

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

HOW THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
CAN EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT THE
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES MISSION

by

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Abstract:

This paper takes the position that the United States Army Reserve can become the lead Title 10 force for the Department of Defense in conducting Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). The National Guard will retain its primacy as the tool for Governors to conduct disaster relief and maintain civil order. When state resources are unable to meet the requirements and local officials or request immediate response assistance or the Governor requests Federal support, the USAR should be the lead federal military responders. The USAR will need to replace its Cold War personnel systems and work with the Active Army to establish Total Force Personnel system. A personnel system is needed that will allow the USAR to respond rapidly to the needs of the Total Force and Combatant Commanders without the cumbersome mobilization process. The USAR must eliminate the numerous duty statuses and their restrictive “training” identifiers that specify what type of actions reservists can complete. The USAR should leverage and expand the number of Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (MEB) for the DSCA mission because of its capabilities to respond to natural and man-made disasters. Many of the disaster response skillsets found in the Army National Guard (ARNG) are found in the USAR. The USAR has engineer, medical, transportation, logistics and chemical biological radiological nuclear (CBRN) units in communities throughout the United States. The USAR focus on the homeland security and defense mission will allow the active Army to concentrate its resources on preparing for and responding to overseas contingency operations. Using the USAR in support of the ARNG in homeland security and defense is a smart use of the reserve component (RC) as an operational reserve, especially with the personnel reductions of active force. Using a remodeled USAR to provide the lead Title 10 efforts in DSCA will keep the Total Force mission requirements balanced and be a great benefit for the United States.

Biography

LTC Larry B. Rentz, Sr. is a United States Army Reserve (USAR), Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Officer assigned as a student to the United States Air War College. In 1992, LTC Rentz was commissioned into the USAR through the Army Reserve Officers Training Corps at Florida A&M University in Tallahassee, Florida. LTC Rentz conducted Peacekeeping Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997 in support of Operation Joint Guard. He also conducted Military Police Operations in Iraq in 2004, and Afghanistan in 2012 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II and Operation Enduring Freedom, respectively. He has served in various leadership and staff positions from platoon to Department of the Army (DA) Staff. His career assignments include, Board Recorder at the DA Secretariat, Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Battalion Executive Officer, Military Police Brigade Operations Officer, and DA Staff Senior Law Enforcement Policy Analyst. LTC Rentz is a graduate of the Military Police Officer Basic and Advance Courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Anti-Terrorism Level II Course, Command and General Staff School Intermediate Level Education Course, and Protective Services School. LTC Rentz is Defense Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA) Level II certified. He has 24 combined years of service in the Florida Army National Guard, Active Army, and USAR.

Introduction

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) is in a position to expand its contribution to the homeland security mission because of the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2012. The NDAA of 2012 gives the Secretary of Defense the authority to order members of the Army Reserve to active duty for up to 120 days to respond to a Governor's request for emergency federal assistance.¹ This law removes the legal barriers preventing the USAR from using its assets in saving lives and restoring services after a catastrophic event here in the homeland.

The USAR can now become the premier Title 10 federal response force for defense of the homeland and responding to natural or manmade disasters. In order to become optimally effective, the USAR should move immediately to enact a force management strategy that will allow for the proper manning, equipping, training, and deployment of that force. The force management strategy should encompass significant changes to the current career management model along with adjustments to the structure of some reserve units. The actions will posture the USAR to execute missions related to homeland support and make it a more vital member of the Total Force. The author will describe the actions the USAR should employ to transform itself to support the current Department of Defense (DOD) policy to use the reserve component as an "operational reserve."² More specifically, I will argue that the USAR should create a tiered level of service to readily provide trained forces to United States Northern Command through United States Army North (ARNORTH) and expand the number of Maneuver Enhancement Brigades for employment in support of the homeland.

The assistance the DOD provides to local governments in emergencies here at home is referred to as Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). DOD Directive 3025.18 *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* defines DSCA as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD Component assets, and the National Guard forces in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.”³ The National Guard provides military support to their states under the authority of their Governors in their Title 32 roles. The purpose of DOD support is to provide federal response to Governors when the emergency’s scope extends beyond the capabilities of the state-activated National Guard forces and local authorities.

