would operate under effective civilian leadership. Last year’s commitment letter set specific civilian milestones to grow a 8,064 civilian workforce, which have not been met. During this reporting period, 80 positions moved from military billets to civilian positions. The previous Acting Minister of Defense, Enayatullah Nazari, began addressing the way forward for civilianization in the MoD by creating a civilian leadership program to fill key senior positions using the Civil Service Commission.

RS advisors are also providing expertise in manpower planning to help enable their Afghan counterparts. Effective coalition TAA efforts resulted in compiling an 18-month manpower plan to be socialized with other MoD departments. However, continuation of MoD’s inconsistent and unbalanced approach to addressing recruitment and attrition aspects of manpower planning represents a significant challenge and a clear hurdle that directly affects success in allocating

resources for recruiting and training meant to maintain ANA end strength, meet fighting season requirements, and grow a mature and professionalized force.

Logistics and Maintenance

The ANA logistics structure consists of two national-level organic sustainment nodes: a maintenance facility called the Central Workshop (CWS), and a warehouse called the Central Supply Depot (CSD). Below these national level organizations, the ANA logistics system is pull/demand-based, which requires a system that communicates well and responds quickly. This type of logistics system relies on ANA units requesting supplies using a MoD-14 form,³⁵ and the requests moving up the support chain to a level that can fill the request. The current process is very bureaucratic and requires numerous signatures for the MoD-14 from the regional and national levels in order to be approved, with an average wait time of 90 days to fulfill a supply request.

The ANA's CWS, which is responsible for repairing or rebuilding equipment to a serviceable condition, is capable of sending mobile maintenance teams to different locations throughout Afghanistan to repair weapons and high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). The Class IX³⁶ items required for these operations are a combination of parts supplied by the CWS and parts provided by the supported corps. The CWS has trouble sustaining maintenance operations due to lack of parts, a result of the inefficient requisition process and poor communication between it and the CSD, which is the primary national level supply depot responsible for issuing, shipping, receiving, storing, and replenishing Class II,³⁷ IV,³⁸ VI,³⁹ VII,⁴⁰ and IX items. All other classes of supply are handled by separate commands that report to the Logistics Command. The CSD is responsible for warehouse operations to receive, account for, store, secure, report on, distribute, and prepare for shipping their assigned classes of supply. The CSD provides Class VI, VII, and IX parts to the CWS via the MoD-14 process.

The CWS also struggles identifying which Class IX items to order. Advisors have assisted the CWS by providing nomenclature and part numbers for the HMMWV with engine rebuild kits, transmission rebuild kits, and bore scopes for various weapons. The CWS has not demonstrated the willingness to order or confirm order receipt of these items. The result is a reduced ability to rebuild engines, repair transmissions, and gauge weapons. Weapons maintenance is still functional, but lacks the validation that weapons have been gauged.

³⁵ The MoD-14 form request is the basic form used to request items and supplies within the ANA logistics system.

³⁶ Class IX is repair parts and components, including kits, assemblies, and subassemblies (repairable or non-repairable) required for maintenance support of all equipment.

³⁷ Class II is clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and kits, hand tools, unclassified maps, administrative and housekeeping supplies, and equipment.

³⁸ Class IV is construction materials, including installed equipment and all fortification and barrier materials.

³⁹ Class VI is personal demand items (e.g., soap, toothpaste, beverages).

⁴⁰ Class VII is major end items such as launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles.



Up Armored HMMWV

In February 2015, the first batches of a total of 200 MaxxPro MRAPs were transferred, i.e., transfer of title, to the ANA and shipped to the CSD to install additional equipment.⁴¹ Once installation was complete, the ANA fielded the MRAPs and MRAP Recovery Vehicles to the receiving units. In most cases, they were immediately put into service.



Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected

The CWS provides the ANA with the ability to perform major repairs and overhaul individual components, major assemblies, and end items. At the regional level, the ANA has seven regional organic maintenance and supply facilities called Regional Logistics Supply Centers (RLSC). RLSCs are located at each of the corps and provide the corps with a capability for more complex maintenance tasks than those performed at the unit level. This is similar to the U.S. Army's two-level maintenance system. The ANA possesses an organic maintenance capability to sustain its ground wheeled fleet of more than 48,000 vehicles but relies heavily on the two base maintenance depot facilities and contracted maintenance to maintain readiness rates. DoD security assistance efforts are focused on improving equipment readiness rates. The ANA will

⁴¹ In 2014, 200 MaxxPro MRAPs and 20 MRAP Recovery Vehicles were provided to the ANA via an excess defense article (EDA) foreign military sales (pseudo-FMS) case.

continue to be challenged to sustain acceptable readiness rates at least until the National Maintenance Strategy is implemented in 2017.

The MoD approved the National Maintenance Strategy on March 12, 2015. The strategy is an Afghan solution that was developed with the assistance of coalition advisors in order to address ANDSF sustainment gaps. The National Maintenance Strategy consists of a contracted logistics support maintenance contract at 23 key national and regional nodes to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations while training and supporting the ANDSF leadership and operators in maintenance and supply chain management operations. Progress on implementing the National Maintenance Strategy has been hindered by suspensions of key leaders in the MoD, especially the Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, which has created a leadership and experience gap that is currently bridged by advising with the current acting assistant minister.

The MoD logistics and maintenance systems can execute basic supply and distribution functions; however, the MoD requires coalition assistance to improve its ability to distribute supplies. Existing systems are largely manual and paper based with a dependency on excessive bureaucracy and often requiring the intervention of senior officers to resolve relatively minor issues. The ability of MoD headquarters to influence supply and distribution outside of Kabul varies considerably, with ineffectual controls, poor consumption reporting, and little visibility below the regional and corps levels.

The Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS)⁴² is the only logistics information management enabler across the entire force, which has created challenges with maintaining adequate supplies for Class IV, V,⁴³ and VIII items. Like AHRIMS, use of the system has been challenged by electrical outages, network connectivity, training, and implementation, especially within the ANA corps and below, and efforts are underway to increase access to Core-IMS. To address training shortfalls, the logistics information management team has trained Afghan contracted civilians and provided them with computers and will embed them at key logistics and maintenance locations for at least one year. These Afghans will train ANDSF logistics officers and non-commissioned officers at their work site on Core-IMS operations.

The best Core-IMS encoders are located at the CSD; however, personnel at the CSD generally prefer to use a paper ledger. Similarly, logistics personnel in management positions are not using Core-IMS executive reports to improve processing, shipping, and receiving to force implementation, instead relying on a manual paper system when their offices lose power or drop connectivity to the internet. The CSD produces reports in a timely manner but is not conducting inventories as required by Decree 4.0, which mandates an annual, physical inventory of 100 percent of stocks.⁴⁴ The delay in decisions at the Logistics Command level affects ANA

⁴² Core-IMS is a full-featured, flexible web-based system designed to address a comprehensive set of warehouse inventory management needs from inventory initialization through order processing across multiple warehouses. Core-IMS provides efficient asset visibility at all levels in the inventory.

⁴³ Class V is ammunition.

⁴⁴ Decree 4.0, ANA Logistical Supply Policy and Procedures for Supporting and Supported Units, provides doctrinal and procedural authority for logistical support to ANA organizations and authorities for execution. According to the decree, inventories must be completed by all supply depot levels (tactical to national), and results must be forwarded to the next level above within seven working days.

logistics and maintenance processes and inhibits the ANA's logistical and maintenance readiness at the corps level and below. The Core-IMS program management office was established but lacks an approved *tashkil* to allow the staffing for it.

The ANA is able to account for serial numbered items, such as weapons, vehicles, and sensitive items. At the national logistics level, the ANA is able to store and receive Class II, IV, VI, VII, and IX items correctly and has a good understanding of the requisition process. It is still reliant on advisors to assist with solving problems. The corps liaison officer at the CSD is the lynchpin of the requisition process. If the corps has selected a strong liaison officer, there are often no issues. If the liaison officer is not engaged and does not take action to correct problems, MoD-14 processing suffers and requisitions go unfilled. The ANA has still not developed the ability to automate its inventory in Core-IMS, to forecast requirements, to track consumption-based data to inform logistics decisions, and to maintain accurate inventories at the regional level and below.

Overall, the ANDSF are in the process of developing the institutional knowledge to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations, operate a demand-based supply system to inform logistics decisions, and provide accurate accountability of Class VII and Class IX repair parts. The National Maintenance Strategy will focus on closing these gaps by continuing training at key national and regional sustainment nodes.

Strategic and Operational Planning

The MoD and the GS are manned, trained, and organized to develop and produce documents that will provide guidance and direction in the preparation of the *National Military Strategy*, the *Guidance for Operational Planning*, the *General Staff Planning Guidance*, and the *Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance*. This guidance and direction will enable the staffs to develop and implement resource-informed and threat-aware products, and implement the strategy, plans, and policies to identify tasks and missions, resources, requirements, task organization, gaps, risk, and processes.

The *National Threat Assessment*, *National Security Policy*, and *National Security Strategy* are intended to inform the basis for the MoD's *National Military Strategy* (NMS). The NMS outlines the MoD's strategy as the basis of subordinate plans for the employment of the ANA for lower-level campaign and capability planning, as well as tactical military plans and operations. It translates this into national military objectives that are designed to neutralize existing and potential threats, and to meet national security objectives set by the NSP and NSS. The NTA, NSP, and NSS were all developed entirely by the Afghan government, but none has been cleared for release by the National Security Advisor.

During this reporting period, the MoD completed the Strategic Planning Directive, which initiates the MoD strategic planning and document development cycle. This is a positive step towards ensuring the strategic planning cycle informs the budget development process, which is critical to the MoD's competence to support the production of resource-informed, threat-aware, requirements-based budgets. These strategic documents also provide critical guidance necessary to direct a disciplined and effective planning and force management process. The MoD's ability

to adopt and adhere to budget and force management principles is crucial to the ANA's long-term sustainability.

However, both the office of the Assistant MoD for Strategy and Policy and the GS Planning Directorate lack capacity in assessment, analysis, and reporting functions. This continues to undermine ability of the MoD and the GS to monitor strategy and policy implementation and evaluate the effectiveness of this guidance. These shortfalls constrict the MoD's ability to execute its strategic planning and policy development systems to fullest potential. Failure to correct these deficiencies will have a direct and adverse impact on the ANA's sustainability. RS advisors support efforts towards the development of increased staff capacity and competence.

The emerging focus of the TAA effort is principally assisting the operational level headquarters to develop seasonal campaign and operational orders that empower the various security force pillars to accomplish their operational objectives. RS advisors will continue to support the Assistant MoD for Strategy and Policy and the GS Planning Directorate staff in the development of the campaign plan and other planning guidance documents in order to provide clear and coherent guidance to the GS to enable the conduct of informed planning for directed operations.

Intelligence

During this reporting period, RS advisors assisted the MoD by helping it to prepare for the fighting season and to develop the long-term Afghan intelligence enterprise along four lines of effort: intelligence integration, intelligence cycle development, training, and sustainment.⁴⁵ The end state of these efforts is for the Afghan intelligence enterprise to develop intelligence policies and strategy; contribute to ANDSF planning processes; conduct deliberate intelligence collection operations to answer published priority information requirements; develop, implement, and enforce procedures for personnel security; and conduct counterintelligence and security operations.

The ANA GS Intelligence Directorate is manned, organized, trained, and equipped to perform all basic intelligence functions at a rudimentary level. The challenge is to build strong institutions that can sustain and grow this nascent ability. RS advisors established monthly synchronization video teleconferences with corps intelligence directors to share information, discuss challenges, and develop solutions. In addition, three GS Intelligence Directorate liaison officers were assigned to the RS Combined Joint Operations Center to facilitate better intelligence exchanges. To improve intelligence and operations integration, RS advisors conducted six senior officer professional development training sessions to emphasize concepts of intelligence and operations fusion and targeting. RS advisors also assisted with managing and teaching 28 courses at the Intelligence Training Center. National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) analysts are now certified on 16 individual and 9 collective tasks, including analysis, prioritizing collection requirements, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

The ANDSF are also increasing their use of equipment to collect intelligence. During this reporting period, they employed the Wolfhound system in multiple operations that enabled them to target insurgents successfully. In addition, they employed the Persistent Stare System (PSS),

⁴⁵ Additional information on the four lines of effort is included in the classified annex accompanying this report.

which consists of tethered aerostats and towers that can detect threat activity and lead to effective countermeasures. Finally, they planned fielding for organic Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms for the ANA in 2016 and added 10 more Rapid Aerostat Initial Development (RAID) towers and 2 more aerostats to the Afghan inventory. However, the ANA still shows some reluctance to embrace technology and automation as a way to improve outcomes on the battlefield. In addition, challenges remain in maintaining ISR enablers, since many spare parts and higher-level field service for many of their enablers are provided by the coalition.



ISR Aerostat

RS advisors continue to work to overcome mistrust among and within agencies, which hinders intelligence sharing. They continue to support improving the working relationship between the Assistant Ministry of Defense for Intelligence and the GS Intelligence Directorate by better defining roles and minimizing redundancies. In addition, challenges remain regarding personnel, particularly the limited pool of literate and educated personnel, to operate and maintain technology and in assigning the proper manning and leadership at the NMIC to speed its growth and capability development. As in other functional areas, paper-based record keeping and dissemination systems are typically preferred. RS advisors continue to demonstrate the value of computer databases and encourage the use of the National Information Management System (NIMS).

