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2014 - 2015 CIVIL AFFAIRS ISSUE PAPERS: THE FUTURE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

Edited by
Christopher Holshek
John C. Church, Jr.



PKSOI PAPER

**2014 - 2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers:
“The Future of Civil Affairs”**

Presented by the

**Civil Affairs Association
In coordination with the**

**U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability
Operations Institute
U.S. Military Academy Center for the Study of
Civil-Military Operations
and the
Foreign Area Officer Association**

**Edited by
Christopher Holshek and John C. Church, Jr.**

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FOREWORD

The Civil Affairs Association is a veteran's organization whose principal mission is, as it has been for over 65 years, to help ensure the maintenance and enhancement of the Civil Affairs capabilities required by our Armed Forces in war and peace. We encourage professional dialog and the exchange of ideas on all aspects of Civil Affairs between our members, the military branches, and interested civilian organizations. Our goal is to encourage research and publications that advance Civil Affairs thought and scholarship and activities which create esprit d corps and camaraderie in the Civil Affairs community through the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Regiment/Corps, its members, and its activities. We support a strong U.S. Civil Affairs military force to promote and help build international stability and peace.

The future of this critical national strategic capability is once again being reviewed, due to shifts in U.S. national security, defense, and foreign policies and another historic military drawdown due to budgetary pressures.

In this pivotal moment, the Civil Affairs Association, in partnership with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Center for the Study of Civil-military operations at the U.S. Military Academy, and the Foreign Area Officers Association, is reaching out to the community of practice including the most operationally experienced Civil Affairs force in decades, to contribute to that discussion. The result is the first of a series of Civil Affairs issue papers beginning to look at "The Future of Civil Affairs."

The purpose of these issue papers is to provide a platform for the broader Civil Affairs community to

communicate to important leaders in the Executive and Legislative branches, as well as key military commands and institutions, and to define the way ahead for Civil Affairs based on tested experience.

This first set of issue papers has been launched at the annual Civil Affairs Roundtable in March 2015 at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. It is our intent, for the foreseeable future, to enter into a cycle of issue papers presented and selected every fall at the annual Symposium and to launch and discuss the resulting issue papers every spring at the annual Roundtable. We will nominate the topic of the next issue papers in the spring and request papers thereafter.

The Association extends its profound thanks to the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations, and the Foreign Area Officers Association for their partnership and support in this endeavor.

Joseph P. Kirlin III
Colonel, U.S. Army, (ret), Civil Affairs
President
The Civil Affairs Association

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - “THE FUTURE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS”

Christopher Holshek

For centuries, Civil Affairs (CA) has long been called upon to facilitate stable and secure transitions from military to civilian control and from conflict to peace. Recently, CA is helping to bring together whole-of-nation elements to engage partners and mitigate conflict. In short, CA is a major national strategic capability that helps end and prevent wars. This capability along with Military Information Support (formerly Psychological Operations) and Foreign Area Officers, comprises the only part of the Joint Force specifically suited for Peace & Stability Operations as well as Engagement.

However, the future of Civil Affairs is under careful review, given shifts in U.S. foreign, national security, and defense policies and another military draw-down under budgetary constraints. The U.S. Navy has eliminated its Maritime Civil Affairs command. U. S. Army Civil Affairs is engaged in intense discussions regarding both Active and Reserve components, while the Marine Corps has doubled its Civil Affairs Groups, but – as with all of Civil Affairs – struggles under increased demand.

With another pivotal moment in the history of Civil Affairs, the Civil Affairs Association, in partnership with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Foreign Area Officer Association, and the Center for the Study of Civil-military operations at the U.S. Military Academy, is reaching out to the community of practitioners including the most operationally experienced CA force in decades,

to contribute to that discussion. The result is this first of a series of Civil Affairs issue papers beginning to look at “The Future of Civil Affairs.”

Their purpose is to provide a platform for the broader Civil Affairs community to communicate to important opinion leaders in the Executive and Legislative branches, as well as key military commands and institutions, what it thinks the way ahead should be for CA, utilizing experienced operators rather than the just the usual think-tank approach. This not only draws on the rich legacy of CA, but its remarkable talent. The first-prize winner, in fact, was written by two non-commissioned officers.

This first set of issue papers is based on the papers presented at the Civil Affairs Symposium at the Freedoms Foundation in Valley Forge, PA, in November 2014, held in conjunction with three panel discussions. These were published and launched at the annual Civil Affairs Roundtable in March 2015 at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. The intent, for the foreseeable future, is to enter into a cycle of issue papers presented and selected every fall at the annual Symposium and the publication and the discussion of the resulting issue papers every spring at the annual roundtable. At that time those present will nominate the topic of the next issue papers and request papers thereafter.

The Civil Affairs Issue Papers, under the larger rubric of “The Future of Civil Affairs,” look at a host of issues, among them: mission, doctrine, and operations; executive and legal authorities; Joint/Service proponent; force design, structure, and management; force mix and integration of Active and Reserve Components; recruitment, career management, and education and training; and, inter-organizational partnering.

Following the November Symposium, the issue papers committee, headed by Brig. Gen. Bruce Bingham USA (ret), selected the five papers to comprise the 2014-15 issue papers on “The Future of Civil Affairs” for publication. Selected from nearly 20 submissions, they include, in order of Committee ranking:

1. “Quality is Free – Improving Outcomes in an Era of Austerity through Integrated Civil Military Training and Operations” – Staff Sgt. Bjorn E. Hansen and Sgt. 1st Class Ryan S. Long.

2. “Redefining Civil Affairs” – Colonel Dennis J. Cahill (ret).

3. “Remote Civil Information Management: A Concept For How U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Subject Matter Experts Can Bring Relevant Civilian Skill Set Support to Combatant Commanders” – Major Marco A. Bongioanni.

4. “Military Governance: The Essential Mission of Civil Affairs,” – Colonel David Stott Gordon (ret).

5. “Transforming CA Into a Phase Zero Force,” – Major Shafi Saiduddin.

In addition to the five papers, the *2014-15 Civil Affairs issue papers publication* includes a summary of the three panels at the 2014 Symposium that discussed: observations and lessons from Civil Affairs in the peacekeeping operations of the 1990s; Civil Affairs during the “Decade of War” and the third panel that discussed the way ahead for Civil Affairs as seen by major Civil Affairs commands and institutions.

They can all be summarized by the following three insights.

First, Civil Affairs is a national strategic capability that must be preserved.

As mentioned, Civil Affairs (CA), along with other related force capabilities, is the part of the Joint Force able to facilitate Civil-military operations (CMO) and dedicated primarily to Peace & Stability Operations – “a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency,” according to DoD Directive 3000.05 – as well as Engagement under the new Army Functional Concept. Outside the small elements of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, (USAID) “CA is the major capability the nation has to transition to peace and bring together whole-of-nation elements to help mitigate conflict, to end and prevent wars. It is the most expedient and cost-effective means to execute U.S. political-military strategy and secure peace and stability on the ground. The low-tech solution to the low-tech problem, it engages and collaborates with partners from all walks of life to prevent or mitigate large-scale deployments of general purpose forces for low or high intensity combat operations. This unique strategic economy-of-force capability helps preserve combat forces for their core missions. In that regard, Civil Affairs is an essential instrument of America’s “strategic landpower.”

As the third panel pointed out, despite the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a general draw-down of forces, “strategic and operational demand remains high for military personnel who understand the civil dimension in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and Peace & Stability operations under the U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, particularly when the environments are dangerous

but also in growing 'Phase 0' (Shape and Influence) operations involving theater security cooperation, "building partnership capacity," and conflict prevention."

To which Shafi Saiduddin added in his paper: "In a resource-constrained national security environment, preventing future conflicts will be more important than our ability to dominate a maneuver battlefield. More importantly, there is a strong reluctance by policy makers, and the American public, to become involved in large scale counterinsurgency operations, limiting our strategic options." Thus, the economy-of-force impacts of CA become even more important.

Because Civil Affairs, for more than a "Decade of War," has been focused almost entirely on tactical level missions, its operational and strategic capabilities have gone fallow and require restoration. This became readily apparent as the demand for CA skyrocketed with the invasion of Iraq. The ad hoc management of CA through the 1990s was exposed, particularly as David Gordon put in his paper, despite the long legacy of CA in military government, "the capabilities required to carry out military government were shunned and neglected by DoD and the Army at large until the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq made it terribly clear that history was repeating itself."

To preserve Civil Affairs as a strategic capability, as Dennis Cahill posed in his paper, CA must be thought anew - redefined. The creation of the Institute for Military Support to Governance, by the U.S. Army's Special Operations Center of Excellence, many agreed, is a step in the right direction in restoring much-needed functional specialists in order for CA to conduct its five core tasks represented in the five logical lines of operations of: Civil Information Man-

agement, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Assistance, Population Resource Control and Support to Civil Administration. But it is only one step.

Second, Civil Affairs like all major strategic capabilities, requires appropriate authorization, organization, and resourcing.

As the third panel advised, CA should be seen “in the context of wider policy trends of the recent era: expanded engagement in civil dimension operations and increased American reliance on civilian agencies and contractors in stability operations. American military actions abroad from 1989 onward broadened to include humanitarian intervention, not only to stabilize relationships between states, but also to protect people within them. Global human security norms emerged that expanded definitions of security and its relationship to development. New national, international, non-governmental and even for-profit agencies came forward to address the challenges of security and development.”

Yet, Civil Affairs writ large has struggled to keep up with even what the first panel identified as its major observations from the 1990s – the increasing complexity and ambiguity of the CMO environment; the growing need to identify and specify required civil-military capabilities early in the strategic and operational planning processes; the importance of managing complex, civil-military, interagency, and multinational political frameworks; and the importance of connecting with indigenous expertise, interlocutors, and power brokers in an inclusive way among all parties to the conflict – including illicit networks. Instead, it has not because CA has been constantly shaped by responses

to operational versus strategic requirements – and thus managed operationally versus strategically. As Long and Hansen noted in their paper, management of CA has reflected consistent violation of the truths and imperatives of Special Operations. These include: humans are more important than hardware; quality is better than quantity; Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced; and, competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

Given the growing and not diminishing need of the Joint Force to deal with complex peace and security environments and Phase 0 operations involving security cooperation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding in coordination with an even greater array of civilian partners, Civil Affairs must evolve and adapt to these emerging imperatives which will require the CA force to work more collaboratively, multilaterally, with and through country teams, as Saiduddin explained. Among his recommendations is adding Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) to the list of CA core tasks.

From the perspective of being a national strategic capability, a rebalancing and overhaul of all of Civil Affairs along “DOTMLPF-P” (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, and policy) lines is in the offing. Army Reserve CA in particular has been far from ideally structured under DOTMLPF-P and is not integrated strategically and operationally with active component CA and interagency partners.

But any reconfiguration of Civil Affairs forces – universal or otherwise – must capitalize on the tremendous operational experience CA has earned in more than a Decade of War as well as its enduring strategic and operational roles and value added capability. Moreover, it must be done within a strategic

context as well as with an understanding of operational lessons. "Once we satisfactorily understand the problem set," Gordon wrote, "we can then develop the DOTMLPF needed."

The good news, the third panel observed, is that it is "no longer the situation that most senior leaders do not understand the value of Civil Affairs." Thus, there is a unique historic opportunity to maintain this national strategic capability at relatively low cost not only for contingencies, but for steady-state engagement activities, including Special Operations "persistent engagement" missions, that can help the Army fulfill its strategic role of "Prevent" and "Shape" as well as "Win" and thus prevent or mitigate large-scale deployments of general purpose forces for low or high intensity combat operations. If, properly managed, organized, maintained, educated, trained, authorized, and resourced both combat capability and military operational capabilities can be enhanced. Hence the need for emphasis on personnel and training as stated by the Commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), or USACAPOC(A).

Third, other than issues relating to the martial principle of unity of command, the most urgent areas of focus for Civil Affairs are Active/Reserve and Special Operations/General Purpose Forces integration.

The prevailing mood of the Symposium, especially among the third panel, "might be characterized as a moment of acceptance of institutional conditions and, at the same time, investment in small scale, practical steps to strengthen the community."

As the second panel surmised, although it is unlikely that DoD will reconsider the CA “divorce” from SOF, its repercussions have had a negative impact on Army CA, notably reduced funding and support for RC CA units and less interaction between AC and RC CA. Long and Hansen added that “calls to restore Army CA under a unifying command are politically charged and unlikely.” Beyond the well-known decisions leading to a disjointed Army force, the Symposium also viewed the Navy’s decision to eliminate the entire Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Force Assistance Teams as a strategic error, reflecting a lack of understanding of the global reach and the benefits to theater engagement that this small force generated.

While DoD may or may not broach the overarching subjects of executive authority, proponent office, and so on, the consensus was that, for the meantime, the community should look more at issues of force balance and integration along especially Active-Reserve and Special Operations - General Purpose Force lines. With regard to balance and integration, the papers are rich with ideas. Ringing loud and clear from all three periods the panels represented was how “deliberative methodical Civil Affairs planning at all levels and phases of military operations was a key to success.” A more mindful approach to Civil Information Management, Marco Bongioanni explained in his paper, would go far to improve CA’s ability to integrate across numerous lines of coordination.

And while growing demand for Civil Affairs capabilities calls for more readily available Active Component CA forces for theater security cooperation and contingency missions, including the presence of CA planners at major and maneuver commands, the challenges of the strategic and operational environments

also clearly elicit the “whole-of-society” equities found in the Reserves. These attributes are even more applicable to emerging security cooperation and security assistance operations increasingly performed by general purpose Forces in Regionally Aligned Force and “building partner capacity” missions as well as in Special Operations “persistent engagement” missions.

Reserve CA, in particular, embodies the longstanding national treasure of the citizen-soldier. Reserve Civil Affairs, which comprises 85% of Army Civil Affairs and an even higher percentage among Marines, bring specific civilian skill sets – and a civilian mindset – difficult and financially challenging to duplicate in the active component. These forces also bring the ability to access as well as influence whole-of-society actors and activities that are center-of-mass of Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) as well as transition from conflict to peace (Phase 4 and 5) – otherwise known in broader (civilian) terms as conflict prevention, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding, respectively.

While capabilities have grown among other services, the majority of Civil Affairs capability still comes from the Army with land power remaining most suited to integrate all elements of national power, especially before and after the outbreak of violent conflict. All of the Nation’s strategic and operational CA capability, however, is in the Army, while about 90% of that is in USACAPOC (A).

Restructuring USAR Civil Affairs forces in a big way is imminent and unavoidable, many suggested. Among many things, as Saiduddin mentioned, doctrinal Reserve CA – Active command concepts of integration and support-to-supported relations based on Cold War era assumptions about civil-military operations (i.e., high intensity warfare concerns about minimizing civilian interference with operations) must be

seriously revised in accordance with the realities and developments outlined above.

There is no doubt that “there is much that is worrisome about the state of Civil Affairs today,” the third panel concluded. However, “the future of Civil Affairs includes some hopeful prospects thanks to practical steps recently taken.” All three panels agreed that in looking to history and in looking forward that both the USMC and Army recognize the need to invest in training and education, including the development of civil sector experts. “The CA leadership is taking actions to more effectively integrate with civilian partners in both the public and private sectors, and to provide the civil information that partners and commanders need in the field,” it reported.

“But they cannot come even close to fulfilling the potential of Civil Affairs alone – the future of Civil Affairs needs much greater attention at four-star and executive agency levels.”

*Colonel (ret.) Christopher Holshek has over 30 years of civil-military experience at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in joint, interagency, and multinational settings across the full range of operations, including as Senior U.S. Military Observer and Chief of Civil-Military Coordination in the UN Mission in Liberia and command of the first CA battalion to deploy to Iraq in support of Army, Marine and British forces. He helped develop Joint, Army, NATO, and UN civil-military policy and doctrine. An executive member of the UN Association and the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition's "Veterans for Smart Power," he also writes extensively on peace & security, strategy, and civil-military issues, including for Foreign Policy and The Huffington Post. His book, *Travels with Harley – A Journey through America in search of Personal and National Identity*, is being published by Inkshares.com.*

Panel Discussion: Shaping the Future of Civil Affairs – Past as Prologue

John C. Church, Jr.

Moderator: Colonel John C. Church, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Director Civil Military Integration Team, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Assistant Professor, Immaculata University

- Haiti – Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.), Director, Civil Affairs Association
- Bosnia/Herzegovina – Major General Thomas J. Matthews, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.)
- Kosovo – Colonel Michael Hess, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.), Director, Civil Affairs Association

The first panel of the Civil Affairs Symposium was designed to review Civil Affairs efforts in Haiti, Bosnia/Herzegovina and Kosovo from those whose efforts were instrumental to those missions.

The first question put to Brigadier General Bingham who, in 1994, became the Civil Affairs Advisor to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command for the Haitian intervention and subsequently led the Ministerial Advisory Team in Haiti, had to do with Civil Affairs planning and its impact upon the success of Civil Affairs challenges across the spectrum of operations. Specifically, the question resulted from an analysis of the 1995 article entitled “Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti – A Case Study,” written by Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes and RADM Gary F. Wheatley, USN (ret.).

U.S. forces were introduced into the country of Haiti in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 on Sept. 19, 1994, as part of Operation *Uphold Democracy*. The purpose of this interdiction was to restore the democratically elected government of President [Jean Bertrand] Aristide and provide for a mechanism to assist in sustaining a secure and stable environment to allow for democracy to sustain itself in this long deprived nation and reduce the flow of Haitians leaving in unsafe boats in an attempt to reach the United States.

Brigadier General Bingham quickly agreed that deliberative methodical Civil Affairs planning at all levels and phases of military operations was a key to success. He further cited that he and his fellow Civil Affairs soldiers enjoyed an extensive timeline for preparation. He indicated that the planning to execution phase was significant and enabled a solid effort, but there were events that planning could not anticipate. He cited the “scared off landing” of the *Harlan County* (LST-1196) which was sent to Port au Prince to pave the way for an agreed-upon UN intervention. However, she was ordered back to sea a day later in the face of protests. Brigadier General Bingham recalled that the first ever Inter-Agency Rehearsal of Concept drill at Ft. McNair as well as extensive Army Special Operations Command and 18th Abn Corps planning for a peaceful entry also facilitated and strengthened Civil Affairs planning.

