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THESIS

**THE CATALYTIC FACTOR OF THE SINO-JAPANESE
SECURITY DILEMMA: THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE
GUIDELINES FOR U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE
COOPERATION**

by

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December 2014

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DILEMMA: THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES FOR U.S.-JAPAN
DEFENSE COOPERATION**

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ABSTRACT

This research starts with two questions of whether and why China regarded the New 1997 Defense Guidelines (NDG) as a national threat. To answer the first question, this research analyzes and categorizes Beijing's responses to the NDG. The result of the analysis suggests that the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, which tried to strengthen their national security, conversely caused Beijing's suspicion and led China to react diplomatically and militarily. Given Tokyo's action and Beijing's reaction, these two states were sinking into the spiral model of a security dilemma.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
B.	IMPORTANCE.....	2
C.	PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS	3
D.	LITERATURE REVIEW	3
	1. The Chinese Perspectives on the New 1997 Defense Guidelines.....	4
	a. <i>The Trigger for Remilitarizing Japan</i>	4
	b. <i>The Deterrent to a Rising China</i>	5
	c. <i>The Obstruction of China-Taiwan Reunification</i>	6
	2. The Security Dilemma and the Divergence of the Realist Views on World Politics.....	7
	a. <i>Understanding the Security Dilemma</i>	8
	b. <i>John J. Mearsheimer's View on the Sino-Japanese Security Dilemma</i>	10
	c. <i>Balance of Power Theory: Kenneth N. Waltz's Defensive Realism</i>	11
	d. <i>Insufficiency of the Balance of Power Theory on Beijing's Opposition to the 1997 New Defense Guidelines</i> ...13	
	e. <i>Balance of Threat Theory: Stephen M. Walt's Defensive Realism</i>	15
	3. Constructivist Views on World Politics and the Sino-Japanese Security Dilemma.....	17
	a. <i>Constructivist Views on World Politics</i>	17
	b. <i>Applying the Constructivist Perspective to the Sino- Japanese Security Dilemma</i>	19
E.	MAIN FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS	20
F.	THESIS OVERVIEW	23
II.	THE U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL ALLIANCE AFTER THE COLD WAR.....	25
A.	THE U.S. AND JAPANESE SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE EARLY POST-COLD WAR ERA.....	26
	1. The U.S. East Asia Strategy in the Early Post-Cold War Era.....	26
	2. The Japanese Strategy of the Early Post-Cold War Era.....	29
B.	THE U.S.-JAPANESE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN THE EARLY 1990S.....	32
	1. U.S.-Japanese Trade Friction	32
	2. Japanese Hostility to the U.S. Military Bases.....	33
C.	THE CONCERNS OF JAPAN OVER THE ABANDONMENT AND ENTRAPMENT COMPLEX.....	35
	1. The Gulf War in 1990–1991	36
	2. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis in 1994.....	37
D.	THE NEW U.S.-JAPANESE AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY COOPERATION	39

1.	The 1995 East Asia Strategic Report	39
2.	The 1996 Joint Declaration and the New 1997 Defense Guidelines	40
E.	THE OUTCOME OF THE REFINED U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL ALLIANCE: THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES	41
III.	CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES	45
A.	THE CATALYTIC FACTOR OF THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES	45
1.	The Ambiguous Article of the New 1997 Defense Guidelines.....	46
2.	The U.S.-Japanese Cooperation of Theater Missile Defense (TMD).....	47
B.	BEIJING'S DIPLOMATIC REACTIONS	47
1.	Criticizing the Strategic Objectives of the New 1997 Defense Guidelines	48
2.	Strengthening a Sino-Russian United Opposition	49
3.	Criticizing the Japanese Prime Ministers' Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.....	51
C.	BEIJING'S MILITARY BEHAVIOR: AN ACCELERATION IN THE BUILDUP OF ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA DENIAL (A2/AD) CAPABILITIES.....	55
1.	The Strategic Objectives of the A2/AD Capabilities.....	55
2.	The Strategic Effectiveness of the A2/AD Capabilities against the U.S.-Japanese Intervention.....	59
3.	Accelerating the Buildup of A2/AD Capabilities after the New 1997 Defense Guidelines.....	60
a.	<i>Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)</i>	61
b.	<i>Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) and Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs)</i>	62
c.	<i>Submarines</i>	63
D.	CONCLUSION: THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES INTENSIFIED THE SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY DILEMMA	66
IV.	REALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM PERSPECTIVES ON THE SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY DILEMMA.....	69
A.	THE VIEW OF BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY ON THE CHINESE OPPOSITION TO THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES	69
1.	Balancing Against the U.S.-Japanese Threats.....	69
2.	The Insufficiency of the Balance of Threat Theory to Explain the Chinese Perception of Japan's Aggressiveness.....	73
B.	CONSTRUCTIVISM PERSPECTIVE ON THE CHINESE PERCEPTION OF JAPANESE AGGRESSIVENESS.....	78
1.	Sino-Japanese Historical Legacies.....	79
2.	China's Negative Image of Japan.....	80
a.	<i>Perceptions of the General Public</i>	81

b.	<i>How Japan is Viewed in the Education of Chinese History</i>	85
3.	Why China Perceives Japan as Aggressive?	86
V.	CONCLUSION	87
A.	THE FUTURE OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.....	88
1.	Mearsheimer's Offensive Realist World.....	88
2.	Waltz and Walt's Defensive Realist World	89
3.	Wendt's Constructivist World.....	90
B.	THE COMBINATION OF WALT AND WENDT'S LOGIC.....	91
1.	Walt's Balance of Threat Theory Revised.....	91
2.	The Importance of Images on the Perception of Aggressive Intentions	92
3.	A Case Study: South Korean and Japanese Relations	93
C.	SUGGESTIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE HARMONY	94
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	97
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	103

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Balance of power versus balance of threat theory.	16
Figure 2.	A discourse on Japan's security policy.	31
Figure 3.	Maximum range of A DF-21/CSS-5 ASBM.	58
Figure 4.	China's Dong Feng 21D (DF-21D).	62
Figure 5.	Acoustic quietness of Chinese nuclear-powered submarines.	65
Figure 6.	Acoustic quietness of Chinese non-nuclear-powered submarines.	65
Figure 7.	Military expenditure share of China and Japan's GNP.	74
Figure 8.	Military expenditures of China and Japan.	75
Figure 9.	Different views on the Japanese apology for its military action.	83
Figure 10.	Chinese positive and negative views on the Japanese traits.	83
Figure 11.	Chinese perception of military threatening countries.	84
Figure 12.	Chinese perception of the Japanese threatening factors.	84

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Trade ratio of the U.S. and Japan in 1991.....	33
Table 2.	Japanese prime minister visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.....	52
Table 3.	Beijing's periodic responses to the Yasukuni Shrine visits.....	53
Table 4.	PLA Navy submarine commissionings (1995–2012).	64
Table 5.	The Beijing's perceived threat after NDG.	72
Table 6.	Favorability rating of China toward Asian neighbors.....	82

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	Anti-Access/Area-Denial
ASBM	Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASCM	Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
DOD	Department of Defense
EASI	East Asia Strategy Initiative
GCCA	Global Cooperation Common Agenda
GNP	Gross National Product
LACM	Land-Attack Cruise Missile
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (People's Republic of China)
NDG	New 1997 Defense Guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
TMD	theater missile defense
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Be strong and courageous. Do not be terrified; do not be discouraged, for the LORD your God will be with you wherever you go (Joshua 1:9).

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The United States continues to recognize that China's rise may potentially threaten its hegemony in East Asia. Additionally, the escalation of the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands has increased Japan's efforts to protect its national security by strengthening its alliance with the United States. These two countries' consensus on their national self-interests has accelerated the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance and created "the New 1997 Defense Guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation" (NDG).¹ The creation of these guidelines, on the other hand, has raised diplomatic concerns for the People's Republic of China (PRC); Beijing feels that the purpose of the alliance is to check or contain PRC's rise.²

In regard to the causal relations between a refinement of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the Chinese perception of it, this research asks whether the NDG would be the one of factors that intensifies the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. Furthermore, the thesis also focuses on why the NDG, which encompasses various degrees of military and diplomatic U.S.-Japanese cooperation, has increased China's mistrust and uncertainty over Japan's intentions. If the NDG has intensified Beijing's mistrust and doubt, one concludes that the NDG is the one catalyst for intensifying the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. The principal hypothesis of the thesis will explore whether the NDG has in fact promoted, rather than dampened, Chinese distrust of Japan's intentions with regard to the major issues that divide them, including unresolved territorial disputes over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands and the PRC's "One-China policy" toward Taiwan.

¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "THE GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION," MOFA: The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, December 13, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>.

² Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 4 (1997): 384.

B. IMPORTANCE

This research is especially valuable when considering the mutually hostile Sino-Japanese relations, which include the escalating conflict over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands and the anxiety that each has expressed about the growing military power of the other. Moreover, the current literature takes insufficient account of Japan as a regional actor, and is too willing to take Sino-American hostility for granted. Given the narrow and fragmentary approaches of previous studies, one cannot deduce a convincing answer in regard to the fundamental reasons for the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. As a result, the outcome of this thesis on how and why strengthening the U.S.-Japanese alliance has led Beijing to feel suspicious can be a useful foundation to analyze the action-reaction process in international relations and predict the upcoming conflicts of East Asia.

Furthermore, previous studies depended mainly on speeches of eminent scholars and politicians to analyze the Chinese concerns over the NDG. In this regard, the outcome of previous studies cannot sufficiently provide a persuasive answer to the main research question of this thesis. To supplement the lack of previous studies' explanatory power, this thesis will analyze more objective and measurable data to determine whether the NDG could intensify the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. Moreover, the perspectives of realist Stephen M. Walt and constructivist Alexander Wendt, as theoretical tools of the thesis, complementarily shed light on why the NDG would be one of the factors to lead China and Japan to fall into the security dilemma's spirals of tension. In this regard, the outcome of this research will test the analytic value of realism and constructivism for evaluating Sino-Japanese relations.

In terms of the effect of the NDG, some scholars ascribe the acceleration of a security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations to a mutual mistrust of the anarchic international system. Furthermore, previous studies maintain that strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance made the Chinese feel intensely threatened given the desire to protect their national interests. Their main threats are as follows: triggering a remilitarization of Japan, deterring a rising China, and obstructing a China-Taiwan reunification. These Chinese threats will be the background to deduce the essential reasons that the NDG may have

stimulated China's security anxiety and how that heightened anxiety may influence Chinese policy.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

For the United States, managing the U.S.-China-Japan triangle has been essential for maintaining the status quo in East Asia. In this respect, the PRC is more likely to regard the NDG as an extension of the U.S. deterrence strategy towards China. As Joseph Nye asserted in 1996, "China's cautious optimism about trends in the U.S.-Japan alliance turned to pessimism, as concerns about future Japanese military assertiveness grew rapidly."³ Hence, the Chinese took the close U.S.-Japanese relationship seriously and as a big burden to its national security. At the same time, as Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glazer have observed, "Beijing judges its interests as best served by a U.S.-Japanese relationship that is neither too tense and unraveling, nor growing too strong and expanding."⁴ Hence, the Chinese perspectives on the U.S.-Japan alliance include a delicate strategic intention. In short, Beijing regards not only U.S.-Japanese security cooperation as a necessary condition to prevent Japan from expanding its military power, but also conversely their too close relationship as a strategic burden.

This research hypothesizes that, if Chinese perceived the NDG as a national threat, Beijing would likely push forward by preparing national countermeasures against it. Furthermore, if the NDG also sparked Chinese mistrust over Japan's intentions, one would expect to see noticeably accelerated Chinese military or diplomatic responses against it, a characteristic enactment of the security dilemma dynamic described by Jervis, and one that, unless interrupted by new measures, can be expected to evolve in a self-fulfilling "spiral of tension."

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review categorizes the Chinese threats over the NDG; this can be a useful basis to analyze why and how the NDG would be one of the catalysts that

³ Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (1999): 61.

⁴ Garrett and Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," 385.

exacerbated Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, the following review builds the theoretical background that can deduce why a state perceives another state's action as a national threat by applying two branches of realist and constructivist perspectives. This also discusses how various variants of realism and constructivism complementarily provide a persuasive explanation for determining the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

1. The Chinese Perspectives on the New 1997 Defense Guidelines

In regard to the Chinese perspectives on the NDG, many scholars agree that China regards the NDG as a national threat. Several scholars have dealt with the Chinese perspectives on the NDG, and this thesis categorizes them into three major threats: the trigger of remilitarizing Japan, the deterrent of a rising China, and the obstruction of China-Taiwan reunification. The previous studies included divergent Chinese perceptions on the NDG, and demonstrated the Chinese uncertainty of the U.S. and Japanese strategic purpose. The previous studies mainly concentrated on comments of scholars and political leaders on the implications of the NDG for China's national security. Even though the previous studies do not provide a consensus on Chinese perspectives over the NDG, they can be a useful reference to categorize the Chinese view.

a. The Trigger for Remilitarizing Japan

In the first category, some scholars claim that enormous Chinese criticism of the NDG came from their fear that the United States would no longer contain Japan's expansionism. As Paul Midford argues, China's complicated strategic goals reflect the Chinese response to Japan's expanded role under the NDG. China needs an efficient means of deterrence to prevent Japanese expansionism. China also regards the continued and strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance as one of Japan's strategies directed toward the right of collective self-defense. However, as Garrett and Glaser maintain, after the United States and Japan signed the NDG, "many Chinese analysts and commentators predict[ed] that if the NDG were modified to allow for regional wartime cooperation, there would be new pressure in Japan to accept the right of collective self-defense."⁵ According to

⁵ Garrett and Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," 388.

Garrett and Glaser's assertion, the Chinese suspicion of Japan's intentions has persisted in their subconscious due to the Japanese army's historical precedent.⁶

According to the realist scholar Paul Midford, a clear theme in China's reactions to the NDG has been the fear that it might weaken the containment function of the alliance and promote Japanese strategic independence.⁷ He explains the inevitable Chinese threats by applying the balance of threat theory. In short, Midford draws a correspondence between Beijing's extreme sensitivity toward the Japanese behaviors, and the Chinese occupation experience.⁸ Similarly, Renmin Ribao argues that the NDG, which promotes U.S.-Japan military cooperation, would be "an important means" for strengthening "the seed of Japanese militarism."⁹ As Ribao argues, Chinese scholars tend to speculate that Tokyo's strategic purpose arises from the Sino-Japanese historical tragedy—the 1900s Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

b. *The Deterrent to a Rising China*

Another category of the Chinese threats from the NDG is the implication that the United States will aggregate its power in East Asia. As the Chinese scholar Chen Zhijiang asserts, strengthening the U.S.-Japanese security coordination gives the feeling that the two countries "work hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region."¹⁰ In this regard, as Dennis V. Hickey argues, the United States could send China a strong signal that "the United States is now better positioned to handle any conflict in East Asia" by joining the NDG.¹¹ In short, even if the NDG did not mean a tremendous change in U.S. or Japanese policy, strengthening the military collaboration between Washington and

⁶ Ibid., 392.

⁷ Paul Midford, "China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?" *International Relations of the Asian-Pacific* 4, no.1 (2004): 127.

⁸ Ibid., 132.

⁹ Zhao Jieqi, "'Redefinition' of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and its Repercussions," *Waijiao Jikan*, no. 41 (1996): 36.

¹⁰ Chen Zhijiang, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security—A Dangerous Signal," *Guangmin Ribao*, April 18, 1996.

¹¹ Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "The Revised U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines: Implications for Beijing and Taipei," *Issues and Studies* 34, no. 4 (1998): 88–89.

Tokyo has inevitably prompted Chinese mistrust and suspicion in the anarchic international system

As a detailed means for the U.S. power aggression, the Japanese scholar Kori J. Urayama argues that the essential goal of the NDG is the U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the theater missile defense (TMD), which is a main threat to China. As Urayama also points out, many Chinese experts expect that “the deployment of an upper-tier, space-based TMD system in Northeast Asia could nullify China’s strategic leverage.”¹² His research on China’s perceptions examines why Beijing has considered the U.S.-Japanese development of a ballistic missile defense system as undermining its nuclear capabilities.¹³ Therefore, Beijing has regarded the development of TMD—which was an essential pledge of the NDG—as a potential threat that can aggregate the U.S. power, and neutralize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s nuclear missiles.

c. The Obstruction of China-Taiwan Reunification

According to the terms of the NDG, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) could assist U.S. forces when a cross-strait crisis occurs, which Beijing vociferously opposes. As Paul Midford asserts, “the goal of the revised Guidelines closely approximates that of parrying the U.S. military strength available in the event of a future confrontation between China and Taiwan.”¹⁴ Then Premier Li Peng’s declaration that, “the Chinese government and the Chinese people can never accept any activity directly proposing or hinting obliquely at including Taiwan in the scope of the Japan-U.S. security cooperation,”¹⁵ supplements Midford’s argument that the Chinese seriously accepted the NDG as a means of obstructing the China-Taiwan reunification.

As Thomas J. Christensen argues, the importance of the Taiwan issue in Chinese calculations about the NDG would likely exacerbate Sino-Japanese relations.¹⁶ He

¹² Kori J. Urayama, “Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan,” *Asian Survey* 40, 4 (2000): 602.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Midford, “China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines,” 126.

¹⁵ Hickey, “The Revised U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines,” 82.

¹⁶ Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 64.

argues that in terms of cross-strait relations, the Chinese consider traditionally defensive weapons, such as TMD, crucial to U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the guidelines. In the hands of Taiwan, and any of its potential allies, the TMD could be dangerous; the TMD could reduce China's ability to threaten the island with ballistic missile attack.¹⁷

2. The Security Dilemma and the Divergence of the Realist Views on World Politics

This thesis takes the security dilemma as a main concept. The concept describes a prevalent phenomenon of an anarchic international system: state A wants to reinforce its power or security in order to survive in anarchy, which conversely makes state B feel it is threatened and leads state B to counteract the other's action. Most realist theories assume that self-interested states struggle for power in an anarchic international system and begin with this security dilemma spiral model. As Stephen M. Walt points out, realism is not a single theory; it has considerably diverged into classical and neorealist theory.¹⁸

Different perspectives of offensive and defensive realists can provide a useful theoretical background to suggest why the NDG would be one of the catalysts that worsens the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. In fact, each variant of realism can present a different explanation for Sino-Japanese relations because of these variants' dissimilar views on the state's nature. In this regard, given the different assumptions of each realist variant, one can conclude that the different assumptions of the representative neorealist scholars—John J. Mearsheimer, Kenneth N. Waltz, and Stephen M. Walt—complementarily throw the most light on the reason for the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

In respect to explanatory power of Mearsheimer, Waltz, and Walt, one must acknowledge that each scholar's view has relative, logical cogency. Therefore, a dichotomous assessment, such as which explanation among offensive and defensive realism is more rational, cannot provide a productive outcome. This is because these two branches of realism build on a different basic assumption regarding the state's nature;

¹⁷ Ibid., 65.