Strategic Communication

Message coordination, public affairs operations, and responsiveness between various Afghan ministries, including the MoD and the MoI, has continued to improve, in part due to the Government Media Information Center (GMIC) and the Cross Ministry News Desk. The GMIC provides improved capability to coordinate, produce, and distribute accurate and timely information products to all end users. It also provides interagency and donor coordination, training for Afghan communicators, and press briefing and meeting facilities to government departments and international stakeholders. Advisors made strides in advancing Afghan

government communicator capacity with the implementation of a GMIC-hosted public affairs capacity building training program. This training provides MoD, MoI, and other ministerial communicators with basic to advanced public affairs training in a variety of subject areas, including basic journalism, news writing, information production, media relations, photography/videography, and interview preparation. The Cross Ministry News Desk helps improve communication as it employs representatives from the MoD, MoI, NDS, and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. These representatives coordinate and disseminate press releases and official statements about security force activities to their respective departments, helping to align cross-ministry communication and messaging cross. However, the traditional centralized approach to managing information in Afghanistan often deters senior Afghan leaders from engaging with the media.

Coalition advisors continue to advise MoD personnel in conducting and sustaining public affairs activities designed to communicate with internal and external audiences. RS advisors have continued TAA efforts designed to enhance existing national-level strategic communication coordination, as well as synchronization processes and procedures among national-level spokesmen across the government and security ministries. Most recently, TAA efforts in this area included successfully conducting a national Senior Communicators Conference designed to enhance strategic communication capabilities among MoD spokesmen.

Coalition advisors continue to assist with literacy training to strategic communication capabilities. The Religious Cultural Affairs Literacy Program has helped produce ANA graduates capable of reading up to the third grade level. Additionally, the Religious Cultural Affairs Literacy Program team has also created a “train-the-trainer” program designed to increase training throughput.

ANA information operations capability continues to improve. In October 2014, Afghan instructors assumed the responsibility for teaching the Afghan Information Dissemination Operations Course at the School of Public Affairs. As of May 2015, it has successfully completed four autonomous courses. In total, the Afghan Information Dissemination Operations Course has produced more than 100 skilled information operations officers for Ground Forces Command and various ANA corps.

Gender Integration

Gender integration in the MoD has shown slow progress. The new MoD gender director and his female deputy are both communicating with the RS Gender Advisor Office on the requirements for recruiting women for the ANA. The MoD has developed a recruiting plan, but it has not yet been signed by the acting Minister of Defense. Female cadets at the ANA Officer Academy moved into new female-only barracks in May 2015.

The MoD still lacks a pool of qualified women to take on senior leadership positions. There are several female colonels; however, there are no female generals at this time. In order for the gender perspective to be fully integrated within the security ministries, it will be essential that both male and female leaders advocate for women’s equal participation and rights.

In cooperation with the Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan, the MoD has conducted a series of human rights and gender workshops for men and women in ANA units around Afghanistan. The basic course is a three-day course, usually conducted at the corps level, and a ten-day course for MoD headquarters.

4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

The Afghan GS provides command and control over all of Afghanistan's ground and air forces, which include all six corps, the 111th Capital Division, two types of special brigades (two mobile strike force brigades⁴⁶ and the National Engineer Brigade), Afghan detention operations, Afghan Air Force, ANA Special Operations Command, and the Special Mission Wing. The ANA remains the most trusted institution in the country with an approval rating that regularly exceeds 85 percent among survey respondents.⁴⁷

The ANA experienced significant leadership changes during this reporting period. President Ghani has embraced his position as Commander-in-Chief. In February 2015, he directed the mandatory retirement of 47 ineffective, excess, and elderly general officers. This action helped remove generals who had long exceeded the mandatory retirement age to make room for the next generation. In addition, he suspended numerous general officers involved in the fuel scandal. Although generally positive in intent, these actions also caused some disruption in areas where replacements were not readily named.

In January 2015, President Ghani signed a decree to create the Kabul Garrison Joint Command, which will coordinate cross-ministerial security in the capital; as part of this effort, the MoD will begin to disestablish the Ground Forces Command, which provides command and control over conventional ground forces. However, since the announcement in January 2015, little planning has been conducted for its disestablishment.

The ANA planned or executed several major operations during this reporting period, including Operation ZILFAQAR in Helmand Province, Operation TOFAN DARASURK in Kunar Province, Operation SHAHEEN in Kunduz Province, Operation BAWAR in Kandahar Province, and Operation KHANJAR in Faryab and Badghis Provinces.


ANA Strength

The ANA is authorized up to 195,000 personnel as part of its *tashkil*. At the beginning of December 2014, ANA manning was approximately 164,000 personnel, including more than 6,200 Afghan Air Force personnel. As of April 20, 2015, the ANA has increased to almost 170,000 personnel primarily as a result in increased recruiting rates (see Figure 7). The ANA also had relatively low rates of attrition during March and April 2015.

⁴⁶ Mobile force brigades provide a rapidly deployable mechanized infantry capability to undertake and reinforce operations in support of ANA missions.

⁴⁷ Recent surveys include Agence France-Presse; BBC; NBC; ABC; Asia Foundation-Afghan Survey 2014; Afghan Ministry of Communications Internal Report; MOBY Research; ANQAR Survey Report, Wave 27; and Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR).

Figure 7: ANA Strength



The ANA military strength depicted above includes the military members of the AAF, which is a component of the ANA.

* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.

** Gain includes all gains (recruits, re-accessions, and return from dropped from the rolls) to ANA strength during the reported period.

As of April 20, 2015, approximately 730 women serve in the ANA and the AAF, making up a smaller portion of the total 2,875 women in the entire ANDSF. The overall 10-year plan is to increase the number of women in the ANA by 10 percent. Although recruiting numbers for women have doubled within the ANP in the last 12 months, recruiting has been very slow within the ANA. The ANA faces a particular challenge recruiting women because of cultural concerns about women working with large groups of men away from their families, and with women in the forces being accused of immorality. Currently, more than 40 female cadets are in training at the ANA Officer Academy, of which 18 are expected to graduate in June 2015. Eight are scheduled to complete training in October 2015, and 14 are scheduled to graduate in February 2016.

The attrition rate in the ANA continues to pose challenges for ANDSF development. The ANA attrition rate dropped to an average of approximately 2.3 percent for the last 12 months (compared to historical norms of approximately 2.6 percent) with a low of 1.8 percent in March 2015 and a peak of 3.0 percent in October 2014. Despite this improved trend, RS advisors


estimate that ANA casualties have increased during this reporting period compared to last year based on operational reporting.⁴⁸

ANA end strength has increased since October 2014, and ANDSF leaders are working to identify and implement appropriate and effective measures to reduce attrition. RS senior leaders and advisors raised awareness of several key factors that likely contribute to attrition and recommended measures be taken by MoD leaders to address. These areas are leadership and leader accountability; a reliable leave process; timely and accurate pay; soldier assignments; and casualty/martyr care. During this reporting period, several hundred non-commissioned officers and soldiers reenlisted, all from units that were actively engaged in combat operations.

In addition, recruitment efforts should allow the ANA to balance the force and replace losses from attrition. Over the course of 2014, the ANA did not set recruiting goals at levels sufficient to outpace attrition, which resulted in a decline in end strength. In November 2014, the ANA increased its monthly recruiting targets and began work on a 14-month recruiting and training surge plan. Since then, ANA end strength has increased steadily. Monthly recruiting goals are ambitious, averaging approximately 5,000 new recruits per month over the next few months. April 2015 recruiting was well below target; however, with a new recruiting command commander and RS advertising assistance, the ANA may be able to meet its recruiting goals.

Afghan National Army Structure

Figure 8: ANA Corps and 111th Capital Division Boundaries



⁴⁸ ANDSF casualty figures are included in the classified annex accompanying this report.

The ANA is divided into one division and six regional corps: 111th Capital Division, 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, and 215th Corps (see their respective areas of responsibilities in Figure 8). According to recent surveys, perceptions of the ANA are most positive in Kabul and 201st Corps areas, and poorest in 215th and 207th Corps areas.⁴⁹

Each corps is typically composed of a headquarters *kandak* (battalion), three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty *kandaks*. In addition, two Mobile Strike Force brigades (wheeled medium armored vehicles) provide an additional seven Mobile Strike Force *kandaks* based in Kabul and Kandahar. These formations are capable of rapid employment in offensive operations. In addition to these combat capabilities, the ANA has headquarters and training units to generate, sustain, command, and control the force.



Mobile Strike Force Vehicle

Afghan Air Force


As part of the ANA, the AAF is responsible for air mobility and close air attack. With the transition from ISAF to RS forces during this reporting period, the AAF has become the primary air enabler for the ANDSF, flying most operations independently. The AAF can now independently plan and execute air operations such as emergency extraction, armed overwatch, casualty evacuation, air reconnaissance, close air attack, and airlift of forces. The AAF also provides air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, human remains return, air interdiction, and aerial escort. The AAF is headquartered in Kabul and has three wings—the Kabul Air Wing, Kandahar Air Wing, and Shindand Air Wing—with detachments in Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Shorab, Gardez, and Herat. It currently conducts semi-autonomous operations⁵⁰ from Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Gardez, Herat, Shorab, and Shindand.

⁴⁹ ANQAR survey, Wave 27, April 2015.

⁵⁰ Semi-autonomous operational locations are defined as those bases where there is no permanent U.S. or coalition air advisor presence. These locations are periodically visited by expeditionary advising teams to assess progress.

The AAF is authorized up to 7,800 personnel as part of its *tashkil*. As shown in Figure 9, during this reporting period, its end strength decreased slightly from 6,634 personnel in October 2014, to 6,533 personnel in April 2015. As of April 2015, AAF personnel included 51 women. This includes Afghanistan’s first female fixed-wing pilot since the Taliban’s rule, who was honored by the Department of State during a visit to the United States in March 2015. TAAC-Air is working with the AAF currently on an advertising program to recruit more Afghan women, but recruitment of women continues to be difficult due to the societal norms of Afghanistan.

Figure 9: AAF Strength



The AAF is a component of the ANA. The military AAF strength depicted above is provided by TAAC-Air. The official ANDSF accounting of ANA strength (including its AAF component) is provided in Figure 7 above.

* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.

** Gain includes all gains (recruits, re-accessions, and return from dropped from the rolls) to ANA strength during the reported period.

Logistical sustainment will make or break the AAF in the long-run. The AAF continues to develop its organic maintenance capability, including conducting aircraft maintenance inspections without coalition assistance. However, it currently relies heavily on contracted logistics support for its current fleet and will continue to do so for the near future, particularly to enable integration of new aircraft into the force. Although the capability of current AAF maintenance personnel continues to improve, obtaining the number and skill levels of personnel required to sustain the current and future fleet will remain a challenge.

Additionally, pilot development and availability within the AAF remains a challenge for several reasons. First, pilot training literacy requirements make finding qualified recruits difficult. Additionally, AAF pilot availability is affected by the MoD's decision to transfer crews from the AAF to the SMW to establish the SMW PC-12 and fill its Mi-17 crews. Finally, highly experienced AAF C-208 pilots were reassigned to enter A-29 training that started in February 2015.

The AAF currently has approximately 150 of 291 required fully trained pilots, and approximately 90 of the 198 required aircrews available for operations; this does not include any fully trained pilots in training for another type of aircraft, such as the A-29 or MD-530.⁵¹ The AAF remains in the early stages of building a long-term and sustainable pilot generation process and is forecasted to continue to expand capacity during the remainder of 2015. In an effort to meet the goal of a 1.5:1 pilot to aircraft manning ratio (with the exception of the Mi-17), an initiative to add a second pilot training site is underway.⁵² This TAAC-Air initiative is examining additional training locations in both Europe and the Middle East to conduct initial fixed-wing and rotary-wing pilot training along with Mi-17 training. Current projections are that additional training locations will be available as early as August 2015. On March 9, 2015, the AAF commander met with Pakistan Air Force leadership to discuss AAF training opportunities in Pakistan, which may include attendance at service academies, technical training, professional development, and pilot training. This would provide the AAF another avenue for professional growth of the force, while enhancing future regional military-to-military relations.

In addition to developing aircrew and maintainers, the AAF is developing a new air-ground capability. This capability is built around Afghan Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) and Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs) that are integrated with ground units and at the headquarters level in accordance with a November 2014 cipher. These experts on the ground work with aircrews and ground commanders to direct efforts against targets, which helps increase combat effectiveness and reduces civilian casualties through the precise use of airpower. ATACs have already tested their new skills on the battlefield, enabling ANDSF success in several ground engagements.

In December 2014, the AAF assumed ownership of the entire ATAC training program from TAAC-Air. The training was relocated to the School of Artillery and integrated into the Fire Support Officers Course. During this reporting period, the first 20 AAF ALOs graduated as trainers, and these graduates now instruct subsequent ATACs and ALOs. To date, more than 250 ATACs have been trained, which exceeds the requirement. Similar success was reported with the ALO training program, with 38 personnel completing training, which exceeds the requirement. Due to the program's popularity, the AAF mandated that all operations officers receive the ALO training, which more than 30 have done as of May 2015.

In addition, the MoD issued a directive for the AAF and the ANA to perform ATAC continuation training, and for corps commanders to keep ATACs in appropriate positions

⁵¹ This number does not include SMW pilots. Aircrews include non-pilot positions, including flight engineers, loadmasters, and mission sensor operators.

⁵² Mi-17s are manned at a lower ratio due to limitations on the airframes' utilization rates. The Mi-17 crew ratio is approximately 1:1.

following training. These actions are critical to successful air-to-ground integration during this fighting season and beyond.

