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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE: IDENTIFYING AND
PRIORITIZING CORE ATTRIBUTES OF THE
PROFESSION**

by

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December 2014

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**NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE: IDENTIFYING AND PRIORITIZING CORE
ATTRIBUTES OF THE PROFESSION**

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ABSTRACT

Since 1944, naval special warfare (NSW) commanders and staffs have led battalion (O-5, U.S. Navy commander) and brigade (O-6, U.S. Navy captain) echelon task forces charged with conducting conventional and irregular warfare. History reveals that these duties often come with little or no notice, as experienced in Operations Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom. For more than a decade following Enduring Freedom, these requirements increased in frequency and scope. Now NSW routinely provides senior leadership to joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, and multinational task forces. Yet current development efforts focus on building world-class individual operators and small units as opposed to senior leaders. This research employs a systems approach to analyze NSW's professional development program. The project commenced by reviewing pertinent historical, doctrinal, and academic contributions. Next, a survey tapped into the experience of senior SEALs—leaders who ran deployed task forces (e.g., NSW task groups and task forces). Participants assessed the current system, prioritized aspects of the profession, and made recommendations to enhance development. Feedback revealed consensus regarding the desire to enhance development through institutional courses designed to prepare SEALs for senior assignments. The data help to define the NSW profession by better identifying and prioritizing the practical skills required by SEAL leaders today.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFRICOM	Africa Command
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AO	area of operation
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
BDE	brigade
BN	battalion
C2	command and control
CERTEX	certification excise
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CJSOTF-A	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan
CMC	command master chief
COCOM	combatant command
COI	course of instruction
COIN	counter insurgency
CPO	chief petty officer
CT	counter terrorism
CWO	chief warrant officer
DA	direct action
DCO	deputy commanding officer
E-7	U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer or U.S. Army Sergeant First Class
E-9	U.S. Navy Master Chief or U.S. Army Sergeant Major
EWS	Expeditionary Warfare School
FBP	final battle problem
FID	foreign internal defense
IA	interagency
ICW	in conjunction with
ILE	intermediate level education
IO	information operations
IRB	Institutional Review Board

ISR	Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISS	Intermediate Service School
IT	information technology
IW	irregular warfare
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIIM	joint interagency, intergovernmental and multinational
JOTC	Junior Officer Training Course
JPME	joint professional military education
JSOF	joint special operations forces
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JSOU	Joint Special Operations University
JTF	joint task force
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MARSOC	Marine Special Operations Command
MARSOF	Marine Special Operations Forces
MCPO	master chief petty officer
MDMP	military decision making process
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSW	naval special warfare
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OJT	on the job training
OPS	operation
OPSO	operations officer
O-3	U.S. Navy lieutenant or U.S. Army captain
O-4	U.S. Navy lieutenant commander or U.S. Army major
O-5	U.S. Navy commander or U.S. Army lieutenant colonel
O-6	U.S. Navy captain or U.S. Army colonel
PLC	platoon leaders' course
PME	professional military education
PRODEV	professional development

SA	special activities
SBT	special boat team
SDV	SEAL delivery vehicle
SEA	senior enlisted advisor
SEAL	sea-air-land
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SF	Special Forces
SFA	security force assistance
SITEX	squadron integration excise
SME	subject matter expert
SOCFWD	Special Operations command forward
SOCOM	Special Operations command
SOF	Special Operations forces
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SPECOPS	Special Operations
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
STD.DEV	standard deviation
SWCC	special warfare combatant crewman
SWFs	seven warfighting functions
TF	task force
TG	task group
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
UDT	underwater demolition teams
UN	United Nations
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare
XO	executive officer

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since World War II, naval special warfare (NSW) commanders and staffs have led battalion (O-5, U.S. Navy commander) and brigade (O-6, U.S. Navy captain) echelon task forces charged with conducting conventional and irregular warfare. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DOD) directs NSW to maintain this capability (translated by the enterprise into force training and force readiness manuals). History reveals that these duties often come with little or no notice, as experienced in Operations Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom. For more than a decade following Enduring Freedom, the requirement to lead battalion and brigade echelon forces increased in frequency and scope. Now NSW routinely provides senior leadership to joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, and multinational (JIIM) task forces. Yet current development efforts focus on building world-class individual operators and small-unit elements, as opposed to senior leaders. Additionally, despite current requirements, there is little consensus on how to develop SEALs for these senior roles. Therefore, defining the NSW profession requires both the identification and prioritization of echelon-specific development requirements.

This research employs a systems approach to analyze NSW's professional development program. The project commenced by reviewing pertinent historical, doctrinal, and academic contributions. Next, a survey tapped into the experience gained by senior members of the community—leaders who spent the last 13-plus years running deployed task forces (e.g., NSW task groups and task forces). Participants assessed the current system, prioritized aspects of the profession and provided recommendations for future development. Feedback revealed consensus regarding the desire to enhance development through institutional courses designed to prepare SEALs for senior assignments. The data helps to define the NSW profession by better prioritizing practical skills required by SEAL leaders today. Finally, combining qualitative and quantitative analysis revealed five key findings, which were used to derive three recommendations for improving NSW's professional development pipeline.

Project Findings

1. **Ongoing Requirement:** History and military directive compel NSW to prepare for leadership roles (command and staff positions) on O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces.
2. **Liability:** Survey participants confirm the need and strongly recommend improving NSW's professional development to better prepare senior joint warfighters. The data demonstrate that NSW currently relies too heavily on individual experience or on-the-job training (OJT) to prepare for these roles.
3. **NSW Profession Defined:** This research produced a prioritized list of the practical skills required by SEALs today (Appendix A). This list is a starting point or an extrapolation of NSW's 2014 professional development priorities as related to this echelon of joint warfare.
4. **Specific NSW Education:** NSW requires deliberate and echelon-specific military preparation, which synchronizes formal (military education and training, study of doctrine) and informal (mentorship, self-study, professional associations) methods designed to achieve a desired outcome—proficiency in the practical skills required by joint warfighters.
5. **Timing:** Sufficient development must be completed prior to first key assignment at this echelon.

Project Recommendations

1. Place greater emphasis on deployed senior leadership skills and seek immediate investment in existing professional development opportunities that cover the subjects contained in this research (Appendix A). To achieve this goal the community must broadcast this objective (proficiency in O-5 and O-6 echelon task force leadership roles) as the desired end state for officers, chief warrant officers, and enlisted members to work toward. Further research must also be commissioned to identify how to implement improved professional development using the methodology and data contained in this research.
2. Mandate feedback from SEALs who are privileged with key leadership opportunities so that the community may learn from their experiences. Archive these records to create a valuable database so that NSW can monitor progress and continuously refine the development process.
3. NSW-specific leadership development is necessary but not sufficient for continued success. Therefore, further research should also identify how to complement military development with exposure to civilian programs (civilian education, fellowships, etc.).

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I. THE NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE PROFESSION

A. INTRODUCTION

Since their inception, SEALs have supported conventional combat operations as well as led a variety of highly visible irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) efforts. The naval special warfare (NSW) community's proven track record and talented people make it a key sub-component of the U. S. Special Operation Command (USSOCOM or SOCOM). However, violent extremists appear resilient despite 13 consecutive years of United States and allied tactical domination of the battlefield. Due to the absence of decisive victory, many are concerned that traditional career paths fail to properly develop U.S. military leaders.¹ Furthermore, the nation increasingly looks to SOCOM not only for quick tactical solutions like hostage rescue or direct action missions but also for broader leadership regarding national security challenges.² In testimony to a U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, Linda Robinson, a prominent analyst of U.S. national security and foreign policy claimed: "There is no more important issue to national security than making sure that special operations forces are developed and employed in a way that maximizes their full potential because they will very likely continue to play a disproportionately large role relative to their size in ensuring U.S. national security in the years ahead."³ Acknowledging the complexity of future security challenges, the commander of SOCOM directed special operations sub-components to "be the best educated and trained force within the Department of Defense (DOD)."⁴

Despite seemingly simple guidance, this remains a complex, multi-variable problem. Moreover, there are no established processes for honing specific competencies that span the entire profession and specifically build senior special operations leaders.

¹ John Arquilla, *Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military* (Lanham, MD: Ivan R Dee, 2008), ix-xii.

² U.S. House of Representatives, Counsel on Foreign Relations, Linda Robinson's comments during a hearing on the "Future of Special Operations Forces," July 11, 2012.

³ H.R., Linda Robinson's comments on the "Future of Special Operations Forces."

⁴ U.S. Special Operations (USSOCOM) Commander, *Commander's Education and Training Guidance FY 13-16*, Policy letter, MacDill, Air Force Base: USSOCOM, 2013, 1.

The topic of development remains hotly debated by special operations professionals due to competing interests (e.g., status, resourcing, and operational methodology) within SOCOM.⁵ Changes or updates require careful navigation around legal, career, and budgetary constraints. Analysis must remain community-specific because the system relies primarily on service (Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and service component requirements (e.g., NSW) as the drivers for development.⁶ Despite these complexities, this study will attempt to support NSW's compliance with the directive by researching the following questions.

First, what are the practical skills required to be a SEAL leader today? Second, are NSW's future leaders being adequately prepared in these competencies?

To answer these questions, this study advances prior research conducted by three SEALs and the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). Primarily, this focuses on work completed by Commander (USN) Thomas Donovan, who is a Naval Postgraduate School graduate.⁷ Captain (USN) Matt Stevens' master's thesis was also considered.⁸ Additionally, research completed by NPS graduate Lieutenant Commander (USN) David Nash was also reviewed.⁹ In 2008, JSOU researched *what* and *how* to meet the needs of the special operations education. This research included appraising previous professional development programs, soliciting input from SOCOM's sub-components, interviewing senior leadership, and conducting a survey.¹⁰ The JSOU survey asked joint-service participants to rate "31 education areas."¹¹ The results from the survey revealed NSW's

⁵ Stephen M. Grenier, David Tucker, and Christopher J. Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007). 143-154.

⁶ Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), *The Navy Leader Development Strategy*, Naval Policy Letter, Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2012. 3-15.

⁷ For full thesis see Thomas A. Donovan, Structuring Naval Special Warfare Junior Officer Professional Military Education (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).

⁸ For full thesis see Matt P. Stevens, *The Missing Link: Professional Military Education in the Navy SEAL Officer Corps* (master's thesis, U.S. Marine Corps University, 2007).

⁹ For full thesis see David F. Nash, Structuring Naval Special Warfare's Lead Chief Petty Officer's Combat Leadership Course (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).

¹⁰ Joint Special Operations University President's Action Team, *Future Concept: Providing the Azimuth for Joint SOF Education* (MacDill, Air Force Base: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2008), 2.

¹¹ Joint Special Operations University, *Future Concept*, 6.

top five educational requirements: irregular warfare, strategic level planning, operational level planning, combating terrorism—interagency executive level, and interagency collaboration.¹² Although relevant to the discussion, these projects do not identify echelon-specific practical skills (a distinct concept) required for SEAL leaders.