¹⁸ Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (1998): 31.

furthermore, it is almost impossible to determine which hypothesis is correct. Nevertheless, one can evaluate which argument between Waltz and Walt has more explanatory power because these two scholars, unlike Mearsheimer, share the basic “defensive realist” assumptions regarding state’s nature—a state inevitably endeavors to protect its security, rather than maximize its power due to uncertainty over other states’ intentions. Therefore, this literature review first presents why China fears the NDG’s strategic implication by applying Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. Then, this discussion determines why Walt rather than Waltz provides a better explanation for analyzing the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

a. *Understanding the Security Dilemma*

The realist literature argues that the security dilemma resulted from the anarchy of the international system. In this anarchic structure, states inevitably doubt other states’ intentions to protect their national security. Therefore, the realism perspective on world politics and security dilemma serves a persuasive foundation for why the NDG aggravated China’s suspicions about Japan and led both countries to sink into the security dilemma spiral model. In this regard, previous research related to the Sino-Japanese security dilemma concentrated on how a state contributes to an adversary state’s reaction in an anarchic world. Most realist researchers argue that strengthening the U.S.-Japanese cooperation intensified China’s fear for protecting its national security and consequently led to the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

Robert Jervis’ article, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” is one of the most famous works in international relations literature. In an extension of realism, he argued about the fundamental assumptions of the international system. As Jervis argues, the security dilemma is an essential factor to determine why a pursuit of security protection between states inevitably leads to the outbreak of war. A security dilemma occurs when “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”¹⁹ This rational argument includes the “spiral model,” which can explain how the states’ interactions of security protection promote competition and

¹⁹ Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): 169.

pressure in political relations.²⁰ In this regard, Jervis' argument builds on realism, as mentioned earlier, shedding light on why Tokyo's efforts to strengthen its national security conversely led Beijing to counteract the Japanese security actions.

In Jervis' definition, a security dilemma occurs when the means by which a state tries to increase its security, decreases the security of others.²¹ If this is correct, why is the security dilemma bad for a state's security? One can find the answer to this question in the action-reaction process between states. For example, state A's action is likely to affect state's B's decrease in security. By the same logic, state B's action will in turn reduce state A's security. In short, the continuing action-reaction process between states eventually makes both states' security unchangeable, or worse off than before a state's initial action.²² Consequently, given the infinite action-reaction process of the security dilemma, a state's action, which makes its adversary states less secure, finally comes back as a self-defeating result.

In terms of the security dilemma of Sino-Japanese relations, Thomas J. Christensen proposed that strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance promoted Beijing's mistrust over Japan's military purpose; it inevitably lead to a security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations. As he argues, given China's intense historically-based mistrust of Japan, Beijing's concern about eroding norms of Japanese self-restraint, the political geography of the Taiwan issue, and even certain new defensive roles of Japan could be provocative to China.²³

Yu-Pan Lee attempted to analyze current Sino-Japanese relations by applying the theoretical concept of a security dilemma. Lee used the two characteristics of a security dilemma, which Alan Collins revised: an absence of expression of the aggressive intention and suspicion over the other's future intentions.²⁴ For example, Japan needed to

²⁰ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 63.

²¹ Ibid., 169.

²² Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," 175.

²³ Christensen, "China, the U.S-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma," 80.

²⁴ Yu-Pan Lee, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Japanese Relations" (master's thesis, Lingnan University, 2009): 167.

strengthen its defensive measures to protect its homeland against North Korea's nuclear missiles, but this Japanese military change made China more suspicious of Japan's intentions. Moreover, the Chinese public considers Japan as potentially dangerous and thus does not want to cooperate with Japan at all.²⁵ Therefore, China would more likely emphasize historical issues and criticize Japanese military efforts, even if these efforts were for a purely defensive purpose. In this logic, Sino-Japanese relations would be gradually falling into a security dilemma.

b. John J. Mearsheimer's View on the Sino-Japanese Security Dilemma

As John J. Mearsheimer argues, "survival is a state's most important goal."²⁶ This is because the anarchic international system makes states strive to worry about their security and compete with each other for power. In this nature of international system, every great power endeavors to maximize its power and ultimately become hegemony. Mearsheimer also points out that great powers in the modern world cannot achieve global hegemony because it is almost impossible to project and sustain power around the globe.²⁷ Therefore, great powers strive to gain regional hegemony and prevent other great powers of other regions from threatening their status quo.

Mearsheimer presents three essential characteristics of the international system. First, states are main actors in anarchy. Second, all great powers have offensive capabilities that can be a useful military means to destroy each other. Third, each state cannot know the other state's intentions, especially the other's future. Taking Mearsheimer's three assumptions together, the best way for states to survive in anarchy is to maximize their power as fully as they can.

According to the Mearsheimer's logic, China is more likely to endeavor to dominate the Asian region and maximize its power in order to achieve this goal.²⁸ Moreover, one can inevitably deduce that China and Japan should fall in the security

²⁵ Lee, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Japanese Relations," 167.

²⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," *Current History* 105, no. 609 (2006): 160.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 161.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 162.

dilemma spiral model because every great power—China and Japan—wants to maximize its power and cannot know the other’s intentions in anarchy. This assumption of Mearsheimer suggests why Beijing strongly criticized the NDG’s strategic implications—the trigger of remilitarizing Japan, the deterrent of a rising China, and the obstruction of China-Taiwan reunification. This is because the NDG itself could play an essential role for China as an impediment to gaining regional hegemony.

In regard to the trigger of remilitarizing Japan, as Mearsheimer argues, China wants to make sure that “it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it.”²⁹ Therefore, Beijing should wish that Japan avoids large-scale costs of defense and upholds a one percent norm of the defense budget as a militarily weak neighbor. However, the NDG provides fertile ground for Japan to strengthen its security role in East Asia, because the NDG implies the SDF’s expanded military role, which goes beyond the previous logistical support to the U.S. troops. China certainly remembers a shameful tragedy of the early twentieth century when they were too weak to counteract Japan’s crackdown.

Mearsheimer predicts that China, in the near term, will strive to unify with Taiwan. Moreover, to gain regional hegemony “China will [have to] get Taiwan back.”³⁰ The NDG, as the U.S.-Japanese agreement that strengthens the U.S. forces’ capabilities to intervene in an East Asian crisis, can be an enough of an impediment to thwart the accomplishment of China’s hegemony. According to Mearsheimer’s logic, the NDG efficiently prevents China from achieving regional hegemony by containing Beijing’s attempt at unification by force. Therefore, these strategic implications of the NDG provide a sufficient reason for Beijing’s strong opposition.

c. *Balance of Power Theory: Kenneth N. Waltz’s Defensive Realism*

Kenneth N. Waltz presented “the construction of a logically rigorous model of international politics;” his “logical coherent analysis” has been a popular and influential

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

way to conceptualize the international system.³¹ Waltz's concept of the international system, which advocated political realism, has provided international politics students with an effective model on how the international system has evolved since the end of the Cold War and how it will change in the future. According to his arguments, "the unintended consequences of interaction" compose an international system.³² For Waltz, "human interaction generates organized complexity because social systems develop in ways which are often not fully comprehended by members of the system."³³ Waltz points out that the international system's anarchic structure is the fundamental reason for those unintended consequences.

In this anarchic world, states realize that they are unable to maintain unchanged allies and they are inevitably exposed to external threats. The states' dread of unwanted consequences simultaneously promotes their "creation of balances of power."³⁴ Moreover, "the distribution of capabilities" among states exemplifies Waltz's balance of power theory.³⁵ Therefore, Waltz's argument implies the anarchic structure and the distribution of capabilities in terms of the international system's nature. In Waltz's view of the international system, there is no formal central authority, which convincingly explains why every sovereign state endeavors to maximize its national security. In this inevitable nature of the international system, states' pursuit of national power as means of increasing their relative power to maintain the status quo leads to a security dilemma.

In regard to the Waltz's views on nature of the international system, Mearsheimer points out that, uncertainty about intentions is the essential difference between his and Waltz's perspective.³⁶ Mearsheimer agrees with the Waltz's main assumptions: the anarchic international system and the state's pursuit of survival. However, he argues that

³¹ Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): 189.

³² Ewan Harrison, "Waltz, Kant, and Systemic Approaches to International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 1 (2002): 148.

³³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 2nd ed. (Illinois: Waveland Press, 2010), 5.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 117.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, "Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part II)," *International Relations* 20, no. 2 (2006): 232.

Waltz's logic is wrong unless he additionally assumes that "states can never be certain about the intentions of other states."³⁷ Like Waltz's hypothesis, if states only seek to survive in the anarchic international system, there is no reason why states fear each other. This is because not every state needs to worry about the possibility that they will attack each other. For this reason, Mearsheimer asserts that there must be the possibility that some revisionist states have, or will have, aggressive intentions. Mearsheimer's two assumptions—some revisionist states may have aggressive intentions, and states can never be certain about other states' intentions—convincingly shed light on why states inevitably fear each other.

d. *Insufficiency of the Balance of Power Theory on Beijing's Opposition to the 1997 New Defense Guidelines*

According to Kenneth Waltz, a state that is a unitary actor seeks its own preservation and drive for universal domination.³⁸ Moreover, states strive to increase their capabilities—internal and external efforts—to achieve these ends.³⁹ He argues that an external disequilibrium primarily leads other states to intensify their internal and external efforts.⁴⁰ Furthermore, a self-help system, in which any state that does not help other states or other less-effective states must be fail to prosper, will expose states to danger internationally.⁴¹ Therefore, fear of such "unwanted consequences" strongly enables states to pursue "the creation of balances of power."⁴² These assumptions by Waltz about a state's nature can convincingly explain the Chinese reaction to the NDG.

To determine whether China's opposition came from the power disequilibrium of East Asia that resulted from the NDG, one must analyze the strategic implication of the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan security alliance after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For the Beijing side, the U.S.-Japan security alliance had been a valuable means to

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 118.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

contain the Soviet security threat. However, the drastic change in East Asia in the 1990s, which included the development of Chinese economic and military power and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, encouraged a new evaluation of the East Asian power structure.

Given the power structure of East Asia, one could divide it into two categories—the U.S. and non-U.S. allies, which were sharply different in the Cold War's two rivalry camps. The U.S. and China, in fact, had maintained intimate relationships after both countries established diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. In this regard, the U.S. necessity of counterbalancing to the Soviet and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes strongly influenced the U.S. normalization of relations with China. Applying Waltz's theory, China chose the U.S. as a security partner against Soviet power aggression. However, the Chinese experienced not only the early-1990s U.S. economic sanctions, but also the 1996 U.S. dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to deal with the Taiwan Straits Crisis, which made Beijing regard the United States as an obstacle to protecting China's national interest. Therefore, Beijing convincingly realized that the NDG was the representative outcome, which revitalized the U.S.-Japan security alliance to protect both countries' status in East Asia. Moreover, China as a non-aligned country must oppose the U.S. and Japanese power aggression and strive to balance by increasing internal and external efforts.

As previously determined, China's fear over the U.S.-Japanese strategic intention of the NDG converges in three aspects—the revitalization of remilitarizing Japan, the means of deterrence to a rising China, and the obstruction of Sino-Taiwan reunification. In regard to the Chinese threats, Waltz's balance of power theory, which emphasizes a self-interested state's counterbalancing against unwanted consequences, can explain why Beijing strongly doubted and counteracted the strategic result of NDG—the U.S.-Japanese containment of a rising China and interference in Sino-Taiwan unification.

Waltz's theory, on the other hand, cannot be sufficient to explain the Chinese threat toward the Japanese remilitarization. This is because, as Midford argues, "China should even favor the Japanese strategic independence" by applying a balance of power

theory.⁴³ Furthermore, as Christensen points out, according to the balance of power logic, China should be concerned about “coercion by the world’s only superpower, the United States,” not the remilitarization of Japan.⁴⁴ If Japan would be less likely to support the United States, it strongly leads the United States, which is China’s most threatening rival state, to weaken U.S. military dominance in East Asia. Therefore, a remilitarized Japan as an independent security entity implies a potential benefit to China’s security. Furthermore, Michael Pillsbury points to “the plausibility of a Sino-Japanese alliance in a balance of power world.” He also argues that China must have an open mind about the strategic merit which could come from a more strategically independent Japan.⁴⁵ In this regard, Waltz’s balance of power theory is less likely to explain fully why China focuses on the possibility that the NDG would trigger the Japanese remilitarization.

e. Balance of Threat Theory: Stephen M. Walt’s Defensive Realism

To complement an insufficient explanation of the balance of power theory, this thesis will use another defensive realist theory, Stephen M. Walt’s balance of threat theory. Walt emphasizes a state’s counter balancing not against another’s actual power, but a state’s perceived threat. He refines Waltz’s defensive realism by presenting a new concept that “states balance against the states that pose the greatest threat.”⁴⁶ Walt agrees with that states unavoidably struggle to maximize their security in an anarchic international system. However, Walt’s balance of threat theory points out that states strive to form alliances or increase internal power to alleviate their exposed vulnerability while Waltz’s balance of power theory argues that states will respond to imbalance of power. In short, Walt regards power as one of the components that affects states’ threat perception. As shown in Figure 1, one can distinguish between balance of power and balance of threat theories.

⁴³ Midford, “China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines,” 116.

⁴⁴ Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (1996): 41.

⁴⁵ Midford, “China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines,” 117.

⁴⁶ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987): 263.

<u>BALANCE OF POWER THEORY</u>		
Imbalance of power	Cause -----	Alliances against the strongest state
An imbalance of power occurs when the strongest state or coalition in the system possesses significantly greater power than the second strongest. Power is the product of several different components, including population, economic strength, and military capability, technological skill, and political cohesion.		
<u>BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY</u>		
Imbalances of threat	Cause -----	Alliances against the most threatening state
An imbalance of threat occurs when the most threatening state or coalition is significantly more dangerous than the second most threatening state or coalition. The degree to which a state threatens others is the product of its aggregate power, its geographic proximity, its offensive capability, and the aggressiveness of its intentions.		

Figure 1. Balance of power versus balance of threat theory.⁴⁷

As Walt presents, states tend to balance against threats, and four components—aggregate power, proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions—determine the level of threat.⁴⁸ First, aggregate power, as Waltz already presented, is an important factor; however, Walt, unlike Waltz, regards it as one of variables that can form states' threat perceptions. In other words, Waltz tries to analyze international politics by using only one variable, power aggregation; Walt, on the other hand, considers it as one of elements that affects states' threat perception. Second, one state's geographic position can strongly influence the other states' strategic decision on how intensely they evaluate one state's military power as a threat to their security stability. Furthermore, a state regards the military power of its neighboring states as more threatening than a distant state's military capabilities. Third, the state, that possesses or newly acquires offensive capabilities, is more threatening. As Walt points out, "other states are more likely to

⁴⁷ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 265.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 276.

balance when states with large material resources acquire specialized offensive capabilities,” which include not only the military means such as highly mobile, long-range ballistic missiles, but also the political capacities like a potentially contagious ideology.⁴⁹ Fourth, along with one state’s military capabilities, states emphasize others’ aggressive intentions. The accumulated relationships between states determine whether one state would be threatening to others. As a result, other states have no justification for balancing behavior, which must unnecessarily expend their diplomatic efforts toward a benign state.

3. Constructivist Views on World Politics and the Sino-Japanese Security Dilemma

A well-known constructivist scholar, Alexander Wendt, contests the neorealist perspective that the nature of the international system as an anarchic structure causally leads to a self-help world. He maintains that self-help and power politics are not essential characteristics of anarchy, but are institutions that originated from an intersubjective process. Moreover, he points out that this process can create a structure of identities and interests. Thus, Wendt’s assertion contrasts not only perspectives of classical realists such as Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau, who focused on human’s willingness to dominate, but also those of neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, who emphasized an anarchic international structure. The constructivist perspectives of Alexander Wendt and Ted Hopf can convincingly provide a supplementary explanation to determine the fundamental reasons for the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

a. Constructivist Views on World Politics

Wendt’s hypothetical argument focuses on how the intersubjective processes between two actors causally create social structures, which are identities and interests. In this regard, the independent variable of this theory is the accumulated interactions between actors. The process of “signaling,” “interpreting,” and “responding” develops a

⁴⁹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 277.

“social act,” and creates “intersubjective meanings.”⁵⁰ Furthermore, continuous social acts of both sides make each other expect the opponent’s future behavior. If one state accumulates sufficient knowledge of the other state, these “reciprocal typifications” develop “stable concepts of self and other,” which are dependent variables of this theory. In other words, Wendt defines identities and interests as “reciprocal interactions” that create enduring “social structures.”⁵¹ Moreover, he presents the model of the “codetermination of institutions and process” to determine how reciprocal interaction creates competitive or cooperative institutions.⁵²

Wendt’s constructivism perspective has pragmatic and theoretical implications for determining how self-help or a cooperative security system evolves from the interaction between states. Therefore, his theoretical approach can explain the security dilemma between two states, unlike the realist perspective. Realism theorists point out that states are forced to doubt other states’ intentions and competitively must accumulate their national power in an anarchic international world. Wendt’s perspective explains that when state A repeatedly has felt state B’s acts are menacing, this intersubjective process influences the development of state A’s identity and interests, which necessarily creates expectations that state B is highly likely to be a threat. Furthermore, if this insecurity cognition prevails between the intersubjective understandings of two states, one state’s efforts to increase its security inevitably make the other feel that its security is threatened. Hence, Wendt’s theory argues that the endogenous process is a fundamental cause of the security dilemma in comparison to neorealist theories.

Ted Hopf defines world politics as a structure that sets “relatively unchangeable constraints on the behavior of states.”⁵³ Furthermore, as Hopf points out, constructivism provides an alternative theoretical tool, which can replace a number of essential themes in international relations, including the meaning of anarchy and balance of power. Like

⁵⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 405.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 406.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 172.

Wendt, Hopf presents that states' identities can ensure some minimal level of predictability and order.⁵⁴ Therefore, durable expectations between states, which intersubjective processes accumulate, can form a basis for states' predictable patterns of behavior. Hopf's logic contests not only Mearsheimer's offensive realism—the nature of states, which want to maximize their power, leads them to compete with each other. His logic is also at odd with Waltz and Walt's defensive realism—states strive to increase internal and external power for their own security.

In terms of security dilemmas, Hopf argues that these conflictual relations among states are not a product of anarchy.⁵⁵ This is because some groups of states—members of the same alliance, economic institution, and two peaceful states—have not shown evidence of a security dilemma. In other words, one must find the central reason for the security dilemma in states' identities, rather than in uncertainty. Following Hopf's logic, uncertainty does not come from an anarchic international system, but from states' perceived identities. The phrase “states understand different states differently” sufficiently exemplifies Hopf's argument.⁵⁶ In short, if state A perceives state B as an aggressor by the process of mutual understandings and habitual practices, state A is likely to feel its level of security status is uncertain.

b. Applying the Constructivist Perspective to the Sino-Japanese Security Dilemma

The theoretical perspectives of Wendt and Hopf are applicable to determine why the Sino-Japanese security dilemma has intensified since the United States and Japan revitalized their security cooperation. In regard to the NDG, the PRC has continually shown strong discontent over Japan's strategic objectives. In this respect, constructivist perspectives may persuasively explain why the U.S.-Japanese effort to enhance security-threatened China. According to Wendt and Hopf's assumptions, Chinese distrust toward Japan has accumulated since China and Japan began interchanges in various fields of activities. Moreover, not only Japanese expansionism in World War II, but also its

⁵⁴ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 174.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 188.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

brutality in the 1937 Nanjing Massacre that killed around 50,000 to 200,000 Chinese, generated Chinese hostility and distrust toward Japan.