DOD assistance to local governments during emergencies is not a new occurrence. Federal or Title 10 forces responded to the Los Angeles riots and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and numerous disasters since then. The Stafford Act, which was originally passed by Congress in 1988 and amended several times over the years with the most recent change occurring in 2013, provides the framework of how the federal government will provide assistance.⁴ Before the passage of NDAA 2012, Federal Reserve forces could only assist if the President declared a National Emergency, such as in the case of 9/11.

The attacks on the homeland on September 11, 2001 had far-reaching implications on how the USAR was employed and particularly how often it was employed. Army Reserve units were immediately mobilized onto active duty to provide security at critical sites throughout the United States as a part of Operation Noble Eagle. Later, USAR units deployed to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 9/11, more than 275,000 reservist have been mobilized worldwide to support contingency operations.⁵ The national crisis broke the paradigm of the use of USAR

as a Cold War Strategic Reserve. The Cold War had ended more than 10 years prior; however, the catastrophic events quickened the Army's pace of transformation of the Reserve to meet our national defense requirements.

The Army of the Cold War era consisted of a large active duty force that was prepared to meet the Soviet threat in the fields of Europe on short notice. Members of its Reserve Component (RC), consisting of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the USAR, would join the active duty force in battle months later. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the reduction in the active force in the 1990's, the Army continued to limit the use of the RC for overseas contingency operations. Despite its utilization in the Gulf War and peacekeeping operations in Haiti and the Balkans, the RC remained structured to respond to operations that allowed time to mobilize for active duty. The Army will redeploy almost all of its forces from Afghanistan within a year. It will also return to pre-war active duty strength of 490,000 soldiers in 2015.⁶ With an active force of that size and continued requirements for operations throughout the world, the Army will become more reliant on its reserve forces to ensure it can meet all of its commitments.⁷

Review of Future Reserve Component Roles

The commitment of protecting our citizens and homeland is a vital mission and the RC must be ready to lead the DOD in that mission. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs produced a report in 2011 titled "*Comprehensive Review of the Future Roles of the Reserve Component*," that assessed the best ways to incorporate the objectives of 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR.) into the National Military Strategy. The six objectives were *Costs, Uses, Roles, Standards, Rebalancing,*

and Changes. Due to the constraints of time and length of this paper, the author will elaborate on the objectives *Uses*, *Roles*, and *Rebalancing*. *Uses* is described as “Leveraging Departmental plans for the future to best determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of the Guard and Reserve to best advantage during drill time, periods of Active Duty, and during mobilization.” *Roles* is described as “determining those roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited and where Guard and Reserve forces should be considered as a force of first choice.” *Rebalancing* is defined as “proposing recommendations on rebalancing the mix of Active and Reserve Components to meet demands of the Combatant Commands based on the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals.”⁸ The report findings stated, “the Reserve Component is best employed for missions and tasks that are predictable, relatively consistent over time, and whose success can be substantially enabled by long-term personal and geographic relationships.... HD [Homeland Defense] and DSCA are Total Force responsibilities. However, the nation needs to focus particular attention on better using the competencies of the National Guard and Reserve Component organizations.”⁹ The report also recommended, “the Reserve Component should be a resource to the nation for both HD and DSCA. The National Guard, given its community base, knowledge of, and familiarity with, state and local governments, and civilian skills, should continue to play the principal role in both mission areas. The Title 10 Reserve Components, when needed, should be more readily available to the Department as a part of the Total Force effort to support USNORTHCOM.”¹⁰ The USAR is embedded in communities almost identically to the National Guard and has similar knowledge of, and familiarity with, state and local governments.

USNORTHCOM has responsibility for planning and coordinating the HD and DSCA missions for DOD. The report recommended HD and DSCA as two of the tasks that could be supported

by “enabling differing methods of service within the Reserve Component.”¹¹ This recommendation essentially recommends creating structure to allow reservists willing to serve more than the tradition drill periods, and deploy more frequently than the typical reservist, the opportunity to do so.

Continuum of Service

A continuum of service is that structure that would allow reservist that desired to serve more than one weekend a month and two weeks a year to in a tiered level of reserve service.

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1200.17 *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force* defined continuum of service as “management policies supported by appropriate statutes, benefit and compensation options, and agreements that facilitate transparent movement, to the extent possible, of individuals between active military, reserve military, and civilian service. These management policies provide variable and flexible service options and levels of participation, and are consistent with DOD manpower requirements and each individual’s ability to serve over the course of a lifetime of service.”¹² DODD 1200.17 also directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to “ensure that sufficient guidance exists to guide Service implementation of the continuum of service concept.”¹³ The following excerpt is from the Human Resource Management One Book Fiscal Years 2006-2011 that succinctly captures DOD’s intent for changing the way the reserve component is managed. It highlights DOD’s position on the management of the operational reserve by utilizing the continuum of service. It emphasizes HD and DSCA.

