



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**AGGRESSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH OR
UNCONVENTIONAL THREAT? THE HUNGARIAN
EXTREME RIGHT-WING SELF-DEFENSE MOVEMENTS**

by

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December 2014

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2014	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE AGGRESSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH OR UNCONVENTIONAL THREAT? THE HUNGARIAN EXTREME RIGHT-WING SELF-DEFENSE MOVEMENTS			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Tibor K. Sonkoly				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____ N/A ____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) In the past decade there has been a growing political and popular right-wing extremist movement in Hungary. According to the Athena Institute, an independent human-rights group based in Budapest, at least 20 extreme right-wing organizations are active at present. Additionally, based on their rhetoric, some of these groups openly seek the overthrow of the existing social order of Hungary and perform activities that have paramilitary features. The role of these right-wing groups has been noted in the crisis on the Crimean Peninsula. This project explores a specific phenomenon among the extremist right-wing movements, the self-defense groups, and the threats they pose to Hungarian national security. Combining online data from communication platforms (blogs) and open-source data, the goal is to visualize this right-wing Hungarian social network and identify alternative strategies to deal with it.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Paramilitary, Far-Right, Extremist, Self-Defense Movement, Hungary, Visual Analytics, Temporal Analysis, Geographical Analysis, Link Analysis, Social Network Analysis, Strategy			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 99	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

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MOVEMENTS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

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ABSTRACT

In the past decade there has been a growing political and popular right-wing extremist movement in Hungary. According to the Athena Institute, an independent human-rights group based in Budapest, at least 20 extreme right-wing organizations are active at present. Additionally, based on their rhetoric, some of these groups openly seek the overthrow of the existing social order of Hungary and perform activities that have paramilitary features.

The role of these right-wing groups has been noted in the crisis on the Crimean Peninsula. This project explores a specific phenomenon among the extremist right-wing movements, the self-defense groups, and the threats they pose to Hungarian national security. Combining online data from communication platforms (blogs) and open-source data, the goal is to visualize this right-wing Hungarian social network and identify alternative strategies to deal with it.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AH	Constitution Protection Office
CFCA	Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism
COA	Course of Action
EU	European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
FIDESZ	Alliance of Young Democrats
HDF	Hungarian Defense Forces
IC	Intelligence Community
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	information operations
JOBBIK	Movement for a Better Hungary
MIEP	Hungarian Justice and Life Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBH	Office of National Security
NVAC	National Visualization and Analytics Center
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SZDSZ	Hungarian Liberal Party
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VAT	Value-added Tax

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I give honor to God through whom all things are possible. Second, I deeply appreciate my wife, Julia, for supporting me during the long process of research and writing. Finally, particular thanks are due to Nancy Roberts and Dan Cunningham, both of whom provided guidance and comprehensive suggestions that greatly enhanced the overall quality of the work.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Hungarian self-defense movements emerged in the context of a steady growth in and acceptance of far-right ideas and practices.¹ Currently, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, JOBBIK), a legal right-wing political party, is leading the charge in the growing popularity of right-wing groups.

The nationalistic ideology of the extreme right-wing groups reflect the socio-political and economic instability that has plagued Hungary since it emerged from the Hungarian Kingdom after the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its land and one-third of its people to Czechoslovakia, Romania, Russia, and Yugoslavia.² The desire to regain the land and reunite Hungary is essential to the far-right's rhetoric.

In the 1990s, Hungary emerged from 46 years of Soviet rule and rapidly gained ground as a free-market economy. Hungary also joined NATO in 1999 and by 2001 extended temporary work, education, and health-care rights (via the Status Law) to Hungarians living in surrounding countries. In 2002 the European Union formally extended the invitation to Hungary to join the EU in 2004. The country's financial situation began to weaken due to high levels of private and state borrowing. Financially, Hungary was dangerously vulnerable to the looming global financial crisis.

The global financial crisis took its toll on Hungary, creating the worst recession in its history. In 2008 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European World Bank granted Hungary a rescue package. By 2009, Hungary and Russia had signed an agreement to partner on the Hungarian transport and storage of Russian gas supplies. That same year Hungary passed a financial austerity package of spending cuts, tax increases, and a wage freeze.

In 2011, the Hungarian parliament passed a controversial new election law that halved the number of Members of Parliament and redrew their electoral boundaries. In

1 Manuel Mireanu, "The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary Groups," *Fascism* 2, no. 1 (2013): 68–93.

2 BBC News. "Hungary Profile," March 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17383522>.

addition, parliament passed a controversial law on central bank reform giving the government increased control over monetary policy, causing the European Central Bank to raise concern.

In 2012, Hungary's Value-added Tax (VAT) increased to 27%—the highest rate in the EU—and the Parliament initiated a new constitution which resulted in public-wide demonstrations and rioting. Its financial ills continued with a downgrading of its credit rating to junk status. The EU then suspended payment to Hungary. By the end of the year Hungary was in a financial standoff with the IMF and political factions were maneuvering into hardline positions. During the April 2014 national elections, Hungary began moving to the right.

This movement to the right had been occurring over a number of years. It picked up momentum in 1993, when the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) was founded. As the first legal and far-right nationalist political party in Hungary, it won 5.5% of the votes and it gained parliamentary representation with 14 seats at the legislative elections in 1998. When it did not get into the national parliament in 2001, its members merged into the JOBBIK party that was established in the same year.³

JOBBIK describes itself as “a principled, conservative, and radically patriotic Christian party” whose “fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values and interests.”⁴ It calls itself “the only party to face one of the underlying problems of Hungarian society—the unsolved situation of the ever growing gypsy population, which constitutes about 7% of the population.”⁵ According to its platform, its focus is on “gypsy crime,” a phenomenon that “everyone knows” but is silenced by “political correctness.”⁶

³ Jobbik.hu. “Miért Alakult Meg A Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom-Párt,” [Why was the Movement for a Better Hungary-Party founded] Jun 2008, http://zuglo.jobbik.hu/miert_alakult_meg_a_jobbik_magyarorszagert_mozgalom_part.

⁴ Jobbik.com. “A Short Summary about Jobbik,” May 2010, http://www.jobbik.com/short_summary_about_jobbik.

⁵ The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that the condition of the country's “Roma minority has come under the spotlight in recent years. The Roma community is blighted by poverty and illiteracy, with many Roma living on the margins of Hungarian society, often victims of discrimination.

⁶ Jobbik.com. “A Short Summary about Jobbik,” May 2010, http://www.jobbik.com/short_summary_about_jobbik

Hungary's history, as well as its political and economic unrest, appears to have generated anxiety among the population that has fueled extreme right-wing ideologies. The higher crime rate typical of underdeveloped, Roma-inhabited regions has specifically provoked right-wing rhetoric and has attracted political support to counter 'gypsy-crime.'⁷⁸ The well-known 2006 speech of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, appears to have triggered riots and violent protests that year. He admits on a confidential, but taped, meeting that his party lied to the public in order to win the general election.⁹

In the years that followed, the hyper-nationalist and anti-Semitic feelings were transformed from rhetoric to direct actions.¹⁰ In the spring of 2008, the Hungarian Guard's patrolling of the streets of Nyírkáta, with the explicit aim of stopping 'gypsy crime,' drew wide media attention to the Hungarian civilian self-defense organizations. JOBBIK's support for the self-defense cause triggered an avalanche of self-organizing group formation.¹¹ Similar self-defense organizations began appearing all over the country.¹² "The events culminated in April 2011 with a crisis in the village of Gyöngyöspata,¹³ where several patrols had been active."¹⁴ The provocative language of

⁷ Analysts have described far-right extremist groups and organizations as holding concrete anti-Roma goals in Hungary.

⁸ Jennifer Leaning, Jacqueline Bhabha, Arlan Fuller, Margareta Matache, Bonnie Shnayerson, Carrie Bronsther, Jelena Ivanis, and Katalin Dobias, *Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary*,. FXB Center for Health & Human Rights, Harvard University (Boston, February 2014), 8, <http://fxb.harvard.edu/report-growing-patterns-violence-roma-hungary-sound-alarms/>.

⁹ BBC News, "Europe, Excerpts: Hungarian 'Lies' Speech." <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5359546.stm>.

¹⁰ Manuel Mireanu, "The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary Groups," 68–93.

¹¹ Damon L. Smith, "Jobbik: A Better Hungary at the Cost of Europe" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2014).

¹² However, several months after the Guard was created, a Hungarian news agency reported that "three founding members of the radical right-wing JOBBIK party, including former chairman Dávid Kovács, had left the party, declaring that it has become too radical. He issued a statement that "JOBBIK has been merged inseparably with the Guard, taking responsibility for something that it cannot really control in the long run." As a result, the leaders of the Guard gradually turn against the JOBBIK which later led to a split within the organization.

¹³ For a Better Future Hungarian Self Defense began to patrol in the village because of the increasingly frequent crime which blamed on the Romas. The tension between the two sides was dependent at least 1 to 2 months during which time more fighting occurred between the two parties.

¹⁴ Manuel Mireanu, "The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary Groups," 68–93.

Zsolt Tyirityán, leader of the Betyársereg (Outlaw's Army), exemplified the heated rhetoric when he called on Hungarians to, “stop being the prey and start being predators.”¹⁵ Subsequent to these and other events, the European Roma Right Centre released a report detailing 61 separate violent acts against Romas between January 2008 and September 2012, some of which involved discharged weapons, Molotov cocktails, and even hand grenades.¹⁶

Hungarian sentiment continued its political shift to the right in 2010. JOBBIK was able to win 47 seats in the national election, completely removing the Alliance of Free Democrats—the Hungarian Liberal Party (SZDSZ)—from government. Meanwhile, the majority Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Alliance) party was enacting right-leaning changes to the law and constitution. Simultaneously, JOBBIK secured three seats in the European Parliament elections, marking the first time a far-right-wing party held a representative government position abroad since the end of the World War II.

A. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH GOAL

The main purpose of this study is to assist the Hungarian Government with illuminating the network of extreme right-wing self-defense organizations in Hungary. Although addressed from the military and unconventional warfare perspective, this study describes and analyzes groups based on their participation in offensive or paramilitary actions, including hate-rallies, demonstrations, security patrols or ‘show the force,’ and military training. Beyond descriptive analyses, the secondary purpose is to identify possible strategic options to deal with this network. Thus, this research focuses on two primary questions: what does the network of right-wing self-defense organizations look like, and what options does the Hungarian government have to deal with them?

¹⁵ Athena Institute. “Athena Institute - Gyűlöletcsoport Térkép,” [Athena Institute – Hate groups map] July 2014, <http://www.athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletcsoportok/>.

¹⁶ Catherine Twigg, *Attacks against Roma in Hungary: January 2008–September 2012* (European Roma Rights Centre, Budapest, October 1, 2012). <http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/attacks-list-in-hungary.pdf>.

B. THESIS STRUCTURE:

The reminder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter II (Literature Review) provides an overview of Hungarian extreme far-right organizations involved in self-defense activities. This section focuses on the network's current activities along with the organizational and ideological foundations of the groups. Chapter III (Research Methodology) describes the analytical methods used to examine the research questions outlined in Chapter II, and provides a description of the sources from which the data were collected and structured. Chapter IV (Data Analysis and Results), the backbone of this study, provides an exploratory analysis of the network using several analytical techniques, namely relational, geospatial, and temporal analyses. Chapter V (Discussion) will first list identified patterns of the network, and subsequently put them into context. The next section of this chapter (Strategic Options) will then list and evaluate several strategic options based on the analytical results. Based on the current situation and the legal framework of Hungary, Chapter VI (Conclusion) recommends the most effective strategy to deal with the challenges presented by the right-wing, so-called self-defense groups.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The 2008 annual report of Constitution Protection Office (AH), formerly known as Office of National Security (NBH), states that the importance of the extreme right in Hungary should not be overestimated. According to the official statement, right-wing movements are divided and only have a small mass base of support, mostly because “their self-appointed leaders are not capable of developing a common position beyond their individual interests.”¹⁷ The report also highlights that the riots associated with the radical right-wing groups have recently become more violent than in previous years and pose a physical threat to their political opponents. This chapter summarizes the various groups, their ideology, tactics, and goals.

A. EXTREME RIGHT-WING SELF-DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS IN HUNGARY

The Hungarian and the Western European press described the extreme right-wing self-defense groups as paramilitary organization, civilian militia or party militia.¹⁸ Joint Publication 1–02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” defines paramilitary forces as “forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.”¹⁹ From a military point of view, Mazzei’s definition better characterizes the Hungarian self-defense organizations. According to her, “paramilitary groups are political, armed organizations that are by definition extra-military, extra-State, non-institutional entities, but which mobilize and operate with the assistance of important allies, including factions within the State.”²⁰ In the case of Hungary, these groups are

¹⁷ Origo.hu. “Nem Kell Túlbecsülni a Szélsőjobbot Az NBH Szerint,” [According to the NBH, the extreme right in Hungary should not be overestimated] April 2009, <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20090415-a-nemzetbiztonsagi-hivatal-nbh-2008as-evkonyve-tevekenysegerol.html#>.

¹⁸ Inside Europe—Deutsche Welle. “Hungarian neo-fascist paramilitary group expands,” accessed: March 28, 2014. <http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,3752785,00.html>.

¹⁹ Richard A. Best Jr. and Andrew Feickert. “Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress.” *CRS Report for Congress*, Order Code RS22017 (December 6, 2006). doi: <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf>.