Building on these findings, this study brought three factors to bear. First, it specifically defined the desired outcome for officers, chief warrant officers, and enlisted SEALs. Second, it tapped into the experience gained by senior members of the NSW community—leaders who spent the last 13-plus years running deployed task forces (e.g., squadrons, special operations task forces, combined joint special operations). Thirdly, it collated this experience, which allowed for an objective assessment of the current process, identification and prioritization of areas for new investment, and collected suggestions about future requirements. This study was designed to help improve NSW’s process for developing the talent required to staff, plan, and lead joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, and multinational (JIIM) task forces in combat and contingency operations. Before commencing, other contributions relevant to this discussion are reviewed in the next section.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW: HISTORICAL, DOCTRINAL, AND ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROFESSION

Over the last 52 years, the NSW enterprise produced some of the most tactically proficient and highly capable combat forces on the planet. From their earliest days, special operations relied on a bottom-up strategy to develop individual and small unit excellence.¹³ In fact, most discussions about Navy Combat Demolition Units, Scouts and Raiders, and Office of Strategic Services Maritime Units focus on the exploits of small elements. For example, early underwater demolition teams (UDTs) serving in World War II worked in small teams, providing significant demolition expertise and amphibious

¹² Joint Special Operations University, *Future Concept*, 40.

¹³ John W. Chambers II, “Training for War and Espionage: Office of Strategic Services Training during World War II,” *Studies in Intelligence* 54, no. 2 (June 2010): 1, 2–5.

support to conventional forces.¹⁴ In Vietnam, it is well documented that 14-man platoons led by SEAL lieutenants (O-3s) operated with little or no direct supervision.¹⁵ Because less emphasis is placed on NSW's leadership of higher-level organizations, one of the initial hypotheses was that it was a relatively recent phenomenon (circa 2001); but this is not the case.

1. Historical Examples of SEAL led O-5 and O-6 Task Forces

Since at least 1944, NSW commanders and staffs led battalion (O-5, U.S. Navy Commander) and brigade (O-6, U.S. Navy captain) echelon task forces charged with conducting conventional and irregular warfare. UDT Captain (USN) B. Hall Hanlon deployed to the Pacific and led a task force in World War II.¹⁶ He exercised "operational control of all participating UDTs, amphibious personnel destroyers, and close fire-support ships."¹⁷ In 1967, members of the newly formed SEAL teams deployed as an O-5 led task force called Naval Special Warfare Group-Vietnam.¹⁸ During that same period, SEALs also manned and led another O-5 echelon command called the Maritime Operations Group (also known as USMACV SOG-37).¹⁹ After Vietnam, SEALs episodically deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces during contingency operations such as for Operation Earnest Will in 1987.²⁰

¹⁴ Tim L. Bosiljevac, *SEALs: UDT/SEAL operations in Vietnam* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1990), 3.

¹⁵ Thomas K. Adams, U.S. *Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London, UK: Routledge Press, 1998), 116-148.

¹⁶ Tom Hawkins, "Navy Combat Demolition Units, Scouts and Raiders, Office of Strategic Services, Underwater Demolition Teams," in *United States Naval Special Warfare*, ed. Greg Mathieson Sr. & David. Gatley (Centerville, VA: NSW Publications LLC, 2013). 44-45.

¹⁷ Hawkins, "Navy Combat Demolition Units, Scouts and Raiders, Office of Strategic Services, Underwater Demolition Teams," 44-45.

¹⁸ Hawkins, "SEALs and Special Boat Teams 1960s-1987," 71-79.

¹⁹ Email (U), CAPT Norm Olson, NSW Historian, to LCDR Jeremiah Teti, NPS Student, October 24, 2014.

²⁰ Adams, U.S. *Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, 213 - 215.

In August 1990, NSW deployed an O-6 level command in support of Operation Desert Shield / Storm.²¹ According to NSW community documents, NSW Task Group—Central was “unprecedented” in size and scope of mission for the community.²² That organization commanded four SEAL platoons and two special boat units during the completion of over 270 combat missions.²³ History reveals that the U.S. Navy and SOCOM expect the SEAL community to run task forces for both combat and contingency operations.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan opened significant opportunities for SEALs to lead larger multi-service and multi-national organizations. In 2001, SEAL Captain (USN) Robert Harward commanded a 2,500-man Joint-service and Multi-national Task Force in Afghanistan.²⁴ Since then, SEALs have routinely commanded similar echelon task forces around the globe. NSW now boasts former theater special operations commanders (e.g., Vice Admiral Albert Calland), joint special operations commanders (e.g., Admiral William McRaven), and SOCOM commanders (e.g., Admiral Eric Olsen).²⁵ Regardless of historic precedence, SEALs now serve at the highest levels of joint command. In light of these assignments, it is appropriate to assess whether or not legacy development strategies sufficiently prepare senior SEALs for roles at higher echelons.

2. Starting Point: NSW Current Development Focus

In 2007, SEAL Lieutenant Commander Tom Donovan published a master’s thesis, which established a need for enhanced junior officer professional military education (PME) prior to assignment as a platoon commander.²⁶ His work provided an overview of the community, a description of the current officer PME pipeline, and an

²¹ Department of the Navy, *Lessons Learned Case Study - Operation Desert Shield / Storm* (Naval Special Warfare Publication 3–1). Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1996. 3–2.

²² Department of the Navy, *Lessons Learned Case Study - Operation Desert Shield / Storm*, 3–2.

²³ Department of the Navy, *Lessons Learned Case Study - Operation Desert Shield / Storm*, 13–1.

²⁴ Department of the Navy, *Navy Special Warfare* (NSW Publication 3–05). Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2013. 1:7.

²⁵ Navy Admiral Biographies are listed: <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp>, 2014.

²⁶ Donovan, “Structuring Naval Special Warfare Junior Officer Professional Military Education,” 54–57.

inter-service comparison (USMC, Army, and Air Force).²⁷ In response, the community commenced rank appropriate development for the platoon echelon (both officers and enlisted SEALs). Since NSW remains primarily focused on these junior leaders, there is an opportunity to complement Donovan's research by looking at senior-level development.

As previously mentioned, senior SEAL officers, chief warrant officers, and senior enlisted advisors are now tasked with leading increasingly larger organizations with greater frequency. Improvements to the community's future leader development must also include those individuals (as opposed to just officers). To support this objective, the following sections examine two ideas. The first posits that NSW leaders receive limited development (training, education, and experience) specifically focused on preparing them for higher echelon leadership roles. The second suggests that NSW leaders require specific development programs (e.g., irregular warfare, maritime operations). To examine these ideas will require a brief review of professional development concepts, policy, and background.

3. Professional Development: Concepts and Terms

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey presents the military as "the Profession of Arms."²⁸ In terms of responsibility, leadership, and mission importance, he equates military service to civilian professional careers and encourages all service members to uphold those "attributes" of excellence.²⁹ According to the CJCS, the purpose of the profession is joint warfighting.³⁰ Inherent to this profession are requirements for members to understand national power and influence, formulate informed security recommendations, work with a wide variety of partners, and remain prepared for an array of security scenarios (asymmetric threats, irregular and both

²⁷ Donovan, "Structuring Naval Special Warfare Junior Officer Professional Military Education", 1–48.

²⁸ Martin E. Dempsey, "America's Military: A Profession of Arms" (white paper, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012). 3.

²⁹ Dempsey, "America's Military: A Profession of Arms," 1.

³⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, DOD Directive CJCSI 1800.01D, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011b, A-A-2.

conventional and unconventional warfare).³¹ However, professional level expertise is not developed immediately; rather, these complex skills must be developed throughout an entire career.³² Therefore, the concept remains arbitrary without a pipeline that consistently produces quality subspecialty (i.e., special operations) professionals.

Under the Department of Defense's (DOD) architecture, the pipeline uses a combination of "how to do" training and "how to think" education to professionally develop service members.³³ Education is defined as academic endeavors that encourage "breadth of view, diverse perspectives, critical analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, and innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, non-linear problems."³⁴ In contrast, training improves military task-specific competence.³⁵ Therefore, this project defines development in the profession of arms as an overarching concept that produces joint warfighter skills in leaders. Moreover, it extrapolates the same requirements for the NSW profession. To be clear, this project does not suggest that everyone should be trained to be an admiral; rather, this is a practical goal emphasizing purposeful preparation for deployment skills required at senior levels.

4. Policy and Background

Although currently ad hoc, many professional development opportunities (e.g., education, training, fellowships) already exist for special operations forces. The Department of Defense relies on the services and sub-components to create "service-specific proficiencies."³⁶ For example, "Army, Navy, and Marine Corps schools focus on land, maritime, and expeditionary warfare, respectively."³⁷ Next, the SOCOM commander's role as a unified combatant commander makes him responsible for

³¹ U.S. Special Operations Command, *Commander's Special Operations Professional Education*, 4-5.

³² Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), *The Navy Leader Development Strategy*, 10.

³³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-1, A-2.

³⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-2.

³⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-2.

³⁶ U.S. House of Representatives, "Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater- Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel," 2010, XI.

³⁷ H.R., "Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater- Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel," 2010, XI.

preparing his force to conduct special operations.³⁸ Finally, NSW shoulders the responsibility for institutional preparation specific to maritime special operations. To achieve these goals, services and sub-component commands conduct internal training, joint exercises, micro-educational venues, and other methods to develop role specific expertise within their communities. However, professional military education (PME) remains the primary method for preparing military members for senior leadership positions. Navigating existing requirements remains a complex task because four hierarchical policies govern NSW's professional development.

The first and most important policy is the law. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandates qualifications and education prior to certain career milestones.³⁹ Therefore, NSW remains subject to and benefits from participation in DOD, Navy, and SOCOM development opportunities and career requirements. These events include joint professional education (JPME) requirements, opportunities for service schools or civilian equivalents, senior War College and various civilian programs (i.e., educational and fellowships).⁴⁰

There are significant professional development opportunities for the NSW community; however, currently there is no pipeline specifically designed to develop senior special operations leaders within NSW. The complexity of the current policies combined with the lack of a deliberate NSW pipeline suggests that the system is sub-optimal. Furthermore, this review did not uncover evidence of significant investment in the development (training, education, and experience) of higher echelon leadership skills. The question remains: Do existing opportunities sufficiently develop NSW senior leaders as joint warfighters?

³⁸ U.S. Special Operations Command, *Commander's Special Operations Professional Education*, 3.

³⁹ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

⁴⁰ Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), *The Navy Leader Development Strategy*, 13.

5. Program of Focused Preparation

The special operations profession remains largely undefined. The JSOU report identifies several common misperceptions affecting preparation.⁴¹ As previously discussed, current policies use a binary divide between training and education. In fact, JSOU limits its efforts to “the operational and strategic education” of special operations personnel and leaves tactical training to component commands.⁴² However, as this research will explore, development of joint warfighters requires purposefully synchronized training, education, especially at higher echelons. To explore this idea it is imperative to answer the following question: Does general education create better joint warfighters?

While broadly beneficial to the individual, general education venues do not necessarily develop the specific skills that are required for effectiveness in senior NSW assignments. It is possible, that certain types of education could dilute rather than reinforce special operations leader effectiveness. Although speaking generally about military professional education, Army War College Professor Steven Metz commented,

No other profession feels compelled to take time away from the focused development of professional skills for the broadening of its senior leaders, or to assign them scholarly tasks only loosely related to what they will do during the remainder of their professional careers.⁴³

The key is to distinguish professional skills (or desired outcomes) from broad spectrum education. While Special Operations personnel need both, professionals require specific training and education. The framework for this argument is derived from the following published works.

a. Military Professional Development History

Three books discuss the origin and fundamental argument for creating professional military leaders that are specifically developed for their roles. Samuel

⁴¹ Joint Special Operations University, *Future Concept*, 8–11.

