



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ANALYSIS OF C3 COUNTERINSURGENCY-INSPIRED
POLICING AND THE FLIP SIDE OF THE COIN**

by

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December 2014

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FLIP SIDE OF THE COIN**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

The Massachusetts State Police Special Projects Team instituted a new strategy named “Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing” late in 2009 in an attempt to address the escalation of gang-related violence in the North End of Springfield. The perceived success of this initiative has prompted calls for its expansion into other high-crime areas of the city. However, there is an undercurrent of concern among critics of the military nexus in social science research and application; they warn that applying a counterinsurgency approach in domestic law enforcement, regardless of how it is labeled, risks casting local communities as hostile populations. Therefore, a current and objective analysis of the true effect of the C3 counterinsurgency inspired policing strategy is needed before its planned expansion. Research for this thesis utilized a single case study limited to quality-of-life indicators before and after the implementation of C3 for the gang-related problem. The advantage of this control is that the data spanned from 2007–2014 as C3 commenced in the fall of 2009. The review of quantitative data collected from various police and city sources revealed a neighborhood trending in a positive direction since the implementation of C3, but that not all indicators across the board were able to support this conclusion.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMR	American Medical Response
C3	Counter Criminal Continuum
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	counterinsurgency
COMPSTAT	Compliant Statistics
CORE	Common Operational Research Environment
DOJ	Department of Justice
ER	emergency room
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCB	Financial Control Board
FM 3–24	U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual
GED	General Educational Development
I-91	Interstate 91
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MSP	Massachusetts State Police
SPD	Springfield Police Department
SPS	Springfield Public School System
UK	United Kingdom
ULI	Urban Land Institute
U.S.	United States

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

As a result of its drugs- and gang-related violence, in 2011, the city of Springfield, Massachusetts was ranked the twelfth most violent city in the United States, according to data gathered from the Uniform Crime Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).¹ The rise in violence followed the inundation of gangs in the city. Since 2009, the number of identified organized gangs that have chapters in Springfield has risen sharply. In a single year, the number climbed from 28 to 37 gangs, bringing the city's gang membership to more than 2,800 people.² Arriving around 2009 in the North End of Springfield in particular, was a gang called Los Boricuas that came from a mountainous region in Puerto Rico and set up criminal operations including rampant open air drug markets, strong arm robberies, and intimidation. This led to a turf battle between them and the existing local gangs over who would control that territory. It culminated in several shootings and murders. This gang was exerting its control through intimidation and went so far as to have lookouts riding around on motor scooters with an SKS rifle strapped on their backs. Gang members were walking into stores and taking whatever they wanted while flashing guns to the clerks. None of these crimes were being reported because there was a level of apathy and fear in the community.

Much like insurgents in a failed state, gangs thrive on community apathy, an environment wrought of fear, despair, or indifference in which the population in these areas passively permits continued criminal activity and undermines policing efforts. To alleviate these conditions, select police departments around the country have begun to adapt counterinsurgency (COIN) inspired tactics that are based on several principles, including building and maintaining legitimacy within the community, emphasizing

¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Preliminary Annual Uniform Crime Report* (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011).

² BJA FY 13 Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program: Application," City of Springfield Massachusetts, Springfield, MA, 2013 [submitted to Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice], https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/byrne_c3_2.pdf

intelligence-driven operations, and focusing on unity of effort among all service providers.³

The Massachusetts State Police (MSP) Special Projects Team instituted a new policing method in the fall of 2009, called “Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing,” to help address gang crime in the North End of Springfield, one of the most depressed neighborhoods of the city. C3 policing was advanced by troopers returning from the overseas war on terror with specialized skill sets, adapting COIN principles originally developed to battle insurgents by Army Special Forces (Green Berets) to domestically target gangs. Based on these principles, C3 aimed to build rapport with the community and underscore unity of effort among the community, local police, and state police.

C3 policing is designed around a campaign plan that utilizes eight building blocks as the foundation of the program. These blocks are: gang demobilization, community outreach meetings, street leader program, youth and parental workshops, anti-gang messaging/information operations, business and community leader development, law enforcement and civil community engagements, and law enforcement operations.⁴ The end state of the process, ideally, is a re-shaping of the community environment, which makes it inhospitable for gangs, drugs, and violent criminal behavior.

Research Question

An objective and current analysis of the true effect of the C3 counterinsurgency inspired policing model on the community is needed. Which metrics of change in the quality of life within the North End of Springfield most accurately assess the efficacy of C3 counterinsurgency inspired policing? More broadly, is there a “flip side of the COIN”? That is, are there unintended consequences associated with the C3 policing model?

³ Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3–24), (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf>, 23.

⁴ “BJA FY 13 Bryne Criminal Justice Innovation Program: Application,” 15.

Problem Statement

The C3 policing model marks a significant departure from the way policing has traditionally been conducted in the North End of Springfield. Past practices of traditional and community policing models have been unsuccessful, creating the need for the implementation of the C3 model. C3 may, or may not be more expensive to support, but it most certainly does require reprioritizing budget decisions and outlays. It could quite possibly affect the way the department trains and equips the members or possibly even the way officers for certain positions are recruited. Meanwhile, it is yet to be seen whether the C3 method of policing has shown convincing, positive, measurable results in terms of the quality of life in this area.

However, there is an undercurrent of concern among critics of the military nexus in social science research and application; they warn that applying a counterinsurgency approach in domestic law enforcement, regardless of how it is labeled, risks casting local communities as hostile populations. Such overused terms as “the war on crime,” “the war on drugs,” or “the war on terror” exacerbate this blurring of the lines and the civil-military and practical problems that arise in the process. The same is true for the journalistic and professional commonplace practice of police calling many urban areas combat or war zones.

Events in Ferguson, Missouri at the time of the writing of this thesis provide an opportunity to engage in a public conversation and reflect upon issues like race relations, civility, and the kind of communities in which we wish to live. In that case, a young man lost his life as the result of a police action, and the response to the ensuing civil disobedience by law enforcement has highlighted law enforcement tactics and the militarization of the police. How the police respond to large-scale disturbances and misinformed perceptions with respect to the 1033 Program, which makes military surplus equipment available to local law enforcement agencies, should not be allowed to hijack the conversation.⁵ So before we allow the discussion to be derailed by those engaged in lawlessness or by well-intended academics, social activists, or the media, it is time to

⁵ Timothy Alben, “The ‘Militarization’ of Police: Another Perspective,” *Boston Herald*, October 25, 2014.

explore and reveal the perceptions of the public in this community that we are duty-bound to protect—those who are the real stakeholders.⁶

With all this in mind, is it possible to promote a positive collaboration and interaction with community leaders and residents with the C3 approach? Does this method help or hinder our efforts of providing a safe environment through police-citizen partnerships, with an emphasis on mutual trust, integrity, fairness, and professionalism?

Hypothesis

If the C3 method of policing has been effective in countering gang activity, then there should be a measurable change in crime, and the overall quality of life should show improvement. To test this hypothesis, data was collected from various published city and neighborhood sources to analyze the effects of C3 policing on the community. Indicators, such as litter, graffiti, crime statistics, economy, housing, and crime-related medical calls, should afford a broader understanding of the actual effects on the community than crime statistics alone could provide. Springfield provides a unique research opportunity in this regard because it has more than five years of statistical data, raw information, and documentation of the implementation of the C3 effort.

The metrics analyzed thus far have been completely based on quantitative indicators. This is typically how COIN-based strategies are graded.⁷ The recognized standard has been using two categories to assess this data. The first is an effects-based assessment that requires researchers to track the results of specific events in the target area over time and build a picture of campaign momentum. The second is pattern and trends analysis that identify various metrics for study and also identifies trends in each over time. That is why the metrics for the two years preceding C3 and four to five years since the implementation were collected. This classic COIN approach is similar to the methods used in this study. It must be remembered though, that the debate continues

⁶Ibid.

⁷ Mike Few, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Metrics in Small Wars,” *Small Wars Journal*, April 15, 2011, SJW Blog, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/lies-damn-lies-and-metrics-in-small-wars>

regarding the correct method of analyzing COIN efforts, and no single model has yet been deemed appropriate.⁸

Reviewing the results of this case study revealed some expected and unexpected outcomes. Although there were some clear and definitive trends, there were also indiscernible ones as well. Most of the economic and some of the health data were unsuccessful in showing positive trends. However, examples of school impacts, such as truancy rates and delinquency, show positive signs. Looking at crime through arrests and calls for service reveal a neighborhood that is becoming more involved with law enforcement and that perhaps trust and legitimacy are indeed being established since the implementation of C3. Increased community involvement was also apparent in the political realm as the number of registered voters continued to climb; this is sometimes an indicator of “voting for a change.” Lastly, positive trends were apparent in both instances of graffiti and litter, which indicates that this community is making it less hospitable for gang activity to develop and flourish.

Findings

Although some argue quite convincingly a contradictory view, the violence, drug activity, and criminal behavior that we see in Springfield’s North End do not constitute an insurgency. Criminal gangs have no ideology beyond their own profit, no political aspirations what so ever, and only achieve passive community support through violence or intimidation. Gangs are nothing more than basic criminal entities. Some COIN principles and practices can, however, support the current law-enforcement strategy aimed to detect, deter, and degrade gangs. The effectiveness of these efforts seem to depend more on deepening reciprocal trust and building legitimacy in the police than perhaps on the application of all of the lessons learned overseas during the global war on terror to Springfield’s inner city neighborhoods.

Without a doubt, COIN strategy is a military strategy; however, the basic skills of working with and through the community, intelligence driving operations, and conducting investigations are all fundamental law enforcement practices. Through many

⁸ Ibid.

conflicts, the military has learned and honed these specific skills, eventually applying them with success through their special operations communities (U.S. Army Special Forces Green Berets). Now is the time for new ideas, such as C3 policing that examines these practices and creates that which has always been missing in community policing: a defined strategy to confront criminal street gangs. C3's COIN gang strategy provides the advantage of strong agency and community relationships to identify, target, and remove the gangs through the use of intelligence driven operations. When properly administered and executed, this strategy of intelligence-driven targeting and operations should be the most effective and efficient means to detect, deter, degrade, and dismantle criminal gang activity in the city of Springfield.

Policy Recommendations

The recent appointment of a new police commissioner in the city of Springfield has prompted the request for a city wide expansion of the C3 program. Prior to such a commitment by the department, the following recommendations are made based upon the information revealed in this thesis:

Recommendation

Based upon the findings contained within this thesis, the selection of prospective officers for any C3 assignment should take into account the multidisciplinary skills required of COIN inspired policing, many of which may not be obtained in traditional law enforcement training. The current C3 team was hand selected based upon prior experience both in law enforcement and military deployments, language, and technical skills. The tasks and organization of the team are unique to the mission, tactical situation, and the technical, cultural, and social terrain. Therefore, training should be developed and offered to reflect the department's commitment to this initiative if our expectations are to entertain its expansion. Failure to commit the proper personnel with the appropriate skills, training, and motivation could ultimately result in the failure of this proposed expansion.

Recommendation

The research shows that in regard to expanding C3 into new communities, law enforcement should seek invitation and permission from the community prior to commencing operations. The neighborhood should be the initiator of the contact as opposed to being arbitrarily selected by either law enforcement or the city administration. The community must have a desired interest in the outcome and be willing to be an active participant in the effort. It is imperative to its success that law enforcement is able to identify and work with the true local leaders and to enlist the support of local community groups. Building legitimacy is crucial to achieving these goals. Ultimately, the ability to mobilize the population against the gang problem depends on good relations between the community and police. Ideally, the end state of the process is a re-shaping of the community environment to make it inhospitable for gangs, drugs, and violent criminal behavior.

Recommendation

For C3 policing to succeed, a multidisciplinary team of law enforcement, public health, public works, school officials, and non-government organizations should be assembled and mobilized in the planning phases before operations commence. This “working group” should conduct a mission analysis and develop an “implementation plan” including, but not limited to, the following:

- Analyze the community’s concerns
- Analyze the departments mission, intent, and expectations
- Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks
- Determine constraints, prohibitions, and restrictions
- Construct a timeline with stated goals
- Develop themes and messages (intra-agency, inter-agency, media, and public)
- Establish course of action evaluation criteria (metrics)
- Conduct a cost analysis to explore the feasibility of implementation

Recommendation

Critics of the military nexus in social science research and application warn that applying a counterinsurgency approach in domestic law enforcement, regardless of how it is labeled, risks casting local communities as hostile populations. Over used terms, such as “the war on crime,” “the war on drugs,” “the war on terror” add to this perception, as do articles quoting police calling many urban areas combat or war zones. It is essential we make every effort to promote the positive collaboration and interaction with community leaders and residents to promote our message of providing a safe environment through police-citizen partnership with an emphasis on mutual trust, integrity, fairness, and professionalism.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I sincerely wish to thank my thesis advisors, Dr. Carolyn Halladay and Dr. Donald Abenheim for their guidance, insight, assistance, inspiration and patience.

Like so many other projects, this one was started alone, but seeing it through to completion required the help of many others. This thesis would not have been possible without the support and understanding of my wife, Sandy, and the invaluable constructive criticism, guidance, and friendly advice of my core support group throughout every step of the Naval Postgraduate experience: Roy Brush, Mark MacDonnell, James Ricciuti, and Lee Smithson. While this program may be ending, the comradery and professional bond I have with these individuals as well as all my classmates will continue. I wish that all who started on this journey could have seen it to the conclusion.

I would also like to thank the Massachusetts State Police and Springfield Police Departments' C3 Team for their openness and willingness to assist me with this research. Every day, they search for new and innovative ways to protect our citizens from "the evil that men do." Without their time and knowledge this project would not have been possible. I especially wish to thank Trooper Mike Cutone, whose expertise and enthusiastic support of the subject matter was a welcome bridge over gaps in the available literature.

I am humbled to have been in the presence of instructors and classmates who I believe are world-changers. The motivation for this thesis was fueled by my desire and passion to see continued innovation within the field of law enforcement and an investment in long-term strategies in the field of homeland security.

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I. INTRODUCTION

As a result of its drug- and gang-related violence, in 2011, the city of Springfield, Massachusetts was ranked the twelfth-most violent city in the United States, according to data gathered from the Uniform Crime Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).¹ The rise in violence followed the inundation of gangs in the city. Since 2009, the number of identified organized gangs that have chapters in Springfield has risen sharply. In a single year, the number climbed from 28 to 37 gangs, bringing the city's gang membership to more than 2,800 people.² Arriving around 2009 in the North End of Springfield in particular, was a gang called Los Boricuas that came from a mountainous region in Puerto Rico and set up criminal operations including rampant open air drug markets, strong arm robberies, and intimidation. This led to a turf battle between them and the existing local gangs over who would control that territory. It culminated in several shootings and murders. This gang was exerting its control through intimidation and went so far as to have lookouts riding around on motor scooters with an SKS rifle strapped on their backs. Gang members were walking into stores and taking whatever they wanted while flashing guns to the clerks. None of these crimes were being reported because there was a level of apathy and fear in the community.

Much like insurgents in a failed state, gangs thrive on community apathy, an environment wrought of fear, despair, or indifference in which the population in these areas passively permits continued criminal activity and undermines policing efforts. To alleviate these conditions, select police departments around the country have begun to adapt counterinsurgency (COIN) inspired tactics that are based on several principles, including building and maintaining legitimacy within the community, emphasizing

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² "BJA FY 13 Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program: Application," City of Springfield Massachusetts, Springfield, MA, 2013 [submitted to Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice], https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/byrne_c3_2.pdf

intelligence-driven operations, and focusing on unity of effort among all service providers.³

The Massachusetts State Police (MSP) Special Projects Team instituted this new policing method in the fall of 2009, naming it “Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing,” to help address gang crime in the North End of Springfield, one of the most depressed neighborhoods of the city. C3 policing was advanced by troopers returning from the overseas war on terror with specialized skill sets, adapting COIN principles originally developed to battle insurgents by Army Special Forces (Green Berets) to domestically target gangs. Based on these principles, C3 aimed to build rapport with the community and underscore unity of effort among the community, local police, and state police.