Brigadier General Bingham further noted that his direct access to first, CINC, Atlantic Command, ADM Paul D. Miller, USN, and then Marine General John J. Sheehan allowed Brigadier General Bingham an opportunity to clearly shape the manner of the Civil Affairs contribution to the planning cycle from the very

highest perspective. Brigadier General Bingham noted the success of the Marine Colonel Ray Kelly who was in between his two tours of duty as the Chief of Police for New York City, and the fact that the Ambassador William Lacy Swing and then the CINC wanted “more Ray Kellys,” was perhaps emblematic, one could offer, of the need for proven warriors who also possessed street smarts and people skills.

Also critical to the success of the effort, according to Brigadier General Bingham, was the complete and thorough vetting process conducted with the Pentagon, all operational chain of command representatives as well as the Department of State with regard to Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). This vetting of NGOs and PVOs was the a first smart step. Then, added Brigadier General Bingham, the Ministerial Advisory Teams would consider where and how to best assist the NGOs and PVOs so that their efforts would not clash with other missions.

Brigadier General Bingham offered that this Haiti mission featured a classic and successful application of the functional specialty Civil Affairs capabilities. He and his Civil Affairs professionals garnered tangible results and positively influenced a wide swath across all of the Haitian government offices by quickly establishing a good rapport and appreciation from Haitian cabinet leaders.

The second query was put to Major General Matthews, former President of the Civil Affairs Association, who participated in numerous domestic and expeditionary civil military operations from the Mariel Boat Lift to Operation Joint Endeavor in the Balkans and the California wildfires. He has served in and commanded U.S. Army Civil Affairs units at the Bri-

gade and Command level and currently serves as a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University and as a Subject Matter Expert for the Joint Civil Military Campaign Planning Course at the Joint Special Operations University, U.S. Special Operations Command.

Reviewing “Peace and Stability Lesson from Bosnia,” by Max G. Manwaring, which appeared in the 1998 Winter publication of *Parameters*, Colonel Church asked Major General Matthews, when harkening back to his service in Bosnia, if he recalled those specific examples of those individuals for whom he may have served who the “right” or mature “mind set” when understanding challenges specific to the execution of Civil Affairs operations and or civil military operations. Major General Matthews commented that he knew of Mr. Manwaring’s effort and many other numerous after action, lessons learned reports that were written and several of which quoted the general.

Major General Matthews commanded at the Brigade and Command level during his time in Bosnia-Herzegovina. History notes that NATO conducted its first major crisis response operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed in December 1995 to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and was replaced a year later by the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR helped to maintain a secure environment and facilitate the country’s reconstruction in the wake of the 1992-1995 war.

When recalling his time in Bosnia-Herzegovina Major General Matthews was quick to concede that “the senior guys got it” but that the real challenge that remained was educating the colonels and below. He further offered that there was a particular challenge

associated with overcoming the then restrictive NATO CIMIC doctrine. Major General Matthews added that World Bank and others were focused on major reconstruction projects. He and those in his charge were focused on disaster recovery and labor intensive projects to address the potential vast unemployment problem that would be made dangerously worse by demobilizing soldiers. In an article describing that mission Major General Matthews sagely noted the subtlety between reconstruction efforts versus disaster recovery.

When he led the NATO-led peace force's program focusing on emergency relief, Major General Matthews recalled that every one of the acts undergone in terms of disaster recovery became building blocks for reconstruction. Matthews further offered, in retrospect, that real reconstruction in any conflict takes both funding and coordination among donors for a lasting rebuilding of institutions.

Major General Mathews was clear in that the most effective Civil Affairs professionals are able to allow both the military commanders and their civilian counterparts to see how wise deliberative actions serve both parties well. He recalled a time when he was able to convince higher staff and IFOR commanders that fixing a water pipe was worth the cost because do so not only assisted the local populace it also meant the French soldiers were no longer placed at risk every day when they escorted trucks carrying bottles of water. Major General Mathews conceded that his "selling" the same effort to two different audiences was not easy, but when done so proved valuable time and time again to both the combatant commander and the local citizenry.

Finally, Colonel Michael Hess, who in addition to his U. S. Army Civil Affairs career was the Assistant

Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), drew upon over three decades of Active and Reserve service to include duty in support of humanitarian operations in Turkey, Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo. His discussion was mainly on the initial NATO and United Nations intervention in Kosovo in 1999-2000.

Among his observations from that experience were: the complexity and ambiguity of both the operation and the NATO-UN-U.S. civil-military architecture; the need to identify and specify required civil-military capabilities early in the strategic and operational planning processes; the importance of establishing an Executive Steering Group to manage the complex, civil-military, interagency, and multinational political framework; and the importance of seeking out indigenous expertise, interlocutors, and power brokers in an inclusive way among all parties to the conflict – including illicit networks.

In addition, Colonel Hess noted success points in: the ability to draw from recent lessons in other major peacekeeping operation in the region (in Bosnia-Herzegovina); the payoff from having Civil Affairs including early in the strategic and operational planning processes; and a well-crafted, actionable UN Security Council Resolution 1244 for the international intervention. He also noted, however, issues with disparate and disjointed civil-military approaches among the NATO/UN sending states – which led to the development of more robust NATO and UN CIMIC doctrines that, unfortunately, remain unfamiliar to U.S. Civil Affairs operators.

Colonel Church cited Eric Ridge's, "Civil Affairs in Kosovo," published for the Center for Strategic and

International Studies in January of 2009, and specifically asked Colonel Hess if he would ever consider relaxing a force protection measure and accepting a risk – if in the long term it would strengthen relationships with the local populace and build trust. Colonel Hess firmly responded in the negative and clearly reminded the facilitator and the audience that: the mission will always be a military mission with civil-military end state. Still, he remembered how “great” civilian and military and inter-agency cooperation enabled his CA teams in the first rotation to make a greater impact, thus setting up future rotations for compiling success.

Clearly, one of the major themes from this panel discussion was the need for and the benefit to be had by early and successful proactive and engaged Civil Affairs planning. Furthermore, the most successful Civil Affairs professional will have the ability to build beneficial relationships with commanders and staff entities across the spectrum of the military structure while simultaneously creating and or nurturing positive relationships with those relevant interagency partners as well as those key NGOs, PVO who are best positioned to contribute to mission success. Finally, the sage Civil Affairs professional is able to anticipate and then articulate - to designated audiences - how actions undertaken by the military will also benefit the local populace and, at other times, how certain actions undertaken by the local populace may also serve to assist a combatant commander as well. This partnering, planning and communicating must take place at every level of mission, tactical through strategic.

John C. Church, Jr., is an Assistant Professor of English and Communication at Immaculata University. A colonel in the Marine Reserves, he served with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Helmand Province, Afghanistan and commanded a combined, joint Civil Affairs unit of Marines, soldiers, sailors, and Iraqi civilians in Ar Ramadi, Iraq. As a Civil Affairs officer he also served in Kosovo, Iraq, Liberia and Afghanistan. John now commands 3D Civil Affairs Group in Great Lakes, Illinois. John earned a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College and an M.A. in Communication Journalism and Public Affairs from American University in Washington, D.C. He is a doctoral student in Mass Media and Communication at Temple University.

Panel Discussion II: Shaping the Future of Civil Affairs – Lessons from the Decade of War

Kurt E. Müller

Moderator: Dr. Kurt E. Müller, Colonel, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.), Senior Research Fellow, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University

- Major General Steven J. Hashem, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.)
- Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci, U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs, Force Headquarters Group, Marine Forces Reserve
- Colonel Jim Ruf, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.) and Senior Program Officer for Civil-Military Affairs, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Dr. Rosemary Speers, Principal Research Scientist, Center for Naval Analyses

Some military functions demonstrate a history of integration into operations and strategy using the analogy of a sine curve. When a military campaign cannot achieve its purpose without addressing one of these functions, these domains receive considerable attention; but, when the need dissipates, the crest gives way to an accelerating decline of attention and resources. These observations are instructive for Civil Affairs because operational environments account for CA demand signals. Thus, prior to Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, military organizations relegated much CA planning to exercising for future wars. But since expeditionary operations depend on friendly forces for planning capabilities, contract oversight, and civil-military interaction, *Desert Shield/Storm* reemphasized the need for CA.

After its considerable use in the campaigns of 1991, Civil Affairs became a valued function for theater staff. Peacekeeping operations used CA extensively, and frequent call-ups led to consideration of expanding Active Component (AC) capabilities, as Reserve Component (RC) CA capacity increasingly required reconstitution. By the time the first rotation of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* was over, more than half of the qualified and available Reserve Component CA personnel had been exhausted. When Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* became protracted campaigns, DoD reaped the result of the earlier, massive call-up of RC CA units – leading DoD to fill resulting gaps first with RC members of other services, who had neither the institutional support nor the professional ethos of the extant CA force structure, and then expanding the AC CA structure. A 2011 RAND study later found CA the most utilized career field in the Army Reserve. Experimental staffing models such as billet transfers from underused specialties to CA could offer a staffing solution to reduce the ratio of deployment-to-“dwell” time to the DoD goal of one year on active duty in five years of Reserve service. Even then, CA remained the busiest career field in the USAR, with deployment rates far exceeding all other specialties.¹

Thus, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for significantly increasing CA, resulting in first the 95th CA Brigade (grown from the 96th CA Battalion serving Special Operations) and later adding the 85th CA Brigade as a General Purpose unit. RC CA increased by about one third, Marine Corps CA capacity more than doubled, and the Navy revived attention to CA. While the operational environment demanded CA for the counterterrorist campaigns of the newcen-

tury, Defense planners ignored the characteristics of RC staffing and modeled deployments on AC patterns. Whether “leaning forward” or “running to the sound of the guns,” short-war mentalities run the risk of squandering limited resources.

Lessons Learned or (at least) Observed

In 2012, the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) division of the Joint Staff published *Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, expected to be volume 1 of a series, *Decade of War*.² The publication compiled themes derived from 46 studies, highlighting four key changes in the strategic environment and identifying eleven strategic themes. Of the key changes, two are of particular interest to CA: (1) the shift from U.S. hegemony to multipolar concentrations of power and (2) an emphasis on the information domain. All eleven strategic themes are relevant to CA, but seven are particularly so:

- *Understanding the Environment*
- Battle for the Narrative
- *Transitions*
- Special Operations Forces (SOF)–General Purpose Forces (GPF) Integration
- *Interagency Coordination*
- Coalition Operations, and
- *Host-Nation Partnering*

Of the seven, Colonel (ret.) James Ruf highlighted the four italicized . Regarding the operational environment, Ruf stressed not only understanding the nation that is the target of an intervention, but also aware-

ness of interorganizational actors. Nonmilitary actors contribute to economic, governance, and societal domains to make transitions to host-nation authority possible. Because their contributions to conditions that facilitate transition to civil authority are essential, Ruf called for periodic training with such partners to build, maintain, and strengthen working relationships with military actors.

Many of these organizations are not staffed sufficiently to allow them to participate in military exercises. When they do, they must achieve value for their participation. Building opportunities for mutually beneficial training requires commands to move from acknowledging the value of civil-sector actors to designing scenarios that facilitate interaction that also helps these civilian entities accomplish their missions. Ruf's organization, United States Institution of Peace (USIP), has proven itself as a solid venue for civil-military collaboration that facilitates civilian priorities as well as military ones. A large military footprint easily skews consideration of the factors that influence decision-makers' determination of when to transition to civilian authority.

Ruf noted the value of meaningful, integrated training and education and observes that much of the terminology that the defense, diplomatic, development, and civil-society communities use in discussing interventions, counterinsurgency, conflict prevention and termination, stabilization, and related complex operations may be shared but is not necessarily mutually understood. The term "stabilization" as an example elicits different reactions from each of these communities.

Whereas military doctrine calls for a transition from military control to a non-military entity, the lat-

ter are typically undefined, therefore unfamiliar. The successor may be a combination of U.S. agencies, a multilateral control commission, a UN mission, or a host-nation authority. If there is a need for transition expertise, such expertise must reside in the various communities of interest.

In host-nation partnering, the Civil Affairs community needs to build a civil-military capability in a host nation and identify the role for CA in this effort. CA can contribute to inter-organizational understanding of complex operations and should remain engaged in developing concepts for effective transitions. Much as some leaders in the intelligence community have recognized shortcomings in analyzing the human terrain of an operational environment, the CA community needs to emphasize familiarity with the economic, social, and political issues and actors that contribute to successful civil-military operations.³ As a repository of expertise in inter-agency and multilateral civil-military operations, the CA community needs to ensure the integration of that expertise in politico-military environments.

MG (ret) Steven Hashem observed key opportunities for Civil Affairs operations to influence the outcome of an intervention by straddling civil-military and multilateral boundaries. MG Hashem's observations added to the themes Ruf cited by highlighting coalition operations and SOF-GPF cooperation. The participation of coalition partners in operations from *Desert Shield* to *Enduring Freedom*, in peacekeeping, stabilization, and belligerent interventions, adds international legitimacy to narratives that justify these interventions. Incorporating coalition partners thus offers both practical (tactical and operational) and

strategic (diplomatic) benefits. If long-term outcomes are an underappreciated metric of success, surely international legitimacy that validates an intervener's claims of improving the geopolitical environment is a key factor in any dispassionate evaluation of results.

MG Hashem provided examples of strategic impact, i.e., achieving the political end of a military operation. Reflecting on operational-level briefings during Operations *Joint Forge/Joint Guard*, MG Hashem noted that of four daily briefers to the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) commander—each of three Multinational Divisions and the Combined-Joint, Civil-Military Task Force—the CJCMTF “was the one organization talking about anything of substance.” From the perspective of military maneuver and engagement, SFOR's operational environment was static, therefore “nothing significant to report” (NSTR) is a positive achievement in peacekeeping.

But the geopolitical outcome that enables a transition to civil authority rests in the domain that capitalizes on a positive security environment to achieve a suitable advancement in economic and governance conditions. Once an intervening force has established a secure environment, civil society needs to resume its economic and social activity. Military planners usually expect a transition authority to shepherd this development, but security and civil-society activity are so intertwined that the military occupier—whether benign or belligerent—cannot escape a shared responsibility for conditions that facilitate the transition to sovereignty.

MG Hashem raised concerns for DoD-wide infusion of Civil Affairs in military planning and execution and notes actions underway at U.S. Special Operations Command that address both SOF-GPF integra-

tion and joint CA. USSOCOM is addressing 23 tasks identified in Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum 162-11. Of the unfinished tasks, significant ones include incorporating CA into the training objectives of combatant commanders and theater special operations commands (TSOCs) and into professional military education and reviewing career paths and requirements for joint CA billets at combatant commands and TSOCs.

USSOCOM is the Office of Primary Responsibility for 10 of the Civil Affairs 23 tasks and services. Combatant commands, Joint Staff, and others are primary actors for the remainder. Although it is unlikely that DoD will reconsider the “divorce” of CA from SOF, its repercussions have negatively impacted Army CA, most notably in reduced funding and support for RC CA units and less interaction between AC and RC CA. One could also see an impact on the AC 85th CA Brigade. A recent Total Army Analysis recommended cutting 50% of the AC CA force, which would fall on the 85th, supporting GPF, rather than on the 95th, supporting (and classified as) SOF. The Congressional budgetary climate favors reducing GPF overall in favor of promoting the small footprint that exemplifies SOF. But distance between AC SOF CA and RC GPF CA undermines shared concepts, lexicon, and interoperability.

MG Hashem observed Civil Affairs successes at tactical, operational, and strategic levels, much depends on situations, timing, and personalities (both supporting and supported). In particular, CA leadership present early in a campaign needs to shape the impact of CA operations. Once subsequent personnel rotations begin, it becomes more difficult to influence changes in command priorities.

Here an observation from previous CA symposia is appropriate. Early in Operation *Joint Endeavor*, CA leadership was stymied in attempting to address the civilian environment because planning staffs drew from operations in Somalia a concern to avoid mission creep. Since the CA deployment included planners at multiple echelons, with the support of senior allied leaders at NATO, CA at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, was able to influence SACEUR's campaign plan to direct IFOR to support provisions of the civilian annexes to the General Framework Agreement for Peace, not simply to the task of keeping the former belligerents separated and developing confidence-building measures.

Analogous to the need to move beyond deconflicting agencies' independent operations to synergistic interdependent programming, the ability to fund projects to meet a timely need is a clear and persistent theme. Parsimonious use of program funds is a consistent theme that interagency partners face. During its short lifespan, in common-core training, the interagency Civilian Response Corps included in its scenarios a dilemma common to chiefs of mission: multiple agencies with independent funding for activities, some of which the ambassador may see as undermining current priorities. This dilemma may seem exceptional to military commanders used to unity of command, but ambassadors confront such situations routinely, as does the National Security Council when it submits integrated civil-military funding proposals to Congress, only to receive a response underfunding civilian activities. This challenge requires legislative review and action as much as any appeal to interagency collaboration.

Marine Corps Lessons

In promoting the role of Marine Corps CA in support of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci highlighted the DoD strategic themes of understanding the environment, interagency coordination, and host-nation partnering. Seeing offensive, defensive, and stability operations as components requiring differential weighting that reflects characteristics of the mission at hand, Marine Corps CA has been most successful recently when the CA elements were closely integrated in the MAGTF structure rather than operating independently.

Of all the Services, the Marine Corps most clearly recognizes CA as critical to stability operations. In accord with counterinsurgency, the Marines have historically stressed classic “small wars” approaches of restoring services and facilitating economic stability. These tasks require collaboration with interagency and host-nation partners, and such collaboration demands both an understanding of differing execution horizons and abiding by the principle of unity of command, a recurring theme that requires continuous exploration. Interagency planners recognize that Congress funds agencies for specific purposes, and specific agencies emphasize an end-state that can differ from the one the military tends to seek. Harmonizing these disparate activities requires mutual understanding and shared experience.

Shared experience and close collaboration leads to some shared insights as well. Marine Civil Affairs has been particularly aware of the need to identify causes of instability, mapping the human terrain, and conducting a civilian-oriented preparation of the battlefield. CA builds awareness of the civil domain much

in the same way as reconnaissance forces provide information on the enemy. In pursuing information on the human factors in a conflict environment, “operational culture,” i.e., efforts to facilitate an understanding of the cultural environment in which Marines are deployed, are the first step in improving civil preparation and civil-information management.

Civil Affairs support to MAGTF operations offers multi-service application as well. Funding CA operations appears to be an often troubling concern shared across services. These areas would benefit from joint procedures to facilitate battle handover and interoperability, to facilitate transition of control from Marine quick response units to those tasked with longer term operations.

