Operations Assessment in Afghanistan is Broken: What Is to Be Done?
Abstract
In the absence of a credible numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency there can be no objective, numbers-based assessment for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The U.S. military nonetheless has attempted to conduct a numbersbased assessment process. Thus,when a new commander and staff take over duties as a regional command in Afghanistan, they inherit an operations assessment process riddled with highly visible flaws that emanate from the improper use of numbers and flawed logic.While no assessment process can be perfect or free of any criticism, the flaws the author observed during a six-week stint in-country are sufficiently egregious that they seriously reduce the value those assessments provide to commanders decision support. In addition, the visibility of these flaws means that military assessments, and by association the military commanders, are rightfully distrusted by higher civilian authority and by other organizations within the theater. It is therefore imperative that incoming commanders and staffs taking over responsibilities for regional commands address these flaws to improve decision making and to earn the trust of higher civilian authority and organizations with whomthey have to work. Staffs and commanders in Afghanistan created operations assessment processes under extraordinarily difficult circumstances while fighting, and it is extraordinary how well they have done given those circumstances. Nevertheless, it is necessary to identify and fix the flaws in the present operations assessment process to strengthen decision support and the validity of the assessments, without apportioning blame or criticism.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA619262
Entities
People
- Stephen Downes-martin
Organizations
- Naval War College