C3 policing is designed around a campaign plan that utilizes eight building blocks as the foundation of the program: gang demobilization, community outreach meetings, street leader program, youth and parental workshops, anti-gang messaging/information operations, business and community leader development, law enforcement and civil community engagements, and law enforcement operations.⁴ Ideally, the end state of the process is a re-shaping of the community environment, which would make it inhospitable for gangs, drugs, and violent criminal behavior.

The C3 strategy aims to detect, deter, and degrade criminal activity. Legitimacy and trust are developed by working with and through the community and empowering community members to take ownership of problems and issues that lead to criminal activity. C3 policing provides leadership and unity of effort, synchronizing existing local, state, and federal resources and directing them at the root causes of criminal activity, rather than reacting to the symptoms.

³ Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3–24), (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf>, 23.

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A. RESEARCH QUESTION

An objective and current analysis of the true effect of the C3 counterinsurgency inspired policing model on the community is needed. Which metrics of change in the quality of life within the North End of Springfield most accurately assess the efficacy of C3 counterinsurgency inspired policing? More broadly, is there a “flip side of the COIN”? That is, are there unintended consequences associated with the C3 policing model?

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

There is extensive research being conducted at the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab in Monterey, California to determine if we can ever accurately measure progress or failure in the application of COIN. This type of research is funded throughout the country by grants such as the Minerva Initiative, an investment endorsed by the Secretary of Defense as a 21st century effort to promote collaboration between the military and social sciences to find better solutions in modern conflict. This highlights the debate that continues regarding the fact that there is no single model deemed appropriate yet to measure the efficacy of COIN efforts.⁵

Supervisory Special Agent Michael Stansbury, speaking on the seriousness of gangs, noted that an estimated one million gang members are infiltrating the nation’s communities. The FBI calls them “urban terrorists.”⁶ Gangs and gang violence are found throughout the world, much like radical and extremist groups.⁷ The philosophy of C3 is that there is more convergence across criminal and extremist groups than divergence, and that knowledge about the structure and processes of street gangs can inform our understanding of extremist groups and vice-versa.

The C3 policing model marks a significant departure from the way policing has traditionally been conducted in the North End of Springfield. Past practices of traditional

⁵ Mike Few, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Metrics in Small Wars,” *Small Wars Journal*, April 15, 2011, SJW Blog, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/lies-damn-lies-and-metrics-in-small-wars>

⁶ Mollie Halpern, and Michael Stansbury, *FBI: This Week: Gang Violence* (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011), <http://www.fbi.gov/news/podcasts/inside/gangs-1.mp3/view>

⁷ Scott H. Decker, and David C. Pyrooz, “Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture, and Country,” in *Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 129.

and community policing models have been unsuccessful, creating the need for the implementation of the C3 model. C3 may, or may not be more expensive to support, but it most certainly does require reprioritizing budget decisions and outlays. It could quite possibly affect the way the department trains and equips the members or possibly even the way officers for certain positions are recruited. Meanwhile, it is yet to be seen whether the C3 method of policing has shown convincing, positive, measurable results in terms of the quality of life in this area.

However, there is an undercurrent of concern among critics that the nexus of the military and social science research and application of military tactics to civilian issues who warn that the idea of applying a counter-insurgency approach in domestic law enforcement; however, it is labeled, risks casting local communities as hostile populations. Such overused terms as “the war on crime,” “the war on drugs,” or “the war on terror” exacerbate this blurring of the lines and the civil-military and practical problems that arise in the process. This is also true for the commonplace practice of journalists and professional calling many urban areas combat or war zones.

Recent events in Ferguson, Missouri at the time of the writing of this thesis provide an opportunity to engage in a public conversation and reflect upon issues like race relations, civility, and the kind of communities in which we wish to live. In this case, a young man lost his life as the result of a police action, and the response to the ensuing civil disobedience by law enforcement has highlighted law enforcement tactics and the militarization of the police. How the police respond to large-scale disturbances and misinformed perceptions with respect to the 1033 Program, which makes military surplus equipment available to local law enforcement agencies, should not be allowed to hijack the conversation.⁸ So before we allow the discussion to be derailed by those engaged in lawlessness or by well-intended academics, social activists or the media, it is time to explore and reveal the perceptions of the public in this community that we are duty-bound to protect—those who are the real stakeholders.⁹

⁸ Timothy Alben, “The ‘Militarization’ of Police: Another Perspective,” *Boston Herald*, October 25, 2014.

⁹ Ibid.

With all this in mind, is it possible to promote a positive collaboration and interaction with community leaders and residents with the C3 approach? Does this method help or hinder our efforts of providing a safe environment through police-citizen partnerships, with an emphasis on mutual trust, integrity, fairness, and professionalism?

C. HYPOTHESIS

If the C3 method of policing has been effective in countering gang activity, then there should be a measurable change in crime, and the overall quality of life should show improvement.

To test this hypothesis, data was collected from various published city and neighborhood sources to analyze the effects of C3 policing on the community. Indicators, such as litter, graffiti, crime statistics, economy, housing, and crime-related medical calls, should afford a broader understanding of the actual effects on the community than crime statistics alone could provide. Springfield provides a unique research opportunity in this regard because it has more than five years of statistical data, raw information, and documentation of the implementation of the C3 effort.

A current analysis of C3 policing also is a perfect opportunity to explore the “civil-military fusion” that could be blurring the line between the armed forces and the police. What could be the legal, social, political, and technical problems? Are there any strategic implications of implementing military inspired counter insurgency methods on a domestic civilian population?

Could the results in the North End of Springfield be replicated and rolled out with success in other communities? The MSP Special Projects Team was hand selected based on prior experience, both in law enforcement, military deployments in support of the global war on terror, language, and technical skills. Taking into account the multidisciplinary skills required of C3, many of which may not be obtained in traditional law enforcement training, could we expect similar results with different personnel in

every city? Are the measures of success and failure unique to the mission, tactical situation, and the technical, cultural, and social terrain?¹⁰

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began advising the Salinas, California police on counterinsurgency tactics that they could use to combat the gang violence problem. Fifteen faculty members and students from the Naval Postgraduate School in nearby Monterey went to Salinas to apply what they had learned in Baghdad and Fallujah.¹¹ The members of this group did not bring military firepower to Salinas, but they did bring first-hand experience and knowledge about combating those who would disrupt the peace and safety of residents.

At the same time on the East Coast, according to the *New York Times*, troopers from Massachusetts introduced Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing, adapted from military counterinsurgency tactics, developed, and implemented in order to combat rampant gang activity.¹²

The field of COIN-inspired policing as it relates to treating gangs as insurgents is relatively new. Therefore, this review is an analysis of the most relevant literature in which research academics, psychologists, and actual practitioners seek to develop a new strategy to combat gang violence and to somehow create a way to measure the success or failure of their efforts.

1. Gangs

Over the past two decades, a growing concern about organized criminal networks has risen within U.S. borders, and it is a threat that communities and law enforcement have been slow at detecting. This crisis is constantly evolving and is influenced by globalization, war, and immigration. Like a cancer, it metastasizes rapidly and has spread

¹⁰ Borna Dabiri et al., “An Assessment of Counter Insurgency-Inspired Policing Methods in the North End of Springfield Massachusetts,” unpublished paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2012.

¹¹ Karl Vick, “Iraq’s Lessons, on the Home Front: Volunteer Veterans Help California City Use Counterinsurgency Strategy to Stem Gang Violence,” *The Washington Post*, sec. A, November 15, 2009.

¹² Erica Goode, “Combating Gang Warfare with Green Beret Tactics,” *New York Times*, sec. A, May 1, 2012.

to the major cities, even reaching into rural America.¹³ These organized criminal networks “threaten multiple facets of the United States including the economy and National Security.”¹⁴ Modern network organizations are mid-level criminal networks, something between street gangs and major cartels,¹⁵ and these mid-level gangs mirror terrorist and insurgent groups in their characteristics.¹⁶ These organizations are adaptive to opposition, have decentralized leadership, use violence to accomplish their objectives, and are constantly growing in sophistication. As the federal government works to develop a comprehensive strategy, the day-to-day responsibility falls on state and local law enforcement.¹⁷

The Congressional Research Service concluded that law enforcement “plays by yesterday’s rules,”¹⁸ and the Center for New American Security suggested “to overcome this challenge, the United States must not only adopt new approaches but also expand those approaches that already work.”¹⁹ To overcome these challenges, state and local law enforcement must incorporate methodologies of counterinsurgency into traditional law enforcement practices in the North End of Springfield, Massachusetts.

Traditionally viewed as criminal enterprises with varying degrees of sophistication and reach, gangs, at least some of them, have evolved; they now may represent more dangerous and destabilizing actors. In many cities where governance, traditional security structures, and community or social bonds have eroded, gangs thrive.

Transnational gangs can have hemispheric, even global potential. In *Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence*, the researcher examines the

¹³ Robert B. Killebrew, and Jennifer Bernal, *Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 5.

¹⁴ Kristin M. Finklea, *Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), summary page.

¹⁵ John P. Sullivan, “Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs, and Intelligence,” *Small Wars Journal* (May 2009), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/future-conflict-criminal-insurgencies-gangs-and-intelligence>

¹⁶ Killebrew, and Bernal, *Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security*, 6.

¹⁷ Finklea, *Organized Crime in the United States*, 8.

¹⁸ Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Kristin M. Finklea, *Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 1.

¹⁹ Killebrew, and Bernal, *Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security*, 63.

dynamics of crime and war. Specifically, the article provides a framework for understanding “criminal insurgencies” where acute and endemic crime and gang violence challenge the solvency of state political control.²⁰

2. Gangs and Terrorists: An Argument for Similarity

Social identity theory is a social psychological analysis of the role of self-conception in group memberships, group processes, and intergroup relations. At the start of the 1970s in Britain, Henri Tajfel first developed social identity theory out of his scientific and personal interest in social perception, social categorization, social comparison and prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict. It has developed and matured, inspiring a prodigious quantity of research.²¹ Through the emphasis of the social identity theory, this literature looks at the dynamics of gang behavior and how they could be compared to terrorist groups.

At first glance, these two factions seem to push the boundaries of comparison, but in this analysis, the important similarities are across criminal and extremist groups. Gangs and gang violence are found throughout the world, much like radical and extremist groups.²² However, surprisingly few studies compare the radicalization of terrorism to the joining of organized crime groups or religious sects.²³

Both terrorist groups and street gangs often are self-identified, which means legitimacy and identity are not conferred on them by some external body, but rather they are self-proclaimed. In addition, membership in both gangs and terrorist organizations is an active proposition. One does not become a member by virtue of birth, ethnicity, or residency. Instead, one becomes a member through some voluntary act, some act of choice. Both types of groups, gangs and terrorist organizations, engage in criminal and,

²⁰ Sullivan, “Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs, and Intelligence.”

²¹ Henri Tajfel, and John C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, eds. William G. Austin, and Stephen Worchel (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 1979), 33.

²² Decker, and Pyrooz, “Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture, and Country,” 129.

²³ Alex P. Schmid, and Eric Price, “Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-Radicalization of Terrorists: Monographs, Edited Volumes, Grey Literature and Prime Articles Published since the 1960s,” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 55, no. 4 (2011): 339.

often, violent behavior. Thus, they operate in an extra-legal environment and maintain an adversarial relationship with law enforcement or peacekeeping interests.²⁴

The thesis examines some of the psychosocial and sociocultural developmental theories and research regarding Latino gang members and their involvement in the gangs. According to Arfaniarromo, Latino gang member orientation and motivation towards the achievement of criminal behavior, largely perceived as deviant by mainstream society, is actually an alternative response to repellent conditions.²⁵ Yet another study by Craig examined the stability of belonging to a gang in early adolescence, the behavior profiles, family characteristics, and friendships of non-gang and gang members. The subjects in the present study were originally part of a larger sample of boys. One hundred and forty-two boys who had a complete data set at ages 11, 12, 13, and 14 were selected for the study. The boys were divided into three groups: stable gang members (children who belonged to a gang at ages 13 and 14), unstable gang members (children who belonged to a gang at either age 13 or 14), and non-gang members. Repeated analyses indicated that stable gang members had significantly higher scores than non-gang members on ratings of fighting behavior, hyperactivity, inattention, and oppositional behavior as well as self-reported delinquent activities (drug and alcohol use, stealing, and vandalism).²⁶

A noted psychologist, Hamden, suggests that a terrorist is an individual who carries out or threatens to carry out acts of terror, for hire or not for hire. The act of harming or killing others, who are direct enemies or innocent victims, may be for monetary gain, gain of group principle, gain of personal principle, or any combination thereof. This work is suggestive of similarities between gang members and terrorists. According to Hamden, "Terrorist groups provide a close knit family environment, meaningful existence, fulfillment of emotional needs, enhanced sense of importance, and

²⁴ Jessica Glicklen Turnley, and Julienne Smrcka, *Terrorist Organizations and Criminal Street Gangs* (Albuquerque, NM: Advanced Concept Group, Sandia National Laboratories, 2002), 53

²⁵ Albert Arfaniarromo, "Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding of Achievement Motivation among Latino Gang Members in U.S. Schools," *Journal of Instructional Psychology* 28, no. 3 (2001): 123.

²⁶ Wendy M. Craig et al., "The Road to Gang Membership: Characteristics of Male Gang and Nongang Members from Ages 10 to 14," *Social Development* 11, no. 1 (2002): 53.

most of all, a welcoming to the group.”²⁷ Other sociologists and social psychologists, such as Stahelski, have discovered that terrorist groups use cult-like conditioning techniques to convert normal individuals into remorseless actors. Stahelski suggests limited global counter terrorism resources should be focused on the eradication of the terrorist group training camps where the conditioning takes place, rather than on trying to find terrorists after they have already been conditioned.²⁸ Both suggest that there is more convergence across criminal and extremist groups than divergence, and that knowledge about the structure and processes of street gangs can inform our understanding of extremist groups and vice-versa.

Many of these same concepts of identity, through self-categorization, that are displayed by gang members are also shown by terrorists. Several sources note that common characteristics of terrorists as well as gang members include history of childhood trauma, family where the father was either absent or estranged, joining of a terrorist group was either by default (based on family involvement), peer pressure, or little discouragement from surrounding culture and society.²⁹ The literature was thin on the places where radicalization is said to take place—prisons, mosques, universities, madrassas, diasporas, or the Internet. Schmid and Price stressed alleged triggers of radicalization-discrimination, foreign occupation or counter-terrorist over-reaction.³⁰ Surprisingly, few such studies compare process of radicalization to terrorism to the joining of organized crime groups.

Gang members have an overwhelming sense that society has failed them. So when an individual feels like he or she is part of the in-group and is actually being accepted, there is a bond and connection that is very hard to break. There is an acquired companionship, provided support, respect between peers, cure of loneliness, need for glorification, rejection of standard, and security of affection is gained when an individual

²⁷ Raymond H. Hamden, *Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types* (Washington, DC: Foundation for International Human Relations, 2006), 11.

²⁸ Anthony Stahelski, “Terrorists are Made Not Born: Creating Terrorists Using Social Psychological Conditioning,” *Cultic Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (2005), 30.

²⁹ Randy Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism* (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004), 3.

³⁰ Schmid, and Price, “Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-Radicalization of Terrorists,” 339.

joins a gang.³¹ Similar to the process self-categorization, terrorists can also attribute the self-enhancing aspects of in-group through self-comparison. Terrorists strive for belonging and are often joiners who cannot form consistent group identities outside of the home.³² The terrorist group provides a close-knit family environment, meaningful existence, and fulfillment of emotional needs, enhanced sense of importance, and most of all, a welcome into the group.³³ The strongest confirmation to a gang member or terrorist that he or she is part of the group comes from the acceptance by other existing members of the gang or terrorist group.³⁴ This final component pulls together all of the aspects of group membership and displays the ultimate enhancement of what being a gang member or terrorist entails.

3. COIN

This thesis views the counterinsurgency approach as it is presented in military documents and the professional literature, especially the new U.S. Army *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (FM 3–24)³⁵ and recent studies produced by the Rand Corporation. Furthermore, this thesis explores the transfer of COIN theory, strategy, technique, and personnel from the military to the police, and vice-versa. A growing number of studies analyze specifically how anti-gang efforts in American cities are shaping and being shaped by military COIN operations abroad.