2.4.8 Promote the transition of the Reserve Components (RC) to an "operational reserve," in addition to their traditional role as a strategic reserve.

We will recognize that the National Guard and Reserve are primarily an on-call force, but they are being called upon to play an even more

integral part in the day-to-day accomplishment of the Department's operational requirements. We must adapt policies, practices, and force management approaches to support this critical change, and provide the Guard and Reserve with the manning, training, equipping, resourcing, and basing essential to their success. We will establish policies and pursue statutory changes to remove barriers to the implementation of a "continuum of service" construct. We will re-engineer mobilization and demobilization policies and procedures and we will further strengthen and encourage the employer support of our Guard and Reserve members, while looking to reduce the burdens and economic impact of their employers. In addition, we will strive to solidify the Reserve component roles in Homeland Defense and Civil Support mission areas by developing policies, which leverage their capabilities and community basing.¹⁴

DOD guidance directing the services to develop and implement policies for an operational reserve, DSCA, and continuum of service is six years old and neither the Army nor Army Reserve has its own parallel guidance. The DSCA mission is an ideal venue for developing a comprehensive policy because it relies on elements of all three components to be executed successfully.

The DSCA mission will require the USAR to have forces ready to provide an immediate response in order to save lives and property.¹⁵ The USAR will need to have soldiers in units that can mobilize and deploy to the scene of the incident in a very short time span. A continuum of service status will facilitate that response.

Lieutenant General (Ret) Dennis McCarthy, former Commander, Marine Forces Reserve described the continuum as, “a way of describing the full spectrum of availability, ranging from members of the Individual Ready Reserve who do not routinely train as members of units and who may never be recalled to active duty, to individuals who perform short-term active service during the course of a year, to Reservist who volunteer for active duty for up to 365 days.”¹⁶ Figure 1 illustrates this continuum of service concept.




Figure 1 Continuum of Service

Reserve service can mean different things to different people at various points in their career.

For example, the continuum of service would allow a soldier, Sergeant Jones to serve in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) at a time when his civilian career was making significant demands on his life. A new promotion, a change in job requirements that would place significant demands on his time, may necessitate that he transfer to the IRR for maybe a year. Sergeant Jones could complete Distributive Learning courses to accumulate the minimum of 48 points for credible Reserve Retirement Year. A different soldier, Specialist Williams, may decide that the traditional one weekend a month, two weeks a year is the level of commitment that she wants. She would join a unit that supports the Emergency Force and attend the unit's scheduled 48 Inactive Duty Training Periods along with the unit's two-week Annual Training Period to meet her reserve duty requirements for the year. Specialist Williams would only be called-up for a National Emergency. Lieutenant Potter is a Platoon Leader in her Institutional Training Unit and is a schoolteacher at the local high school. Since she has 90 days of summer vacation, she

volunteers to support summer surges at Initial Entry Training locations or Reserve Officer Training Corps Camp at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Staff Sergeant Peters loves being a transporter and wants to train more often and conduct real world operations. He requests assignment to a unit that supports USNORTHCOM and will participate in a major DSCA exercise this year. Sergeant Peters attends all IDT Battle Assemblies, then participates in a four-week DSCA exercise, and finally supports firefighting in California for 30 days. Lieutenant Potter and Staff Sergeant Peters are both in the Contingency Force of the continuum of service. They both are helping the Total Army meet its mission requirements. Potter and Peters are also gaining valuable professional experience, as well as pay and retirement benefits for their extended service. By providing varying levels of commitment, continuum of service retains the skills of experienced service members and provides greater opportunities for Soldiers to serve on active duty while ensuring the Army meets all of its requirements.

Soldiers serving on active duty, as a part of the Regular Army will be leaving in large numbers as the Army reduces its active duty end strength from 520,000 to approximately 450,000. Those soldiers will take with them a trove of experience and skills developed over the past 13 years of contingency operations around the world. It is incumbent upon the Army to ensure all those skills and experience are not lost to the civilian sector. Preserving those skills in the RC will improve the overall readiness of the Total Army and ensure the DSCA mission is resourced with the greatest number of operationally experienced Soldiers.