Given the Chinese identities and interests that historical legacies produced, the PRC may be more likely to regard Tokyo's behaviors as a result of aggressive intentions. Furthermore, the PRC explicitly considered the NDG as a critical threat to the Sino-Taiwan reunification due to an article of the guidelines that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces could assist the United States "in the areas surrounding Japan."⁵⁷ Moreover, even though the 1998 North Korean missile test catalyzed U.S.-Japanese cooperation for developing the ballistic missile defense (BMD), China regarded it as a strategic obstacle to the Sino-Taiwan reunification.⁵⁸ This is because the BMD would be a defensive weapon of Taiwan against the PLA's missile capabilities. Hence, Chinese negative perspectives toward Japan, which intersubjective processes between both countries had accumulated, may have led Beijing to regard Tokyo's efforts to enhance its security as more threatening than the realist security dilemma alone can account for.

E. MAIN FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS

In regard to the creation of the NDG, analyzing how U.S.-Japanese security cooperation has developed since the end of the Cold War would be a useful background for deducing changes in the Beijing's perception. With the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), U.S.-Japanese relations changed to adapt a new international situation. In January 1992, representatives of the United States and Japan met in Tokyo and proposed the establishment of a "global partnership."⁵⁹ Even though the U.S.-Japanese "global partnership" provided Japan with a more autonomous foreign policy, Chinese concerns over the U.S.-Japan alliance scarcely existed. This is because, as Garrett and Glaser argue, the Chinese majority forecasted that, "the security

⁵⁷ Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning* (London: Routledge, 2003), 92.

⁵⁸ Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," 68.

⁵⁹ Chu-Kwang Chin, "The U.S.-Japan Joint Declarations: Strategic Implications for Taiwan's Security," *World Affairs* 160, no. 3 (1998): 153.

relationships will be terminated sometime in the early part of the twenty-first century despite the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship in the near term.”⁶⁰

In contrast with Beijing’s expectation, the United States and Japan have increasingly solidified their cooperation since both countries reconfirmed the importance of their security partnership in 1992. In January 1995, the White House announced a joint declaration entitled the Global Cooperation Common Agenda (GCCA).⁶¹ It meant that the United States and Japan could cope with global challenges collaboratively. “In November 1995, Japan changed its National Defense Program outline on Japan’s role from ‘defense against limited small scale attack’ to support for effective implementation of U.S.-Japan security arrangements that respond to situations that arise in the areas surrounding Japan.”⁶² In April 1996, the United States and Japan announced the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration to increase their security and political cooperation in the region. In September 1997, these two nations revised the 1978 Defense guidelines, which were the NDG. These included “each partner’s respective role in coordinated responses to military conflict in Northeast Asia.”⁶³ Comparing China’s perception to the U.S.-Japanese alliance between the early and middle-1990s, one can deduce that the solidification of the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation correspondently had been increasing Beijing’s suspicion.

This thesis bases its analytical method on a hypothesis that if China regarded the NDG as a national threat, Beijing would make an effort to protect its national interests. Moreover, if the Chinese efforts to protect its national security against a threat of the NDG existed, as the section of the literature review mentioned, those Chinese actions are likely to conversely accelerate Japanese reactions. It means that China and Japan would be located in the security dilemma spiral of tension. Therefore, to determine whether the NDG worsened a security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations, one must find the Chinese

⁶⁰ Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 386.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Chin, “The U.S.-Japan Joint Declarations,” 153.

⁶³ Chris Ajemian, “The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines under the Japanese Constitution and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal* (1998): 5.

responses that come from the logic that states inevitably pursue protection of their security.⁶⁴

In terms of the Beijing's responses to the NDG, the thesis sets up the following indicators: Beijing's criticisms, diplomatic effort, and military development against the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. What follows is a description on why these three indicators can represent the Chinese reactions.

First, the Chinese official statements and studies represent their perspectives and reflect their perception of threats from the NDG. Moreover, these perceptions determine whether the NDG directly or indirectly intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. This is because perceptions or misperceptions between states strongly contribute to forming and catalyzing the security dilemma.

Second, as Glenn H. Snyder argues, "a state that is dissatisfied with the amount of security it has forms alliances in order to bolster its security."⁶⁵ If the NDG provoked the Chinese threat perception, then one should identify that Beijing made an effort to reinforce its alliance against a threat of NDG. Therefore, the Chinese diplomatic efforts, which balance a threat of the NDG, would be a relevant indicator.

Third, China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which contain anti-ship cruise missile, ballistic missile, and submarine forces, and are relevant indicators to determine the Chinese military efforts against the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. The Chinese threat from the NDG, as previous studies have indicated, converges on a national fear: either the U.S.-Japan alliance, or Japan itself; a remilitarized Japan will obstruct China's rise. Therefore, when assuming that a state is a rational decision-making organization, China's military response to its threats must strengthen the military means to reduce them. In this regard, the Chinese A2/AD strategy, which China revised to prevent not only enemy forces' entry into a theater of operation, but also to limit their freedom of action in a narrow area under direct Chinese control, was a relevant

⁶⁴ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," 169.

⁶⁵ Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 471.

means to protect its national interests.⁶⁶ Consequently, Beijing's efforts to develop the A2/AD capabilities—anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and submarines—can be convincing indicators of the Chinese response against the NDG.

In terms of another research question of this research about why the NDG intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, this thesis uses two branches of theoretical view: realism and constructivism. As Walt has argued, “no single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics.”⁶⁷ He points out that applying various theories, rather than a single theoretical approach, can strengthen explanatory power in regard to determining complicated and multi-layered contemporary phenomena. Thus, a different theoretical approach of realism and constructivism can provide a more persuasive explanation of why the NDG aggravated Beijing's threat perception.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis contains five chapters. Chapter I introduces the thesis research question, importance, hypothesis, literature review, and main frameworks to propose its structure and purpose. Chapter II analyzes how the security circumstance of East Asia and the U.S. and Japanese perceptions in the post-Cold War produced the NDG, which is an essential variable. Chapter III determines what China's response to the NDG was by analyzing China's perception, and its diplomatic and military efforts. To analyze an essential cause why the NDG catalyzed the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, Chapter IV uses two theoretical perspectives: realism and constructivism. Finally, Chapter V not only determines why the NDG was a catalytic factor in the Sino-Japanese security dilemma by summarizing the results of this research, but it also presents why two combined theoretical perspectives can complementarily suggest a more convincing explanation regarding contemporary international politics.

⁶⁶ Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, *Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge* (Washington, DC: Center For Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003), 2.

⁶⁷ Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” 30.

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II. THE U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL ALLIANCE AFTER THE COLD WAR

In the Cold War, the alliance with Japan efficiently enabled the United States to contain the Soviet Union's expansion in East Asia. For the Japanese side, the U.S.-Japan alliance not only provided Japan an umbrella against the nuclear threat of the Soviet Union, but it also gave benefits to various fields, such as importing advanced U.S. techniques and securing the U.S. consumer market. With these two countries' common perspective on national security, the United States and Japan maintained their strong security alliance despite the unequal roles and responsibilities imposed on the two countries.

However, with the end of the Cold War, the historical watershed that came from the disappearance of the United States and Japan's major enemy, the Soviet Union, made them reevaluate their bilateral alliance. In the early 1990s, the disappearance of a common enemy deepened U.S.-Japanese conflicts, which had been regarded as less important compared to national security issues during the Cold War. For example, the two nations fought over trade and the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan. Furthermore, the United States and Japan clashed during the Gulf War and the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis, which further accelerated the necessity for these two countries to redefine their bilateral security relationship. This new security environment led them to contemplate a distinctive role of the U.S.-Japanese alliance; as a result, the 1996 Joint Declaration and the NDG were created.

In terms of the realignment of the U.S.-Japan relationship, this chapter attempts to determine which strategic decisions of both countries during the 1990–1997 period influenced the continuance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, despite some conflicts during a transition period after the Cold War. Therefore, this chapter comprehensively analyzes the reinforcement and exacerbation variables that could influence the cohesiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and produce the NDG. Moreover, the outcome revealed why the United States and Japan agreed to reaffirm the bilateral alliance, despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

A. THE U.S. AND JAPANESE SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE EARLY POST-COLD WAR ERA

As Stuart Harris has argued, “even if less clearly defined, the implications of the end of the Cold War in Northeast Asia are no less portentous than those in Europe.”⁶⁸ Moreover, RAND, the U.S. National Defense Research Institute, mentions that the future of the Pacific Rim after the advent of the post-Cold War would show “a political and security environment” remarkably different from what the United States had confronted in the Cold War era.⁶⁹ Therefore, even though the common enemy of the United States and Japan—the Soviet Union—had disappeared, these two countries still regarded the security environment of East Asia as persistently fluid, uncertain, and changed. In this regard, this chapter determines how the United States and Japan assessed the security circumstance of the early post-Cold War period by analyzing both countries’ official strategic reports in the beginning of the 1990s.

1. The U.S. East Asia Strategy in the Early Post-Cold War Era

On August 2, 1990, U.S. President George Bush made a speech in Aspen, Colorado, which encouraged Asian allies to contribute to regional security. Furthermore, the Department of Defense (DOD) published the *Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim* that gave shape to the guidelines for the “U.S. strategic objectives, needed military capabilities, and selected policies.”⁷⁰ Therefore, analyzing this report provides valuable implications for determining what the U.S. strategic recognition of the early 1990s was.

According to the *Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim*, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. strategic intention showed that the United States promoted its friends and allied countries, which had sufficient economic, political, and military capabilities, to increase its contribution to peace in the Pacific Rim. In this regard, the

68 Harris Stuart, “The End of the Cold War in Northeast Asia: The Global Implications,” in *The End of the Cold War in Northeast Asia*, eds. Stuart Harris and James Cotton (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991): 258.

69 James A. Winnefeld et al., *A New Strategy, and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), 5.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 1.

fundamental reasons why the United States urged its allies to play more roles in the regional security resulted not from a decreasing security threat, but from the recognition of declining U.S. economic power. This is because the United States evaluated the security status of Asia as uncertain given the persistence of communist regimes in East Asia—China, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam.⁷¹ As the U.S. trade deficit had been accumulating since the mid-1980s, the Bush administration had to settle its economic problems. With the decline of U.S. economic power, the U.S. government had to reduce its security contribution in East Asia, where economic growth was the fastest in the world. Hence, the United States strongly required its allies to strive for more “reciprocal and mature economic, political, and defense partnerships” due to the buildup of its allies’ national ability.⁷²

Both the U.S. economic decline and the necessity of sustaining security stability led to a new U.S. strategic decision that reduced its forward deployed forces and strengthened the Asian allies’ cost sharing. The detailed framework of the U.S. military posture embodied in the 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative Report (EASI) that was the “three-phased approach to maintain an appropriate structure of forward deployed forces in East Asia.”⁷³ As the plan of the EASI explained, the DOD was supposed to enforce the reduction in U.S. deployed forces in Asia in three phases.

During Phase I (1990–1992), the DOD reduced the U.S. force in “Japan, Korea, and Philippines by 15,250.”⁷⁴ Detailed reductions included “more than 5,000 Army personnel, 5,400 Air Force personnel, almost 1,200 Navy personnel, almost 3,500 Marines, and joint organization personnel.”⁷⁵ In fact, the reduction of the U.S. forces was nearly 12 percent of the deployed troops in Asia; the planned reductions were completed

⁷¹ Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1992), 3.

⁷² Ibid., 2.

⁷³ Ibid., 13.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

by the end of 1992.⁷⁶ Therefore, the United States strove to simplify its military constitution by supporting the reduced number of troops in Asia.

The Phase II (1993–1995) of the EASI included the withdrawal of an additional 6,500 forces in South Korea and reductions of approximately 200 U.S. Air Force billets in Okinawa.⁷⁷ However, uncertainty and a threat of North Korea’s nuclear program deferred the reductions of combat forces in South Korea. Hence, the new appearance of North Korea’s nuclear threat disrupted the progress of the U.S. military reductions. During Phase II (1993–1995), the United States merely reduced small numbers of U.S. Air Force personnel in Okinawa.

According to Phase III (beginning 1996), the United States contributed the security of the Asian region by solidifying its military bases of South Korea and Japan. Furthermore, the United States continued to reinforce various military exercises and maintain a permanent base structure with the Asian allies for preparing for an urgent situation. In accordance with strengthening the alliance with Japan, “the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region,” which DOD issued in February 1995, emphasized the importance of the deployed troops in Asia and its alliance with Japan.⁷⁸

In terms of “the 1995 U.S. strategy toward the East Asia Pacific Region,” the 1995 new U.S. strategy report strongly called for increasing its military troops by 100,000 and strengthening security cooperation with Japan. However, this report ironically demonstrated how much the United States changed its East Asia strategy in contrast with the 1990 reduction plan of the EASI. To determine why the U.S. strategy had drastically changed in the short period, this chapter explicitly analyzes which strategic variables—especially the 1990–1997 period—had influenced the change of the U.S. East Asia strategy. Furthermore, this chapter also determines how the U.S. strategic recognition of Japan had evolved in parallel with the change of the U.S. East Asia strategy.

⁷⁶ Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim*, 16.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁷⁸ Christensen, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 60.

2. The Japanese Strategy of the Early Post-Cold War Era

According to Japan's 1992 defense white paper, Japan regarded the security of East Asia as uncertain because of "the continuing confrontation between North and South Korea, the multinational dispute over the islands, and the unresolved conflict in Cambodia."⁷⁹ Furthermore, the Japanese security experts strongly warned about the threat of Russian military forces despite the Soviet Union's demise. The 1992 Japanese white paper argued that, it is not yet clear how the former Soviet Union's massive military forces in the Far East will develop. As of now, the Far East has not seen significant movement toward arms reductions. Therefore, with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which had been the main threat to Japan's security, the rise of China, in Japan's view, became a new threat.

Japan also regarded the rise of China as another factor threatening the stability of its security. The evidence that China drastically increased its military expenditure since 1990 accelerated Japan's doubts about Chinese economic and military expansion. However, the Japanese of the early 1990s desired China to be neither "weaker nor militarily stronger."⁸⁰ This is because Japan perceived that a weaker China is highly likely to arouse social, economic, and political instability; it also could lead to the exponential growth of Chinese immigrants and refugees and a demand for greater economic aid. A stronger China, on the other hand, could become a rival in the East Asian region. To sum up, Japan did not consider China to be the most serious security threat in the early 1990s and anticipated that the conflict related to the Sino-Taiwan reunification would not trigger severe armed conflict.

The 1992 defense white paper described the Korean peninsula: "the pattern of military confrontation between North and South has remained basically unchanged since the end of the Korean War, and the Korean Peninsula has remained an unstable factor for the security of East Asia including Japan...."⁸¹ Japan was especially concerned about the

⁷⁹ Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 8.

⁸⁰ Fukuyama and Oh, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War*, 12.

⁸¹ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1992*, 51.

possibility that “North Korea could develop nuclear weapons” because its scud missiles had a capability to deliver nuclear warheads to western Japan.⁸² Even though Japan had some worrisome points in 1992—the possibility of North Korea’s nuclear development and Kim Jung Il’s succession to power—Japan concentrated more on an economic, political, and security ripple effect that would come from the Koreans’ unification under South Korean terms. As the Soviet Union had provided economic and military support to North Korea, following its 1991 collapse the economic gap deepened between North and South Korea and likely influenced Japan’s evaluation of the Korean peninsula.

In the late twentieth century, the Japanese perspectives over security policy were complicated and various. Tokyo’s assessments of the post-Cold War security environment promoted a discourse on Japan’s security policy; revising Tokyo’s security cooperation with Washington emerged as a key issue. As Richard J. Samuels argues, in the late-20th century, there were strong disputes within the elite and governmental level how “Japan should provide for its security.”⁸³ Samuels categorizes the security policy preferences along with two axes—the alliance with the United States and the willingness to use force in international affairs (see Figure 2). One axis separated those who believed that the U.S. military power was paramount for Japan’s security, and those who asserted that Japan should keep away from the United States because Japan would be likely entangled in American intervention policy. These two different perspectives were divided by the second axis concerning acceptability of the use of force. The continued debates, such as whether Japan should revise its constitution to contribute international peace, also showed the divergence of Japanese security views. In short, the change of Japan’s security circumstance—the end of the Cold War and the conflicts with the United States—intensified the discourse on the issues of national security, and forced the Japanese government to shape a new security strategy.

⁸² Fukuyama and Oh, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War*, 13.

⁸³ Richard J. Samuels, “Securing Japan: The Current Discourse,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 33, no. 1 (2007): 127.




Figure 2. A discourse on Japan's security policy.⁸⁴

In the early 1990s, the Japanese government determined that continuing the U.S.-Japan security cooperation was far more beneficial to both regional and Japanese national security stability. In terms of Samuels' classification of Japan's security policy, Japan inclined to strive to be a normal nation. Among two essential elements, Tokyo pledged to maintain the close security relationship with the United States and heightened the SDF's international role by joining the NDG. In this context, not only economic and social problems, but also the concerns of Japan over the abandonment and entrapment complex affected joining the NDG. To determine why Tokyo decided to maintain a close security alliance with the United States by joining the NDG, the following section analyzes the causal relationships between Japan's domestic and international circumstance of the 1990s, and the refinement of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 128.

B. THE U.S.-JAPANESE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN THE EARLY 1990S

In the Cold War era, even though the U.S.-Japan security alliance had confronted various conflicts, these two countries had never lost a firm cooperative relationship. A security threat that came from their common enemy, the Soviet Union, contributed to this strong security cooperation. However, the disappearance of the common enemy inevitably made the Japanese emphasize economic and social differences in the beginning of the post-Cold War era. Two of the most important U.S.-Japanese conflicts in the early 1990s were U.S.-Japanese trade friction and strengthened Japanese hostility to U.S. military bases.

1. U.S.-Japanese Trade Friction

The diminished Cold War threat of the late 1980s highlighted the emergence of an accumulated trade dispute. Moreover, both the huge Japanese trade surplus with the United States and the strong U.S. dollar caused U.S. national demand for an amendment to Japanese trade practices. Given the 1991 data on trade-balance and cumulative investment between the United States and Japan (see Table 1), one can determine how serious the trade imbalance between these two countries was. Continuing a substantial trade imbalance between the United States and Japan since the 1980s had promoted “a rise of nationalism and hostility in both countries.”⁸⁵ Furthermore, both the United States and Japan had trouble in neutralizing critical public opinion toward each other because of the disappearance of the two countries’ common national interest.

⁸⁵ Young-Sun Song, “Prospect for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation,” *Asian Survey* 35, no. 12 (1995): 1092.

Table 1. Trade ratio of the U.S. and Japan in 1991.⁸⁶

	Imports (percent)	Exports (percent)	Investments (percent)
United States	19	11	7
Japan	22	29	40

To solve the trade conflict, the Clinton administration exerted diplomatic pressure to open the Japanese market. However, the U.S. attempt to remove Japanese market barriers brought about noise and tension. Some Japanese scholars questioned U.S. trustworthiness and argued that Japan regarded alternative methods for its national security. Nevertheless, in 1993, the Hosokawa government endorsed a 102-item program, which strove to formulate and implement the specific economic deregulation policies.⁸⁷ As a result, although the program still saw the policies as significant, it also advocated that Japan must pursue an independent defense, and take multilateral, security cooperation into account as the alternative method for its bilateral alliance.

2. Japanese Hostility to the U.S. Military Bases

According to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, “for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”⁸⁸ These U.S. military bases resulted in the bilateral alliance, and have enabled both Washington and Tokyo to benefit from various strategic advantages. Furthermore, U.S. military bases in Japan exemplify mutual support for security interests between the United States and Japan. The United States

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Laura Stone, “Whither Trade and Security: A historical Perspective,” in *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999): 259.