⁴² Joint Special Operations University, *Future Concept*, 9.

⁴³ Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: Rethinking War Colleges and the Education of U.S. Military Leaders.” *World Politics Review* (September 2014), doi: 12372.

Huntington wrote the first one in 1957, which is titled *The Soldier and the State*. Charles White, author of the second, wrote *The Enlightened Soldier* in 1989. These two works are critical to building a full understanding of the idea of military professional development because they review the origin. Both prominent historians attribute this concept to the nineteenth century Prussian Army.⁴⁴ Although this section focuses on the origin, a noted sociologist named Morris Janowitz described the transition and development of American military professionalism in his book titled *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*.⁴⁵

Samuel Huntington claimed that institutionalized military professionalism was born on August 6, 1808.⁴⁶ On that day, the Prussian government standardized selection requirements for officers.⁴⁷ Previously, family lineage rather than military qualification determined who led on the battlefield.⁴⁸ Prior to this period, it was commonly believed that valor and combat proficiency were innate to certain leaders, rather than learned.⁴⁹ The new policy supported objective standards that were founded by balancing education, training, and experience.⁵⁰ Huntington elaborated on the profession by suggesting that similar to civilian professionals, military leaders require progressive development strategies and a shared identity or “corporate nature” within the community.⁵¹ Huntington’s book documents the history behind the need for rigorous military qualification and corporate collaboration (i.e., professional associations and journals) designed to further the profession.

⁴⁴ For a full discussion see Charles E. White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1989).

⁴⁵ For a full discussion see Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1960).

⁴⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 30.

⁴⁷ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 30.

⁴⁸ White, *The Enlightened Soldier*, 35.

⁴⁹ White, *The Enlightened Soldier*, 18.

⁵⁰ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 30–31.

⁵¹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 10.

Charles White attributed this radical change in policy to the Prussian General Gerhard Johann David Waitz von Scharnhorst.⁵² Although not as famous as his student Carl von Clausewitz, Scharnhorst's reforms improved the effectiveness of the entire Prussian military.⁵³ He designed the reorganization of the army into combined arms divisions, created "better education for officers and noncommissioned officers," and developed an examination-based promotion system.⁵⁴ Scharnhorst also warned, "Nothing is more dangerous here than using personal experience without regard for that experience which military history teaches us."⁵⁵ Two hundred and six years ago, the Prussians identified a system to prepare their officers and non-commissioned leaders in the application of opponent-centric conventional warfare, including the complex and dynamic use of combined arms. Moreover, they had also learned not to overly rely on on-the-job training.

b. *Examining How to Professionally Develop NSW Senior Leaders*

In the *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, William Lind argued that it is imperative combat leaders be prepared via specific military programs. He described tactics as "a process combining two elements, techniques and education to find unique solutions to various combat scenarios."⁵⁶ In discussing techniques or maneuvers, he insisted that they must be standardized in support of establishing a "common language."⁵⁷ However, he also advised "good techniques are not enough."⁵⁸ According to Lind, military education should include constant and career-long exposure to "military history, war-gaming, and terrain walks."⁵⁹ Lind defined the study of military history as practical analysis of tactical and operational case studies, and mentorship through war-gaming scenarios.

⁵² White, *The Enlightened Soldier*, xiii.

⁵³ White, *The Enlightened Soldier*, 15.

⁵⁴ White, *The Enlightened Soldier*, Xii, 19.

⁵⁵ White, *The Enlightened Soldier*, 91.

⁵⁶ William S. Lind, and Michael D. Wyly, *Maneuver warfare handbook* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 12

⁵⁷ Lind and Wyly, *Maneuver warfare handbook*, 12.

⁵⁸ Lind and Wyly, *Maneuver warfare handbook*, 12.

⁵⁹ Lind and Wyly, *Maneuver warfare handbook*, 12.

Additionally, Lind recommended that beginners should focus on developing proficiency and understanding “two levels up” from their assigned position.⁶⁰ As applied to SEAL teams, lieutenants should first be educated and trained to run a troop (O-4 level) and squadron (O-5 level) before they are instructed at the platoon level (O-3). Lind recommended that this same sequence should be used to prepare higher-level echelon leaders.⁶¹ Using this training approach, lower-level leaders and their superiors then share a common language, increase organizational trust and confidence thus enhancing flexibility and decision-making up and down the chain of command.

c. Special Operations Peculiar Skills

The nation expects special operations personnel to master certain skills inherent to the profession. For example, SOCOM was designated as the proponent for security force assistance (SFA), which remains a term typically synonymous with irregular warfare.⁶² Moreover, political leaders routinely receive reports stating that NSW plays a key role in irregular warfare and are also the nation’s premier maritime special operations force.⁶³ For example, NSW is described at the congressional level as maritime experts “postured to fight a globally dispersed enemy ashore or afloat.”⁶⁴ These congressional reports also state that NSW forces are capable of quickly deploying from Navy ships and submarines.⁶⁵ However, SOF cannot train and educate for everything. In a resource and time constrained environment, how does SOF in general and NSW in particular prioritize their tasks?

⁶⁰ Lind and Wyly, *Maneuver warfare handbook*, 42.

⁶¹ Lind and Wyly, *Maneuver warfare handbook*, 42.

⁶² Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Paper, Defense Technical Information Center—RS21048, 2014, 2.

⁶³ Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Paper, Defense Technical Information Center—RS22373, 2014, 1, 4.

⁶⁴ Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress,” 5.

⁶⁵ Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress,” 5.

d. Factors to Consider and the Special Operations Dilemma

A recent article in *Joint Forces Quarterly* points out the dilemma faced by all military service PME programs.⁶⁶ The dilemma is weighing additional programs against both limited time and resources.⁶⁷ Because no additional time or money is available, the authors conclude that “fundamental change in the existing training and education venues” is preferable over the addition of anything new.⁶⁸ Therefore, defining the NSW profession requires both the identification and prioritization of echelon-specific development requirements.

Defining special operations is a popular but divisive topic. In *United States Special Operations Forces*, defense scholars David Tucker and Christopher Lamb highlight the differences between conventional and special operations.⁶⁹ The book describes a special versus elite dilemma and suggests special operations forces remain overly focused on high-level conventional proficiency.⁷⁰ The authors argued that special operations forces should focus on developing unconventional skills, which provide the nation a more effective range of options. While these authors argued against remaining too conventional and broadly described some aspects of unconventional warfare, they did not sufficiently define the practical skills required by the special operations profession.

Several modern military thinkers take an opposing view. For example, historian Douglas Porch warned that history demonstrates that good conventional soldiers can succeed in irregular warfare scenarios; however, special operations forces remain severely limited when applied against conventional enemies.⁷¹ Porch advocates the dominance of conventional or direct lines of effort in warfare.⁷² Adding to the weight of

⁶⁶ Rhonda Keister, Robert Slinger, Matthew Bain, and David Pavlik. “Joint PME,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 74 / 3rd QTR 2014, 65–71.

⁶⁷ Keister et al., “Joint PME,” 69.

⁶⁸ Keister et al., “Joint PME,” 65–71.

⁶⁹ Stephen M. Grenier, David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb. *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008). 145-154

⁷⁰ Grenier et al., *United States Special Operations Forces*. 184-236.

⁷¹ Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 240–257.

⁷² Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, 240–257.

this academic position, existing PME policies pragmatically caution against investing too heavily in one warfare area versus another, such as irregular warfare versus conventional combat.⁷³ Since special operators advertise advanced skills and unconventional capabilities, then development should include specific yet currently undefined advanced preparation. How should NSW balance these specific development priorities? Regardless of how community balances irregular warfare and conventional combat skills, the discussion highlights the need to seek clarity in purpose regarding the NSW profession.

Defining the special operation's profession requires external and internal assessments. In 2004, an article in *Military Review* reproved SOCOM for not having adequate staff, planners, and leaders who were capable of functioning at the "Combatant Commander and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) echelon."⁷⁴ The article pointed to organizational shortfalls that affected U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.⁷⁵ Specifically, the authors pointed out, "SOF field grade officers receive no formal education to prepare them for Joint special operations at the operational level except that obtained in the intermediate service schools (ISS)."⁷⁶ The key point was that the enterprise largely lacked preparation and skills required to lead large joint and combined special operations task forces.⁷⁷ As a caution to future development efforts, the article suggests that it is negligent for SOF to "slight joint doctrine and education" because those skills are required to "combat terrorism."⁷⁸ The article posited that since special operations forces operate both unilaterally and in support of conventional forces, they must maintain a proficiency in conventional warfare.

Although this article (*Military Review*) primarily focused on SOCOM, NSW was also cited as having development shortfalls for senior leaders.⁷⁹ A 2014 article written by

⁷³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-2.

⁷⁴ Steven P. Schreiber, Greg E. Metzgar, and Stephen R. Mezhir, "Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer." *Military Review* 84, no. 3 (2004): 2.

⁷⁵ Schreiber et al., "Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer." 2.

⁷⁶ Schreiber et al., "Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer." 3.

⁷⁷ Schreiber et al., "Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer." 3.

⁷⁸ Schreiber et al., "Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer." 6.

⁷⁹ Schreiber et al., "Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer." 7–8.

a SEAL officer updates this claim, stating that NSW “tends to neglect” SEAL leader preparation for the O-5 level “Operations Directorate.”⁸⁰ Together these articles suggest that NSW requires community-specific development with an emphasis on deployment skills. Furthermore, there are no articles or essays claiming that current development programs produce fully adequate special operations commanders and staffs.

6. Counterpoint: Supporting the Status Quo

There are three principal opposing views to the assertion that NSW professional development requires improvement. First, is the “status quo” argument or the belief that success achieved by the NSW community provides reason to believe the process already works effectively. NSW members have successfully commanded thousands of combat operations and several NSW officers have already been promoted to very senior levels through the current system. Second, there are concerns that too much focused training will rob the community of its innovative problem-solving abilities, which stem from flexible career paths and broad experiences. The suggestion is that standardized development could alter the core identity and potentially negatively impact the effectiveness of the SEAL Teams. Finally, some NSW community members informally postulate that future special operations missions will not require higher echelon leadership.⁸¹ If individuals and small teams dominate the demand for future special operations, then investment in senior leaders remains an unnecessary distraction. These are concerns voiced by some members of an already overburdened community.

Acknowledging the counterpoints, there are at least three reasons this research should continue. First, the SOCOM Commander’s current guidance states unequivocally that improving professional development is one of his top priorities.⁸² Second, the theory that non-standard and non-focused training will create better higher-level joint warfighters remains unsupported. As a community, NSW does not accept this logic for simpler skills such as physical fitness and weapons proficiency. Logic demands a

⁸⁰ Matthew Peterson, “The Roles and Responsibilities of an Operations Directorate,” *Ethos: Naval Special Warfare*, Issue 25, 26.

⁸¹ Informal discussion among members of the NSW community.