Airframes

As of May 31, 2015, the AAF has a total of 102 aircraft, which include C-130s, C-208s, Mi-17s, MD-530s, Mi-35s, and Cheetahs.⁵³ Afghanistan’s fixed-wing platforms include 25 C-208s and 3 C-130s, and its rotary-wing platforms include 5 Mi-35s, 56 Mi-17s, 10 MD-530s (five trainers and five weaponized), and 3 Cheetahs. The first A-29 Super Tucano aircraft will begin replacing the Mi-35 helicopters later this year when the first class of pilots graduates from training at Moody Air Force Base and returns with their aircraft to Afghanistan. Figure 10 summarizes the number of AAF airframes and associated pilots.

With the transition to the RS mission during this reporting period, the AAF is responsible for providing air support to conventional Afghan forces. The AAF uses C-130s, C-208s, and Mi-17s to conduct air mobility missions. The Government of India donated Cheetah helicopters during this reporting period.

Coalition aerial fire support to the ANDSF has been drastically reduced. However, U.S. and coalition unilateral aerial fires continue to be executed as authorized by the NATO and U.S. authorities granted to General Campbell as Commander, Resolute Support, and Commander, USFOR-A, respectively. As a result, the responsibility to provide aerial fires in support of ANDSF operations now falls almost entirely to the AAF, which can use its 5 Mi-35 attack helicopters, 10 fixed forward firing modified Mi-17s, and 5 armed MD-530 light attack helicopters.

Figure 10: Summary of AAF Airframes and Pilots*

	Type of aircraft	Inventory	Planned	Fully trained pilots
Fixed Wing	C-130	3	4	8
	C-208	25	25	34
	A-29	0	20	0
Rotary Wing	Mi-17	56 ⁵⁴	56	86
	Mi-35	5	0	19
	MD-530	10	17	0
	Cheetah	3	3	4
Total		100	125	147

* as of May 31, 2015

⁵³ SMW aircraft are not included in this total.

⁵⁴ This number does not include the additional 30 Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW.

C-130 Tactical Transport



The C-130 tactical transport aircraft provides a medium-airlift capability in support of personnel transport, CASEVAC, and human remains return capabilities. The AAF currently has three C-130s with an associated eight fully trained pilots. During this reporting period, Commander, Resolute Support, decided to accept the delivery of the fourth (and final) C-130 aircraft to the AAF after NATO Air Command – Afghanistan confirmed AAF medium-airlift requirements. NAC-A reported that AAF C-130 utilization had increased to 70 percent of contracted hours and was projected to increase to 88 percent following the implementation of a hub and spoke concept of operations. The concept of operations will use a hub and spoke airlift system for troop movement and logistics support to meet the demands for ANA corps resupply, life-saving CASEVAC, disaster response, presidential support, and aircrew training. During the 2015 fighting season, AAF C-130s are expected to fly 80 percent more missions than they did during the 2014 fighting season. Additionally, the C-130 fleet is sized to meet the ANDSF's quick reaction force response requirements, such that AAF C-130s can move an infantry company and equipment within 24 hours notification. The fourth C-130 is scheduled to be delivered to the AAF by the end of June 2015.

With the limited number of C-130s and crews, increasing the number of available instructor pilots will increase the AAF's flexibility and capability to expand capacity more rapidly. The AAF graduated its first C-130 instructor pilot in January 2015, which was a key milestone to cultivating experience and capacity to train future aircrews. The next pilot instructor training began in May 2015 and is scheduled to finish in July 2015. Each training sortie – to upgrade an aircraft commander or an instructor pilot – comes at a cost of seasoning another younger crew and requires flexible scheduling to avoid affecting operational requirements. With a finite fleet of aircraft, focusing on upgrading instructors will be key to building self-sustaining weapons systems crews in the coming years.

C-208 Aircraft



The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and human remains recovery capabilities for the ANDSF. Significant events during this reporting period include surveys of additional C-208 landing zones, reassignment of C-208 pilots to the A-29, and completion of a maintenance supervisory course by two airmen. Additional landing zones increases the operational reach of the C-208, thereby reducing some of the operational load on the Mi-17 fleet. The AAF currently has 25 C-208s with an associated 37 fully-trained pilots. Aircrew manning for the C-208 was of sufficient quality, so some highly experienced C-208 pilots were reassigned to enter A-29 training that started in February 2015; highly experienced pilots were desired due to the more complex nature of the A-29 mission.

The AAF has a sufficient number of C-208 maintainers; however, it lacks the requisite distribution of skill levels to perform the necessary maintenance to maintain the fleet on its own. The coalition continues to train Afghan maintainers and develop C-208 sustainment capabilities. During this reporting period, two AAF airmen completed a maintenance supervisory course and are now capable of performing several leadership roles within an aircraft maintenance squadron.

Mi-17 Helicopter



The Mi-17 helicopter conducts personnel transport, CASEVAC, resupply, close combat attack, aerial escort, and armed overwatch missions. Not including the SMW's 30 Mi-17s, the AAF currently has 56 Mi-17s with an associated 86 fully trained pilots. Ten of the 56 Mi-17s have been modified as fixed forward firing to provide aerial fires. An additional 2 Mi-17s will be configured to reach a total of 12 fixed forward firing Mi-17s within the fleet, which will increase the AAF's aerial fires capacity. Mi-17 crews continue to increase their capability to provide night time armed overwatch and aerial escort missions.

The Mi-17 fleet remains the workhorse of the AAF, but continues to struggle to meet the demand from the ANA corps. This gap is likely to grow as the demand continues to increase and capability remains relatively static. With the ANDSF assuming full responsibility for security, and an associated significant decrease in coalition air support, the demand for air support in the form of ISR, airlift, aerial fires, and CASEVAC is likely to increase significantly.

Maintenance manning for the Mi-17, the AAF's most logistically mature platform, is still growing. As with the C-208, the AAF still lacks the requisite distribution of experience necessary to maintain the fleet on its own. Yet the AAF has added the ability to perform 100-hour Mi-17 inspections at Kandahar and 200-hour inspections at Kabul, which is an important milestone towards reaching an organic capability to conduct 50-, 100-, 200-, and 300-hour inspections. Only overhaul and heavy repair maintenance would need to be contracted.

MD-530 Helicopter



The MD-530 helicopter provides close air attack and aerial escort capability with the ability to operate at high altitude to offer better visibility to aircrews, allowing them to identify targets quickly and operate the aircraft safely. Prior to this reporting period, the AAF had been operating five unarmed MD-530 helicopters to train pilots. New armed MD-530s were purchased through a pseudo-FMS case, which includes necessary items, including training, spare parts, maintenance, logistical support, ammunition, and other contracting efforts in a total package approach.

In March 2015, the first six armed MD-530 helicopters arrived in advance of the 2015 fighting season. The armed helicopters are fitted with a mission equipment package consisting of upgraded weapons, communications equipment, fuel systems, and ballistic protection for the crew. During the roll-out ceremony at the Kabul Air Wing on April 9, 2015, four of the new helicopters performed a live-fire demonstration of their twin FN Herstal Heavy Machine Gun Pods. To accommodate the extra weight of this equipment, the helicopters have been upgraded with a more powerful engine, longer rotor blades, longer tail, and high-capacity landing gear. In May 2015, one armed MD-530 crashed during training; an investigation into the cause of the accident is underway. Six additional MD-530s are scheduled to arrive in early June 2015. The five training variant MD-530s will then be shipped to the United States for modification, which will bring the fleet to a total of 16 fully operational armed MD-530s by early 2016. Once in service, they will augment the machine gun-equipped Mi-17 helicopters and supplant the Mi-35 helicopters as they retire, as well as augment the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft that is due to arrive in early 2016.

The first class of 10 MD-530 pilots is currently in training and expected to graduate in July 2015. The training program is designed to transform a basic helicopter pilot into a combat aviator. Initial rotary-wing training covers the basics of airmanship, including hovering, navigation, radio operation, emergency procedures, and basic piloting. TAAC-Air instructor pilots then focus on the advanced combat tactics curriculum. Over three months, Afghan pilots take additional lessons on team tactics, aerial gunnery, and ground integration.

Mi-35 Helicopter



The Mi-35 helicopter provides a close air attack and armed aerial escort capability. The AAF currently has a small fleet of 5 Mi-35s with a full complement of 21 fully trained pilots. During this reporting period, the AAF installed S-5 rockets onto its Mi-35s. TAAC-Air advisors instructed Mi-35 crews about minimum safe distances for rocket employment to avoid collateral damage, which led to the requalification of crews with this weapon. The AAF subsequently employed its first Mi-35 rockets in more than three years, providing an increased aerial fires capability. Additionally, the crews have been demonstrating restraint when it comes to potential civilian casualties. The AAF's Mi-35 fleet is forecasted to reach the end of its service life in February 2016, just as the A-29 starts to come on line.

A-29 Super Tucano



The AAF will use the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to provide critical air support, such as aerial fires, to ground forces. The first three A-29s were delivered to Moody Air Force Base in Georgia in September 2014. The U.S. Air Force began training the first class of eight Afghan A-29 pilots and maintainers at Moody Air Force Base in February 2015; the class is expected to graduate in December 2015. The first four A-29s, along with their Afghan pilots and maintainers, are forecasted to achieve initial operational capability when they arrive in Afghanistan in January 2016. The remainder of the aircraft will continue to be delivered to Moody Air Force Base in support of subsequent Afghan training through May 2016. The aircraft will then continue to be delivered to Afghanistan with subsequent graduating classes of pilots and maintenance personnel. The current schedule builds the AAF A-29 fleet to 8 by the 2016 fighting season and 12 by the 2017 fighting season to achieve a fully operational capability of 20 airframes, 30 pilots, and 90 maintenance personnel by the end of 2018.

Operations

During this reporting period, the AAF achieved numerous successes. The AAF continues to develop operational capabilities in a number of key mission areas, such as airlift, CASEVAC, human remains recovery, aerial reconnaissance, and support civil authorities.

The AAF support to operations in northern Helmand, Badakhshan, and Kunar Provinces demonstrated the integration of air enablers in operational planning and more effective command and control of airpower. In support of these operations, the AAF proactively forward-staged and allocated Mi-17s, Mi-35s, and C-208s for pre-planned, rather than reactive, support to ANDSF

operations. As of April 2015, planning for future operations is underway and includes cross-pillar integration with SMW PC-12s in forward-basing plans.

The AAF demonstrated growth and progress in CASEVAC capabilities during this reporting period. The AAF successfully conducted more than 2,200 CASEVAC missions in 2014, a 45 percent increase compared to the previous year, and reduced the average response time to less than 4 hours. Between January 1 and April 1, 2015, the AAF autonomously transported 1,147 wounded. Personnel assigned to the TAAC-Air Surgeon General trained more than 75 AAF medics in 3 different types of aircraft. In an effort to expand field care capability, the TAAC-Air Surgeon General trained more than 135 ANA medics on CASEVAC procedures to improve medical response and expedite exfiltration of casualties from the battlefield. Additionally, the AAF is routinely employing the tactic of pre-positioning C-208s for both resupply and CASEVAC during deliberate operations.

In March 2015, the AAF conducted rescue and relief operations in response to a series of avalanches and ensuing floods in the northern provinces. This effort included Mi-17 flights delivering medical teams and humanitarian supplies, rescuing survivors, caring for displaced personnel, and recovering remains. Kabul Air Wing airmen generated and flew 10 aircraft over 3 days to deliver more than 9 tons of supplies to local area avalanche victims in the Panjshir Valley. The crews delivered more than 600 blankets, 13,000 liters of fuel, and tons of food to the area. AAF Mi-17s also provided transportation to senior MoD leadership, including the AAF commander, the deputy Minister of Defense, and the deputy chief of the GS to survey the avalanche area. The AAF's quick response to disaster relief efforts demonstrated its operational readiness, providing timely fuel and food to avalanche survivors, while flying more than 41 survivors to safety.

During Operation ZILFAQAR in northern Helmand Province, personnel from the AAF's Kandahar Air Wing flew 114 sorties, moving 908 personnel, 4,350 kilograms of supplies, and evacuating 95 casualties. AAF operations supported both 205th and 215th Corps with C-130s, Mi-35s, Mi-17s, and C-208s. AAF Mi-35 crews provided effective aerial fire support to ANA ground forces. During one mission in the heavily contested Sangin District, Mi-35s were credited with killing 24 insurgents. In another instance, Mi-35s employed 44 rockets that killed 40 insurgents and destroyed 1 vehicle.

On April 19, 2015, the AAF transported President Ghani to Faizabad Airfield in Badakhshan Province. The movement involved detailed integration and planning with the Afghan Presidential Protection Service, moving more than 300 personnel and their equipment. The crew demonstrated the ability to execute the movement in marginal weather and to austere fields on short notice without coalition support. The mission validated a critical AAF capability to move senior personnel in response to a crisis situation.

MoD Afghan Special Security Forces

Three special security forces fall under the ANA: the ANASOC, the *Ktah Khas*, and the SMW.

Afghan National Army Special Operations Command

The ANASOC offers rapidly deployable, highly mobile, light infantry units trained to conduct expeditionary commando operations. Its mission is to provide responsive and decisive action in support of the security objectives of the Afghan government.

Approximately 10,700 personnel are under the command of ANASOC. ANASOC is grouped into 10 *kandaks* (battalions) geographically dispersed across Afghanistan. At least one special operations *kandak* operates in each corps area of responsibility. The 10th Special Operations *Kandak* was established during this reporting period.⁵⁵ The ANASOC now consists of two special operations brigades, a military intelligence *kandak*, a national strategic reserve operations *kandak*, and four mobile strike force companies.