⁸⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan* (Tokyo: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/163490.pdf>.

provides Japan with varied military support: “the nuclear umbrella, offensive power projection, and global intelligence.”⁸⁹ In response, Japan offers “host nation support and bases for American forces.”⁹⁰ Hence, the U.S. military bases on Japanese soil have represented a strong security relationship between the United States and Japan since the end of World War II.

Nevertheless, some Japanese hostility to the U.S. military bases in Japan has persisted and varied in different localities, periods, and circumstances. The continued debate over the U.S. forces on Okinawa shows Japanese antagonism. In fact, nearly 75 percent of all U.S. installations and 29,000 troops are stationed in Okinawa; it means that Okinawan citizens have sacrificed for the U.S.-Japan security alliance.⁹¹ However, most citizens agreed U.S. military capabilities are necessary to protect their national security; therefore, Japanese dissatisfaction over the U.S. bases was limited.

The potential for Japanese discontent regarding the U.S. military bases strongly surfaced with the 1995 Okinawa rape in which three U.S. servicemen sexually assaulted a 12-year-old Japanese girl. This incident catalyzed a deluge of Japanese animosity toward the U.S. military and led to a national consensus that Japan must revise the terms of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Furthermore, some nationalist scholars asserted that Japan must strive to have autonomous military capabilities instead of depending on U.S. military power. As former Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa insisted, “only an end of Japan’s ‘protectorate status’ can create the necessary domestic political conditions for Japan to assume a balanced security role in regional and global affairs.”⁹²

⁸⁹ Paul S. Giarra, “U.S. Bases in Japan: Historical Background and Innovative Approaches to Maintaining Strategic Presence,” in *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999): 114.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Sungwon Cho, “The Changing Dynamics of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance after the Cold War: with Special Attention to Challenges to and Responses of the Alliance” (master’s thesis, Seoul National University, South Korea, 1999), 28.

⁹² Ibid., 30.

As a result, the United States conceded and agreed that Japan judge suspects by its law due to the fierce public opinion that the Japanese court must hold a trial and declare the offenders guilty.⁹³ Furthermore, to solve the Okinawan citizens' discontent, Washington and Tokyo established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November 1995 and announced that the United States would return approximately 21 percent of the Okinawa military bases.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the dispute over the U.S. military bases has continued and frequently stood out; therefore, this means that a lingering discord over U.S. bases is likely to cause serious diplomatic conflicts between Washington and Tokyo. In this regard, both the United States and Japan jointly make an effort to decrease local hostility, which is a critical challenge to the U.S.-Japan alliance.

C. THE CONCERNS OF JAPAN OVER THE ABANDONMENT AND ENTRAPMENT COMPLEX

As Victor D. Cha points out, “abandonment and entrapment reflect the combination of opportunity and obligation inherent in any alliance arrangement.”⁹⁵ The fear that the ally may leave an alliance triggers the fear of abandonment. When the ally fails to provide proper support in contingencies, where support is expected, the possibility of abandonment increases. Entrapment, on the other hand, happens when the ally's performance of its responsibility becomes harmful to its national interest. Cha characterizes the abandonment and entrapment complex as “the balance of anxieties between allies.”⁹⁶ For example, a state's fear over abandonment is likely to be higher with high external threats perception, no alternative alliance partner, and no internal power. Entrapment fear, by contrast, is likely to be higher with unfavorable public opinion to war and the absence of external threat.

The continued conflict from the U.S.-Japanese alliance in the Gulf War and the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis made Japan seriously concerned over the abandonment

⁹³ Teresa Watanabe, “U.S., Japan OK Pact on Military Crime Suspects,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 26, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-26/news/mn-61240_1_military-facilities.

⁹⁴ Cho, “The Changing Dynamics of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance after the Cold War,” 29.

⁹⁵ Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000): 265.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

and entrapment complex because of the alliance with the United States. As a result, both Washington and Tokyo's cost-benefit calculation led them to refine their bilateral alliance. Given that both countries confronted a common security threat—North Korea and China—the highlight on new external threats of the post-Cold War era led Japan to mitigate the concern over the abandonment and entrapment complex and finally sign the NDG.

1. The Gulf War in 1990–1991

The U.S.-Japanese diplomatic conflicts in the Gulf War sparked Japanese concern over abandonment and entrapment that the alliance with the United States might cause. As Michael H. Armacost, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan during 1989–1993, argued, “the Gulf War was [the] defining moment in the evolution of U.S.-Japan relations.”⁹⁷

Japanese political and military role in the anti-Iraq coalition was insignificant in spite of its strong economic power. Japan exposed its constitutional and political limitations when the United States requested Japanese military support. Answering U.S. pressure on “Japan to contribute personnel as well as financial support to the coalition effort in the Gulf,” Tokyo solely provided 1.3 billion dollars to the coalition, but excluded personnel and materiel supply.⁹⁸ In accordance with U.S. demands, Japan dispatched mine sweepers when the war was already over. For these reasons, some Americans questioned Japan's reliability in the security alliance, which also increased distrust over Tokyo's willingness to play an international role commensurate with its economic status, and encouraged the United States to reevaluate the efficacy of the U.S.-Japan diplomatic relationship.

Japan's policy makers, in turn, seriously began reappraising the suitability of its low-posture security role, mandated by restrictions on the “use of force in Article 9 of the Peace Constitution and the depth of anti-militaristic norms among Japan's citizenry,” in

⁹⁷ Michael H. Armacost, *Friends or Rivals: The Insider's Account of U.S.-Japan Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 98.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 112.

the post-Cold War era.⁹⁹ Japanese policy makers deeply recognized two complicated fears. One was that United States might leave the alliance because of Tokyo's insufficient support in the Gulf War. The other was that Japan would be highly likely to drift into a war when Tokyo sends its military troops in contingencies. This also means that Japan must endure the ravages of war. Furthermore, the constitutional constraint on the international role of Self-Defense Forces no longer rationalizes Tokyo's insufficient commitment to the alliance.

In the end, as Armacost points out, the U.S.-Japan diplomatic experience in the Gulf War left wounds on both sides.¹⁰⁰ The Japanese hesitation to share the hazards, as well as the expenses, of a major multilateral coalition made Washington question its security partner. Many Japanese, on the other hand, regarded U.S. criticism as excessive and a devaluation of Tokyo's considerable financial support. Washington's and Tokyo's different perspectives on Japan's international role were central to alliance tensions during the early-1990s. This tension was reconciled only after Tokyo changed its policies after the September 11 attacks of 2001—demonstrated by the SDF's active support in the war in Afghanistan and in the reconstruction in Iraq,

2. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis in 1994

In the post-Cold War period, North Korea gradually became an international security troublemaker; therefore, the Japanese policy makers analyzed how North Korea's security threat could influence Japan's security stability. Given North Korea's limited military capabilities and economic collapse in the early 1990s, Japan was less likely to regard the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) bitter denunciation of the international sanctions as a critical security threat. However, the 1993 missile test, in which North Korea launched a Nodong-1 into the East Sea of Korea, caused security disputes that the North's 1,000–1,300 kilometer range ballistic missiles could attack a significant part of Japanese territory. Even though the accuracy of the North Korean

⁹⁹ Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 119–50.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 125.

missiles was relatively low, Japanese security experts warned that the North's "high-explosive, biological, or chemical warheads" could have major effects in Japan's urban population areas.¹⁰¹ As a result, North Korea's missile threat strongly influenced the Japanese recognition that Pyongyang would be highly likely to use its missile capabilities as blackmail at a negotiation table.

North Korea's nuclear threat again highlighted the abandonment and entrapment complex in the U.S.-Japanese alliance. The different security objectives of these two countries led them to confront various levels of conflicts. For example, the United States as a superpower was focusing on maintaining the stability of the Korean Peninsula and preventing nuclear proliferation; on the other hand, Japan was primarily considering its own national security as its highest priority. Therefore, the two countries' discord over their national interests led Japan to worry over the abandonment and entrapment complex; it also catalyzed the divergence of security priorities for the United States and Japan in dealing with the North Korea's nuclear threat.

Facing the North Korean nuclear threat provided Japan with a controversial question as to whether Japan should support the United States at the enormous risk of national security. As Christopher W. Hughes has argued, "the divergence of security priorities [between the U.S. and Japan] was revealed after Washington's mid-1994 request to activate the security treaty and procure Japanese logistical support."¹⁰² According to the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, Japan could support the U.S. forces "in the case of situations in the Far East outside Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan."¹⁰³ However, the ambiguous meaning of the articles brought about an interpretation dispute and sparked the debate whether Japan should be involved in supporting the U.S. sanctions against North Korea's

¹⁰¹ Christopher W. Hughes, "Super-Sizing the DPRK Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 2 (2009): 298.

¹⁰² Hughes, "Super-Sizing the DPRK Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea," 300.

¹⁰³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*, November 27, 1978.

nuclear weapons. Therefore, Japan was unable to actively support Washington's requests because of the disagreement of opinion.

For the American security experts, Tokyo's uncooperative response to the U.S. request made them regard Japan as less trustworthy. Moreover, the repeated Japanese passive responses, which had continued since the Gulf War, intensified both countries' recognition that Washington and Tokyo must realize the insufficiency of the guidelines and seek advanced security cooperation. As a result, North Korea's nuclear threat not only exposed the strategic limitation and weakness of the bilateral alliance, but also promoted the subsequent alliance restructuring.

D. THE NEW U.S.-JAPANESE AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY COOPERATION

Not only the new security environment of the early 1990s—which came from the dissolution of the Soviet Union—but also the continued decline of U.S. economic power made the United States reappraise its East Asia policy. The outcome of the new strategic assessment enabled the United States to reduce its number of military troops in Asia and impose more burdens on its Asian allies. Furthermore, the Bush administration simultaneously streamlined its U.S. military troops in Asia revolving around the alliance with Japan. Therefore, one can determine that the United States kept the strategic importance of the bilateral alliance with Japan, even if its common enemy, the Soviet Union, had disappeared. Moreover, the unstable East Asian security circumstances—especially the rise of China and North Korean nuclear power—in the post-Cold War era led them to agree with the NDG. As a result, the U.S.-Japan security alliance persisted in maintaining its strategic importance despite the fluctuation of the U.S. security strategy of the post-Cold War era toward East Asia.

1. The 1995 East Asia Strategic Report

U.S. and Japanese officials discussed their advanced security cooperation before the 1995 East Asia Strategic Report (EASR) was released. Moreover, the continued exchange of opinions between the bilateral bureaucratic channels strongly influenced the 1995 U.S. strategic report. The EASR had significant implications on Washington and

Tokyo's redefinition of the role of the U.S.-Japan security alliance to pursue a common national strategy in the post-Cold War period.

According to the EASR, the United States reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the “linchpin” of its security policy in Asia.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, this report emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Japanese cooperation in security, economic, and political fields. It also presented a suitable Asia strategy that the United States must actively continue forward military deployments and increase the number of U.S. military troops up to 100,000 in Asia. Therefore, the 1995 U.S. East Asia strategy placed a high value on the alliance with Japan to deter regional dispute and maintain its status quo.

2. The 1996 Joint Declaration and the New 1997 Defense Guidelines

After the U.S. DOD issued the EASR, both countries had a summit to redefine and assure its bilateral security alliance in 1996. The two governments reached three main agreements: enlarging Japan's security role in Asia, confirming the significance of U.S. forward deployment in East Asia and Japan, and emphasizing more reciprocal and balanced bilateral alliance.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, a summit held by the two countries firmly pledged that the United States and Japan would revitalize the bilateral cooperation at a regional and global level. The discord in the U.S.-Japan alliance created by the Gulf War and North Korean nuclear crisis encouraged both countries to reappraise the feasibility of the bilateral alliance and finally pledge to revise the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines signed in 1978.

According to the NDG, the United States and Japan pledged to increase information sharing and coordinate peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, Japan can support U.S. forces by providing various facilities and military support at a rear area. Therefore, the U.S. military can use the Japanese civilian airports

¹⁰⁴ Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), 10.

¹⁰⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for 21st Century*, April 17, 1996, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>.

¹⁰⁶ Chris Ajemian, “The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines under the Japanese Constitution and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal* 7, no. 2 (1998): 341.

and harbors and receive the various military support including fuel and oil. Many scholars evaluate that the NDG has important strategic implications because it spells out the U.S.-Japan cooperation “during situations in areas surrounding Japan.”¹⁰⁷ In other words, the new guidelines could provide Japan with the institutional basis to extend its military activity beyond the Japanese territory.

In summary, the NDG presents the U.S. foreign policy toward Japan. First, the United States encouraged Japan—which had great economic power—to take more of a security role in Northeast Asia. Both the United States and Japan needed to adjust the role of the bilateral alliance confronting the new security circumstances. As determined before, the United States was confronted with critical discord about the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Soviet Union collapsed. In this regard, the Japanese passive posture in the Gulf War and the North Korean nuclear crisis made the United States recognize the necessity of a revised alliance. Second, the United States and Japan enhanced their joint operation capabilities by regularly conducting the U.S.-Japan joint military exercise. Moreover, the regular and extensive joint military exercises enabled both countries to demonstrate the solidity of their bilateral military cooperation.

E. THE OUTCOME OF THE REFINED U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL ALLIANCE: THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES

This chapter has discussed how the United States and Japan agreed to the NDG after they had confronted challenges in the Gulf War and the North Korean nuclear crisis. This development is clear from not only comparing the 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative Report and the 1995 East Asia Strategic Report, but also analyzing how these U.S. strategic plans proceeded in practice. Considering core contents of the 1990 East Asia Strategy, the U.S. planned to reduce its number of military troops in Asia and strengthen the burden sharing with Asia allies. As indicated previously, the decline of U.S. economic power and the changing security threat shaped its strategic decision. Even though the persistence of communist regimes—China, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam—made the United States evaluate the security status of Asia as uncertain, the

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 340.

Bush administration had to decrease its number of military troops in Asia because of its economic power weakening.

Nevertheless, Washington regarded Tokyo as an invaluable security partner because of the rise of new threats. Given the reduction plan of the EASI, the United States decided to draw down the smallest number of American troops in Japan despite its having the largest number of military troops in Japan—Philippines: 14,800, South Korea: 13,487, Japan: 5,473.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the United States encouraged Japan to take on greater burden sharing in accordance with Japanese economic power. Consequently, even though the Bush administration proceeded with its military reduction plan in Asia, the highlight of the 1990 U.S. Asia Strategy was to maintain its political and military leverage by reconstructing its forward-deployed forces with Japan as the center.

For Tokyo's side, maintaining the alliance with the United States was a more pragmatic strategy under the uncertainty of East Asia's security. Furthermore, the rise of China and a threat of North Korean nuclear weapons provided fertile ground to simulate the Japanese threat perception. Given that Japan, in fact, did not have tactical capabilities to conduct independent operations and could not present another security partner as an alternative to the U.S.-Japan alliance, as Cha mentioned previously, Tokyo was likely to fear abandonment more than entrapment.

The United States realized the strategic limitations of the bilateral alliance by experiencing continued critical international issues—the Gulf War and the 1994 North Korea Nuclear Crisis. Furthermore, the U.S. security decision makers acknowledged that the collapse of the Soviet Union was unable to resolve the security uncertainty of East Asia due to the emergence of new security threats such as China and North Korea. Therefore, the United States needed to solve these two emerging security problems—Japan's limited security role and the continued unstable security environment of East Asia. The Clinton administration alleviated its security threats and maintained a strong military commitment in East Asia by redefining the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance. The U.S.

¹⁰⁸ Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 23.

government also continued to encourage Japan to change its security role in the regional and global security problems.

Moreover, the overlap of the United States and Japan's threat perception—a rise of China and North Korean nuclear weapons—explicitly reflected the reinforcement of the BMD cooperation that was the essential element of the NDG. Given that China continued to develop ballistic and cruise missile technologies in 1990s, it would provide sufficient grounds for the U.S.-Japanese BMD cooperation. In this context, Japan publicly argued that the purpose of the BMD system was only for deterring the North Korean nuclear threat not for China. Nevertheless, taking the East Asian security environment of 1990s as a whole, one can deduce that the United States' and Japan's shared worries about China and North Korea's nuclear weapons led them to cooperate on the development of BMD by joining the NDG.

Consequently, the NDG was the result of both countries' strategic calculations. For the U.S. side, Washington continued to need Japanese support to maintain the East Asian security stability against the rise of China and the North Korean nuclear threat. For this reason, the United States constantly adhered to the U.S.-Japan alliance as a strategic security stronghold of East Asia even though its decision makers enforced the reduction plan to alleviate its economic pressures. Japan also realized that its alliance with the United States was an optimal choice for its national interests. The combination of Japan's internal and external circumstances in the 1990s—its insufficient internal capabilities and a rise of new external threats—made Tokyo more fearful over abandonment than entrapment, which the alliance with the United States might trigger.

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III. CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES

This chapter evaluates the Chinese reactions to the NDG in two aspects: diplomatic and military behavior. After the United States and Japan agreed to the NDG, Beijing criticized the potential threat that the U.S.-Japanese diplomatic pledge may represent to China itself and to East Asia's security stability. In this regard, Beijing's diplomatic reactions include open criticisms, reinforcement of a united opposition, and condemnation of the Prime Ministers' Yasukuni visits. In addition, the PLA's buildup of A2/AD capabilities after the signing of the NDG represents Chinese military behavior particularly reactive to the NDG. As a result, this analysis assesses whether China regarded the NDG as a security threat and presents China's security concerns. Moreover, breaking down the Chinese reactions to the NDG into diplomatic and military behavior, clearly organizes evidence of the causal relationships between the NDG and the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

A. THE CATALYTIC FACTOR OF THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES

As determined in Chapter II, the NDG emphasized the expanded U.S.-Japan security cooperation in repelling an external attack against Japan and for crisis situations in "areas surrounding Japan."¹⁰⁹ As this document explains, "the concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographical but situational."¹¹⁰ Moreover, they pledged to closely cooperate and coordinate against a ballistic missile threat.¹¹¹ However, these two strategic agreements conversely provoked the Chinese fear of unwanted consequences—the U.S.-Japanese intervention in the Sino-Taiwan unification, the U.S. containment of the rise of China, and a remilitarization of Japan. In this regard, this

¹⁰⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "THE GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

chapter, at first, analyzes why these implications of the NDG threaten China's security stability.

1. The Ambiguous Article of the New 1997 Defense Guidelines

The NDG stipulated the role of the SDF as logistics and rear-area supports in time of regional conflict. Those roles involve "intelligence gathering, surveillance, and minesweeping missions."¹¹² Furthermore, Washington and Tokyo announced, "the scope of the alliance covers situations in the area surrounding Japan."¹¹³ In regard to this ambiguous meaning, Beijing questioned its strategic implication and interpreted the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance as extending to Taiwan and the South China Sea. As Thomas J. Christensen states, "situational rather than geographic imperatives" determine the definition of the guidelines' scope.¹¹⁴ Therefore, the ambiguous article of the Guidelines intensified Beijing's suspicion of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

In respect to the ambiguous article of the NDG, Paul Midford argues that the language of the Guidelines was more likely to grant a legitimate authority to Japan in dealing with regional conflicts.¹¹⁵ Given the role of the SDF, which has been shown during the regional crises of the 1990s, Japan's security role had been restricted as only a non-combat operation. Even though the new Guidelines reassured that the SDF can solely offer logistical support, which is distinguished from areas of combat operations by specifying the forty examples of such support, the agreement enabled the U.S. and Japan to legitimately enforce joint-operational planning and exercise. For these reasons, Beijing realized that the enhancement of the U.S.-Japanese joint military capability will most likely be applied to the Sino-Taiwan crisis by considering the situational scope of the NDG.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," 63.