⁸² U.S. Special Operations Command, *Commander’s Special Operations Professional Education*, 6.

deliberate process to consistently produce credible and qualified members in any established profession. Third, U.S. law and military policy make it likely that senior SEALs will participate in the running of future joint task forces due to the level of responsibility inherent to special operations mission command.⁸³

7. Application to Naval Special Warfare Development

Aggregating the factors and recommendations discovered in this review reveals eleven factors to consider when strengthening the NSW profession (see Figure 1).

Summary:

1. Since 1944, NSW deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces, and current military directives direct the community to maintain this capability (FRM S3500.3, 2013).
2. DOD expects NSW to produce proficient joint warfighters.
3. Recent research suggests that NSW's professional development could be improved.
4. SEALs benefit from numerous albeit ad hoc development opportunities and mandates.
5. Effective development programs synchronize training, education, and experience.
6. Development should be purposeful, career-long, and include the two levels-up concept.
7. NSW should resist relying too heavily on past experiences or OJT.
8. Specific NSW education must take precedence over general education.
9. Formal education includes case study analysis, mentorship during war-gaming and terrain walks, and self-study of the NSW profession.
10. NSW would benefit by including informal methods of what Huntington describes as corporate nature (mentorship, professional associations and journals, etc.).
11. Any changes must protect the core characteristics and strengths of NSW.

Figure 1. Summary of Naval Special Warfare Professional Development Findings and Considerations.

⁸³ Department of the Navy, "The Charge of Command" (white paper by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations), 2011, 1-4.

8. Research Questions

In light of the stakes involved and expanding roles of SOCOM and NSW leaders, it is appropriate to test the bottom-up approach. This analysis raises three important questions about the profession. First, what are the echelon-specific knowledge requirements for the NSW profession? Second, does the current development system sufficiently prepare SEAL leaders to run larger-scale organizations and operations in these types of deployed environments? Third, have conditions and requirements changed sufficiently to warrant altering the current development strategy? This review did not discover adequate answers to these research questions during the examination of previous research and existing professional development policies. Therefore, an opportunity exists to update NSW's professional development strategy.

This literature review supports the need for research that is designed to advance the NSW profession. Analytic rigor could inform how NSW should refine its development strategy to better balance competing requirements (i.e., conventional and irregular warfare, and maritime skills). To move forward, this research project makes two assumptions. First, SEALs will lead O-5 and O-6 task forces in the future and may be expected to rapidly fill these roles in future combat and contingency operations. Second, the NSW profession requires specific preparation, which includes a concentration in irregular warfare and maritime operations. To contribute to a better understanding of the profession, further research must gather more data on the following requirements (see Figure 2).

Research Requirements:

1. Identify and prioritize key aspects of the NSW profession.
2. Assess NSW's current professional development system.
3. Pursue recommendations for ways to improve senior leader preparation.

Figure 2. Research Requirements Revealed through Literature Review.

C. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THIS PROJECT

This research is constructed around a “systems approach” that is similar to the one described by Donovan.⁸⁴ Although slightly different, the fundamental concept of planning backward from a desired outcome remains the same. The model is adapted from David A. Nadler, and Michael L. Tushman organizational behavioral model (see Figure 3).⁸⁵ For those familiar with the original model, “skills/functions” take the place of tasks/requirements and “SEALs” takes the place of “people.” Essentially, the five-part model describes a transformation process, which produces desired outputs (qualified people) and outcomes (organizational capabilities).⁸⁶

The arrows in the octagon of Figure 3 indicate that an appropriate alignment of the individual (current training and experience), the skills and functional requirements, and the informal and formal development mechanisms should be driven by the goal of the system. In accordance with Figure 3, there are numerous factors that affect professional development system input, including availability of talent, resources, and career constraints to name a few. For brevity, this report will not delve into those aspects of the system. Instead, this project will focus on defining the skills/ joint functions required by senior SEAL leaders.

⁸⁴ Nathan Leites, and Charles Wolf Jr. *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), 35.

⁸⁵ David A. Nadler, and Michael L. Tushman. “A model for diagnosing organizational behavior.” *Organizational Dynamics* 9, no. 2 (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Inc., 1980): 35–51.

⁸⁶ Nadler and Tushman, “A model for diagnosing organizational behavior,” 35–51.




Figure 3. Systems Approach⁸⁷

Table 1 identifies how this research translated different parts of Figure 3 to the professional development “system” for NSW. The items listed under formal and informal are the current and possible mechanisms used for professional development. Before discussing this model further, a short discussion about the community is useful to put the model in context.

Table 1. Professional Development System – Example Interpretation.

Skills / Functions	Formal (Institutional)	Informal	Outputs / Outcome
-Seven warfighting functions -Irregular warfare -Maritime operations	-Military education (JPME) -Intermediate service schools -War colleges -Pre-mission training -Development training	-Mentorship -Self study -War-gaming -Associations	-Qualified and prepared -SPECOPS joint warfighters

⁸⁷ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 35.

1. SEAL Teams and O-5 and O-6 Echelon Task Forces

For simplicity, this project focuses on the “traditional” SEAL teams while purposely excluding other facets of the community. As depicted in Figure 4, SEAL teams consist of a headquarters element, three troop or task unit (TU) headquarters, and seven SEAL platoons (21-man elements).⁸⁸ Before deployment, SEAL team command and staffs are responsible for preparing the team for a wide range of special operations. On deployment, teams often form the core of task groups (NSWTGs) or task forces. Naming conventions vary by assignment but for the purposes of this research, task forces are defined as a battalion-level or above organization headed by at least a U.S. special operations lieutenant colonel or commander.⁸⁹ As previously discussed, these organizations may cover large territories and include several thousand troops from diverse communities (military service, civilian organizations, and other nationalities). An example of a task force organizational chart is listed in Figure 5.




Figure 4. U.S. Navy SEAL Team Task Organization Example.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Department of the Navy, *Naval Special Warfare* (NWP 3-05) (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2013) 2:3.

⁸⁹ U. S. Special Operations Command, *Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations* (Joint Publication 3.05.1) (MacDill, Air Force Base: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2011) III-7.

⁹⁰ Department of the Navy, *Naval Special Warfare*, 3:2.




Figure 5. Naval Special Warfare Task Force Example.⁹¹

2. SEAL Professional Development

To simplify the presentation, this project will use the officer career path for illustration; however, enlisted, chief warrant officers, and officers each require careful individual analysis. The following three paragraphs will detail NSW's current formal (institutional training, experience, education) and informal (self-study, mentorship, sense of community) professional development mechanisms.

3. Formal Development

For officers, assignments progress through approximately ten years of tours assigned to a SEAL team (Figure 6).⁹² In between these tours, officers spend time away from the SEAL teams to gain exposure to both operational and strategic issues. The desired outcome or apex of the officer profession (at least for the first 20-years) is selection as a SEAL team commanding officer. Likewise, senior enlisted and chief warrant officers hold key leadership and advisory positions on SEAL teams.

⁹¹ Department of the Navy, *Naval Special Warfare*, 3:6.

⁹² Department of the Navy, Approved FY-15 Active-Duty Line Community Career Brief, 2014.




Figure 6. Approved 2014 Naval Special Warfare Officer Career Path

a. Tactical

SEAL Team officer training can be divided into two categories: troop and below and task force level (see Figure 7). From initial qualification through the milestone billets, SEAL officers spend approximately eight years training at and below the troop level (individual, fire team, platoon, and troop).⁹³ Team billets typically consist of two-year tours that are comprised of eighteen months of training and six months of deployment. During each cycle, troops and platoons spend approximately six months completing individual skills training (shooting, parachuting, diving, etc.), six months participating in unit training (troop and below), and six months preparing to operate inside of a task force.⁹⁴ Team operations officers, executive officers, and commanding officers often participate in tactical training and even execute command during field readiness exercises. However, there are no standardized training (academic, education, or

⁹³ Department of the Navy, *Naval Special Warfare*, 4:3.

⁹⁴ Department of the Navy, *Naval Special Warfare*, 4:3.

focused mentorship) blocks designed to prepare task force level competencies (planning, running daily operations, commanding) in maritime special operations.⁹⁵




Figure 7. Naval Special Warfare Officer Task Force Assignments.

b. Academic

SEAL officers progress through various stages of academic preparation (classroom education training) throughout their career. SEAL officer candidates attend a five-week Junior Officer Training Course (JOTC), which develops platoon-level capabilities as well as basic leadership skill development.⁹⁶ Four years later, officers attend a five-week platoon leader's course, which reinforces platoon-level leadership skills.⁹⁷ Before becoming a team commander, officers typically attend two forms of intermediate education. First, prior to assuming command, officers must complete the first level of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).⁹⁸ Second, officers often

⁹⁵ Department of the Navy, *Naval Special Warfare*, 4:1-14.

⁹⁶ "Navy SEALs (Sea, Air & Land)," Department of the Navy, August 15, 2014, <http://www.navy.com/careers/special-operations/seals.html>.

⁹⁷ Common knowledge within the NSW community.

⁹⁸ "Joint Professional Military Education," Department of the Navy, August 16, 2014, <http://www.public.navy.mil/Bupers-NPC/Officer/Detailing/Jointofficer/Pages/JPME.aspx>.

attend some type of graduate school, including options at several civilian institutions, service command and staff programs, and even various War Colleges (depending on seniority).⁹⁹

The Navy also requires all executive and commanding officers to attend two-weeks of leadership training in Newport, Rhode Island, which reinforces basic leadership principles, Navy policies, and administrative regulations.¹⁰⁰ Finally, SOCOM and NSW both require short pre-command courses, which educate commanders on special operations issues, initiatives, strategies, and lessons learned.¹⁰¹

4. Informal Development

NSW mandated mentorship occurs at least twice in an officer's career. Before becoming a platoon commander, officers complete an assignment as an assistant officer-in-charge, which allows junior SEAL officers to receive mentorship from both the senior non-commissioned officer and the platoon commander. As operations and executive officers, SEALs again receive mentorship from the commanding officer on how to administratively and operationally run a SEAL team. Additional mentorship often occurs while officers deploy forward augmenting staffs to gain experience in task force operations.

5. Defining the Profession's Required Skills and Functions

As discussed in the literature review, the skills and functional requirements inherent to the NSW profession remain largely undefined, covering all aspects of military endeavors (conventional and irregular warfare, non-combat operations, maritime operations, etc). Additionally, there is a critical difference in the skills required to run a tactical platoon or managing single operations versus leading large organizations, which require campaign planning to achieve effects in operational and strategic realms. The

⁹⁹ "Education Opportunity Opportunities for Officers," Department of the Navy, August 16, 2014, <http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/career/education/Pages/default.aspx>.

¹⁰⁰ "Command Leadership School" Department of the Navy, August 16, 2014, <http://www.netc.navy.mil/centers/cls/CO.aspx>.

¹⁰¹ "Joint Special Operations Forces Pre-Command Course," U.S. SOCOM, August 16, 2014, <https://jsou.socom.mil/CourseInformation.aspx>.

purpose of this research is to gather data to better understand the more operational and strategic leadership skills, how to prioritize those requirements and the implications to the development of NSW personnel for joint task force leadership roles.