²⁰ Julie Mazzei, *Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2009), 4.

offensive and in many cases violent, but they have to reject arming openly because of the current security and legal environment.

The dissolution of the first Hungarian Guard in 2009 was due to their demonstrations and events against ‘Gipsy-crime’ that turned discrimination into their political agenda. According to the Metropolitan Court, the group’s use of fear to intimidate others was not acceptable.²¹ According to Domina Kristóf, of the Athene Institute, an independent human-rights group based in Budapest, these right-wing organizations now “deny any connection to hate crimes or other offenses. They (have) learned their lesson from the banning of the Hungarian Guard, [...] (and) are very careful not to be involved [in any criminal activity] as an organization.”²² The efforts of right-wing self-defense organizations appear to strategically adapt to public and legal acceptance regarding paramilitarism.

Although Hungarian groups do not perfectly fit the definitions above, they can be safely considered paramilitary organizations because their activities are clearly directed against a definite group of people who are perceived as threatening the socioeconomic basis of the desired political order,²³ and in addition, their activities clearly include paramilitary features such as military type trainings, security patrolling, and wearing uniforms.

1. Ideological Basis

Paramilitary activities have been characteristic of the Hungarian far-right in the past. As Bodó points out, paramilitary violence based on both extreme left and right ideologies (the period of Red and White Terror) helped shape Hungary after the Great War.²⁴ After the end of the Second World War and the fall of Nazi domination, the

21 Politics.hu. “Court Dissolves Hungarian Guard, Claiming Right-Wing Group Insults Roma Minority,” December 2008, <http://www.politics.hu/20081217/court-dissolves-hungarian-guard-claiming-rightwing-group-insults-roma-minority/>.

22 Sonni Efron and Tad Stahnke, *We’re Not Nazis, but... - The Rise of Hate Parties in Hungary and Greece and Why America Should Care* (Human Rights First, New York, August 14, 2014), 58. <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-report-We-Are-Not-Nazis-But.pdf>

23 Mazzei, *Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?*, 4–5.

24 Bodó Béla, “Pál Prónay: Paramilitary Violence and Anti-Semitism in Hungary, 1919–1921.” *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 2101 (December 21, 2011): 2. doi: <http://carlbeckpapers.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/cbp/article/view/167>.

Communists established their military wing again under the name of Youth Defense Guard (Ifjú Gárda). It was similar to the later Workers' Guard (Munkásőrség), which was created and trained to defend the Single Party's regime after the revolution in 1956.²⁵

Because real political opposition could not exist under communism, right-wing extremism was able to re-emerge only in the 1990s. Until the 2006 riots, their messages generally focused on "ideas of national redemption, with rare outbursts of anti-Semitism and [...] accusations against the current political elite."²⁶ These ideologies triggered violence only occasionally, and in isolated cases. In the following years, direct actions became a practice built around hyper-nationalist and anti-semitic, or more frequently, anti-Roma (racist) ideas.²⁷

Today, Hungary has three main types of right wing radicalism: the Skinhead or neo-Nazi; the Hungarist; and the New-Radical right-wing. Despite adhering to right-wing political views, these organizations are not monolithic. Conflict between the New-Radical right and the Hungarists has been intensifying since the mid-1990s.²⁸ For instance, the national radicals idealize the 'Horthy era,'²⁹ while the Hungarists characterize Horthy as a supporter of the Jews, which is against right-wing beliefs. They also have differences in their rhetoric. For example, in contrast to the Hungarists, the New-Radical refrain from anti-democratic or anti-regime statements in the mainstream media and only use this rhetoric in front of far-right-wing audience.³⁰ Moreover, the two parties publicly reject collusion with the other, although they both target specific minorities, primarily the Roma and Jewish people,³¹ which is a crucial element of their ideologies.

²⁵ Manuel Mireanu, "The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary Groups," 71.

²⁶ Manuel Mireanu, "The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary Groups," 73.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Tóth Ferenc, *Voltunk, Vagyunk, Leszünk? "Hungaristák" Jelenkori Vetületei* [We were, we are, we will be? Contemporary projections of the Hungarists] (Országos Tudományos Diákköri Tanács, Társadalomtudományi Szekció, Zsigmond Király Főiskola, Budapest, 2011): 6–8. doi: <http://otdk.zskf.hu/Dolgozatok/225.pdf>

²⁹ Vitéz Horthy Miklós was a Hungarian Admiral and statesman who served as Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary during most of the inter war era and World War II.

³⁰ Tóth Ferenc, *Voltunk, Vagyunk, Leszünk?*, 6–8.

³¹ Ibid.

These groups largely share negative views of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF). After the break-up of the Warsaw-Pact, the government suspended the army's conscription system and significantly reduced it in size. These changes, which were brought on by the country's tough financial situation under left wing and liberal governments, resulted in a noticeable reduction in the country's military capabilities. This trend ultimately changed role of the HDF into a weaker organization that relies greatly on external support from organizations such as NATO. Today, because of its weaker role and its reliance on external support, most extremist groups refer to the current HDF as a mercenary army used to support the interests of Jewish conspiracy instead of homeland security. Additionally, they claim the reserve force is just a scam.³² These positions appeal to the younger generation that is often attracted to masculine militarist challenges which are championed among these self-defense groups.

The Hungarian far-right distinguishes itself from other European new radical parties because it has its own paramilitary force, for instance the Hungarian Guard.³³ The Guard was formed in 2007 through an 'oath of allegiance' taken by men and women wearing black uniforms bearing the ultra-nationalist symbols made famous in the 2006 riots.³⁴ Samu Tamás Gergő, president of the Békés County JOBBIK organization announced in 2009: "If the JOBBIK gains power ... the members of the Guard will form the backbone of the [new] Hungarian gendarmerie, will be invested with public authority, and will march here, ... with weapons on their side."³⁵ With its inception, the Guard brought on a modern form of far-right paramilitarism that seeks and is able to garner public support. As Mireanu summarized in 2014,

The need for such a group was clearly articulated upon a perceived deficit of security, and the Guard was supposed to fill that gap by tackling threats to national security. Yet, this gap was perceived not only as a capability

³² jövönk.info. "A Tartalékos Haderő Is Átverés?" [Is the reserve force just a scam?] December 2010, <http://www.jovonk.info/2010/12/22/tartalekos-hadero-atveres>.

³³ Damon L. Smith, "Jobbik: A Better Hungary at the Cost of Europe" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2014).

³⁴ Manuel Mireanu, "The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary Groups," 74.

³⁵ BEOL.hu. "Tüntetés Sarkadon: fegyvert adna a Gárdának a Jobbik," [Demonstration on Sarkad: the Jobbik would give weapons to the Garda] March 2009, <http://www.beol.hu/bekes/kozelet/tuntetes-sarkadon-fegyvert-adna-a-gardanak-a-jobbik-215811>.

gap, but also as a moral and ideological one. The Hungarian Guard uttered a discourse of historical decadence, whereby internal and external enemies threaten the daily wellbeing of ethnic Hungarians everywhere.³⁶

Thus, self-defense and paramilitarism can be understood as a vital part of the right-wing groups. It is built on the protection of its own ethnic community against aliens and/or minorities.³⁷ Anti-elite views and Euro-skepticism are general features of the self-defense movements as well, primarily because of their attention in mainstream media and the protection of rights of self-determination.³⁸ As Bíró and Róna noted (2011), the expropriation of the ‘Gipsy-crime’ topic was the cause of the sharp increase in the far-right’s popularity in Hungary from 2009.³⁹ The Garda Movement, and the other cooperative or rival paramilitary organizations, has succeeded in convincing a significant part of the public that their activities are not aimed at the fueling of the ethnic tensions but meeting the country’s existing needs.⁴⁰ As a result, they were able to operate and gain popularity under the left- as well as right-wing governments.⁴¹

³⁶ Manuel Mireanu, “The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary Groups,” 75.

³⁷ Szombati Kristóf and Feischmidt Margit, *Gyöngyöspata 2011. A Magyarországi Szélsőjobboldal Laboratóriuma - A Politikai Mozgósítás és az Interetnikus Konfliktus Elemzése és Tanulságai* [Gyöngyöspata 2011. The laboratory of the Hungarian far-right—Political mobilization and the interethnic conflict analysis and lessons] (Ökopolisz Alapítvány, Budapest, 2012): 7. http://www.okopolisz.eu/uploads/Csatolmanyok/okp_gy_2011_tanulmany_final_0416.pdf.

³⁸ Szombati Kristóf, Feischmidt Margit, *Gyöngyöspata 2011*, 8.

³⁹ Bíró Nagy András, Róna Dániel, *Tudatos Radikalizmus - A Jobbik Útja a Parlamentbe, 2003–2010* [Conscious radicalism—The Jobbik’s path into the Parliament, 2003–2010] (Policy Solutions, Budapest, 2011): 36–37. http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/file/B%C3%ADr%C3%B3%20Nagy-R%C3%B3na_Tudatos%20radikalizmus_v%C3%A9gs%C5%91.pdf.

⁴⁰ Szombati Kristóf, Feischmidt Margit, *Gyöngyöspata 2011*, 10.

⁴¹ Ibid.



Figure 1. JOBBIK's Protest in Kerecsend October 2012. The events were triggered by an attack on local elderly couple. The banner reads: "Stop the Gypsy Crime" (from alfahir.hu, 2012)⁴²

To summarize, in the case of self-defense, the boundaries are blurred between the far-right political views. The main difference remains only the level of rejection of the current legal social structure.⁴³ Building on the summary above and the typology of Political Capital,⁴⁴ a Hungarian policy research and consulting institute, the following chart (Table 1) classifies the most important Hungarian far-right organizations involved in self-defense or paramilitary activities.⁴⁵ The less significant skinhead organizations—the Hungaria Skins or Skins4skins—are considered as one group due to their relatively small size, inconsistent positions, and a lack of sources. The 'relationship with democratic institutions' column describes the level of rejection of the current legal social structure in the case of each group. The 'public relations' column refers the public transparency and the openness of the groups.

⁴² Alfahir.hu. "kerecsend_1.jpg (JPEG Image, 550 × 367 Pixels) - Scaled (0%)," October 2012, http://alfahir.hu/sites/barikad.hu/files/2012/10/kerecsend_1.jpg

⁴³ Tóth Ferenc, *We were, we are, we will be?*, 8.

⁴⁴ Gimes Gergely, Somogyi Zoltán, Krekó Péter, Kiss Kálmán, and Juhász Attila, *Látélet 2008* [Report 2008] (Political Capital, Budapest, 2008): 66. http://www.euroastra.info/files/20081016_eloiteltesseg_tanulmany_081016.pdf.

⁴⁵ Athena Institute. "Athena Institute - Gyűlöletcsoport Térkép," [Athena Institute – Hate groups map] July 2014, <http://www.athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletcsoportok/>.

Table 1. Hungarian Far-Right Organizations Involved In Self-Defense or Paramilitary Activities.

Name Used in the Project	Original Name	Relationship with Democratic Institutions	Ideology	Organizational Form	Risk to Society	Public Relations
Blood & Honour Hungary	Vér és Becsület	Reject	Neo-Nazi	Movement	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
Conscience 88 Group	Lelkiismeret 88 Csoport	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
Death Squad	Halálbrigád	Unknown	Unknown	Racist serial killer group	Inactive	Covert
For a Better Future Hungarian Self Defence	Szebb Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
Guards of the Carpathian Homeland Movement	Kárpát Haza Őrei Mozgalom	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
Hereditary Hungarian Guard	Őrző Magyar Gárda	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Inactive	Partially transparent
Hungarian Guard	Magyar Gárda	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Inactive	Partially transparent
Hungarian National Front	Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal (Magyar Nemzetiszocialista)	Reject	Hungarist	Movement	Paramilitary	Partially transparent

	Akciócsoportok)					
Hungarian National Guard	Magyar Nemzeti Gárda	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
Hungarian Self Defense Movement	Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom	Reject	Hungarist	Movement	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
JOBBIK - The Movement for a Better Hungary	JOBBIK Magyarországért Mozgalom	Accept	New-Radical	Party	Aggressive rhetoric	Transparent
National Protection Force Heritage and Civil Guard Association	Nemzeti Őrsereg Hagyományörző és Polgárőr Egyesület	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
National Will Platform	Nemzeti Akarat Platform	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Inactive	Partially transparent
Nationalist Motorcyclists	Nemzeti Érzelmű Motorosok	Accept	New-Radical	Association	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
New Hungarian Guard	Új Magyar Gárda	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
NS Straight Edge	NS Straight Edge	Reject	Hungarist	Movement	Paramilitary	Partially transparent
Outlaws' Army	Betyársereg	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Violent demonstrations	Covert
Pax Hungarica	Pax Hungarica	Reject	Hungarist	Movement	Aggressive demonstrations	Partially transparent
Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement	Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom	Accept	New-Radical	Movement	Aggressive rhetoric/ demonstrations	Transparent

Skinheads	Skinheads	Reject	Neo-Nazi	Movement	Violent demonstrations	Covert
Soldiers of the Defense Force (Defense Force)	Véderő Honvédei Nemzeti Felszabadító Front (Véderő)	Reject	New-Radical	Movement	Paramilitary	Transparent
The Arrows of the Hungarians National Liberating Army / Hunnia Movement	Magyarok Nyilai Nemzeti Felszabadító Hadsereg / Hunnia Mozgalom	Reject	New-Radical	Terrorist group	Inactive	Covert
The Raggeds Cultural Association	Rongyosok Kulturális és Hagyományőrző Egyesület	Accept	New-Radical	Reenactment group	Aggressive demonstrations	Transparent

There are other issues of concern regarding the ideological bases of self-defense groups. Political analysts have noted that the majority of the far-right parties all over the EU, including the Hungarian New-Radicals as well as the Hungarists are pro-Russian,⁴⁶ without any historical or ideological ties to Hungarian nationalism. Moreover, earlier in this year, one of JOBBIK's members in the European Parliament, Kovács Béla was suspected of spying for Russia.⁴⁷ The latest issue arose when Moscow accused Hungary of supplying Ukraine with arms based on the bulletin of a relatively unknown Hungarian far-right news portal (www.hidfo.net). These events suggest a Russian policy that aims to develop or support European extremist groups to undermine the EU and NATO from within.