¹¹⁵ Midford, "China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines," 124.

2. The U.S.-Japanese Cooperation of Theater Missile Defense (TMD)

For Beijing's side, another unacceptable factor was the U.S.-Japanese agreement to cooperate against a ballistic missile threat. This comprehensive pledge, which will allow the U.S.-Japan security forces to cooperatively deal with a ballistic missile threat, was sufficient to make China suspicious that "Japan will deploy a TMD system."¹¹⁶ Furthermore, the August 1999 agreement of the U.S. and Japan to materially cooperate in ballistic missile defense demonstrated that the Chinese fear was not an exaggeration. However, the Japanese officials point out that TMD is a solely defensive military means also intended as a deterrence measure against North Korean ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, as Garrett and Glaser argue, most Chinese officials and analysts maintain that, "the target of TMD in the region is certainly Chinese missiles and nuclear weapons, not North Korea."¹¹⁷ Hence, the U.S.-Japan agreement to cooperate in a TMD, which was comprehensively reflected in the NDG, triggered Chinese doubt; furthermore, the 1999 U.S.-Japan agreement made Beijing solidify its anti-TMD sentiment.

B. BEIJING'S DIPLOMATIC REACTIONS

Beijing's diplomatic reactions to the NDG fall into two categories: a direct and an indirect realm. A direct realm includes Beijing's criticism to the NDG's aggressive intentions and diplomatic efforts to form a united opposition. An indirect realm, on the other hand, describes Beijing's diplomatic attempt to make domestic and international public opinion view the NDG as the revival of Japanese militarism. In this regard, the remarkable increase in Beijing's criticisms of Japanese Prime Ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine persuasively reveals this aspect of China's diplomatic reactions. As a result, Beijing's direct and indirect diplomatic endeavors indicate how the Chinese perceive the NDG as a threat.

¹¹⁶ Garrett and Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," 392.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 393.

1. Criticizing the Strategic Objectives of the New 1997 Defense Guidelines

According to Paul Midford, China's responses to the NDG were contradictory and complicated.¹¹⁸ He asserts that Chinese official statements about it have unquestionably converged on three aspects: U.S. power aggregation, the Taiwan Straits, and the remilitarization of Japan. As the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen pointed out, the guideline proposes that "the treaty may be extended to cover the whole region."¹¹⁹ Thus, the Chinese official statement showed their fears about the strengthening of U.S. military power in the East Asia region. The famous newspaper in China, *Guangming Daily*, maintained that strengthening the military coordination between the U.S. and Japan means that the two countries work "hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region."¹²⁰ Hence, China regards the NDG as the beachhead of the U.S. that helps maintain its hegemony in East Asia.

After the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kajiyama Seiroku, caused a dispute in August 1997 by saying that "the revised Guidelines should explicitly cover Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits," the Chinese Premier Li Peng sharply criticized it through a public address.¹²¹ In regard to the Taiwan issue, Beijing has sensitively reacted to the separate independence movement of Taiwan. Japanese scholar Kori J. Urayama maintains that, "all the Chinese analysts interviewed cited the Taiwan factor as the foremost reason for Chinese opposition" to the NDG.¹²² Given that one of China's national objectives is the reunification of Sino-Taiwan, the fact that Beijing regards the NDG as a critical threat means that continuous Chinese opposition and suspicion to the strategic purposes of the NDG will persist.

¹¹⁸ Midford, "China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines," 126.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ The Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, *The United States and Japan in 1998: Adapting to a New Era* (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1998), 68.

¹²² Kori J. Urayama, "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan," 601.

According to Ronald Montaperto in the National Defense University, China's strong opposition to the NDG reaches beyond the Taiwan scenario, and thus embraces concerns over granting a bigger role to Japan in the region.¹²³ The Chinese concerns about Japan's military autonomy came to the surface when President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in November 1997.¹²⁴ Even though President Clinton attempted to explain that the strategic purposes of the NDG are not related to China, Jing emphasized the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and its brutal occupation of China.¹²⁵ Moreover, in Jing's interview with the *Washington Post*, he warned that the United States disregarded the lessons of the past to enable Japan's resurging militarism.¹²⁶

Likewise, the Chinese media has focused on the strategic function of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, which used to contain Japanese remilitarization, but now justified it. An article of the *People's Daily* explicitly charged that the NDG would be an important watershed for promoting Japanese militarism.¹²⁷ The *New China News Agency* argued that the NDG, by redefining the bilateral alliance to encompass regional security, encourages Japan to break the provisions set out in "the Japanese constitution that Japan shall not exercise the right of collective self-defense."¹²⁸ Furthermore, some Chinese strategists and analysts are seriously concerned about the possibility that Japan could choose nuclear weapons as strategic means.¹²⁹ Many Chinese regarded the NDG as the strategic umbrella that could lead Japan to develop nuclear weapons.

2. Strengthening a Sino-Russian United Opposition

In response to the U.S.-Japanese cooperation of the BMD systems, which was an essential agreement of the NDG, China began to build a strong, united opposition

¹²³ Nigel Holloway and Peter Landers, "Manage a Trois: Defense Pact Could Open U.S.-Japan-China 'Trialogue,'" *Far Eastern Economic Review* 160, no. 24 (1997): 72

¹²⁴ Paul Midford, "China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines," 128.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Garrett and Glaser, "Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," 396.

relationship with Russia. Beijing's perception of the U.S.-Japanese cooperation of the BMD as a threat corresponds to that of Russia. On April 16, 1999, China and Russia issued a communique that the two were strongly concerned about the issue and emphasized their cooperation to oppose the BMD.¹³⁰ As conflicts arose between the U.S. and Russia in 1999, some Russian strategists asserted that the Russo-Chinese relationship would perform a role as an efficient military alliance against U.S. encroachment.¹³¹ According to Paradorn Rangsimaporn, a diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, "with increasing U.S. involvement in Central Asia, Russia's traditional sphere of influence, and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Moscow's old suspicions of Washington returned to the foreground and ties with China were again emphasized."¹³² Hence, a strategic consensus between China and Russia led them to strongly oppose the NDG with one voice.

The fact that the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, visited Beijing in July 2000, demonstrates the warming in Sino-Russian diplomatic relations. The fact that one of the key outputs of the summit was "the signing of a joint declaration condemning the U.S. plan to create a TMD system," shows that both Russia and China regarded the U.S.-Japanese cooperation as a threat that strongly undermines their own security.¹³³ In addition, their mutual agreement about both states' territorial integrity means that Putin and Jiang agreed to deepen the Sino-Russian friendship.

In July 2001, the new Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation between China and Russia, showed the Chinese strategic intent against the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Given that China had refused to consider the Soviet's proposition for a new treaty after the Sino-Soviet Treaty expired in 1980, the fact that Jiang proposed a new treaty at a July 2000 summit meeting demonstrates that Beijing endeavored to deal with the new security threats from the NDG by enhancing a common

¹³⁰ Urayama, "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense," 611.

¹³¹ Paradorn Rangsimaporn, "Russia's Debate on Military-Technological Cooperation with China: From Yeltsin to Putin," *Asian Survey* 46, no. 3 (2006): 493.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Elizabeth Wishnick, "Russia and China," *Asian Survey* 41, no. 5 (2001): 802.

opposition. As Elizabeth Wishnick argued, the strategic partnership between China and Russia draws “its strength from a shared interest in countering American unilateralism in international relations.”¹³⁴

This renewable treaty between China and Russia shows that the Chinese perceive the NDG as a threat. Given that Chinese strategists had denied any kinds of alliances and regarded Russia as an unreliable state in the past, one can deduce that Beijing’s diplomatic efforts to cooperate with Russia is a noticeable change in policy.

3. Criticizing the Japanese Prime Ministers’ Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine

Since the collapse of the Empire of Japan, Japanese Prime Ministers have visited the Yasukuni Shrine 65 times (see Table 2).¹³⁵ However, Beijing’s responses to these visits have varied from ignoring to strongly complaining about them. In fact, the Chinese government had showed little diplomatic protest over the Yasukuni visits until the mid-1990s. For this reason, Beijing’s concern over the Yasukuni Shrine visits increased after the signing of the NDG, which provides persuasive evidence that the NDG made China more concerned over Japan’s aggressive intentions.

If Beijing increased its criticism of the Yasukuni Shrine visit after the NDG, one can deduce two fundamental reasons for this behavior. First, China feels that the NDG represents the revival of Japanese militarism. Second, the Chinese government seeks to shape domestic and international public opinion to negatively view a remilitarized Japan. In other words, Beijing wanted help form negative world public opinion of the NDG. Simultaneously, China increased its own nationalism, which makes territorial disputes with Japan more likely by emphasizing Japanese remilitarism. No matter which explanation better explains Beijing’s intentions, one can conclude that Beijing regarded the NDG as a potential threat based on how Beijing increased its criticism of the

¹³⁴ Ibid., 820.

¹³⁵ Steven E. Lewentowicz, “In Response to Yasukuni: the Curious Approach the Chinese and South Korean Governments Take Toward an Unresolved Link to the Past” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 47.

Yasukuni Shrine visits. This is because Beijing regards Yasukuni visits as an exhibition of Japanese militarism and aggressiveness.

Table 2. Japanese prime minister visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.¹³⁶

Prime Minister	Term	Visits	Year	Prime Minister	Term	Visits	Year
Yoshida Shigeru	1948-54	5	1951	Suzuki Zenko	1980-82	9	1980
			1952				1980
			1953				1980
			1953				1981
			1954				1981
Hatoyama Ichiro	1954-56	0	N/A				1981
Ishibashi Tanzan	1956-57	0	N/A				1982
Kishi Nobusuke	1957-60	2	1957				1982
			1958				1982
Ikeda Hayato	1960-64	5	1960	Nakasone Yasuhiro	1982-87	10	1983
			1961				1983
			1961				1983
			1962				1984
			1963				1984
Sato Eisaku	1964-72	11	1965				1984
			1966				1984
			1967				1985
			1968				1985
			1969				1985
			1969	Takeshita Noboru	1987-89	0	N/A
			1970	Uno Sosuke	1989	0	N/A
			1970	Kaifu Toshiki	1989-91	0	N/A
			1971	Miyazawa Kiichi	1991-93	0	N/A
Tanaka Kakuei	1972-74	5	1971	Hosokawa Morihiro	1993-94	0	N/A
			1972	Hata Tsutomu	1995	0	N/A
			1972	Murayama Tomiichi	1994-96	0	N/A
			1973	Hashimoto Ryutaro	1996-98	1	1996
			1973	Obuchi Keizo	1998-2000	0	N/A
Miki Takeo	1974-1976	3	1974	Mori Yoshiro	2000-2001	0	N/A
			1974	Koizumi Junichiro	2001-2006	6	2001
			1975				2002
Fukuda Takeo	1976-78	4	1975				2003
			1976				2004
			1977				2005
Ohira Masayoshi	1978-80	3	1978				2006
			1978	Abe Shinzo	2006-2007	0	N/A
			1978	Fukuda Yasuo	2007-2008	0	N/A
Abe Shinzo	2006-2007	1	1979	Aso Taro	2008-2009	0	N/A
			1979	Hatoyama Yukio	2009-2010	0	N/A
			1979	Kan Naoto	2010-2011	0	N/A
			1980	Noda Yoshihiko	2011-2012	0	N/A
				Abe Shinzo	2012-2014	1	2013

¹³⁶ Ibid., 21.

Among the 65 visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, Beijing responded 10 times (15.4 percent) while ignoring the other 55 visits (84.6 percent).¹³⁷ Analyzing the chronological pattern, one can divide the periods of Prime Minister visits into three different categories: Mao (1949–1976), Deng (1976–1989), and the post-1989 leadership era (1989–2013). In the Mao era, Beijing ignored all 30 of the Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits.¹³⁸ During the Deng era, Beijing responded only twice (in 1982 and 1985) during 26 visits. After 1989, the next visit did not take place until 1996; Chinese leaders have responded to each of the 8 visits since (see Table 3).¹³⁹

Table 3. Beijing’s periodic responses to the Yasukuni Shrine visits.

	Mao Zedong (1949–76)	Deng Xiaoping (1976–89)	Post-1989 Leaders (1989–2013)
The Number of Visiting (65)	30	27	8
The Number of Ignoring (55)	30 (100 percent)	25 (92.6 percent)	0 (0 percent)
The Number of Response (10)	0 (0 percent)	2 (7.4 percent)	8 (100 percent)

From this analysis, one can find three important pieces of evidence. First, Mao completely ignored the Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Second, Deng also ignored most of the visits and only responded twice. Specifically, after Beijing strongly condemned Nakasone’s 1983 visit, they continued to ignore Nakasone’s following seven visits. In regard to Nakasone’s planned 1985 visit, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) warned Tokyo that the visit would hurt the Chinese-Japanese relationship. The government wasn’t the only one to protest, however. In the Deng era, university students

¹³⁷ Ibid., 67.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 47.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 55.

led the 1985 anti-Japanese demonstrations that were likely to disturb the government-led economic initiatives. Yet Hu Yaobang, then-CCP general secretary, appealed for the demonstrators “to avoid disruption to economic initiatives.”¹⁴⁰ For this reason, the Deng government suppressed the anti-Japanese sentiment and did not express strong diplomatic condemnation of the Prime Ministers’ Yasukuni visits. Finally, Beijing has strongly responded to all of the Yasukuni Shrine visits since 1989, all but one of which took place after the adoption of the NDG.

Taken together, China’s responses to the Yasukuni Shrine visits seem to have varied as its political and economic purposes have evolved. In the Deng era, the Chinese government tended to ignore the Yasukuni Shrine visits and even suppress the anti-Japanese movement, given Japan’s economic strength and its role in China’s economic development. However, since Hashimoto’s 2006 visit, the Chinese government has taken the lead in criticizing Japan and strived to link the Yasukuni visit with the revival of Japanese militarism. According to this evidence, the mid-1990s Chinese government obviously increased its criticisms of Japanese Prime Ministers’ Yasukuni visits. Beijing strives to connect this issue with Japan’s aggressiveness and the revival of militarism. Therefore, this increase in Beijing’s criticism explicitly reflects China’s high level of threat perception over Japan’s aggressiveness and its desire to publicize the possibility of Japan’s remilitarization.

Applying this evidence to the causal relationship between the NDG and the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, one can draw the logical conclusion that the strategic implication of the NDG was sufficient to make Beijing perceive it as the outcome of Japanese aggressiveness. Given that the NDG assured the expansion of SDF’s operational role in East Asian contingencies, China was likely to view it as a rise in the Japanese remilitarism. Moreover, Prime Minister Koizumi’s frequent visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (6 times during 2001–2006) convinced Beijing of Japan’s aggressive intentions.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 62.

C. BEIJING'S MILITARY BEHAVIOR: AN ACCELERATION IN THE BUILDUP OF ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA DENIAL (A2/AD) CAPABILITIES

As the literature review determined, one of Beijing's concerns about the NDG is that the consolidated U.S.-Japanese cooperation could disturb Sino-Taiwan reunification and contain the rise of China. Moreover, the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis strongly led them to find proper military means against U.S. military intervention. In this regard, China's A2/AD capabilities would be efficient military means against the intervention of U.S.-Japanese troops in Sino-Taiwan reunification. Furthermore, given that Sino-Taiwan reunification is an essential prerequisite for the rise of China, the A2/AD capabilities also can be a relevant means to ensure the rise of China. For those reasons, determining whether the PLA accelerated the development of the A2/AD capabilities after the signing of the NDG sheds light on the causal relationships between Beijing's fears of the consequences of the NDG and its military reactions.

1. The Strategic Objectives of the A2/AD Capabilities

The PLA's preparation for their military challenges has converged on the development of A2/AD capabilities. After the United States deployed its aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Strait Crisis in March 1996, China acutely felt the necessity of military means to deter American's intervention in China and Taiwan's reunification. Moreover, the 1996 Chinese limitation against U.S. military power accelerated its military development to focus on restricting or controlling their adversaries' access to its offshore. Hence, after China experienced the considerable maritime power of the U.S., the Chinese strategists were more likely to focus on the A2/AD capabilities due to its effectiveness with lower cost.

For China, A2/AD capabilities include the following: space weapons, submarines, and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs). Therefore, Beijing's military modernization efforts are as follows.

In terms of the Chinese space weapons, many Chinese military scholars assert that the First Gulf War was "a watershed" for military technology. China regards the

“weaponization of space and space warfare” as inevitable to surpass the United States.¹⁴¹ The 1991 Gulf War showed how the United States’ military power was superior compared to other countries because of its precision-guided missiles, space-based Command and Control Systems, and reconnaissance satellites. The Chinese military strategists also realized the significance of space military technology due to the United States’ unrivaled superiority of space infrastructures, such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), reconnaissance satellites, and space-based radar.

China’s efforts to develop space weapons resulted in the test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability in 2007. “The Xichang Satellite Launch Center in China” launched “a ballistic missile” to destroy a non-functioning “Chinese weather satellite.”¹⁴² It was China’s first exercise to test its anti-satellite (ASAT) system. Since 2007, China has continually developed “kinetic and directed-energy,” such as “lasers, high-powered microwave, and particle beam weapons, technologies” for ASAT systems.¹⁴³ China will continue to develop the ASAT systems to prevent its potential adversaries from using space-based assets during crisis or conflict.

The perception that space assets are important made China push ahead with the development of space military technology such as the Chinese satellite navigation system and the reconnaissance satellite. As the 2011 analysis of the U.S. DOD states, the Chinese Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) system will provide regional services with approximately 10 satellites by 2012.¹⁴⁴ China has a plan to complete “the PNT system named *BeiDou-2* by 2020,” with “a 35 satellite constellation” to provide “global coverage.”¹⁴⁵ In addition, China’s Huanjing program is planning eight satellites, which

¹⁴¹ Stephanie Lieggi and Erik Quam, “China’s ASAT Test and the Strategic Implications of Beijing’s Military Space Policy,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 55, no. 1 (2007): 12.

¹⁴² Brian Weeden, “Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-satellite Testing in Space,” *The Space Review*, June 5, 2014, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2473/1>.

¹⁴³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), 37.

¹⁴⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report 2011*, 36.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

have “capabilities of infrared, multi-spectral, and synthetic aperture radar imaging.”¹⁴⁶ Therefore, if the PRC’s space development plan progresses on schedule, its space capabilities will independently enable the PLA to maneuver with their own reconnaissance and PNT system.

Another important military development of the Chinese A2/AD capability is submarines. The 2009 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) report stated that. “the PRC has emphasized the submarine force as one of the primary thrusts of its military modernization effort since the mid-1990s.”¹⁴⁷ The U.S. DOD analysis states that, “China’s 2nd-generation SHANG-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are already in service and as many as five 3rd-generation SSNs will be added by 2013.”¹⁴⁸ This means that China’s submarine force will carry out operations quietly and cover a broader range during interdiction and surveillance. “The eight Kilos purchased from Russia” are equipped with the “highly efficient Russian-made Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs).”¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the PLA’s continued submarine development is on schedule to achieve its military objectives, such as denying enemies’ access and expanding the PLA’s scopes of operation.