Maritime Civil Affairs

The reactivation of maritime Civil Affairs was actually a renaissance, not an innovation. Few CA practitioners are aware that California had a naval officer as military governor before it was a state and that the Navy had an extensive military-government operation in the Trust Territory of the Pacific. The Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG) was activated in 2006, at the time that deployable CA capacity was in critically short supply. The sine-curve pattern fits maritime CA in that it was reorganized in 2009, merged with security training, and then disestablished in mid-May 2014. Fortunately, the Center for Naval Analyses is undertaking an effort to archive the materials the then MCAG (later the Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command or MCAST) produced, gather lessons learned, describe best practices in Maritime CA, and develop courses of action to maintain and reconstitute this capability.

The Navy justified disbanding MCAST by indicating the presence of mission capabilities in “other Department of Defense agencies,”⁴ and, indeed, a number of the tasks MCAG and MCAST undertook have been conducted by Army elements. But the maritime environment is likely to be served more effectively by CA forces attuned to the characteristics of that environment, notably in addressing functional specialties in maritime CA. The WW II example of the Navy captain serving as port marine superintendent thus echoes in the era of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.

The maritime flavor of CA is notable in the source of requests for MCAG/MCAST. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Global Fleet Stations called for MCAT deployments in every GCC. As is true of CA in the other services, MCAG/MCAST, which often comprised both AC and RC personnel, undertook whole-of-government approaches to their missions.

The learning trajectory of MCAG/MCAST is highly instructive. Experience in the Horn of Africa highlights maritime dimensions that are replicable in stability and counterinsurgency operations elsewhere. In 2008, for example, MCAST began a program in Kenya called Community Watch on the Water. By 2011 the program transitioned to Kenyan control. A significant outcome of this effort is evident in improved relations between government agencies and the fishing industry. In 2008, Kenyan public perception was of government authorities as oppressive. By 2010, the two sides in this conflict were relying on each other. The experience in Kenya is applicable to the U.S. Pacific Command as well, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, where counter-piracy and illicit fishing are regional issues.

Conclusion

Some government capabilities are used episodically rather than continuously. Prior to the Decade of War, Civil Affairs often found itself in such a situation. We can take solace that over the past quarter century, the United States has used its CA assets to minimize circumstances that promote conflict and to hasten the recovery from conflict. But we cannot avoid concluding that protracted expeditionary operations call for CA capacity far beyond that needed for peacetime engagement. Recent deployments demonstrate that specific service environments call for expertise attuned to the elements they support: fitting in a service culture facilitates trust building, just as civilian experience eases the civil-military, whole-of-government, whole-of-society interaction that characterizes CA operations.

When RC CA personnel were scheduled for release from active duty but demands for the function continued, DoD opted to (1) school Air Force and Navy personnel in CA operations and (2) expand Army, Navy, and Marine capacity in both active and reserve components. In current circumstances, there is a predictable call to reduce the size of the military. Marine Corps lessons offer continuing support for expanded CA structure, and Army RC reductions across the force are likely to be smaller than for AC. With fewer troops deployed, supporting CA operations will also decline, but the need for planning CA or CA related capabilities remains. If CA planning capacity is inadequate, we can predict that combatant commands will ignore the broader civil society in which military interventions occur, and we will find future leaders again assailing the inability to understand the operational environment.

Moreover, Civil Affairs is not ground-force specific. Maritime aspects surfaced recently that had not been appreciated since Admiral William Radford (later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) relinquished his position as High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in 1951. Recent experience indicates the desirability of joint CA billets on combatant command staffs and those of sub-unified commands. But effectively filling such positions should demand both joint and CA experience. The primary question in a period of reducing organizations will be how we maintain institutional knowledge as well as organizational capabilities.

Dr. Kurt E. Müller is a Senior Research Fellow with the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University. His CA assignments include command of the 416th CA Bn, J3/CA for JTF 160, USAREUR CIMIC team chief, Special Functions Chief of the 304th CA Bde, and Civil Affairs Advisor to SACEUR and C9 at SHAPE. After retirement, he became a CA subject-matter expert for the U.S. Special Operations Command, then at the State Department Civilian Response Corps.

Notes

1. Michael L. Hansen, Celeste Ward Gventer, John D. Winkler, and Kristy N. Kamarck, *Reshaping the Army's Active and Reserve Components* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2011), esp. 39–42, 69, 73.

2. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division, *Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations* (Suffolk, VA: JCOA, 2012).

3. See, for example, Michael T. Flynn, James Sisco, and David C. Ellis, "'Left of Bang': The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today's Environment," *Prism* 3.4 (2013): 12–21.

4. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVNOTE 5400, subj: Disestablishment of Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command and Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA, 13 Dec 2013.

Panel Discussion III: Shaping the Future of Civil Affairs – The Way Forward

Karen Guttieri

Moderator: Dr. Karen Guttieri, Security and Development Policy Lead with the Peace Innovation Lab at Stanford University and author of *Masters of Peace*

- Major General Daniel Ammerman, Commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
- Brigadier General Ferd Irizarry II, U.S. Army Reserve Command, G-3/5/7
- Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen, Director, Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG), U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
- Lieutenant Colonel Louis “Rocky” Simon, Director, U.S. Marine Corps Civil-military operations School

The state of Civil Affairs (CA) at the close of 2014 might be characterized as a moment of acceptance of institutional conditions and, at the same time, investment in small scale, practical steps to strengthen the community. The third and final panel of the Civil Affairs Symposium in Valley Forge focused on “Shaping the Future of Civil Affairs.” The panelists discussed the state of the community affected by a mixed recent past that results from a convergence of institutional and policy trends, as well as ways forward for the CA community. To sharpen this effort, they focused on four priorities: training and education; functional specialty revitalization; public-private partnerships; and, civil information management. These are practical ar-

eas of concentration for a community that appears to accept its institutional limits while striving to address the larger demand in the operational environment.

Institutional Trends in Civil Affairs

The recent past sends mixed signals about the future of Civil Affairs. The U.S. Marine Corps continued expansion of its CA capability – at 900 personnel it is twice the size it was in 2004. Although the Marines added Active Component elements to their CA force structure in that time, CA is unlikely to become a primary military occupational specialty for the USMC. The Navy, on the other hand, in 2014 entirely disestablished the force structure it had launched in 2006, without clear indication how the capability would be provided by others to meet demand for it. And the Army, home to the largest number of CA forces, remained divided along the lines set forth by the 2006 “divorce” that separated Active and Reserve Components between U.S. Army Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command. That division was further complicated by the Army’s establishment of the Active Component 85th CA Brigade reporting to Forces Command, all the while sustaining proponent office with the U.S. Special Operations Command. The Army established Civil Affairs as a branch in 2007 without providing other features of a general officer branch within the Army, or a branch schoolhouse. As outgoing U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Commanding General Jeffrey Jacobs noted in his 2014 farewell address, three different force provider headquarters control Army CA units based in the continental United States, and a Special Operations proponent determines doctrine, training and equipment for a force that is mostly conventional.

Policy Trends in Civil Affairs

The state of Civil Affairs in 2014 should also be considered in the context of wider policy trends of the recent era: expanded engagement in civil dimension operations and increased American reliance on civilian agencies and contractors in stability operations. American military actions abroad from 1989 onward broadened to include humanitarian intervention, not only to stabilize relationships between states, but also to protect people within them. Global human security norms emerged that expanded definitions of security and its relationship to development. New national, international, non-governmental and even for-profit agencies came forward to address the challenges of security and development.

In 2005, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 defined stability operations – missions in which Civil Affairs are key contributors – as “civilian and military activities.” DoD 3000.05, later affirmed in a 2009 DoD Instruction, defined stability operations “a core U.S. military mission” that the military should be prepared to conduct “throughout all phases of conflict” and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments.” This message addressed a debate on the American way of that had simmered at least since Vietnam, but did not point to a clear way forward for the CA community.

In theory, the U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs force structure has resided primarily in the Reserves to develop and sustain specialized civilian skills that could be drawn upon as needed. However, intense demand for CA forces after 2003 showed problems with the system of functional specialty concentrations among CA personnel. The intense demand for CA generalists be-

tween 2005 and 2009 took precedence over functional specialists. To meet demand, the Department of Defense turned to the individual ready reserve, internal cross-leveling, and Navy and Air Force “shake and bake” CA personnel. CA partners in the field, expecting specialists, were often disappointed. As noted at the Symposium, the inability to deliver on the promise of functional specialists became a “black eye” for CA.

In order to meet demand in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. revisited a civil-military model it had used in Vietnam, by reconceiving the Joint Civil-military operations Task Force (JCMOTF) as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs included civilians from the State Department and other agencies as well as military civil-military personnel. However, by 2003 these were already in such seriously short supply that PRTs were often commanded by a Navy commander or Air Force lieutenant colonel. In 2005-6 the Army established a Human Terrain System comprised mostly of contracted civilians to develop sociocultural knowledge for combat commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq, including Human Terrain Teams deploying with tactical units.

In the midst of a military surge in Afghanistan in 2010, the United States conducted a “civilian surge” that tripled the number of diplomats and civilian workers including experts in law, governance and agriculture, to more than 1,100. Surprisingly missing from this surge effort was an organization by the State Department for just these types of missions. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Civilian Response Corps, was established in 2008 to provide civilian experts, similar to programs in Europe and Canada. The program initially aimed to provide up to 4,000 civilian experts, and

would include active, standby and reserve members. The Department of State was unable to fill the roster of the Response Corps or wrest control of civilian surge efforts from the office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other civilian agencies. After struggling for several years, S/CRS was transformed into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) following the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and plans for a cadre of expeditionary civilians were set aside.

The Future of Civil Affairs

These factors together begged the question about the viability of the military's Civil Affairs brand and, more generally, what should be the future of CA. U.S. CA and Special Operations Commanding General Major General Daniel Ammerman assured those convened that the CA brand is not suffering because demand for it remains so high. Indeed, the 1 June 2014 edition of *Army Times* termed CA "the hottest job in the Army today," noting that even as the Active Component sheds thousands of soldiers, CA would add 400 annually in the coming several years. The expansion of CA may indeed signal the strength of the brand, or it may signal that increased salience of the civil dimension in United States missions abroad creates sufficient demand to overcome any challenges to the brand.

The panel at large concluded that the immediate future is unlikely to bring a reconciliation of the Army's 2006 "divorce," much less development of a joint force structure. That said, the panelists did highlight

some recent and promising developments regarding the role of Civil Affairs in American strategy.

For instance, the U.S. Marine Corps already has a company grade and basic school, and will add a staff course in January 2015 in Washington, DC. Maj. Gen. Ammerman identified readiness, training and leader developments among the top items on his list of priorities for USACAPOC. Clearly a focus on preparation is vital to address what Brig. Gen. Irizarry called a need to develop “credible CA expertise.” For most of its existence, the professional military education for Civil Affairs has been “a pick-up game,” hampering its professionalization as a force.

Brig. Gen. Van Roosen noted a goal of the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG), established in 2014, is to provide predictable, accredited skills. He added that 54 functional specialty cells reside at the Army’s Civil Affairs battalions, brigades and commands, but that few personnel met the criteria for the doctrinal skill identifiers. Irizarry, in his comments, argued that CA personnel need to be “expert generalists” conversant with operational design. The expertise needed is one that enables a system-wide view of a field such as agriculture or engineering, or threat finance. That observation echoes a 2014 Naval Postgraduate School report for the IMSG in 2014. Van Roosen remarked that the IMSG has now completed its analysis of expertise, identified 22 categories, and will soon issue its own report. These personnel would perform as advisory teams, in military government, support to civil authority and theater security cooperation beginning in October 2015 when the conversion of a portion of the 38A Civil Affairs to the new 38G (Governance) takes place. By directly commissioning some officers, the IMSG seeks to more readily access expertise from the civilian sector.

Recognizing the increased relevance of civilian as well as military expertise, Ammerman identified the Army Reserve's Public-Private Partnership Initiative (P3I) and "informal networks" among his top priorities. P3I provides a means for private sector resources and Reserve manpower to combine. As Ammerman mentioned, U.S. Army Reserve training exercises are already engaging the private sector. Irizarry noted the establishment of Army Reserve Engagement Cells at the Combatant Commands, to leverage the Reserve Component more deliberately and continuously with Active Component commands.

Lt. Col. Simon, the current director of the USMC Civil-military operations School, focused primarily on Civil Information Management (CIM), or more precisely, on MARCIM – the U.S. Marine Corps semantic wiki for assessment and analysis. MARCIM enables mobile data collection, and a site for data sharing and collaboration. The system enables decision support with visualization (maps, graphs and timelines) and link analysis. That two of the three papers selected as finalists in the CA Association essay competition are on the topic of CIM underscores its importance. But those papers focus on CIM, in part, because it has yet to settle upon a working system that truly delivers. Irizarry also emphasized civil reconnaissance and CA as "scouts of the civil domain." He argued for development of a standardized concept, lexicon, and hands-on training. Writ large, it would be more appropriate to think about "threat" rather than "enemy" because often the concern for CA is a non-human foe such as pestilence or illiteracy. The environment must be framed "beyond time and space." (Some added that what Irizarry may really mean here is the difference between "threats" and "drivers of conflict," a term

used more readily by peacebuilders and development experts using a “human security” approach.)

Threading these themes together, Brig. Gen. Irizarry discussed the need to shift thinking from Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) to Civil Military Operations (CMO) with CA as the lead proponent. He spoke of the need to place new emphasis on the Civil Military Operations Center concept. Focusing on force structure, he emphasized the need for CA to rethink the troop to task and consider the function, size, scale and scope of the mission, rather than a standard consideration that a brigade combat team is assigned a CA company. In some cases, such as the West African Response Force, this model may not fit, and a more tailored package of CA is needed.

Maj. Gen. Ammerman noted that even as the demand for Civil Affairs is strong, the budgets are shrinking – training funds for Reserve CA for the current fiscal year are half of the previous year. Meanwhile, civilian surge efforts are also retrenching. The Department of State has disbanded its Civilian Response Corps. Many of the *ad hoc* structures such as PRTs and the HTS did not make their way into the more permanent force structure or doctrine.

Lt. Col. Simon said the new generation of Civil Affairs could leverage technology to their advantage if given the right tools at the right time for the right mission. He claimed without hesitation that those graduating from the MOS-producing school have what they need to make a difference. The challenge remains how to best enlighten those at the operational and strategic level leading the captains and corporals, not those engaged at the tactical level.

Conclusion

There is much that is worrisome about the state of Civil Affairs today. The Navy disestablished nearly all of its CA capability and the prospect for a Joint Force structure is slimmer than ever. The Army's Civil Affairs leadership appears to have accepted its institutional divisions. Policy makers in recent years often turned not to CA but to *ad hoc* and non-CA solutions to civil dimension challenges. Professional military education for CA has often been a "pick-up game." The functional specialist program has been "a black eye." Civil Information Management, in turn, struggles to achieve its potential.

On the other hand, strategic and operational demand remains high for military personnel who understand the civil dimension in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and Peace & Stability operations under the U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, particularly when the environments are dangerous but also in growing "Phase 0" (Shape and Influence) operations involving theater security cooperation, "building partnership capacity," and conflict prevention.

It is no longer the situation, the panel concluded, that most senior leaders do not understand the value of Civil Affairs. The future of CA includes some hopeful prospects thanks to practical steps recently taken. The USMC and the Army recognize the need to invest in training and education, including the development of civil sector experts. The CA leadership is taking actions to more effectively integrate with civilian partners in both the public and private sectors, and to provide the civil information that partners and commanders need in the field. But they cannot come even

close to fulfilling the potential of CA alone – the future of CA needs much greater attention at four-star and executive agency levels.

Dr. Karen Guttieri is the Security and Development Policy Lead with the Peace Innovation Lab at Stanford University. She's published in the domains of international security, military strategy and doctrine, international law, cognitive psychology, and organizational learning, directed multidisciplinary and interagency research teams on Governance Innovation for Security and Development and Insurgency, and developed graduate courses and programs on Security and Development and the Rule of Law for the Civil Affairs community. Karen is completing Masters of Peace, a book on the American military's approach to Civil Affairs. Dr. Guttieri was selected in 2014 as an Honorary Member of the Civil Affairs Regiment.

**Quality is Free:
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Sergeant First Class Ryan S. Long and
Staff Sergeant Bjorn E. Hansen

A continued lack of familiarity between Active and Reserve Civil Affairs (CA), and between CA and other governmental agencies (DoS/USAID, etc.), all during an era of reductions in military spending, continues to result in unnecessary friction during joint and inter-agency operations. By integrating Reserve and Active Component CA and military/non-military training and routine operations the Army and DoD can expect higher force generation rates, lower end-strength requirements, and better operational outcomes. This paper will present a case for integrating Active and Reserve CA force structure and operations, improving training and readiness standards, and integrating CA training with relevant non-DoD agencies in order to better utilize the unique capabilities of each component, while reducing costs.

Since the War on Terror began in 2001, U.S. Army Civil Affairs has been relied on to support the nation's political and military efforts in nearly every theater of operations. With the vast majority of CA forces belonging to the Army Reserve, these resource and personnel-intensive operations quickly drained the availability of trained CA forces Army-wide. As Army CA struggled to generate forces over more than a decade of warfare, it faced challenges brought about by rapid growth and provisional missions and taskings, such as fractures between Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces, and missions in support of non-DoD elements.

These missions rapidly impacted readiness and the overall effectiveness of CA as a branch. Units rarely deployed together, and non-CA Soldiers were regularly tasked with typical CA tasks such as: project management; collecting civil reconnaissance; and, conducting foreign humanitarian assistance. Senior leadership positions were filled with re-classed individuals sent through two-week Civil Affairs courses immediately prior to leading units in combat, and rosters were intermittently filled out with Inactive Ready Reserve augmentees. The AC was forced to fill CA positions with Field Artillery officers, while intelligence sections were tasked with covering down on the unfamiliar task of Civil Information Management. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were frequently led by the Navy and Air Force officers, and parallel organizations such as Human Terrain Teams were created in an effort to offset CA's workload.

Civil Affairs can view its ability to meet OPTEMPO demands with some pride, but it is essential to understand that these temporary structures were created both in support of Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and Civil Military Operations (CMO) and to cover real and perceived deficiencies. No matter the purpose, it remains the Army's continual mission to adjust and grow based on lessons learned. The drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan allows a respite from the experiences of the past decade of war, but CA and the Army must learn from these experiences in order to address these deficiencies in an era of declining resources. History has shown us that CA forces will continue to be called on in times of instability and conflict, despite claims that these missions are solely civilian endeavors.¹ As such, this response to lessons learned must be completed before subsequent (and inevitable)

contingency operations again expose systemic weaknesses in the current arrangement.