One of the basic building blocks used and “tweaked” for the C3 policing model is the U.S. Army *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*.³⁶ The military field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. It is based on existing doctrine and lessons learned from recent combat operations. To make this text

³¹ Edmonton Police Service, “Traits of Gang Members,” Edmonton Police Service, accessed November 17, 2014, <http://www.edmontonpolice.ca/CommunityPolicing/OrganizedCrime/Gangs/TraitsOfGangMembers.aspx>; Jean-PhilippeA2, “Profile of a Street Gang Member,” Jean-PhilippeA2, accessed October 14, 2014, <http://jean-philippea2.blogspot.com/2008/02/profile-of-street-gang-member.html>

³² Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism*; Stahelski, Terrorists are made Not Born,” 30.

³³ Hamden, *Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types*, 11.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3–24).

³⁶ Ibid.

useful to leaders involved in counterinsurgency operations regardless of where these operations may occur, the doctrine was made broad in scope and involved principles applicable to various areas of operation. It is based on the premise that fundamental to all counterinsurgencies is the need to help local authorities establish safety, security, and stability because insurgents thrive on chaos and instability.³⁷

Insurgency is defined as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”³⁸ Counterinsurgency is “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”³⁹ Modern military COIN tactics possess a number of primary characteristics, with the legitimacy of the government and its role in political, social, and economic development as a primary objective. A legitimate government derives its just powers from the governed and competently manages collective security and political, economic, and social development.

According to Metz and Millen, “Today the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant.”⁴⁰ These new ideas spill over into the civilian world brought by the return of veterans to organizations like the police forces, some of which have explored the new skill sets and ideas for fighting organized criminal groups on home soil. This is the evolution of counterinsurgency policing.

Retired General and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), David Petraeus, asserts that many people who articulate and apply U.S. policy and those who conduct operations in counterinsurgency environments are neither conversant nor familiar with the principles of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.⁴¹ This is not surprising, considering that those subjects have been generally neglected in broader

³⁷ Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (FM 3–07.22), (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2004), iv.

³⁸ Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3–24), 1–1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1–1

⁴⁰ Steven Metz, and Raymond A. Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), vi.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War more than 40 years ago. The *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* was designed to reverse that trend; it was also designed to merge traditional approaches to counterinsurgency with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances and globalization.⁴²

Petraeus contends that unity of effort on the behalf of the counterinsurgents through those responsible for the nonmilitary elements of power is imperative.⁴³ Political, rather than military, objectives must be retained. The majority of the population must recognize the legitimacy of the government and either actively support or at the least not hinder the efforts of the counterinsurgents. The analysis of the effect of any operation is impossible without understanding the society and culture within which the COIN operation occurs. All operations must be shaped by actionable intelligence gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible levels.

According to Petraeus, the isolation of insurgents from their cause and support is more effective than killing every insurgent.⁴⁴ Security must be provided under the rule of law. In addition, security provided by a recognized legal system will produce a greater level of governmental legitimacy. Furthermore, a commitment to a long-term effort must be made and communicated to the populace. An insurgent wins by not losing, but by drawing into question the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government.

Petraeus asserts that terrorist tactics are used in urban areas to sow disorder, incite sectarian violence, weaken the legitimate government, intimidate the population, kill government officials and leaders of any opposition, intimidate law enforcement and military personnel, and drive the government to act in a repressive manner that will create support for the insurgency.⁴⁵ This type of insurgency requires little or no popular support. As societies have become more urbanized, this approach has become more effective. In locations with well-run security forces, urban insurgencies take on a cellular structure

⁴² Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3–24), 1–1.

⁴³ Ibid., 1–22.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 1–23.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 1–6.

that works along lines of close association, such as family, religion, political party, or social group.⁴⁶ This insurgent model is similar to a domestic criminal street gang.

But there is criticism of COIN that must be seriously considered. First, the tactic provides for only one way to quell insurgencies and deal with the world's instabilities: population-centric counterinsurgency. The FM 3–24 manual offers no other alternatives, no other strategies, or methodologies. A short five-line paragraph in Chapter 5 considers more limited options.⁴⁷ This short paragraph should have been turned into half of the manual, according to Colonel Gian P. Gentile, director of the Military History Program at the United States (U.S.) Military Academy.⁴⁸

Second, history has shown that insurgencies can be defeated by means other than the population-centric approach. Consider the recent defeat of the Tamil Tigers by the Sri Lankan military. Or consider what actually broke the back of the Malayan insurgency in the early 1950s, which was not so much the hearts-and-minds persuasion but the hard-handed use of military force against civilians, combined with a major resettlement program.

A respected counterinsurgency professional in the U.S. Army, Colonel Robert Cassidy, said in a widely cited 2004 essay that conducting counterinsurgency warfare was “more difficult” than conventional war.⁴⁹ Another counterinsurgency expert, David Ucko, in a recent book on what he calls the “new counterinsurgency era,” argues that COIN with all of its associated political and economic tasks is “far more demanding” than the relatively simple process of “locating and striking targets.”⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Thomas X. Hammes, *Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Imprint, 2006).

⁴⁷ Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” *Parameters* (Autumn 2009), <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/09autumn/gentile.pdf>, 11.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁹ Robert M. Cassidy, “Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare,” *Military Review* 84, no. 5 (2004), 41.

⁵⁰ David H. Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 2.

Counterinsurgency and current law enforcement practices possess some similarities. Community policing, Compliant Statistics (COMPSTAT) and intelligence-led policing have attributes employed in COIN; conversely, COIN uses some tactics similar to these law enforcement techniques. A 2006 study by George Mason University found that 60 percent of municipal and county agencies with more than 100 sworn officers considered community policing a major part of the organization's operations.⁵¹ The same study indicated that 31 percent of the same survey group considered COMPSTAT a major part of the organization's operations.⁵²

Furthermore, identifiable similarities between community policing and counterinsurgency exist. COIN stresses the need for decentralized command, flexible response to problems, coordination between a wide range of organizations, and the establishment of relationships with the citizenry with which military personnel interact. All of these techniques are aspects of community policing.⁵³ These techniques are used to increase citizen satisfaction, reduce fear and respond to neighborhood problems in a flexible fashion, as opposed to a one size fits all manners.

In *Globalization and Insurgency*, Mackinlay explains that insurgency thrives in a failed government or state, much like gangs thrive on community apathy.⁵⁴ Weakened states provide an environment for loosely organized armed bands to form insurgent forces. Urban and economic decay feed the emergence of gangs in the city of Springfield. These similarities are what first prompted returning veterans to use skills that they learned overseas in the war against insurgencies, to combat gangs in the city. The globalization of insurgency leads inexorably to the globalization of counter-insurgency.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Stephen D. Mastrofski, James J. Willis and Tammy Rinehart Kochel, "The Challenges of Implementing Community Policing in the United States," *Policing* 1, no. 2 (2007), 225.

⁵² Stephen Mastrofski, James Willis, and Tammy Kochel, *Compstat and Community Policing: Are They Compatible?* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. George Mason University, 2007), <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/willismastrofski%20.pdf>, 9.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4 and 7.

⁵⁴ John Mackinlay, *Globalisation and Insurgency*, Adelphi Papers, no. 352 (New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 93.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 100.

This is seen as part of the overflow of military methodology into the civilian world of policing.

In *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, Bruce Hoffman attempts to explain, in counterinsurgency terms, where we went wrong in Iraq and shed light on future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements.⁵⁶ Regarded highly in this field, Hoffman's work has had influence on current COIN practitioners and is currently being used in the development of C3 policing.

There is also the extensive research, mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, currently being conducted at the CORE Lab in Monterey, California. The debate continues regarding the fact that there is no single model deemed appropriate yet to measure the efficacy of COIN efforts.⁵⁷ It is naive to blindly look at collected metrics from the occupying force, counterinsurgent force, or host nation in order to gleam the current situation.⁵⁸

4. Measuring the Impact of C3 Policing

In order to measure the efficacy of a COIN inspired policing model, an objective analysis of the COIN efforts is needed. If the C3 method of policing has been effective in countering gang activity, then there should be a measurable change in crime, and the overall quality of life should show improvement.

A study of 71 countries for the period 1960–1985 explored the following hypotheses: income inequality, fuelling social discontent, and increases sociopolitical instability. Since investment is a primary engine of growth, the paper identified an inverse relationship between income inequality and growth.⁵⁹ This source demonstrates the importance of middleclass business ownership and income equality to the stability of

⁵⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2004), 2.

⁵⁷ Few, "Lies, Damn Lies, and Metrics in Small Wars."

⁵⁸ Joshua Thiel, and Joyce Hogan, "Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality," *Small Wars Journal* (April 2011), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-statistical-irrelevance-of-american-sigact-data-iraq-surge-analysis-reveals-reality>

⁵⁹ Alberto Alesina, and Roberto Perotti, "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," *European Economic Review* 40, no. 6 (1996): 1203.

any community. It seems plausible that an increase in the number of business registrations in the target neighborhood would be one of the indicators that C3 policing had improved the economic health of the area.

In *Urban Graffiti: Crime, Control, and Resistance*, research explores the ways in which producers of contemporary urban graffiti resist the increasing segregation and control of urban environments, and shows how graffiti participants undermine efforts at control.⁶⁰ Data comes from four years of fieldwork in Denver, Colorado and research in other cities. This study can be used as a measurement of gang activity in any target area. Graffiti affects the appearance of a neighborhood and is also important to the function of gangs. It is used to mark turf and to encode information, such as where to buy drugs or where homicides have occurred. It is a direct measure of gang presence.⁶¹

The city of Springfield engaged the Donahue Institute at the University of Massachusetts (UMass) to prepare an assessment of economic needs in Springfield's low and moderate income neighborhoods, strategies to address those needs, and best practices for providing economic development services from comparable municipalities. Statistical data from this source provided information as "33 percent of Springfield small businesses reported that neighborhood crime was the top inhibitor to their growth" and "48 percent of respondents reported that theft/petty crime limited the success of their business."⁶² As such, it might be safe to hypothesize that businesses would suffer in areas with high gang presence.

The North End community in Springfield, Massachusetts is one of many communities across the United States that is struggling with how to improve its economic health. A thesis written at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Informal Microenterprise in the North End Community," explores the nature of informal economic activity, specifically informal microenterprise, present within the North End community as a means for understanding its economic reality and supporting its continued

⁶⁰ Jeff Ferrell, "Urban Graffiti Crime, Control, and Resistance," *Youth & Society* 27, no. 1 (1995), 73.

⁶¹ Ibid., 78.

⁶² Michael D. Goodman, and Kate Modzelewski, *City of Springfield Economic Assessment Project* (Hadley, MA: UMass Donahue Institute, 2008), 24.

development.⁶³ Data collected from North End business owners suggest that there are a number of dynamic yet informal enterprises operating within the community. Informal businesses do play an economic role in the community, and many are positioned to increase the impacts they have on the North End with goals of growth and formalization.⁶⁴ Information and data contained in this paper helps to better understand the North End area and assess the impact of C3 policing on the quality of life.

An article in the *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* shows that scholars are paying close attention to incivilities and how they affect citizens' fear of crime.⁶⁵ A common research finding is that neighborhood incivilities (e.g., abandoned storefronts, unkempt lots, litter, noise, bench sleepers, and public drunks) are often as powerful in generating feelings of fear as crime itself. The implication is that by removing the riffraff from the streets and graffiti from the walls, feelings of fear will be reduced. Moreover, community "clean-sweeps" will meet with public approval as they improve the overall quality of life in cities and neighborhoods. This article examines the influence of a number of social and physical incivilities on two different reactions to crime—perceptions of risk and feelings of fear. The data revealed significant relationships between social and physical incivility and perceptions of risk; incivility is also related to fear but less strongly so. To the extent that incivility is predictive of fear, its causal effect is mediated almost entirely through perceptions of risk to crime.⁶⁶

The question of whether living in a disadvantaged neighborhood damages health, over and above the impact of personal socioeconomic characteristics, is probed in *Neighborhood Disadvantage, Disorder, and Health*.⁶⁷ The researchers hypothesize that (1) health correlates negatively with neighborhood disadvantage adjusting for personal

⁶³ Tara Kumar, *Informal Microenterprise in the North End Community* (Springfield, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004), <http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17696>

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Randy L. LaGrange, Kenneth F. Ferraro, and Michael Supancic, "Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime: Role of Social and Physical Incivilities," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 29, no. 3 (1992): 311.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Catherine E. Ross, and John Mirowsky, "Neighborhood Disadvantage, Disorder, and Health," *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 42, no. 3 (2001): 272.

disadvantage; (2) neighborhood disorder mediates the association; (3) this circumstance arises partly because disorder and the fear associated with it discourage walking; and (4) partly because disorder, disadvantage, and fear directly impair health. The daily stress associated with living in a neighborhood where danger, trouble, crime and incivility are common apparently damages health.⁶⁸

Yet another study reported a reverse association between fear of crime and mental and physical health.⁶⁹ Fear of crime was associated with poorer mental health, reduced physical functioning on objective and subjective indicators, and lower quality of life. In the study, participants reporting greater fear exercised less, saw friends less often, and participated in fewer social activities compared with the less fearful participants. Curtailed physical and social activities helped explain the link between fear of crime and health. The researchers concluded that fear of crime may be a barrier to participation in health-promoting physical and social activities.⁷⁰ This association between the fear of crime and mental health is another method to measure the efficacy of C3 policing on the quality of life issues in the North End. Researching medical calls for service over the implementation time of the C3 initiative could be one metric.

Finally, the broken windows theory states that monitoring and maintaining urban environments in a well-ordered condition may prevent further vandalism as well as an escalation into more serious crime.⁷¹ “Broken Windows” finally acknowledged the connection between disorder, fear, crime, and urban decay that has been playing out in America’s cities for decades.⁷² The authors show that the key to reducing crime is the restoration of order.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Mai Stafford, Tarani Chandola, and Michael Marmot, “Association between Fear of Crime and Mental Health and Physical Functioning,” *American Journal of Public Health* 97, no. 11 (2007): 2076.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ James Q. Wilson, and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” *Atlantic Monthly* 249, no. 3 (1982): 30.

⁷² Ibid., 32.

5. The Flip Side of the COIN

In *Our Enemies in Blue*, the chapter titled “Your Friendly Neighborhood Police State” is devoted to the argument that the two major developments in American policing since the 1960s—militarization and community policing—are actually two aspects of a domestic counterinsurgency program. The idea was summed up with a simple equation: Community Policing + Militarization = Counterinsurgency.⁷³

There are other recent pieces of literature that also raise this sentiment. For example, *War by Other Means* states that law enforcement “capabilities” are “considered to be high priority”⁷⁴ in COIN: “well-trained and well-led community police and quick-response, light-combat-capable (constabulary) police.” Also referenced many times in this thesis is a Joint Special Operations University report, *Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: The Thick Blue Line*. The report states:

The predominant ways of utilizing police and law enforcement within a COIN strategy . . . consist of the adoption of the community-policing approach supported by offensive-policing actions such as paramilitary operations, counter guerrilla patrolling, pseudo-operations [in which state forces pose as insurgent groups], and raids.⁷⁵

Meanwhile, this thesis joins a growing body of literature that argues that gang violence should be treated as a type of insurgency. However, in the application of the techniques and strategies of counterinsurgency to counter-gang campaigns, the state might inadvertently suggest that there is a political dimension to gangs.

By applying the COIN philosophy in a domestic setting, the government concedes that its legitimacy is being challenged and that the challengers are rivals, or potential

⁷³ Kristian Williams, *Our Enemies in Blue: Police and Power in America* (Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press, 2004), 255.

⁷⁴ David C. Gompert, and John Gordon IV, *War by Other Means—Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), xlv.