China has developed and tested an “anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM),” which is “a theater-range ballistic missile.”¹⁵⁰ These missiles strongly threaten U.S. forces due to their capabilities, which mainly enable them to attack moving vessels on the ocean. The U.S. DOD argues that “the missile has a range exceeding 1,500km and that it is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific Ocean (see Figure 3).”¹⁵¹ In regard to the Chinese ASBM threat, U.S. military scholars have strong concerns that these missile systems, which can combine

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 35.

¹⁴⁷ Ronald O’Rourke, *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 11.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 13.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 16.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 9.

¹⁵¹ Cole J. Michael, “The DF-21D or ‘Carrier Killer,’” *The Diplomat*, April 22, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/the-df-21d-or-carrier-killer-an-instrument-of-deception/>.

with “broad area maritime surveillance” and a “targeting system,” enable the PLA Navy to attack not only U.S. Navy forces, but also its partners’ maritime ships. Some U.S. military experts regard these “highly accurate ballistic missiles,” which can hit moving vessels at sea, “as a game-changing weapon.”¹⁵² Due to the capability of China’s DF-21D missile, which can change its course, both U.S. and Chinese military experts agree how menacing the development of ASBM is as part of China’s A2/AD capabilities.



Figure 3. Maximum range of A DF-21/CSS-5 ASBM.¹⁵³

Given the PLA’s development of A2/AD capabilities, one can determine that it mainly focuses on denying enemies an approach into their periphery. As the U.S. DOD analyzes, China’s current military development provides the PLA with capabilities that “can engage enemies’ surface ships up to 1,800km from China’s coastline.”¹⁵⁴ Moreover, the U.S. DOD continues to evaluate the PLA’s missile capability as China’s current missile system enables the PLA to “attack the U.S. regional air bases, logistical

¹⁵² Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (2009): 67.

¹⁵³ Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea?” *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 4 (2009): 54.

¹⁵⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report 2013*, 32.

facilities, and other ground-based infrastructure.”¹⁵⁵ Therefore, China regards the long-range anti-ship cruise or ballistic missile as a crucial means to achieve the PLA’s operational objectives. This perception makes China endeavor to develop multiple launch platforms of ASBMs.

2. The Strategic Effectiveness of the A2/AD Capabilities against the U.S.-Japanese Intervention

Chinese strategists regard A2/AD capabilities as an effective military strategy against the U.S.-Japanese intervention in the Cross-Strait conflict or the U.S. efforts to contain the rise of China. In this context, the PRC regards A2/AD capabilities, which can deter or deny enemies’ access into China’s borders and coastlines, as a prompt and efficient strategic means to propel the national military concept of “forward defense.” The “forward defense” means that, “the PLA prefers to fight a military conflict as far away from China’s borders and coastlines as is possible.”¹⁵⁶ As the China’s *2008 Defense White Paper* states, the PRC focuses on “attacking enemies’ weak points with a stress on asymmetric warfare.”¹⁵⁷ The Chinese and even U.S. military strategists agree that the PRC’s asymmetric approaches against its national threats are effective strategic tools.

China’s asymmetric military strategy seeks to enable China to deter its opponent’s superior platforms relatively inexpensively. For example, the PLA poses a threat to its enemies’ access by deploying several ASMBs launchers, while China’s potential enemies, especially the United States, might be reluctant to accept the risk of losing a much more expensive aircraft carrier. Consequently, A2/AD capabilities can be an efficient military means for China to accomplish its military strategic concept of “forward defense.”

Another important concept related to A2/AD capabilities is “army building.” Observing the Gulf war, Chinese strategists asserted that the PLA must prepare to fight

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 33.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 133.

¹⁵⁷ The People’s Republic of China, *China’s National Defense in 2008*, 22.

“a limited war under high-tech condition[s].” The Chinese perception regarding the importance of technology in modern warfare since the early 1990s has enabled the PRC to focus on the PLA’s weapon system modernization. According to Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky’s argument in *Patterns In China’s Use of Force*, changes in the security threat and technology’s role in military conflict influenced the PLA’s military strategy in the early 1990s “at the strategic level (the type of war to be fought)” and “at the operational level (how a war would be fought).”¹⁵⁸ This perception produced China’s “*Two Transformations*,” which has been “the military strategic guideline” since 1995 for “army building.”¹⁵⁹ The “*Two Transformations*” demands that the PLA transforms itself to “an army preparing to win under modern, high-tech condition warfare,” and “an army based on high-quality.”¹⁶⁰

In terms of this “army building” military concept, China’s development of the A2/AD capabilities is closely linked to their use of high-tech weapon systems. Due to the A2/AD’s essential required condition that it should attack far-off enemies to deny its access, the A2/AD capabilities must depend on a long-range precision weapon system. In addition, to detect its enemies’ ships and submarines and acquire its real-time targeting information, developing an independent surveillance, and targeting system is essential. Therefore, given the nature of the A2/AD capabilities, which must integrate various categories of a high technology weapon system, development of A2/AD capabilities can accomplish the military concept of “army building.”

3. Accelerating the Buildup of A2/AD Capabilities after the New 1997 Defense Guidelines

This section evaluates whether the NDG materially accelerated the development of A2/AD capabilities. Moreover, if the NDG stimulated the Chinese perception of a threat, Beijing would inevitably endeavor to increase its military countermeasures against it. In this regard, as determined above, the A2/AD capabilities could be a proper military

¹⁵⁸ Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, *Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 30.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy,” 135.

strategy to prevent the United States and Japan from containing China's rise and reunification. In fact, the PLA's buildup of A2/AD capabilities started from the early 1990s, before the United States and Japan revised their security alliance. Nevertheless, if China further promoted its A2/AD capabilities after the signing of the revised NDG, this would demonstrate a causal relationship between the NDG and the Chinese perception of a threat from the U.S. and Japan. For this reason, the following section examines whether the buildup of the PLA's A2/AD capabilities after the signing of the new NDG, in practice, was further accelerated. It does so by analyzing specific A2/AD military technology: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) and Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs), and Submarines.

a. *Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)*

According to "China Naval Modernization: Implication for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress," the PRC continually has been developing and testing an anti-ship ballistic missile.¹⁶¹ The U.S. military analysts especially evaluate the DF-21D (see Figure 4), which is "a theater-range ballistic missile equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV)," as a "game-changing" weapon.¹⁶² Moreover, the DF-21D would be a more critical weapon since it can change its flying route.

Between the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and present day, comparing the PLA's ASBM capability shows that the Chinese military buildup focused on denying external power access to Sino-Taiwan reunification. Moreover, when the U.S. deployed their two aircraft carrier battle-groups during the 1996 crisis, the PLA had insufficient military means to prevent the U.S. Navy from accessing the vicinity of Taiwan. This painful experience most likely influenced Chinese military development. Given the deployed period of DF-21D, approximately in the year 2010, many defense analysts argue that China had strived to develop military technology to prevent the arrival of U.S. carrier groups in regional conflicts since the 1996 Sino-Taiwan Crisis.

¹⁶¹ O'Rourke, *China Naval Modernization*, 5.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 6.



Figure 4. China's Dong Feng 21D (DF-21D).¹⁶³

b. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) and Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs)

According to “China’s Cruise Missiles: Flying Fast under the Public Radar,” the PLA’s investment in A2/AD capabilities is converging on the development and deployment of large numbers of ASCMs and LACMs on a wide-range of ground, air, and naval platforms.¹⁶⁴ The Chinese sources point out that Chinese LACMs have a range that could attack as far as away as “Guam, Darwin, and Diego Garcia.”¹⁶⁵ Moreover, China has strived to not only develop its own highly capable ASCMs (the YJ series), but also import Russian supersonic ASCMs.

China continued to deploy two types of subsonic LACMs—the air-launched Yj-63 with a range of 200 km and the 1500km-range ground-launched DH-10—since the mid-1990s.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, the PLA possesses the Russian *Klub 3M-14E SS-NX-30* LACM, which can be launched from the 636M *Kilo-class* submarines.¹⁶⁷ As Christopher P. Carlson, the author of the *Defense Media Network*, argues, China has pushed forward a

¹⁶³ Michael J. Cole, “The DF-21D or ‘Carrier Killer,’” *The Diplomat*, September 6, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/the-df-21d-or-carrier-killer-an-instrument-of-deception>.

¹⁶⁴ Dennis Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, “China’s Cruise Missiles: Flying Fast under the Public’s Radar,” *National Interest*, May 12, 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-cruise-missiles-flying-fast-under-the-public%E2%80%99s-radar-10446>.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

flurry of activity in their ASCM programs since 1998, which coincidentally overlaps with the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. For those reasons, the PLA's strategic efforts, which increase its capabilities of ASCMs and LACMs, have a direct correlation with the possibility of U.S.-Japanese intervention in Sino-Taiwan reunification. This is because the ASCMs and LACMs could be effective weapons against the intervention of an external power.

c. Submarines

The PLA's continued efforts to modernize the submarine forces accelerated in the mid-1990s. As the DOD stated, "The PLA Navy places a high priority on the modernization of its submarine force."¹⁶⁸ China also has regarded its submarine forces as an essential military weapon against its adversary's intervention since the U.S. deployed Navy forces in the 1996 Sino-Taiwan Crisis. According to the commissioning data of the PLA submarine, actual commissions of Chinese submarines significantly increased after the mid-1990s (see Table 4). In addition, this table shows that China has placed into service 52 submarines at an average of approximately 2.9 submarines per year. As Admiral Samuel Locklear, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command asserted, "China is planning to acquire a total of 80 submarines."¹⁶⁹ This data also shows that the PLA's submarine development has moved from the diesel-powered attack submarine (Type SS) to the nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Most experts argue that the current Chinese improvement in the area of submarine buildup has received benefits from Russian submarine technology and knowledge.

¹⁶⁸ O'Rourke, *China Naval Modernization*, 7.

¹⁶⁹ Richard Halloran, "China, U.S. Engaging in Underwater Arms Race," *Taipei Times*, May 16, 2014, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2013/05/16/2003562368>.

Table 4. PLA Navy submarine commissionings (1995–2012).¹⁷⁰

	Jin (Type 094) SSBN	Shang (Type 093) SSN	Kilo SS (Russian- made)	Ming (Type 035 SS)	Song (Type 039 SS)	Yuan (Type 039A SS)	Qing SS	Annual total for all types shown	Cumulative total for all types shown	Cumulative total for modern attack boats
1995			2	1				3	3	2
1996				1				1	4	2
1997				2				2	6	2
1998			1	2				3	9	3
1999			1		1			2	11	5
2000				1				1	12	5
2001				1	2			3	15	7
2002				1				1	16	7
2003					2			2	18	9
2004			1		3			4	22	13
2005			4		3			7	29	20
2006		1	3		2	1		7	36	27
2007	1	1						2	38	28
2008								0	38	28
2009						2		2	40	30
2010	1					1		2	42	31
2011						3	1	4	46	35
2012	1					5		6	52	42

To determine the PLA’s strategic intentions related to the NDG, one must concentrate on the fact that the Chinese submarines are armed with one of the ASCMs, the wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes. Moreover, as the U.S. DOD points out, “8 of the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia are armed with the highly capable Russian-made SS-N-27 Sizzler ASCM.”¹⁷¹ For that reason, the PLA is likely to regard submarine forces as a delivery system for A2AD capabilities. The submarine forces, which are armed with ASCMs or ASBMs, could prevent an adversary’s access to China’s territories.

By analyzing Figures 5 and 6, one can deduce that China has strived to develop undetectable submarine forces against the sonar ability of opposing forces. As Commodore Sauders writes in *Jane’s Fighting Ships*, “the downward slope of the arrow in each figure indicates the increasingly lower noise level of the submarine designs shown; in general, quieter submarines are more difficult for opposing forces to detect and counter.”¹⁷² According to the Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s acoustic quietness, China demonstrates the importance of this ability by commissioning improved

¹⁷⁰ O’Rourke, *China Naval Modernization*, 14.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 12.

¹⁷² Commodore Stephen Sauders, *Jane’s Fighting Ships 2013–14* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2013), 134.

submarines after 2000, the *SHANG* and *JIN* Class. Their submarines will catch up with the Russian acoustic quietness technology in 2015. Furthermore, the Chinese diesel-powered submarines, which have been commissioned since 2000—the *SONG*, *YUAN*, and *KILO* class—have already reached a significant level in a noise-reducing technology.




Figure 5. Acoustic quietness of Chinese nuclear-powered submarines.¹⁷³




Figure 6. Acoustic quietness of Chinese non-nuclear-powered submarines.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ O'Rourke, *China Naval Modernization*, 11.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 12.

Given the strategic impact of the NDG and the objectives of A2/AD capabilities, one can deduce that Beijing pursued the arms buildup to prevent the United States and Japan from intervening in the Sino-Taiwan unification. As this chapter pointed out, the PLA's ASBMs, ASCMs, LACMs, and submarines can efficiently restrain adversaries' forces from accessing China's coastline. The 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis made China fundamentally doubt its military capabilities in the face of U.S. power projection. On the other hand, the NDG of the following year further intensified Beijing's threat perception given its strategic implications. As this chapter determined above, the NDG implied reinforcement of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation in East Asian regional conflicts; this simultaneously meant that Japan would explicitly join the U.S. in any intervention in a Sino-Taiwan crisis. In this context, one concludes that the combination of these two consecutive international issues made China to accelerate the development of A2/AD capabilities.

D. CONCLUSION: THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES INTENSIFIED THE SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY DILEMMA

As this chapter has determined, the Chinese response to the NDG can be classified in two aspects: diplomatic responses and arms buildup. In other words, China regarded the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese bilateral alliance, which the NDG created, as a security threat and strove to alleviate its security vulnerability by enforcing diplomatic cooperation and an arms buildup. As Robert Jervis described, a security dilemma occurs or intensifies when state A's action, which mostly is an effort to increase its national security, leads state B to feel it as a security threat. This is because state B has to supplement its relative security weakening, which resulted from A's action. Therefore, given the anarchic international structure, state A and B are highly likely to sink into the action-reaction process that is referred to as a spiral model.

Applying this action-reaction process to the Sino-Japanese relationship, one can convincingly demonstrate how the NDG intensified the two countries' security dilemma. As Chapter II pointed out, the U.S. and Japanese awareness of the unstable security environment of East Asia in the early 1990s, as well as their perceived need to redefine its bilateral alliance, which originated from the Gulf War and the 1994 North Korean

nuclear crisis, led them to revise the NDG. Moreover, the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance fundamentally achieved both countries' common strategic objectives, which enabled them to strengthen their national security against potential and existent adversaries—China and North Korea. As a result, China, which had been emerging as a new economic and military power, strongly influenced the U.S. and Japanese strategic decision.

On the other hand, the enforcement of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance made the PRC doubt the U.S.-Japanese strategic objectives and perceive it as a security threat. Moreover, the Chinese scholars and Foreign Ministry spokesman concentrated on reporting three negative effects of the NDG to protect its security: the aggregation of U.S. power in East Asia, U.S.-Japanese cooperation as an obstacle to Sino-Taiwan reunification, and the justification of remilitarized Japan. Given Beijing's official responses, China explicitly realized that the reform of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance by revising the NDG could be a security threat. With the recognition of the NDG as a security threat, Beijing has showed various levels of diplomatic and military responses—strengthening a Sino-Russian united opposition, highlighting the aggressive intentions of Prime Ministers' Yasukuni Shrine visits, and accelerating the buildup of A2/AD capabilities.

The action-reaction process, shown in the relationships between China and the U.S.-Japan alliance, obviously demonstrates the security dilemma's spiral model. The United States and Japan's security effort to increase their security power conversely led China to strongly doubt their strategic aggressiveness and to devise a countermeasure in various fields. Moreover, as this chapter determines, China not only increased its diplomatic efforts since the U.S. and Japan redefined the NDG, but also encouraged the PLA's arms buildup, especially the development of the A2AD capabilities. The PRC has grappled to find a proper solution against its exposed security vulnerability. As a result, the NDG, which was the representative symbol of the U.S. and Japanese security agreement, convincingly intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

Another objective of this thesis is to determine why China showed strong negative reactions to the transformation of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance. Even though many

security experts argue that the growing North Korean nuclear threat and the desire of the U.S. to increase the Japanese security role in the region caused the redefinition of the NDG, Beijing has concentrated on the possibility that the U.S.-Japan alliance can intervene in the Sino-Taiwan crisis and contain the rise of China. In this regard, the following chapters use two theoretical perspectives, realism, and constructivism, to determine which elements shaped these Chinese strategic perceptions. Yet, these two theoretical perspectives combined together can provide a better explanation in terms of a causal relationship of the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

IV. REALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM PERSPECTIVES ON THE SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY DILEMMA

This chapter uses two theoretical perspectives—realism and constructivism—to determine why the NDG intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. Furthermore, a combination of these two perspectives efficiently provides a more persuasive explanation for the post-1997 intensification of the Sino-Japanese security dilemma than either perspective by itself. This combination provides a new theoretical tool that can throw better light on the analysis of contemporary international politics.

A. THE VIEW OF BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY ON THE CHINESE OPPOSITION TO THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES

Realism has been described as the most reliable theory during the Cold War era and even presents a sufficient explanation in current international politics. The core assumption of the realism theory on international politics is a power struggle between self-interested states. To determine why China strongly regarded the NDG as its national threat and strove to alleviate a potential threat, this chapter uses Stephen M. Walt's balance of threat theory. Walt's realist view can provide a better theoretical tool in regard to determining why the NDG intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, and efficiently supplement Kenneth N. Waltz's insufficient balance of power theory.

1. Balancing Against the U.S.-Japanese Threats

According to Walt's balance of threat theory, states strive to "form alliances to balance against threats," which the combination of four elements—"aggregate power, proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions"—directly affect.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, states choose allies to balance against the most serious threat, and prefer balancing to "bandwagoning," except in the cases of weak and isolated states.¹⁷⁶ In contrast with Waltz's logic, Walt's balance of threat theory regards aggregate power as an important but not the only component that forms a state's threat perception.

¹⁷⁵ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 263.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

In regard to analyzing Beijing's fears of the NDG, as the literature review previously determined, Waltz's balance of power theory is insufficient to explain China's opposition to remilitarized Japan. However, considering Walt's four variables—aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions—rather than power alone, provides a more reliable explanation for determining why the NDG threatened Beijing.

First, the U.S. and Japan aggregated power by signing the new NDG, which is sufficient to threaten Beijing. The NDG has an important strategic implication because it spells out “the U.S.-Japan cooperation during situations in areas surrounding Japan.”¹⁷⁷ Moreover, the NDG included various levels of security cooperation between the U.S.-and Japan. For example, the U.S. and Japan pledged to increase information sharing and coordinate peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, Japan can support the U.S. forces by providing various facilities and military support in a rear area. Supposing the possibility that China clashes with either the U.S. or Japan, or even both, Beijing is likely to regard the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance as a big challenge. In short, China as the non-U.S. ally sufficiently perceived the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japanese alliance as a direct threat to its security.

Second, as Walt argues, “states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away.”¹⁷⁹ In this respect, one state's geographic closeness is likely to affect the other states' assessment on how intense they calculate that state's military power as a security threat. States also regard military capabilities of its neighboring states as more menacing than those of far-off states, which are constrained by distance. Furthermore, the ocean's strong restraint on power projection leads states to solidify their belief that a close state's voice could be vividly heard and felt.¹⁸⁰ In this context, the U.S. military bases in Japan strongly influence the Chinese perception of threats. Due to the closeness

¹⁷⁷ Chris Ajemian, “The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines under the Japanese Constitution and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal* 7, no. 2 (1998): 340.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 341.