The *kandaks* are divided into two main groups: commandos and special forces. Commandos are a specialized light infantry unit with the capability to conduct raids, direct action, and reconnaissance in support of counterinsurgency operations; and they provide a strategic response capability for the Afghan government. This trained unit represents some of the most elite fighting forces in the ANDSF. They continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct independent operations throughout Afghanistan and, when engaged, win decisively. Nearly all special operations *kandaks* are conducting independent company-level operations, and several have conducted unilateral missions driven by Afghan intelligence gathered without the involvement of coalition special operations forces. Commando units routinely conduct night raids independently using their own intelligence to drive their operations.

As an operational headquarters, ANASOC continues to make steady progress. The most significant development for the ANASOC this reporting period was in its ability to execute mission command for complex operations. Deploying a command post forward to Helmand Province, ANASOC leadership provided mission command for operations that included the SMW, the GCPSU, and the *Ktah Khas*. During this operation, the ANASOC demonstrated force projection, mission command, utilization of enablers, and joint interoperability. ANASOC leadership directed targeting and current operations, as well as planning for future operations during the month-long deployment. The ANASOC continues to organize, train, equip, plan, coordinate, and project its forces in combat operations to disrupt and destroy insurgent forces. The staff continues to improve its orders process, coordination, and implementation of enablers during the operational planning process.

Coalition advisors mentor ASSF leaders during mission planning to improve cooperation and interoperability with other ANDSF units. On missions, advisors evaluate leadership and tactics both in the field and in tactical operations centers in order to guide their ASSF partners through after-action reviews and then to apply lessons learned for future security operations. Finally, advisors provide critical support to the successful integration of coalition fires, MEDEVAC, and ISR enablers when such assets are committed. Since the transition to the RS mission, advisors have focused on substituting organic ASSF unit capabilities and weapons systems for coalition

⁵⁵ Additional information about the 10th Special Operations *Kandak* is included in the classified annex accompanying this report.

enablers. This is an ongoing effort to build Afghan confidence in their systems, processes, and joint special security forces.

The ASSF now have the lead for training and generation of special security forces. In particular, nearly all specialty training courses within the ANASOC have transitioned to being Afghan-led and taught. During this reporting period, the ANASOC School of Excellence has assumed full responsibility for 25 of the 28 specialty training courses. The remaining three specialty training courses will begin their transition to being Afghan-led and taught during Summer 2015.

Ktah Khas

The *Ktah Khas* is a light infantry special operations battalion consisting of three companies, a reconnaissance unit, and several sections that enable and support the strike forces. *Ktah Khas* platoons and companies are trained to conduct precision raids and vehicle interdictions against high-value targets utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms.

The *Ktah Khas* has improved its battalion-level command capabilities, its operational reach, and its integration with ANASOC forces in numerous combined operations over the past six months. For the recent attempted hostage rescues of the captured Hazara hostages in Zabul Province, the *Ktah Khas* spearheaded the main effort to the suspected compound while an ANASOC Commando unit isolated the target. Additionally the *Ktah Khas* has expanded its operational reach and expeditionary capability to operate in provinces outside of Kabul.

In January 2015, the *Ktah Khas* planned and resourced its first independent helicopter assault force raid in Kapisa Province. Over the long term, the *Ktah Khas* will continue to build an enduring relationship with all MoD special operations units, particularly the ANASOC.

Special Mission Wing

The SMW supports primarily the MoD and the MoI ASSF. The SMW conducts day and night air assault and ISR missions. In addition, the SMW provides rotary-wing air mobility (Mi-17 helicopters) and fixed-wing ISR capability (PC-12s) to support counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in Afghanistan. This capability allows the ANDSF to project power at night over longer distances with the precision required to support the high-risk counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions critical to Afghan and U.S. security interests. Due to the topography and security environment of Afghanistan, this aviation support remains a key enabler to denying freedom of movement and safe haven in remote areas to insurgents, terrorists, and drug trafficking networks.

In April 2015, the SMW was realigned from the MoI to the MoD. Previously, the SMW had a split *tashkil* – both the MoD and the MoI were responsible for manning, initial training, and equipping the SMW. However, that created issues such as different pay scales for pilots assigned to the MoI compared to those assigned to MoD, even though they were flying the same missions. Now, all SMW pilots fall under the MoD and the same pay scale, and they still support both MoD and MoI ASSF units. Additionally, AAF pilots can be reassigned to the

SMW. In terms of mission allocation, the MoD and the MoI have a joint committee to determine how they approve SMW support requests for their organic ASSF units.

The SMW currently has three squadrons: 1st and 2nd Squadrons are located in Kabul, and 3rd Squadron was established in Kandahar during this reporting period. Expansion to Kandahar Airfield and aggressive training plans have enabled the SMW to execute more than twice the operational hours compared to this point last year. Efforts continue in support of SMW expansion for a future 4th Squadron to Mazar-e-Sharif, with ongoing development of infrastructure. The new squadron is expected achieve an initial operational capability in October 2015 and full operational capability in January 2016, with a total of seven Mi-17s and four PC-12s.

The SMW currently consists of approximately 460 personnel. In addition to these personnel, there are currently over 100 personnel undergoing the entry process, which requires background and security checks, English proficiency testing, as well as an interview with the commander prior to final acceptance.

Training conducted at the SMW consists of basic proficiency evaluations/refresher training and mission qualification training (such as pinnacle landings, low-visibility landings, and multi-aircraft operations) prior to establishment as fully mission-qualified pilots. The SMW capability is dependent on personnel qualification and, at this time, advisor support.

The SMW continues to build its maintenance capacity, but challenges remain. The earliest SMW will have a full maintenance and repair capability is summer of 2020. This will not eliminate the need for contractor logistics support, but will allow Afghan personnel to autonomously conduct day-to-day and routine maintenance tasks. This timeline can only be met if the training plan is executed as proposed, and SMW maintainers are recruited (currently SMW is manned at 74 percent for Mi-17 and 22 percent for PC-12 maintainers; additional PC-12 maintenance personnel will also be needed for Airwolf signals intelligence capability recently installed).

Airframes

During the reporting period, the SMW has progressed in manning, training, and sustainment. The SMW now possesses 30 of 30 authorized Mi-17V5s, and 13 of 18 authorized PC-12s (see Figure 11). The remaining five PC-12s will arrive later this year following the addition of the Airwolf system.

Figure 11: Summary of SMW Airframes and Pilots*

Type of aircraft	Inventory	Planned	Fully trained pilots	Qualified crews
Mi-17V5	30	30	67	35
PC-12	13	18	15	6
Total	43	48	82	41

* as of May 31, 2015

Mi-17

The SMW uses its Mi-17 fleet to provide Afghan special forces with medium-lift air assault, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and quick reaction force capabilities. The SMW is currently manned with 66 Mi-17 pilots, including 44 night-certified. All of the rotary-wing pilots have graduated initial entry rotary training or have been previously rated as an Mi-17 or Mi-35 pilot.

The ANDSF are currently performing approximately 10 percent of the scheduled maintenance to maintain the Mi-17 fleet. The SMW has 93 trained Mi-17 maintainers, up from only 38 in June 2014. Mi-17 maintenance has seen growth in Afghan phase maintenance teams, and the Mi-17 technical trainers course continues to produce Afghan Mi-17 maintainers. The SMW has one fully trained Mi-17 phase maintenance team and two Mi-17 50-hour maintenance teams. The technical trainers course qualifies personnel to conduct 50, 100, and 200-hour inspections and trains 6 to 7 member teams at a time.

PC-12 Aircraft



The PC-12 aircraft is Afghanistan's first fixed-wing ISR platform. In the first two months of 2015, the PC-12s flew more than 40 percent of the total sorties flown during 2014.

The SMW is currently manned with 30 PC-12 pilots, including 12 that are night-qualified. Nearly 90 percent of PC-12 pilots had no previous flight experience prior to initial training; however, they are demonstrating progress.

PC-12 crews require a mission-qualified aircraft commander, co-pilot, and mission system operator. SMW PC-12s improved readiness and expanded capability by fielding the first Afghan independent crews in February 2015. On March 8, 2015, the SMW achieved a major milestone when the first all-Afghan crew flew a combat ISR mission. Ultimately, the SMW met its 2015 fighting season goal of having 6 independent PC-12 crews, which is 54 percent of the operational requirement. To increase manpower, advisors augment Afghan crewmembers and provide 6

partnered crews, bringing the manning up to more than 100 percent of the operational requirement.

All PC-12 maintenance is performed by contractors. Like the Mi-17, it takes 60 months to train PC-12 mechanics fully. The first 10 Afghan PC-12 maintainers began English language training in April 2015. After completion of English training (between three to six months) the students will begin the PC-12 maintenance training pipeline.

Operations

From December 1, 2014, to May 31, 2015, the SMW conducted more than 849 Mi-17 and 1,008 PC-12 operations and training missions. The SMW has proven its ability to provide organic ISR, target development, and mission overwatch during the infiltration and exfiltration of SMW Mi-17s and ground personnel. SMW PC-12s only flew 205 total missions in 2014. The continued development of the SMW will facilitate the transition of critical enabler support to being a sustainable Afghan-led capability.

Throughout this reporting period, the SMW sustained an operational tempo of multiple missions per week, including mission intelligence planning in support of the ANASOC, the GCPSU, and the *Ktah Khas*. The SMW's 3rd Squadron provided support to operations in Helmand Province that required coordination and planning with multiple elements of ASSF, including the ANASOC, the GCPSU, the NMU, and the *Ktah Khas*. SMW aircraft and crews supported both infiltration and exfiltration of these forces by providing intelligence preparation of the battlefield and overwatch through persistent ISR, employing two PC-12s. Four Mi-17s provided a helicopter assault force capability to insert forces rapidly with the element of surprise while reducing the risk to the force present by IEDs, as well as on-call CASEVAC. The SMW also demonstrated its ability to respond to emergent requirements by deploying assets to Badakhshan Province in response to avalanches in that region.


SECTION 5 – MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

In addition to the Resolute Support mission, a variety of international organizations continued to focus on the institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior and on the professionalization of the ANP. On December 17, 2014, the Council of the European Union extended the European Union Police (EUPOL) mission in Afghanistan from January 1, 2015, until the end of 2016. The EUPOL mission in Afghanistan consists of more than 200 members from 23 European Union contributing nations who develop local training capacity and institutions, and support the improved interaction among Afghan law enforcement and criminal justice actors, such as cooperation between police officers and prosecutors in criminal investigations. The German Police Project Team (GPPT) focuses on basic and advanced training for Afghan police, implements infrastructure projects, and extensively supports the improvement of ANP and Afghan Border Police equipment. On December 29, 2014, representatives from EUPOL, GPPT, and RS participated in a joint ceremony to sign a memorandum of cooperation that formalizes the ongoing collaboration among these organizations in their common goal to develop the professionalism and sustainable capacity of the MoI and the ANP. Later, on April 23, 2015, EUPOL signed a memorandum of cooperation with the MoI.

5.1 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

The MoI has the responsibility to provide security; safeguard stability; strengthen public order; enforce the law; fight terrorism, organized crime, and narcotics; defend Afghan citizens' rights; discover, investigate, and prevent crimes; fight corruption; and disarm illegally armed groups. The MoI's organization is depicted in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Ministry of Interior Organizational Chart



In January 2015, the Afghan Parliament confirmed General Noor-ul Haq Ulumi as the new Minister of Interior. Since his appointment, Minister Ulumi has announced 15 priorities for the MoI:

- 1) Rule of law;
- 2) Impartiality;
- 3) Counter-corruption;
- 4) Police professionalism and capacity building;
- 5) Respecting human rights;
- 6) Protection of borders and highways;
- 7) Rewards and punishments;
- 8) Women's participation;
- 9) Coordination among ANDSF and judicial entities;
- 10) ANP structure review and stationing of police forces;
- 11) Counternarcotics;
- 12) Public relations;
- 13) Equipping ANP;
- 14) Reducing casualties; and
- 15) Respect the rights of those in prison.

The MoI and the ANP have made some incremental gains towards stabilizing Afghanistan. Confidence in the ANP continues to grow, with recent polling showing that 76 percent of Afghan respondents expressed confidence in the ANP.⁵⁶ During this reporting period, the ANP continued to build on its successes in contributing to the highly successful execution of the *Loya Jirga*, two nationwide elections and the subsequent election run-off, and a successful 2014 fighting season. Although the security environment remains challenging, the MoI and the ANP are positioned to strengthen further their contribution to security and the rule of law.

Although the MoI and the ANP continue to improve, obstacles still remain. Within the MoI, the biggest difficulties are in the areas of human resources, logistics, and supply chain management.

In the area of human resources management, the MoI does not have an integrated personnel and pay system. The MoI is working towards gaining better accountability of its personnel by having all police properly slotted against their authorized positions within the Afghanistan Human Resources Information Management System in order to ensure incentive payments and salaries are accurate, while providing improved oversight of U.S. and other donor nation funding. To ensure increased accuracy and accountability of funds, controls have been placed on U.S. and coalition funding through a series of financial commitment letters with the MoI. If the criteria identified in the commitment letters are not met, funding can be withdrawn or withheld until the Afghan government takes steps to uphold its agreements. These enforcement mechanisms incentivize Afghan leadership to demonstrate greater accountability and transparency in the spending of donor funds.

In the area of logistics and supply chain management, MoI logistics and maintenance systems can execute basic supply and distribution functions. The MoI relies on a largely manual, paper-

⁵⁶ ANQAR survey, Wave 27, April 2015.

based system that depends on excessive bureaucracy. The ability of the MoI headquarters to influence operational and tactical outcomes outside of Kabul varies considerably, with ineffectual controls, poor consumption reporting, and little visibility below the regional and corps level. Finally, major procurement initiatives require intense coalition support.