This project asserts that definition and prioritization are possible if the feedback loop between desired outcomes and professional development exists (see Figure 3). This project used joint and NSW doctrine as a starting point and solicited input from the NSW community to validate and prioritize broad doctrinal guidance applicable to professional development. To achieve this goal, a survey was designed around the seven warfighting or joint functions (SWFs), which are discussed in *Joint Operations* (Joint Publication 3-0) and *Unified Land Operations* (Army Doctrine Publication 3-0). These “elements of combat power” remain integral to all military operations regardless of echelon, task, or type of warfare.¹⁰² They describe basic military capabilities such as leadership, command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment (see Table 2).¹⁰³

Table 2. The Seven Warfighting Functions.¹⁰⁴

Seven Warfighting Functions
Leadership Intelligence Fires Command and Control Movement and Maneuver Protection Sustainment

6. Defining the Desired Outcome

The final aspect of the framework involves anchoring the desired outputs and outcomes to a professional milestone. The outputs or goals for each SEAL involve the

¹⁰² Department of Defense, *Joint Operations* (Joint Publication 3-0) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), III 1–35.

¹⁰³ Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations* (Army Doctrine Publication 3-0) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011), IV.

¹⁰⁴ Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, III 1–35.

development of individuals prepared with a common knowledge and community-specific language. These leaders must be equipped with enhanced capability to mentor junior community members. Key staff and support members also require enhanced planning, staffing, and subject matter expertise. According to policies reviewed, the desired outcomes should be a community of professional joint warfighters who are also sub-specialists in special operations, maritime operations, and irregular warfare. In accordance with standard career timelines, this project focuses on the first twenty-five years of SEAL officer, chief warrant officer, and enlisted career paths. Therefore, the requirements discussed in this study are specific to deployed task forces at the O-5 and O-6 echelon.¹⁰⁵ Designating the desired output as staff, planners, advisors, and leaders for this echelon allows productive analysis of the pipeline.

7. Research Parameters

Research Parameters:

1. Emphasize practical skills required for deployment.
2. Use a systems approach.
3. Designate the desired outcome: leaders & staff prepared for the O-5 and O-6 echelon.

Figure 8. Summary of Research Parameters.

¹⁰⁵ “Secretary of the Navy Approved FY-15 Active-Duty Line Community Career Brief,” Department of the Navy, August 20, 2014, <http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/boards/activedutyofficer/CommunityBriefs.aspx>.

II. SURVEY METHOD

A. APPROVAL, RECRUITMENT, AND RESPONSE

The approvals, recruitment, and survey questions are detailed in three documents. The survey supporting this study (see Appendix D) was approved by the Naval Postgraduate School's (NPS) Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protection of Human Subjects (see Appendix E). The Commander of the Center for SEAL and SWCC also approved the survey for release to the NSW community (part of Appendix E). In accordance with IRB guidelines, recruitment for this survey was completed via two emails (see Appendix F).

The survey invitation was made in the following manner. The author obtained the participants' contact information via NSW's email distribution lists. An initial email was sent to 429 community members, requesting their participation in the online survey (see section C. below). Then after one week, a reminder email was sent to the same individuals. In addition to the emailed invitations, the author called numerous senior community leaders to help advertise; however, community leadership did not participate in official recruitment activities.

Survey responses were collected in the following manner. The survey remained open for two weeks (August 18, 2014–September 01, 2014). Seventy-nine SEALs participated, which translates to an 18 percent response rate for the survey (see Table 3).¹⁰⁶ Participants invested significantly in this project as evidenced by both the quality and consistency in responses. They spent an average of 37 minutes completing the 33 question online survey. Furthermore, they collectively wrote over 10 pages of single-spaced feedback (5962 words) in response to the qualitative questions.

¹⁰⁶ Sixteen responses were either incomplete or had inconsistent data. For example, several of those responses exhibited a combination of impossibly high data in certain sections, and contradictory ratings with no variation in the other sections (i.e., selecting only the lowest answers). Even if a participant strongly disagreed with this survey's approach, then intellectually consistent responses would still demonstrate some variation based on the questions in the survey. Those sixteen responses were excluded from analysis, leaving seventy-nine usable responses.

B. SOFTWARE (LIME SURVEY)

Naval Postgraduate School officials mandated the software used to construct this survey. The author was provided an account for the school's Lime Survey program. Each question in the survey was modified from existing templates provided by the program.

C. PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS (QUESTIONS 2–4)

The demographics section collected information pertaining to the rank, deployment experience specific to O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces, and JPME qualifications of participants. Participants were senior SEALs (see Table 3) who served in key positions assigned to deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces. They included former members of command teams and operations teams (see Table 4). The data suggests that these were highly experienced SEALs in terms of number of deployments in key leadership positions at this echelon. With the exception of O-4s, survey respondents deployed twice in key positions at this echelon (see Table 5).

Table 3. Demographics of Survey Participants (Rank – Question 2).¹⁰⁷

Rank	# of Participants	% of Survey	NSW's Total Population (October 2014)
E-9	12	15	137
CWO-4, & 5	11	14	22
O-4	29	37	109
O-5	21	26	99
O-6 or above	6	8	62
Total	79	100	429
Approximately 18% of SEALs holding the rank and experience sought by this survey responded.			

¹⁰⁷ Total population came from a 2014 community-manning snapshot provided by the NSW detailee. The population experiences minor but constant changes in number due to retirements and promotions.

Table 4. Key Assignments for O-5 and O-6 Echelon Task Forces.

Key Assignments
Tactical Elements (troop and below leaders)
<u>Operations Team:</u>
- Operations Chief Warrant Officers
- Operations Senior Enlisted Advisors
- Operations Officers
<u>Command Team:</u>
- Executive Officers
- Command Warrant Officers
- Command Senior Enlisted Advisors
- Deputy Commanders
- Commanders

Table 5. Demographics of Survey Participants (Deployments – Question 3).¹⁰⁸

O-5 and O-6 Echelon Task Force Assignments	Mean # (Std Dev) of Deployments by E-9 Respondents	Mean # (Std Dev) of Deployments by CWO Respondents	Mean # (Std Dev) of Deployments by O-4 Respondents	Mean # (Std Dev) of Deployments by O-5 Respondents	Mean # (Std Dev) of Deployments by O-6 or above Respondents
Operations Senior Enlisted Advisor	1.2 (1.0)	1.1 (2.1)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Operations Chief Warrant Officer	N/A	1.4 (1.0)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Operations Officer	N/A	0.7 (1.4)	1.4 (1.0)	1.5 (1.2)	1.3 (1.6)
Executive Officer	N/A	N/A	0.3 (0.7)	0.5 (0.6)	0.2 (0.4)
Command Chief Warrant Officer	N/A	0.9 (1.7)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Command Senior Enlisted Advisor	1.5 (2.8)	0.1 (0.3)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Deputy Commander	N/A	0.5 (1.4)	0.1 (0.3)	0.3 (0.5)	1.0 (1.2)
Commander	N/A	N/A	0.1 (0.6)	1.0 (1.8)	0.7 (0.7)
Mean # of reported deployments in key assignments (highlighted in red) is approximately 2.0, indicating this group is experienced at running O-5 and O-6 echelon Task Forces.					

¹⁰⁸ Summary of the results from Survey Questions 3 (Subject Deployment Experience).

As shown in Table 6, at least 25 percent reported at least some level of JPME qualification training. Of note, 75 percent of the CWO participants reported that they had not attended any JPME training.

Table 6. Demographics of Survey Participants (JPME – Question 4).

Rank	% of Participants with No JPME	% of Participants with Senior Enlisted JPME	% of Participants with some JPME (i.e., I or II)	% of Participants with Joint Officer Qualification
E-9	27	73	N/A	N/A
CWO	75	13	12	N/A
O-4	54	N/A	46	0
O-5	10	N/A	67	23
O-6 or above	17	N/A	50	33
Significant numbers of E-9s, CWOs, and O-4s reported no Joint Professional Military Education.				

D. SURVEY DESIGN

The survey captured participants' views about SEAL professional development, specifically focusing on staffing, planning, and leadership requirements associated with O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces. Additionally, all of the survey's questions were posed in the context of preparing to run or staff deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces. The demographics section (questions 1–9) was constructed to quantify participant experience and time spent (in months) preparing for leadership roles at this level.

Following the demographics question, the survey was divided into three sections: prioritization of aspects of the profession (questions 10–25), assessment of current professional development (questions 26–29), and way ahead (questions 30–33). In the first section, participants prioritized skills, topics, and capabilities associated with each of the joint warfighting functions (JWFs) derived from doctrine. Questions were designed to help define what a task force leadership role encompasses by using military doctrine. To further define these functions, 111 sub-categories were added by analyzing joint special

operation and naval special warfare publications (Joint Publication 3-05 and NSW Publication 3-05). An example question is listed in Figure 9.

Section 4: Warfighting Functions (Joint Publication 3-0 and Field Manual 3-0)

Function: 1. Leadership

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon - **consider both Command and Operations Teams** (i.e. SOTF, CJSOTF, SOCFWD etc.).

10

Leadership: Types of Warfare for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level

Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)	No answer
Conventional Warfare (Enemy Centric)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Irregular Warfare (Population Centric)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒

Figure 9. Sample Warfighting Function (Survey Question 10).

The next section of the survey asked participants to assess how well the current SEAL system prepares the community in the JWFs. General assessments were requested as well as by individual position or assignment, which helps confirm timing of development requirements. The assessment section concluded by asking participants to identify the most essential aspect of their personal preparatory experiences from a list or to elaborate by commenting on what aided their personal development. A sample of assessment questions is presented in Figure 10.

Assessment:

This section asks you to assess how well the current pipeline prepares NSW for deployed leadership roles at the O5 and O6 Task Force echelon **consider both Command and Operations Teams.**

26

Assessment: Developing O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leaders

The current pipeline sufficiently prepares SEALs in the seven warfighting functions:

	Strongly Disagree (1)	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree (6)	No answer
Leadership	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Command and Control	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Intelligence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Fires	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Movement and Maneuver	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Protection	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Sustainment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒

Figure 10. Sample Assessment (Survey Question 26).

Finally, the Way Ahead section (see Figure 11) was designed to collect the community's recommendations and priorities improving SEAL development. The final question was qualitative, collecting feedback from a comment box so that participants could expand on their recommendations on how to improve the current professional development system.

Way Ahead:

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon **consider both Command and Operations Teams.**

32

Way Ahead: Improving preparation for O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leadership:

Prioritize the usefulness of the methods listed below for increasing NSW's expertise in the Seven Warfighting Functions.

	Lowest Priority (1)	2	3	4	5	Highest Priority (6)	No answer
Greater participation in existing in Exercises (SITEX, CERTEX, FBP)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Greater participation in existing Staff or Planning Schools (EWTGLANT or PAC)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Greater participation in existing Military Education (i.e. Command and Staff College, JPME, etc)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Greater investment in On the Job Training (more deployments)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Greater investment Self Study of Doctrine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
New investment focused on developing Joint Task Force leadership (i.e. training and education)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒

Figure 11. Sample Way Ahead (Survey Question 32).

E. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

This report used IBM's Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software to calculate basic descriptive statistics, which included means, standard deviation (Std Dev), and frequency of all response choices for each question. The mean captures the average value by adding all of the values for each question and then dividing the total number of participants.¹⁰⁹ Standard deviation identifies the amount of variation within the mean listed for each question.¹¹⁰ High standard deviations indicate high variation in responses while low variation indicates constancy among participants.