Retaining experienced active duty soldiers in the ARNG or USAR increases the overall proficiency level of the Total Army. Soldiers in the RC sometimes geographically relocate due to change in employment or life changes. As a result, they may need to transfer from the ARNG to the USAR or vice versa. The Army Human Resources Command should implement an

integrated Total Force personnel system that makes the move nearly transparent to the Soldier.

A continuum of service would allow soldiers to move between the reserve components with little effort on the soldier's part, and retain their skills and experience in the Total Force.

Accessibility to the Reserve Component

The national focus on improving the Total Force through faster access to the reserve components has resulted in significant changes to Title 10. Perhaps the most significant changes give Service Secretaries the ability to activate their reserve forces for up to 180 days to respond to contingencies. While the dilemma on accessing the reserve component has been addressed, the USAR should now review the usefulness of using the Inactive Duty Training (IDT), Annual Training (AT), and Active Duty for Training (ADT) statuses. These various statuses served a purpose for years to restrict the use of the reserves to primarily a training status in preparation for major conflict. The continued use of the training status runs counter to the Operational Reserve and Total Force concepts. The most common and most confusing status is IDT.

IDT is the status Soldiers perform their one weekend a month training assemblies at their local units. While in an IDT status, Soldiers are paid for unit training assemblies or UTAs. A UTA lasts four hours and is equal to one day of active duty base pay. An eight-hour day of training or two UTAs is equal to two days of pay.¹⁸ A typical Saturday to Sunday drill period is equal to four days of pay for reservists. Keeping track of the incremental training periods can be confusing to Active Component when conducting operations with the reserves.

AT and ADT categories more closely resemble the active component duty days. USAR Soldiers are paid one day of pay for each day of AT or ADT duty completed. Soldiers receive allowances while in those statuses as well. AT is performed once a year, normally at location

away from the location where IDT is performed. ADT is usually performed to complete various military education courses in residence.¹⁹ The reserve component is now an “Operational Reserve”²⁰ and the use of the reserve only training status creates obstacles to employing the RC as a Total Force.

The multiple training categories should be replaced. Instead, the USAR should use a single active status category that allows USAR Soldiers to serve without restrictions on what duties they can perform. The USAR could support short-term projects and missions without the need to mobilize. Reserve component service members would be either on active duty or off. This would streamline the ability for USAR units to respond to short duration DSCA missions such as debris removal after a storm. Soldiers could also augment active duty units quickly for any approved mission without the need to determine which status they would serve. Eliminating the antiquated statuses would also reduce the separate reserve bureaucratic system to produce orders and pay soldiers. An additional advantage of this would make reserve soldiers subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice whenever they are serving.

Use of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

To further support the DSCA mission, the USAR should assign a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) type unit to each FEMA region. The MEB is a multifunctional, mission command headquarters. The number and type of organizations that are task-organized to a MEB are driven by mission requirements.²¹ Figure 2 shows the location of the 10 FEMA Regions. The USAR has units of varying capabilities located throughout each FEMA region. The MEB has the capabilities that are highly desired for supporting a request for immediate response after a natural or manmade disaster. Federal commanders are authorized to provide immediate response

authority (IRA), without Secretary of Defense approval, when requested by a civil authority such as a fire chief or mayor.²² Examples of authorized IRA assistance include:

- (1) Search, rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment.
- (2) Emergency restoration of essential public services.
- (3) Emergency clearance of debris or explosive ordnance.
- (4) Monitoring and decontaminating chemical, biological, and radiological hazard effects, and controlling contaminated areas.
- (5) Assistance with interim emergency communications.
- (6) Facilitating reestablishment of government functions.
- (7) Other actions to save lives, prevent suffering, or mitigate great property damage.²³

The MEB can be configured as shown in figure 3.²⁴ There are three MEBs in the USAR inventory; therefore, the USAR should consider establishing seven more to align with the 10 FEMA regions. In the interim, a Maneuver Support Brigade is able provide Mission Command for subordinate units and should suffice as a replacement for the MEB. A minimum of one MEB or Maneuver Support Brigade Headquarters would be authorized to support each FEMA Region. The MEB is modular in design and can add or remove subordinate elements based on the type of mission. The brigade and down trace units should be notified of their pending DSCA mission not long after they enter the Reset Phase of the Army Forces Generation Model as illustrated in Figure 4.