Resource Management and Procurement

Resource management and procurement objectives include developing transparent, accountable, and effective Afghan government resource management processes; increasing resource management capability and capacity; and setting conditions for 2017 and beyond. The strategy to achieve these objectives includes enforcing conditionality and fiscal discipline outlined in CSTC-A commitment letters; establishing a Procurement Technical Working Group to address procurement and contracting issues; conducting regular execution and financial management reviews; increasing MoI budget execution; implementing integrated pay and personnel systems; conducting a conditions-based transition of the Law and Order Trust Fund – Afghanistan (LOTFA); and adding skilled personnel in the MoI headquarters to build capacity as coalition forces draw down through the Ministerial Advisory Contract Services and subject matter expert programs.

With advisor assistance, the MoI Programming and Analysis Office completed requirements generation training to put the MoI on a solid path to conduct its first bottom-up budget build. This process was aided by the development of a programming tool that will enable MoI budgetary units to see clearly what can be afforded with a specified budget. Afghan leaders will have an opportunity to reprioritize requirements while staying at specified budget levels, preventing programming budget requirements above available resources.

Through advisor involvement in establishing duties and responsibilities of existing MoI procurement subject matter experts, the MoI Procurement Directorate has improved coordination with the MoF, the MoI Finance Directorate, and provinces on funding, the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System, and procurement processing. The development of a subject matter expert program will provide a network of procurement personnel that will report directly to the MoI Procurement Directorate on all procurement-related issues, processing, decisions, and tracking to provide a strong tracking system. The placement of subject matter experts at each of the 34 provinces with reach-back to the MoI headquarters will increase capacity horizontally and vertically by having trained personnel assist provincial and national financial staff with the proper methods for processing and executing financial related actions.

The MoI Procurement Directorate Chief of Procurement accepted responsibility and leadership of the Procurement Technical Working Group and developed group initiatives by providing a prioritized list of issues to be researched and resolved for the SY 1394 execution cycle. The MoI Procurement Directorate personnel consistently provide data, information, updates, and documents to help improve capability standards, such as contract tracking lists, logs of incoming procurement requisitions, and copies of ciphers issued to spur execution at the budgetary unit and provincial levels.

Through the increase of advisor support, the MoI improved its finance and budgetary units' capacity in managing resources in end-of-year fiscal close-out and execution of current year funds. In addition, advisors' support enabled the MoI budgetary units to develop detailed monthly spend plans for SY 1394, and these units are monitoring and updating these plans routinely to reflect changes in in-year plans and procurement. This enables a more proactive approach to budget management and execution, identifying problems, and taking remedial action in a timely manner. Further improvement in budget management has been achieved through use of a contract and commitment tracker tool developed by advisors, seeking to preclude overspending through a clear understanding of all commitments against budget.

Improving transparency and accountability of resources hinges upon the successful implementation of the Ministerial Internal Control Program. Minister Ulumi signed the MICP cipher on March 30, 2015, which demonstrates his commitment to reducing corruption. The MICP will map critical processes, identify key internal controls, assess risks associated with current processes, implement corrective actions to mitigate the identified risks, and increase transparency, accountability, and oversight. This will be achieved via the MoI Transparency Working Group and Steering Committee, the latter chaired by the Minister of Interior. The goal of these efforts is for the MoI to develop a comprehensive and sustainable MICP that forms the foundation for an effective counter-/anti-corruption system and informs the Afghan government, NATO, and international stakeholders of transparency, accountability, and oversight in accordance with best practices.

Although the MoI IG has refused to accept responsibility and leadership for the implementation of MICP without ministerial direction, the recent appointment of a Minister of Interior and his support of the MICP philosophy have paved the way for progress.

Legal Affairs

The MoI has limited effectiveness in identifying, investigating, and appropriately acting upon gross violations of human rights, such as extra-judicial killings. Detection, reporting, and investigation mechanisms are in place for GVHR incidents, although they are complicated by multiple entry points for GVHR allegations. Clearly defined, written reporting and investigation standard operating procedures are a necessary next step in further developing their processes. Coordination between the MoI's three GVHR initial investigation units can be improved. Once a case is passed to the Attorney General's Office for further investigation and prosecution, the MoI loses control over the process, and there is little cooperation and follow-up between the two ministerial-level offices. The post-AGO referral process must become more transparent and visible to both MoI and RS personnel in order to address appropriately and continue to improve addressing and processing GVHR cases.

The MoI has initiated a process to identify, investigate, and act appropriately on instances of major corruption. Despite efforts by the MoI to forward corruption cases to the AGO for prosecution, to date, productive inter-ministerial cooperation between the MoI and the AGO has not yet commenced.

Personnel Management

ANP personnel and payroll data is collected and transferred using the following process. The MoI requires the ANP to record personnel attendance—present-for-duty and not present-for-duty—using paper-based daily check-in and check-out signatures. Each employee’s attendance information is passed manually to the provincial headquarters on a monthly basis. The attendance reports are used to create a document that forms the basis for calculating monthly pay. Once the data reaches the provincial headquarters, personnel updates, such as changes in status (e.g., rank, duty location, and training), are entered into the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System. Provincial officials use the data to facilitate planning and reporting for human resources needs and calculate salary payments. ANP financial officials enter the monthly attendance data into the web-based Electronic Payroll System, the ANP’s payroll system administered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

Once ANP personnel and payroll data is collected, it is entered into a series of data systems using a number of manual entry and transfer processes. Data for new recruits, including each individual’s ANP identification number, is collected during training at regional centers and added to recruits’ records in the EPS and AHRIMS. The MoI submits a payroll summary to the MoF, which administers AFMIS, the country’s government-wide accounting system. Because AFMIS and the EPS are not linked, the MoF’s provincial-level staff enters data from the MoI-provided payroll summaries into AFMIS and uses the data to determine final ANP personnel salary payments.

Once the MoF receives ANP salary funding from UNDP and payment requests from provincial level MoI representatives, it disburses funds monthly to one of four banks. The banks pay personnel salaries using one of two electronic systems: (1) electronic funds transfer directly to individual bank accounts, or (2) electronic funds transfer to an individual’s bank account with subsequent transfer to a mobile phone using a text message system called M-Paisa. In the areas without banks, provincial MoF officials transfer monthly salary payments to the bank account to a “trusted agent.” This agent is charged with personally delivering those funds to the recipients in cash.

Coalition advisors work to ensure the proper implementation and integration of these electronic systems by placing conditional controls and requirements tied to funding in the MoI through the SY 1394 commitment letter. The commitment letter includes 24 sections that define various measures designed to prevent direct contribution funds from being misappropriated or otherwise misused. Measures that ensure the verification of monthly payroll submissions, as well as the prohibition of payroll for salary or purchases above and beyond the approved *tashkil*, are included. In addition, anti-corruption measures and conditions on payroll withholdings are outlined in the commitment letter to promote good stewardship of MoI’s financial responsibilities.

In an attempt to improve the personnel and pay system, the MoI is increasing gradually the slotting of personnel in AHRIMS. During this reporting period, the MoI slotting in AHRIMS increased from 66 to 90 percent against ANP strength. MoI AHRIMS slotting improved only marginally by four percent per month primarily due to two conditions: lack of required

documents (e.g., identification cards) for policemen needed for input into AHRIMS, and slow AHRIMS uploading/slotting within isolated ANP posts. In February 2015, the MoI developed a plan to dispatch mobile identification card teams and establish identification card teams at provincial headquarters to alleviate a portion of the problem. As within the MoD, AHRIMS data accuracy is also a significant hurdle for MoI leadership. Although the emphasis from MoI leaders is strong, the policies, systems, and procedures to ensure accuracy of the right “faces-to-spaces” are not in place. In March, April, and May 2015, CSTC-A imposed penalties for missing the agreed upon standard to slot all assigned personnel against authorized positions.

Coalition advisors also focused their efforts on projecting future manning requirements and identifying factors of attrition necessary to maintain ANP end strength to inform the General Recruiting Command (GRC) and the General Training Command (GTC) more effectively. The advisors struggled to identify a single organization or directorate responsible for tracking and validating the number of trained (and untrained) ANP personnel to project manning requirements. Reporting on current manning requirements fluctuates from 8,000-20,000 positions, and estimates for the overall number of untrained police range from 5,000-8,000 personnel. Although data about untrained personnel from GRC, GTC, and MoI leaders has remained inconsistent, the GTC is demonstrating a commitment to address the issue with its SY 1394 annual training plan. The number of untrained ANP has become a small portion (approximately five percent) of the force’s overall strength due to sustained training efforts over time.

During this reporting period, coalition advisors helped the GTC re-scope its training objectives focused on reducing ANP casualties. Previously, the GTC focused on providing conduct combat lifesaver training and subsequently issuing and distributing combat lifesaver bags. The Deputy Minister for Security conducted an independent analysis of the root causes of casualties and identified 31 reasons for ANP injuries or deaths in the field. In February 2015, coalition advisors and GTC staff agreed to focus their casualty reduction training efforts based on the report’s findings. Curriculum writers at the GTC have begun developing a risk mitigation course consistent with the Afghan government’s casualty findings and that addresses more effectively the training-specific issues that are tied to ANP on-duty injuries and deaths. Accreditation of this course is projected for July 2015.

Logistics and Maintenance

The logistics structure for the ANP consists of one national-level contracted depot called the National Logistics Center (NLC) and one contracted maintenance facility called the Central Maintenance Facility (CMF). The NLC is located in Wardak Province and provides the ANP with vehicle and weapons maintenance and supply chain management capability. The CMF is located in Kabul Province and provides the ANP with a vehicle maintenance capability. At the regional level, the ANP have nine contracted Regional Maintenance Centers and one contracted Regional Logistics Center that provide the ANP with regional field maintenance and supply chain management capability.

The nascent MoI logistics system remains the subject of considerable coalition advising effort to improve the MoI’s ability to distribute supplies. The largely manual, paper-based system

depends on excessive bureaucracy and the “crisis intervention” of senior officers to resolve relatively minor issues. The ability of the MoI headquarters to influence operational and tactical outcomes outside of Kabul varies considerably, with ineffectual controls, poor consumption reporting, and little visibility below the regional maintenance and logistics centers. The MoI does not currently have a functioning procurement system, and the overall logistics system is susceptible to fraud and corruption. Major procurement initiatives, such as those for uniforms and facilities, which are enablers for the long-term sustainability of the MoI, are at risk of being taken “off budget.”

The Core-Information Management System has been adopted as the only logistics information management enabler across the MoI; however, Core-IMS utilization is limited within the ANP due to various reasons, including electrical outages, network connectivity, and training. The Core-IMS program management office was established, although no *tashkil* is approved that would allow the staffing of it. Core-IMS will be able to account for Class IV, V, and VIII supplies. The logistics personnel in management positions are not using Core-IMS executive reports to improve processing, shipping, and receiving to force implementation. They are reliant on a manual, paper system when offices lose power or drop connectivity to the internet.

The ANP currently relies on contracted maintenance to support its fleet. Overall, the ANDSF lack the institutional knowledge to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations, operate a demand-based supply system to inform logistics decisions, and provide accurate accountability of major end-items and repair parts. As part of the National Maintenance Strategy, RS advisors will focus on closing these gaps by continuing “shoulder to shoulder” training at key national and regional sustainment nodes.

The ANP has demonstrated strengths in the accountability of serial number items, such as weapons, vehicles, and sensitive items. In general, it is proficient in storage and receiving classes of individual supply items (e.g., clothing, tents, and tool sets), barrier material, personal supply items (e.g., soap and toothpaste), major end-items, and repair parts; has a good understanding of the MoI-14 form process; and its organization and layout of warehouse operations is efficient. Yet it relies heavily on coalition advisors to address problems. The MoI-14 process is lengthy, and there is no accountability for canceling orders.

The Automotive Management Services (AMS) contract is continuing to work well for the ANP at the national and regional levels. AMS provides excellent support in maintenance and repair parts management and allows coalition forces to maintain visibility and accountability of the ANP ground wheeled vehicle fleet of more than 47,000 vehicles in order to meet end-use monitoring requirements. The AMS has ten regional maintenance centers that are performing in accordance with their contract by providing maintenance support and repair parts management. The MoI and ANP are currently developing a National Maintenance Strategy to replace the AMS contract. The ANP National Maintenance Strategy will continue using a contract logistics support maintenance solution similar to the AMS contract, but will also focus on training ANP junior and senior leaders on maintenance and supply chain management operations.

Strategic and Operational Planning

The MoI leadership continues to refine its ability to develop, publish, and distribute effective baseline strategic documents. Like in the MoD, the three national strategic documents are intended to inform the basis for the *Ministry of Interior's Strategy* (MIS), as well as the minister's *10 Year Vision*. The MIS, which replaces the previous *National Police Strategy*, defines the MoI's vision and the goals and objectives to achieve them, which then forms the basis of subordinate plans for the employment of the ANP and other police pillars under the MoI. The MoI finalized the MIS for 2015-2019 in February 2015. The new MIS analyses the security situation, and outlines 5 goals and 29 objectives for the 5-year period. Additionally, in March 2015, the MoI finalized the *Ministry of Interior's Plan* (MIP) for 2015-2017. The MIP, which replaces the previous *National Police Plan*, details objectives under each strategic goal outlined in the MIS, and sets priorities and activities for a three-year period.

The Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy has been able to heighten MoI and ANP awareness and gain institutional acceptance of the MIS, the MIP, and the Strategic Programming Guidance Directive.⁵⁷ The Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy improved this year's delivery of key strategic documents, both in terms of timeliness and quality, which represents a positive step towards ensuring the strategic planning cycle informs the budget development process, a condition vital to the MoI's competence to produce requirements-based budgets. Advisors have assisted by advising them on how to write, not what to write. Immature capability and nascent capacity in the assessment, analysis, and reporting functions continue to undermine the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy's ability to monitor strategy and policy implementation and evaluate the effectiveness of this guidance.

The ability to optimize these efforts continues to be plagued by a lack of discipline to follow directives and an equally debilitating lack of consequences for those neglecting to adhere to guidance. These conditions must improve to ensure long-term ANP sustainability.

Intelligence

The Directorate of Police Intelligence tasks and coordinates intelligence at a basic level, produces analysis and intelligence products capable of informing senior MoI leaders and shaping MoI operations, and effectively targets terrorist and criminal networks through the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC). NTEC is currently the most mature and capable Afghan targeting organization. In addition to its independent function providing targeting support to the GCPSU and other units, it is a key intelligence supplier to the new interagency National Threat Intelligence Center. The Directorate of Police Intelligence is the senior user of the National Intelligence Management System within the MoI. Other police pillars, particularly the Afghan Anti-Crime Police's (AACP's) Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID), use NIMS effectively; however, there is a lack of NIMS connectivity with provincial chiefs of police and some provincial DPI directors. The MoI must assume program management for sustainment and

⁵⁷ The Strategic Programming Guidance Directive is a five-year planning document that provides direction for budget formulation based on requirements development in support of the goals and objectives in the MIS and the tasks and activities in the MIP.

continued development of the MoI NIMS. A desired expansion of MoINET, a form of secure electronic communication, will facilitate greater NIMS access.

The Police Intelligence Training Center in Kabul is on schedule to become completely autonomous by September 2015. This achievement is offset by the lack of provincial personnel trained due to funding issues. The recent revival of police intelligence mobile training teams can mitigate this problem if properly funded and supported. Many provincial personnel lack the rudimentary knowledge to conduct intelligence operations effectively.

Intelligence-related capabilities, such as biometrics and forensics, are beginning to enhance law enforcement efforts. The Afghans' Automated Biometrics Identification System currently has more than 2.5 million records, including more than 1.5 million individuals; however, it still needs standard policies and program structure to reach sustainment. The Herat and Kabul forensics laboratories are capable of ballistics, fingerprint, document, and media exploitation, as well as chemical analysis. The Herat Criminal Techniques Laboratory is operational but suffers from a shortage of personnel. The Kabul Criminal Techniques Laboratory will move into its new facility at the new MoI headquarters complex by the end of 2015. The increased forensics capabilities need to be matched by increased awareness of sensitive site exploitation by tactical units, as well as greater attention to evidence storage, processing, and tracking.

Strategic Communication

Efforts to improve the MoI's strategic communication are broken down into two sub-components: public affairs and information operations. The desired end-state for coalition advisors is for the MoI personnel and public affairs activities to be capable of conducting and sustaining operations designed to communicate with internal and external audiences. Although police build relationships by working within a community, professional communication is needed to increase awareness, transparency, trust, and respect between the police and the population.

Advisors have continued efforts designed to enhance existing national-level strategic communication coordination/synchronization processes and procedures among national-level spokesmen. Most recently, advisory efforts in this area included successfully conducting a national Senior Communicators Conference designed to enhance strategic communication capabilities among Afghan government spokesmen. Advisors have also conducted events featuring Afghan leadership spokespersons designed to increase collaboration and coordination.

Gender Integration

The MoI is working to develop plans to improve facilities and barracks; install security cameras in the police academy, regional training centers, and workplaces throughout the provinces; and secure transportation for female employees. The MoI plans to build and/or renovate childcare centers to accommodate the children of female police personnel while they are working and/or training. In addition, the MoI ordered tailored uniforms for female police that are scheduled to arrive this summer.

Courses such as violence against women, self-defense, weapons, and driver training will be added to the curriculum to meet the requirements for the basic skills of a police officer. The MoI has also committed to holding workshops, seminars, and training programs regarding the registration of reports of violence against women and procedures to be followed in order to investigate and prosecute offenders during the next two years. Additionally, the ANP conducted 51 workshops on human rights and the prevention of sexual harassment during the last year.

During this reporting period, the MoI also organized several conferences to discuss the integration of women into the ANP. One such conference was hosted by ABP 301st Zone on January 13, 2015, which included more than 100 police, including 35 female police from Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan, and Laghman Provinces and women interested in joining the ANDSF. The conference discussed the importance of female integration and equality within the ANP, women's rights to work according to Islamic Law, current police facilities and workshops available to support the training of women, and ANP female recruitment goals.

5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The ANP force is intended to maintain civil order, reduce corruption, and prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics. The ANP should meet the expectations of the Afghan public regarding individual and community security, and the safeguard of legal rights and freedoms. Confidence in the ANP continues to grow, with recent polling showing 76 percent of Afghan respondents express confidence in the ANP.⁵⁸ This type of confidence in the police is essential for implementing the rule of law.

Though the long-term focus for the ANP is on community policing,⁵⁹ the short-term focus is to combine ANP capabilities with the ANA to fight the insurgency. However, ANP units are less heavily equipped to fight insurgents compared to their ANA counterparts. The ANP continued to increase its capabilities in preparation for the fighting season, but was often employed incorrectly or misused as personal bodyguards.

The Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan Border Police, and Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters are generally rated as capable, but not fully operational or adequately effective. They lag behind the ANA in development and struggle at times to integrate their operations with their ANA counterparts.

During this reporting period, the MoI began to plan replacing the various Type A headquarters with six ANP zones, plus Kabul, to create better ANP unity of command by establishing a single commander for all police forces within the zone. The proposed new ANP zones will align with the ANA corps to provide a more manageable situation for the MoI to control its forces, allowing the MoI to command and control 6 zone commanders and the Kabul City Police chief, instead of the current arrangement of directing 34 different provincial chiefs of police. MoI leaders are planning to create the zone headquarters without increasing the overall personnel numbers in the approved *tashkil*.


⁵⁸ ANQAR survey, Wave 27, April 2015.

⁵⁹ Community policing focuses on the police building ties and working closely with members of the community.

ANP Strength

In April 2015, the ANP reportedly filled 97 percent of the force's 157,000 authorized positions with approximately 155,000 personnel, including more than 2,100 women. The ANP averaged approximately 1.7 percent attrition for the last 12 months, with a low of 1.0 percent in December 2014, and a peak of 2.4 percent in January 2015. During this reporting period, the ANP average monthly attrition rate was 1.55 percent, as depicted in Figure 13. The ANP is currently projected to recruit between 3,000-5,000 new recruits per month to keep the force near its authorization.

Figure 13: ANP Strength



The ANP consists of the AUP, the ABP, the ANCOP, and the AACCP.

* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.

** Gain includes all gains (recruits and re-accessions, and return from dropped from the rolls) to ANP strength during the reported period.

Policing has become an attractive job option for women. The nature of duties and ability for policewomen to work close to their home helps explain the variation from the ANA in recruiting numbers. The MoI has directed the ANP to employ 6,000 women by the end of fiscal year 2015, employ 10,000 women by the end of 2016, and have women make up 10 percent of the workforce by the end of 2017. This year, the MoI issued a recruitment plan to target women with at least a 12th grade education or higher, and it is currently working on developing a public affairs campaign. Recruiting numbers for women have doubled within the ANP in the last 12 months.

On February 27, 2015, approximately 200 police women graduated in Sivas, Turkey, after four months of training, which included incentive pay. All of the course graduates have been placed in their new police assignments before beginning advanced training. The RS Gender Office is researching whether Afghan law will allow women to hold the rank of officer upon graduation. The next recruiting class will begin a 6-month training course in Turkey in May 2015 with approximately 400 women. USFOR-A is assisting with the costs associated with the training and the transportation of the women to Turkey. In the meantime, some men are filling female billets on the *tashkil* in order to hold positions for future police women.

ANP Structure

The ANP is composed of four pillars – the AUP,⁶⁰ the ANCOP, the ABP, and the AACP – the GCPSU, and three sub-pillars. The sub-pillars – the Afghan Local Police, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) – are not officially a part of the ANDSF but provide additional security under the MoI.

Afghan Uniform Police

The AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary means of policing to provide public security. The AUP consists of the traffic police and the fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters in each of the 34 provinces. Although it is now focused on fighting insurgents, the long-term intent for the AUP is to conduct community policing. The AUP is assigned approximately 90,300 personnel who are intended to concentrate on basic police duties, such as crime prevention, crime scene preservation, detection of crimes, ensuring of security and civil order, protection of governmental and private properties and assets, control and management of traffic affairs, and response and assistance to unexpected incidents and natural disasters.

RS advisors continued to train, advise, and assist at Type A police headquarters, which are centered around large urban areas and provide oversight to Type B and Type C headquarters. In general, AUP leadership generates respect from its subordinates. These leaders do not always delegate responsibilities, however, which hinders the development and effectiveness of lower level leaders. The AUP is generally capable of planning and conducting tactical operations and participating in joint operations. However, it does not work with the ANA frequently enough. The AUP is capable of conducting investigations and collecting evidence. However, challenges remain with obtaining analysis of that evidence from the forensic labs in Kabul and Herat.

⁶⁰ The latest *Ministry of Interior's Strategy* refers to the AUP as the Afghan Security Police, which includes Provincial Police Headquarters, District Police Headquarters, Police Precincts, Traffic Police, and the General Directorate of Firefighting and Emergency Response.

Afghan National Civil Order Police

The second pillar of the ANP is the ANCOP, which combats insurgent activities in cooperation with the other ANDSF throughout the country. The ANCOP brigades are regionally based with the capability to deploy nationally rapidly to support the rule of law, support the “holding” phase of counterinsurgency operations, and provide support to counternarcotics and the eradication of poppy cultivation. ANCOP units maintain a paramilitary structure and more closely resemble the ANA than a civil order organization.

With a force of approximately 15,000 personnel, the majority of ANCOP units conduct high-intensity security operations after the ANA has cleared an area and before the security situation stabilizes to the point that AUP forces can resume their normal policing role. ANCOP units benefit from specialized training and unique recruitment. ANCOP units frequently combat the insurgency, assist ANA operations, and hold cleared terrain.

RS advisors train, advise, and assist the ANCOP only at the national headquarters, which they assess as capable overall. The most significant area of concern for the ANCOP remains the incorrect employment of its force, as opposed to a higher-capability police force. The ANCOP is frequently deployed piecemealed as a reserve force. Undue political influences have resulted in the ANCOP units performing missions that should be conducted by other ANP pillars or other ANDSF. The units are often deployed to locations where their capability is wasted on checkpoints or to provide protective services detail support for Afghan government officials. This misuse in resources affects the ANCOP units’ ability to support joint operations with the ANA and NDS. Additionally, the ANCOP sometimes struggles with sharing information and intelligence across the other ANP pillars and with the NDS.

As with much of the rest of the ANDSF, the ANCOP struggles generally with inventory and logistics. A consolidation and re-employment of the ANCOP into a true gendarmerie role, in conjunction with ANA clearing operations, is necessary to establish continuous Afghan government control over contested districts.

Afghan Border Police

The third pillar of the ANP is the ABP, which is strategically arrayed to patrol and secure the border and control entry ports, such as airports and border-crossing points, to guard against illegal entry of persons, weapons, narcotics, and other goods. The ABP is manned, trained, and equipped to provide security and interdiction along the border with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 82mm mortars. The ABP, under the current *tashkil*, is authorized a target end strength of approximately 22,000 personnel.

The ABP headquarters is located in Kabul, and brigade-level units are assigned to six zones throughout the country. RS advisors continue to train, advise, and assist at the ABP headquarters and five ABP zones. Overall, advisors assess the ABP as capable. Although continued advising is necessary, advisors assess that the ABP is sufficiently capable of planning and conducting operations.

Along a large portion of the border, the ABP operates in some of the most rugged and remote terrain in the world. This leads to a number of administrative and logistical challenges that are not common in the majority of the ANDSF formations. For example, the ABP has experienced issues with connectivity with the AHRIMS. Those locations also still require the use of the pay agent system to distribute their salaries, since they do not have easy access to banking facilities.

Additionally, many of its checkpoints and outposts along the eastern border with Pakistan are accessible only during favorable weather and require extensive planning and coordination in order to resupply them with basic life support items.

Afghan Anti-Crime Police

The fourth pillar of the ANP is the AACP, which focuses on investigative and police intelligence capacities, as well as proactive counterterrorism operations. During SY 1393, the AACP investigated more than 17,500 crimes across the country, including more than 2,100 homicides, 150 kidnappings, and 120 armed robberies. The AACP is assigned approximately 8,000 personnel split between two primary directorates, the Criminal Investigation Directorate and the Counter-Terrorism Directorate.

The CID is the lead for criminal investigations and police intelligence reporting. The AACP manages the national forensics laboratory and biometrics program, which are mentored daily by U.S.-sourced contractors. The MoI has one forensics laboratory in Kabul and opened a second laboratory in Herat during this reporting period.

The Counter-Terrorism Directorate conducts counterterrorism operations, civilian weapons and armored vehicle registration, and security for certain categories of Afghan government officials both in the capital and in each province. During 2014, the very important person (VIP) security unit provided approximately 3,000 guards for almost 500 officials, as well as temporary protection for political candidates during the presidential elections and subsequent election audit. Additionally, the Judicial Security Unit provides dedicated guards to courtrooms and attorney general offices around the country.