Operational Disconnects

The organizational split between Active and Reserve CA in 2006 was largely driven by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's opinion that the failures of OEF/OIF required a shift in CA force structure to better support the conventional Army's needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to not distract the focus of the Special Operations community from its Direct Action focus. Despite a clear preference to remove CA from the Special Operations community due to the strain of managing the readiness challenges of reservists, USSOCOM argued that CA was a capability that belonged within Special Operations Forces (SOF).

As a compromise, nearly all Reserve CA was shifted out of USASOC in late 2006. As explained by Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen in his 2009 Army War College paper, this had a significant effect on the integration, readiness, and doctrinal clarity of Reserve CA as it "consistently violated three of its four SOF truths and imperatives. These include: humans are more important than hardware; quality is better than quantity; Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced; and, competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur."² After eight years of continuous deployments under this arrangement, the result has been a parallel CA community, with Active and Reserve units training and deploying separately and little shared knowledge between them before, during, or after respective deployments.

The removal of USACAPOC from USASOC and the explicit relegation of Active CA to SOF missions

immediately revealed the obvious capability and capacity gap of a lack of Civil Affairs support to rapid conventional contingency operations. The Army's solution, the creation of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, further compounded the lack of unity within Civil Affairs. Currently, the 85th BDE aligns its battalions to each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), while USACAPOC does the same with its reservist elements. With the inclusion of USASOC's 95th BDE and their similar alignment, the Army has created a confusing overlap of responsibilities between three elements of the same branch that almost never interact with one another. CA now has three distinct sub-branches, with only the nominal consistency of a shared proponenty and its doctrine to unite them.

In a typical mission, CA forces could now enter a conflict rapidly in support of SOF, transition after a 90-day period to an Active Component team, and then finally pass the mission to reservists and their specialized civilian skills. However, this confusing overlap rarely succeeds, as these involved elements lack common standards, familiarity, SOPs, data-sharing mechanisms, or even a means of identifying or communicating with one another prior to their brief turnover.

Calls to restore Army CA under a unifying command are politically charged and unlikely, despite the fact that this organizational handicap is clearly recognized by all echelons of CA forces. While not necessarily a result of the so-called "divorce," elements have attempted isolated measures to unify CA's vital Civil Information Management (CIM) systems through programs such as CIM-DPS and USACAPOC's short-lived AxisPro system, acknowledging that after 13 years of continuous deployments CA still does not have an effective and centralized program to manage

and share its most important operational information. The raw data, analysis, and products from these many years of conflict are scattered across a range of databases and systems such as Tactical Ground Reporting System (TIGR), Combined Information Database Network Exchange (CIDNE), Geographic Information Systems (GIS), the Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK) and Mapping the Human Terrain (MAP-HT), not to mention Excel spreadsheets and PowerPoint slides. In addition to these systems, the AC 95th BDE has developed the Civil Affairs Operating System (CAOS) for its own operations, and other stopgap theater-specific options are still being created and employed. The result has been an inability to aggregate and analyze Civil Affairs Operations and Civil Information across provinces, years, or initiatives. In a sly historical reference, Afghanistan is commonly referred to as the “graveyard of databases.”

The authors strongly believe that effective CIM is the basis by which CA, along all operational lines, brings relevance and value to the combatant commander and non-military agencies. CA is uniquely qualified to integrate and analyze disparate data sources from a complex civil environment, and to maintain this information for future operations. Any attempt to bridge these CA communities will fail without an acknowledgement of the need for the aforementioned Active and Reserve CA, non-CA military, and non-military actors in a theater to share and analyze data in a common and sustained format. These organizations must make progress towards a single common operational picture in support of commanders and other affected leaders. Simply put, and as a first step towards some form of unification, CA must address this single glaring operational issue.

A re-unification, under any proposed structure, would not only support continuity within the branch, but also place CA in a position to more effectively support its aligned GCCs in joint and interagency missions. This reorganization would benefit training and force generation, as well as CIM data sharing, through more streamlined chain of command and focus areas. As outgoing USACAPOC Commander Major General Jeffrey Jacobs noted in his retirement speech in June 2014, “unless and until we can fix that disconnect, we, USACAPOC, cannot provide the best possible Civil Affairs support to the United States Army and the Army will not truly interest itself in CA and Civil Affairs will not achieve full equality as a branch of the Army.”³ While completely true, it is also telling that this message from the Army’s senior CA officer only applied to his outgoing command within the Reserve, and not Army Civil Affairs as a whole.

Reacting to Austerity

The current drawdown of all components of the armed forces (Active, Reserve, and Guard) dismisses fears of a shrinking capability by assuming that the operational nature of the Guard and Reserve forces will continue into the future. This is at odds with the prior, strategic use of those forces, which historically expected to rely upon them for massive mobilizations of national interest. The continuing era of low-intensity conflict throughout the world has the potential to quickly degrade and distract the Active forces from their traditional missions without regular assistance from the Guard and Reserve forces. This is particularly true for CA forces. While Reserve CA provides ongoing support of the continuing joint mission in the

Horn of Africa, as well as small mobilizations in support of DoS and DoD missions within assigned GCCs, there is a distinct possibility of the AC CA units (both conventional and SOF) assuming these missions for the foreseeable future. This has the potential of eroding the operational experience earned at great cost, with lessons relearned only when these RC units are mobilized for a future contingency.

The post-9/11 era has demonstrated the ability of the Guard and Reserve to generate forces for deployment, but only with significant mobilization, lead time and resources.⁴ After the first rotation, the typical unit often relied on cross-leveling Soldiers from other units, and even from other services, in order to man subsequent battle rosters. This was particularly true of CA units, where experienced NCOs and officers were in short supply, particularly those able to deploy. With the total cost of deploying a soldier for a year ranging from one to two million dollars, the answer to these concerns is not to fight to preserve every slot in CA units, but rather to increase the percent of qualified CA Soldiers ready and available to deploy.

A streamlined yet more professional force would trade numbers for expanded training and enhanced efforts to identify, recruit, and retain higher quality Soldiers. A ready and available Reserve CA soldier would have the following characteristics:

- Physically fit- passing the APFT according to SOF standards
- Experienced- either a prior deployment or having a secondary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)
- MOS-qualified- graduated from appropriate qualification or Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) courses

- High aptitude- possessing GT scores from at least the highest quintile
- Relevant civilian skills- completed training or current occupation in line with one of the functional areas or core tasks of Civil Affairs

While senior leadership within the CA community would wholeheartedly agree with these expectations, the composition of Reserve CA units belies a commitment to these standards. These requirements would almost certainly result in a reduced population of CA forces, and would limit the ability of Soldiers lacking applicable skill sets to enter the CA community. This would not be a negative, as CA may be forced to cut end strength in the coming years, and these filters are reasonable methods of ensuring some basic standard within Army Civil Affairs, whether SOF-aligned, AC, or RC. The authors propose a better integration between Active and Reserve CA to meet Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) requirements with an expected reduction in end strength.

Force Validation and Training

In an effort to more effectively support changing missions and force structure, CA must also quickly adapt its training and readiness capabilities. Current ARFORGEN methods look at the readiness levels of standard-sized echelons, ignoring the fact that CA elements typically operate in teams of four to six soldiers. A CA battalion commander may slowly push his unit along the four-year RC ARFORGEN cycle, but the operational needs of the Army tend to be far more complex and immediate, as our recent contingency operations have shown.

In both the AC and RC, single elements, to include CA Teams (CAT), CA Planning Teams (CAPT), Civil Liaison Teams (CLT), as well as individuals, are often deployed from units that aren't yet in the ARFORGEN "available" status. These missions are either requested by commanders, are assigned based on the inability of planned units to deploy, or are assigned based on needs within the unit's aligned GCC. Additionally, and as noted earlier, in larger contingency operations like Iraq and Afghanistan, small groups were often transferred between elements so as to support another unit's company-level or higher mobilization. In order to meet the needs of these missions, commanders have regularly been forced to send ad-hoc teams of volunteers, or to pull from individuals who happened to meet readiness standards at that time. The ARFORGEN policy has not been effective at providing adequate CA forces or predictable deployments for soldiers.

Rather than continuing to rely on these (arguably ineffective and certainly administratively cumbersome) patchwork organizations, a team-based validation process will work to motivate organic elements to increase their readiness at the lowest level, especially when combined with incentives for increased standing on order-of-merit lists for advanced schooling, as well as for the opportunity to undertake operational training and deployments. Additionally, commanders will be able to quickly identify and allocate ready teams when needs arise. At the lowest level, the tactical-level CAT, these teams are led by experienced captains and sergeants first class who should already be aware of ARFORGEN requirements, so transition issues should be minimal.

Teams would internally track their ARFORGEN requirements for key members, allowing considerations for new Soldiers, those awaiting MOS reclassification, pending losses, and those with temporary medical issues, and push for their completion at the lowest level.⁵ Unit-level Mission Essential Task List (METL) training can then be more specifically targeted and verified by battalion or higher leadership, so as to bring these teams up to ARFORGEN standards quickly and effectively, resulting in organic elements that have trained together, with members that are fully aware of, and invested in, their team's capabilities.

While team-based validation would help to ensure that missions are assigned to teams that are judged to be fully capable by ARFORGEN standards, the lessons from recent operations clearly show that simply providing the proper number of "ready" bodies to a theater is not always sufficient to ensure success. In an effort to address a lack in specialized skill sets, the CA Proponent has further developed its Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) system. This has partly addressed the branch's inability to expand and organize the civilian skill sets of its Soldiers along CA functional specialties, such as Public Health, Governance and Rule of Law. Additionally, a long term plan to provide a separate career path for Civil Affairs officers, known as the 38G path, is also in development with the goal of further enhancing CA's ability to support its specialized mission requirements.⁶

These efforts would be a good start if the 38G program were even fully supported for implementation, but it has languished for several years now. Even if implemented as envisioned in late 2015, it partly ignores the aforementioned issue that CA missions often require a specific skill set for a specific mission.

CA Officer ASIs are notoriously understaffed, and limiting these opportunities to officers further restricts the overall effectiveness of teams ranging from Functional Specialty Cells to the lowest level CAT. These programs, left alone, will only continue this myopia by recognizing the concern only at the officer level, making the assumption that a unit is defined by the skills and qualifications of its officers and not by its members as a whole—another tenet that highly effective SOF elements would find disagreeable.

This issue can be mitigated by combining our recommendations to consistently and regularly enhance the skill sets of CA soldiers (quality is better than quantity), and by cataloguing and reorganizing team structures based on existing civilian skill sets. In addition to allowing for enlisted ASIs beyond the currently required Battle Staff, the CA Proponent could easily identify or contract for training courses and certifications to further develop and recognize the capabilities of CA elements as a whole. These courses would align with CA functional areas, and be open to AC/RC officers and enlisted members to mitigate the gap between skills offered and mission needs.

These rank-immaterial ASIs would truly embrace the intent of Reserve Component CA to not just bring in individuals with civilian skill sets, but to also develop its own Soldiers, just as every other branch of the military does from the grade of E-1 onward. Additionally, these courses would allow Active Component CA troops the opportunity to expand their capabilities, further diminishing the gap between them and their RC counterparts. It is fully understood that new courses cost money and manpower, so measures must be undertaken to utilize distance-learning options, as well as tie these courses in with existing organic skills,

such as law, engineering, information analysis, and languages. Since our recommendations above will result in a more clearly identifiable force with specific skill sets, opportunities would avail such as having Reserve Component CA Soldiers who work as judges or attorneys being tasked with conducting standardized training on Rule of Law. Units would also coordinate with local colleges for applicable lectures and to encourage Soldiers to utilize unused education benefits to support training needs. Furthermore, as expanded upon below, commands would engage with interagency and interorganizational partners to conduct the type of partnership-building and training efforts that were desperately needed in the lead-up to the recent conflicts.

Interorganizational Partnering

CAO, by doctrine, directive, and common sense, are best accomplished through cooperative and coordinated efforts between a range of military and non-military actors. Unfortunately for many CA Teams, the first time most of them learn about the capabilities of non-military resources in theater is when they meet upon arrival for their mission or deployment. To the Department of State or USAID professional, (now defunct) Civilian Response Corps member, or S2 analyst, the four-man CAT represents the capabilities of the entire branch, whether Active or Reserve. The CAT must have more than a cursory awareness of these different agencies, their capabilities, and their restrictions, as the supported commander, his staff, and maneuver unit commanders each are relying on the CAT to leverage these non-military assets to complete their mission.⁷

These expectations are not just operationally relevant, but are a core element of Civil Affairs' DoD mandate. As clearly stated in DoDD 2000.13:

“Civil Affairs operations may be conducted to support national policies and interests as part of an interagency, bilateral, or multinational military or political-military operation, in accordance with law and consistent with applicable DoD policy and issuances.”

This expands on the experiences gained from the World War II-era FM 27-5 on *Military Governance and Civil Affairs*, which presciently noted the fact that military governance isn't specifically a task for times of war. CA will always be expected to stand ready to accomplish missions in support of other U.S. Government entities in line with its core tasks and functional areas. The National Defense Strategy further reinforces this expectation, emphasizing the need for providing “a Stabilizing Presence” and building upon capabilities developed since 2001.⁸ Civil Affairs' utilization from these recent conflicts are directly at odds with CA's supposed stated mission, as CA was often expected to replicate non-DoD assets in theater to give the supported commander his own capabilities instead of simply partnering to take advantage of the skills and missions of USAID and DoS initiatives. These directives clearly outline the expectations for Civil Affairs, and can be leveraged to support the justification for additional interagency training links.

The CA proponenty has begun work on developing this link with the Institute for Military Support to Governance.⁹ This effort proves that elements within CA leadership already understand that the true subject matter experts for CA's functional areas lie in the civilian world. It should, therefore, be very simple to

justify interagency training opportunities between DoD and these groups. Utilizing existing civilian training courses, encouraging links with local academic resources, and building upon existing relationships created during these ongoing conflicts would support the Army's need to enhance training while responding to austerity measures.

Part of successful interagency partnering is acknowledging that the Army cannot be all things to all people. Too often combatant commanders have conducted CMO in parallel with the work of a PRT or DoS actor because it was not comprised of personnel from his unit. CA teams must be able to effectively advise a commander on the capabilities of civilians from within a PRT or other similar organization. This cannot be accomplished without regular training opportunities with State Department, USAID, U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), or other organizations expected to advise ambassadors and high-level military leaders on the conduct and resolution of a conflict. Once effectively trained, these units can conduct Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center rotations with the confidence and skills required to convince Active Component leaders of Civil Affairs' relevance. Only by supplying well-rounded CATs and other CA elements can the supported commander be effectively advised on how to work with and capitalize on non-organic assets in their AO.

Implementation Strategies

The recommended solutions to the issues pointed out in this paper can be organized along the DoD categories of doctrine, organization, training/leadership/education, materiel, and personnel, and are restated below:

Doctrine - While CA doctrine has improved in the last ten years, it would need to be adapted to fit the proposed changes. Modifications would delineate the roles of those with specialized skills and additional skill identifiers within the force, and would highlight the importance of interoperability between all CA elements.

Organization - Lasting links must be established between AC/RC CA as well as with relevant government agencies to ensure a true whole-of-government approach that is formalized prior to being called for in a contingency operation. This "Civil WARTRACE" will drastically improve links between these elements here in the United States, and also provide a framework for a robust "reachback" system for deployed personnel, whether DoD or otherwise. A system would also be developed to better support CA units with on-call support from DoD personnel and teams with expertise in areas such as contracting, engineering, geographic information systems, and intelligence. These personnel would be drawn from a pool of individuals who are not only skilled in their own fields, but more importantly have been trained in how their respective roles apply to both Civil Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations.

Training/Leadership/Education - The 38G program must be instituted, and similar programs rapidly initiated to acknowledge, develop, and retain the

specialized expertise of enlisted Soldiers. Joint training must be conducted between Active and Reserve CA, between CA and other DoD elements, as well as between CA and interagency and intergovernmental elements. Civil Affairs soldiers will utilize existing U.S. Government organizational training opportunities, to include an expansion of joint and interagency Realistic Military Training (RMT) and Innovative Readiness Training (IRT), and units will expand their connections to local universities and private/public sector organizations and agencies in order to support an expanded CA skill set without requiring the costly development of additional resident CA training courses within DoD. Many of these recommendations stem from a systemic failure to adhere to NCO and officer career development plans, which already call for this type of personal and professional development.

Materiel - Unified Civil Information Management is the basis for effective continuity between Army CA's three major elements (not to mention joint CA capabilities). A single standardized CIM system is absolutely vital—contracted and managed by the CA proponent and linked with other services and agencies. A joint working group would retain the best aspects of the numerous systems utilized, and ensure interoperability at all levels throughout program development.

Personnel - Finally and arguably most importantly, without quality soldiers, CA cannot complete appropriate training and participate in the types of joint and interagency operations envisioned in this paper. Recruitment and retention must be incentivized, to include identifying and drawing from functional experts already within the DoD. Civil Affairs must market itself beyond the appeal of attending Basic

Airborne School, and de-mystify the military by presenting itself as a professional and academic branch, fully accessible and rewarding to those with specialized skill sets. Standards must be raised, allowing for a natural reduction in end-strength to offset the costs of expanded training and expertise. ARFORGEN validation must be tracked at the team level in order to provide a more organic rewards-based readiness system with incentives to adhere to both Army and Civil Affairs developmental requirements. This highly proficient cadre of CA personnel could then be further augmented by previously identified DoD specialists (engineers, data managers) to support additional skill training and rapid expansion in the case of future contingencies.

Conclusion

Civil Affairs finds itself with time to reflect on the lessons learned in the post 9/11 era of conflict. For more than a decade Reserve and Active CA have deployed at a pace that has burned out the force and resulted in a demand for other personnel, units, and agencies to become involved in CAO and CMO. The outgoing commander of USACAPOC acknowledged our need to deliver a better product to the supported commanders, or risk becoming marginalized. Budgets and end-strength are decreasing and will continue to do so into the near future, but the need to be ready to deploy at short notice to help address a stunningly diverse array of issues is not decreasing. Active Component CA can benefit from the unit skills and capabilities Reserve Component CA have available, but they will likely only do so if the RC can improve the consistency, preparedness, and specialized skill sets

necessary to effectively augment and partner with them and non-DoD agencies.