Figure 3 Maneuver Enhancement




Figure 2 FEMA Regions




Figure 4 ARFORGEN CYCLE Model

The brigade would follow the typical training cycle for the ARFORGEN plan beginning year two with individual skills identified by USNORTHCOM and Army North (ARNORTH). The training topics include Rules for the Use of Force, Posse Comitatus Act, DSCA Phase 1, Security Cooperation, National Incident Management System, and National Framework. Battalion and above training includes the Homeland Security Planner Course at the Joint Forces Service College in Norfolk, Virginia. The basic Warrior Tasks are required training as well as several military occupational specialty specific tasks related to DSCA are required.²⁵

During the third year of the ARFORGEN cycle, the brigade would focus on collective tasks and prepare for the major DSCA exercise that would occur during fourth year. Also during the fourth year, the brigade is ready for deployment in support of DSCA. It is assumed that another brigade would be in its Available Phase at this time and would have primary responsibility to deploy, but the brigade in the Ready Phase would be a contingency force.

Once the brigade enters the Available Phase all unit members would be at the highest level of readiness and alert level and will be subject to a 48-hour recall. The unit members would participate in training periods for two weeks every quarter to maintain proficiency and ensure readiness. The brigade will come on to active duty for 90 days during the peak natural disaster period for that FEMA Region to continue sustainment training and rapidly respond to a request for assistance.

After one year in the Available Phase, the brigade will return to the Reset Phase. Service members that would like to continue to support the DSCA mission can transfer to other units in deferent phases of the ARFORGEN Cycle or transfer to other units that are in the Contingency Force of the continuum of service.

Challenges

Using the continuum of service model to resource the USAR DSCA mission has a few challenges that must be addressed. Some of the challenges are minor while others may take legislation or policy changes. The following issues will need to be addressed before this concept can be implemented.

- When U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) identifies a unit for DSCA, it is unavailable for worldwide employment. USAR and FORSCOM planners will have to carefully track the rotation of units for DSCA employment so that the impact on overseas contingency operations is assessed and mitigated.
- Some soldiers will have to be involuntarily mobilized to ensure units have personnel with the proper skill sets that will allow it to complete its mission. USAR human resources managers must closely monitor units with upcoming missions and ensure they have the proper manning. Advertising vacancies on the Human Resources Command website can also be used to fill vacancies with soldiers that wish to join a Contingency Force unit.
- Training an entire brigade for employment in a DSCA emergency scenario will require significant funding. Because of the nature of the mission (high consequence-low probability), there is a good possibility the brigade will not be employed in an emergency during its available year. Offsetting the cost, the extended periods of training will increase the level of readiness of the units. Those skills will remain within the USAR formations and can be used for other contingencies. As mentioned earlier, the soldiers can transfer to other units supporting the DSCA mission once their unit returns to Reset Phase.

Active Duty vs Reserve Forces

Some planners may suggest that the active component unit would be a better choice to respond to a DSCA event for two reasons: (1) they are on active duty and can deploy to an emergency much faster than a reserve unit that has to mobilize; and (2) using active duty forces does not cost the taxpayers as much as bringing a reserve unit on to active duty. In response to item one, many of the bureaucratic roadblocks to accessing the USAR have been eliminated by the recent NDAA's. Additionally, if the department continues to update its force management policies that support the "operational reserve," the current activation timeline will be almost eliminated. With a brigade kept at a higher level of readiness, the reserve unit can possibly respond faster to an emergency because reserve units are dispersed in communities where as active duty units are centralized on remote installations.

The active Army is downsizing to 450,000 soldiers and must still be able to support the Combatant Commanders with expeditionary land forces. Active forces should keep their planning and training focused on overseas missions to ensure the Total Army maintains globally responsive, regionally engaged strategic land forces.²⁶ With regard to the second item, employing reserve forces cost less than maintaining a full-time active force to complete the same mission. While the costs to perform the actual mission are commensurate, the costs associated with providing benefits for the active soldier and his dependents over the long-term dwarfs the costs of training and employing a reserve soldier for a short time period.²⁷ According Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley, Chief of the Army Reserve and Commander of the United States Army Reserve Command, "the Army Reserve provides all these capabilities, and 20 percent of the Army's trained soldiers and units for just six percent of the total Army budget."²⁸