In December 2014, the former head of the CID was promoted to the chief of the AACP. The new chief, a highly regarded police professional, has worked to improve the professionalism and training of the AACP. Currently, many AACP officers in the provinces lack critical investigative skills and are often assigned their posts through parliamentarian influence without regard to professional qualifications. Initial investigative training is conducted at the Crime Management College, which is located in the Afghan National Police Academy and mentored by EUPOL.

General Command of Police Special Units

The GCPSU consists of three national mission units – Crisis Response Unit 222, Commando Force 333, and Afghan Territorial Force 444 – with a mandate to operate across the country; 33 provincial units called provincial special units that operate in direct support to the provincial chiefs of police; and a nationwide Investigative and Surveillance Unit (ISU) that partners with

the PSUs. With a force of approximately 5,100 personnel, the GCPSU conducts law enforcement in high-threat environments in order to uphold Afghan laws. They respond to crisis events, such as the Mazar-e-Sharif insurgent bombing and attack against a provincial administrative building in April 2015. The GCPSU provides special capabilities and tactical expertise to support counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and organized crime activities. These include establishment of units to respond to critical situations, and those to provide intelligence and surveillance capabilities, rapid response to emergencies or hostage situations, and assurance of security for high-ranking officials and judicial leadership.

PSUs consistently exhibit a high level of capability to respond to and resolve specific threats to Afghan security. PSUs conduct the following missions to resolve critical incidents within provincial boundaries: high-risk arrest, cordon and search, quick reaction force, armed reconnaissance, vehicle interdiction, reconnaissance patrol, cache recovery, and security patrolling. All of their operations are conducted according to Afghan rule of law, are evidence based, and approved by the MoI. As a result of their increasing capabilities, their multinational advisors perform TAA functions, rather than direct support.

Afghan Local Police

The ALP is a locally oriented defensive force consisting of members of the village it protects. The ALP typically operates in rural areas and is often the first line of defense against the Taliban. The ALP works with other ANDSF units in its local areas and is supported by the provincial and district chiefs of police under a U.S.-funded program supervised by the MoI ALP headquarters. With a minimal investment in training, the ALP provides a powerful countermeasure to Taliban influence in rural areas that may be otherwise vulnerable to insurgent attacks. Insurgents target the ALP more frequently because it is not centrally garrisoned, and its members live in their villages.

The ALP continues to grow toward its maximum authorized *tashkil* of 30,000 personnel with 28,356 ALP members, also known as Guardians, by the end of this reporting period. Of these, 25,179 Guardians were estimated to be fully trained. The ALP has 1,320 checkpoints in 155 districts spread across 29 provinces. Estimates are that 93 percent of ALP members renew their contracts. With the drawdown last quarter, U.S. forces no longer have visibility into the attrition rate because the Afghans only report gains and losses. However, given the strength the ALP maintained over the year, the attrition is very low at less than two percent. The ALP experienced an uptick in casualties this reporting period. However, it has not experienced challenges in recruiting.

Afghan Public Protection Force

The APPF provides fixed-site, convoy, and personal security as an Afghan government state-owned enterprise. Key operational tasks performed by the APPF include providing fixed-site security for key government and non-government and international projects; escorting and protecting convoys against insurgent attacks; protecting non-governmental organizations and international organizations having diplomatic immunity and political agencies of foreign countries residing in the country; protecting facilities donated to the Afghan government by

international organizations and the private sector; and providing personal security as an Afghan state-owned enterprise. It is currently assuming security missions from private security companies as directed by Afghan Presidential Decree #62 in August 2010, which required that private security companies be disbanded. The coalition does not advise the APPF as part of the RS mission.

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

The CNPA is the lead Afghan agency for counternarcotics and falls under the Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics, who reports directly to the Minister of Interior. It consists of regular narcotics police and a specialized force in all 34 provinces. The CNPA has approximately 2,870 personnel assigned, with approximately 1,330 in the capital and approximately 1,530 out in the provinces.

The CNPA headquarters includes an administration directorate, special unit directorate, tactical operations center, forensics laboratory, training department, and an international relations unit. The special unit directorate includes the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), both directly equipped and mentored by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency with counterdrug funding provided by DoD and the Department of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau. A third element of the special unit directorate is the Intelligence Investigative Unit (IIU), which is funded and mentored by the United Kingdom's National Crime Agency. In the provinces, CNPA elements operate under the command of the provincial chief of police.

The CNPA is responsible for collecting intelligence and investigating the punishable activities related to cultivation, smuggling, and production of illegal narcotics. Its units conduct active detection, eradication, and interdiction operations regarding the flow of narcotics; arrest drug traffickers and seize illicit drugs through other legitimate investigative agents of counternarcotics and refer them for prosecution; and coordinate with other relevant departments in counternarcotics efforts. During SY 1393, the CNPA seized approximately 3,645 kilograms of heroin, 50,939 kgs of hashish, 67,181 kgs of opium, 6,335 kilograms of morphine, and eradicated 8.7 hectares of opium poppy. ISAF previously provided an advisor to the Deputy Minister for Counternarcotics and oversaw the strategic development of the CNPA until 2013, when the CNPA ministerial development position was eliminated as a result of the ISAF drawdown. After that, strategic development and advisement continued under the construct of the DoD and Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, known as the CNPA Development Unit, until March 2015, in the face of a declining security environment. At the beginning of 2015, a Romanian police officer with extensive counternarcotics experience was assigned as a liaison between the RS mission and other international actors involved with the CNPA. Direct international assistance to the CNPA, especially from the Department of State, is expected to decrease dramatically in 2016. The RS counternarcotics liaison officer will assist with the transition from dependence on international community assistance to a more sustainable Afghan government solution within the budgetary process of the MoI.

SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE ANDSF

The ANDSF will continue to rely on the coalition’s security and advisory assistance for the remainder of 2015 and beyond. The ANDSF are primarily funded by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, and by international community donations to the United Nations Development Program Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan and the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund. The Afghan government has committed to provide the remaining funding starting in FY 2015 and progressively increasing its contribution through the current “decade of transformation.”

As articulated during the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit, NATO’s leaders intend for the Afghan government to assume full responsibility for its security costs by 2024. The framework laid out at the 2011 Bonn Conference assumes the Afghan government will gradually assume a greater share of the cost of the ANDSF. The Afghan government committed to providing \$500 million in support of the ANDSF starting in 2015, and gradually increasing its commitment until it assumes full responsibility for security costs in 2024. However, the 2015 Afghan national budget only allocates \$411 million against the \$500 million pledge.⁶¹

6.1 HOLDING THE AFGHAN MINISTRIES ACCOUNTABLE

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan continues to administer measures to ensure the Afghan government’s proper use of funds from international donors and partners. Stewardship of U.S. taxpayer dollars remains a top priority for USFOR-A, which has incorporated the recommendations of independent agencies and various inspectors general into its processes. In the last year, stringent financial controls have been placed on U.S. and international contributions through a series of financial commitment letters with the MoD and the MoI. These letters establish expectations for the responsible management of ASFF, the NATO ANA Trust Fund, and the UNDP LOTFA. If the criteria spelled out in the commitment letters are not met, funding can be withdrawn or withheld until corrective steps are taken. These enforcement mechanisms underpin U.S. messaging to Afghan leadership that they must demonstrate greater accountability and transparency in the spending of donor funds. President Ghani acknowledged the importance of accounting for every “U.S. dollar and penny” during his visit to Washington, DC, in March 2015. Continued U.S. and international financial contributions to the ANDSF through the “decade of transformation” will be critical signals of support to the government and people of Afghanistan.

6.2 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF through ASFF, an annual appropriation included in the DoD Appropriations Act and made available to the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, for the

⁶¹ The Afghan government designates funding for the \$215 million cost of the NDS as a contribution to its security sector. Although this is a positive contribution toward the security of Afghanistan, DoD and international donors do not consider the NDS part of the larger ANDSF, as this would exceed both the ASFF authority and the intent of the broader international community.

purpose of providing assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan. ASFF is a key enabler and center of gravity for the U.S. mission, providing the funding necessary for the ANDSF to succeed in Afghanistan. The FY 2014 ASFF budget was \$3.962 billion, and the FY 2015 ASFF budget is \$4.1 billion. CSTC-A anticipates that FY 2014 ASFF will be fully obligated by September 30, 2015.

6.3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the 2011 Bonn Conference, the wider international community decided to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF beyond December 31, 2014. At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, the international community reaffirmed its strong commitment to this process and to playing its part in the financial sustainment of the ANDSF. Although Chicago was not a pledging conference, financial commitments made at, or in the run up to, the summit totaled more than \$1 billion per year for 2015, 2016, and 2017 (in 2012 dollars).⁶² The financial commitments were announced as an annual amount to be given every year for three years from 2015 through 2017. At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the international community again reaffirmed its commitment to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF, and nations renewed the financial commitments they had made to the sustainment of the ANDSF.⁶³ Donors provide funding through bilateral or multi-lateral channels. The two multi-lateral channels are the NATO ANA Trust Fund and the UNDP LOTFA.

DoD manages the NATO ANA Trust Fund on behalf of international donors to provide support and sustainment of the ANA. Since the beginning of the NATO ANA Trust Fund in 2007, 26 nations have contributed more than \$1 billion. For calendar year 2015, 25 nations have pledged \$440 million; as of May 2015, the NATO ANA Trust Fund received \$200 million in contributions.⁶⁴

Approximately one-half of all international contributions for ANDSF sustainment reconfirmed at the NATO Summit in Wales are expected to flow through the ANA Trust Fund, with the remainder through the UNDP LOTFA. Beginning in Afghan SY 1394, CSTC-A initiated a NATO ANA Trust Fund commitment letter with the MoD and the MoI using the same stringent controls in the ASFF commitment letters.

Since 2002, the UNDP has managed LOTFA. Today, the UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 157,000 police. CSTC-A coordinates closely with UNDP to meet the needs of the LOTFA. The legal agreement between UNDP and the Afghan government (LOTFA Phase VI) expired on December 31, 2014, and LOTFA has been functioning under an interim agreement set to expire at the end of June 2015. An agreement for LOTFA Phase VII is currently being modified through a dialogue between UNDP,

⁶² Commitments at the Chicago Summit were made in Euros and other national currencies. Due to fluctuations in exchange rate and the increased strength of the U.S. dollar, the value of funding to be provided by international donors in FY 2015 is estimated at less than \$1 billion. Based on an average of April 2015 exchange rates, international contributions are valued at approximately \$920 million.

⁶³ Donor commitments can be found in the classified annex.

⁶⁴ Pledging nations for 2015 are: Germany, Italy, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Turkey, Norway, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Azerbaijan, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, Belgium, and Montenegro.

the Afghan government, and donor nations, including the United States.⁶⁵ President Ghani has agreed to a phased plan to transition the management of the LOTFA from the UNDP to the Afghan government.

6.4 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS

The lead responsibility for sustaining the ANDSF in the future rests with the Afghan government. The Afghan government has allocated \$411 million of some \$706 million contributed toward the security forces specifically to pay for MoD and MoI costs in 2015 (82 percent of the \$500 million pledge). Although this is short of its commitment to provide at least \$500 million in 2015, it represents 20 percent of overall Afghan government budgetary funding for all ministries—a large share compared to the funding most countries typically provide for national security.

The Afghan government attributes its lower than expected contribution to two principal reasons: exchange rate declines of the Afghani relative to the U.S. dollar and a differing definition of Afghan security forces. Since the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, where the \$500 million was mutually agreed, the value of the Afghani fell 17 percent relative to the U.S. dollar, and the Afghan government does not have the funds to cover the short-fall. In addition, the Afghan government includes its funding of other security institutions, such as the NDS and the Presidential Protective Service, in its overall security funding contribution, and the remainder of the \$706 million is allocated to these institutions. U.S. and international donors are working with the Afghan government to clarify the expectation of increasing contributions toward the ANDSF to meet Chicago Summit goals, with the intent for full Afghan assumption of security costs by the end of 2024.

Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

The United States, the international community, the Afghan government, and civil society work together in mutually reinforcing ways to support a sustainable Afghan economy. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework provides a construct to help guide Afghan-led reforms, many related to economic and financial development, as international donors continue providing extraordinary levels of assistance. Other international fora, such as the Asian Development Bank-sponsored Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program, the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process, and the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, provide opportunities for regional leaders to break down trade barriers, increase cross-border investment, and improve trade routes between Central and South Asia. The United States supports regional engagement through its New Silk Road initiative, with an emphasis on regional energy integration, trade and transport, customs and borders, and individual connections.

Most assessments suggest that Afghanistan’s economy will not grow rapidly enough in the next five years to assume a significantly larger share of the cost of security. The World Bank projects

⁶⁵ Although President Ghani initially requested that UNDP transfer LOTFA responsibilities to the MoI by the end of June 2015, donors, the Afghan government, and UNDP reached an agreement to make that transition conditions-based. An agreement for LOTFA Phase VII is expected to be complete by June 30, 2015.

an economic growth rate of 2.5 percent in 2015, and 5 percent in 2016.⁶⁶ In a best case scenario, a growth rate in 2018-2020 comparable to the 9 percent average growth of 2003-2012 would mean approximately a one-third increase in gross domestic product (GDP) from 2016-2020. Assuming revenues grow in line with GDP, this would translate into an increase of approximately \$600-700 million in total annual revenues by 2020. Even if all of these proceeds contributed to funding MoD and MoI costs, this would cover only one-fifth of the total cost of security at current force levels.

The United States has spent approximately \$17 billion on civilian-led assistance since 2001, helping to develop trade, support capacity building in the extractive industries, spur investment and private sector development, and workforce development through education and training. USAID, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Transportation, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation are among the number of U.S. entities helping to develop Afghanistan's business prospects.