⁷⁵ Joseph D. Celeski, *Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: The Thick Blue Line* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2009), 40.

rivals, with independent claims to legitimacy and distinct spheres of influence.⁷⁶ John Sullivan, a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputy, writes in one RAND report:

[S]ome [gangs] have begun to adopt varying degrees of political activity. At the low end, this activity may include dominating neighborhood life and creating virtual 'lawless zones,' application of street taxes, or taxes on other criminal actors. At the high end, some gangs have active political agendas, using the political process to further their ends and destabilize governments.⁷⁷

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research for this thesis utilized a single case study regarding the Massachusetts State Police introduction of a counterinsurgency inspired form of policing in the North End of Springfield, Massachusetts to combat criminal gang activity. The time frame of this study was limited to quality-of-life indicators before and after the implementation of C3. The advantage of this control is that the data spanned from 2007–2014 as C3 commenced in the fall of 2009. The disadvantage is that C3 may not have been the only factor that affected metrics during that time. To isolate the effects of other factors, the North End was analyzed relative to the entirety of the city of Springfield. This step permitted the isolation of citywide trends.

This case study evaluated distinct metrics that determine changes in the quality of life within the North End by analyzing issues of health, economy, education, housing, crime, and community. The sources of this data were internal State Police and Springfield Police Department records and reports, literature on local urban studies and planning, local hospital and private ambulance records, information provided by way of records from various city department and agencies, local and national media, online real estate resources, and military training manuals and field manuals. Though there were some categories that were inconclusive, most indicators support the fact that C3 has had a

⁷⁶ Kristian Williams, "The Other Side of the COIN: Counterinsurgency and Community Policing," *Interface* 3, no. 1 (2011): 99.

⁷⁷ John P. Sullivan, "Gangs, Hooligans, and Anarchists-the Vanguard of Netwar in the Streets," in *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, ed. John Arquilla, and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 102.

positive influence on their immediate target area. The problem is in how to replicate those results in other neighborhoods within Springfield.

Looking at other high crime areas around the country such as Flint Michigan, Chicago Illinois, and Oakland California, law enforcement is applying the same old traditional policing tactics. For example, in Chicago this past Fourth of July weekend, there were approximately 82 shootings and 14 murders over that four day weekend.⁷⁸ Yet, law enforcement continues to deploy the same tactics, flooding the area with more officers and patrol cars, perhaps convening a task force, but it is not changing the landscape of inner city American policing. So this leads to the question of “where is the innovation” in urban policing in America? C3 offers a strategy that quite possibly could be the answer.

⁷⁸ Peter Nickeas, “Fourth of July Weekend Toll: 82 Shot, 14 of Them Fatally, in Chicago,” *Chicago Tribune* July 07, 2014.

II. GANGS, TERRORISTS, AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

A. AN ARGUMENT FOR SIMILARITY

Gangs and gang violence are found throughout the world, much like radical and extremist groups.⁷⁹ As Schmid and Pierce noted, “Surprisingly few studies compare radicalization to terrorism to the joining of organized crime groups or religious sects.”⁸⁰ This chapter is an exploration of the validity of an analogy between street gangs and terrorists. Through the emphasis of the social identity theory, this chapter will look at the dynamics of gang behavior and how it could be compared to a form of terrorism in the United States.

My central argument is that there is more convergence across criminal and extremist groups than divergence, and that knowledge about the structure and processes of street gangs can inform our understanding of extremist groups and vice versa. Tempered with the knowledge that there are points of convergence across these groups, it is important to understand and respect the differences between these groups. This argument is an analysis that bolsters my thesis that counter insurgency tactics can be modified to successfully disrupt, degrade, and deter gang violence in an urban setting.

B. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this comparison, the term “terrorism” will be defined as an act of violence or threat of violence carried out by an individual or group of individuals against members of a negatively referenced, contrasting group.⁸¹

Social identity theory is a general theory of self that can be examined through three different components, the concept and bases of identity, the activation of identities

⁷⁹ Decker, and Pyrooz, “Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture, and Country,” 129.

⁸⁰ Schmid, and Price, “Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-Radicalization of Terrorists,” 339.

⁸¹ Hamden, *Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types*.

and identity salience, and the cognitive and motivational process.⁸² These core components reveal the dynamics of gangs and terrorist groups.

In order to justify and rationalize the use of military inspired counterinsurgency techniques in an urban environment, there must be an investigation into the validity of an analogy between gangs and terrorists. Failure to win that argument would render the rest of this thesis invalid. There are strong constituents to both side of the argument. The most glaring difference is that terrorists have a political agenda whereas gangs do not, but how they operate is similar. Both groups want to operate in failed states or areas. The insurgent operates in failed areas such as Syria, places in Africa, Yemen, or Somalia where there is lawlessness. They want to move into these areas because they can open up their training camps or operation centers and run missions from there, and there is no fear of reprisals.

The same holds true for drug dealers and gang members. They want to move into a neighborhood that has failed, where they know that the community is not going to pick up the phone and engage the police—where there is no fear of reprisals. These conditions allow the gangs to work within the passive support of the community.

For the most part, neither group is actively supported by the community. The actual active support is very small, but the passive support is more important than the active support. An example of active support would be if a gang member was running by a house, gave another his gun to hide, and when the person was questioned by the police, he/she would not disclose that she or her had had seen the perpetrator. However, the majority of the population, displays passive support; they know who are gang members, know who sells drugs, knows where they keep the drugs, and knows what kind of car they drive, but they never picks up the phone to call the police. Or when the police do come by and question them about gang members, they respond that they have no idea about anything. Gang members know this and that is why they operate in those areas. They know that passively, the community is not going to “rat” them out.

⁸² Jan E. Stets, and Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” *Social Psychology Quarterly* (2000): 224.

Passive support is not so much out of fear of reprisals from the gangs or terrorists as it is a very powerful established norm or moray within the community. It is a cultural thing where populations are born into this understanding that if someone with whom one has grown up or has a place in that community is selling drugs or is a member of an insurgency, there is a tacit understanding or messaging that one does not “rat” him out to the police. It is very powerful and the gang members and terrorists know this, and they use it as an intimidation tool to label others as a “rat” causing such deep shame that it will force people to “clam up.” But when the onion is peeled back, there is very rarely physical retaliation on that person. In sum, the similarities are in the way that they operate in failed environments, and how they survive off of passive support. How they differ, is in their political ends.

So what is at stake? The population is. That is how the gang members or insurgents win. If they win over the community or terrorize members to the point where they do not want to say anything, the insurgents, or gang members, have won. Even if the community does not like them or is fearful of them, they have established control over the community. So the best hope at law enforcement or police success is to mobilize the community willfully against the nefarious actors because it will not last if the community is strong armed by the police into giving up information. The community members need to voluntarily buy into the messaging, and, on their own, decide that they do not want the gangs or terrorists in their community.

C. STRUCTURES AND IDENTITIES

Both terrorist groups and street gangs often are self-identified, that is, legitimacy and identity are not conferred on them by some external body (i.e., they do not need to be “recognized” by a larger community in order to act). Rather, members and groups are self-proclaimed. For the social identity theory, the concept of identity is by a category or group. The identity is constructed when a person acknowledges that he or she belongs to a social category or group. A social group is often defined as a set of persons who view themselves as members of the same social category and hold a common social

identification.⁸³ Self-categorization is the process in which the individual impulsively categorizes, classifies, or names him or herself, in a way that relates to other social classifications. Membership in both gangs and terrorist organizations is an active proposition. One does not become a member by virtue of birth, ethnicity, or residency. Rather, one becomes a member through some voluntary act, an act of choice.

The social category to which people assign themselves to is based on parts of the structured society that is already in existence; individuals are born into an already structured society.⁸⁴ Of course, it is through the unique combination of different social categories off of which the person bases his or her social concept of identity.⁸⁵ An example of self-categorization in the context of gang members would be through culture or community, and family or peer influence. Culture is part of a structured society that has been found to be intertwined with the development of self-identity. It is also possible that the community a person is born into is an unstable condition or in the state of anomie.⁸⁶ When there is an imbalance between the socially acceptable goals and the available means in which one is to obtain those goals, an individual can be affected by this condition. As a result, one may seek familiarity through the only means possible, a gang, as an effort in strengthening their identity and attempting to reach out to the traditional culture. There is also a tendency for the community to stem a self-fulfilling prophecy of an individual, which increases their self-identity to be centered on that of a gang member

Another structured society that precedes the individual is the family. Individuals whose families have minimal levels of socialization and who put little emphasis on the expression of affection and emotions between one another have an increased likelihood of becoming a gang member, compared to their counterparts. An individual who is part of a family unit, who lacks supervision, for one reason or another, also has a greater

⁸³ Ibid., 226.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 225.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 229.

⁸⁶ Arfaniarromo, "Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding," 19.

tendency to affiliate his or her self-identity with that of a gang member.⁸⁷ Youth gang members are allowed to go unsupervised by parents who are either absent or naïve. A study revealed that the alienation from parents and the family was the initial cause for an individual to turn to gang involvement.⁸⁸ The study also established lack of a male figure and rejection by the family as related characteristics of gang members.⁸⁹

There is also an intense pressure put upon an individual by their peers. When the structured society through peer influence makes being a gang member seem glamorous and successful, then there is an increased likelihood that the individual will be influenced into becoming a gang member. Another influence on an individual that is part of the environment he or she is born into is the media. Gang violence is portrayed as being acceptable and as a valid means to an end through television, movies, and music. External influences also have an impact on the development of crime and delinquent related motivations and direction.⁹⁰

It is interesting to note that many of these same concepts of identity, through self-categorization, that are displayed by gang members are also shown by terrorists. Common characteristics of terrorist include history of childhood trauma; family where the father was either absent or estranged; joining of terrorist group was either by default (based on family involvement), peer pressure, or little discouragement from surrounding culture and society.⁹¹ Both types of groups (gangs and terrorist organizations) engage in criminal and, often, violent behavior. They thus operate in an extra-legal environment and maintain an adversarial relationship with the forces of law, order, or peace.

In self-comparison, an individual categorizes him or herself as the in-group, by having similarities, and sees others as the out-group because they differ from his or her self-identity. It is through the social comparison methods that one may feel self-

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Craig et al., "The Road to Gang Membership," 54.

⁹⁰ Arfaniarromo, "Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding," 128.

⁹¹ Hamden, *Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types*.

enhancing results.⁹² It is through the self-comparison method that one derives a positive experience from gang involvement. As a gang member, the fulfillment of traditional achievements may be lacking, but that often means that sense of accomplishment is obtained by other means. A different form of socialization is sometimes developed through the inner workings of a gang and sometimes by means of deviant or criminal behavior.⁹³ Satisfaction that was missing from accepted social groups, such as school participation, is not obtained through the lifestyle of a gang member. The terrorist may also not feel connected to say his parents messaging or culture; therefore, he may become disenfranchised and ripe for radicalization. The social span for the terrorist could range from a dirt farmer to a college graduate. But this same subject may walk into a mosque and be told by the iman that Allah has called him for great things and tailor whatever message the radical entity chooses. Like the gang member, initiates are separated from the community by the hope of a new sense of belonging and support.

The gang comes to represent a surrogate for the member's biological family. When gang members form this type of kinship with one another, the fulfillment of being part of the in-group is so strong that the gang has effectively over-taken the place of the family.⁹⁴ Since the gang involvement is granting the subject with positive emotions, the ideals of parents or society is outweighed.⁹⁵ Some gang members may feel that society has failed them. So when subjects begin to feel like they are part of the in-group and are actually being accepted, there a bond forms and the connection is very hard to break. There is an acquired companionship, provided support, respect between peers, cure of loneliness, need for glorification, rejection of standard, and security of affection is gained when an individual joins a gang.⁹⁶

Similar to the gang process self-categorization, terrorists can also attribute the self-enhancing aspects of in-group through self-comparison. Terrorists strive for

⁹² Stets, and Burke, "Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory," 225.

⁹³ Arfaniarromo, "Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding," 131.

⁹⁴ "Gangs Psychology," SocialPC, accessed August 19, 2013, <http://www.socialpc.com/SocialIssues/Gangs.html>

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Jean-PhilippeA2, "Profile of a Street Gang Member."

belonging and are often joiners who cannot form consistent group identities outside of the home.⁹⁷ The terrorist group provides a close knit family environment, meaningful existence, the fulfillment of emotional needs, enhanced sense of importance, and most of all, a welcoming into the group.⁹⁸

The phenomenon of self-identity through the group-based identification is the most influential bases for participation in group behavior. This level of commitment and attraction to the in-group is often how gangs and terrorists recruit and keep their members. Since members can be of any race, ethnicity, sex, and location, it is the prominent identification that influences the behavior of a member.

According to a study by Arfaniarromo, gang members tend to commit more crimes and engage in a variety of different forms of delinquency at a higher rate than the general population.⁹⁹ Arfaniarromo's study, "Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding of Achievement Motivation among Latino Gang Members in U.S. Schools," found that stable gang members engaged in more fighting behaviors than the non-gang members, have more contact with the police, and are responsible for a more proportionate amount of crime; also, stable gang members reported their friends as being more aggressive and engaging in delinquent behaviors.¹⁰⁰ In addition, observations of gang members at an early age revealed when gang members dress according to the specifics of the gang, are awarded nicknames, and own a weapon this also increases one's bases of identity with the group.¹⁰¹

Terrorists also display these same characteristics. Similarly to gang members, terrorist have no gender, race, or national limitations; they partake in actions of the gang, such as giving up their civilian clothes and any behavior patterns that are not conforming

⁹⁷ Anthony Stahelski, "Terrorists are Made, Not Born," *Journal of Homeland Security* (March, 2004): 30; Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism*.

⁹⁸ Hamden, *Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types*.

⁹⁹ Arfaniarromo, "Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding," 123.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Jean-PhilippeA2, "Profile of a Street Gang Member."

to the terrorist group; and have an increased commitment to the group through the continuation of terrorists behaviors and actions.¹⁰²

The activation of identities and identity salience is the next component to the social identity theory. The perception and behavior of the gang or terrorist member has increased and reached a point of no return, when the individual is now making his or her own decisions as to how to react in certain situations. At this point, the group involvement and acceptance has become a necessity to the member's life.

The final component of the social identity theory is the cognitive and motivational process. The cognitive process, also known as depersonalization, is when an individual sees him or herself as the in-group prototype rather than as an individual. The depersonalization process of an individual as a member of a group includes the aspects of identification with a category or group and the behavior that is associated with that category or group.¹⁰³ The strongest confirmation to a gang member or terrorist that he or she is part of the group comes from the acceptance by other existing members of the gang or terrorist group.¹⁰⁴

D. THE C3 CONNECTION

Gang members and gang activity can be seen as a form of terrorism in the United States. The comparison of gangs to terrorist groups highlights the similarities and differences between the groups and increases our ability to develop effective responses such as C3 policing. There is merit in comparing gangs to terrorist networks on the basis of their structure, processes, cultural orientations and activities.

In one of the few pieces to consider the topic, Curry examined the relationships between gangs and terrorist groups.¹⁰⁵ The members of both groups are primarily male, violence is common in both groups, solidarity and elements of collective behavior

¹⁰² Hamden, *Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types*, 32.

¹⁰³ Stets, and Burke, "Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory," 231.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ G. David Curry, Richard A. Ball, and Robert J. Fox, *Gang Crime and Law Enforcement Recordkeeping*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1994).

operate in both groups, and the violence used by both groups often represents a form of “self-help,” or attempts to redress wrongs. The differences included a profit motive for gangs that is largely absent for terrorist groups, cross-national connections maintained by terror groups, the diversity in different types of crime that typifies gang crime, and an ideological belief among members of terror groups that is not present among gang members. Most of the similarities between the groups reflect the fact that terrorist groups are less structured than is publicly believed.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), vii; John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618, no. 1 (2008): 89.