This continued reliance on RC CA will require an acknowledgement that there are three distinct CA communities, and that the linkages between them are poor. Where these three communities are housed is almost immaterial- what matters is that they need to operate together as a family. Low-intensity deployments, combined AC/RC training opportunities, and unified information sharing will work to normalize this relationship. Further training opportunities and information sharing with non-DoD agencies through an effective CIM program will begin to formalize the relationship between DoD and non-DoD agencies. The result will be increased coordination, improved information sharing, and an awareness of the capabilities of each agency. The number of critical After Action Reports (AARs) and special investigator reports in Iraq and Afghanistan about the failure to address these issues are legion. The issues are known; the only choice now is whether to act.

SFC Ryan S. Long has served in Civil Affairs for 13 years and has deployed four times, serving on Civil Affairs Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Civil Affairs Planning Teams in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. He is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute's Arabic Basic course, and is completing degrees in Arabic and geography/GIS. He currently serves as the CIM NCO-IC for HHC, 415th CA BN, Kalamazoo, MI.

SSG Bjorn E. Hansen has served as a Civil Affairs sergeant and team sergeant on two separate deployments to Iraq. Prior to joining the Army Reserve in 2006, he deployed as a squad leader with the 1st Provisional Security Company to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, with the US Marine Corps Reserve. He has master's degrees in urban and regional planning and business administration and 13 years civilian experience as a transportation planner in Charlotte, NC. He currently serves as 1SG for D Co, 422nd CA BN, Greensboro, NC.

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Redefining Civil Affairs

Dennis J. Cahill

Civil Affairs (CA) forces have participated in every major United States military operation since World War II. During World War II and the Korean War, CA forces followed closely behind combat units, addressing issues of immediate concern to the people and governments of newly liberated friendly territories or standing up temporary military governments in newly occupied territories. In Vietnam, CA was an integral part of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later Rural) Development Support (CORDS) program that was an integrated civil and military effort to combat insurgency. These roles were repeated in one form or other from Operation *Urgent Fury* in Grenada in 1983 through Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America. Yet, over time, exercising the full range of CA capabilities in military operations diminished and many military commanders came to view CA primarily as a link to humanitarian assistance (HA) supplies and managers of the commander's emergency response program (CERP) rather than a uniformed source of skills associated with the functions and well-being of civilian communities in the commanders' areas of responsibility. This path has led to two alarming consequences: the atrophy of core task skills within the CA force that were designed to mitigate the absence of U.S. government agency representation in civil-military operations,¹ and the development or transfer of traditional CA capabilities to other, sometimes ad hoc, organizations, such as human terrain teams and reconstruction teams.

One reason commanders misunderstand the value of CA forces is the poorly worded definition currently associated with the term *Civil Affairs*, which illogically refers to forces and units rather than affairs, or activities, of a civil nature that are important to military operations. Correcting this deficiency begins with re-writing the current definition. Another reason stems from the fact that, until now, CA doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) have not been sufficiently integrated into the broader Army DOTMLPF-P considerations or, more importantly, critical routine and pre-deployment training events and the early days of contingency operations. Correcting this deficiency requires a review of how Civil Affairs are integrated into Army doctrine and training as well as a review of Army and Defense Department policies guiding access to U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) forces in training and deployments.

This paper highlights some problems with the current definition of Civil Affairs and makes the case for CA to be defined as *matters of civilian community interest that affect or are affected by the execution of military missions*. It crosswalks current CA capabilities with future Army capabilities identified in current Army doctrine-shaping concepts to redefine the value of CA forces beyond HA and CERP. It then identifies policy recommendations to strengthen the relationship between supported commanders and their supporting CA forces.

Revisiting the Definition

The term, Civil Affairs, has little usage outside of a military context and a non-military definition of Civil Affairs is virtually nonexistent in Standard English dictionaries. One exception – Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary – defines Civil Affairs as “*affairs and operations of the civil population of a territory that are supervised and directed by a friendly occupying power.*”² This definition harkens back to the military government and transitional military authority operations of the United States and Allied militaries following World Wars I and II and in Korea in the 1950s. It is close to what we’re looking for, but it needs to be updated to meet our purposes.

The military definition that was contained in Joint and Army doctrinal publications prior to the year 2000 was very complex. This particular year offered that that Civil Affairs were “*The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil Affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.*” This version was radically different from the Merriam-Webster’s version in that its focus was on “activities of a (military) commander” as opposed to “affairs and operations of (a) civil population,” which one might logically infer from the term. It also did not conform to published Department of Defense (DoD)

standards, which called for definitions of military terminology to be clear, concise, and complete.³

Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, currently defines Civil Affairs as “*designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations (formerly, activities) and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA.*”⁴ Although this definition has been the accepted one for at least the last 15 years, it is awkwardly constructed, contains an obvious circular error, and fails to adequately provide a meaning of Civil Affairs that is useful to a commander. In its simplified form, the definition does no more than say that Civil Affairs are “*designated...forces and unit ... (that) conduct Civil Affairs operations...*” Since Civil Affairs operations are defined as “*actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces ...*,”⁵ the definition effectively states that “*Civil Affairs are designated forces that conduct actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces.*”

Considering an Alternative

According to English grammar, an open form compound word like Civil Affairs combines the modifying adjective, civil, meaning, “*of or relating to the regular business of the people in a city, town, state, etc.: not connected to the military or to a religion,*”⁶ with its plural noun, affairs, meaning, “*work or activities done for a purpose (such as) commercial, professional, public, or personal business*”⁷ to create a new plural noun.⁸ Thus, we might describe Civil Affairs as *commercial, professional, public, or personal work or activities that are of, or related to, the regular business of the people in a city, town, state, etc.* Be-

sides being wordy and multifaceted, this language has little utility for the military definition-builder who must identify a “general military or associated significance”⁹ for the term. We must find, therefore, simple wording that reflects recognition that “the physical, cultural, social, political, and psychological aspects of human populations”¹⁰ can influence military operations on the land domain.

To define Civil Affairs, then, in a way that a commander would find militarily significant, we might consider this alternative: *matters of civilian community interest that affect or are affected by the execution of military missions*. In this context, the civilian community consists of indigenous populace and institutions (IPI) in the operational environment¹¹ as well as all non-military partners, including U.S. and foreign government agencies, non-government organizations (NGOs), international relief organizations (IROs), and multi-national corporations (MNCs). Matters of interest to this community include non-military issues common to all peoples and cultures that can be organized under the broad, stability endstate conditions of social well-being, rule of law, safe and secure environment, sustainable economy, and stable governance.¹² Strength or instability in any of these areas influence a commander’s ability to execute missions in any operational environment across the range of military operations.

This definition would have made sense to General Dwight D. Eisenhower who, on 30 November 1942 – just three weeks into Operation *Torch* in North Africa – wrote to General George C. Marshall: “The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are

absorbed in political and economic matters.”¹³ In other words, as Allied forces advanced against Axis forces through Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, issues of social well-being, rule of law, safe and secure environment, sustainable economy, and stable governance within and among the communities through which they fought – and which now constituted “rear areas” – began to affect the execution of military missions associated with combat and logistics. He could no longer ignore these issues and had to dedicate precious military resources to execute stability operations in his ever-expanding area of responsibility – a contingency for which he had not prepared.

This definition also describes a major focus of combat operations during the transition from the Afghanistan Campaign’s Consolidation II phase to Consolidation III phase in late 2009. The senior intelligence officer of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) directed subordinate intelligence staffs to expand their information-gathering efforts to “acquire and provide knowledge about the population, the economy, the government, and other aspects of the dynamic environment we are trying to shape, secure, and successfully leave behind.”¹⁴ In a supporting effort, the Director of ISAF Joint Command’s Information Dominance Center developed Host Nation Information Requirements (HNIR) to “enable the commander to make informed decisions – allow him to more effectively conduct the full spectrum of military and civilian activities that will achieve popular support for government”¹⁵ in a population-based counterinsurgency mission. In this instance, commanders were interested in identifying *matters of civilian community interest throughout Afghanistan that (would) affect or (be) affected by the execution of military missions* designed to support the local populace, national security forces,

and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in a unified effort against enemy forces and other threats to the security of Afghans.

The Continuing Need for Civil Affairs Forces

In the mid-1980s, the CA force was at risk of being eliminated from the Army's force structure. The Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and others "believed that Civil Affairs forces were anachronisms and needed to be expunged from the Army... (the TRADOC commander) spoke for many when he attacked the concept of government support by U.S. military personnel as an outmoded and politically unacceptable idea. He felt that more mundane civil-military roles required of CA units could readily be performed by other forces, or agencies in lieu of Army Reserve units composed of rank-heavy citizen-soldiers."¹⁶ The Chief of Staff of the Army was convinced to retain the force by transferring it to the newly-formed U.S. Special Operations Command but, in 1990, in the early days of planning for a Kuwait Task Force to oversee the post-conflict restoration activities that would follow Operation *Desert Storm*, anti-Civil Affairs sentiment resurfaced when "HQDA... felt that the State Department and other civilian agencies should have been considered for the role that the CA Reserve soldiers would have to assume; after all the restoration of government dealt with traditional civilian, not military, matters."¹⁷

The problem with this line of thinking is that civilian matters in an operational environment *are* military matters in the sense that they must be taken into account and dealt with quickly by military commanders to be fully successful. The recently-published Army Operating Concept (AOC) recognizes this when it

says, "Recent and ongoing conflicts reinforce the need to balance the technological focus of Army modernization with a recognition of the limits of technology and an emphasis on the *human, cultural, and political continuities* of armed conflict."¹⁸ (Italics added.) It goes on to say, "The Army... prepares for security operations abroad including *initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authorities.*"¹⁹ It later states, "The complexity of future armed conflict, therefore, will require Army forces capable of conducting missions in the homeland or in foreign lands including *defense support of civil authorities, international disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, security cooperation activities, crisis response, or large-scale operations.*"²⁰ The Army core competency of wide area security "includes the essential stability tasks including: *establish civil security; security force assistance; establish civil control; restore essential services; support governance; and support economic and infrastructure development.*"²¹

Each of the italicized terms in the preceding paragraph is tailor-made for CA forces. The Army's CA branch consists of Soldiers dedicated to studying the functions of civil society and how those functions are affected by man-made or naturally occurring crises. The two fields within the CA branch are distinct and mutually supporting. Soldiers in the generalist field (currently identified by career management field (CMF) 38A and military occupational specialty (MOS) 38B) plan for, integrate, and deconflict Civil Affairs (as defined in this paper) with military operations at every level. Soldiers in the functional specialty field (soon to be identified by CMF 38G) apply skills in civil sectors that fall under six functional specialty areas—rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and pub-

lic education and information. The individuals and teams resident in corps/ division G-9 sections, brigade S-9 sections, and CA units, are trained, organized, and equipped to engage with the civilian communities described earlier – often in the local language; conduct civil reconnaissance to answer civil information requirements identified by commanders to enhance situational understanding; plan, coordinate, integrate, and deconflict civil and military interests in all phases of operations across the range of military operations; and, when required, perform activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. The supported commander, therefore, needs neither to look far for these inherent military capabilities nor create competing or redundant capabilities in his or her organization.

The following table (Table 1) provides a crosswalk of future Army required capabilities, identified in the AOC and Army Functional Concepts (AFC), with current capabilities of the Civil Affairs force.

Future Army Required Capabilities	Current Civil Affairs Capabilities
[] Develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations. (AOC) [] Assess a nation-state's ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions to identify strengths and deficiencies. (AFC for Engagement) [] Understand regional considerations (cognitive, moral, physical, and socio-economic) of the operational environment in order to have scalable options. (AFC for Engagement)	[] Develop pre-mission, country or sub-national CA area studies to establish baseline information relating to the geography, historical setting, and the social, political, military, economic, health, legal, education, governance, infrastructure, and national security systems and institutions of a specified area using a combination of open- and restricted-source materials. (FM 3-57) [] Conduct civil reconnaissance and CA initial, deliberate, and survey assessments to obtain a rapid overview of existing conditions, to update the CA area study, and/or to provide in-depth analysis on specific issues or locations, according to priority information requirements, to enhance situational understanding and facilitate decision-making by integrating into the overall supported commander's operations plan and enhancing the deployment of the common operating picture. (FM 3-57)

[] Maintain an agile institutional Army that ensures combat effectiveness, supports other services, fulfills DOD and other government agencies' requirements, ensures quality of life for Soldiers and families, and possesses the capability to surge (mobilize) or expand (strategic reserve) the active Army. (AOC) [] Develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos, and are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations in complex environments and against adaptive enemies. (AOC)	[] The Civil Affairs Branch Proponent and the Army Force Modernization Proponent at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, along with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command G-8 and G-9, perform DOTMLPF-P functions for the active and reserve component CA forces that support both special operations forces and conventional forces, including execution of mobilization courses to meet Army surge and expansion requirements.
[] Establish and maintain security across wide areas (wide area security) to protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities necessary to shape security environments, consolidate gains, and set conditions for achieving policy goals. (AOC) [] Protect civilians from the effects of combat operations to reduce collateral damage effects, influence the local population, deny the enemy popular support, and preserve freedom of action. interorganizational (AFC for Maneuver Support and Protection)	[] Conduct populace and resources control (PRC) - a core CA task that includes: - Populace control (e.g., dislocated civilian (DC) operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)) to provide security for the populace, mobilize human resources, deny enemy access to the population, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents; and - Resources control (e.g., property rights procedures, rationing and distribution programs, customs procedures, and protecting and securing strategically important institutions) to regulate the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy. (FM 3-57) [] Conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) - a core CA task - to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions that present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. (FM 3-57) [] Conduct nation assistance (NA) - a core CA task that includes security assistance (SA) and foreign internal defense (FID) - to support a host nation by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions in order to promote long-term regional stability. (FM 3-57) [] Conduct support to civil administration (SCA) - a core CA task that takes place in friendly or occupied territories - to help to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. (FM 3-57)

[] Integrate joint and multinational partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military operations. (AOC) [] Support efforts led by other U.S. government agencies to enhance a partner's capability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. (AFC for Engagement)	[] Establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) at tactical, operational, and strategic levels to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. (JP 3-08, JP 3-57, FM 3-57)
[] Incorporate the human aspects of conflict and war into operations planning and execution in order to enable scalable options. (AFC for Engagement)	[] The G-9/S-9 is the principal and coordinating staff officer for synchronizing Civil Affairs operations (CAO) and integrating civil-military operations (CMO). The G-9/S-9 conducts the initial assessment during mission analysis that determines CA force-augmentation requirements. The CA planning teams augment supported G-9 staffs at division and higher levels to assist in this process. The G-9/S-9 staff provides direction and staff oversight of the supporting CA unit during mission execution. The G-9 and his staff ensure each course of action effectively integrates civil considerations (the "C" of METT-TC). (FM 3-57)
[] Establish, maintain, and shape relations with foreign defense establishments, leaders, populations, and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations to gain and maintain access, facilitate maneuver, and succeed in unified land operations. (AFC for Mission Command)	[] CA forces enable interagency coordination through various means and organizational structures at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels including— - Civil-military operations Centers. - Civil Liaison Teams. - Direct support of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Civilian Response Corps elements. - Civil-Military Support Elements. (FM 3-57)
[] Conduct information collection to support the commander's issuing of mission commands and specifically to answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements and commander's critical information requirements across the range of military operations. (AFC for Intelligence)	[] Conduct civil information management (CIM) - a core CA task - by which civil information (driven by the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and integrated with the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) plan) is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher HQ, and other USG and DOD agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. The CIM process ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO. (FM 3-57)

Table 1.

Addressing Policy Constraints

On September 11, 2001, 96% of the CA force was in the USAR; the remainder comprised of one Active Component (AC) CA battalion. In post-9/11 operations, the USAR portion of the CA force was activated on a rotational basis under the partial mobilization authority of 10 U.S. Code 12302, which allowed for involuntary activation of Reserve Component (RC) forces for up to 24 consecutive months. Early Army policy dictated that AC and RC units would have standard theater deployment tour lengths of 12 months (known as “Boots on the Ground” time, or BOG). To achieve this, RC units generally mobilized for 16-18 months to allow for post-mobilization train-up periods and post-deployment leave time. DoD policy, however, dissolved the Army’s ability to build, deploy, and re-deploy multi-component units on synchronized timelines, first by interpreting 24 *consecutive* months to mean 24 *cumulative* months, then by limiting total mobilization time for RC units to 12 months – reducing BOG to about 9 months and imposing a policy goal of five-year “dwell” periods between deployments for RC units and individuals.²²

Meanwhile, AC units continued to deploy to a theater for 12 (and sometimes 15) months BOG with a dwell goal of two years. While the dwell goals were never fully realized during Operations *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) or *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF), the differing BOG times effectively guaranteed that AC maneuver commands and their supporting USAR CA units would be on different training and deployment schedules, making the development of pre-deployment relationships difficult, if not impossible.

In 2005, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the expansion of AC CA capability by creating an AC CA brigade, consisting of one HHC and five CA battalions, focused primarily on Special Operations missions. Three years later, OSD directed the creation of a second AC CA brigade, also with one HHC and five CA battalions, but placed in the General Purpose Force to meet perceived shortfalls in the USAR CA force.²³ At full strength, and given enough lead time, this brigade could train and deploy with up to one corps headquarters, five division headquarters, and 25 brigade combat teams for an overseas contingency operation. If the operation required USAR CA unit rotations and OEF/OIF BOG policies are reinstated, subsequent rotations will again be out of synchronization. To strengthen the relationships between supported commanders and supporting CA forces, reduce unsynchronized deployments, and increase mission success, the Army must advocate mobilization and deployment policies that maximize USAR CA unit mobilization times and align AC/RC BOG times.

In Summary

CA capabilities must be preserved by the Army, exercised by supported commanders, and strengthened by continued integration into Army DOTMLPFP initiatives and changes to DoD deployment policy. Redefining the term “Civil Affairs” as presented in this paper serves at least two purposes: it returns the term to its grammatical and historical roots; and, it clarifies the concept of Civil Affairs for commanders and their staffs. More importantly, it helps define the purpose of CA forces and activities in a way that a supported commander can appreciate. Commanders

need not look far nor create new capabilities to focus on those *matters of civilian community interest* inherent to every military mission and *that affect or are affected by the execution of* those missions. The capabilities required by commanders to integrate or deconflict Civil Affairs with military missions reside in their CA soldiers and staff and in CA units.

Dennis J. Cahill is a retired Civil Affairs officer who currently works as the Deputy Director of Civil Affairs Force Modernization at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) and Special Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE). The views expressed in this paper are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the USAJFKSWCS/SOCoE or the U.S. Army.