¹⁰⁹ Seymour Lipschutz and John J. Schiller. *Schaum's Outline Introduction to Probability and Statistics* (New York NY: McGraw Hill, 2012), 5.

¹¹⁰ Lipschutz and Schiller, *Schaum's Outline Introduction to Probability and Statistics*, 7.

Therefore, lower variation or standard deviation values suggest stronger agreement across participants. In order to compare the ratings of importance of the topics under the seven war fighting functions, several t-test comparisons of means were conducted to determine a “rule of thumb.” Based on these analyses, it was determined that if two means differ by 0.3 or more, that difference is statistically significant ($p < .05$). However, if two means differ by less than 0.3, that difference is not statistically significant, so the ratings should be treated as equal in importance.

F. DATA INTERPRETATION

Before diving into the results, it is important to review how the results were derived. The prioritization of doctrine, assessment, and way ahead sections used a 6-point scale with 1 representing the lowest rating on preparedness, importance, or priority and 6 representing the highest rating. Only the two anchor points or the labels of the end-points of the rating scale (i.e., 1 and 6) were identified to assure equal intervals between the rating options. Given the 1 to 6 range in ratings, a mean rating on a question of 3.5 would represent the mid-point on the rating scale. Low numbers indicate negative responses and high numbers indicate positive responses. As depicted in the survey key (Table 7), if participants assessed the system with a rating of 5 or 6 it would indicate a well-prepared team. One final note, the results are presented in the following format: status of community preparedness (why), joint warfighting functions (what), individual assignments (who and when), and moving forward (how). Questions that ask about *who* and *when* refer to the NSW assignments listed in Table 4 (O-5 and O-6 echelon Task Force assignments).

Table 7. Survey Response Rating Anchors.

Survey Response Mean:

1

6

Assessment	Insufficiently Prepared	Well Prepared
Functions	Low Importance	High Importance
Way Ahead	Low Priority	High Priority

III. SURVEY RESULTS

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT - WHY (QUESTIONS 5–9, 28)

This section was designed as an assessment of the current development system by asking participants to answer the following question: “How well was (were) your Team (s) prepared for running a task force?” The survey produced a rating for professional development specific to this echelon of deployed leadership. The data from the survey strongly suggest a need to improve preparations for O-5 and O-6 echelon task force roles.¹¹¹ This claim is supported by two sets of statistical evidence, involving both an assessment and an indication of total time spent in preparation for this echelon.

The rating scale for this question was 1 (insufficiently prepared) to 6 (well-prepared). The mean rating for this question was slightly above the midpoint (3.5) for both Operations and Command Teams, which are interpreted as marginal ratings (see Table 8). However, a significant number of participants (about a third for both categories) gave ratings below the midpoint; these are interpreted to reflect “inadequate” preparation (see Table 9).¹¹² Additionally, approximately 30 percent of participants rated preparation for both Operations and Command Teams as 4s, which were also interpreted as marginal preparation for those assignments.

For Operations Teams, 36 percent of participants rated preparation as inadequate (three or less) and an additional 30 percent gave a marginal (four) rating (see Table 9).

For Command Teams, 29 percent of participants rated preparation as inadequate (three or less) and an additional 29 percent gave a marginal (four) rating (see Table 9).

¹¹¹ Although twelve participants skipped question 28, the participants still provided clear feedback in the self-assessment section.

¹¹² Summary of the results from Survey Questions 28.

Table 8. NSW's Assessment of Preparation for O-5 and O-6 Level
(Mean Ratings – Question 28)

Questions 28: NSW Self-Assessment of Preparation for O-5 and O-6 echelon	Participants' Mean Rating (Std Dev), Scale 1-6, (6 = Highest Rating)
Operations Team	3.9 (1.2)
Command Team	4.0 (1.3)
Survey participants assessed NSW preparation for deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon assignments as marginal.	

Table 9. NSW's Assessment of Preparation for O-5 and O-6 Level
(Response Frequency on a 1 to 6 Scale – Question 28)

NSW Self-Assessment of Preparation for O-5 and O-6 echelon	Assessment: Frequency of Response (%) on Scale 1-6, (6 = Highest Rating)					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Operations Team	4	8	24	30	26	8
Command Team	6	8	15	29	33	9
A substantial number of survey participants assessed NSW preparation for deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon assignments as inadequate.						

A second set of questions gives additional support for why more attention to preparation is needed, suggesting that participants received minimal preparation specific to this echelon. Respondents were asked to specify the number of months spent in activities specific to preparation for their O-5 and O-6 echelon Operations Team assignments (see Table 10).¹¹³ A large number of respondents in each category reported zero months of preparation specific to this echelon (at least 36 percent as seen in the Field Exercises result in Table 10). Substantially higher percentages report zero preparation from other sources (see Table 10). For example, 77 percent reported attending zero months of Staff of Planning Schools prior to their first Operations Team assignment. Forty-eight percent reported zero months of Training or School prior to their first

¹¹³ Summary of the results from Survey Questions 5–8.

Command Team assignment (see Table 11). The average time participants reported in preparation for this echelon prior to their first assignment is listed in Tables 10 and 11.

Table 10. Preparation of O-5 and O-6 Operations Team (J3 or N3 – Questions 5–8)

Preparation Events	Mean # of Months (*Std Dev)	% Reporting Zero Months
Staff or Planning Schools	0.3 (0.7)	77
Command Post Exercises	0.6 (1.3)	69
Field Exercises	1.4 (2.1)	36
Deployment Augments	1.7 (3.4)	67
Participants received little preparation for O-5 and O-6 echelon Operations Team Assignments		

Table 11. Preparation of O-5 and O-6 Level Command Team (School – Question 9)

Preparation Event	Mean # of Months (*Std Dev)	% Reporting Zero Months
Training / School to prepare you for a Command Team position on an O-5 or O-6 echelon Task Force	0.9 (1.7)	48%
Participants received little preparation (Training / School) for O-5 and O-6 echelon Command Team Assignments		

B. SKILLS REQUIRED - WHAT (QUESTIONS 10–25, 26, 30)

This research was designed to answer the following question: “What are the practical skills required to be a SEAL leader today and are those competencies being developed into NSW’s future leaders?” The study produced a list of potential areas for professional development in the warfighting functions (see Table 12) and sub-aspects (see Appendix A). The goal for this section of the survey was to solicit survey participant

input to better define those skills by identifying development priorities. Although the list may incompletely answer this question, this survey confirmed that the seven warfighting functions (SWFs see Table 13) are highly important for running O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces.¹¹⁴

Table 12. The Seven Warfighting Functions.¹¹⁵

Seven Warfighting Functions
Leadership
Intelligence
Fires
Command and Control
Movement and Maneuver
Protection
Sustainment

The data support this interpretation in two ways. First, all SWFs had means of 4.6 or above (out of a maximum rating of 6) in terms of how the survey participants rated the importance of that area of expertise (see the first column in Table 13).¹¹⁶ Second, participants were also asked to respond to the following statement: “SEALs should be formally developed in the SWFs.”¹¹⁷ Again participants rated all seven functions highly with means at or above a 4.8 (see the third column in Table 13).¹¹⁸ Collectively, these findings reveal simply that of all the SWFs are perceived by the community to be important to the preparation of O-5 and O-6 echelon Task Force leadership. Of note, the Leadership and Intelligence categories were ranked highest in both sections (see Table 13). The second column of Table 13, covering the assessment will be discussed later.

¹¹⁴ Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, III 1–35.

¹¹⁵ Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, III 1–35.

¹¹⁶ Summary of the results from Survey questions 10–25.

¹¹⁷ Summary of the results from Survey Question 30.

¹¹⁸ Summary of the results from Survey Question 30.

Table 13. Ranking of the Functions for O-5 & O-6 Task Force
(Questions 10–25, 26, and 30).

Seven Warfighting Functions (SWFs)	Importance (Questions 10–25) Rating Mean (Std Dev)	Assessment (Question 26) Rating Mean (Std Dev)	Way Ahead (Question 30) Rating Mean (Std Dev)
Leadership	5.1 (0.5)	4.0 (1.5)	5.6 (1.0)
Intelligence	5.1 (0.7)	3.2 (1.4)	5.2 (1.1)
Fires	5.1 (0.9)	3.4 (1.4)	5.1 (1.1)
Command and Control	4.8 (0.6)	3.9 (1.4)	5.6 (0.9)
Movement and Maneuver	4.8 (0.8)	4.2 (1.5)	5.2 (1.1)
Sustainment	4.6 (0.9)	3.1 (1.3)	5.0 (1.0)
Protection	4.6 (0.8)	3.5 (1.4)	4.8 (1.1)
- Importance ranked highly - NSW's self-assessment was significantly lower—needs improvement - Participants strongly recommended investing in all SWFs			

The survey included a list of 111 sub-aspects of the SWFs, which were ranked by means (complete list is in Appendix A). As previously discussed (in Chapter II, Section E), it was determined that if two means differ by 0.3 or more, that difference is statistically significant ($p < .05$). However, if two means differ by less than 0.3, that difference is not statistically significant, so the ratings should be treated as equal in importance. To summarize, the first 91 sub-aspects were rated above a 4.5, indicating that survey participants considered them to be *highly important* skills for the O-5 and O-6 echelon (according to Table 7). Numbers 92 through 111 were still rated above the mid-point (3.5), falling in the *important* category. For illustrative purposes, the top ten sub-aspects are listed below in Table 14. Six of the top ten require classified training venues due to their association to classified programs (e.g., ISR integration and Employment Systems, Intelligence agencies, and Targeting).

Table 14. Sample from NSW's Professional Development Priorities List
(full list in Appendix A)

2014 NSW Professional Development Topics Rated by Importance to Survey Participants		War Function	Mean Response Rating Scale 1–6	Std Dev
1	ISR Integration and Employment Systems	Movement and Maneuver	5.68	0.5
2	Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision-making	Leadership	5.68	0.6
3	Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) Targeting	Intelligence	5.62	0.7
4	ISR Employment and Integration	Intelligence	5.58	0.8
5	Battle Staff or JOC Procedures (i.e., Practical Application of C2 during Mission Execution)	Movement Maneuver	5.55	0.9
6	Practical Application of Fires Approvals and Employment	Fires	5.52	0.9
7	Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)	Protection	5.52	0.9
8	Authorities and Approvals	Leadership	5.51	0.8
9	Intelligence Agencies (NSA, CIA, DIA)	Command and Control	5.48	0.8
10	Irregular Warfare (Population Centric)	Leadership	5.47	0.9

Despite high ratings (all above 4.6) in perceived importance, participants gave lower marks when asked if the current pipeline sufficiently prepares SEALs in the SWFs as related to O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leadership (see Table 13). As shown in the “Assessment Rating” column of Table 13, three of the functions had responses that suggest inadequate preparation (rated below the rating scale midpoint of 3.5) and the others hover near a 4.0 rating.¹¹⁹ Additionally, fairly large percentages (28 percent or more as in Movement and Maneuver) of participants graded the current system poorly (3 or less) in terms of the adequacy of preparation in all of the SWFs (see Table 15). In contrast, over 61 percent of survey participants that ranked all SWFs at a 5 or higher in priority for future investment indicating strong agreement with this statement (as seen in the Protection row of Table 15). A complete list of response frequencies for Questions 26 and 30 is located in Appendix B.