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III. SPRINGFIELD AND THE NORTH END

To understand the growing gang problem of Springfield, it is important to examine the problems of the city within a historical framework.¹⁰⁷ The city of Springfield in the 1950s and 1960s was by all accounts a manufacturing town. Many of the largest employers in the city, including the Springfield Armory and Smith & Wesson, relied on the city's highly skilled workforce to generate revenue.¹⁰⁸ But by the late 1960s and 1970s, many of these businesses left Springfield in search of more favorable tax and labor conditions.¹⁰⁹ To more complicate the matter, in 1968, the federal government closed the Springfield Armory. This loss of industry dealt a significant blow to the city and was the first of many events that precipitated an era of decline. From 1970 to 2000, the percentage of the population employed by the manufacturing industry decreased by more than half. As the city's unemployment rate rose, the poverty rate increased from 13 percent in 1970 to 20 percent by the year 2000.¹¹⁰

The city's problems, and especially those of the North End neighborhood, were amplified by the construction of Interstate 91 (I-91) in the 1960s, which impeded access to the river front, some of the city's most economically valuable land. Once, as part of the city of Springfield's Urban Renewal Plan, city planners lobbied for I-91 to be constructed along the riverfront because they believed that the river had become too polluted and that I-91 would catalyze economic growth.¹¹¹ In the event, however, I-91 blocked access to

¹⁰⁷ This chapter reflects data and information I collected to check past results and add current data to an unpublished case study done by Harvard students in 2012. I am unable to cite specific pages and narrative, as all I could obtain was a draft copy. Dabiri et al., "An Assessment of Counter Insurgency-Inspired Policing Methods."

¹⁰⁸ Mark Muro et al., *Reconnecting Massachusetts Gateway Cities: Lessons Learned and an Agenda for Renewal* (Boston, MA: MassINC and Brookings Institute, 2007), 20.

¹⁰⁹ "Chap. 0169—An Act Relative to the Financial Stability in the City of Springfield," State Library of Massachusetts, 2004, <http://hdl.handle.net/2452/122220>

¹¹⁰ DeAnna Green, "Springfield, Massachusetts: Old Hill, Six Corners, and the South End Neighborhoods," in *The Enduring Challenge of Concentrated Poverty in America: Case Studies from Communities across the U.S.*, ed. David Erikson et al. (Washington, DC: Federal Reserve System and the Brookings Institution, 2008), http://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/cp_fullreport.pdf, 136.

¹¹¹ Diana Bernal et al., *A Plan for the North End Campus* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 2004), 14.

the river and had the unintended consequence of splintering communities like the North End. Thus, the highway came to represent the city's most unsuccessful effort at urban renewal.

The ensuing decline prompted many middle-class residents to leave the city for the surrounding suburbs.¹¹² This departure was accompanied by an influx of Hispanic migrant workers, particularly during the 1970s. Many were lured by relatively affordable housing and farming employment opportunities. Today, Springfield, which was once a predominately white city, has equal proportions of Hispanics and Caucasians.¹¹³ The populations are noticeably separated by neighborhoods within the community and are ethnic based.

As the demographics of the city shifted, political power was slowly transferred from the city to the state government. Bad decision making on the part of city government in the early 2000s resulted in fiscal deficits that forced the state to assume financial responsibility.¹¹⁴ The ensuing result was the State Secretary of Finance and Administration establishing the Financial Control Board (FCB) that was tasked with administering a loan of \$52 million while devising a strategy to cut the city's deficit.¹¹⁵ Meanwhile, the National Urban Land Institute (ULI) was hired to develop the "Plan for Springfield," in an attempt to reduce citywide crime and devise plans for the city's revival.¹¹⁶ Then, in 2012, Mayor Domenic Sarno replaced the ULI's plan with a privately funded project called "Rebuild Springfield." Since it was one of the most economically challenged neighborhoods in the city, the North End received federal, state, and city aid to revitalize its rebirth.

¹¹² David M. Ahronian et al., *Making Connections-Envisioning Springfield's North End*, Paper 4. 2009. http://scholarworks.umass.edu/larp_grad_research/4/, 10.

¹¹³ Green, "Springfield, Massachusetts: Old Hill, Six Corners, and the South End Neighborhoods," 137.

¹¹⁴ "Chap. 0169—An Act Relative to the Financial Stability in the City of Springfield."

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ David B. Panagore, *Springfield: Strategies for a Sustainable City* (Springfield, MA: Urban Land Institute, 2006), 22

Springfield's North End, an economically depressed area and the target for the C3 policing initiative, is made up of two neighborhoods separated by I-91: Brightwood and Memorial Square. Of the 11,000 residents in the North End, more than 75 percent are of Puerto Rican heritage. Economic activity, which is made up primarily of retail and service industries, is focused on Main Street in Memorial Square. In contrast, the Brightwood section of the North End is primarily residential.¹¹⁷

A. MEASURING THE IMPACT, A CASE STUDY OF C3

Gangs and gang violence are nothing new to the North End. A particularly violent gang, the Las Boricuas, moved into the North End in 2009 and began to seize control over the local drug trade.¹¹⁸ Almost all of the other gangs in the North End are characterized as “posses,” which are loosely organized sects made up of mostly of young males, 14–19 years of age,¹¹⁹ and are defined by kinship to operate near their base of passive support.

There are basically four levels of organized gangs in the United States. There are posses, neighborhood based street gangs, regional gangs, and national gangs. Posses tend to be younger males, loosely organized, who grew up as friends, smaller in their numbers, with no distinct hierarchy or “shot callers.” They are usually friendship or kinship based. It is not based on the neighborhood proper. So if these particular members were moved, they would still be a gang; whereas a neighborhood street gang is identified by its street, neighborhood, or block. The posse really identifies more with each other and are distinct to each other. The posse member tends to be more violent because they are younger and trying to “make their bones” or establish a reputation as a hard core kid despite their young age. Now-a-days, tough guys are not established by a fist fight, they “make their bones” by doing shootings or strong arm robberies.

¹¹⁷ Shibeen Banerji et al., *Building in the Present, Growing towards the Future: A Plan for Economic Development in the North End* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 2005), <http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/urban-studies-and-planning/11-945-springfield-studio-fall-2005/projects/finalreport.pdf>, 49.

¹¹⁸ Michael Cutone, “U.S. Attorney Gang Prevention Summit Presentation,” presentation, Massachusetts State Police Department, Springfield, MA, 2013.

¹¹⁹ Curry, Ball, and Fox, *Gang Crime and Law Enforcement Recordkeeping*, 10.

The “shot caller” is typically a ranking system within a national gang. The “shot caller” is the one who doles out the punishment or approves violence against another. In this system, one has to go through the hierarchy and get approval before acting. This does not occur in posses. If a member within a posse has a particular beef with someone, he or she can just go ahead and shoot that person without having to check with anybody.

Therefore, it was difficult for traditional law enforcement in the North End to combat crime due to the lack of structure within the posses. Tradition policing in this area was based upon the FBI model of multiple street level narcotic buys, getting informants into the group, moving higher up the structure, and attacking the gang unit in that way. But it fails against these types of group because there is no boss, similar to the insurgents “leaderless resistance.” There is no command structure and in the long term; there is no strategic change in the gang’s environment. Traditionally, police would typically flood an area, make a lot of arrests and that would suppress the gangs for a while. Even if all the gang members were locked up, the conditions were still ripe for another group to move in and restore criminal operations.

As a metaphor, picture the target area as a beach, and seagulls as gang members or insurgents. Say that a hundred seagulls land on the beach and a person comes along with a Labrador retriever, which represents the traditional police officer. That Labrador runs down the beach and all the seagulls take flight. But after his eight-hour patrol, the Labrador leaves, and the seagulls return to the beach. Even if the Labrador catches a few seagulls and continues to do so for a few days, they still return.

So law enforcement has a press conference with the mayor, complete with a PowerPoint presentation showing how many bad guys were captured, but what was actually done to change the actual conditions on the ground? Nothing. So what C3 policing does is explore what needs to be done to make the beach different and more difficult for the seagulls to land. It does not mean that one will completely eliminate the seagulls, but instead of having a 100 landing, now maybe only 50 land. The goal is to make it harder for the seagulls to land when the Labrador is gone. Certain conditions or obstacles have been created on the beach so that when the seagulls come, they decide to

go elsewhere, where it is easier to do what they want to do. That is counterinsurgency, changing the conditions so that it is no longer ripe for that behavior.

Change that metaphor so that the beach is now the population. How is it that the population can be won over to where they won't passively allow the gangs there anymore? The bottom line is this—one must change the environment that allows the behavior. Therefore, C3 in the North End focused on detecting, disrupting, degrading, and dismantling criminal activity. More specifically, according to the mission statement of the MSP Special Projects Team, it aimed to separate gangs from their cause and support.¹²⁰

If the C3 policing method, which started in 2009, has been effective in countering gang activity in the North End of Springfield, then measures of crime and quality of life should show improvement. Measurement of the overall effectiveness of C3 was sought by examining specific indicators of changes in the quality of life within the North End. These categories included health, economy, education, politics, housing, crime, and community.¹²¹

1. Medical Calls Related to Criminal Acts

One clue as to the quality of life in a given community is the health of the people living there. Health can be affected by local crime rates since crime and the fear of crime are directly correlated with increased anxiety and decreased physical activity (for example, walking and exercising).¹²² Therefore, being exposed to the disorder that goes with crime can have a negative impact on one's health. Living in a neighborhood that has

¹²⁰ Massachusetts State Police C3 Policing Team, "What is C3 Policing?," accessed September 22, 2014, http://mspc3policing.com/?page_id=800

¹²¹ To accurately interpret data, a control group was established to distinguish changes in the North End due to C3 from other factors. To this end, both temporal and spatial controls were used. The temporal control group allowed for the comparison of quality of life indicators before and after the implementation of C3. The advantage of this control is that it is inherent in the data that spans 2007–2014, as C3 commenced in the fall of 2009. The disadvantage was that C3 is not the only factor that affected metrics in this time period. To isolate the effects of other factors, a spatial control was utilized and the North End was analyzed relative to the entirety of the city of Springfield. This case study adds current data to a prior unpublished study done by students at Harvard University.

¹²² Stafford, Chandola, and Marmot, "Association between Fear of Crime and Mental Health," 2076.

excess violence, graffiti, and litter can negatively affect one's health due to the stress induced from chronic exposure to disorder.¹²³

A corresponding improvement in general health should appear in the North End if the implementation of C3 has been actually reducing the incidents of crime there. Crime-related medical calls were analyzed in an attempt to shed light on the community's state of health. Records from American Medical Response (AMR), a private ambulance company serving the North End, and Bay State Medical Center, a local level 1 trauma center, were collected.¹²⁴ AMR is a private ambulance service covering the North End and provides first responder attention to various medical emergencies. Bay State Medical Center's 24-hour surgical trauma service is the regions foremost medical provider.

Because C3 activities were aimed at curtailing gang activity, applicable medical incidents such as overdoses, gunshot wounds, and stabbings were collected and charted. Data for the North End was gathered for each year ranging from 2007 to 2013 (Figure 1). Comparing the number of calls for service in each category per month, as a function of year, revealed declining trends in the number of calls for overdoses and assaults but not so for gunshot wounds and stabbings. These categories showed a slightly climbing trend for 2010–2012, before dropping off significantly in 2013.

¹²³ Ross, and Mirowsky, "Neighborhood Disadvantage, Disorder, and Health," 272.

¹²⁴ Email from Nancy Morrissey, Communications Manager, American Medical Response, "C3 Stats" September 19, 2014; Baystate Medical Center, *KAS PEN Injuries Report* (Springfield, MA: Baystate Medical Center, 2011–2013).




Figure 1. Ambulance calls for service in the North End from 2007–2013.¹³³

¹³³ William Christeson, and Sanford Newman, *Caught in the Crossfire: Arresting Gang Violence by Investing in Kids* (Washington, DC: Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, 2004), 1.

The AMR data may have not been complete, as it may not have captured all gang activity since individuals involved may not request an ambulance for fear of police involvement, and they may self-ambulate to the local emergency room (ER) as a result. To circumvent this shortcoming, gunshot wounds and stabbings reported directly to Bay State Medical Center's ER¹ were collected per capita and plotted by year ranging from 2007 to 2013 (Figure 2). Relative to the Springfield Trauma Center data that contained all instances reporting there from throughout the entire city, the North End exhibited the same trends of gunshot wounds and stabbings (with the exception of 2013). This would seem to indicate that C3 had little to no impact on gunshot wounds and stabbings, but it certainly a clear impact on assaults and overdoses.

¹ Ibid.




Figure 2. Gunshot wounds and stabbings in the North End and in Springfield 2007–2013.

2. Economy

An informed estimate of the economic cost of gang crimes cannot be made because gang crimes are not routinely and systematically recorded by most law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the proportion of all crimes attributable to gangs is unknown. In addition, the medical and financial consequences of gang violence are often overlooked. The total volume of crime is estimated to cost Americans \$655 billion each year,¹³⁵ and gangs are responsible for a substantial proportion of this. Gangs in the United States have long had a significant economic crime impact.¹³⁶

In 2008, the City of Springfield Office of Planning and Economic Development was advised by an economic assessment report that 33 percent of small businesses in Springfield reported that neighborhood crime was the top inhibitor to their growth.¹³⁷ In addition, 48 percent of respondents reported that theft/petty crime limited the success of their business.¹³⁸ Therefore, one can conclude that businesses could suffer in areas with high gang activity, like the North End. Based upon this assumption, it would seem that if C3 were effectively reducing gang presence and activity in the North End, an improvement in business activity should present itself.

There is a direct correlation between middle class business ownership and income equality to the stability of any community.¹³⁹ This would indicate that an increase in the number of business registrations would signal that the economic health of the North End has improved as a result of C3. In order to check this hypothesis, the number of business registrations in all of Springfield was compared against the number of business registrations in the North End (see Figure 3).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Al Valdez, *Gangs: A Guide to Understanding Street Gangs*, 3rd ed. (San Clemente, CA: Law Tech Pub. Co, 2000), 562; Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Urban Street Gang Enforcement* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997), iii.

¹³⁷ Goodman, and Modzelewski, *City of Springfield Economic Assessment Project*.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Alesina, and Perotti, "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," 1203.

¹⁴⁰ "Business List" received from Springfield City (Massachusetts) clerk, August 1, 2014.




Figure 3. The number of business registrations in the North End and Springfield from 2007–2013.

New business registrations in the North End and Springfield were normalized by population and tallied per year. The trends in business registrations in the North End paralleled the trends in Springfield and no appreciable increase in business registrations seem to have appeared since the implementation of C3 was noted. However, several different factors could impact this data. In addition, limited real estate suitable for business in the North End could impede improvement.¹⁴¹ Also not included is the fact that the North End has an exuberant informal economy.¹⁴² Many of these businesses are not registered with the city and some, including smaller food vendors and retailers, have been doing business in the North End for more than a decade.¹⁴³ Therefore, any trends in the informal economy would not be included or be represented.

Another avenue to explore in the overall state of the economy in the North End was to look at average home values over the past seven years. The values for both the North End and all of Springfield were collected and tabulated from 2007–2013.¹⁴⁴ Between 2007 and mid-2008, the average home values in the North End were consistent with the rest of Springfield (Figure 4). However, in mid-2008 until mid-2009, North End home values fell more abruptly than the rest of Springfield.¹⁴⁵ However, despite an overall downward trend citywide in mid-2009 until late 2010, there was a surprising uptick of North End home values. This trend was not paralleled by the home values throughout the rest of Springfield. In all fairness, it should be noted that this upward slope began before C3 commenced and other explanations must also be considered. Late 2011 saw a more drastic drop in the North End, which finally bottomed out in early 2012. By mid-2012 the property values again began to mirror those of the rest of the city. If C3 had any responsibility for closing the gap in values between mid-2010 and mid-2011, that trend was lost for the remainder of the time studied.

¹⁴¹ Kumar, *Informal Microenterprise in the North End Community*.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Zillow, “01107 Home Prices and Values,” accessed September 2, 2014, <http://www.zillow.com/springfield-ma-01107/home-values/>

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.




Figure 4. Average home values in the North End and Springfield from 2007–2013.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Kathryn A. Chandler et al., *Students' Reports of School Crime: 1989 and 1995* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs and U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, 1998), <http://www.zillow.com/springfield-ma-01107/home-values/>, 4, 7, 12.