2. Organizational Basis

The self-defense/paramilitary activities are typically carried out within the legal framework of political movements. For example, members of the Hungarian Guard, who were disbanded by the Metropolitan Court for the violations of the law of assembly in 2009, founded a new and legal movement known as the New Hungarian Guard Movement.⁴⁸ The Blood and Honor Cultural Association, which was disbanded in 2005, followed a similar legal process by re-establishing itself as a movement under the name of Pax Hungarica. By establishing themselves as legal movements, instead of association or party that can be banned, they can continue to take advantage of the benefits that such bodies can receive.⁴⁹ According to the Athena Institute, most of the far-right movements in Hungary have bank accounts for fundraising, and can even receive one percent of personal income tax as social organizations.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Sonni Efron and Tad Stahnke. *We're Not Nazis, but*, 32.

⁴⁷ Origo.hu. "Kémkedéssel Gyanúsítják a Jobbik Jelöltjét," [The Jobbik's candidate is suspected of spying for Russia] May 2014, <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20140515-kemkedessel-gyanusitjak-a-jobbik-jeloltjet-kovacs-belat.html>.

⁴⁸ Athena Institute. "Athena Institute - Nulla Pénzből Gazdálkodik a Magyar Extrémizmus," [Athena Institute—The Hungarian extremism operates by zero money] July 2007. <http://www.athenaintezet.hu/fokuszban/olvas/9>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

In terms of their paramilitary activities, such as military trainings, these groups maintain their ability to act mainly through supporter contributions and volunteer work.⁵¹ The costs appear to be minimal- given their three-day-long training camps for the participants,⁵² usually less than 2000 HUF (approximately 8 USD). In comparison, the price of an ‘Airsoft’ war game is 17.500 HUF (72 USD).⁵³ A five-day-long military-type team-building training organized by a civilian company costs 39.000 HUF (161 USD).⁵⁴ Thus, the far-right groups have been able to find ways to support themselves even though many of them have been legally dissolved at one point.

The size of each right-wing group is unclear. Hungarian mass media has provided several conflicting reports regarding the size of the groups and their supporters; however, no comprehensive study has been conducted. According the Athena Institute, the Hungarian Guard alone contained approximately 700 active members at the peak of its popularity.⁵⁵ In the case of the remaining self-defense organizations, the average number appears to be about one hundred active members.⁵⁶ Part of the difficulty with determining the size of each group, is that the right-wing groups often collaborate and share members. The Outlaws’ Army is one example of a group whose members are often associated with other groups. For example, their leader was a member of the Hungarian National Front as well as Blood and Honor.⁵⁷ According to several testimonies, the group’s webpage is also maintained by the same person who was involved in the military training of The Arrows of the Hungarians. A more common example mentioned in the mass media is that of Zagyva György Gyula, who is parliamentarian of the JOBBIK and

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Hvg.hu. “Itthon: ‘Katonai Kiképzést Kaptunk’ - Interjú a Nemzeti Arcvonal-Tábor Egyik Résztvevőjével,” [We received military training—Interview with a participant of the National Front’s Camp] March 2011, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20110319_magyar_nemzeti_arcvonal_kikepzes.

⁵³ DevGru. “Bombák Földje 6 Előzetes I.rész,” [Land of bombs 6—review] <http://www.devgru.hu/?p=4321>.

⁵⁴ Elite Challenge. “Elite Challenge GY.I.K.,” [Elite Challenge FAQ] <http://www.elitechallenge.hu/index.php?q=gyik>.

⁵⁵ Athena Institute. “Athena Institute - Gyűlöletcsoport Térkép,” [Athena Institute – Hate groups map] July 2014, <http://www.athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletcsoportok/>.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Athena Institute. “Athena Institute - Nulla Pénzből Gazdálkodik a Magyar Extrémizmus,” [Athena Institute—The Hungarian extremism operates by zero money] July 2007. <http://www.athenaintezet.hu/fokuszban/olvas/9>.

the former chairman of the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, but who is also a member of the Outlaws' Army.⁵⁸

3. Activities

Military action conducted outside of the state's formal armed forces, as well as trainings organized by self-defense organizations can be considered paramilitary activities. As seen in Table 1 in Section 1, over a dozen right-wing groups exist in Hungary that can be considered paramilitary organizations. A description of each group's paramilitary activities is beyond the purpose of this chapter. Instead, this section will describe these groups' activities largely through the most typical examples, which best represents the activities of Hungarian right-wing groups in general.

Regarding the military-type trainings, the Hungarian National Front has the most media coverage compared with the rest of the groups. According to the Athena Institute, the Hungarian National Front has been one of the oldest and most organized self-defense groups in Hungary. Their founder "claims to have revived the movement under the name Hungarian National Socialist Task Force back in 1989 answering a call from WWII fascist leaders exiled during the Communist regime."⁵⁹ Their 'action groups' have been trained for actual armed combat. On their website (<http://www.jovonk.info>), they regularly publish propaganda materials and reports about their training events and capabilities. Paramilitary events are held all year long to educate and train the members. The paramilitary training seems to be a multistage process led by organizers with police or military experience. The basic trainings are conducted over three-day-long 'open camps.'⁶⁰ These 'open camps' are partially public events for external volunteers, and according to witness reports, their primary focus is military training. The candidates receive close combat, basic weapon drills, small unit tactics, as well as psychological training. Ideology does not appear to play an important role in these events.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Athena Institute. "Athena Institute - Gyűlöletcsoport Térkép," [Athena Institute – Hate groups map] July 2014, <http://www.athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletcsoportok/>.

⁶⁰ Angyal Gábor, "Belföld - Vizsgálják a Bőnyi Neonáci Kiképzőtábor Ügyét," [Domestic—The Bőnyi neo-Nazi training camp is under investigation] NOL.hu, September 2009, http://nol.hu/belfold/vizsgaljak_a_neonaci_kikepzotabort-348514.

In the next stage of training, only the members can participate in special preparations like land navigation, night-fighting, medical training, and urban combat. The acquired knowledge and capabilities are periodically tested on complex exercises. In one such event, the members of an elite ‘action team,’ located all around the country, have to capture or kill a fictional high-value target (referred to ‘the enemy of the people’) on a particular and fortified location guarded by a ‘security unit.’ The elite ‘action team’ must be able to covertly approach a target building and conduct a hit against an opposing force. After the execution of the exercise, the members leave the target area individually.⁶¹



Figure 2. ‘Action Teams’ in the ‘Open Camps.’ Urban warfare (left) medical (middle) and close quarter combat (right) training with simulation guns held by the Hungarian National Front (from jovonk.info, 2013).⁶²⁶³

The members of Hungarian National Front, and many of the other groups, also participate in long-range road marches. These activities are connected to historical events and guided by popular nationalist ideals. For example, in the ‘Outbreak Memorial Tour’ (Kitörés Emléktúra) or ‘Attila Defense Line Tour’ (Attila-Védvonal Túra), both of which are memorials to German and Hungarian defenders of the ‘Fort of Budapest’ in the

61 Szabad Riport. “Ez Még Csak Gyakorlat: A Belső Ellenség Felszámolása,” [It is still only a training: Elimination of the internal enemy] November 2011, <http://szabadriport.wordpress.com/2011/11/29/ez-meg-csak-gyakorlat-a-belso-ellenseg-felszamolasa/>.

62 Jövönk.info. “2011-08-31-Helyi-Csoportok-Kepzese-folytatodik1.jpg (JPEG Image, 500 × 375 Pixels) - Scaled (0%),” August 2011, <http://www.jovonk.info/sites/default/files/kepek/hir/2011-08-31-helyi-csoportok-kepze-folytatodik1.jpg>.

63 Jövönk.info. “16-Ero-Es-batorsag2.jpg (JPEG Image, 640 × 480 Pixels),” December 2013, <http://www.jovonk.info/sites/default/files/kepek/2013/12/16-ero-es-batorsag2.jpg>

Second World War, most of the prominent Hungarian far-right stakeholders participates, including the JOBBIK itself.⁶⁴⁶⁵

As was mentioned above, paramilitary training does not always popularize the ideology. The theoretical and practical trainings often take place separately. While the Hungarists organize open ‘culture nights’ on permanent locations, some of the New-Radicals initiate cross-country journeys and hold a series of lectures often combined with recruitment. These events are mainly political/ideological, for instance ‘Hungarian Resistance Academy’ (Magyar Ellenállás Akadémia), but topics like guerilla warfare, legal limits of underground activities, and asymmetric warfare can be found too.⁶⁶⁶⁷ Sometimes the speakers illustrate their lectures with combat footages about the most recent war in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁶⁸

The training of the self-defense movements is not the only activity to receive publicity. Activities demonstrating strength are also prominent activities that gain public awareness. The new Guards and other local vigilante organizations still conduct security patrols concentrating on “rural areas with threatened public order and public safety.”⁶⁹ These places are usually densely populated by Romas so carrying out ‘show the force’ systematically creates a threatening atmosphere without actual attacks against the

64 Kuruc.info. “A Híresztelések Ellenére Nem Maradt El: Kitörés-Emléktúra Az Óbudai Jobbikkal,” [Despite the rumors, the Outbreak memorial tour was held by the Jobbik] February 2014, <http://kuruc.info/r/23/122644/>.

65 Szent Korona Rádió. “Együtt Tiszteleg a Nemzeti Oldal: Attila-Vérvonal Túra Október 19-én,” [The national side is saluting together: Attil defense line tour] August 2013, <http://szentkoronaradio.com/20130828/egyutt-tiszteleg-nemzeti-oldal-attila-vedvonat-tura-oktober-19-en>.

66 Betyársereg. “‘Eltakarítottuk Pécsről a Kommunista Söpredéket’ (+videó),” [Pécs was cleared away the Communist scum] February 2014, <http://betyarsereg.hu/eltakaritottuk-pecsrol-a-kommunista-sopredeket-video/>.

67 Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom. “Lezajlott Az Első Magyar Ellenállás Akadémia,” [The first Hungarian Resistance Academy] January 2010, <http://www.hvim.hu/akademia>.

68 Betyársereg. “A Mélységi Felderítőktől a Jobbikig – Ismét Kever-Kavar Az ATV (+videó),” [From the long-range reconnaissance to Jobbik—The ATV massed up again] February 2014, <http://betyarsereg.hu/a-melysegi-felderitoktol-a-jobbikig-ismet-kever-kavar-az-atv-video/>.

69 Polgár Info. “Nyírkátán Demonstrál a Jobbik, a Gárda És Az Őrsereg,” [The Jobbik, the Guard and the National Protection Force demonstrate on Nyírkáta] April 2008, <http://www.polgarinfo.hu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=20133>.

community. As an example, the old Hungarian Guard conducted hundreds of these patrols from 2007 December till 2009 February.⁷⁰



Figure 3. Security Patrol. Show of force front of a Roma family by members of For Better Future Hungarian Self Defense movement in Gyöngyöspata (from origo.hu, 2011)⁷¹

These events usually take place in the form of unarmed marching in formation or patrolling in small teams, see on Figure 3. They usually start with public speeches about the importance of taking actions against the ‘Gipsy crime’ phenomenon. Participants in these events typically refrain from physical violence mostly because of ideological and legal considerations. As LeBor (2014) summarizes in his work, the Guard tries to maintain that they are a positive force and not involved in any criminal activity. This stance also helps to sustain the legitimacy of its parental organization—JOBBIK.⁷²

⁷⁰ Szombati Kristóf, Feischmidt Margit, *Gyöngyöspata 2011*, 10.

⁷¹ Origo.hu. “20110311gyongyosp5.jpg (JPEG Image, 640 × 426 Pixels) - Scaled (0%),” March 2011, <http://rewrite.origos.hu/s/img/i/1103/20110311gyongyosp5.jpg>

⁷² Adam LeBOR, “Marching Back to the Future: Magyar Garda and the Resurgence of the Right in Hungary,” *Dissent Magazin* 55, no. 2 (September 2008): 34. doi: <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/marching-back-to-the-future-magyar-garda-and-the-resurgence-of-the-right-in-hungary>

Only a small portion of the actual groups, such as the Outlaws' Army, believe in actually using violence to achieve their goals.⁷³ Interestingly, they often boast about these actions openly on their webpage although they typically “sanitize” their message to avoid legal consequences. For instance, they published information and images about an attack conducted against a liberal radio station in 2009 (see Figure 4).⁷⁴



Figure 4. Members of the Outlaws' Army (from betyarsereg.hu, 2013)⁷⁵

As seen above in Figure 4, some self-defense groups also effectively use social media platforms as ways to spread propaganda. Most of the teams have webpages and Facebook profiles such as www.hvim.hu or www.betyarsereg.hu. In addition, a variety of both New-Radical and Hungarian news portals exist, for instance webpages such as <http://kuruc.info/>, <http://kitartas.net/> or <http://alfahir.hu/node>. The quality of the digital products also has become better and more sophisticated over time. They regularly use the Internet to organize events like demonstrations or training camps; however, they often

⁷³ Jennifer Leaning, Jacqueline Bhabha, Arlan Fuller, Margareta Matache, Bonnie Shnayerson, Carrie Bronshter, Jelena Ivanis and Katalin Dobias, *Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary*, 25.