Army Reserve vs Army National Guard

Leaders of the National Guard feel confident they have the capabilities to support most emergencies with ARNG assets available in the state and through Emergency Management Assistance Compact or EMACs. The EMAC is a formal agreement put in place between governors to provide assistance to other states in the event one state is in need of resources. In my discussions with National Guard leaders, they have expressed emphasized the importance to train with all DOD and inter-agency forces in preparation for multi-state or catastrophic disasters. Disasters such as the Madrid Fault earthquake and the Hurricane Katrina or the level of disasters that would require USAR and Active Army support. The USAR is cognizant of the vital role the ARNG has in DSCA and does not plan to attempt to replace assume any of their duties. The USAR has many capabilities that can complement those of the ARNG. While it may not politically popular for local authorities to request Title 10 support under IRA, the potential to use local USAR units on short notice to save lives is a great option for community. The passage of time will and regular joint training will help to build stronger relationships between the USAR and ARNG in DSCA.

The USAR and ARNG cooperation is strengthened by the Deputy Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) assigned to each of the ten FEMA Regions. The Deputy DCO is an USAR Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Lieutenant Colonel that assists the Defense Coordinating Officer with synchronizing all DOD support to the states in the region. Relations with the ARNG and interagency partners are important to facilitate exercises prior to emergencies and positive working relationships during emergencies.

Conclusion

The USAR has proven itself as a capable operational force in the last 13 years of overseas deployments. The ability of the USAR to perform any number of missions in a professional manner in extreme environments can be leveraged to support DSCA. With downsizing of the active component, the USAR will be needed to fill the requirements of the Total Force that were once performed by our AC counterparts. The unique civilian skills of reservists in conjunction with the location of USAR units in communities throughout the United States make them a key resource in the mission to protect the homeland. The USAR must continue to replace Cold War force management systems with a responsive, integrated system for the Total Force. The USAR will need to provide varying levels of service among its units and Soldiers, which will ensure that it remains a viable option for Citizen Soldiers with busy careers. The tiered levels of service will also make sure is the USAR is able to provide surge capabilities to the Army during major conflicts. Many of those units at a higher state of readiness should be trained in DSCA missions throughout the ARFORGEN Cycles. An additional byproduct of the reduction of the active Army is the availability of separating Soldiers who are highly trained in skills that could improve the readiness of the USAR. The USAR must work aggressively to bring that talent pool into the USAR formation and make the transition between components seamless. A continuum of service will allow the USAR to properly train and respond rapidly to DSCA missions. The USAR is ideally suited to protect the homeland because its members live and work among the population it protects. The citizen soldier has discernable skills that facilitate close interaction with local authorities and communities when performing DSCA. The Total Army must recognize this advantage in homeland defense and utilize it.

In the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), President Barack Obama stated, “we are now moving beyond traditional distinctions between homeland and national security.” The President uses the word “homeland” over 20 times in the NSS. Homeland Defense is a significant part of the over National Security Strategy. If the USAR successfully adapts its processes and proves itself in the homeland defense mission, it will fill a significant place in the overall National Security Strategy.

¹ National Defense Authorization Act of 2012. Public Law 112-81, Sec 515. 112th Cong., 31 December 2012. Available at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/pdf/PLAW-112publ81.pdf>

² Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1200.17 *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, 1, 29 October 2008

³ DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, 29 December 2010, Incorporating Change 1, 21 September 2012.

⁴ *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act* of 2013. Public Law 93-288. 113th Cong., April 2013

⁵ Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley, Chief, Army Reserve, “Army Active and Reserve Force Mix” (testimony before US Senate 113th Cong. 2nd sess., April 8, 2014) Available at <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/14-04-08-army-active-and-reserve-force-mix>

⁶ General Raymond Odierno, interview by Lisa Ferdinando, “Army faces 'tough' choices in uncertain fiscal times ARNEWS, April 8, 2014. Available at http://www.army.mil/article/123612/Odierno_Army_faces_tough_choices_in_uncertain_fiscal_times/

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¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 40

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 58

¹² DODD1200.17 *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, 8.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Working Paper, *Human Resources Management One Book Fiscal Years 2006 - 2011 Strategic Plan*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2008, 8.

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¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 32. With modifications made by the author

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¹⁹ *Ibid.*,

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²¹ Field Manual 3-81, *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade*, April 2014, 1-1

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