Several projects over the past several years have contributed to an influx of capital into the North End. For example, the Borinquen Apartment project in 2009 invested \$8.1 million to rehabilitate 41 housing units in the North End.¹⁴⁷ In addition, the city of Springfield's North End Improvement Project invested another several million dollars to improve roadways and sidewalks on Main Street. Lastly, Baystate Medical Center opened its new \$300 million facility in the North End, dubbed the "Hospital of the Future," in February of 2012.¹⁴⁸ These improvements to the neighborhood, more than likely, provide a reasonable explanation for the 2009–2010 rise in property values. Interpretation of the data collected shows mixed evidence for the economic efficacy of C3. It is more likely that the property values show greater sensitivity to changes in the national economy and other complicated factors than to the advent of C3.

3. Youth and Education

In areas where they have a substantial presence, youth gangs are linked with serious delinquency problems in elementary and secondary schools in the United States.¹⁴⁹ This study of data gathered in the School Crime Supplement to the 1995 National Crime Victim Survey documented several examples. First, there is a strong correlation between gang presence in schools and both guns in schools and availability of drugs in school. Second, higher percentages of students report knowing a student who brought a gun to school when students report gang presence (25 percent) than when gangs were not present (eight percent).¹⁵⁰ Third, students who report that any drugs (marijuana, cocaine, crack, etc.) are readily available at school are much more likely to report gangs at their school (35 percent) than those who say that no drugs are available

¹⁴⁷ Michael McAuliffe, "Borinquen Apartment Rehab Project in Springfield's North End to Receive Federal Stimulus Funds," *The Republican*, November 25, 2009, http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/11/borinquen_apartment_rehab_proj.html; Peter Goonan, "Springfield Borinquen Apartments Rehab Praised by Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick and Others," *The Republican*, August 27, 2010, http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2010/08/springfield_borinquen_apartmen.html

¹⁴⁸ Jim Kinney, "Baystate Health Opens MassMutual Wing, the 'Hospital of the Future' for Springfield," *The Republican*, February 28, 2012, http://www.masslive.com/business-news/index.ssf/2012/02/baystate_opens_massmutual_wing_the_long-.html

¹⁴⁹ Kathryn A. Chandler et al., *Students' Reports of School Crime: 1989 and 1995*, 4, 7, 12.

¹⁵⁰ Internal document, Springfield School Department Records, Springfield, Massachusetts.

(14 percent). Fourth, the presence of gangs more than doubles the likelihood of violent victimization at school (nearly eight percent versus three percent). The presence of street gangs at school also can be very disruptive to the school environment because they may not only create fear among students but also increase the level of violence in schools.¹⁵¹ Gang presence is also an important contributor to overall levels of student victimization at school.¹⁵²

The Springfield Public School System (SPS) reports that approximately 2,000 students (including teenagers) live in the North End.¹⁵³ Meanwhile, the assertion by the MSP Special Projects Team is that the majority of crimes in the North End are either directly or indirectly due to posses that involve young males from ages 14 to 19.¹⁵⁴ It would make sense then, that since a significant portion of North End's residents are of school age, taking a look at their behavior while in school would be an important metric.

a. *Truancy in North End Schools*

The improvement of school attendance provides positive alternatives for potential young gang members and can lead to reduced gang violence.¹⁵⁵ So looking at North End school truancy rates might be a valid indicator of neighborhood gang activity. Due to their close location to the North End, two schools, Brightwood Elementary School and Chestnut Middle School, were evaluated. Brightwood elementary currently has 358 students, 75 percent of whom live in the North End while 40 percent of Chestnut Middle School's 847 students reside in the North End.¹⁵⁶ The method of measuring school

¹⁵¹ John H. Laub, and Janet L. Lauritsen, "The Interdependence of School Violence with Neighborhood and Family Conditions," in *Violence in American Schools: A New Perspective*, eds. Delbert S. Elliott, Beatrix A. Hamburg, and Kirk R. Williams (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 144.

¹⁵² James C. Howell, and James P. Lynch, *Youth Gangs in Schools* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2000), 1.

¹⁵³ "Chestnut Street Middle (02810310)," Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, accessed October 2, 2014, <http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/profiles/student.aspx?orgcode=02810310&orgtypecode=6&DOE.MASS.Edu>

¹⁵⁴ Stafford, Chandola, and Marmot, "Association between Fear of Crime and Mental Health," 2076.

¹⁵⁵ Eric J. Fritsch, Tory J. Caeti, and Robert W. Taylor, "Gang Suppression through Saturation Patrol and Aggressive Curfew and Truancy Enforcement: A Quasi-Experiment Test of the Dallas Anti-Gang Initiative," *Crime & Delinquency* 45, no. 1 (1999): 133.

¹⁵⁶ "Chestnut Street Middle (02810310)."

truancy was by totaling the number of days a student has an unexcused or illegal absence from school and dividing that number by the total number of possible days the student was enrolled (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Chestnut Middle School truancy rates from 2007–2013.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ Figure sent to author by Tim Duquette, Springfield Public Schools, Springfield, MA, September 14, 2014.

Truancy rates since the implementation of C3 reveal a downward trend for Chestnut Middle School since the 2008–2009 academic years. Truancy rates for Brightwood Elementary School showed a downward trend starting in the 2007–2008 school year (Figure 6) but saw a nearly 50 percent increase from the 2009–2010 to the 2010–2011 school years. Overall though, there seems to be positive signs that there was an indication of improved school attendance in response to C3.




Figure 6. Brightwood Elementary truancy rates from 2007–2013.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

b. Delinquency in Schools by North End Students

How children are behaving once in school is another metric worthy of investigation. To study this, reports of violence and drug activity that North End students engage in during school hours were tallied. These data were collected for middle schools and high schools that contain North End students.¹⁵⁹ High school delinquency data from five nearby schools were examined.¹⁶⁰

The information collected was screened so that only North End students were counted, since the schools include students from various neighborhoods. The number of violent and drug-related incidents from the two middle schools in the North End and the five nearby high schools were combined to reveal the total amount of delinquent activity attributed to North End students. When comparing reported incidents each year, a decreasing trend in violent activities was very apparent in the middle school. The high schools showed a significant drop in violent activity immediately following the implementation of C3, and drug activities appear to have remained consistent at only one or two instances per year (Figures 7 and 8).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.




Figure 7. Middle School violence and drug activity 2007–2013.¹⁶¹




Figure 8. High School violence and drug activity 2007–2013.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

In addition to the advent of C3, other factors may have contributed to the decrease over the last few years, including a truce created by two gangs in Commerce High School, who agreed to suspend fighting on school grounds and during school hours. Furthermore, a citywide school uniform policy was instituted in the 2008–2009 academic year, and both administrators at each school and officers stationed in the schools said they saw a marked decrease in violence as a result of this policy.

c. After School Programs

After school programs have also been shown to have a significant impact on the behavior of city youth and participation in after school programs can deter violent behavior.¹⁶² In the North End, 24 youths that had formally been identified as gang members or aspiring gang members have been placed in General Educational Development (GED) classes or assisted in securing employment opportunities since C3 began in 2009.¹⁶³ Another successful partnership has been with the Student Trooper Program offered by the State Police and held as an in resident program at the State Police Academy. Participation in this program exposes city youths to the demands of police training and serves to foster positive relationships between the community and the police that serve them.

4. Politics in the North End

Community politics is not a technique; it is an ideology and a system for ideas to allow social change. It is very important for the community to actively participate politically. It has been proven that the political climate has direct ties to the effectiveness of the police force in combating organized crime,¹⁶⁴ and a community's trust in an elected official is positively correlated with how local that individual is to the

¹⁶² James C. Fraser, *Juvenile Structured Day and Alternative Learning Programs: Impact and Process Study* (Chapel Hill, NC: Center for Urban & Regional Studies, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2004), 7, 69.

¹⁶³ New North Citizen's Council Representative, Springfield, MA.

¹⁶⁴ William G. Hundley, "Nature of Interstate Organized Crime and Problems in Law Enforcement," *Notre Dame Law Review* 38, no. 6 (1963): 628.

community.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, political endorsement of the police positively affects public opinions of law enforcement.¹⁶⁶ The political history of Springfield over the past 50 years was viewed. The decision by then Mayor Charles Ryan in the 1960s to change the city's representation from ward to an at-large system, no longer guaranteed geographic locations representation, but resulted in the election of nine city council members receiving votes from the entire city of Springfield.¹⁶⁷ In short, the North End could not vote for a North End representative. Representation for the North End became more disproportionate as the region became more Hispanic,¹⁶⁸ and over 30 years passed until the region's first Hispanic representative was elected to the Massachusetts legislature in 1999.¹⁶⁹

Ward representation was reinstituted in 2010.¹⁷⁰ In the 2011 election, voter registration continued to increase and four Latino City Council representatives were elected, one of who was from the North End.¹⁷¹ These factors would seem to indicate increasing neighborhood involvement and trust in politics, ultimately pointing to increased legitimacy of government officials in the community. Voter registration continued to rise for the 2013 elections (Figure 9), and although there was a lower voter turnout, that may be an indication of the lack of a popular contested race.

¹⁶⁵ Irving A. Spergel, "The Violent Gang Problem in Chicago: A Local Community Approach," *Social Service Review* 60, no. 1 (March, 1986): 96.

¹⁶⁶ Thomas D. Stucky, "Local Politics and Police Strength," *Justice Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (2005): 144.

¹⁶⁷ Mike Plaisance, "Ward Representation to Become Reality in Springfield Again," *The Republican*, March 22, 2009, http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/03/ward_representation_to_become.html.

¹⁶⁸ Green, "Springfield, Massachusetts: Old Hill, Six Corners, and the South End Neighborhoods," 6.

¹⁶⁹ General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, "The 188th General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts—Cheryl A. Coakley-Rivera," The General Court, accessed October 3, 2014, <https://malegislature.gov/People/Profile/car1>

¹⁷⁰ Plaisance, "Ward Representation to Become Reality in Springfield Again."

¹⁷¹ "The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Election Night Results—November 8th, 2011 City Election," City of Springfield, Massachusetts, accessed September 19, 2012, <http://www3.springfield-ma.gov/elections/elect-201111080.0.html>




Figure 9. Voter activity in the North End from 2007–2013.¹⁷²

¹⁷² Figure sent to author by Springfield City clerk, September 18, 2014.

5. Housing

The crime level in a neighborhood can be closely linked to the quality of its housing. It has been shown that greater socioeconomic diversity in a housing complex can be linked to reduced crime rates.¹⁷³ The average annual household income in the North End is less than \$22,000, and most residents are renters that live in Section Eight housing that is government subsidized. In the densely populated North End, the population distribution of renters and of Hispanic residents overlaps.¹⁷⁴ This correlation has been linked to Section Eight housing.¹⁷⁵ The Edgewater Apartments that are located at 101 Lowell Street is the largest rental property in the North End, and as the only high-rise in the North End, it is the most densely populated area in the neighborhood, housing over 2,000 residents.

Since 2010, 101 Lowell has been subject to six kinetic operations resulting in more than 60 arrests and numerous weapons and drug seizures. Narcotics related crimes account for 90 percent of arrests made there.¹⁷⁶ This gives 101 Lowell the title of holding the highest crime density in the North End and the obvious focal point for law enforcement efforts.

6. Crime

Measuring the actual incidents of neighborhood crime is the most direct barometer of C3's effects on the North End. The reporting and recording of criminal events is typically divided into separate categories, which include calls for service, incidents, and arrests. The overall combination gives a snapshot of a community's state of criminal activity (see Figure 10).

¹⁷³ Mark L. Joseph, Robert J. Chaskin and Henry S. Webber, "The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty through Mixed-Income Development," *Urban Affairs Review* 42, no. 3 (January, 2007): 387.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Juan Gerena, *Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing* (City of Springfield, MA: Springfield Office of Planning & Economic Development, 2005): 22–23.

¹⁷⁶ Internal document, Springfield Police Department Records, Springfield, Massachusetts.




Figure 10. Calls for service in the Brightwood Section 2007–2013.

Basically, a call for service is a request for police presence. Upon an officer's arrival, one of three courses of action will be taken. (1) If the officer finds no evidence of crime or suspicious activity, no written report is produced. (2) If the officer finds evidence of a crime but finds no suspect to arrest, then an incident report will be filed. (3) Lastly, if evidence and the suspect who committed the crime are obtainable, an arrest will be made. Independent of a call for service, an officer on patrol may witness a crime and either write an incident report or make an arrest. In order to analyze crime, all four data types from 2007–2013 for the North End were collected.

7. Violent Crime in the C3 Area

Crimes within the North End that were directly affected by the C3 initiative were compiled (see Table 1).

Table 1. Incidents of C3-related violent crimes in Brightwood
2007–2013.¹⁷⁷

Crimes	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Aggravated	21	20	20	23	22	14	18
Arson	0	2	2	3	2	0	2
Larceny	37	34	27	35	41	39	46
Mal Dam	66	56	59	37	44	21	41
Threats/Intimidation	32	38	36	35	38	38	39
B&E	28	30	28	29	28	24	26
M/V Theft	12	7	11	12	20	12	13
Murder	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Robbery	3	3	0	5	4	4	10
Weapons	1	4	4	4	9	5	0
Totals	200	194	187	183	208	157	196

Calls for service in the North End significantly fluctuated between 2007 and 2009, and there was an uptick in numbers following the commencement of C3 policing in 2009.¹⁷⁸ This could signal that the police were building legitimacy in the neighborhood and that residents were more likely to call when observing criminal events. The reports of

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

crime remained high in 2011 and the downward trend in calls for service in 2012 and 2013 could indicate an actual decline in criminal activity due in part to the efforts of C3. Drug related arrests in the North End included kinetic operations run by the MSP and the SPD, and this indicated a nearly three-fold increase between 2010 and 2011 (Figure 12). When isolating C3 directly affected crimes (Figure 11), the incidents were virtually unchanged or only trending down slightly between 2007 and 2010 and rose in 2011. There was a sharp decline in 2012 but returned to the average number again in 2013.

C3 Directly Related Incidents in Brightwood




Figure 11. Incidents directly related to C3 in Brightwood area 2007–2013.

The trends in arrests and calls for service suggest that the community is beginning to take ownership and responsibility for reporting crime, which has ultimately led to more arrests and calls for service.




Figure 12. Drug arrests in Brightwood 2007–2013.

Gang involvement and control of the retail drug trade poses a serious threat to public safety and stability in many mid-size cities because such distribution activities are routinely associated with lethal violence.¹⁷⁹ Violent disputes over the control of drug territory and collection of drug debts frequently occur among gangs. A review of the drug-related arrests in Brightwood showed a significant reduction in drug arrests immediately following the implementation of C3 but then a drastic spike in 2011, which was due to the previously mentioned kinetic operations conducted by law enforcement during that year. Overall, after the sweep of 2011, drug arrests seem to be trending downward since the implementation of C3.

¹⁷⁹ National Gang Intelligence Centre, *2011 National Gang Threat Assessment—Emerging Trends* (Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011), 11.

8. Litter and Graffiti

A trash and graffiti free neighborhood can be related to resident's perceptions of safety. Litter and vandalism lead to the perception of increased crime¹⁸⁰ and are often common in communities with increased incidence of crime.¹⁸¹ Graffiti not only affects the appearance of a neighborhood, but it is also important to the function of gangs.¹⁸² It can display in code information such as where to buy drugs or where homicides have occurred, and it also marks the territory held by different or rival gangs. Tracking the incidents of graffiti can be a direct measure of gang presence. Therefore, if C3 has had an impact on the presence of gangs, one would expect to see a measurable drop in the litter and graffiti of the neighborhood (Figure 13).




Figure 13. Graffiti reports per square mile for the North End.

¹⁸⁰ LaGrange, Ferraro, and Supancic, "Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime," 311.

¹⁸¹ Wilson, and Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," 29.

¹⁸² Ferrell, "Urban Graffiti Crime, Control, and Resistance," 78.

Incidents of graffiti and litter indices were provided by the City of Springfield Department of Public Works, whose records originated from a variety of both public and private sources.¹⁸³ Graffiti records included date and location of each instance, whereas litter indices were maintained as part of the “Keep America Beautiful” initiative.¹⁸⁴ Teams of four or five surveyors continuously travel the city, observe litter, and assign each neighborhood a score. These scores range from one—clean, to four—extremely littered. These scores are tabulated together to form the litter index.