⁷⁴ Betyársereg. “Betyártámadás: 2009-Ben Élőben Csaptak Oda a Harcosok,” [Outlaw attack: the warriors strikes live in 2009] March 2011, <http://betyarsereg.hu/betyartamadas-2009-ben-eloben-csaptak-oda-harcosok/>.

⁷⁵ Betyársereg. “betyarok2.jpg (JPEG Image, 1024 × 682 Pixels) - Scaled (0%),” March 2013, <http://betyarsereg.hu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/betyarok2.jpg>.

leave out key details to the wider public, such as the exact place or time, in order to maintain secrecy. In fact, most of the participants are informed personally via the groups' personal offline networks.

There are other issues of concern regarding the activities of self-defense groups. Some of the prominent organizations, for instance the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, are attempting to mobilize ethnic Hungarian in neighboring countries.⁷⁶ As a result, the Hungarian self-defense movement cannot be considered only as a domestic issue. Unfortunately, the examination of the cross-border activity is beyond the purpose of this study.

To summarize, the Hungarian far-right, self-defense organizations perform activities that have paramilitary features. In these activities, their underground networks pose a specific challenge to current social order. The question remains how connected these groups are to one another. Chapter III summarizes the methods used to explore the links between and among these groups.

76 Sonni Efron and Tad Stahnke, *We're Not Nazis, but*, 58.

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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study utilizes Visual Analytic methods (Link Analysis, Geospatial Analysis, Temporal Analysis, and Social Network Analysis) to analyze Hungarian extreme right-wing self-defense organizations. The analysis is conducted at the organizational level and it focuses on the time-period from the establishment of the old Hungarian Guard in 2007 until the last national election in 2014.

The objective of the study is to search for patterns and relationships between the organizations and the events in order to ascertain whether a right-wing inter-organizational network exists within Hungary.

The first section summarizes the data sources utilized in the study. The second section describes how the data are structured. The third section briefly describes how the data are analyzed and the results of the analyses are presented in chapter IV.

A. DATA SOURCES

Data collection focused on the offensive or paramilitary actions carried out by right-wing organizations. Only those events that could be coded with an exact time and place were included in this study. The data collected using open sources include 25 organizations and 275 events. These data include all anti-Roma or anti-Semitic attacks in Hungary, along with demonstrations and rallies from 2007—2014 that had media attention in newspaper articles and extreme right-wing blogs. The list encompasses all the actions of the extreme right-wing organizations with national self-defense and paramilitary features and the exact date and place of those events, many of which were determined based on the group webpages and news portals. This dataset also covers which organizations participated in the events (reflected as the official group affiliations). A full description of the sources and the data they provided can be found in Table 2.

Table 2. Primary Data Sources

Source	Data Collected and Format	Methods
Attacks against Roma in Hungary: January 2008-September 2012 Report from the European Roma Rights Centre	62 events (attacks and hate related activities) from 2008–2012. Unstructured Data	Link Analysis Geospatial Analysis Temporal Analysis
The Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism – Incidents in Hungary: 2007–2014	70 events (attacks against Jewish people or properties, antisemitic demonstrations) Unstructured Data	Link Analysis Geospatial Analysis Temporal Analysis
Google search of extreme right-wing blogs, official and extremist news portals (in Hungarian)	More than 144 different events (anti-Roma political events and “show of force” rallies/marches, and military trainings) from 2007 till 2014. Unstructured Data	Link Analysis (aided by SNA) Geospatial Analysis Temporal Analysis
Athena Institute – Extreme Right-wing Groups	25 different group with paramilitary features. Unstructured Data	Link Analysis (aided by SNA) Geospatial Analysis Temporal Analysis

European Roma Rights Centre: This center provides data on reported attacks against Roma People or their property in Hungary from 2008 through 2012.⁷⁷ This report provided a brief description of the event, the name of its location, and the date of the incident. The data contained 62 events in text format.

The Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism (CFCA): This webpage is a state forum that monitors anti-semitic activities throughout the world. It has the largest and most comprehensive data base of anti-semitic incidents reported inter alia Hungary. The events in the archive can be accessed by date, location and/or category.

Self-defense group blog posts and official Hungarian news portals: The third set of data were gathered by searching news reports and hate group blogs, looking for reports of events with paramilitary features including trainings and demonstrations as

⁷⁷ Catherine, Twigg, *Attacks against Roma in Hungary: January 2008–September 2012* (European Roma Rights Centre, Budapest, October 1, 2012). <http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/attacks-list-in-hungary.pdf>.

well as the name of hate groups who participated in them. The primary sources are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. Primary Extremist Webpages Used For Data Collection

Webpage	URL	Data Collected
Hungarian National Front's webpage	http://www.jovonk.info/	event ads, event reports
Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement's webpage	http://www.hvim.hu/hirek/all	event ads, event reports
Outlaws' Army's webpage	http://betyarsereg.hu/akcioink/	event reports
Hungarian National Guard's webpage	http://www.gardamozgalom.org/gardamozgalom?page=51	event ads
The Raggeds Facebook community page	https://hu-hu.facebook.com/Rongyosok	event ads, event reports
For a Better Future Hungarian Self Defense Facebook community page	https://www.facebook.com/SzebbJovoertMagyarOnvedelem/timeline	event ads, event reports
New radical news portals	http://kuruc.info/ http://alfahir.hu/node	events ads, event reports
Hungarist news portals	http://harcunk.info/ http://kitartas.net/	events ads, event reports

Athena Institute's Hate Groups in Hungary: The fourth set of data came from the Athena Institute, which maintains a database on Hate Groups in Hungary. This source provided information about 24 different hate groups with paramilitary features in Hungary, their current activity status, and their publicly-stated connections with other hate groups.

B. DATA STRUCTURE

The data were coded using the 2014 Naval Postgraduate School's Visual Analytics Course's (D3610) code book. Table 4 shows the complementary definitions of the events examined in this study.

Table 4. Complementary Definitions to the 2014 DA3610 Naval Postgraduate School CORE Lab Codebook

Event Type	Definition
Show of Force	Any action taken to warn or intimidate an opponent and to demonstrate own capabilities to act if provoked. It includes the civilian security patrols.
Assault	Any purposeful unarmed confrontation that results in physical harm to an individual or set of individuals.
Military Training	Any designed event that teaches the knowledge, skills, and competencies of organized armed fight or insurgency in order to directly support stated and common organizational goals.
Training	Not military specific preparation. It includes any designed event that is able to indirectly support the knowledge, skills, and competencies of organized armed fight or insurgency, and it does not have any paramilitary feature. For instance: martial art or legal training.
Road March	Any movement with special purpose other than simple locomotion. It can be also considered as ideologically motivated physical exercise.
Vandalism	Any event where the nature of the attack appears to be based on racist/antisemitic ideology. It does not include personal confrontation but usually directed against physical property.
Harassment	Any attack when physical confrontation does not occur; for instance, this includes verbal threats.

C. VISUAL ANALYTICS

Visual Analytics is a rapidly evolving and multi-disciplinary field that seeks to provide the methodologies and the technology to meet the challenges of complex problems and large data sets. Several definitions of Visual Analytics exist; however, one of the most concise definitions comes from Jim Thomas. He is considered by many a visionary in the field of visualization and visual analysis, and was named by the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security as the founding director of the National Visualization and Analytics Center (NVAC) in 2004. He defined Visual Analytics as “the science of analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces.”⁷⁸ Thomas’ definition underscores the field’s grounding in a scientific approach, as well its reliance on technology to capitalize on a human’s innate ability to process and understand things visually.

Of the number of visual analytic-related methodologies, at least four are of specific value to intelligence analysis: Link Analysis, Social Network Analysis, Geospatial Analysis, and Temporal Analysis. All four methods, which are valuable on their own, are unique approaches that can generate different insights into specific problem sets. Consequently, the fusion of these methodologies can provide a more comprehensive understanding of a problem set.

Link Analysis links people, organizations, places, objects, and events to each other. This process produces a visualization called a link analysis diagram. This method of analysis allows the analysts to examine connections and relationships as well the properties of the data points and objects. This study utilizes Palantir, a software platform created by Palantir Technologies Inc., as the primary platform for analysis.

As defined by Stanley Wasserman, social network analysis “provides a precise way to define important social concepts, a theoretical alternative to the assumption of independent social actors, and a framework or testing theories about structured social relationships.”⁷⁹ It applies social theory and statistical analysis to relationships, or ties, that connect people or organizations to each other. Unlike Link Analysis, which includes people, places, and things, social network analysis typically only analyzes a single mode, or class of entities, such as people or organizations. Because all nodes in a social network analysis are the same, standardized values can be assigned to the nodes and their properties. These standardized values permit the application of algorithms which provide

⁷⁸ James J. Thomas and Kristin A. Cook, eds., *Illuminating the Path: The Research and Development Agenda for Visual Analytics* (IEEE Computer Society Press, 2005): 4.
http://vis.pnnl.gov/pdf/RD_Agenda_VisualAnalytics.pdf

⁷⁹ Stanley Wasserman, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications* (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994): 17.

statistical data and give visual structure to the network in the form of a sociogram.⁸⁰ The social network analysis in this study employs the software called ORA—a dynamic meta-network assessment and analysis tool developed by CASOS at Carnegie Mellon.⁸¹

Geospatial Analysis, according to *Geospatial Analysis: A Comprehensive Guide to Principles, Techniques, and Software Tools*, “concerns what happens where, and makes use of geographic information that links features and phenomena on the Earth’s surface to their locations.”⁸² The data used in this study was processed with Palantir and Google Earth software.

Temporal Analysis concerns the analysis of occurrences or phenomenon over time—it helps to answer the question “when” does something occur. This type of analysis can significantly increase an analyst’s ability to identify patterns among occurrences and draw inferences related to time and duration. Geospatial Analysis and Temporal Analysis often are used in tandem to provide additional insight and understanding by marrying “when” and “where” questions. One of the most common geospatial-temporal products used in intelligence analysis is the heatmap. These maps allow analysts and researchers to quickly identify areas where there are concentrations of specific events or phenomena. This information can provide insight into a specific topic of interest and subsequently guide analysts and decision-makers in their application of limited resources to achieve the greatest desired effect. The temporal data analysis is also carried out on Palantir.

⁸⁰ Stanley Wasserman, *Social Network Analysis*, 17.

⁸¹ ORA project webpage: <http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/>.

⁸² Michael John De Smith, Michael F. Goodchild, Paul Longley, *Geospatial Analysis: A Comprehensive Guide to Principles, Techniques and Software Tools* (Fourth edition, The Winchelsea Press, Winchelsea, UK, 2013): 33. <http://www.spatialanalysisonline.com/Extract.pdf>.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This chapter explores the connections among organizations engaged in offensive and paramilitary actions within Hungary. The purpose is to ascertain whether a far-right-wing network exists, and if it does, to describe the relationships and activity patterns among the organizations.

A. GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS

Geospatial Analysis focuses on the “where” question. For the purposes of this research, the data set only includes events that had identifiable geospatial properties (i.e., geo-referenced data). The refined data set geospatially displays the activities of self-defense organizations that occurred from 2007—2014—the hotspot map in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Hotspot Map of Events Related to Self-Defense or Paramilitary Activities in Hungary During the Examined Time-period.

As one can see, the hotspot map (Figure 5) suggests that paramilitary activities are not isolated phenomenon but occur country wide. To explore the geospatial data in greater depth, the dataset was disaggregated into two major categories: kinetic and non-kinetic activities. Kinetic events include any type of violent action involving lethal force or direct (face-to-face) confrontation with targeted individuals or groups. This category

includes armed attacks, acts of arson, bombings, and sectarian violence. In contrast, non-kinetic events include acts of influence directed either internally within the self-defense groups or externally toward the targeted minority audiences they seek to intimidate. These non-kinetic events include political events, show of force events, acts of vandalism, harassment, and any self-defense group training events (Table 5).

Table 5. Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Events.

Kinetic Events	Non-Kinetic Events
Armed Attack Arson Assault Bombing Sectarian Violence	Harassment Military Training Political Event Road March Show of Force Training Vandalism




Figure 6. Hotspot Map of Non-Kinetic (blue) and Kinetic (red) Activities of Right-Wing Extremists.

There appears to be a correlation between kinetic and non-kinetic events in some parts of the country (Figure 6), especially in northeast and southwest Hungary, and around the nation's capital of Budapest. It is reasonable to assume that kinetic and non-kinetic events are likely triggered or based on the same external factor. Two variables worth exploring are the levels of JOBBIK political support (as determined by actual votes cast for JOBBIK during the 2010 national elections)⁸³ and the population density of the Roma across the country (based on 2010 Hungarian census data).⁸⁴ As previously mentioned, right-wing groups maintain a strong anti-Roma stance, and have demonstrated they have a relatively significant level of political support based on the 2010 national elections when they gained influence. Hence, an overlay of these two factors on top of paramilitary activities should provide greater insight into the potential relationship between these two factors and paramilitary activity.