Last year, lack of investor confidence, largely related to delays in forming a new government, hampered economic growth. President Ghani's broad-based reform agenda seeking to encourage a sustainable economy has helped to bolster confidence to some degree. The Afghan government has implemented a variety of incremental reforms that lay the foundation for its wider anticorruption and economic development objectives, which include improving the investment climate and increasing revenues. To control non-security expenditures, the government passed a budget for the current solar year that decreases revenue assumptions to more realistic levels, curtails discretionary development spending, and minimized year-on-year spending increases. Some of the recent reforms that affect socioeconomic development include:

- New revenue measures, such as increasing import duties, enforced tax laws, and increased overflight fees.
- Finalized negotiations for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff-monitored program.
- Efforts to stabilize one state-owned bank and started organizing a tender to finally privatize New Kabul Bank.
- Work with Parliament on a new, IMF-certified banking law.
- Establishment of a national procurement committee, which has begun reviewing all large contracts.
- Opening investigations into corruption within the MoD and MoI.
- Work with Pakistan to attempt to start reconciliation talks with the Taliban.
- Emplacement of all but one minister of the new cabinet.
- Establishment of the agreed-upon special electoral committee.
- Actions to cement Kabul Bank verdicts and recoup losses.

To ensure sustainability, the Afghan government needs to reduce the costs within the security sector drastically. Many resources funneled to the security sector are wasted mainly due to lack of control mechanisms in business processes, massive corruption, and lack of long-term partnerships with the private sector.

⁶⁶ World Bank, *Afghanistan Economic Update*, April 2015.

CSTC-A continues to work with the Afghan government to ensure appropriate oversight of direct contributions to the MoI and the MoD. During this reporting period, CSTC-A and Afghan security ministry leaders signed the SY 1394 comprehensive bilateral financial agreement. This bilateral financial agreement, known as the commitment letter, stipulates how the MoD and the MoI allocate funding for the fiscal year and under what conditions it is provided by CSTC-A, identifies various legal constraints (such as the Berry Amendment), and instructs the Afghans on the use of the automated accounting systems at the five-digit accounting level in order to advance their management of the funding. The MoD ASFF commitment letter and the MoI ASFF commitment letter, worth \$1.597 billion and \$553 million, respectively, were signed by all parties in December 2014.

During the reporting period, CSTC-A signed five separate commitment letters: two with the MoD (ASFF and ANA Trust Fund), two with the MoI (ASFF and ANA Trust Fund), and one with the UNDP LOTFA. Each of these bilateral financial arrangements defined CSTC-A's commitment to develop ministerial capabilities and capacities while supplementing SY 1394 security budgets. Disbursements are provided to the MoF and later allocated to the respective security ministry as required, based on, but not limited to, actual expenditure rates, procurement plans, and estimated expenditure forecasts. In 2014, CSTC-A began placing conditional controls and requirements tied to funding in the MoD and MoI commitment letters. In just the last year, the number of conditions has nearly tripled, as a means to facilitate and promote full transparency, accountability, and oversight of international donor and U.S. funding.

CSTC-A provided advice and recommendations to assist ministries in making informed decisions to improve support to the Afghan government, and enhance stewardship of resources, while remaining independent and objective in its audit approach. CSTC-A continues to perform and assist independent assessments and audits to ensure appropriate scrutiny of Afghan financial processes and make recommendations for improving Afghan capability. CSTC-A provides independent, reasonable assurance that the Afghan government has transparent and accountable business processes and executes direct contribution funds in accordance with CSTC-A's commitment letters and applicable laws. During this reporting period, the CSTC-A audit division had one audit in the withhold process, issued three final reports, and issued two draft reports. These audits identified material weaknesses in the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System's financial data reliability; vulnerabilities with tracking payments to contracts; issues with compliance with law, policies, and procedures; and lack of an audit trail of documentary evidence for expenditures of direct contribution funds. Audit recommendations resulted in CSTC-A recouping \$41.1 million in inappropriately spent funds and enabling ministerial advisors to support improving controls within the Afghan financial and contracting processes. Further, the audits made recommendations to increase the visibility of the MoD's and MoI's execution of ASFF funds, improve accountability, and strengthen financial management. Of note, 36 Afghan graduates (31 from the MoD and 5 from the MoI) completed the first Inspector General course in more than a year on April 7, 2015.

The DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) recommendations⁶⁷ for strengthening the Afghan government's internal controls are being implemented by CSTC-A, ensuring a transparent and accountable fiscal process for direct contributions provided on-budget for the sustainment of the ANDSF. By creating a more stringent SY 1394 ASFF commitment letter, CSTC-A addressed the Afghan government's lack of documentation, inadequate reconciliation payment with personnel data, and incorrectly charged budget accounts. CSTC-A concurred in the DoDIG's recommendations to increase the visibility of the MoD's and MoI's execution of ASFF funds, improve accountability for pension contributions, and strengthen payroll processes, and is working with the MoD and the MoI to improve these areas by increasing the number of subject matter experts working directly with each ministry. CSTC-A has begun implementing the audit's recommendations, including adding additional advisors within the MoD and the MoI to improve financial management with adequate controls, transparency, and greater accountability. Improving the ability of the MoD and the MoI to provide appropriate oversight and accountability of international funding for the ANDSF, and developing Afghan capability in financial management, will continue to be a core focus of the RS TAA mission.

Finally, CSTC-A continues to work with the MoD and the MoI to develop their internal capabilities and capacities for resource management and procurement. This effort focuses on strengthening the ANDSF's ability to manage their fiscal resources more effectively, while helping to provide oversight of the ASFF money being spent on-budget. One key effort undertaken by CSTC-A is the expansion of a subject matter expert program from the MoI to the MoD. This program hires well-educated Afghans in various support fields to assist the ministries in executing their missions. Another significant undertaking is the implementation of an integrated personnel and pay system for the MoD. The MoD's pay system is currently a manual system in that is susceptible to corruption (e.g., paying "ghost soldiers") and also takes approximately 25 days to process. CSTC-A's initiative, the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), will link the current Afghan Human Resource Information Management System to an electronic pay system. This will help automate and streamline the process, while providing the additional transparency and visibility required to oversee the payment of salaries properly. The APPS effort will achieve initial operational capability in the third quarter of FY 2016 and full operational capability a year later.

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, "Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency over Direct Contributions," DODIG-2014-102, August 29, 2014.

ANNEX A – RESOLUTE SUPPORT INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Essential Function	Indicators of Effectiveness
EF 1: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MoD and MoI are able to accurately identify requirements, programs, and funding over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance - MoF provides timely guidance to enable MoI and MoD to develop a budget - MoD and MoI are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements - MoD and MoI are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes - MoD and MoI are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned - MoF provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to MoI and MoD - MoD and MoI possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts
EF 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MoD MICP is effectively implemented and sustainable - MoD IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability - GS IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability - Critical items (the “big four” issues -- fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level - Ensure appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan government
EF 3: Rule of Law and Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MoD and MoI have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other GVHR - MoD and MoI identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and GVHR - MoD and MoI inter-ministerial cooperation with AGO on corruption adjudication, and with AGO on GVHR allegations
EF 4: Force Generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and MoI utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force - MoD implements civilianization goals and objectives as outlined in the bilateral agreement - MoD and MoI manpower plans are developed and used to project future manpower requirements that inform recruiting goals, mitigates attrition rates, and achieve desired end strength - MoD and MoI establish systems to integrate lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; and programs of instruction

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All untrained ANP receive formal police training, and MoI prevents future untrained policy by forecasting training requirements and scheduling courses to accommodate recruit intakes - The ANA has established a system for training in air and ground coordination; capability established and used for information operations delivery - Training delivered that results in reduced casualties
<p>EF 5: Logistics and Maintenance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Measurement and reporting has command emphasis - ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements - ANDSF has adequately executed a demand based inventory management system - ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors - MoI assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the coalition-funded AMS contract - MoD has a developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable - MoD has sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill <i>tashkil</i> - MoD has an operational and sustainable medical logistics process - ANP operate inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines - The Afghan government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare - MoD capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government - MoD able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure - MoD able to sustain information management systems throughout their lifecycle - MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems - MoD able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations - MoI capable of managing its portion of frequency spectrum for the Afghan government
<p>EF 6: Command and Control Operations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ONSC delivers national security guidance through the national strategic security document set (NTA, NSP, and NSS) - Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead -- deliver strategic documents (<i>National Military Strategy and Guidance for Operational Planning</i>) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware) to inform subordinate planning - Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead -- delivers the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance in time and of sufficient quality to inform and drive the departmental capability development process

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GS Plans Directorate deliver planning guidance and a coherent, synchronized campaign planning process - The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy -- delivers strategic documents (MIS, MIP, and Strategic Programming Guidance Directive) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware), monitors implementation and manages change through a robust force management process - The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy monitors MIS and MIP implementation and delivers guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process - ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct combined arms operations - ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with ANP - ANA has assessed its capability gaps at the operational level and implemented improvements to address the gaps - ANA has a sustainable capability to prepare detailed plans and orders at the corps level from strategic guidance from the MoD - ANP has an established and sustainable capability to coordinate ANP inputs to ANA operations - ANASOC develops as a strategic MoD asset capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining the force - ANASOC is able to synchronize special operations brigade and special operations <i>kandak</i> operations within the framework of corps security operations in support of the Afghan government and MoD objectives - SMW develops as a strategic Afghan government organization capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining a force to conduct special operations force air assault and airborne ISR capability in support of ASSF - AAF has developed sustainable enterprise manning, a sustainable aerial fires capability, and a sustainable theatre mobility system
<p>EF 7: Intelligence</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages security issues - MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making and into ANASOC and ANA corps level operations - DPI human intelligence institutes a sustainable human intelligence network that can action and report on intelligence requirements and tasking - Establish NMIC as an operational intelligence center capable of retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various intelligence sensors and developing products that support Afghan government intelligence operations - DPI trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment requirements to meet operational needs - Establish enduring and sustainable organic intelligence capability at Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and ANASOC
<p>EF 8:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National unity government develops and distributes strategic

<p>Strategic Communication</p>	<p>communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MoD Religious Cultural Affairs leadership expands the throughput of the existing literacy program - MoD and MoI increase female recruitment through the development of a national media campaign - GS Operations Directorate Information Operations has the knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as necessary) yearly [personnel and equipment] <i>tashkil</i> inputs, as well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which will enable the MoD information operations capability throughout the country
<p>Gender</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and plans on gender integration - MoI and MoD provide safe training and working environment (facilities) for women - MoI takes actions to eliminate gender-based violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of women in the MoI/ANP

ANNEX B – ACRONYMS

AAC	Advise and Assist Cell
AAC-SE	Advise and Assist Cell – Southeast
AAC-SW	Advise and Assist Cell – Southwest
AACP	Afghan Anti-Crime Police
AAD	Advise and Assist Directorate
AAF	Afghan Air Force
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research
AFMIS	Afghanistan Financial Management Information System
AGO	Attorney General’s Office
AHRIMS	Afghan Human Resource Information Management System
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
ALP	Afghan Local Police
AMS	Automotive Management Services
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANASOC	Afghan National Army Special Operations Command
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANQAR	Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
APPS	Afghan Personnel and Pay System
ASFF	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
ASSF	Afghan Special Security Forces
ATAC	Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator
AUP	Afghan Uniform Police
BSA	Bilateral Security Agreement
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CID	Criminal Investigation Directorate
CMF	Central Maintenance Facility
CNPA	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
Core-IMS	Core-Information Management System
CSD	Central Supply Depot
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
CWS	Central Workshop
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDIG	Department of Defense Inspector General
DPI	Directorate of Police Intelligence
EDA	Excess Defense Article
EF	Essential Function
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPS	Electronic Payroll System
EUPOL	European Union Police

FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FY	Fiscal Year
GCPSU	General Command of Police Special Units
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMIC	Government Media Information Center
GPPT	German Police Project Team
GRC	General Recruiting Command
GS	General Staff
GTC	General Training Command
GVHR	Gross Violation of Human Rights
HMMWV	High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IG	Inspector General
IIU	Intelligence Investigative Unit
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ISU	Investigative and Surveillance Unit
KIA	Killed-in-Action
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MAAR	Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MICP	Ministerial Internal Controls Program
MIP	Ministry of Interior's Plan
MIS	Ministry of Interior's Strategy
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoI	Minister of Interior
MRAP	Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected
NAC-A	NATO Air Command-Afghanistan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NIMS	National Information Management System
NIU	National Interdiction Unit
NLC	National Logistics Center
NMIC	National Military Intelligence Center
NMS	National Military Strategy
NMU	National Mission Unit
NSP	National Security Policy
NSS	National Security Strategy
NTA	National Threat Assessment
NTEC	Network Targeting and Exploitation Center

NTIC	National Threat Intelligence Center
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel
ONSC	Office of the National Security Council
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PL	Public Law
PoAM	Program of Actions and Milestones
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
PSS	Persistent Stare System
PSU	Provincial Special Unit
RAID	Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment
RASR	Regional ANSF Status Report
RLSC	Regional Logistics Supply Center
RS	Resolute Support
SDCA	Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIU	Sensitive Investigations Unit
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SMW	Special Mission Wing
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SY	Solar Year
TAA	Train, Advise, and Assist
TAAC	Train, Advise, and Assist Command
TAAC-Air	Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air
TAAC-C	Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital
TAAC-E	Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East
TAAC-N	Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North
TAAC-S	Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South
TAAC-W	Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VIP	Very Important Person
WIA	Wounded-in-Action