Plotting graffiti incidents per square mile by year for both the North End and Springfield revealed a considerable spike in 2009. However, the high incidence of graffiti in the North End was subsequently diminished by nearly 68 percent by 2011.¹⁸⁵ That trend continued drastically downward until the present day here in 2014 where the North End and the rest of the city are almost even. Next, graffiti instances for each month were assessed and revealed highly variable data for the North End (Figure 14). July 2009 and January 2012 were outliers for the North End because during this time, a few pathological graffiti artists were overactive and raised overall averages.¹⁸⁶ The takeaway from the data provided was that compared to the city of Springfield, the North End had steep upward trend from 2007 to 2009, which reversed from 2009 to 2014.

¹⁸³ Author received from August 13, 2014 from Michael Cass, Springfield City Department of Public Works, Department of Public Works, Graffiti Remediation and Keep America Beautiful Litter Index.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.




Figure 14. Graffiti reports per square mile for the North End and Springfield per (A) year and per (B) month.

Since C3 began in late 2009, there has only been two months with 10 or more instances of graffiti per square mile, and the number of months without any graffiti has risen. Graffiti-free months have increased considerably from 2007 to 2014, a trend unique to the North End (Figure 15).




Figure 15. Graffiti-free months in per year from 2007–2014.

To analyze litter data, the indices for each year from 2007 to 2014 were tabulated.¹⁸⁷ The Brightwood section of the North End where C3 was implemented in 2009 was the focus. Brightwood was compared to the nearby neighborhood of Memorial Square as well as the entirety of Springfield. Both other regions are outside of C3's area of focus (Figure 16).

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.




Figure 16. Averaged litter index scores per year from 2007–2014.

Prior to 2009, Brightwood was typically as littered as the rest of the city, if not more. Since then, it has always fared better than the rest of Springfield and neighboring Memorial Square. In fact, in 2011 and 2014, it was the single cleanest neighborhood in the entire city. While graffiti in the North End still slightly surpasses that of Springfield as a whole, there are fewer instances since C3 commenced, and the number of months without any graffiti has increased. In addition, litter in the North End has dropped measurably compared to the rest of Springfield, a trend not paralleled by Memorial Square. All indications are that the physical appearance of the neighborhood where C3 is focused on is improving. Because neighborhood appearance is linked to feelings of public safety,¹⁸⁸ these conditions suggest that C3 is having positive effects on the overall quality of life in this community.

B. ASSESSMENT OF C3

The metrics analyzed thus far have been completely based on quantitative indicators. This is typically how COIN-based strategies graded.¹⁸⁹ The recognized standard has been using two categories to assess this data. The first is an effects-based assessment that requires researchers to track the results of specific events in the target area over time and build a picture of campaign momentum. The second is pattern and trends analysis that identifies various metrics for study and identifies trends in each over time. That is why the metrics two years preceding C3 and four to five years since the implementation was collected. This classic COIN approach is similar to the methods used in this study. It must be remembered though, that the debate continues regarding the correct method of analyzing COIN efforts, and no single model has yet been deemed appropriate.¹⁹⁰

In conclusion, pattern and trends analysis alone will never determine what metrics are important to a given community. It is conceivable that something important in one location may be irrelevant in another. It is through these observations, though, that the

¹⁸⁸ Wilson, and Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," 29.

¹⁸⁹ Few, "Lies, Damn Lies, and Metrics in Small Wars."

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

policy recommendations for further implementation of C3 are partially based. Therefore, it is important to form opinions on statistical data that shows positive trends. Residents understand the area better than an outside observer but this would require a means of analysis that would enlist their expertise. However, qualitative research was not included in this academic review. The author hopes that a qualitative researcher will assist in future updates to this study with a blend of qualitative evaluation measures.

Viewing the current North End environment through the lens of the accepted counterinsurgency strategy of *clear* (ridding an area of insurgency leadership and quick impact efforts to degrade their legitimacy), *hold* (securing the area against further insurgency activity while building legitimacy and working to stabilize the population), and *build* (effectively immunizing the community against further insurgent activity by increasing its ability to provide its own security, economic stability and growth, and the development of civil order and governance),¹⁹¹ it would appear that C3 policing in the North End can generally be considered in the *hold* phase. Infrequent and sporadic instances of gang activity continue, while indicators of the community's stabilization against the escalation of gang violence show slow but positive gains.

A review of the results of this case study revealed some expected and unexpected outcomes. Although there were some clear and definitive trends, there were also indiscernible ones. Most of the economic and some of the health data were unsuccessful in showing positive trends. However, examples of school impacts, such as truancy rates and delinquency, show positive signs. Looking at crime through arrests and calls for service reveal a neighborhood that is becoming more involved with law enforcement and that perhaps trust and legitimacy is indeed being established since the implementation of C3. Increased community involvement was also apparent in the political realm as registered voters continued to climb, which is sometimes an indicator of "voting for a change." Lastly, convincing trends were apparent in both instances of graffiti and litter, which indicates that this community is making it less hospitable for gang activity to develop and flourish.

¹⁹¹ Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24), 5-18.

IV. COIN IN POLICING IN THE WORLD

The primary objective of any COIN operation is to help set the conditions for a stable environment and to separate disruptive subjects or groups from their cause and support. Effective police and law enforcement activities in COIN may or may not be applicable to some because its origins lie in colonial warfare, and its results are extremely mixed. Essential to this objective and are the primary means by which the state maintains control over the illegitimate and illicit transactions of bad actors. Important lessons can be learned from other countries experiences (Figure 17).



Figure 17. Massachusetts State Police, British Armed Forces, and Indian Defence

This chapter presents two case studies that look at the effects of law enforcement and policing efforts on the results of COIN efforts. It is important to evaluate past applications of COIN policing applications to observe relevant lessons for strategists, leaders, and planners at both the strategic and operational levels. A study of historical cases such as these can sometimes provide new and vital perspectives on the deployment of new strategies and perhaps help to improve organizational performance. Highlighted are the aspects of a contemporary COIN model of policing and law enforcement action undertaken by two democratic nations in recent history:

- More than 30 years of COIN operations in Northern Ireland during the *Troubles* (imperial policing).

- The policing and law enforcement model used to defeat Naxal insurgents in central India.

A. COIN POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969–2007 (THE TROUBLES)

Ireland achieved independence in 1922, but six of the nine northern counties of Ulster remained under governance of the United Kingdom (UK). This divided the population of Northern Ireland between Catholics and Protestants. This caused religious tensions between both groups:

The Protestants, as loyalists (or unionists), advocated for political affiliation with the UK.

Whereas the Catholics, as the republicans (or nationalists), stood for the unification of all Ireland and as such, created a political organization known as Sinn Féin and an insurgent component, the Irish Republican Army (IRA).¹⁹²

Many lessons were learned by the operations on the part of the British during this time, and those found applicable to the present day application of COIN in this thesis, derived from official government briefings, follow:¹⁹³

If possible, use a campaign plan to resolve unity issues—that is, implement effective *command and control*. Control measures such as tactical and operational boundaries should be similar, and if at all possible, related to those of any overall coordinating intelligence body. Establish joint committees or organizations at all levels.

Develop early in the campaign the legal requirements for operational framework as the military begins to act more like police (constabulary) and the police become more military-like.

Special training is required to prepare for policing operations in COIN environments. There should be consideration for COIN training to deal with policing techniques for the units chosen to operate in urban insurgencies. Comprehensive and dedicated training of the police on

¹⁹² Andrew Silke, “Bitter Harvests: The Royal Ulster Constabulary’s Response to Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland,” *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 9, no. 2 (2000): 1–5.

¹⁹³ *Operation BANNER: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2006), http://www.vilaweb.cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/op_banner_analysis_released.pdf, 4–1–4–13.

aspects of COIN and operating with non-governmental organizations will help the two succeed.

These policing and law enforcement lessons learned indicated that investigative functions and intelligence gathering should form the basis of an effective COIN strategy during irregular acts of terrorism from urban guerrillas.¹⁹⁴

It is true that law enforcement will tend to become more military-like with COIN. This could result in communities feeling alienated from law enforcement due to police focusing on COIN tasks at the expense of ordinary crime, the result being the community losing its support for the police. To counter this, the public needs to be reassured by the government that police and law enforcement agencies are still focused on crime prevention through community policing, even during COIN operations. Failure to do so could result in an unintended result of vigilantism.¹⁹⁵

B. COIN POLICING IN INDIA 1967–2011 (THE NAXAL INSURGENCY)

This next example of a COIN policing is a study from field research on the police operations in central India to engage the Naxal insurgents. The difference in this particular approach was that policing and law enforcement in COIN represented a direct strategy, the police and law enforcement, not the military, were the main actors.

Discussions and interviews with key police and law enforcement intelligence personnel resulted in critical discoveries related to police operations in COIN environments (from the government perspective):¹⁹⁶

Some COIN operations require military solutions, but overall the police model is preferred, using minimum force as the doctrinal template.

The preferred method for overall police unity of command is to emplace an overall district police inspector or inspector general to lead the COIN effort, backed by the national police and in support of local and regional police.

¹⁹⁴ Lindsay Clutterbuck, "Countering Irish Republican Terrorism in Britain: Its Origin as a Police Function," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 114.

¹⁹⁵ Silke, "Bitter Harvests," 27.

¹⁹⁶ Celeski, *Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: The Thick Blue Line*, 75.

A variety of police units can be used in a COIN environment. Police must be multi-tiered to cover the district, and territorial areas.

The sharing of intelligence requires remembering the difference between what the military and the police need for their own uses. The differences will help reconcile tension between them. The military often is looking for tactical intelligence to defeat insurgents, while the police are looking for investigative, forensic style information to build cases and make arrests. Understanding differences aids in the collection, analysis, and distribution of the raw data to be shared between the two forces.

Leaders (who include politicians) must be seen frequently visiting the neighborhoods to keep an understanding of what is occurring in the environment. Leadership cannot manage and call the shots from afar.

The policing model for COIN within the district was considered effective by the senior police representatives. Their thoughts were that the people relate to local police; they are familiar. The population believes that the police share their same dangers because they live there, plus the police have the local understanding and background of every situation. The largest attribute of a police-led COIN effort are that the police have a vast historical record of all the activities of their areas (e.g., who has been arrested, who lives there). This critical knowledge and information becomes the basis of their intelligence.

C. COIN POLICING IN CONTEXT

Policing in the North End of Springfield had fallen into a reactive approach to law enforcement due to waning manpower, rising calls for service, and the overall philosophy of policing in urban environments. Comparatively, good practices in the UK and India offer a proactive approach focusing on collection and analysis of intelligence, social data, engaging the community, and building trust through partnerships to support ongoing investigations aimed at identifying criminals and crime trends.

Over the past several decades, policing the North End of Springfield has relied on a community policing based approach, but this technique has been revealed as resource intensive, overly bureaucratic, and difficult to assess. This approach utilized a short-term and tactical level of intelligence that addressed the immediate problem. It worked well for some issues, but it was not strategic in nature and fell short of being integrated into the

entire agency’s way of doing business. However, this was a start and the department has begun to realize the importance of being more proactive as opposed to reactive. A comparison between Community Policing and C3 Policing is in Table 2.

Table 2. Past Springfield and Massachusetts State Police Community Policing versus COIN Policing¹⁹⁷

<u>Principals of Community Policing</u>		<u>Principals of COIN-Inspired Policing</u>
-Philosophy and organizational strategy -Commitment to community empowerment -Decentralized and personalized policing -Immediate and long-term proactive Problem solving -Ethics, legality, responsibility and trust -Expanding the police mandate -Helping those with special needs -Grassroots creativity and support -Internal change -Building for the future	VS	-Legitimacy is crucial to achieving our goals -You must understand the environment (<i>must know the <u>ground truth</u></i>) -Unity of effort is essential -Intelligence drives operations -Prepare for a long-term commitment -Local factors are primary -Security under the rule of law is essential -Gangs must be separated from their cause and support
Philosophy -More resources needed		Actual Strategy -Utilizes existing resources

One of the biggest contentions by other agencies and academics alike after first hearing of C3 policing is: “That’s just community policing. We’re doing that now.” I can only surmise that they come to this conclusion by focusing only on the community meetings aspect of the two programs. Community policing in Springfield was implemented in the early 1990s during an atmosphere of economic growth and never addressed attacking the root causes of gangs and drug dealing. Police could identify “hot spots” and “nuke” the problem by flooding the area with officers. When federal funding for additional police officers dried up, most departments became shorthanded. As a result, they were no longer able to respond with the same numbers of officers.

Community policing and C3 are two very distinct and different tools. One is not better than the other; they are different. To say one is better than the other is like saying a screwdriver is better than a hammer—it all depends on what the intended job is. They are

¹⁹⁷ Massachusetts State Police C3 Policing Team, “C3 Vs Community Policing,” MSP C3 Policing, accessed November 4, 2014, http://mspc3policing.com/?page_id=13

designed for different end states. The 10 bullet comments, or principles, that are under community policing come from the Department of Justice (DOJ) website.¹⁹⁸ They are all philosophical tenants of what to do in community policing. It leaves a lot of leeway for the chief or the person running it to interpret the philosophy. I would argue that community policing is a good tool in communities that want to work with the police. Places where there are home owners, businesses, low crime, and where the population looks at police officers respectfully. Community policing is not an effective tool in a community that has negative connotations of the police, and one in which the population does not want to engage with the police. There seems to be no action arm to community policing. In addition, there is no intelligence cycle to target the nefarious actors.

Community policing has philosophical approaches like “commitment to community empowerment.”¹⁹⁹ What is the community being empowered to do? It doesn’t say. If that was a tenant in C3 policing, it might say “empower the community to overthrow gang members” for instance. It would be more specific. The principals of C3 and COIN are very specific. It is saying that things must be done differently. Intelligence drives operations in C3. It is telling the officer, the chief, or the patrolman that the operations are driven off of the intelligence that are garnished from the community.

It also states under the principles of C3 Policing that “gangs must be separated from their cause and support.”²⁰⁰ Their cause is the gang lifestyle, the guns, the drugs, and running a gang. Their support base is the passive support from the community.

So we have two different tools for two different problem sets. So outwardly, it looks to some that C3 is community policing because there is a lot of community engagement but the difference is the C3 strategy is to garnish information that can be turned into intelligence to do targeting at the same time mobilizing and educating the community members so that they, on their own, willfully turn against the gang members.

¹⁹⁸ Massachusetts State Police C3 Policing Team, “C3 Vs Community Policing.”

¹⁹⁹ Gayle Fisher-Stewart, *U.S. Department of Justice, Community Policing Explained: A Guide for Local Governments*, 2007, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/publications/cp_explained.pdf, 29.

²⁰⁰ Massachusetts State Police C3 Policing Team, “C3 Vs Community Policing.”

There is no plan in community policing to do that. It is “empowerment,” “expanding the police Mandate,” and to “help those with special needs.”²⁰¹ How does that attack the gang problem? That is where the two approaches are different. Community policing is a philosophy that will be interpreted differently by each department, by each chief differently, and executed differently. With C3 policing there is some room for interpretation, but it is also very specific. It says “legitimacy is crucial to achieving our goals,”²⁰² that is the legitimacy of the police. Rebuilding police legitimacy with the population is crucial. It must be built before any gains within the community can be made.

It is unfair to expect the highly motivated good officers or troopers to do C3 policing when they are not given the tools at the academy. At the academy, they are taught criminal law, motor vehicle law, ethics, how to do investigations, reports, patrol procedures, defensive tactics, crash investigations, and arrest procedures. What is not taught to the officer, and typically does not fall under our skill set is long-term planning and how to change the environment.

D. COMPARATIVE LESSONS

Comparison of concepts in the UK and India, which relied heavily on COIN principals of intelligence-driven products to direct resources, can have an impact on the development and emergence of C3 policing. Law enforcement can learn from these past accounts to address the new challenges faced in policing economically depressed urban environments using intelligence in a more realistic and integrated manner. Again, the key benefit that the UK and Indian examples offer is the ability to be proactive instead of reactive and to leverage resources to effectively address issues.