Figure 7 indicates there is a potential relationship between bases of JOBBIK political support and the location of Roma populations. For instance, the majority of the JOBBIK's support comes from the northeastern counties that are also densely-populated by Romas.

⁸³ Tarki. "Területi Elmozdulások a Pártszimpátiákban a 2010-Es Parlamenti Választások Óta," [Regional shifts in the support of the parties since the 2010 elections] May 2012, http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2012/kitekint/20120503_partszimpatia.html.

⁸⁴ Prajzer Tamás, "Térképek: Önkormányzati Választások 2010," [Map: Local government election 2010] Terkepem.blog, October 2010, <http://terkepem.blogspot.com/2010/08/onkormanyzati-valasztasok-2010.html>.




Figure 7. Comparison of Density of Roma Population (above right) and the Political Support of the JOBBIK (above left) in 2010. The densely populated areas by Romas colored with red; the higher political support highlighted with darker yellow.

It also appears that self-defense groups do not necessarily focus their activities only on areas densely populated by the Roma minority (Figure 6). Based on Figure 7, this relationship is very limited because New-Radicals did not receive most of their votes from the southwestern counties where the majority of the Romas live and the possibility of the ethnic tensions are the highest. As a result, these observations indicate that these groups' ultimate objective appears to be gaining political support, not just simply targeting actions against Romas.

B. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS

As mentioned earlier, temporal analysis focuses on events as they occur in time. During the time period analyzed there were 272 events that were subdivided into the following 12 event types.

Table 6. The Distribution of Events.

Event Type	Event Category	Quantity
Show of Force	Non-kinetic	61
Vandalism	Non-kinetic	39
Military Training	Non-kinetic	37
Political Event	Non-kinetic	34
Armed Attack	Kinetic	22
Assault	Kinetic	17
Arson	Kinetic	15
Road March	Non-kinetic	14
Harassment	Non-kinetic	13
Training	Non-kinetic	12
Sectarian Violence	Kinetic	7
Bombing	Kinetic	1
Total:	Non-kinetic	272

The events depicted in Figure 8 illustrate the occurrence of kinetic and non-kinetic events during the period of analysis.




Figure 8. The Trend Lines of the Non-Kinetic (blue) and Kinetic (red) Actions. Five focus areas, where the trend lines follow roughly the same patterns, highlighted with light-blue during the examined time period.

Figure 8 reveals a few interesting observations. First, there appears to be a pattern between the kinetic and non-kinetic events, as indicated by their trend lines, from 2007 until 2010. After 2011, the non-kinetic events dominate, whereas the violent actions practically ceased. A potential relationship between the two types of events appears to reemerge again at the end of 2012 when both trend lines peak at the same time. These

observations suggest again that these events may be triggered or regulated by the same external factor.

These trend lines prompt an investigation on the political environment in Hungary during these periods when kinetic and non-kinetic events appear to follow the same pattern. This investigation resulted in the identification of several key political events during the time-period in question (Table 7).

Table 7. Key Domestic Political Events Regarding the Self-Defense Movements.

No.	Date	Event
1.	03/10/2008	The old Hungarian Guard ⁸⁵ splinters into separate factions. The original core members of the old Guard leave the movement.
2.	03/01/2009	The signing of a cooperation agreement between the Hungarian National Front and Pax Hungarica. ⁸⁶
3.	06/07/2009	The JOBBIK is elected to seats in the European Parliament.
4.	06/14/2009	A cooperation agreement established between JOBBIK, Hungarian Guard, Outlaws' Army, and Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement. ⁸⁷
5.	07/02/2009	The old Hungarian Guard is officially dissolved by the court.
6.	07/31/2009	Members of the Death Squad ⁸⁸ arrested.
7.	04/11/2010 and 10/03/ 2010	Hungarian national elections, JOBBIK elected to Hungarian Parliament.
8.	08/16/2011	JOBBIK dissociates from the Outlaws' Army. ⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Politics.hu. "Hungary Around the Clock - Founders Quit Far-Right Party Jobbik Over Hungarian Guard," March 2008, <http://www.politics.hu/20080311/founders-quit-farright-party-jobbik-over-hungarian-guard/>.

⁸⁶ Jövők.info. "A Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal És a Pax Hungarica Mozgalom Közös Közleménye," [The mutual statement of the National Front and the Pax Hungarica] March 2009, <http://jovonk.info/2009/03/20/magyar-nemzeti-arcvonal-es-pax-hungarica-mozgalom-kozos-kozlemenye>.

⁸⁷ Index.hu. "Összefognak a Nemzeti Radikálisok," [The national radicals are joining] Jun 2009, http://index.hu/belfold/2009/06/14/osszefognak_a_nemzeti_radikalisok/.

⁸⁸ Sebestyén István. "Horogkereszt És Sörétes Puska," [Swastika and shotgun] Hetek Archívum, August 2009, http://www.hetek.hu/fokusz/200908/horogkereszt_es_sorettes_puska.

⁸⁹ Origo.hu. "Elhatárolódik a Jobbik a Faji Háborús Kijelentéstől," [The Jobbik distance himself from the racial war statements] August 2011, <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110816-nem-zarja-ki-a-jobbik-zagyva-gyorgy-gyulat.html>.

9.	10/07/2012	Disruption of the Hungarian National Front. ⁹⁰ Gyula Thurmer, leader of the (Communist) Labour Party and the Hungarian National Front group together to prevent the eviction of Istvan Kovacs on Erd ⁹¹
10.	04/06/2014	Hungarian national election
11.	05/25/2014	National election to the European Parliament
12.	07/05/2014	the JOBBIK call the national radical organizations for an alliance ⁹²

An overlay of these key political events over the kinetic and non-kinetic timelines provides interesting insights (Figure 9). The time-periods during which the trend lines of kinetic and non-kinetic events follow the same pattern all include a domestic political event that has a direct impact on the self-defense groups.




Figure 9. Key Political Events Regarding the Self-Defense Groups during the Examined Time Period. The trend line of non-kinetic actions colored is blue and kinetic is red.

⁹⁰ Jövönk.info. "Az MNA vezetőségének közleménye," [The statement of the leadership] October 2012, <http://jovonkinfo.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/az-mna-vezetosegenek-kozlemenye/>.

⁹¹ Kustánczi Norbert. "Megmentették Kovács Istvánt – Video," [Kovács István was saved] FN24, October 2012, <http://fn.hir24.hu/ithon/2012/10/31/megmentettek-kovacs-istvant-video/>.

⁹² Híradó. "Szövetségre Hívta a Nemzeti Szervezeteket a Jobbik," [The Jobbik called for alliance the nationalist organizations] July 2014, <http://www.hirado.hu/2014/07/05/szovetsegre-hivta-a-nemzeti-szervezeteket-a-jobbik/>.

In the case of the first focus period, both trend lines stay relatively stable after the break between the old Hungarian Guard and the JOBBIK. This time-period can be described as a transitional or power shifting period among the extreme right-wing movements. The remaining self-defense groups repositioned themselves to align with either group and tried to find their side in the conflict, which largely left their activities unchanged for some time.

During the second focus period, the number of kinetic as well as non-kinetic events decreased sharply after the signing of a cooperation agreement between the two major Hungarist groups. This trend suggests that the transitional process during the first focus period had been over and there was a major control over the self-defense activities. This notion is also supported by the cooperation agreement between the JOBBIK and several other New-Radical organizations. It seems cooperation agreements between some of the extremist groups have direct impact on the levels of both kinetic and non-kinetic activities.

Regarding the third focus period, it appears that the elections had a diminishing effect on non-kinetic activities. Before each election (focus periods 2 and 3) the activities noticeably increase and subsequently decrease shortly before the actual event. It suggests that the non-kinetic paramilitary activities are favorable before the election but the affiliation with these actions has a negative effect on the self-defense groups during the elections. For instance, it may help mobilize a party's voter base but the overt support is not acceptable in front of a wider public during the actual election. In other words, the legal extremist parties have less need for non-kinetic activities after the votes are in.

During the fourth time-period, tensions appeared between the Outlaws' Army and the JOBBIK. Based on the JOBBIK's official explanation, the party was no longer interested in offensive or paramilitary activities.⁹³ As a result, the level of non-kinetic activities decreased.

⁹³ Origo.hu. "Elhatárolódik a Jobbik a Faji Háborús Kijelentéstől," [The Jobbik distance himself from the racial war statements] August 2011, <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110816-nem-zarja-ki-a-jobbik-zagyva-gyorgy-gyulat.html>.

During the fifth focus period, it appears there was another strategic shift. Since 2012, some of the leadership of the Hungarian National Front shifted the focus from military trainings to overt political activities. The founder, Gyórkös István, sought to establish a legal party in collaboration with the far-left (communist) Labor Party. This action led to dissent within the group. As a result, the level of activities decreased.⁹⁴

Additionally, after the arrest of the members of the Death Squad, the number of violent kinetic actions never reached the 2009 level again. So it appears that the kinetic state actions have a major impact on the level of activities. Consequently, from this point the extremist seems to consider violence as an ineffective approach and the groups have purposely stayed away from violent attacks. In contrast, the trend line of the non-kinetic events demonstrates the opposite trend. In general, since 2011–2012, their numbers are dramatically higher than the previous years because of the legal framework of Hungary in such that the government might be not able to respond effectively to this approach. It appears there was a major shift toward the more sophisticated non-kinetic approach regarding the strategy of the self-defense groups.

To summarize, it would appear that domestic political events related to extremist self-defense groups influence the paramilitary and offensive activities. Cooperation agreements and tensions among the groups as well as major elections have as much diminishing effect on the level of activities as kinetic state actions. Unfortunately, the temporal analysis wasn't able to explain the reason behind the multiple peaks of the non-kinetic activities between 2013 and 2014, probably because of the shortfalls of the dataset.

C. LINK ANALYSIS

As previously mentioned, link analysis consists of visualizations depicting relationships between entities. In the case of the current dataset, two kinds of relationships have been coded between organizations, explicit and implicit links. Explicit connections are openly declared ties (i.e., ideology) between one or more organizations.

⁹⁴ Jövönk.info. "Az MNA vezetőségének közleménye," [The statement of the leadership] October 2012, <http://jovonkinfo.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/az-mna-vezetosegenek-kozlemenye/>.

In contrast, implicit relationships are ties between two or more organizations that are linked together by participating in the same event.

Overall, the data set contains 28 organizations linked to 172 events (out of 272). Unfortunately, it was difficult to assign a group, or a perpetrator, to all the events making up this dataset. Table 8 shows the most active groups and summarizes the exact distribution of the non-violent activities among them. The listed organizations were present in the most paramilitary or offensive events during the given time period. The rest of the groups were affiliated only five or less events.

Table 8. The Most Active Organizations Based On Event Affiliation.

Group	Ideology	Total Event Affiliation	Kinetic Event Affiliation	Non-Kinetic Event Affiliation
JOBBIK	New-radical	50	2	48
Hungarian National Front	Hungarist	42	0	42
For Better Future Hungarian Self Defense	New-radical	36	1	35
Hungarian Guard (dissolved)	New-radical	25	4	21
Outlaws' Army	New-radical	22	0	22
Hungarian National Guard	New-radical	20	0	20
Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement	New-radical	20	0	20
New Hungarian Guard	New-radical	14	0	14
Death Squad (dissolved)	none/ unknown	8	8	0
Pax Hungarica	Hungarist	7	0	7

Table 8 clearly shows that the JOBBIK, which is linked to 50 events, is the most active organization in this dataset. Among Hungarists, the Hungarian National Front was the highest on the list, linked to 42 events. Interestingly, the neo-Nazi or skinhead groups,

despite all of the media attention it receives, did not even make the list, having only two attributable events.

In terms of kinetic and non-kinetic activities, The Death Squad committed the most kinetic actions with eight events, and the JOBBIK and the Hungarian National Front participated in the most non-kinetic actions with 48 and 42 non-kinetic events, respectively. The table also suggests that the most active Hungarist groups are not linked to any kinetic activities, another interesting observation because of their extensive focus on paramilitary training.

An examination of the relationships between groups maintaining different ideologies, as depicted in Figure 10, leads to interesting observations. First, the different types of ideological groups typically cluster based on three major ideologies: New-Radical, Hungarist and Skinhead/neo-Nazi.




Figure 10. The Clustering of the Events Around the Subgroups Based On Ideology.

The second interesting observation, which is related to the first, is that ideology appears to be a factor affecting the type of events in which groups participate. Specifically, groups without specific ideological backgrounds, as seen with the Death Squad and Arrows of Hungarians, appear to be more likely to participate in violent events. The rest of the organizations, which do have clear ideologies, do not appear to participate in violent events. Similarly, events that are more visible to the public (especially show the force and political events) are clustered almost entirely around organizations that ascribe to the New-Radical ideology. These events are mainly about gaining public support or generating media attention. In contrast, the majority of the traditional paramilitary activities (military and non-military type trainings) are related almost exclusively to Hungarists. Last but not least, the role of skinhead groups, again despite the media's fixation on them, seems to be inconsequential.

The third observation, and possibly even more telling than the first two, is the presence of overlaps or points of contacts between the ideological clusters. Eleven events can be considered as key linkages between the different ideologies. Table 9 summarizes the properties of these events.