Notes

1. The Civil Affairs core tasks, outlined in FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, with Change 2, 18 April 2014, are populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil information management (CIM), nation assistance (NA), and support to civil administration (SCA).

2. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civil%20affairs>, 18 September 2014.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5705.01, Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology, 10 November 2010, requires a definition to be clear, concise, and complete. To be clear, the definition must address the meaning of the term only. It “should not contain doctrinal or procedural information; i.e., it should focus on describing ‘what’ a term is and not ‘how’ or ‘why’ it is used.” To be concise, definitions must “be as brief as possible including only information that makes the term unique.” The definition should be limited to one sentence whenever possible. Finally, to be complete, the definition must “include all information required to distinguish the term from those that are related or similar.” Additionally, a definition should not contain circular errors – meaning the term being defined should not be contained in the definition as a characteristic of the term – or contain hidden definitions of other terms.

4. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 August 2014).

5. The full definition of Civil Affairs operations is: “Actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO.” (JP 3-57)

6. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civil>.

7. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affairs?show=0&t=1411324782>.

8. <http://www.grammarly.com/handbook/mechanics/compound-words/3/open-compound-words/> and <http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/compounds.htm>.

9. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5025.12, Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology, 14 August 2009.

10. Definition of land domain, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 31 October 2014.

11. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, defines operational environment as *"a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander."*

12. FM 3-7, Stability, 2 June 2014.

13. United States Army in World War II Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964, p. 45. <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/civaff/>.

14. Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf.

15. George Franz, David Pendall and Jeffrey Steffen, "Host Nation Information Requirements: Achieving Unity of Understanding in Counterinsurgency," *Small Wars Journal*, 15 January 2010. "Host Nation Information Requirements [are] information the commander needs about friendly nation institutions or organizations in order to partner effectively, develop plans, make decisions, and integrate with civilian activities" and include questions such as, "Who are the key influencers and community leaders that will determine the right projects for economic development? (Development); What partnership activities should we take

to ensure sustainable freedom of movement for the population? (Security)...Where and when can we enhance the growth of government capacity to serve the population? (Governance)" <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/host-nation-information-requirements>.

16. Dennis Barlow, *The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination*, September 2012 http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2012/09/cco_case_study_no._4-kuwait_task_force-student.pdf.

17. John R. Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War and Winning the Peace," a report prepared for the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, by the Andrulis Research Corporation, October 9, 1991, p. 51.

18. TRADOC Publication 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040*, 7 October 2014, p. 6.

19. *Ibid*, p. 8.

20. *Ibid*, p. 14.

21. *Ibid*, p. 21.

22. Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, 4 September 2007.

23. In 2005, the Army began to transform to a modular, brigade-centric force. The transformation of USAR CA units from the A-series Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) to the G-series MTOE was scheduled to begin in 2008 and end in 2011. In the fall of 2005, however, the Joint Staff validated and approved a Central Command request to deploy CA units in the modular configuration to support corps, divisions, and brigade combat teams. This decision required roughly two CA battalions of the A-series configuration to deploy one CA battalion of the G-series configuration. The grade and MOS shortfalls that remained after this consolidation required reassignment and retraining of hundreds of USAR Soldiers each year to meet deployment readiness goals.

**Remote Civil Information Management:
A Concept for How U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs
Subject Matter Experts Can Bring Relevant Civilian
Skill Set Support To Combatant Commanders**

Major Marco A. Bongioanni

The ability to effectively identify subject matter experts (SMEs) at the right place and time is not a new struggle for U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Civil Affairs (CA). Lean Six Sigma, a series of techniques and tools for process improvement initially developed in the manufacturing sector and today also taught to senior Department of Defense (DoD) leaders, notes the importance of SMEs as somebody who, “Exhibits the highest level of expertise in performing a specialized job, task, or skill of broad definition.”¹ Lean Six Sigma also specifically identifies non-utilized talent as one of the eight significant wastes that hinders performance improvement and an essential focus for any manager looking to improve processes.

The current lack of remote tools that can allow us to harness underutilized SMEs is a significant waste for not only USAR CA, but also DoD and other U.S. Government agencies. This deficiency also hinders our ability to support allied or coalition partner security forces around the world in the global war against violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Because we cannot effectively help remotely, we often have to commit financial and human resources in “boots on the ground” deployments. These commitments are made despite having significant depth in SMEs all over the continental United States (CONUS). However, particularly in the civil sector, there is currently no effective mechanism in place to link requests for information (RFIs) with stateside SMEs. This concept

article posits that the creation of an online “Remote Civil Information Management (CIM) Portal,” as the potential missing link for how not only USAR CA can better support the various Combatant Commander Areas of Responsibility (COCOM AORs) but also how it could leverage SMEs from a variety of other inter-agency, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Framing the Problem

TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, *U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement*, clearly notes the current Army Concept Framework (ACF) does not adequately guide forces on how to advise and assist foreign security forces, governments, and peoples. TRADOC Pam 525-8-5 further notes the importance of partnership activities and special warfare activities in any engagement strategy.² CA forces play an important role in this framework, but they are by far the sole players. There are a variety of other DoD, interagency, intergovernmental, and NGO players on the battlefield that ultimately help in how we can best advise and assist foreign security forces, governments, and peoples.

It is important to briefly understand the clear distinction between Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and Civil Military Operations (CMO) in order to best grasp the warfighting capability gap that a remote CIM portal could fill in line with the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPL) model. According to JP 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*, CAO is “Actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces that enhance the awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment.”³ Meanwhile CMO is, “activities of

a commander performed by the designated Civil Affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions.”⁴

Perhaps it is the often confusion between what CAO and CMO is that causes disregard or dismissal of important host nation civil sector shortfalls that are usually first identified at the tactical level through basic CIM RFIs. CIM has therefore remained a relatively narrow U.S. Forces centric task, mainly in the CAO realm, and is lacking in doctrinal guidance. Is it therefore our doctrine that needs adjusting to take into account the varied stakeholders in both CAO and CMO support for the COCOMs?

Additionally, in TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept*, winning in a complex world means leveraging concepts and technologies to maintain capability overmatch while speeding deployment and reducing logistical demand.⁵ Despite the plethora of existing technologies and equipment to conduct CIM and manage civil sector RFIs, there has been little to no attempt to share it with foreign security forces, governments, and peoples. While by nature the vast majority of CIM data is not classified, such as livestock breeding habits, agricultural outputs, public transportation problems, or rule of law questions. This info should therefore be resident on an unclassified reporting network and used directly by our allies to help in their efforts against VEOs. Does this apparent lack of digital materiel effect how we train and fight with CIM data? A further examination of the current use of SMEs, CIM systems, and a review of an existing current digital model will help further show DOTMLPL warfighting capability gap shortfalls in two distinct areas: doctrine and material.

Background – DoD’s Current Approach to CA SMEs

According to FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, USAR Functional Specialty Teams (FxSPs) should have subject matter experts at the BN and BDE level in public health and welfare, rule of law, infrastructure, and governance. Additionally at the CACOM and above level the FxSP should also have specialists in economic stability and public education and information.⁶ This current FxSP specialty array does not align well within the Army, Joint, and DOS stability framework and has also historically proven notoriously difficult to man with qualified soldiers. Additionally, within USAR CA formations, there are many civilian skill set SMEs that are not slotted in FxSP positions. Visibility of these soldier civilian skill sets is almost non-existent outside the local command levels. USAR CA soldiers struggled to prove how they could be a value added asset to a commander not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but also in previous CAO and CMO in the Balkans and Haiti. Due to a variety of factors such as manning shortfalls, mismatch of skill set with seniority of position, and inefficient task organization structures, many SMEs were often assigned to positions where their skills sets were not relevant or underutilized. Land owning maneuver commanders often marginalized these Soldiers when they could not effectively action on CIM data and utilize their supposed functional skill set expertise. Failure in many of these examples ultimately soiled the image for USAR CA and how civilian SME skill sets translate to CAO and CMO capability.

To address the apparent USAR CA FxSP shortfalls there is currently new doctrine and task organization changes being developed around the concept of creat-

ing area of concentration 38G (Military Government) specialists. ATP 3-57.70, *Civil-military operations Center*, identifies that, "By fiscal year 2016 all FxSP functional specialists positions identified in the USAR will be recoded to 38G. The new area of concentration has the ability, through the use of criteria for degree-of-proficiency coding, to distinguish between competence levels corresponding to strategic, operational, and tactical employment. Proficiency levels are determined by experience, education, and certifications and will identify four levels of proficiency: basic, senior, expert, and master."⁷ Despite these coming changes, the inherent low density of even these new 38G FxSP subject matter experts in any formation makes it even more critical to link theater based operations with stateside USAR CA SMEs, even while in a part time Troop Unit Program (TPU) status.

Background - DoS's Current Approach to SMEs

DoD is not the only government agency challenged with finding operational relevancy for SMEs in its ranks. In 2005, the Department of State (DoS) published its Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks. In an attempt to bring its SMEs to where they could have a relevant application in Iraq and Afghanistan and address these post-conflict reconstruction essential tasks, DoS created the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). Similar to the USAR CA FxSPs, the CRC would be experts in their respective reconstruction fields and be able to provide actionable guidance and recommendations on CMO goals to senior DoS and DoD officials on the ground. Despite being well intentioned, the CRC also was also not resourced as it was envisioned due to a revision by DoS in the roles of the Conflict Stabilization Operations Bureau.

Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD 23) further outlined a new inclusive and deliberate approach to sector security assistance (SSA), an area of close focus also for DoD and USAR CA. While PPD 23 reaffirmed DoS lead in policy, supervision, and general management of SSA, it also highlighted the importance of interagency collaboration in order to synchronize regional.⁸ However, the mere existence of parallel DoD and DoS efforts on how to best focus their SMEs to support SSA and political military policy shows the somewhat disjointed effort and the need for a single automated system to ultimately link all U.S. Government SME capability.

Shortfall of Current CIM Systems

ATP 3-57.50, *Civil Affairs Civil Information Management*, further highlights the importance of the entire scope of CIM planning, collection, collation, processing, analysis, production of products, and dissemination as vital to successfully supporting the commanders CMO objectives.⁹ However, as previously noted, even the doctrine falls short on recommending ways that CIM planning information can be shared with allies and coalition partners to support strategic objectives. A digital CIM portal may be the logical answer for sharing the workload with coalition and allied partners of what has traditionally been a unique U.S. Forces skill.

Despite CA soldiers deployed to COCOM theaters trained in CIM software systems such as Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR), AxisPro, Map Human Terrain (MAP HT), or Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), there is currently no ability for even them to query potential stateside USAR CA

SMEs or coalition and allied partners for answering their potential RFI. Often relevant CIM information is gathered and collated by a Joint Task Force CIM cell or military intelligence collection structure and stored on secret or secure networks. Access to these networks is something neither a CONUS Soldier nor a coalition or allied partner nation staff officer can accomplish, even on an official network computer. CIM data need to be accessible by commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computing devices otherwise it is useless to any agency, NGO, or allied/coalition country who do not possess computers with specific government security patches.

How a Remote CIM Portal Could Help in the Global War on Terrorism

The concept of the Remote CIM Portal aligns well with the current information gathering techniques of many of the security forces from our coalition and allied partners who are countering VEOs. These security forces have a small core group of staff officers, who are often cross trained from their traditional combat arms roles, fulfilling the additional duty of Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO-CIMIC) or Coordination (UN-CIMIC) Officers. Meanwhile, infantry soldiers at the unit level have likely also received additional pre-deployment training in basic CMO skills such as conducting key leader engagements (KLEs), mapping of the civil terrain, and collecting of civil component spot reports. This raw CIM data gathered by coalition and allied partners frequently do not make it into a database where a trained staff officer can collate, analyze, and potentially give recommendations for action. Creating an online digital database portal at the unclassified level to collate, analyze, and action CIM

data is one of the few clear ways U.S. forces could collaborate with these partners on the ground with limited expenditure.

A Possible Fictional Scenario Involving Remote CIM

Regionally aligned CA forces focused at defending national interests by conducting CMO and security cooperation operations is a current reality seen across the globe. The following example uses a fictional scenario but realistic challenges from the current U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility and highlights the significant increase in capability CA forces could have with a remote CIM tool to link SMEs with requirements in theater.

A Peacekeeping Troop Contributing Country (TCC) staff officer at battle group headquarters deployed in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has just received several daily civil information situation reports. He notices in the reports there are several request for information (RFI) from a recent civil reconnaissance conducted by two coalition infantry companies. Included is a request for a SME on zoonotic diseases to help with a strange virus effecting goat herds in Beledweyne, a call for advice from a water plant manager on what types of pumps should be used at a new public works agricultural water distribution system in Kismaayo, and a question from an education administrator in Mogadishu on methods to improve administration of 15 different elementary schools in his district. He passes these reports to his CIM cell who posts these RFI to a digital portal on a COTS automation platform via an unclassified commercial internet connection. The next morning at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, a CA officer assigned to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Af-

rica (CJTF-HOA) signs into the same portal and sees these RFIs, prioritizes them, and categorizes them based off FxSP specialty areas.

Ten days later back in the CONUS during a regularly scheduled battle assembly (BA) weekend at 353rd Civil Affairs Command (CACOM), a unit assigned to the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), several part time TPU USAR Soldiers assigned to the units FxSP see these same RFI in the digital portal. One of these soldiers is a veterinarian in his civilian profession while another works for the U.S. Department of Education. Since they don't have a SME in their FxSP infrastructure section with the necessary skills to answer the public works water distribution RFI, they run a quick portal query and identify a soldier in a subordinate BDE who has a graduate degree in water system management and forward him the RFI. These SME all reply to these RFI with recommendations on how to solve these varied civil sector challenges.

Several days pass and the CA staff officer back at CJTF-HOA screens the SME reply's and forwards the recommendations back to AMISOM battle group HQs in Mogadishu. Shortly thereafter a local veterinary officer orders the right medication to treat the goats, the water plant manager orders the right pumps to improve agricultural water distribution, and the school administrator learns of a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded education administration training program. The end state is SME are able to support the COCOM and rapidly bring relevant recommendations to coalition partners that directly impacts their ability to build civil component capacity and defeat violent extremist organizations. Most importantly, this occurred in a time of fiscal constraint without having to set additional boots on the ground or spend a dollar in operational contingency funds.

APAN: A Possible Successful Existing Model

An example of a current successful system that bridged many of the aforementioned CIM gaps is the existing All Partners Access Network (APAN) Unclassified Information Sharing Service (UISS). Created by a DoD initiative in 2010 as a platform to mainly share disaster response information with NGOs, APAN has grown into truly one of the only functioning UISS collaborative knowledge solutions between DoD elements, other government agencies, and NGOs. APAN operates much like a social network site where administrators grant access to account requests. Once an agency is verified, it can link and collaborate with other agencies in its community space. Message boards, announcements, chat rooms, and map graphics are all accessible in a Microsoft Share Point format. There is even a mobile application and an “APAN Lite” version displayed with limited graphics for users in low-bandwidth areas.

This is a critical capability as many digital infrastructures in the developing world still use dial up servers and other low bandwidth networks. APAN is currently being successfully used by many other collaborative agencies inside and outside the traditional scope for DoD to include the Ebola Response Network (ERN), Afghan Information Sharing (RONNA), Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). Despite APANs apparent success, there is currently no link between its collaboration tools and the USAR CA SME community. An APAN like tool for use in CIM collection would be a potential goldmine and it could help bridge the gap between COCOM CIM RFI and SMEs with a limited resource expense.

Remote CIM Portal Implementation Recommendations

Implementing a Remote CIM Portal would require a threefold effort:

1. *Development of Portal.* Using experience from existing CIM database platforms such as TIGR, AxisPro, MAP HT, and UISS portals such as APAN, develop a web-based “Remote CIM Portal” that can be accessed from any unclassified COTS automation platform. This design must be accessible via low bandwidth “dirty” commercial Internet but still have the appropriate security measures to protect information up to the unclassified level. This portal also needs to be formatted and presented with basic input fields, map graphics, and structure to allow ease of use by operators who may speak English as a second language and have limited computer automation skills. Social media sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter should be used as a design guides for the portal as their use and manipulation is familiar globally. It is essential that any non-intuitive functions or tools be limited so any user, even with limited training, can master the basic operation techniques. This Remote CIM Portal should also ideally have links to the existing APAN structure so that user accounts can be established and monitored within the existing UISS guidelines.
2. *Training and Registration.* Develop a training software package for this portal. This package should include modules translated into a

variety of languages to allow ease of instruction and a training site that replicates the actual portal but does not have a live feed. The registration process should have drop downs where SMEs can note their particular civilian skill sets, licenses, or accreditations into a functional specialty area database. This format would be the heart of the database and query tools should be built into it so you can quickly identify SMEs with particular skills for a particular problem.

3. *Create a project office.* Assign this office to US-ACAPOC or SOCOM with full-time military and civilian staff. They will manage the portal database on a daily basis, track response times on incoming/outgoing CIM RFIs, communicate with the applicable command for responses, and offer software /technical help desk support. This office should also be manned with individuals who would ensure the continual doctrinal CAO aspect of analyzing CIM that requires specialized CA skills to develop actionable products such as linkage diagrams. Therefore, conceptually this office would have a branch that handles the day to day administrative aspects of operating the system and another branch that performs as a CIM think-tank by doing strategic level analysis on data in the system.

Daily Operation and Use of System Once Created

Once fielded, trained/registered, and operational, the remote CIM portal database would be ever expanding and could not only tie in USAR CA SMEs but also active duty CA counterparts, interagency

experts, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs via the existing APAN structure. While RFIs could be inputted into this database on a daily basis, one of the large benefits of this system is that real time same day responses are not required. Since most CIM RFI deal with longer term civil sector challenges such as agricultural, farming, and education questions, responses are not necessarily as time sensitive.

A lag time of even a few weeks in receiving a response is acceptable. This process makes it particularly usefully for USAR CA units and their TPU Soldiers who only drill once a month. Responses could occur days or even weeks later and still be relevant in application. The distribution of BA dates across the calendar in different USACAPOC units would also mean that different FxSP subject matter experts from different commands would be able to provide feedback on these RFI throughout the month. The newly created project office could help monitor particular RFI that need a more immediate turn around.

The creation of a remote CIM portal would not only provide a strong link between theater based operations and stateside SMEs, it would also provide a monthly real world training opportunity for USAR CA staffs and organizations. A remote CIM portal, linked to an existing successful UISS such as APAN, is truly limitless in its collaboration possibilities. Different hierarchies could be created in the database for support of COCOM AORs, aligning them with USAR CACOMs already focused at particular regions.