In the examples discussed above, the police in UK and India seek to change the social conditions within the target area to address the underlying issues. They seek the “ground truth,” not that which is perceived or projected by the government or authority. Therefore, the mission *end state* must be to bring cultural change to the community.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

Failure to achieve this objective reduces the police to no more than an occupational force, similar to the failed application of COIN early during the UK involvement in Northern Ireland. Our typical barracks patrol officers currently see themselves as “crime fighters” and tend to shun any form of social work. They respond to calls for service from the public and see their mission as arresting criminals. The threat of arrest is the dominant mode of acquiring compliance from the community. Community members seem to be angry at the police for not addressing the issues they see as important. This shows that the cultural changes that need to take place are not only with the community, but the policing methodology as well.

The military and the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the UK learned that special training is required to prepare for policing operations in COIN environments. There should be consideration of COIN training to deal with policing techniques for the units chosen to operate in urban insurgencies. Comprehensive and dedicated training of the police on aspects of COIN and operating with non-governmental organizations will help the two succeed. We currently do not offer these forms of training in our traditional policing curriculum. The needed course materials and specialized skills to accomplish the mission need to be properly identified should be researched and offered to members requesting this assignment. The current success we have seen in C3 policing is based largely upon skills that these officers obtained by serving in the armed forces while deployed overseas in the global war on terror. However, expansion would require additional officers, who have not received this specialized training, and unfortunately the training is not currently available through our traditional academy curriculum.

Both the UK and Indian examples stressed the ability to engage the public to form legitimacy of the police and government. The current environment in Springfield is lacking in that regard. The low percentage of calls for service compared to the actual incidents of crime indicates that the citizenry is reluctant to call the police. The trust and confidence in the police must be built before any reasonable impact can take place in the community.

The Springfield Police and Massachusetts State Police must incorporate the entire community if we ever expect to change the social landscape. The UK and India learned

that the community can become alienated from the police during these campaigns against insurgencies or gangs. Furthermore, they learned that they could not focus on COIN at the expense of ordinary crime and quality of life issues. On the other hand, the Springfield Police and the Massachusetts State Police tend to keep separate from the community social agencies that address things like housing, schools, health, and welfare. Building better partnerships, like the UK and India did, would help to add legitimacy to our stake in these neighborhoods.

Another common thread in both the UK and Indian models was a public relations initiative. These campaigns focused on portraying the police and law enforcement agencies as protecting law and order with the support and help of the community. Far too often, here in the U.S., we overlook the power of promoting our positive collaboration with the public. The steady stream of media tends to only reflect the negative examples of interaction between the police and the public. Perhaps adopting methodology of public relations campaigns used in India and the UK can be a force multiplier in achieving our ultimate goal of the reduction of violent gang crime.

Both of these examples (Northern Ireland and India) provide important lessons for the further development and successful expansion of C3 policing. While these are only two examples, strategists and policy makers must continue to research and study various historical COIN experiences to form policies on the application of police and law enforcement in targeted areas. The overall conclusions about policing and law enforcement in COIN described in these two examples are:

- Effective policing and law enforcement, perceived as legitimate by the populace, in consort with other measures implemented by the government to improve the quality of life and ensure security, would serve as a preemptive or preventative measure against any chance of escalating crime.
- Comprehensive and dedicated training of the police on aspects of COIN and operating with non-governmental organizations is vital to help the two succeed.
- Assessments and planning must always take into consideration the roles offensive policing and community policing play as an integrated portion of the government's response to crime.

- To effectively move police from a community policing posture to an intelligence-led policing posture will require paying attention to their training and equipment. The capacity to train and enable police is increased by incorporating assets from partners within the community with a stake in the outcome.
- Police reserves, community volunteers, auxiliaries, and specialized police units are all resources that can be used to expand the capacity of law enforcement.
- A success metric for a COIN end state is when the situation begins to revert back to a level of disorder that a society can live with.

These experiences from the UK and India provide some interesting perspectives and insights into the use and application of COIN strategies, tactics, techniques and procedures. The lessons learned provide increased knowledge in respect to civil policing and COIN parallels, and how to better provide police services.

V. CONCLUSION

Although some argue quite convincingly a contradictory view, the violence, drug activity, and criminal behavior that we see in Springfield's North End do not constitute an insurgency. Criminal gangs have no ideology beyond their own profit, no political aspirations what so ever, and only achieve passive community support through violence or intimidation. Gangs are nothing more than basic criminal entities. Some COIN principles and practices can, however, support the current law-enforcement strategy aimed to detect, deter, and degrade gangs. The effectiveness of these efforts seem to depend more on deepening reciprocal trust and building legitimacy in the police than perhaps on applying all of the lessons learned overseas during the global war on terror to Springfield's inner city neighborhoods.

Without a doubt, COIN strategy is a military strategy; however, the basic skills of working with and through the community, intelligence driving operations, and conducting investigations are all fundamental law enforcement practices. Through many conflicts, the military learned and honed these specific skills, eventually applying them with success through their special operations communities (e.g., as applied by the Green Berets). Now is the time for new ideas and approaches, such as C3 policing that examine these practices and create that which has always been missing in community policing: a defined strategy to confront criminal street gangs. C3's COIN gang strategy provides the advantage of strong agency and community relationships to identify, target, and remove the gangs through the use of intelligence driven operations. When properly administered and executed, this strategy of intelligence-driven targeting and operations should be the most effective and efficient means to detect, disrupt, degrade, and dismantle criminal gang activity in the city of Springfield.

A. CIVIL-MILITARY FUSION: THE FLIP SIDE OF THE COIN

At what point in the future do the commando and cop merge? Both travel a separate and distinctive path that has slowly been narrowing to a point where at the current course of things, they are bound to intersect. The reasonable person would select

to take the best practices of each and discard those attributes that tend to cast the civilian population as enemy combatants. Critics worry that military methods and mindsets are creeping into police practices to the detriment of citizens' safety and community stability.

According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), "the militarization of domestic law enforcement began in the 1970s with the war on drugs, and has been fueled by billions of dollars in federal funding throughout the so-called war on terror."²⁰³ Its report also asserts that Massachusetts police departments have been accepting equipment from the Department of Defense (DOD) free of charge for many years. This dispersal is handled by the U.S. military's 1033 program,²⁰⁴ which gives used DOD equipment to state and local law enforcement for "counter-drug or counter-terrorism activities."²⁰⁵

Between 1994 and 2009, 82 police departments and other authorized agencies in Massachusetts received 1,068 military weapons from the DOD—including 486 fully automatic M-16 machine guns and 564 semi-automatic M-14s.²⁰⁶ West Springfield, Massachusetts, population 28,137, got two grenade launchers through the 1033 program.²⁰⁷ Massachusetts police departments also received five "peacekeeper armored vehicles" valued at \$1 million, 771 vehicles worth more than \$11 million, and large marine craft worth \$300,000.²⁰⁸ In 2012, Massachusetts agencies requested equipment worth over \$2 million from the DOD, including night vision goggles, binoculars, telescopes, computers, and trucks.²⁰⁹

²⁰³ "Our Homes are Not Battlefields: Reversing the Militarization & Federalization of Local Police in Massachusetts," American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, accessed November 14, 2014, <http://www.privacysos.org/swat>

²⁰⁴ "1033 Program Overview," The Official website of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/msp/1033-program.html>

²⁰⁵ "Our Homes are Not Battlefields."

²⁰⁶ Donovan Slack, "Police Add Assault Rifles across the State." *The Boston Globe*, June 3, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/06/03/police_add_assault_rifles_across_the_state

²⁰⁷ "Weapons List," accessed October 7, 2014, https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/1033_Weapons_List.pdf

²⁰⁸ "1103 Program Roster," accessed October 7, 2014, https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/1033_Program_Roster.pdf

²⁰⁹ "1033 Program Property Books," accessed September 27, 2014, https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/1033_Program_Property_Book.xls

This acquisition of military equipment, including powerful weapons, happens without a process for public input. A *Boston Globe* report²¹⁰ found that when it surveyed 12 Massachusetts police departments, not one had informed the public that it was getting free military weapons through the 1033 program. That public engagement is crucial because not all communities are eager to receive military weapons, even when the DOD is giving them away.

At the writing of this thesis, many in law enforcement are preparing for the public response to the pending release of grand jury findings in Ferguson, Missouri. In this case, a young man lost his life as the result of a police action. This has vaulted to the forefront a public conversation about the law enforcement tactics used during a public safety crisis and scrutinizes the military-civil fusion. These concerns are not only legitimate but welcomed in a democratic society. These events also reignite the examination of the civil-military fusion debate, focusing on the 1033 program, which makes military surplus equipment available to local law enforcement agencies.

The police, who act as the civilian representatives of the law in our communities, completely understand the public's concerns. To this end, Massachusetts State Police Colonel Timothy Alben, also a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) alumnus, recently wrote in a *Boston Herald* article, "Assault rifles, while a legitimate and necessary tool for serious law enforcement applications, have no place on the front line of any civil demonstration in our communities."²¹¹ Understanding that, the Massachusetts State Police, as well as other law enforcement agencies across the country, have acquired many other pieces from the military beyond just firearms.

Most of the equipment acquired by the MSP has been valuable items such as night vision goggles, personal protection equipment, and commercial grade industrial and construction equipment. This includes small unit support vehicles (SUSVs), which have been used to help transport residents of flooded towns. Also acquired have been bucket loaders, flatbed trailers to haul critical equipment, generators for storm ravaged or

²¹⁰ Donovan Slack, "Even Small Localities Got Big Guns," *The Boston Globe*, June 15, 2009.

²¹¹ Alben, "The "Militarization" of Police: Another Perspective."

disaster stricken communities; and heavy trucks with plows. According to Alben, “Even the six Humvee’s the Massachusetts State Police acquired are neither armor-plated nor equipped with weapons. These all-terrain vehicles, capable of navigating otherwise impassable, swampy or snow-impacted terrain, are utilized almost exclusively for search and rescue operations and will never be deployed to a public disturbance of any type.”²¹²

Another asset portrayed as part of the “militarization” is armored vehicles, which are mainly purchased through federal homeland security grant programs—not the 1033 program.²¹³ These particular vehicles are defensive in nature and designed primarily for the protection of police. They are not, and never have been, equipped with mounted guns or other lethal instruments predominantly associated with military operations. Instead, they are equipped with public address systems to communicate with large crowds or for crisis negotiators to calm barricaded subjects as well as armed, distraught individuals. They are also used to shuttle tactical teams into volatile and threatening situations where they could be facing incoming gunfire.²¹⁴

Another commonly criticized observation of the “militarization” is the uniforms worn by law enforcement during such disturbances or critical incidents. These uniforms are worn in these instances because they are more durable and better suited for the situation, rather than to “mimic” soldiers.²¹⁵ In a crisis response scenario, whether man-made or natural disaster, these particular uniforms can provide greater protection from chemicals, fire, or sharp objects. Most importantly, these uniforms display a badge, agency patch, and troopers last name so that officers are easily recognizable as police officers, not soldiers.

How about other things that can be considered “militarization”? Every day in emergency rooms across the country, combat medical techniques are saving the lives of

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

hundreds. Where do did the Boston Trauma Centers learn their skills to treat the Boston Marathon bombing victims? That's right, combat medicine.²¹⁶

Here in Massachusetts, "militarization" technology being developed by the Army's Natick Soldiers Center researching new protective technology for soldiers, including better body armor, breathing systems, and technology to locate soldiers in a critical situation, could be helpful to civilian public safety applications. Technology being used today to track soldiers on the battlefield will be used someday to locate the positions of firefighters in a burning building.

The "flip side" is that when Sir Robert Peel first developed his framework for the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, he borrowed heavily from the military in both organization and administrative structures.²¹⁷ But most of all, he wanted there to be a clear distinction between the police and the military. To that end, the uniforms of the London Metropolitan Police (Bobbies) were blue, in contrast with the red uniforms worn by the British military. Bobbies were also forbidden to carry guns.

Our early American policing structure was loosely modeled after Peel's plan. The military's mission was predicated on the use of force, whereas Peel's principles of policing emphasized crime prevention, public approval, the minimal use of force, and *the willing cooperation of the public*.²¹⁸ Although the community policing movement had drawn heavily from Peel's principles of policing, which emphasized the importance of the relationship between the police and the community they serve, what was the option for when gangs thrive in a failed community, one that has lost trust in law enforcement, refuses to engage the police, and passively permits gangs to operate? The current drift toward some strategic methods inspired by the current "global war on terror" might not be the evil form of "militarization" that some are quick to point out.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Karl Bickel, "Will the Growing Militarization of Our Police Doom Community Policing?," *Community Policing Dispatch* 6, no. 12 (2013), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/12-2013/will_the_growing_militarization_of_our_police_doom_community_policing.asp

²¹⁸ "Policing by Consent," FOI release, December 10, 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent>; "Sir Robert Peel's Principles of Law Enforcement, 1829," accessed October 7, 2014, https://www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/Documents/Peels_Principles_Of_Law_Enforcement.pdf

In sum, “militarization” need not always be viewed in a negative light. However, continued civil-military fusion can only successfully exist in an environment where there is a strong community—police relationship, recurrent and sustained training, and responsible law enforcement leadership.²¹⁹ The debate over whether there is a “flip side of the COIN” or any unintended consequences could only truly be answered by conducting interviews and surveys within the community to gain a qualitative analysis. After all, seeing the landscape through the lens of those affected, is the only means of an accurate account.

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The recent appointment of a new police commissioner in the city of Springfield has prompted the request for a city wide expansion of the C3 Program. Prior to such a commitment by the department, the following recommendations are made based upon the information revealed in this thesis.

Recommendation 1: The selection of prospective officers should take into account the multidisciplinary skills required of COIN inspired policing, many of which may not be obtained in traditional law enforcement training. The current C3 team was hand selected based upon prior experience both in law enforcement and military deployments, language, and technical skills. The tasks and organization of the team may be unique to the mission, tactical situation, and the technical, cultural, and social terrain. Therefore, training should be developed and offered to reflect the department’s commitment to this initiative if we are expected to entertain its expansion. Failure to commit the proper personnel with the appropriate skills, training, and motivation could ultimately result in the failure of this proposed expansion.

Recommendation 2: Invitation and permission from the community regarding entry of C3 policing should be sought prior to commencing operations. The neighborhood should be the initiator of the contact as opposed to being arbitrarily selected by either law enforcement or the city administration. The community must have a desired interest in the outcome and be willing to be an active participant in the effort. It

²¹⁹ Alben, “The “Militarization” of Police: Another Perspective.”

is imperative to its success that the members of C3 are able to identify and work with the true local leaders and to enlist the support of local community groups. Building legitimacy is crucial to achieving these goals. Ultimately, the ability to mobilize the population against the gang problem depends on good relations. Ideally, the end state of the process is a re-shaping of the community environment, which makes it inhospitable for gangs, drugs, and violent criminal behavior.

Recommendation 3: For C3 policing to succeed, a multidisciplinary team of law enforcement, public health, public works, school officials, and non-government organizations should be assembled and mobilized in the planning phases before operations commence. This “working group” should conduct a mission analysis and develop an “implementation plan” including, but not limited to, the following:

- Analyze the community’s concerns
- Analyze the departments mission, intent, and expectations
- Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks
- Determine constraints, prohibitions, and restrictions
- Construct a timeline with stated goals
- Develop themes and messages (intra-agency, inter-agency, media, and public)
- Establish course of action evaluation criteria (metrics)
- Conduct a cost analysis to explore the feasibility of implementation

Recommendation 4: Critics of the nexus of the military and social science research and application of military tactics to civilian issues warn that the idea of applying a counter-insurgency approach in domestic law enforcement; however, it is labeled, risks casting local communities as hostile populations. Over used terms such as “the war on crime,” “the war on drugs,” “the war on terror” add to this perception, along with articles referring to police calling many urban areas combat or war zones. Every effort to promote the positive collaboration and interaction with community leaders and residents is essential to promote our message of providing a safe environment through police-citizen partnership with an emphasis on mutual trust, integrity, fairness, and professionalism.

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