¹⁷⁹ Stephen M. Walt, “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance’: Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 136.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 137.

of the U.S. military bases, the U.S. can unrestrictedly intervene in various East Asian disputes. Therefore, even if the U.S. is separated by the Pacific Ocean and located far away from China, the military bases in Japan countervail its regional isolation.

Third, a state that owns or newly obtains offensive capabilities is likely to be viewed by the other states as more aggressive. However, given that one of the Chinese fears over the NDG is the U.S.-Japanese TMD cooperation, some scholars raise questions about this claim. This is because even if the missile defense system can be categorized as a defensive military means, the cooperation of the U.S.-Japanese TMD system strongly intensified the Chinese doubts. As Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler propose about the ambivalent nature of weapons, “a gun can be the source of food for a family in a hunting community, or it can be used to spray bullets across a school in a mad killing.”¹⁸¹ In other words, there hardly exists an absolute standard to divide weapons into categories of offensive and defensive tools in international politics. Applying this logic, Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong argues that, “the TMD can be a component of a larger offensive weapons system” because the TMD’s inherent technological capabilities and the military missions for which it might be used.¹⁸² He points out that TMD is highly likely to be seen as offensive when it is deployed abroad to protect U.S. forward-deployed troops, which could be used for offensive purposes.¹⁸³ Moreover, for TMD’s technological side, due to the fact that achievements in research and development of TMD would be transferred to ballistic missile technology, Beijing is more likely to regard it as a threatening military weapon.

Fourth, states underscore other states’ aggressive intentions as well other states’ military capabilities. Walt maintains that the characteristic of states’ accumulated behavior determines their distinctive perceived intentions. For example, the Soviet Union’s Afghanistan invasion, periodic interventions in Eastern Europe, and successful attack on a Korean airliner reinforced suspicions of its aggressive intentions. In this

¹⁸¹ Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 43.

¹⁸² Yan Xuetong, “Viewpoint: Theater Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security,” *The Nonproliferation Review* (1999): 66.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

context, China acutely felt that Washington had an aggressive intention against Sino-Taiwan unification after the Clinton administration deployed its aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait in March 1996. Moreover, continued territorial disputes with Japan over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands provide fertile ground for the Chinese doubts.

Taken together, these four variables of balance of threat theory determine why China regarded the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance as a potential threat (see Table 5). For Beijing, signing the NDG increased the U.S.-Japanese aggregated power and convinced China that the U.S. and Japan strove to increase their offensive power, especially through the TMD, as the result of aggressive intentions. Moreover, the refinement of the U.S. and Japanese logistical support activities and joint operation system potentially strengthened the efficiency of the U.S. military bases in Japan. In other words, the U.S. could not only dispatch its troops to any disputed region of East Asia as soon as possible, but also efficiently use the Japanese assets for supporting its military operations. Therefore, the NDG compelled China to view the U.S. military capabilities as a nearby threat.

Table 5. The Beijing's perceived threat after NDG.

	Power Aggregation	Geographic Proximity	Offensive Power	Aggressive Intentions
Beijing's Perceived Threat	+	+ (Potentially)	+	+

Walt's balance of threat theory explains far more than Waltz's balance of power theory, which solely focuses on the power aggregation of other states or coalitions. As a result, Walt's theoretical explanation can deduce that the Chinese perception of a threat, which came from the interlinking of Walt's four variables, led Beijing to strive to balance against threats that the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance triggers. However, the next section discusses why Walt's explanation, although better, is still not enough.

2. The Insufficiency of the Balance of Threat Theory to Explain the Chinese Perception of Japan's Aggressiveness

The Chinese perception of the aggressive intention of the NDG represents the subjective and psychological realm in contrast to measurable variables, such as the aggregated power of the U.S. and Japan, geographic proximity, and offensive power. As Walt maintains, states can deduce other states' intentions from the others' accumulated behavior. For example, if one state increases aggressive capabilities, has periodically invaded other states, or deploys intermediate-ranged nuclear missiles in the area of a border line, an adversary state is likely to perceive that the state has an aggressive intention.

To determine whether Tokyo had aggressive intentions in signing the new NDG, one must first historically analyze Japanese behavior. In fact, the Prime Minister of Japan, Yosida Shigeru (1946–1947 and 1948–1954), had focused on economic recovery and development while avoiding the large-scale costs of defense since the 1952 San Francisco Peace treaty. In tandem with these political and economic benefits after the United States and Japan signed the first security treaty, Japan's economy-first policy strongly influenced its foreign and security policies for the next 20 years. Furthermore, despite the shifting bipolar global power structure of the early 1990s, Japan did not change its overall policy trends. Given the strong collaborating and burden-sharing with Washington on security and upholding of the 1 percent norm of the defense budget, Tokyo's general security strategy had not changed since the end of World War II (see Figure 7).

According to Figure 7, Japan has persistently maintained its military expenditure at 1 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP); on the other hand, China in the Mao era (1962–1976) spent about 16–28 percent of its GNP on military expenditure. Furthermore, even though the economy-first policy of the Deng government (1976–1989) decreased China's military budgets from the level of 16 percent to 2 percent of its GNP, Beijing's military spending of its GNP always overwhelmed the level of Tokyo's. The evidence of China and Japan's military expenditure is sufficient to discredit Walt's logic that a state's aggressive behaviors can reinforce another's suspicion about its hostile intentions. As Figure 7 shows, China was unlikely to perceive the NDG as the outcome

of Japan's aggressiveness given Tokyo's adherence to the low level of military expenditures.




Figure 7. Military expenditure share of China and Japan's GNP.¹⁸⁴¹⁸⁵

Some Chinese analysts may argue that even though the Japanese defense budget maintained 1 percent of GNP, the amount of military spending in 1997 was very high as the world's third biggest country.¹⁸⁶ In fact, Japan continued to increase its military budget since 1970s. Nevertheless, as Chapter II determined, until joining the NDG, Tokyo was unprepared and reluctant to contribute to global security; successive Japanese governments portrayed its security policy as "defensive defense."¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, Samuels ascribes the continuous increase of the Japanese military budget since 1970s to the persistent U.S. pressure on Japan to spend more on defense.¹⁸⁸ In this context, the 1977 statement of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda (1976–1978) that "Japan would contribute to regional security by economic and diplomatic means only" exemplifies the

¹⁸⁴ David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965," National Material Capabilities (v3.02), <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htm#notes>.

¹⁸⁵ The World Bank, "World Development Indicator," <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator>.

¹⁸⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database," http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database.

¹⁸⁷ Richard J. Samuels, "New Fighting Power! Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2007): 88.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 87.

mainstream of Japanese security perspective at that time.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, even though Japan was the third largest defense spender and possessed the most modern military force in Asia, its defense spending was inevitably restrained from the United States—especially when Tokyo demanded for power projection capabilities.¹⁹⁰ Taken together, one can conclude that the evidence of Tokyo’s continued increases in military budgets, and their absolute size, is insufficient to correlate with Japanese aggressiveness.

Analyzing the trend of military budget between China and Japan provides a further convincing result that the genuinely aggressive country lately has been China (see Figure 8). Even though Japan was spending approximately 2.5 times as much as China in the late-1980s, the rapid growth in China’s military budget gradually decreased the gap of these two countries’ military spending. China surpassed Japan in 2004 and is recently spending about 3–4 times as much as Japan. The reversal of the ratio of Sino-Japanese military spending in this period indicate that it China, not Japan, whose aggressive intentions have been growing.




Figure 8. Military expenditures of China and Japan.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ Hideo Otake, *Japan’s Defense and Domestic Politics* (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1983), 150.

¹⁹⁰ Samuels, “New Fighting Power!’ Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” 91.

¹⁹¹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.”

Japanese security behavior since the end of World War II has not revealed consistently aggressive intentions. Therefore, one must attribute Beijing's perception of Tokyo's aggressive intentions to more lengthy Sino-Japanese relations. In this context, Walt's assumption that a state can recognize other states' intentions from accumulated behavior is questionable in four aspects.

First, Walt neglects the possibility that states' mutual cognitions, which have been accumulated for a long time by intersubjective processes, contribute to a state's perception of other states' intentions. For example, Canada's existing cognition of the U.S. is reflected in the long historical intersubjective outcome. Canada does not regard the U.S. as a security threat, in spite of the extraordinary arms build-up and formidable power projection capability of the U.S., because the United States does not behave threateningly toward Canada, and because Canada trusts that the friendly relationship is enduring. This logic differs from Walt's. Walt just focuses on material aggressiveness, which can be shown in a visible component, such as the state's military expenditure increase and military forward deployment. With Walt's logic, one state's military reinforcement and aggressive military doctrine must induce other state's threat perception. However, as the U.S.-Canada relationships shows, real international politics historically has shown that Walt's logic is incomplete. In short, if state A has a positive cognition to State B, the former, like Canada, is less likely to regard the latter's material power development, like the U.S., as a threat.

Second, Walt disregards that the sphere of international politics frequently requires states to judge ambivalent and ambiguous phenomena. He explains that states perceived the Soviet's aggressive intentions not only by Stalin's coercive statements and emphasis on offensive military forces, but also through the invasion of Afghanistan. Certainly, this Soviet behavior sufficiently provided a fertile ground for perceiving Stalin's aggressive intentions. Furthermore, the Cold War's dichotomous bipolar system between the U.S. and the Soviet bloc helped far more states distinguish whether certain another state's behavior was the outcome of aggressive intentions. However, the advent of various key actors in East Asia—the U.S., China, Japan, and South and North Korea—makes states' judgment of others more difficult.

Third, with the multilateral security environment of East Asia, states must analyze a number of complicated variables. For this reason, a state's intention is less likely to be objectively interpreted, and more likely to be swayed by the other states' accumulated perception of the state. In short, even if state A's intention reflects in its behavior, as Walt argues, the other states' evaluation of A's behavior varies depending on each state's accumulated perception of state A.

Fourth, as Peter J. Katzenstein argues, "the threat perception of enemies is an explanatory variable that does not offer a compelling answer as much as it invites further investigation."¹⁹² Even if Walt's balance of threat theory is based on a neorealist style analysis, he pushes beyond rationalist styles of analysis. Furthermore, Katzenstein points out that Walt moves a large distance from material capabilities to ideational factors.¹⁹³ In other words, Walt's theory loses credibility because his ambivalent approach tries to analyze an ideological and psychological component through a neorealist perspective. He finally fails to present how a threat perception—an ideational variable—can be measured. For that reason, the effect of inter-states' collective identity and interest is an important ingredient to overcome the insufficiency of Walt's theory.

Therefore, to supplement Walt's argument, the theory of constructivist scholars Alexander Wendt and Ted Hopf will be examined. Wendt and Hopf assume that one state's perception of another state depends on its accumulated national identity and interest, which is a useful theoretical approach. This argument sufficiently provides a persuasive explanation of why Beijing perceived the NDG as the outcome of Japanese aggressive intentions, despite the fact that Japan had not shown hostile intentions since the end of World War II.

The analysis of the causal relationships between Sino-Japanese historical legacies and the Chinese perceptions of Japan reinforces the useful aspects of Walt's theory. As Christensen points out, the Sino-Japanese "historical legacies and ethnic hatred" strongly

¹⁹² Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): 586.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

exacerbate their security dilemma.¹⁹⁴ Moreover, given that U.S.-Japanese TMD can be categorized as a defensive military means (despite Chinese, such as Yan Xuetong above, who may interpret it as an offensive system), the realist perspective alone is still problematic as a way to analyze this issue. Hence, it is essential to determine Sino-Japanese historical relations to supplement Walt's theoretical insufficiency.

The last part of this chapter demonstrates that Sino-Japanese historical legacies had formed China's negative perceptions of Japan, which led them to regard the NDG as a threat. Therefore, the following section describes how these historical legacies reflect the negative Chinese view of Japan and why this Chinese hatred exacerbates the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. In this context, Wendt's and Hopf's constructivist perspectives provide a convincing explanation to determine how the Sino-Japanese historical legacies have helped build Chinese identities and interests in the region.

B. CONSTRUCTIVISM PERSPECTIVE ON THE CHINESE PERCEPTION OF JAPANESE AGGRESSIVENESS

As Alexander Wendt argues, international politics is also the outcome of social relationships.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, he points out that "shared knowledge, material resources, and practices" are the main elements of social structures.¹⁹⁶ In terms of security dilemmas, Wendt maintains that states' perceptions, which come from the intersubjective process, intensifies, or alleviates it. Therefore, Wendt assumes that the result of negative intersubjective cognition between states is more prone to security dilemmas.

Wendt attributes security dilemmas to a "situated activity" not given by anarchy or nature.¹⁹⁷ Wendt's logic contests the realist perspective, in which an anarchic international structure encourages states' self-help and efforts to survive. Yet, putting aside the debate of these two contrasting theoretical perspectives in the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, the main objective of this chapter is to determine why Beijing believed

¹⁹⁴ Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," 51.

¹⁹⁵ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 392.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 407.

that Tokyo had aggressive intentions despite the fact that Japan had not shown an expansionist foreign policy since the end of World War II. As a result, this added constructivist approach can support Walt's insufficient explanation for why China perceived Japan as a threat.

1. Sino-Japanese Historical Legacies

As Allen S. Whiting argues, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 remains a historic benchmark in Chinese perceptions of Japan because China suffered its first loss of territory in modern times as “a result of military defeat.”¹⁹⁸ He also points out that Tokyo's seizure of Manchuria in 1931–1932 and its ferocious invasion of 1937–1945, especially the Japanese atrocities committed against the Chinese inhabitants, have left bitter memories in the populace.¹⁹⁹ According to *China's Response to the West: A documentary Survey (1839–1923)*, the Japanese military forces continually overran China's main industrial areas and killed millions of Chinese people from 1894 to 1945.²⁰⁰ For those reasons, Chinese memories of the past have been an obstacle to maintaining a close relationship with Japan and manifested, on occasion, in the ventilation of Chinese private or public animosity.

China and Japan have contrasting attitudes to the 1937–1945 Japanese invasions. In fact, the Japanese atrocities, which included the Nanjing Massacre, have been repeatedly recalled in China but ignored or deemphasized in Japan. This is a critical element that impacts the negative Chinese relationship with Japan. Given the intense Chinese antagonism against continued Japanese attempts to revise historical records and textbooks, the cognition of these two countries in the history of bilateral relations is substantially different. Moreover, in September 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's tribute to the Japanese fallen soldiers in the Yasukuni Shrine incited thousands of Chinese university students to publicly demonstrate against the importation

¹⁹⁸ Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 29.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁰⁰ SSu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 126.

of the Japanese economic system in China.²⁰¹ Hence, the Chinese, regardless of generation, have a strong antipathy to its wartime suffering and the Japanese efforts to dilute historical wrongs without self-reflection.

As Whiting points out, the term *image*, which refers to “the preconceived stereotype of a nation, state, or people that is derived from a selective interpretation of history, experience, and self-image,” strongly influences the mind of the decision makers for coping with foreign phenomena.²⁰² In this context, the Japanese Nanjing Massacre, in which approximately “340,000 Chinese people died, 190,000 in group massacres and 150,000 in individual murders,” contributed to forming the Chinese perception of the worst images of Japan.²⁰³ This historical Chinese bitterness constantly has been transmitted to younger generations by not only personal accounts, but also the mass media. Hence, the negative Japanese image, which has been accumulating in China since the occupation of Manchuria, directly and indirectly impacts Beijing’s decision making.

2. China’s Negative Image of Japan

The following section evaluates whether the negative Japanese image is indeed reflected in various levels of social opinion in China. If the negative Chinese cognition of Japan exists, one can use it to supplement Walt’s theory in the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. If the Chinese have a collective notion that Japan is aggressive, this image of Japan is likely to affect Beijing’s threat perception of the NDG as the outcome of Tokyo’s expansionism.

The profound Chinese distrust and negative perception of Japan, which have been accumulating since the brutal Japanese invasions of 1894–1945, is reflected in various fields. Therefore, as Wendt argues, these negative perceptions can build Chinese identities and interests that lead them to interpret and predict Japanese behaviors.

²⁰¹ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, 28.

²⁰² Ibid., 18.

²⁰³ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, 37.

a. *Perceptions of the General Public*

According to “Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another,” a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center of 2,180 Chinese adults in 2006, many Chinese had a strong negative perception of Japan. The research found that 71 percent of Chinese respondents had hostility toward Japan.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, given the ratio of Chinese negative emotion to other Asian countries, the highest percentage of their negative feeling was directed toward Japan (see Table 6).

²⁰⁴ 6-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, “China’s Neighbors Worry about Its Growing Military Strength: Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another,” The Pew Global Project Attitudes, September 21, 2006, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/09/21/publics-of-asian-powers-hold-negative-views-of-one-another>.

Table 6. Favorability rating of China toward Asian neighbors.²⁰⁵

	China (percent)	Japan (percent)	India (percent)	Pakistan (percent)
Favorable	94	28	47	69
Unfavorable	5	71	39	7

The Pew Research Center attributes these negative Chinese emotions to the unreflective Japanese stance on its past faults. For this reason, the Chinese and Japanese populations have greatly differing perceptions of the Japanese apologies for its military actions. As 81 percent of Chinese respondents believe, the Japanese apologies are insufficient to soothe the victims of brutal persecution.²⁰⁶ In Japan, on the other hand, 40 percent of respondents reply that they have apologized sufficiently for its military actions in World War II; even 14 percent of people answer that they don't need to atone for them at all (see Figure 9).²⁰⁷ Therefore, the negative Chinese sentiments to Japan are rooted in historical legacies and have continued to be unresolved because of Beijing's perception that Tokyo has not apologized sufficiently for its militaristic faults.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.




Figure 9. Different views on the Japanese apology for its military action.²⁰⁸

As the 2006 survey of Pew Research Center indicates, only a small percent of Chinese interviewed have a positive attitude to Japan. Furthermore, Chinese regard the Japanese as competitive, greedy, and arrogant. Comparing the percentage of the Chinese respondents who vote for positive Japanese characteristics—honest (15 percent), generous (9 percent), and tolerant (22 percent), those who vote for the negative traits are much higher—competitive (74 percent), greedy (68 percent), and arrogant (69 percent) (see Figure 10). Therefore, one can deduce that a negative and hostile impression largely pervades the Chinese perception of Japan.




Figure 10. Chinese positive and negative views on the Japanese traits.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

In another survey, Genron-NPO, a Japanese non-profit organization, interviewed 1,609 Chinese individuals in 2007. The Chinese regarded Japan as the second most-threatening country in the world (see Figure 11).²¹⁰ Furthermore, for the question “reasons why you feel Japan is a threat,” Japanese aggression, which was only experienced in the distant past, accounted for almost 62 percent. This was the highest percentage among the respondents’ answers (see Figure 11).




Figure 11. Chinese perception of military threatening countries.²¹¹




Figure 12. Chinese perception of the Japanese threatening factors.²¹²

²¹⁰ Genron-NPO, “Japan-China Joint Opinion Polls,” August 17, 2007, http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/20070817_e_press.pdf.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

b. *How Japan is Viewed in the Education of Chinese History*

After the Education Law was passed in 1995, the PRC has emphasized patriotic education by widely reminding its citizens of the stories of Japanese invasion forces. As Christopher W. Hughes points out, the Chinese students simultaneously learn about the importance of national security and Japanese brutality in the story named “Thought and Value,” in which one young boy was executed because he refused to betray his country to Japan.²¹³ Hughes also mentions that the younger Chinese generation directly and indirectly has been affected by these negative images of Japan. Furthermore, according to the investigation of David P. Janes, *Chinese History Book I*, used by 80 percent of Chinese middle schools, tends to be biased. For example, it allots the story of the Nanjing Massacre to a whole chapter.²¹⁴ It presents the cruelty of the Japanese army by highlighting their indelible faults during World War II.