¹¹⁹ Summary of the results from Survey Question 26.

Table 15. Assessment versus Recommendations (Interpretation of Data from Questions 26 and 30).

<u>Preparation Event</u>	<u>Assessed:</u> % Rating a 3 or Less (Insufficiently prepared)	<u>Way Ahead:</u> % Rating a 5 or More (Priorities for preparation)
Command and Control	32	94
Leadership	32	92
Movement and Maneuver	28	81
Intelligence	58	81
Fires	47	74
Sustainment	57	71
Protection	47	61
High consensus in low assessment numbers versus high priority recommendations for new investment in the Seven Warfighting Functions.		

This survey also examined whether conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and a detailed set of specific maritime operations are important preparations for NSW O-5 and O-6 echelon Task Force leaders.¹²⁰ The data reveal statistically significant preference ordering using a t-test comparison of means. As shown in Table 16, participants gave irregular warfare (mean = 5.5) a significantly ($p < .05$) higher rating than conventional warfare (mean = 4.8).¹²¹ Participants rated the importance of nine sub-aspects of maritime operations. While all nine aspects have means above 4.0 (on a six-point scale of importance), three aspects had ratings that were significantly ($p < .05$) lower than the higher-rated six (see Table 16).

¹²⁰ Summary of the results from Survey Question 10, and 21.

¹²¹ As previously discussed in Chapter II, Section E, it was determined that if two means differ by 0.3 or more, that difference is statistically significant ($p < .05$). However, if two means differ by less than 0.3, that difference is not statistically significant, so the ratings should be treated as equal in importance.

Table 16. Conventional and Irregular Warfare, and Maritime Operations (Questions 10 and 21).

<u>Preparation Event</u>	Mean (Std Dev)
Conventional Warfare (Enemy Centric)	4.8 (1.3)
Irregular Warfare (Population Centric)	5.5 (0.9)
<u>Maritime Operations (Question 21)</u>	
Sea Basing Command and Control	5.0 (2.0)
Amphibious Operations - Littoral	4.8 (1.2)
Special Boat Integration	4.8 (1.1)
Maritime Interception Operations	4.8 (1.1)
NSW Riverine Operations	4.3 (1.1)
Integration with Navy Surface Ships	4.9 (1.2)
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Integration (SDV)	4.2 (1.4)
NSW Submarine Operations	4.0 (1.4)
Air over Water Operations	4.7 (1.2)
- Irregular warfare valued highest; however, conventional warfare and maritime operations were also highly valued.	

C. STATUS SPECIFIC TO NSW ASSIGNMENTS - *WHO AND WHEN* (QUESTIONS 27, 31)

This section examines individual preparation in the SWFs specific to the nine assignments listed in Table 17. To achieve this, the survey took a two-step approach. First, respondents assessed how well the community prepares the nine personnel categories in the SWFs.¹²² Five of the nine roles were identified as receiving inadequate preparation (below 3.5) and the others remain near a 4.0 rating (Table 17). Forty-nine percent or more of the participants assessed the current development system at or below a 4 rating (Table 17). In contrast, greater than 55 percent of participants rated all of the positions as being a high (5 or more) priority for investment need for professional development in the SWFs (Table 18). However, even the highest rated assignments still fell below the desired level of a 4.5 or higher (see Table 17). Therefore, all SEALs require formal development in the Seven Warfighting Functions prior to their first

¹²² Summary of the results from Survey Question 27.

assignment on an O-5 or O-6 echelon Task Force. A complete list of response frequencies for Questions 27 and 31 is located in Appendix B.

Table 17. Assessment of Adequacy of Preparation for Individual Positions (Interpretation of Question 27)

Personnel Assignments	Mean Rating (Std Dev) for Adequacy of Preparation	Assessment % Rating of 4 or Less (Marginally Prepared)
Tactical Elements (Troop and Below)	4.3 (1.5)	49
Commanders	4.0 (1.3)	54
Senior Enlisted Advisors (SEAs)	3.7 (1.4)	64
Deputy Commanders	3.7 (1.4)	66
Operations SEAs	3.4 (1.4)	78
Operations Officers	3.3 (1.3)	82
Executive Officers	3.3 (1.3)	77
Operations Warrant Officers	2.8 (1.3)	93
Command Warrant Officers	2.5 (1.3)	92
All nine assignments assessed with significantly low numbers; however, those listed in red indicate insufficient preparation.		

Second, it asked respondents to prioritize future investment by assignment.¹²³ The key finding is that all of the positions were rated as high priority (4.5 or higher). Interestingly, in Table 18 commanders and operations officers had the highest ratings (priority for future preparation) while chief warrant officers had the lowest ratings.

¹²³ Summary of the results from Survey Question 31.

Table 18. Way Ahead—Identifying Priorities for Future Preparation
(Interpretation of Question 31)

Personnel Assignments	Mean Rating (Std Dev) for Priority of Future Preparation	Way Ahead % Rating of 5 or More (Highest Priority)
Tactical Elements (Troop and Below)	5.2 (1.2)	76
Commanders	5.7 (0.9)	93
Senior Enlisted Advisors (SEAs)	5.5 (1.0)	87
Deputy Commanders	5.4 (1.0)	86
Operations SEAs	5.3 (0.9)	91
Operations Officers	5.6 (0.8)	95
Executive Officers	5.2 (1.0)	81
Operations Warrant Officers	4.7 (1.3)	70
Command Warrant Officers	4.5 (1.5)	55
All nine assignments were highly recommended to receive formal development in the SWFs.		

D. MOVING FORWARD – *HOW* (QUESTIONS 29, AND 31–32)

This survey used three methods to consolidate the survey’s recommendations for developing future O-5 and O-6 echelon task force leaders. First, the survey asked participants to identify the most essential element of their own personal preparation.¹²⁴ Participants chose from a list of possible answers (Table 19). The results of the survey clearly demonstrate that the community values “on-the-job training (deployments)” as the most essential element of preparation (58 percent chose this answer).

¹²⁴ Summary of the results from Survey Question 29.

Table 19. Most Essential Element of Preparation for O-5 and O-6 Task Force Echelon Roles (Question 29).

Most Essential Element of Preparation (Method)	Response Percentages
Military Command and Staff College	4
Joint Professional Military Education	4
Staff and Planning Schools	3
Participation in Joint Exercises	10
On the Job Training (Deployments)	58
Self Study	5
Not Adequately Prepared	9
Missing	7
Total	100
NSW values OJT the most out of several development options	

However, participants also indicated that a new program is required to prepare the community for O-5 and O-6 echelon assignments. Participants prioritized the following development approaches for future investments (Table 20).¹²⁵ As the results indicate, all of the mechanisms for professional development are seen as important. However, the data strongly suggest that the community would benefit from new investment designed to produce O-5 and O-6 echelon task force leaders (as seen in the “New Education and Training” row with a mean rating of 5.5 in Table 20).

¹²⁵ Summary of the results from Survey Question 32.

Table 20. Prioritizing Future Investment for Task Force Leaders
(Question 32).

Usefulness of Preparation Method	Way Ahead Rating Mean (Std Dev)
New Education and Training to produce Joint Task Force Leaders	5.5 (1.1)
More participation in existing JPME	4.7 (1.3)
More participation in Joint Exercises	4.4 (1.4)
More participation in existing Staff and Planning Schools	4.0 (1.5)
More deployments	3.9 (1.5)
More Self Study	3.7 (1.4)
Participants valued all preparation methods; however, the highest recommendation method was: New Education and Training to produce Joint Task Force Leaders.	

1. Qualitative Findings: Most Essential Sources of Preparation

On-the-job training or experience remains critical to preparation for the O-5 and O-6 echelon. The third source of data about ways to move forward in improving professional development for NSW leaders came from qualitative comments.¹²⁶ Forty people (51 percent of respondents) provided qualitative responses to the following question: “If you felt sufficiently prepared for your role at the O-5 and O-6 echelon, then identify the most essential element of your personal preparation.”¹²⁷ To summarize the four pages (12-point font and single spaced), responses were grouped in four categories (see Figure 12). The summary box below lists the key themes that emerged from analysis of the comments in order of frequency of mention. [Note: participants often included several themes in their responses so the total number of comments by theme is greater than 40.] A detailed presentation of the qualitative analysis, it is listed in Appendix C.

¹²⁶ This section summarizes the qualitative comments from Questions 29 and 33.

¹²⁷ This section summarizes the qualitative comments from Question 29.

Qualitative Summary from Question 29:

- If you felt sufficiently prepared for your role at the O-5 and O-6 echelon then identify or comment on what was the most essential element of your personal preparation:

Twenty comments identified on-the job training or personal experience

1. Nine comments identified Joint Exercises
2. Four comments identified Joint Professional Military Education
3. Twenty comments stated that NSW should improve professional development.

Figure 12. Summary of Qualitative Findings: Most Essential Sources of Preparation

2. Way Ahead—Qualitative Recommendations

Thirty-three people (42 percent of respondents) provided qualitative responses to the final question, which asked for recommendations on how to improve NSW's professional development.¹²⁸ To summarize the 10 pages (12 point font and single spaced), responses were grouped in two categories (supportive and cautionary). The summary box below lists the responses in order of their frequency (Figure 13). As with the qualitative question analyzed above, participants often covered several topics in their responses to this question so the total of thematic comments is greater than 33.

¹²⁸ This section summarizes the qualitative comments from Question 33.

Qualitative Summary from Question 33:

- *Asked for recommendations on how to improve NSW's professional development.*

1. Thirty-six Supportive Comments:
 - a. Twenty-seven calls for creating and / or improving existing NSW PRODEV—specifically for O-5 and O-6 echelon leaders.
 - b. Nine novel recommendations, including micro-education, Interagency (training and collaboration), logistics training, war-gaming, more joint exercises, looking at other services professional development pipelines, and suggestions for re-analyzing NSW task organization.
2. Eleven cautionary mentions or suggestions that fell outside that provided by military channels.
 - a. Eight explicitly recommended the use of civilian sources for professional development.
 - b. Three cautioned against spending too much time off the battlefield.

Figure 13. Summary of Qualitative Recommendations: How Should the Community Prepare Leaders?

IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. PROJECT FINDINGS

This project answered the following questions: First, what are the practical skills required to be a SEAL leader today? Second, are these competencies being developed into NSW's future leaders? To explore this topic, this project used two Research Questions. The first was whether NSW leaders receive adequate development (training, education, and experience) specifically focused on preparing them for higher-echelon leadership roles. The second question examined what specific capabilities NSW's leaders require (e.g., irregular warfare, maritime operations). To examine these questions, historical, military doctrine, current policy, and academic contributions were reviewed and used as the foundation for the study. Survey feedback revealed consensus regarding the desire to enhance development through institutional courses designed to prepare SEALs for senior assignments. Additionally, the data helps to better define the NSW profession by identifying and prioritizing the skills required for those assignments. Finally, combining qualitative and quantitative analysis revealed five findings, used to derive three recommendations for improving NSW's professional development pipeline.