Table 9. The Properties of the "Bridging Events."

Event Types	Locations	Groups Involved the Most
Political Event (3)	Budapest (5)	Pax Hungarica (6)
Road March (3)	Békés (2)	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement (6)
Military Training (2)	Bőny (2)	Hungarian National Front (4)
Training (2)	Bükkszentkereszt (1)	JOBBIK (4)
Show of Force (1)	Pátka (1)	Outlaw's Army (4)
		Hungarian National Guard (3)

Two observations are immediately apparent with regards to these "bridging events," which seem to unify groups that have different ideologies. First, most events (7) occur outside of the public's view. Specifically, the majority of these events include training events. The road marches also have training functions besides the cultural/

historical purposes because the participants often required navigating and overcoming long distances in formation.

Second, it seems the Pax Hungarica and the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement maintain key ideological brokerage functions because these groups were present on the “bridging events” six times out of ten total.

The implicit relationships, which are assumed relationships based on two groups participating in the same event, provide additional insight into the network. Based on the visualization (Figure 11), where the shared events have been converted into direct links,⁹⁵ the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement seems to be the most connected because it has relationships with 17 organizations (through 15 shared events). The JOBBIK, which was considered the most active during the event link analysis, is only linked to 13 different organizations (over the course of 39 events). These data indicate that the JOBBIK is an active, but not necessarily the most connected, organization. Also important to note, the groups connected to the most violent activities, specifically the Death Squad, are separated from the rest of the organizations.

⁹⁵ In this case, the conversion of events into direct relationships between organizations is the same process of using matrix multiplication to convert two-mode data into one-mode data. Two-mode data are relational data containing two different entity classes where as one-mode data are relational data containing one.




Figure 11. The Merged Implicit Links between Groups. The JOBBIK, the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, and the Death Squad are circled.

Once the implicit and direct relationships are combined, Pax Hungarica emerges among the most connected Hungarist group to radical organizations with 8 connections. Among the new radicals, the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement has four connections with the Hungarists. The Outlaws' Army and the Hereditary Hungarian Guard follow with three connections. In terms of the neo-Nazis, both of the Blood and Honor Hungary and the Hungarian Skins link to the Hungarists and to the new radicals. Based on these results which identify the different patterns of connections among the right-wing organizations, this study now turn to social network analysis to examine these connections in greater depth.

D. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

In contrast with the link analysis, SNA typically only analyzes one class of entities at a time, which allows analysts to measure characteristics of the network and quantify relative importance of the far-right organizations. This analysis utilizes some commonly used descriptive measures in order to examine the overall network structure. Specifically, this section will use network size, diameter, and measures of cohesion and centralization to describe the network. A second section will analyze the network using various centrality and brokerage measures to identify relatively important groups within the network.

1. Topographical Analysis

In this section, the analysis focuses on the entire structure, or the network topography. It is important to note that the network size (25) does not include the isolated groups (i.e., isolates). As a result, the fragmentation score of the structure is zero because every organization is connected at least with one other organization.




Figure 12. The Sociogram of Extreme Right-Wing Self-Defense Groups. The ideological backgrounds of the organizations marked with different colors.

Based on the sociogram in Figure 12, the network of the extreme right-wing self-defense groups forms a single weak component where the different ideological bases do not form separate and distinct clusters. In other words, different ideological groups are embedded in each other's web. Consequently, it appears that Hungarian far-right self-defense movements are relatively close to one another in terms of average path length.

According to Everton, the Average Distance refers to the average length of all shortest paths (or geodesics) between all organizations in the network.⁹⁶ The relatively

⁹⁶ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks* (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012), 137.

low value (1.97) in Table 10 indicates that information or other resources can diffuse fast through the network because the groups are relatively close to each other.

A related measure, Network Diameter, refers to longest geodesic, or longest “shortest path” between any two actors in the network. In other words, its value indicates how dispersed the network is.⁹⁷ Interestingly, the relatively small value (4) also suggests that organizations are relatively reachable to one another within the network and that information and/or resources only have to traverse four steps at a maximum to go from one end to the other.

The density of the network is the ratio of actual ties (84) divided by all possible ties (300). Its value (0.28) seems relatively low and suggests that the network is sparse; lots of potential ties do not exist.⁹⁸ Thus, while the organizations are relatively close to one another and may have access to one another, several organizations are not directly linked and must rely on brokers and key actors to diffuse information and resources.

Table 10. Network-Level Measures from ORA’s Standard Network Analysis Report.

Measure	Value
Average Distance	1.977
Network levels (diameter)	4.000
Density	0.280
Betweenness centralization	0.227

The Girvan-Newman algorithm, one of the so called “community detection” algorithms, help detect clusters within the larger network. This algorithm, although not technically a topographic measure, will help identify potential seams in the network and can help indicate how ideological groups cluster within the overall network structure. Table 11 and Figure 13 show the three main ones.

⁹⁷ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 137.

⁹⁸ The formal measure of density is inversely related to network size (i.e., the larger the network, the lower the density) because the number of possible lines increases exponentially as actors join the network. So this value itself doesn’t say much about estimated network cohesion or cohesive subgroups.

Table 11. The Main Potential Clusters among the Network.

Group no.	Size	Members
1	10	Defense Force, Hungarian National Guard, For a Better Future Hungarian Self Defense, The Raggeds, Guards of the Carpathian Homeland Movement, Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, JOBBIK, Pax Hungarica, Outlaws' Army, New Hungarian Guard
2	5	Hungaria Skins, Blood & Honour Hungary, National Revolutionary Party, Hungarian National Front, NS Straight Edge
3	4	Hungarian Guard, National Protection Force, Nationalist Motorcyclists, Civil Assosiation for Patka




Figure 13. Clusters among the Network of Extreme Right-Wing Self-Defense Groups. The main clusters (number 1 to 3 based on Table 11) marked with different colors.

The results of the community detection analysis suggest that the organizations form clusters independently of their core ideology. In other words, the Hungarists, Skinheads, as well as New-Radicals, can be found in the same structural groups. This finding not only suggests that groups are close to one another on average but also that different ideological groups tend to cluster. To arrive at a more accurate conclusion, attributes other than ideology need to be considered.




Figure 14. Comparison of the Declared 'Relationship to Democratic State Order' and the 'Transparency' of the Groups. Groups that accept the democratic order mark with green on the left side, organizations that operate transparent to the public highlighted with light green on the right side.

The visualization of the 'relationship to democratic state order' and the 'transparency' attributes⁹⁹ of the groups (Figure 14) highlight additional insights. First,

⁹⁹ As it was mentioned earlier regarding Table 1, the 'relationship with democratic institutions' describe the level of rejection of the current legal social structure, the 'public relations' refers the public transparency or the openness of the groups.

the largest organizations that do not plan to overthrow the democratic political system (the JOBBIK and the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement) are structurally surrounded with groups that do seek to do so. Second, the overtly operating organizations are intermixed into the web of the covertly, or only partially transparent groups. These data suggest that the transparent organizations have extensive relationships with more covert groups. Consequently, these legal entities may be able to influence the network of self-defense movements.

Centralization measures capture the hierarchical dimension of network topography. As Everton summarizes, in general, the larger a centralization index is, the more likely it is that a single group is very central while the other organizations are not, so these measures can be seen as measuring how unequal the distribution of individual values are. A central group can be considered as an organization that has numerous ties with the others (Degree Centrality), that has numerous ties to highly central groups (Eigenvector Centrality), that is close (in terms of path length) to other organizations (Closeness Centrality), that lies on the shortest path between numerous pairs of groups in the network (Betweenness Centrality).¹⁰⁰

Nevertheless, Everton also suggests that Betweenness Centralization is closer to the intuitive understanding of hierarchy than other measures.¹⁰¹ Consequently, this analysis will focus on this particular measure over the other three. As seen in Table 10, in the case of the overall network, its value is relatively low (0.227), so there is not a single organization that serves as a central gatekeeper between the rest of the groups.

2. Actor-Level Analysis

This section now turns to actor-level measures to identify relatively important actors within the right-wing network. This section utilizes four commonly used centrality measures. The first measure, degree centrality, is simply the count of an actor's ties within a network (at least within an undirected network). It often identifies potentially influential or relatively active actors within a network. The second metric, betweenness

¹⁰⁰ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 207.

¹⁰¹ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 225.

centrality, measures the extent to which each actor lays on the shortest path between all other actors in the network. Actors with high betweenness centrality often have relatively high brokerage potential. Closeness centrality measures how close on average an actor is to all other actors in a network. This measure is often associated with each actor's level of accessibility to other actors in the network. Finally, eigenvector centrality is similar to degree centrality, but it assumes that ties to highly central actors are more important than ties to peripheral actors. Figure 15 highlights all the organizations with the top ranked centrality measures.¹⁰²




Figure 15. The Sociogram Of Extreme Right-Wing Self-Defense Groups When the Node Size Based on Betweenness Centrality Score. The ideological backgrounds of the organizations marked with different colors.

¹⁰² Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 207.

Based on the combined scores, the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement is potentially the most influential in the overall network. It ranks first across all four centrality measures, indicating that it has the greatest potential influence, brokerage potential and accessibility to other actors in the network. In addition, certain groups, such as the Hungarian National Front the JOBBIK, the Outlaws' Army and the Pax Hungarica, repeatedly rank highly in the basic centrality measures (Table 12).

Table 12. The Top Ranked Groups Based on Basic Centrality Measures.

Rank	Degree Centrality	Value
1	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement	0.708
2	JOBBIK	0.542
3	Pax Hungarica	0.542
4	Outlaws' Army	0.542
5	Hungarian National Front	0.500

Rank	Betweenness Centrality	Value
1	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement	0.260
2	Hungarian National Front	0.213
3	Hungarian Guard	0.180
4	JOBBIK	0.119
5	Outlaws' Army	0.114

Rank	Eigenvector Centrality	Value
1	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement	0.552
2	Outlaws' Army	0.473
3	JOBBIK	0.436
4	Pax Hungarica	0.431
5	Hungarian National Guard	0.388

Rank	Closeness Centrality	Value
1	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement	0.774
2	Outlaws' Army	0.686
3	JOBBIK	0.649
4	Pax Hungarica	0.649
5	Hungarian National Front	0.615

An alternative set of measures exist that allows analysts to identify sets of key actors. These measures, or Key Player measures (often referred to as critical sets), exist because in many real-world networks there is rarely one actor whose removal either completely fragments the network or who reaches all other actors in the network.¹⁰³ Consequently, Borgatti offers two algorithms that either identifies sets of actors who maximally fragment a network or sets of actors who reach the most unique set of

¹⁰³ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 272.

actors.¹⁰⁴ The first algorithm, the fragmentation measure, is designed to disrupt a network through the removal of sets of actors while the second one, the reach measure, can be used to identify sets of actors to most effectively spread disinformation. In this analysis, the critical sets results align with the list of central actors (Table 13). Again, the results demonstrate the relative structural importance of the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, JOBBIK, the Hungarian National Front, and Pax Hungarica.

Table 13. The Comparison of Critical Set of Groups and the List of Top Ranked Central Actors Based on Centrality Measures.

Critical Set	Central Actors
Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement
Hungarian National Front	JOBBIK
JOBBIK	Outlaws' Army
Pax Hungarica	Pax Hungarica
Outlaws' Army	Hungarian National Front

¹⁰⁴ Stephen P. Borgatti, "Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network." *Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory* 12 (Berlin, 2006): 22. doi: <http://www.babr.ufl.edu/sites/default/files/Borgatti%20-%202006%20-%20Identifying%20sets%20of%20key%20players%20in%20a%20social%20networ.pdf>.




Figure 16. The Critical Set of Extreme Right-Wing Self-Defense Groups (highlighted with green).

Specifically, the fragmentation results suggest the simultaneous removal of several key organizations would almost completely fragment the network. In fact, the value after removing the critical set nodes is 0.742, which is relatively close to 1 where almost every organization is isolated. This approach, however, is highly unlikely to occur in reality given the inability (legally and in terms of capability) of the government to isolate each organization. Fortunately, some other groups (Falcon Youth Movement, Nationalist Motorcyclists, Unified Hungary Movement, Civil Association for Patka and the National Protection Force) are peripheral to the network and appear to be the most vulnerable to being isolated based on their current position in the network, which means their removal may not significantly affect the operation of the network, but may offer

alternative strategies for degrading the network. Table 14 provides a summary of the actor level results. The table highlights the top five results regarding each centrality measure.