As Dune Lawrence and Bradley K. Martin maintain, a guide of the Chinese high-school history textbooks published in 2004 included the idea that “Guarding against the revival of Japanese militarism and fascism remains one of the most important problems that we face.”²¹⁵ Moreover, some scholars are concerned that the Chinese patriotic education strongly influences the younger generation’s “blind patriotism” and forms “the idea that their national security is threatened by external power, especially the U.S. and Japan.”²¹⁶ In this regard, the younger Chinese generation, who is educated by the biased patriotic history education, is unable to hold balanced attitudes to Japan and is also more likely to perceive Japanese political activities as a national threat. In short, history education in China, which emphasizes Japanese brutality during World War II, contributes to the persistence of negative Japanese images in the China.

²¹³ Christopher W. Hughes, *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 74.

²¹⁴ David P. Janes, *Building a Stable Northeast Asia: Views from the Next Generation* (Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum CSIS, 2005), 9.

²¹⁵ Dune Lawrence and Bradley K. Martin, “Hu, Fukuda Warm China-Japan Ties, Shifting Strategic Balance,” *Bloomberg*, July 6, 2008, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHGL0KbNqQ2Y&refer=home>.

²¹⁶ Robert T. Schatz, Ervin Staub, and Howard Lavine, “On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism,” *Political Psychology* 20, no. 1 (1999): 154–55.

3. Why China Perceives Japan as Aggressive?

China's negative Japanese images shed the most light on why Beijing regarded the NDG as the outcome of Tokyo's aggressive intentions. As a constructivist scholar, Wendt argues that state A's interpretation of state B's action is decided by state A's identities.²¹⁷ Moreover, the process of creating intersubjective meanings between states, by signaling, interpreting, and responding, makes both states hold certain ideas about each other. Finally, these "reciprocal typifications" create relatively stable concepts of self and other—identities—regarding the issue at stake in the interaction. Therefore, the reciprocal typifications of Sino-Japanese relations led Beijing to perceive the NDG as the outcome of Japan's aggressiveness.

As determined above, the Chinese public has negative images about Japan. These negative images result from the brutal Japanese exploitation of Chinese people and from the idea that Tokyo's reflections on the war are insufficient. Moreover, the PRC's education policy, which emphasizes the brutality of the Japanese army forces during World War II, continues to provoke anti-Japanese sentiments in the younger generations. For this reason, one can deduce that the Chinese, regardless of generation, have an unfavorable perception of Japan. As Wendt points out, these negative images are reflected in Beijing's interpretation of Japanese behavior.

With the negative perception of Japan, the strategic implication of the NDG—the reinforcement of Japanese security roles against regional conflicts—was sufficient to catalyze the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. China's images of Japan converge on two aspects—an unfavorable state that has no introspection about its past faults, and a threatening state in which some people want to revive militarism. Therefore, Beijing interpreted the 1997 redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as evidence of the resurgence of Japanese militarism. Given the intense Chinese mistrust toward Japan, many Chinese judged that the NDG undermined the Japanese norms of self-restraint, which made Beijing feel that Tokyo strove to normalize its international security role and even revive militarism by signing the NDG.

²¹⁷ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 405.

V. CONCLUSION

This thesis has focused on the two questions of whether and why China regarded the NDG as a national threat. To answer the first question, the thesis categorizes Beijing's responses to the NDG. The result of the analysis suggests that the Chinese efforts are categorized by two aspects: diplomatic and military reactions. As the Jervis' action-reaction process describes, the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, which tried to strengthen their national security, conversely made China suspicious and led them to counteract the agreement in various fields. Given Tokyo's action and Beijing's reaction, these two states were sinking into the spiral model of a security dilemma. Hence, one can conclude that the NDG intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma even though the United States and Japan tried to redefine the limitations of their security alliance, which emerged during the early post-Cold War era.

To answer the second question, this thesis uniquely combines two theoretical perspectives—Stephen M. Walt's balance of threat and Alexander Wendt's constructivist theory. Taken together, Walt's four independent variables—aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions—show much of why the NDG threatened the Beijing's perception. First, the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance implies that both states pledge to fight together against external aggressions. Therefore, the NDG could be an efficient and visible means to aggregate the security power of the U.S. and Japan; however, it is a serious threat to China, which is the major non-U.S. ally in East Asia that is also arguing with Japan over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Second, the important strategic implication of the NDG is the fact that Japan agrees to provide active support for U.S. operations in the various disputes of East Asia. In other words, the NDG maximizes U.S. power and contributes to its unlimited freedom of action in East Asia. Hence, China fears that the U.S. can unrestrictedly intervene in its national interests—especially in Sino-Taiwan reunification and territorial disputes with Japan. Third, the U.S.-Japanese cooperation in developing a TMD system sufficiently intensifies Beijing's perception of a threat. Given the strategic implications of a TMD—neutralizing the PLA's nuclear power, protecting U.S. forward-deployed troops, and potentially

strengthening Taiwan's defense capability—Chinese explicitly regard it as an offensive weapon despite of its defensive nature.

However, Walt's fourth variable, aggressive intentions, cannot persuasively explain why China perceived that the NDG was the outcome of Japanese aggressive intention. Given Tokyo's constant collaboration and burden-sharing with the United States, as well as its adherence to the 1 percent norm of the defense budget, Japan has not revealed its aggressive intentions since the end of World War II. In contrast with Walt's assumption that states can deduce other states' intentions by their exposed behaviors, Tokyo's political activities since the 1950s have been far from the aggressive.

To supplement Walt's logic in explaining the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, this research uses Alexander Wendt and Ted Hopf's constructivist theory. According to this thesis, the Chinese public has intensely negative images of Japan. Moreover, the Chinese fear of a militarized Japan persists and affects Beijing's negative interpretation of Tokyo's reasons for signing the NDG. As a result, the combination of Walt and Wendt's theoretical perspectives complementarily suggests why Beijing regarded the NDG as a national threat, which intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

A. THE FUTURE OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

As the above literature review determined, each international relations theory presents a distinct argument regarding the nature of a state and the international system. For this reason, one can predict a different future of Sino-Japanese relations by applying these various theories. Yet, using a dichotomous approach in which one theory is correct and the other is incorrect is less likely to present a productive output. In this context, therefore, the different hypothesis of each international relations theory will complement each other to shed light on determining the future of Sino-Japanese relations.

1. Mearsheimer's Offensive Realist World

With Mearsheimer's offensive logic, China inevitably wants to dominate the East Asian region; therefore, Beijing will continue to increase its power to drive out the United States from Asia. In this context, the PLA will accelerate the development of

A2/AD capabilities, which efficiently prevent the U.S.-Japanese allied forces from interfering in Sino-Taiwan reunification and China's territorial disputes. Given past actions of the U.S., which has shown intolerance to competitors, this theory suggests that the new Cold War is coming close.

In the near future, China's main national interest is to retrieve Taiwan. As Mearsheimer points out, Taiwan has an important strategic implication for controlling the sea lanes of East Asia. For this reason, maintaining the independent status of Taiwan is a significant goal for the U.S. East Asian strategy. This U.S. security policy is directly reflected in the fact that the NDG included contingencies about Taiwan. Considering Taiwan's strategic importance, the conflicts between Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo over Taiwan will most likely trigger various levels of security competition—from low-intensity to high-intensity conflicts.

In the long term, other Asian neighbors of China—especially South Korea, India, Russia, and even Japan—will be forced to choose Beijing or Washington as its ally. In fact, many East Asian countries have worried not only about the rise of China since the early-1990s, but also whether the U.S.-led balancing coalition can efficiently contain China. As a result, based on Mearsheimer's offensive logic, one can only predict that China and the U.S.-Japan alliance will collide to achieve an East Asian hegemony.

2. Waltz and Walt's Defensive Realist World

In contrast, Waltz and Walt as defensive realist theorists argue that a state only strives to increase its internal and external capabilities for security. While the views of a defensive realist differ from those of an offensive realist on the nature of a state, these two branches of realism share the belief that states hardly believe others' intentions in the anarchic international system. For this reason, security dilemmas always exist in international relations; their level fluctuates with the combination of various security variables. For example, as Jervis' offensive-defensive balance theory points out, the combination of two variables—whether the offensive or the defensive means can provide an advantage and whether states can distinguish the offensive or the defensive posture of other states—can produce the four levels of a security dilemma.

With the defensive realist view, one hardly predicts the optimistic future of the Sino-Japanese relations. This is because the rise of China is sufficient to threaten the perception of security of the U.S. and Japan when applying Walt's theory—China's power aggregation, the geopolitical closeness in East Asia, the PLA's modernization efforts, and Beijing's determined stance on territorial disputes. Furthermore, the security dilemma's zero-sum competition is already developed between China and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Beijing seems to regard the U.S.-Japanese cooperation over the TMD system as a military means for preventing Sino-Taiwan reunification. As this thesis determined, China further increased diplomatic and military reactions against it. In other words, a new arms race between China and the United States is accelerating, like the one between the United States and the Soviet Union. Based on this evidence, one can expect that if the United States and China persist in this zero-sum game, they will inevitably begin a new Cold War era.

3. Wendt's Constructivist World

Wendt's theory somewhat shares a defensive realist view of the world, especially regarding the existence of security dilemmas in the anarchic international system. Yet, to be more exact, Wendt combines the social concept, in which intersubjective processes form states' identities and interests, with the neorealism's main argument that the international system has an anarchic structure. Given that the concept of a security dilemma is based on the essential hypothesis of a defensive realism, in which states' efforts to protect their security force them to sink into a spiral model, this logic indirectly reflects Wendt's idea that intersubjective processes affect the intensity of the security dilemma.

On the basis of Wendt's logic, one can deduce that the future Sino-Japanese relations will depend on whether China and Japan will resolve their bitter historical legacies. Nevertheless, given not only Beijing's attempt to link the territorial disputes over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands with the revival of Japanese expansionism, but also Tokyo's ignorance of their militaristic faults, a pessimistic outcome is more likely.

Although Wendt's perspective is efficient to analyze the causal relationships over past and present international politics, it is an insufficient theoretical tool to predict the future. According to Wendt's logic based on psychological and sociological realm, one can conclude that certain people's identities could directly affect national policy, which would inevitably influence international relations. For example, as Wendt argues, Gorbachev's rethinking changed the Soviet Union's identities and interests and consequently changed those of the United States. With this logic, one cannot predict the future, because it is impossible to know who will be a national leader. Hence, Wendt's constructivist view presents an insufficient basis for prediction about the future of Sino-Japanese relations.

B. THE COMBINATION OF WALT AND WENDT'S LOGIC

By applying the combined approach of realism and constructivism to the issues that a unilateral view alone cannot sufficiently determine, one obtains a further convincing theoretical tool. In this context, this thesis presents the revised model that persuasively explains why a state feels an adversary's actions as a threat and which elements can determine the size of a perceived threat.

1. Walt's Balance of Threat Theory Revised

As mentioned above, both Walt and Wendt's theories are partially insufficient to explain the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. For example, even though Walt argues that the aggressive intention can be shown by a state's behaviors, China's negative images of Japan, which intersubjective historical interactions had accumulated, led them to view Tokyo's action as an outcome of aggressive intentions. In addition, Wendt's logic, which combines a psychological and sociological concept with the neorealism's anarchic structure, lacks logical coherence and cannot provide a persuasive explanation regarding the future of Sino-Japanese relations.

Despite Wendt's lack of future predictability, his constructivist perspective effectively supplements Walt's theory. This research already verified that the combined theoretical tool provides a better explanation for the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. As

the case of Sino-Japanese relations determined, state A's images of state B directly affect state A's perception of whether state B's actions are aggressive. Of course, as Walt argues, the visible evidence, such as the increase of military expenditure and offensive capabilities or the deployment of offensive missiles along a border line, also lead states to regard actions as the outcome of aggressive intentions. Nevertheless, given that Beijing feared the revival of Japanese remilitarism despite Tokyo's continuation of the 1 percent norm of defense expenditure, one can conclude that the image of a state takes priority over its visible actions.

2. The Importance of Images on the Perception of Aggressive Intentions

Given the causal relationships between the NDG and Beijing's threat perception, China's perceived image of Japan was one of factors that led China to interpret the strategic objective of the NDG as aggressive. Of course, the possibilities that the NDG may disrupt Sino-Taiwan unification and contain the rise of China significantly affected Beijing's perception that the U.S.-Japan alliance represents aggressive intentions. Nevertheless, this research demonstrates that intersubjective processes produce an image of states; it can be an essential factor, which directly influences one state's interpretation of another state's action.

Another essential implication of this thesis is that the images of a state can directly increase the level of perceived aggressive intentions. As Beijing's attitude to the NDG showed, the Chinese hatred of Japan, in fact, provided fertile ground for the possibility that the NDG may cause a remilitarized Japan. The Chinese negative images of Japan, which come from the brutal Japanese behavior during World War II, made them view the NDG as the outcome of Tokyo's aggressive ambition.

The Chinese government had a relevant catalyst to remind the public about Tokyo's aggressiveness, for it combined the hostile images of Japan with the extension of the SDF's security role from the NDG. As a result, Beijing efficiently achieved a shift in its policies concerning the disputes of Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands with Japan. For this reason, since the mid-1990s, China drastically increased its vehement objections to the

Japanese Prime Ministers' Yasukuni Shrine visits in order to highlight Japanese aggressiveness.

3. A Case Study: South Korean and Japanese Relations

The combined perspectives of Walt and Wendt can also persuasively explain why South Korea strongly opposes Japan's attempt to legislate its collective right to self-defense. With Walt's balance of threat theory, South Korea, as a U.S. ally, should hope that Japan sends its Self-Defense Forces to protect an external aggression—especially a threat from North Korea. In other words, South Korea, which directly confronts North Korea's threatening military capabilities, should require Japan's pledge that the SDF will engage in a South Korean crisis to contain the North's hostility. Nevertheless, the general public strongly disagrees with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's attempts to reinterpret and reform Japan's constitution for exercising its collective self-defense right.

Considering Walt's logic—a state will likely endeavor to protect its security in an anarchic system—the Park administration's diplomatic action is somewhat questionable. If Japan recognizes the right to exercise collective self-defense, it can act as a strong deterrent to a North Korean threat. Furthermore, in the basic concept of an alliance system, allies have a mutual responsibility to defend each other, which means that Japan must provide South Korea with military support if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula. Despite this promise of Japanese support to balance against the Kim Jong-Un regime, Seoul regards Tokyo's actions as the outcome of aggressive intentions.

In terms of Seoul's questionable reaction, Walt's balance of threat theory, revised with Wendt's theory, sheds the most light on the essential reason for the Park administration's perception of a threat. Like China, a deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment over Japan's colonialism persists in South Korea. In this context, Japan's brutality during World War II, where Japanese military forces used South Korean women as wartime sex slaves, contributed to the negative South Korean perception of Japan. The older South Koreans have constantly transmitted this historical bitterness to younger generations, not only through personal accounts, but also through the mass media. For

this reason, Japan has negative image that directly and indirectly impacts South Korea's security decision making.

The combination of the negative images of Japan and the strategic implication of Japan's self-defense right, in which Japan reinforced its security roles against regional conflicts, was sufficient to catalyze the Park administration's threat perception. Like China, South Korea's images of Japan also converge on two aspects—an unfavorable state that has no introspection about its past faults, and a threatening state in which some people want to revive militarism. Therefore, Seoul interpreted the political gesture of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to exercise its self-defense right as a symbol of the resurgence of Japanese militarism. The combination of South Korea's intense mistrust of Japan and fear about the weaker Japanese norms of self-restraint led to its perception that Tokyo strove to normalize its international security role and even revive militarism.

As the analysis of Sino-Japanese relations determined, the negative Japanese images of South Korea also lead them to perceive Tokyo's actions as a threat despite the fact that these actions are likely to act as an efficient deterrent to the North. Therefore, this demonstrates that an accumulated image of a state directly affects an adversary's interpretation of that state's action. Furthermore, a state's image is one of the most important variables when analyzing East Asian relations, where the bitter memory of the brutal Japanese behavior during World War II persists.

C. SUGGESTIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE HARMONY

One can also deduce important suggestions for the future of Sino-Japanese harmony from this research. To alleviate the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, states must strive to mutually shape their positive images by interacting with each other. Examples of interaction would include increasing economic interdependence, continuing a positive dialogue on a historical problem, and, in the long term, organizing the Asian political community like the European Union. Among these options for interaction, the most primary effort must be to settle historical problems.

For a settlement of historical hostilities, it is essential that Japan endeavors to establish a sense of trust by apologizing for its war crimes and colonialism. Until Tokyo

sincerely shows a reflective attitude over its faults of imperialism, the Chinese public is likely to continually doubt Japan's behavior. Moreover, without the ability to trust Japan's intentions, Beijing will continue to fear Tokyo's aggressiveness and remilitarism, which will be an essential obstruction to joint security cooperation. Nevertheless, given current Chinese intense antagonism toward Tokyo's continued attempts to revise historical records and textbooks, the reconciliation with Japan seems to be a long and rough journey.

To reconcile Japan with China regarding historical problems, a positive approach from China and Japan's leaders will be essential. As the drastic increase of China's condemnation of the Yasukuni visits since mid-1990s shows, the public's nationalist passion can be soothed or fueled depending on the government's actions. For this reason, if Chinese or Japanese leaders are willing to interact with each other, the national consensus for reconciliation can be easily made. For both sides, Beijing must forgive the old Japanese faults and Tokyo must apologize for its past crimes.

Finally, Walt's balance of threat theory also suggests that the only way to alleviate the Sino-Japanese security dilemma is to shape their mutual positive images of each other. The reasons that support this claim are as follows. First, the rise of China means an increase in its aggregation power; therefore, the U.S.-Japanese alliance must seek a way to balance against an increasing threat. Given the lack of U.S. economic power, the United States will continue to increase the Japanese SDF's role; this conversely catalyzes China's reaction. Hence, the rise of China is inevitably one of catalytic factors that can intensify the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. Second, the geopolitical closeness between China and Japan makes both countries more sensitive to external threats. Furthermore, the overlap of both countries' maritime interests—including the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands—will likely become a major trigger of a military collision. Third, as the evidence of the U.S.-Japanese cooperation in developing the TMD and China's ferocious opposition shows, it is impossible to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons because most weapons system can be used offensively and defensively. This means that Beijing or Tokyo feel threatened and react against the development of an adversary's weapon system, regardless of the type of weapons system.

Beijing and Tokyo can shed light on their harmonious relations by trying to shape positive mutual images. As determined above, visible elements as well as invisible factors like the images of a state, directly affect the final source of a threat— perceived intentions. However, Beijing’s fears of Japan’s remilitarism despite Tokyo’s upholding its 1 percent norm of the defense budget indicate how the image of a state takes priority over the visible elements. For this reason, one can conclude that if China and Japan endeavor to establish mutual positive images by maintaining various channels of communication with each other, these two countries can efficiently alleviate security conflicts.

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