Strategic Implications

Remote technology concepts, such as the remote CIM portal, support recent strategic guidance. TRA-DOC Pam 525-8-5, *U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement*, noted the importance of enhancing foreign security environments in a responsible, cost-effective manner that follows U.S. and partner interests.¹⁰ A remote CIM platform helps achieve CMO and CAO goals without the significant associated costs with having to put boots on the ground.

The concept of creating a remote CIM portal could be the missing link to not only link SMEs across DoD, but also interagency, intergovernmental, and NGO alike. By using APAN, SMEs have already been providing and proving the importance of strategic level help to many NGOs during disaster response and humanitarian scenarios. Extending a capability like APAN to help answer a variety of CIM RFIs would truly provide a unique reach back value added benefit to any COCOM. Again since this portal can be accessed from any COTS automation platform via an unclassified network, it has an ability to influence the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare.

Recommendations for a Way Ahead & Conclusion

Since this is a concept paper for a system that could potentially fill a DOTMLPF warfighting capability gap, the biggest recommendation for a way ahead is to establish a timeline for implementation of the three previously mentioned recommendations. A trial run of the system once developed could be conducted first with all USAR CA Soldiers. After initial training, these soldiers would establish user accounts in order to test the system for effectiveness and ease of collab-

orative use. Since the majority of these soldiers have skill sets from their civilian careers, it would give the system a wide enough SME pool to allow a variety of its functions tested. The system could then be on a live server connection with the COCOMs (given a handful of their staff officers also trained on how to use it). Later account access could be extended to SMEs from other DoD, interagency, intergovernmental, and NGOs. Finally, partners could also receive access. At each of these implementation windows there should be a variety of measures of effectiveness and performance that the system is tested on for its operational capability.

As we have seen in the analysis of this concept paper, there currently exists a DOTMLPF warfighting capability gap shortfall in two distinct areas: doctrine and material. This shortage is due to the lack of a system that can link CONUS SME capability with the end users supporting a COCOM AOR. The successful implementation of a remote CIM portal would also have the additional effect of further developing CIM doctrine and allowing the varied stake holders to become more involved in CAO and CMO goals. In line with the Lean Six Sigma process improvement concepts, a remote CIM portal would allow maximization of limited resources and ensure SMEs do continue to be non-utilized talent.

With a relatively modest initial expenditure for portal design development, training plus initial registration, and creation of a project office manager, USAR CA, interagency, intergovernmental, and non-governmental agency SMEs could truly directly impact the various COCOM missions to defeat violent extremist organizations and build civil component capacity without ever having to set additional boots on ground.

MAJ Marco A. Bongioanni has served as a Civil Affairs and Logistics Officer in a variety of assignments to include deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, and overseas tours to the Republic of Korea and the Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai, Egypt. He currently serves as the Executive Officer for 411th Civil Affairs Battalion, Danbury, CT. He is a licensed mental health counselor in his civilian career, working for the Department of Veteran's Affairs. The views expressed in this paper are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the U.S. Army.

Notes

1. George, Michael L. *Lean Six Sigma: Combining Six Sigma Quality with Lean Production Speed* McGraw-Hill; 1 edition (April 25, 2002).
2. TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, *U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement*, 24 FEB 2014.
3. JP 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*, 11 SEP 2013.
4. *Ibid*
5. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept*
6. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, OCT 2011.
7. ATP 3-57.70, *Civil-military operations Center*, MAY 2014.
8. Presidential Policy Directive 23, April 05 2013.
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Military Governance: The Essential Mission of Civil Affairs

Colonel (ret.) David Stott Gordon

“Military government, the administration by military officers of civil government in occupied enemy territory, is a virtually inevitable concomitant of modern warfare. The US Army conducted military government in Mexico in 1847 and 1848; in the Confederate states during and after the Civil War; in the Philippines, Porto (Puerto) Rico, and Cuba after the Spanish American War; and in the German Rhineland after World War I. In each instance, neither the Army nor the government accepted it as a legitimate military function. Consequently, its imposition invariably came as a somewhat disquieting experience for both, and the means devised for accomplishing it ranged from inadequate to near disastrous.”

--Earl F. Ziemke,
*The US Army in the Occupation
of Germany 1944-1946*¹

As Dr. Ziemke points out, the U.S. military, in particular the Army, has invariably been given the task of administering occupied or liberated territory after major combat operations, and (with the exception of World War II) invariably has been ill- or unprepared to carry out that task. In World War II, thanks largely to the experience in the Occupation of the Rhineland by US Army forces after the Armistice in World War I,² the Army made substantial preparations in terms of doctrine, training, and force structure to prepare for the occupation of the Axis nations and the civil administration of territories liberated from Axis occupation.³ While today's Army Civil Affairs (CA) forces are

the descendants of the CA and Military Government forces created prior to and during World War II, the capabilities required to carry out military government were shunned and neglected by DoD and the Army at large until the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq made it terribly clear that history was repeating itself: the U.S. was quite unprepared for the responsibilities of administering Iraq and supporting the government of Afghanistan, and the *ad hoc* means we devised once again “ranged from inadequate to near disastrous.”

As a consequence of now more than a dozen years of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have painfully learned numerous lessons about how to stabilize a country; however, we should have studied and understood these lessons well before the first U.S. boots hit the ground. It is possible that these lessons can be institutionalized in doctrine, training and force structure so that future leaders and commanders will not be unprepared as their predecessors have been. In furtherance of this goal, DoD has established the policy that it must maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of Civil Affairs operations, including actions that “establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.”⁴

A very positive development is that the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School has established the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG), which is in the process of studying and developing the doctrine, training, and force structure for providing military support to civil governments in future conflicts. In particular, the IMSG has focused on developing Civil Affairs specialists in military government (AOC 38G). This paper discusses what I believe to be the principal mission for which 38Gs must prepare.

Occupation is the Occupation: “We’ll Never Have To Do That Again” Or Will We?

While 38Gs may be deployed to support U.S. operations in a number of circumstances (security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, etc.) the scenario that is most important to the military is the environment that will exist in the immediate aftermath of major ground combat operations. In such an environment, it will be essential for the U.S. Government to be prepared to restore order to the civilian population in the vacuum that results from combat.⁵

While the idea of the U.S. being an occupying power may be politically, culturally, and socially untenable in our current environment, it can become an unavoidable necessity, given the geopolitical realities that we now face and may encounter in the not-too-distant future. A chronic problem of the U.S. military has been that we have failed to adequately prepare for such a necessity, and have massively failed because of that lack of preparedness; the initial occupation of Iraq in 2003 is a glaring example. Consider the following all-too-possible scenario:

President Putin invades the Baltic States, which are members of NATO. NATO decides to honor its commitments to protect the Baltic States from invasion, and mounts a counterattack. After fierce fighting carried out largely by the US Army and Marines, NATO ground and air forces force the Russian military out of the Baltics and secure a buffer zone within Russian territory. NATO also occupies the Kaliningrad Oblast of Russia, which has no land connection to the rest of Russia. Because of the disruption caused by the Russian invasion and occupation and the NATO counterattack, the governments of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are unable to administer their own territories or

provide essential government services to their populations, and will require months of reconstruction before they are able to perform those tasks. The Kaliningrad and the buffer zone within Russian territory are captured enemy territory, making the US and its NATO allies responsible for their governance under international law regarding occupation. Winter is coming, and there will be a massive humanitarian catastrophe if basic governmental services are not restored quickly.

There are of course many other readily foreseeable scenarios, as well as those that seem far-fetched now (much like the occupation of Iraqi territory in 1991 and 2003 would have seemed impossible in 1988).

Planning Assumptions

In practically any scenario, the following planning assumptions probably will be applicable:

- Critical government infrastructure will be damaged or destroyed by combat operations, looting, etc.
- Important public records may have been destroyed, damaged, or removed.
- Local national public employees will have either fled or will refuse to cooperate with American forces.
- In particular, police and other law-enforcement personnel will not be available to provide security and law enforcement services.
- U.S. forces personnel will not be fluent in the local language, necessitating numerous technically trained translators.

- The operational capacity of U.S. civilian agencies and international civilian actors to participate in administration of occupied/liberated territory will be very limited or non-existent initially and probably for a considerable time thereafter.⁶
- The environment will be insecure.

Legal and Practical Considerations

There are legal and practical considerations which mandate that the U.S. forces be prepared for occupation, restoration, and administration. The fundamental legal consideration is that the Occupying Power has a legal duty under The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Civilians Convention to administer the occupied territory, to include providing security, governance, law enforcement, judicial proceedings and enforcement, and other essential government services.⁷

The practical reason is that not being prepared for occupation administration creates a high risk that the occupied territory will lapse into anarchy and spawn widespread criminal activity, terrorism, and insurgency, as was clearly the result of the US lack of preparation for the occupation of Iraq.⁸

The Occupying Power must be prepared to carry out these responsibilities mandated by international law immediately upon taking control of the territory or any part thereof. Administration of occupied territory, in the aftermath of major combat operations, is a complex task requiring extensive preparation and resources; it cannot be an afterthought. Put simply, we cannot make our plans for military governance based on what resources we are able to spare for the project. Instead, we must realistically determine what is

necessary to restore and administer essential government services during and immediately after combat operations until such functions can be transferred to U.S. and international civilian personnel and/or local nationals.

Mission Essential: The Capability to Administer Governmental Systems

Thus, the capability to administer governmental systems is the mission essential element. It is relatively easy to advise; one person can visit different organizations every month or so, and claim those organizations have been successfully advised. However, the legal requirement is to *administer*, not advise. It is a completely separate issue to be able to administer the day-to-day functions of government in the absence of operating governmental institutions or when such institutions are severely crippled by conflict. And to administer, it is necessary for enough qualified personnel to be present on the ground to ensure that the mechanisms of government work. It is critical for long-term mission success to recognize and use “the Golden Hour:”

In post-conflict transition terminology, the golden hour refers to the first year after the end of hostilities. Unless the population senses steadily improving conditions in that first year, popular support for change and whoever is in charge declines, and the chances for economic, political, and social transformation begin to evaporate, enabling recidivism and even insurgencies.⁹

Historically, the burden of post-conflict administration has fallen on the military, particularly the

Army. Moore¹⁰ has described the history of American post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, which has been done almost exclusively by military personnel exercising governance functions. Patterson¹¹ has addressed some of the issues involved and lessons learned in military governance. Her paper uses the military government schools created during World War II as a potential model for training and education programs for contemporary military nation builders. She provides a useful summary of the historical data from the principal sources about American military government in World War I and World War II.

One fact that needs to be recognized is that the military's primary interest in an occupation or liberation scenario is not primarily to support development, but to have the capability and capacity to restore and administer existing governmental systems. As we have seen in the past, the military will be the agency of United States that will be tasked to restore essential governmental services because no other U.S. entity will be capable of doing so. Development efforts will come after basic services are restored. This is not to offer that many activities the military might be tasked to perform might be similar to development activities, and may--and should--support and facilitate subsequent development activities, but providing administration to restore governance is the basic requirement.¹²

Phases of Transitional Military Governance

I propose six phases to transitional military governance in an occupation/liberation scenario:

1. *Secure*: Take control and safeguard all important installations, records, administrative facilities, etc.
2. *Restore*: Reactivate critical systems, such as law enforcement, power, water and sanitation, food distribution, judicial functions.
3. *Administer*: Perform all the governmental functions necessary to provide critical services.
4. *Reconstitute*: Locate, vet, and negotiate with Host Nation (HN) government personnel to bring them back into the workforce, and, if necessary, bring in new hires to staff critical functions.
5. *Train, Mentor, and Advise*: Train local personnel so that they are better able to perform their jobs. Mentor them in order for them to become more confident and competent in their tasks. As more responsibility is transferred to local officials, advise them in performing their tasks.
6. *Disengage*: As local authorities become more capable of effectively executing the tasks of governance, US personnel progressively transfer all responsibility to the local authorities, disengage, and redeploy.

The Need for Generic Mission Analysis: What Does It Take to Run a Country?

Perhaps the most logical way to determine the proper qualifications for 38Gs would be to analyze the sorts of missions they would be called on to perform, and then determine the qualifications needed to do the tasks associated with the missions.

The basic governance mission is to be able to restore and administer all essential governmental services at the local, district, provincial and national lev-

els of an occupied territory. The logical first step (and this is a potentially large academic research project) is to understand what is necessary to provide the required governance in such a scenario. What are the tasks to be performed, and the sorts of skills required to do the tasks? How many people, and what and how much equipment, might be necessary? This Military Governance Requirements Research Project should be the precursor to the further development of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) relating to 38Gs.

Every country is different, but all countries have similar characteristics. For instance, governments tend to be organized in hierarchical structures. Most nations have a tiered governance structure (usually district, provincial, and national) with minor variations (*e.g.*, city, town or village, consolidated metropolitan level). There may also be tribal and other traditional governance structures, which may have an overlay of more formal structures with which they sometimes cooperate and sometimes compete.

It ought to be possible to analyze the governmental structures in several countries which might be conflict risks because of their locations, political and/or economic conditions. What sort of governance services do they currently provide? What are their systems for administration? How are they funded? How are their officials selected? What are the processes by which they interact with their populaces? What are the problems, such as corruption, discrimination, favoritism, lack of resources, or lack of authority, with which they must cope?

The goal of such research is not to prepare our personnel to administer those particular countries, but to attempt to make valid abstractions and generalizations which will allow 38Gs to understand a new country and develop feasible plans and programs to operate within it successfully. We cannot create 38Gs who are expert on every country; rather, we should be looking to formulate principles of analysis which we can teach to our 38G experts so that they can rapidly and accurately evaluate a new mission environment.

Note that the standard of governance in an occupation or liberation scenario is restoration of basic governmental services, such as delivery of food and water, basic health services, transportation and other infrastructure services, and public order services such as police and judicial functions. In most areas where we may have to operate, the services rendered by the local government are relatively rudimentary even in the best of times, so that is the standard for which we are seeking to achieve in an occupation or liberation.

Conclusions and Recommendation

In Afghanistan and Iraq, we spent years in painfully developing techniques, tactics, and procedures to assist and strengthen the governments of those countries. Many of the problems that we faced as conditions deteriorated would simply not be issues in the early phases of an occupation or civil administration, and possibly might never become issues if the proper steps are taken at the beginning. The temptation we will face is to structure our future doctrine and forces on the basis of the lessons that we most recently learned, rather than determining what lessons we should have learned before we began. It is important that we struc-

ture our doctrine and train and equip our personnel to be prepared to deal with the issues that exist during and immediately after major conflict, rather than limiting our scope to what they might need to know and be able to do after years of engagement in a mature theater.

CA and U.S. Government preparation to provide military support to governance suffered from neglect for many years. The U.S. Government and the military in particular had to pay a very high price for this neglect in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our nation needs to make the investment of both fiscal and intellectual capital needed to understand and prepare for the inevitable next time the U.S. military is required to govern foreign territory disrupted by war or disaster.

My recommendation is that the IMSG should take the lead to champion and coordinate the Military Governance Requirements Research Project described in this paper so that we adequately understand the nature and requirements of occupation and liberation administration. Once we satisfactorily understand the problem set, we can then develop the DOTMLPF needed.

Colonel (Ret) David Stott Gordon is a retired Army judge advocate officer with over 20 years' experience in Civil Affairs organizations. He is a graduate of the Judge Advocate Basic and Graduate courses, the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. His overseas service in Civil Affairs includes Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Storm and Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom. He is a rule of law and stability operations consultant for the Department of Defense.

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1. Erwin F. Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Army Historical Series), (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2003 reprint), page 3.

2. Erwin L. Hunt *et al.*, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918-1920* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943) (the “Hunt Report”).

3. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (United States Army in World War II, Special Studies), (Washington, DC: Office of The Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964).

4. DOD Directive 2000.13, Subject: Civil Affairs (March 11, 2014), Para. 3(5). It should be noted that this requirement to be able to execute military government is not included in TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, *US Army Functional Concept for Engagement* (24 Feb 2014), and needs to be added to that pamphlet.

5. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (2011, with changes 1 and 2, 2014), para. 2-59.

6. The scope of this paper has been very deliberately limited to what the US military can do in an occupation or liberation scenario, rather than propose an inter-agency solution. While other agencies of the US government will also participate in any occupation or liberation action, the capability and capacity of other agencies to participate in the early stages of an occupation or liberation will be quite limited; the other agencies, by their structures, mandates, staffing, and funding, are and will be very limited in their ability to plan and execute any operations to administer occupied or liberated territory. The optimum solution would be some sort of inter-agency process or organizational structure that was designed to function in an occupation or liberation administration; however, there is no such process or structure that exists today, nor does there appear that a viable system will be developed in the foreseeable future.

7. Hague Regulations (1907), Arts. 42-56; Geneva Civilians Convention (1949), Arts. 47-78.

8. See e.g., Ted Spain and Terry Turchie, *Breaking Iraq: The Ten Mistakes That Broke Iraq* (Palisades, NY: History Publishing Company, 2013); Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); David L. Phillips, *Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco* (Westview Press, 2005); Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).

9. James Stephenson, *Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider's View of Iraq's Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), page 36.

10. Richard Scott Moore, "Non-Traditional Missions, Civil Tasks, Military Forces, and Complex Operations," in Jon Gunder-
sen and Melanne Civic, *Unity of Mission*, Air University Press (2014).

11. Rebecca Patterson, *Revisiting a School of Military Government: How Reanimating a WWII-Era Institution Could Professionalize Military Nation Building*. Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Expeditionary Economics (June 2011) http://www.entrepreneurship.org/~media/Entrepreneurship/Files/Resource%20Center/EE%20Revisiting%20reportfinal_withphotos.pdf.

12. 38Gs will not be limited to providing administration in occupation/liberation situations. They may also engage in developmental advise and support activities as part of other types of missions not involving combat operations or occupation. But if the US has the qualified personnel and other resources needed for occupation, these assets can be used for other missions such as security assistance, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping when required.

Transforming CA Into a Phase Zero Force

Major Shafi Saiduddin

Success in the future operating environment will depend on the ability of Civil Affairs professionals to generate strategic effects in a Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) complex operations environment. Currently Army Civil Affairs, in terms of doctrine, training and force structure, is imbalanced towards a Phase 4 (Stability) post-conflict reconstruction mission.