Table 14. Basic Node-Level Measures

Group	Part of the Critical Set	Centrality, Betweenness	Centrality, Closeness	Centrality, Degree	Centrality, Eigenvector
Blood & Honor Hungary	no	0.000	0.533	0.250	0.219
Civil Association for Patka	no	0.000	0.358	0.042	0.023
Conscience 88 Group	no	0.000	0.500	0.167	0.152
Defense Force	no	0.000	0.511	0.250	0.271
Eastern Front Comradely Association	no	0.000	0.436	0.125	0.097
Falcon Youth Movement	no	0.000	0.387	0.042	0.036
For a Better Future Hungarian Self Defense	no	0.001	0.522	0.292	0.305
Guards of the Carpathian Homeland Movement	no	0.003	0.545	0.333	0.348
Hereditary Hungarian Guard	no	0.005	0.462	0.167	0.135
Hungaria Skins	no	0.000	0.533	0.250	0.219
Hungarian Guard	no	0.180	0.545	0.333	0.209
Hungarian National Front	yes	0.213	0.615	0.500	0.328
Hungarian National Guard	no	0.033	0.571	0.417	0.388
Hungarian Self Defense Movement	no	0.001	0.511	0.208	0.198
JOBBIK	yes	0.119	0.649	0.542	0.436
NS Straight Edge	no	0.000	0.533	0.250	0.219
National Protection Force	no	0.000	0.421	0.083	0.070
National Revolutionary Party	no	0.003	0.545	0.292	0.265
Nationalist Motorcyclists	no	0.000	0.358	0.042	0.023
New Hungarian Guard	no	0.018	0.571	0.333	0.337
Outlaws' Army	yes	0.114	0.686	0.542	0.473
Pax Hungarica	yes	0.113	0.649	0.542	0.431
Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement	yes	0.2600	0.7742	0.7083	0.5519
The Raggeds	no	0.000	0.522	0.250	0.285
Unified Hungary Movement	no	0.000	0.387	0.042	0.036

In order to better understand the results, they are summarized in a separate (Table 15).

Table 15. Summary of Basic Node-Level Measures

Node-Level Measure	Avg	Min/Max	Min/Max Nodes
Centrality, Betweenness	0.042	0.000	12 nodes (48%) have this value
		0.260	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement
Centrality, Closeness	0.525	0.358	Nationalist Motorcyclists, Civil Association for Patka
		0.774	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement
Centrality, Degree	0.280	0.042	4 nodes (16%) have this value
		0.708	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement
Centrality, Eigenvector	0.242	0.023	Nationalist Motorcyclists, Civil Association for Patka
		0.552	Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement

In summary, it can be suggested that the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, the JOBBIK, the Outlaws' Army, the old Hungarian Guard and the Hungarian National Front have the most impact on the paramilitary activities and capability building among the extreme far-right groups in Hungary. Interestingly, the roles the Nationalist Motorcyclists, and the Civil Association for Patka, come out as negligible.

V. DISCUSSION

Given the insights from the four different approaches of Visual Analytics, the project is able to synthesize the following findings:

A. IDENTIFIED PATTERNS

Geospatial Analysis:

- Actions related to paramilitary activities occur country wide, because in contrast with their rhetoric, self-defense groups' ultimate objective appears to be attracting political support nation-wide, not just targeting actions against Romas.

Temporal Analysis:

- Domestic political events related to extremist self-defense groups appears influence the paramilitary and offensive activities.

Link Analysis:

- Self-defense groups are not openly associated with kinetic actions.
- The neo-Nazi groups, despite all of the media attention, do not have significant role in paramilitary or offensive activities.
- The co-sponsored trainings are the primary "bridging events" between groups with different ideological basis.

SNA:

- The network of self-defense groups is decentralized (at least in terms of brokerage potential) and different ideological groups are intermeshed. Information or other resources can diffuse rapidly through the network with the help of several key organizations.
- The Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, the JOBBIK, the Outlaws' Army and the Pax Hungarica are repeatedly ranked highly across actor-level measures and they have extensive relationships with more covert groups.
- Only the simultaneous removal of critical set of groups, such as Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, Hungarian National Front, JOBBIK, Pax Hungarica and Outlaws' Army, would be able to fragment substantially the network.

B. INTERPRETATION

The analytical results from the previous section must be put into context in order to provide strategic solutions for the threat posed by these self-defense movements. As it was pointed out earlier, in the case of ‘national self-defense,’ the boundaries are blurred between the three main, the New-Radical, the Hungarist, and Skinhead/neo-Nazi far-right political views. The main difference remains only the level of rejection of the current legal social structure.¹⁰⁵ Based on the rhetoric, some of the groups openly seek the overthrow of the existing order.

The broad socio-economic processes favor the emergence of self-defense groups in general. As it was summarized in chapter II, Hungary’s history, as well as its current political and economic context, is generating anxieties that fuel extreme right-wing ideologies. In general, the higher crime rate typical of underdeveloped Roma-inhabited regions has prompted extreme right-wing rhetoric and resulted in political advances based on fears of ‘gypsy-crime.’ Based on the analysis, this trend is observable nationwide and is not only limited to areas populated densely by the Roma.

The right-wing, self-defense organizations adapt their rhetoric but also their operating procedures. The self-defense organizational network provides fast information distribution, flexibility, and survivability. The groups can learn how to avoid most of the direct (kinetic) law-enforcement strategies because they are able to easily share their experiences of ongoing law enforcement operations based on the relative short path length in the network.

Based on the analysis, it appears that the network of organizations interested in ‘national self-defense’ is really intermeshed, and alliances are not formed based solely on the organizations’ original core ideologies. This is likely why training events or historical marching serve as a bridge between organizations that can link them despite their ideological differences.

The leading legal New-Radical party, the JOBBIK, seemingly the most active player, enjoys the most benefits of the growing popularity of extreme right-wing groups.

¹⁰⁵ Tóth Ferenc, *We were, we are, we will be?*, 8.

As a result, in contrast with their rhetoric, domestic political interests might have bigger impact on the self-defense groups than any real security issues. This finding is also confirmed by the Hungarian National Front's former leadership's continuous pursuit of party formation.¹⁰⁶

This analysis also points out that there is no single, central or influential organization that has significant influence and direct, conscious control over paramilitary activities. Rather, the prominent organizations that are repeatedly top ranked regarding the basic centrality measures should be viewed as the ringleaders among the self-defense movements. The JOBBIK, just like most of the moderate groups, has consistently denied any involvement in violent activities or using inciting rhetoric. Its rise to elected office has opened political space and attracted even more extremist groups and ideologies. As a result, the emergence of one of their proxies, the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, as the most connected organization, suggests its indirect control over the network.

The JOBBIK periodically and publically terminates and renews the connections with the more radical groups depending on how the voter base views these affiliations. For instance, in 2011, Vona Gábor distanced himself from racial guerilla war against Jews associated with Outlaws' Army,¹⁰⁷ but right after the election in 2014, he took steps to renew his connection.¹⁰⁸ Based on the analysis, this kind of periodic alliance has as much impact on the level of paramilitary or offensive activities as the kinetic state actions.

To summarize, the extremist self-defense organizations appear to be constantly adapting to the legal conditions of Hungary. The analysis suggests their potential threat is far beyond Roma human right issues. Their network is able to motivate the ideologically uncommitted population to support the extremists' by addressing 'national defense'

¹⁰⁶ Jövőnk.info. "Az MNA Vezetőségének Közleménye," [The statement of the leadership] October 2012, <http://jovonkinfo.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/az-mna-vezetosegenek-kozlemenye/>.

¹⁰⁷ Origo.hu. "Elhatárolódik a Jobbik a Faji Háborús Kijelentéstől," [The Jobbik distance himself from the racial war statements] August 2011, <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110816-nem-zarja-ki-a-jobbik-zagyva-gyorgy-gyulat.html>

¹⁰⁸ Híradó. "Szövetségre hívta a Nemzeti Szervezeteket a Jobbik," [The Jobbik called for alliance the nationalist organizations] July 2014, <http://www.hirado.hu/2014/07/05/szovetsegre-hivta-a-nemzeti-szervezeteket-a-jobbik/>.

issues nationwide. The hands of the law-enforcement are tied because the paramilitary activities and tactics are consciously designed to slip below the legal threshold for reaction. As a side effect, this feature promotes popular support and constant growth for the Hungarian extreme right-wing self-defense groups because the cost related to participation or joining remains acceptable for the potential supporters. Additionally, the mere existence of an intermeshed network with paramilitary capabilities whose kinetic and non-kinetic activities can be initiated by an external actor, for instance Russia, poses a potential threat to Hungarian national security.

C. STRATEGIC OPTIONS

In the case of Hungary, law enforcement is primarily responsible for the issue of tracking and disrupting self-defense/paramilitary networks. As Treverton (2009) summarizes in his work, the law enforcement approach built on “after-the-fact” investigations in order to develop criminal cases, does not predict future actions as part of a broader more strategic intelligence effort.¹⁰⁹ Thus, it has been difficult to mount credible and legitimate response against the groups. Currently, the government’s main line of counter-efforts is still directed against the Nazi, anti-Semitic ideology and the Skinhead organizations even if their roles are negligible based on this analysis.

Based on this analysis, the question arises: What strategic options does the government have to counter these right-wing organizations? The main goal is to destabilize and degrade the abilities of the self-defense group network. Typically, there are at least three indicators of destabilization according to Carley, Lee, and Krackhardt (2002).¹¹⁰ First, the information flow through the network has been seriously reduced. Second, “the network as a decision making body, can no longer reach a consensus, or takes much longer to do so.”¹¹¹ Third, the network’s accuracy at doing tasks has been

¹⁰⁹ Gregory F. Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror* (1 edition, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009): 121.

¹¹⁰ Kathleen M. Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt, *Destabilizing Networks* (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 2002): 84.
<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/complexity/carley%20paper.pdf>

¹¹¹ Carley, Kathleen M., Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt, *Destabilizing Networks*, 84.

impaired. To carry out these goals, the following strategic options are identified based on the Roberts and Everton typology.

Roberts and Everton summarize (2011), “the kinetic approach involves aggressive and offensive measures to eliminate or capture network members and their supporters, while the non-kinetic approach involves the use of subtle, non-coercive means for combating dark networks.”¹¹² Usually, the kinetic approach receives more attention because the capture and elimination of high-value targets attracts headlines and engenders popular support. In contrast, according to Everton, the non-kinetic approach requires sophisticated skills and it takes longer than a kinetic campaign and tends to attract far less attention because of its low profile nature.¹¹³ Although identified as a broad set of separate options, these approaches can complement each other.¹¹⁴ Based on the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, kinetic actions may be urgent and necessary in the short term, but it is merely “a holding action that buys time for the indirect approach to have its decisive effect in the longer term.”¹¹⁵

1. Kinetic Approaches

The kinetic approaches considered here are targeting and capacity building strategies. The former takes place in the form of high profile raids or strikes that can be directed by an advising force (i.e., the U.S. in Afghanistan) or by host-nation armed forces. It focuses on the removal of stakeholders based on their position in the network or the disruption of key ties among the entities.¹¹⁶ In the case of Hungarian extremists, the SNA analysis suggests that only the removal of the optimal or so called critical set of organizations can disconnect the network of self-defense groups. Based on the network

¹¹² Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks.” *Journal of Social Structure*, volume 12, (2011): 23. doi: <http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12/RobertsEverton.pdf>.

¹¹³ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 33.

¹¹⁴ Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 23.

¹¹⁵ Eric T. Olson. “Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy” (speech. Washington Institute in Washington, DC, 17 September 2009). <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/Olsonremarks20090917.pdf>

¹¹⁶ Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 4.

metrics, if the kinetic approach were pursued, it should target the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, the Hungarian National Front, the JOBBIK, the Pax Hungarica and the Outlaws' Army simultaneously.

This approach, however, has limitations given Hungary's current legal and constitutional framework. No connections have been established between illegal activities and the right-wing extremist network. Therefore, targeting a person, group or organization to prevent their activities is limited exclusively to the internal disruption via provocateurs.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the interconnectedness of the network's ideological groups along its relatively low levels of centralizations suggests kinetic options would have limited effect anyway.

Based on the Roberts and Everton typology, capacity-building, refers to the strategy where our own armed forces would work "through, by and with" indigenous forces to build their capacity to conduct effective targeting operations against a common enemy.¹¹⁸ In this case, the focus is on the training of a third party to carry out aggressive, coercive tactics. As mentioned above, these types of approaches are limited within the Hungarian context. Additionally, in a stable democratic state, only the state can have the monopoly of violence; the authority cannot be transferable to a third party. Moreover, the network is adaptive by keeping up-to-date on law enforcement operations, sharing their experiences and holding trainings in legal issues. Without the actual violation of law, the unjustified use of these kinetic tools will compromise the law-enforcement tactics and techniques in the long-run.

To summarize, the Hungarian government should refrain from the use of kinetic actions against the self-defense groups that are not associated with kinetic actions, even in the case of those organizations (the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, the JOBBIK, the Outlaws' Army and the Pax Hungarica) that are repeatedly ranked highly

117 Jövönk.info. "Egy Újabb Sikertelen NBH-Akció Tanulságai," [Lessons of another unsuccessful NBH operation] March 2003, <http://www.jovonk.info/2009/03/22/egy-ujabb-sikertelen-nbh-akcio-tanulsagai>.

118 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks," 5.

across actor-level measures and they have extensive relationships with more covert groups.

2. Non-Kinetic Approaches

In contrast, the non-kinetic approach involves indirect power to undermine underground networks. Its primary goal is counter-influence. It employs numerous sophisticated ways to cut the enemy's ties to the population: institution-building, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Information Operations (IO), and rehabilitation and reintegration.¹¹⁹ Based on the growing popularity of the self-defense movements in Hungary, the non-kinetic approach would deal with right-wing challenges indirectly.

a. Option 1: Institution Building

As the analysis demonstrated, the trainings and the paramilitary capability building events under the umbrella of 'national self-defense' are able to unite the ideologically divided groups. Therefore, the Hungarian government must target this idea indirectly.

In general, the first non-kinetic approach concentrates its efforts on building institutions of governance, rule of law, and economic development in war-torn communities.¹²⁰ In the case of Hungarian far-right, self-defense organizations, the focus should be on those youth sympathizers who are not necessary ideologically committed but who are drawn to uniforms, weapons and sense of 'national self-defense.' The government could absorb these individuals under the umbrella of a legal organization. Perhaps a national guard-like organization could be established in lieu of the conscript system.¹²¹ Although the reserve element of the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF)

¹¹⁹ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 34.

¹²⁰ Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks," 5.

¹²¹ Malkovics Tibor, *Jó Szomszédi (v)iszonyok? A Jobboldali (nemzeti) Radikalizmus És a Hazai 'Gárdák' Kapcsolathálózati Elemzése* [Scratching Each Other's Back. An Analysis of the Network of Relations between the Radical (National) Right and the Hungarian 'Guards'] (PhD diss, Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem, Budapest, 2012): 222. doi: <http://phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/654/>

currently exists,¹²² it is the focus of the extremist propaganda and branded as just a scam.¹²³ If transformed, this organization could attract those youth who are not ideologically committed but seek military challenges that the right-wing self-defense groups offer.

This new institution could provide an alternative to those attracted to ‘national self-defense’ ideals. In order to be successful, the new institution would need to meet three main requirements: first, it should be organized on territorial basis, so members can serve their own community and address local issues. Second, the members would not be deployed abroad so the new institution would not be branded as a “mercenary army.” Third, the new institution must base on Counter-Unconventional Warfare¹²⁴ (Counter-UW) capabilities to provide a credible strategic-level ability to interdict and roll back any possible external sponsorship of self-defense movements.¹²⁵

Currently, only the HDF’s Special Forces Battalion has the professional basis to establish an organization that can meet all of the requirements above. With their guidance, a Reserve Special Forces unit could be established to attract the non-ideological youth who form the base of their right-wing self-defense organizations.

Recommended Course of Action (COA): The HDF should expand the Voluntary Reserve Force and establish a counter-UW capable territorial element under the advice of the Hungarian Special Forces. The new organization would bridge the gap between the government and right-wing group members to attract and collect the youth population committed to “national defense.’

122 The Hungarian Voluntary Reserve Force based on voluntary defense- and voluntary operational reservists. The first group responsible for the protection of the bases and installations of the HDF, the second group can be mobilized in case of national emergency.

123 Jövönk.info. “A Tartalékos Haderő Is Átverés?” [Is the reserve force just a scam?] December 2010, <http://www.jovonk.info/2010/12/22/tartalekos-hadero-atveres>.

124 Unconventional Warfare (UW)—defined in military doctrine as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government.

125 Janine Davidson, “Counter-Unconventional Warfare Is the Way of the Future. How Can We Get There?” Defense in Depth, October 2014, <http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/10/23/counter-unconventional-warfare-is-the-way-of-the-future-how-can-we-get-there/>.

b. Option 2: Communication Campaign

To influence the network of self-defense groups, another strategy could be to target indirectly the central groups because they score highly in basic brokerage and centrality measures.

According to the definition of U.S. Special Operations Command, PSYOPS involves the dissemination of information for influencing the emotions, perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign nationals so they are more aligned with U.S. goals and objectives during times of conflict and peace.¹²⁶ PSYOP can also employ counter adversary propaganda to reduce their will to fight. Everton notes that this strategy can also be used to turn network members or subgroups against one other.¹²⁷ Unfortunately, the use of this military tactic domestically is illegal.

The paramilitary activities require a broader national security discussion. Based on current regulations, the military intelligence community (IC), as well as the Hungarian armed forces are not competent to act on any home affairs issues.¹²⁸ Therefore, to settle the issue of Hungarian self-defense movement extensive professional consultation and knowledge sharing is necessary with the competent law-enforcement professionals about the lessons learned regarding HDF's successful PSYOP/CIMIC and SOF engagements. Such a new domestic communication campaign with limited aims could be a tool of the government to counter domestic right-wing influence.

The main goal of the new communication campaign would be to prevent the consensus among the leaders and supporters base of the self-defense groups. The destabilization can be reached by the capitalization of the existing ideological frictions among the far-right organizations. This option could exploit the inconsistency between protecting 'national self-defense' and supporting possible foreign influence (i.e., by Russia). This new law-enforcement communication campaign can include overt messaging (through mass media) and covert disinformation (through agents).

126 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton. "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks," 6.

127 Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 35.

128 Bári Gabor, "Intelligence Architecture in the Hungarian Special Operations Forces" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005).

Recommended COA: Law-enforcement should launch a new communication campaign to exploit the existing ideological frictions among the groups and the inconsistency regarding the possible foreign influence. In order to destabilize the network, the campaign must be directed against the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, the JOBBIK, the Outlaws' Army, and the Pax Hungarica because they are repeatedly ranked highly across actor-level measures and they have extensive relationships with more covert groups.

c. Option 3: IO Campaign

As the analysis highlighted, the co-sponsored trainings are the primary “bridging events” between groups with different ideological basis. Therefore, the Hungarian government could target these events non-kinetically.

In the case of Hungarian self-defense organizations, IO means the integrated employment of Electronic Warfare (EW)¹²⁹ and computer network operations to detect paramilitary activities such as trainings and capability development. It also refers to the monitoring of charitable donations and the transfer of funds to these organizations. Currently, this is the most widely used tool by the law enforcement. Cell phones and online messaging should be monitored to keep an eye on stakeholders, their followers and their activities.¹³⁰ More importantly, these EW efforts should focus primary on the bridging events highlighted by the analysis, not just simply on the most active organizations among the network in general. As the analysis demonstrated, the network of self-defense groups is decentralized and the information or other resources has the potential to diffuse rapidly throughout the network. Therefore, the primary goal of this option would be to reduce this ability of information to flow freely.

Recommended COA: The Hungarian government should develop and utilize a new IO concept in order to prevent the bridging events. The EW capabilities of the law-enforcement must attack, deceive, and disrupt information operation capabilities of the

¹²⁹ The term of Electronic Warfare (EW) is used to describe any action which is executed in the information environment.

¹³⁰ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 35.

groups identified as the most active regarding these events (Pax Hungarica, Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, Hungarian National Front, Hungarian National Guard, JOBBIK, Outlaw's Army) in order to destabilize the network.

d. Option 4: Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program

Another strategy to degrade the network is related to target non-kinetically the peripheral groups because, based on the analysis, they are the most vulnerable to being isolated.

In the case of Hungary, the over simplification and generalization about radical ideologies encourages their dissemination. Although the mass media and the public constantly condemn the Nazi ideology, based on this analysis, the role of neo-Nazis and skinheads does not appear to be a significant factor behind the paramilitary or self-defense activities. Instead, the current anti-Nazi condemnations appear to improve the cohesion among the extremists and radicalize them.¹³¹

A counter-ideological program based on moderate insiders with more balanced views¹³² is needed. Referred to as rehabilitation, they could engage the public in a broad public discussion on matters of security. Members of right-wing organizations could be invited to participate in professional discussions concerning issues like civil defense, disaster management. Self-organized civic policing and providing security for citizens must become unaffected by political considerations. The government could support these initiatives because these discussion forums would reintegrate the ideologically non hardcore members of the groups back into the society.

Recommended COA: To design the future of 'national self-defense,' the HDF should organize open forum about the issues of the peripheral actors identified by the analysis (Falcon Youth Movement, Nationalist Motorcyclists, Unified Hungary

131 Betyársereg. "Eltakarítottuk Pécsről a 'Kommunista Söpredéket' (+videó)," [Pécs was cleared away the Communist scum] February 2014, <http://betyarsereg.hu/eltakaritottuk-pecsrol-a-kommunista-sopredeket-video/>.

132 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton. "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks," 6.

Movement, Civil Association for Patka, and the National Protection Force), who are the most easily isolated from the network of self-defense groups.

D. STRATEGIC OPTIONS COMPARISON

This study compares the available options to provide an effective and feasible strategic solution to destabilize the network of self-defense groups. The comparison includes the analysis and the evaluation of each identified strategic option from the Hungarian government's perspective. To reach the best recommendation with the highest probability of success, this study establishes evaluation criteria to assess the risk and potential benefits of each option.

1. Evaluation Criteria

Before the employment of any counter measure, the Hungarian government should consider the following requirements:

1. **Feasibility:** the strategic option is capable of being suitable and being done within the current legal framework of Hungary. It doesn't require any changing or shaping of the regulations.
2. **Simplicity:** the strategic option does not require capabilities and special knowledge other than the available and competent law-enforcement tools. It does not require any time-consuming or complex capability building.
3. **Flexibility:** the strategic option is able to adapt and to be responsive to changes regarding the tactics and techniques of the adversaries. It provides the best flexibility to meet "unknowns" during the execution.
4. **Political sensitivity:** the implication of the strategic option cannot harm the broad social, economic, domestic, and foreign affair interests of Hungary. The accomplishment poses minimum risk to government, for instance negative press coverage.
5. **Short-term effectiveness:** the strategic option has the capability of producing a temporary but immediate destabilizing effect on the network of self-defense groups.
6. **Long-term effectiveness:** the strategic option has the capability of producing a durable but gradual destabilizing effect on the network of self-defense groups.

2. Decision Matrix

A common technique to compare strategic options is a decision matrix using the criteria outlined above in order to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the options. Table 16 shows the relative order of the options regarding each criterion, ranging from one to four where four means the full compliance with the requirements. Three criteria are seemed to the most important—feasibility, political sensitivity and long-term effectiveness—therefore receive double counts.

Table 16. Decision Matrix. The best suited options are highlighted regarding each criterion.

	Option 1 Institution Building	Option 2 Communication Campaign	Option 3 IO Campaign	Option 4 Reintegration Program
Feasibility *	3 (6)	4 (8)	1 (2)	2 (4)
Simplicity	2	1	3	4
Flexibility	1	4	2	3
Political sensitivity *	4 (8)	3 (6)	2 (4)	1 (2)
Short-term effectiveness	1	2	4	3
Long-term effectiveness *	4 (8)	3 (6)	1 (2)	2 (4)
Total:	15	17	13	15
Total weighed:	26	27	17	20

Table 16 suggests that Option 2 (Communication Campaign) is the most effective strategic solution to destabilize the network of self-defense-groups. However, the difference is insignificant compare with the weighed scores of Option 1 (Institution Building). The decision matrix determines the Option 3 (IO Campaign) as the least suitable COA. If we consider the great adaptability of the network, this suggestion appears to be justified in general.

The decision matrix alone cannot provide a solution; it just compares the competing COAs. As Table 16 suggests, Option 2 (Communication Campaign) scores low regarding simplicity, because this strategy requires capability building by the law-

enforcement. The HDF has the required professionals but the transfer of the special knowledge is time consuming. To full fill this gap, the Hungarian government could consider employing other solutions as well to increase the short-term effectiveness of the counter measures. Therefore, the final recommendation is use the best features of each option to come up with a combined strategy.

3. Overall Recommended COA

To summarize, in the case of the groups that have not violated the law, the use of kinetic approaches is very limited. In order to conduct effective counter measures the Hungarian government should build up the HDFs counter-UW capabilities via the establishment of a territorial Reserve Special Forces (option 1). To counter balance the disadvantages of this strategy (relative ineffective and inflexible in short-term), launch communication campaign (option 2) in order to form the public opinion and trigger tensions among the members of the self-defense groups. At the same time, it is necessary to illuminate and prevent the bridging events via a more focused IO Camping (option 3) and reintegrate the moderate insiders through public discussions about the ‘national self-defense’ (option 4).

Disengaging moderate sympathizers from the hard-core members of the right-wing organizations is a major objective of these efforts. In combination these non-kinetic options offer both long-term (institution building and communication campaign) and short-term solutions (reintegration and IO campaign).

VI. CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this study was to help the Hungarian Government positively identify the network of extreme right-wing self-defense organizations. Based on the analysis, the Hungarian self-defense groups form an intermeshed network. Under the umbrella of ‘national self-defense,’ the boundaries are blurred between the groups with different ideological bases. Their network structure provides great adaptive capability, steady growth, and therefore, it should not be underestimated. The Hungarian government should reconsider its current counter-measures and strategies against the right-wing groups.

Based on the data analysis, the Hungarian government should employ a combined unconventional two-step (short- and long-term) campaign in order to destabilize the network of self-defense groups and enforce the counter-UW capabilities of the country.

In the case of the groups that have not violated the law, the use of kinetic approach is very limited. As a result, in the short term, a new communication campaign should focus on the possible foreign ties and the danger what the network of self-defense groups pose to the ‘national self-defense.’ Parallel with this effort, the integrated employment of electronic warfare and computer network operations must monitor the bridging events, and track the transfers of charitable donations.

In long term, institution building supported by a rehabilitation program must take place in the form of public forums. At the same time the nation’s counter-UW capabilities should be increased against any external threats via a mutually trusted institution, for instance Reserve Special Forces organized on a territorial basis, because it could attract moderate right-wing organizational members.

In conclusion, the network of self-defense groups should not be considered as only ‘aggressive neighborhood watch’ but as an unconventional threat to national security.

The analysis of political messaging of the self-defense groups and the activities of satellite or proxy organizations, especially the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement’s

and the JOBBIK's so-called 'basic organizations' abroad, exceeded the scope of this study. Future investigation could explore the connections at the individual level of analysis. Further refinement is needed to flesh out how the strategic options could be implemented. This study only identifies the data-driven strategies that emerge from this study and not how they would be executed. Finally, as more data are structured and analyzed, additional strategies may surface forcing a review of the recommended strategic options in this study.

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