The recent addition of Special Operations as an Army core competency is a recognition that current doctrine has not been completely successful in prosecuting population centric conflicts.¹ Culturally and structurally, our military is still primarily configured to fight World War II style conventional conflicts. As historian Max Boot illustrates in his book *Invisible Armies*, conventional conflicts are an aberration in the history of warfare. Historically, what we call irregular warfare has actually been the most regular form of warfare.² In the future, we are far more likely to engage in small wars than in maneuver warfare against an industrialized nation state. The role of the nation state itself is predicted to decline.

With the decentralization of information through the Internet and cell phones, the role of the civilian population in conflict is increasing and future conflicts will involve many types of non-state actors. Governance, or the lack thereof, will play a crucial role in how conflicts begin and are resolved. Influence will play a greater role in military operations than force. We are more likely to encounter conflicts in megacities which are not conducive to traditional concepts of military operations.³ As we have seen recently in Iraq

and Afghanistan, there are limitations on our ability to create stability by training host nation forces. Traditional military training exercises with partner nation forces may not be enough to disrupt a complex political awakening or influence a population.⁴

Our greatest challenge for the foreseeable future will remain countering violent extremist ideology. Without fully understanding regional and cultural dynamics and developing our ability to wage what can best be described as “political warfare,” we are likely to struggle with irregular conflicts while our adversaries wage unconventional warfare campaigns against us. In a resource-constrained national security environment, preventing future conflicts will be more important than our ability to dominate a maneuver battlefield. More importantly, there is a strong reluctance by policy makers, and the American public, to become involved in large scale counterinsurgency operations, limiting our strategic options.

In response to these challenges, the Army changed its operating concept from “AirLand Battle” to “Win in a Complex World.” An important part of this new operating concept is regional engagement.⁵

Engagement typically takes place in what we describe as “Phase 0,” the doctrinal term used to describe the steady state environment before a conflict begins. Phase 0 is also the time where potential conflicts can be identified and often mitigated before armed conflict ensues. Consistent with this concept, Civil Affairs (CA) personnel have the potential to take the lead in the Phase 0 environment, but the force as currently structured lacks the ability to take on this challenge. At present, approximately 84% of the total Army CA force is oriented towards supporting conventional forces engaged in high intensity warfare and post

conflict reconstruction activity. CA could also facilitate decisive strategic effects in Phase 0; however, this will require significant changes in terms of doctrine, training and force structure.

Both Army doctrine and National Security Strategy support expanding CA's role in Phase 0. The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement stresses the need for the Army to assess, shape, deter, and influence the behavior of a people, foreign security forces, and governments. It further describes the future role of the Army in a "Prevent, Shape and Win" construct, reinforcing the importance of conflict prevention.⁶ Building partner nation capacity, as illustrated by Presidential Policy Directive 23, Security Sector Assistance, is key to the *National Security Strategy*. One of the stated purposes of Security Sector Assistance is reducing the possibility that the United States or partner nations may be required to intervene abroad in response to instability. CA forces, by nature of their language and regional expertise are ideally suited as a Phase 0 force. CA forces are capable of conducting population centric operations, advising and assisting in governance and development, segmenting and fully understanding population dynamics in a region, and working in conjunction with units from peer Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) regiments such as Special Forces (SF) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) to influence a population while conducting Unconventional Warfare (UW) or Foreign Internal Defense (FID). CA can become the focal point for military integration into the Interagency domain, allowing whole of government efforts to succeed.

Most significantly, CA can have wide reach into a population, interacting with civilian authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public health

officials, and a wide range of private sector actors, as well as host nation government and military. This extended reach gives CA unique potential to develop networks and shape the environment well beyond the confines of a traditional combined military exercise. By building networks CA can set the stage for a coordinated UW campaign or a counter-UW campaign. CA can also prevent future conflicts by identifying causes of instability and directing resources towards mitigating unstable conditions.

Changes are ultimately needed in CA force structure. A significant difficulty in planning the future CA force is that the service lacks a comprehensive theory for CA. This is not unexpected, as the development of a theory for Special Operations is a relatively new endeavor.⁷ As CA is a core Special Operations capability, it follows that a theory for CA will mean it nests within a larger theory of Special Operations. The need for a comprehensive theory of Special Operations is illustrated by the disconnect between definitions of Special Operations and actual capabilities. Joint Publication 3-05 currently defines Special Operations as: "operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk."

This definition is based on tactical capabilities, and leans more to kinetic, rather than shaping, operations. It has resulted in an inadequate conceptualization of how SOF can be utilized to achieve strategic effects. The use of Special Operations has grown dramati-

cally in recent years, but their use has not yet been translated into a new way of war.⁸ The definition of Unconventional Warfare is likewise extremely narrow and tactically focused. Our current definition of UW is: activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. A “traditional” UW campaign that meets all the parameters of this definition is a rare occurrence. Far more common are long term UW campaigns waged by both nation state and non-state adversaries against the U.S. and partner nations in a Phase 0 environment⁹.

A more accurate definition of Special Operations has been suggested by Col. Cory M. Peterson, winner of the Joint Special Operations University 2014 essay contest: “Special Operations are tactical activities which result in political and strategic-level effects. Special Operations are conducted by highly trained and educated operators due to the significant, primarily political, risk of mission failure or exposure.”¹⁰ Moving toward a theory Special Operations requires developing a corresponding theory of CA that will likely follow a parallel line of thought focused on tactical activities that lead to strategic outcomes. This is precisely the intent of CA’s role in conflict prevention. Rather than merely shaping an environment for future operations, CA has the potential to significantly impact the strategic environment.

The lack of a comprehensive theory for CA has also led to misunderstandings within the military and even within the CA community as to what CA is and what it does. Divisions within the force, such as SOF CA versus conventional CA, and tactical general-

ist versus functional specialist, contribute to this and create confusion for joint force commanders, chiefs of mission and civilian policy makers alike, as to the exact capabilities they have at their disposal. A superficial understanding of the true capabilities of CA leads to a perception that CA is only a maneuver enabler or a post-conflict force used to rebuild a nation and transition it to civil authority. This perspective can result in a very myopic “project focused” use of CA, as metrics, such as numbers of projects and dollars spent, can be easily quantified and tracked. However, as the final report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction illustrates, money spent and numbers of projects do not necessarily translate into effects.¹¹

This confusion has been compounded by a bias towards lethal, or “kinetic”, operations, such as direct action, within the SOF community. As a decade plus of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated, neither direct action, nor training indigenous combat forces to a U.S. standard, have been successful in achieving stability. Our ability to influence populations and counter violent extremist ideology remains limited. SOF leaders have recognized this and Army Special Operations Forces doctrine has been reorganized into two mutually supporting concepts, Special Warfare and Surgical Strike. Special Warfare is defined as the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. Surgical Strike is defined as “the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations

forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence threats.”¹² These doctrine changes create a more clearly defined role for CA within Special Operations, but are sufficiently broad enough that they do not constrain CA to a particular role or phase of an operation.

A prerequisite for influencing a population is achieving a deep understanding of culture, social or tribal dynamics, local forms of governance and politics. Furthermore, this understanding must be actionable, moving beyond the typical area study and involving lasting relationships with government and military officials as well as influential non state actors. There is a limit to how much this effort can be achieved through episodic engagement such as traditional military exercises. CA teams, working out of an embassy on a rotational basis, are in a perfect position to develop both this deep understanding and lasting relationships, and to translate these into coordinated action by working with a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) to develop plans supporting national strategy.

Key to changing the role of CA in supporting Phase 0 operations is adding Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) to the list of CA core tasks. OPE is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as the conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the operational environment.¹³ Current CA core tasks include: Populace and Resources Control (PRC); Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA); Civil Information Management (CIM); Nation Assistance (NA); and Support to Civil Administration (SCA). While many of the activities CA conducts during Phase 0 fall within these existing core tasks, no sin-

gle task clearly conveys to a non-CA commander what CA's actual role is in Phase 0. The purpose of CA persistent engagement is to secure a strategic advantage for the United States, to prevent future conflict, and shape the environment for anticipated operations. OPE describes the intent of CA engagement activities to joint force commanders far more accurately than either Nation Assistance (NA) or Support to Civil Administration (SCA). Assigning OPE as a core task of CA is also consistent with the recent changes in ARSOF doctrine delineating the responsibilities of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike. OPE is one subset of the umbrella term Preparation of the Environment (PE). The other subset of PE is Advanced Force Operations (AFO), which are operations conducted to refine the location of specific, identified targets and further develop the operational environment for near-term missions. AFO supports targeting for kinetic Surgical Strike operations while OPE includes the development of networks and collection of information by CA that could support the Special Warfare missions of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense.

The Phase 0 mission will also require additions to the current active duty CA training pipeline of selection, language, regional studies and core CA skills. Persistent engagement involves small teams operating in uncertain environments outside a traditional military support structure. Author David Kilcullen describes the capability as "early entry or high threat humanitarian and governance teams."¹⁴ CA teams have the ability to go places where Department of State civilians cannot without a large protective detail. Tactical proficiency for a CA team must be on par with a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA), though the focus will be different. While an

ODA is primarily focused on training and fighting alongside a guerrilla or partner nation force, a CA team must focus on individual and team survivability in a low signature environment. Threats faced may include insurgents, terrorists, foreign intelligence services and common criminals. As part of the only U.S. military present in some regions, the ability to blend seamlessly with other SOF teams and form a Crisis Response Element (CRE) or Quick Reaction Force (QRF) when needed, adds value in the eyes of commanders and chiefs of mission. Advanced marksmanship, high threat driving and surveillance detection are all examples of the skills required. Active duty SOF CA conducts this type of training, however the Phase 0 environment includes regionally aligned conventional forces as well. Advanced tactical training should be incorporated into the qualification pipeline for all CA soldiers.

The 2006 separation of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the designation of Army Reserve CA as “conventional” has often been blamed for the force structure imbalance. However, the problem existed prior to 2006. At that time there were only four CA battalions in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) with a dedicated SOF mission, these were designated Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare (FID/UW) battalions. The majority of USAR CA battalions were designated as General Purpose and configured to support conventional maneuver units. The only active duty unit, the 96th CA battalion, was designated as General Support and intended as an early-entry SOF CA capability working with both SOF and conventional forces.¹⁵ Before 2006, there was already a

training and capability gap between the SOF CA FID/UW battalions and the General Purpose battalions. Now that the SOF CA mission exists entirely on the active duty side and active duty CA has a selection and assessment course and a comprehensive qualification course, that gap has widened considerably.

While the active component SOF CA element has expanded from one to five battalions with the creation of the 95th CA brigade, the net SOF CA force structure has not increased from the pre-2006 levels (96th plus four FID/UW battalions). At the same time, the SOF mission has expanded to include the Civil-Military Engagement program. SOF CA Civil Military Support Elements (CMSEs) now work on a rotational basis out of Embassies and conducting persistent engagement in support of the Global SOF Network. The 95th also continues the FID/UW missions supporting Theater Special Operations Commands and maintaining a UW focused CA capability. The active component 85th CA brigade and all of USACAPOC are designated as 'conventional' and unable to support the CMSE mission or TSOC requirements, including the FID/UW mission. It goes without saying that the engagement mission will need to be targeted judiciously, but it will also require an increased number of units available for tasking.

Rebalancing the force toward Phase 0 operations, necessarily involves accepting risk in other mission areas. The Phase 4, post-conflict reconstruction, mission for CA is still important, however, a new paradigm is needed to mitigate risk and allow CA to conduct this mission more effectively thereby reducing the numbers of CA forces required. In order for CA to achieve strategic effects in conjunction with partnered forces, the CA force must consist of experienced, highly

skilled, language trained, regional experts. This level of training cannot take place overnight and will result in a continual shortage of qualified CA personnel. Furthermore, the troop to task alignment needs to be more flexible than the current construct that aligns a CA battalion with a brigade combat team. This alignment often results in either too little or too many CA soldiers tasked against a problem set.¹⁶ To be fair, this concept of integration was developed for high intensity warfare when maneuver forces are not focused on Civil Military Operations (CMO) and minimizing civilian interference with operations is considered more of a priority than influencing a population. Additionally, institutional knowledge of CMO has historically been limited within maneuver forces. Much has changed in the training and experience of maneuver officers over the past decade of conducting Counterinsurgency (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operating in the human domain is now part of maneuver institutional training. Today's maneuver officers are so well versed in COIN that senior leaders in the maneuver community have concerns that the schoolhouse has not been focusing enough on high intensity warfare.

The time is right to build on this knowledge and further institutionalize CMO within the conventional force. The new Army Operating Concept stresses the concept of Regionally Aligned Brigades. This necessitates a closer relationship with regionally aligned Special Warfare forces, and the issue of Special Operations Forces - Conventional Forces - Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (SOF-CF-JIIM) integration is a priority topic for senior leadership. A framework for integration has been outlined in the Strategic Landpower white paper and developed further through joint exercises such as Silent Quest.¹⁷

True interdependence will involve hybrid planning and command structures at the strategic and operational levels.

One possible solution at the tactical level is to bring back the CMO planner course and skill identifier. This former opportunity was a two to three week course taught at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) covering the basics of CA, CMO and operational planning. It could easily be a requirement for maneuver officers at the captain and major ranks. The current Reserve Component Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) with its combination of distance learning and a four-week resident phase can easily be modified to fill this requirement and taught through mobile training teams. A robust S9, Civil-military operations staff section at the maneuver battalion and brigade levels is also required for commander to effectively conduct CMO, however, ongoing personnel shortages in the CA regiment limit the ability to effectively staff, let alone expand, S9 sections. The CMO planner skill identifier would allow maneuver units to fully staff these sections 'in-house' and would effectively institutionalize CMO at the tactical level. Other units that could benefit from the CMO planner designator and expanded S9 sections include theater engineer and medical units, as these units are most often used in large scale humanitarian operations. Recognizing that CA tactical units are a limited commodity, they can best be managed at the operational level through the combination of hybrid strategic/operational planning structures, an expanded S9 section at the maneuver tactical level, and when necessary, CA qualified SOF Liaison Elements (SOFLEs) attached to maneuver units.

In a time of active duty “downsizing,” a comprehensive restructuring of Reserve Component CA will be necessary. At present, the majority of the force structure imbalance exists in the Army Reserve. With active duty CA remaining at zero growth at best, or even shrinking, the reserve component will need to train for Phase 0 operations. Army Reserve CA forces will likely be restructured following the implementation of the 38G Military Government Specialist career field. Creation of this career field, consisting of civil sector experts, was intended to correct the imbalance between CA generalists and functional specialists. Historically, tactical generalists and functional specialists were placed under the same career field and this has limited the capabilities of both. The development of the 38G career field creates an opportunity to restructure and “right-size” the Reserve Component and this restructuring also provides a venue to transition some CA tactical units to match active duty SOF CA capabilities and reconfigure others to better support conventional forces.

One area of concern is the Reserve Component’s ability to recruit and train soldiers to succeed in the active component pipeline, a key requirement for developing a Phase 0 capability. However, there is already an established process within National Guard Special Forces that can be adapted to the needs of CA. Reserve component Special Forces has already gone through a similar evolution. From the 1960s through the 1980s, reserve component SF qualification was achieved through a variety of methods, from on the job training to a correspondence course program, while active duty SF went through the full resident course. This dual training standard within the force led to a gap in rapport and trust between active and

reserve component SF. During that time, reserve SF had a very limited role in real world operations, and integration with their active component counterparts was poor.¹⁸

In 1990 the Reserve Component training pipeline was eliminated and all SF soldiers were required to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and the active component Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). In order to increase the success rates of soldiers going through the pipeline, reserve component SF units created training detachments to assess volunteers and prepare them for the schools. The actual processes used to evaluate and recruit are decentralized and units can develop training programs that work for them. Typically, the programs involve some sort of a “tryout” to assess volunteers, and then a training program conducted during monthly drills to prepare these volunteers for the rigors of SFAS. Success rates for some units have been up to 90%.¹⁹

Another method used by National Guard SF was recruiting SF qualified soldiers leaving active duty. The combination of these methods has allowed National Guard SF to maintain strength and readiness through a decade of continuous deployments. It must, however, be noted that reserve component SF is considerably smaller today than it was 30 years ago. The two USAR SF Groups were deactivated in the early 1990s and there are only two SF Groups in the National Guard. The difference is that the two National Guard Groups are full partners with their active duty counterparts and are involved nearly seamlessly in any operation requiring Army Special Forces.

The new Army Operating Concept correctly identifies the future operating environment as complex. Traditional military solutions are unlikely to produce

acceptable results. By identifying unstable conditions and leveraging whole of government efforts to deal with them before they become a problem, we have the potential to avoid large scale deployments that can be costly in lives and resources. In a resource constrained national security environment, the need for regional experts who can thrive in complex environments and work seamlessly with international civilian and military partners has never been greater.

Army CA, with changes in doctrine, training, and force structure, can fill this role, based on the following recommendations:

1. Add Operational Preparation of the Environment to the list of core CA tasks. This is consistent with current doctrine and employment of CA and will clearly define CA's Phase 0 capabilities to supported entities.
2. Develop a new paradigm to enable CF to conduct CMO more effectively. This change will mitigate risk to the Phase 4 mission and allow changing the balance of the CA force. Support to conventional units is best provided through better SOF-CF-JIIM interdependence and the development of hybrid command and planning structures at the strategic and operational levels as well as expanded S9 sections at the tactical level. This will also support the regional alignment of conventional forces.
3. Re-purpose the Reserve Component CAQC into a non-branch qualifying CMO Planner course for CF soldiers and expand S9 sections at the maneuver battalion and brigade levels in order to institutionalize CMO within maneuver forces. Employing CA qualified liaison elements with CF will solidify this interdependence.

4. Incorporate Phase 0 specific advanced tactical skills into the CA training pipeline to increase the survivability and operational effectiveness of CA teams working in a Phase 0 environment.
5. Restructure USAR CA forces significantly and reconfigure a portion of them to match active duty SOF CA training and capabilities. Utilize established National Guard Special Forces methods of recruiting and training to enable Reserve Component soldiers to complete the active duty training pipeline.

MAJ Shafi Saiduddin served in Civil Affairs for 14 years. He deployed as a CA Team Leader with the Combined, Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) and as a Current Operations Officer (J33)/ Future Operations Planner (J5) with the Special Operations Command and Control Element - Horn of Africa (SOCCE-HOA). He also served as an assistant instructor for 3rd BN 1st Special Warfare Training Group. MAJ Saiduddin is currently the Group Civil Military Operations Officer (S9) at 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne). The views expressed in this paper are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), Army National Guard or the U.S. Army.

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