There are five key findings from this project. First, both history and current military directives compel NSW to make preparation for O-5 and O-6 echelon task force assignments an imperative element of development. Second, NSW overly relies on "on-the-job" training to grow key staff, planners, and leaders. This is a liability if opportunities for sustained deployments decrease as per the draw-down in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously the community is still expected to surge expert capabilities in support of contingency operations (SOCFWDs, etc.). Third, there are specific skills and knowledge requirements associated with each echelon of deployed NSW commands. This research produced a starting point, or an extrapolation of NSW's 2014 professional development priorities, as related to this echelon (Appendix A). Highlights for this list include placing emphasis on and developing proficiency in running O-5 and O-6 task forces, the seven warfighting functions, irregular and conventional warfare, and maritime operations. Tangentially, the feedback also confirmed the

limitations of general education, JPME, and even current institutional professional development. Fourth, the community strongly recommends improving professional development to better develop senior joint warfighters. Finally, sufficient development must be completed prior to the first assignment in a key role at this echelon (typically on an operations team). A summary of this project's findings are listed in Figure 14.

Project Findings (for O-5 and O-6 Echelon Task Forces):

1. History & military directives compel NSW to prepare for these assignments.
2. NSW relies too heavily on on-the-job training or personal experience, which is a liability.
3. Specific skills are required for each echelon - a starting point is identified by this research in Appendix A.
4. NSW community strongly recommends improving professional development to better develop senior Joint Warfighters.
5. Sufficient development must be completed prior to the first key assignment at this echelon.

Figure 14. Summary of Project Findings

B. PROOF OF CONCEPT: SURVEY-BASED DATA TO INFORM DECISION MAKING

Perhaps, the most significant finding in this project is confirmation that an evidence-based approach enables the isolation and exploitation of data which can inform decisions. Moreover, this project demonstrates a powerful, highly useful, and cost effective proof-of-concept (survey-based data to inform decision making). It is possible to solve problems and inform decision makers using existing people, resources, and proven techniques. Naval Postgraduate School students, faculty, research assistants, and technology remain available for support to the NSW community. Similar processes are already used by NSW to inform decision makers about organizational readiness (Defense Readiness Reporting System—Navy). Additionally, several top corporations like Google

are investing heavily in survey technology to exploit and empower the collective intelligence of their people.¹²⁹

By keeping the project inside NSW, the community benefits from members still personally invested in the community. They bring recent experience and context to each project. Additionally, the period of study allotted at NPS (18 months) allows for significant background research, which when combined with qualitative and quantitative survey data produces powerfully informed recommendations. Moving forward, this author recommends that NSW capitalize on this invaluable opportunity immediately by formally engaging with students and faculty to capitalize on the intellectual capacity in the Defense Analysis program.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

This project concludes with three recommendations. The objective to prepare senior leaders for task force roles must be broadcast to the NSW community. Designating the end state allows the community to improve professional development purposefully and adapt to future preparation requirements. Use of these findings to organize supporting research will be necessary to identify means to efficiently achieve the desired outcome. NSW must continue using the methodology in this report which involved a thorough literature and historical review and a system based approach to analyzing professional development. Further, NSW could spread responsibility for development as appropriate between the system's transformation processes (as depicted in Figure 1, Formal and Informal venues). For example, certain skills could be developed through self-study, other skills through mentorship, and still other in formal courses. The point is to synchronize efforts to achieve purposeful development. By organizing in this manner and clarifying the purpose of professional development, NSW will avoid haphazard efforts.

For this to work and remain viable requires the second recommendation: Feedback must be institutionalized. Key elements of this feedback should include an assessment, prioritization of required skills or functions of the profession, and a section

¹²⁹ Author attended a conference on this subject at Google in Mountain View on October 2, 2014.

that collects recommendations for improvements. Doing this will allow the community to differentiate between adequacy and excellence as done with physical fitness and shooting skills. Leading special operations organizations should require similar scrutiny and evaluation. To achieve this level of professionalism, a formal and active method for collecting, analyzing, and archiving community feedback is required. Organizations like Google survey their people continuously, sometimes as often as every six months. Their people participate because the organization responds accordingly. NSW's challenge will be participation; however, if the community made it a mandatory turnover item for leaders leaving key positions then the community could capture and consume their feedback. Adaptability remains a key strength of NSW so this approach will ensure that the community remains on the cutting edge of innovation.

Finally, enhancing professional development with increased focus on senior joint warfighting skills is necessary but not sufficient enough for continued success. While the skills identified by this report (see Appendix A) should be considered core NSW competencies, other things are also needed. For example, there are many valuable opportunities available in the civilian / corporate sectors for leadership development, which may offer perspectives unavailable from a purely military education. Therefore, this project absolutely supports civilian education and corporate interactions, which broaden our leader's strategic perspectives. The key is to not prioritize civilian education above essential elements of the NSW profession, which must come first. The issue is timing. Further research should determine precisely how NSW integrates civilian education in to the development pipeline. A recent study for the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff looked at the issue of career progression and development timing. It suggests that civilian graduate education and fellowships should be experienced prior to battalion-level command but only after attending both intermediate and advanced levels of military education.¹³⁰ Based on the findings contained in this research, this approach (as

¹³⁰ Ross Coffman and Chris Donahue, Foster, Mike, Riga, Chris and Symes, Kim. *“Developing Strategic Leaders in the United States Army.”* (Fellowship Research for the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, National Security Program, 2013).

described in *Developing Strategic Leaders in the United States Army*) is both sensible and viable, and will directly benefit the NSW community in the execution and accomplishment of future missions. This project's final recommendations are summarized in Figure 15.




Figure 15. Summary of Project Recommendations

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APPENDIX A. 2014 NSW PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

	2014 NSW Professional Development Topics Rated by Importance to Survey Participants	War Function	Mean Response Rating Scale 1–6	Std Dev
1	ISR Integration and Employment Systems	Movement and Maneuver	5.68	0.5
2	Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision-making	Leadership	5.68	0.6
3	Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) Targeting	Intelligence	5.62	0.7
4	ISR Employment and Integration	Intelligence	5.58	0.8
5	Battle Staff or JOC Procedures (i.e., Practical Application of C2 during Mission Execution)	Movement Maneuver	5.55	0.9
6	Practical Application of Fires Approvals and Employment	Fires	5.52	0.9
7	Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)	Protection	5.52	0.9
8	Authorities and Approvals	Leadership	5.51	0.8
9	Intelligence Agencies (NSA, CIA, DIA)	Command and Control	5.48	0.8
10	Irregular Warfare (Population Centric)	Leadership	5.47	0.9
11	Operational (Wins Campaigns)	Leadership	5.45	0.6
12	Enemy, Detainee, Collateral Damage Considerations	Leadership	5.43	0.8
13	Preparation of the Environment	Leadership	5.42	0.7
14	Recent NSW History (lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Philippines, etc.)	Leadership	5.40	0.8
15	Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Casualty Evacuation	Sustainment	5.37	1.0
16	Counter Terrorism	Leadership	5.35	0.9
17	Tactical / Operational Case studies	Leadership	5.35	0.8
18	Rotary Wing Operations	Movement and Maneuver	5.30	1.0
19	Commander's Visualization	Command and Control	5.29	0.8
20	Counter Insurgency	Leadership	5.28	0.9
21	Public Speaking	Leadership	5.27	0.9
22	Law of Armed Conflict	Leadership	5.27	1.0
23	Fires Targeting Process	Fires	5.26	1.0
24	Fires Case Studies (Good, Bad, and Lessons Learned)	Fires	5.25	1.0
25	Signals Intelligence	Intelligence	5.25	0.9
26	Mission Command	Command and Control	5.24	0.8
27	Team Building	Leadership	5.23	1.2
28	Theater Level Intelligence	Intelligence	5.21	1.0
29	Joint Service Operations	Command and Control	5.19	1.0

	2014 NSW Professional Development Topics Rated by Importance to Survey Participants	War Function	Mean Response Rating Scale 1–6	Std Dev
30	Human Intelligence	Intelligence	5.19	0.9
31	Direct Action	Leadership	5.19	1.0
32	State Department and Embassy	Command and Control	5.17	1.0
33	Special Reconnaissance	Leadership	5.17	1.1
34	Unconventional Warfare	Leadership	5.17	1.1
35	Friendly Fires Capabilities	Fires	5.16	1.1
36	Joint Fires	Fires	5.14	1.0
37	Operational Risk Management	Movement and Maneuver	5.14	1.3
38	Combined Arms / Joint Warfighting	Movement and Maneuver	5.13	1.0
39	Battle Tracking Systems	Command and Control	5.10	1.0
40	Operational Security (OPSEC)	Protection	5.10	1.2
41	Military Decision Making Process	Command and Control	5.09	1.0
42	SOF Operational Doctrine and Design	Leadership	5.06	0.9
43	Enemy Fires Capabilities	Fires	5.05	1.1
44	Negotiations	Leadership	5.05	1.0
45	General Intelligence or the Intelligence Process	Intelligence	5.04	1.2
46	Green on Blue Counter Measures	Protection	5.04	1.1
47	Strategic (Wins Wars)	Leadership	5.01	1.1
48	Sea Basing	Movement and Maneuver	4.99	1.2
49	Tactical (Wins Battles)	Leadership	4.97	1.2
50	Joint / Conventional Force Planning and Integration	Movement and Maneuver	4.97	1.1
51	Cyber Security	Protection	4.96	1.1
52	Funding (Pots of Money)	Sustainment	4.96	1.0
53	National Level Intelligence	Intelligence	4.93	1.1
54	Human Domain / Network Analysis	Intelligence	4.92	1.1
55	U.S. Policy Considerations	Leadership	4.92	1.2
56	Culture Considerations	Command and Control	4.91	1.0
57	Integration with Surface Ships	Movement and Maneuver	4.91	1.2
58	U.S. Service Member Medical Treatment Considerations	Protection	4.91	1.2
59	Fixed Wing Operations	Movement and Maneuver	4.90	1.1
60	Military Advisor (to Foreign Military Leaders and Organizations)	Command and Control	4.88	1.1
61	Regional Studies	Command and Control	4.88	1.0
62	Indirect Fires	Fires	4.87	1.1
63	Force Protection and Security	Protection	4.86	1.2
64	Negotiating / Cooperation Building with Foreign Cultures	Command and Control	4.84	1.1

2014 NSW Professional Development Topics Rated by Importance to Survey Participants		War Function	Mean Response Rating Scale 1–6	Std Dev
65	Maritime Interception Operations	Movement and Maneuver	4.84	1.1
66	Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) Considerations	Sustainment	4.83	1.0
67	Department of Justice and Law Enforcement (FBI, NCIS, et al.)	Command and Control	4.82	1.1
68	Security Force Assistance	Leadership	4.82	1.0
69	Special Boats integration	Movement and Maneuver	4.82	1.1
70	Counter Intelligence	Intelligence	4.81	0.9
71	Maneuver Warfare	Movement and Maneuver	4.81	1.0
72	Information Operations	Leadership	4.79	1.1
73	Combined or Multinational Operations (NATO, Allied and Coalition Partners)	Command and Control	4.77	1.1
74	Conventional Warfare (Enemy Centric)	Leadership	4.77	1.3
75	Amphibious Operations / Littoral	Movement and Maneuver	4.75	1.2
76	Knowledge Management	Intelligence	4.74	1.1
77	Personnel Recovery	Protection	4.74	1.2
78	Foreign Disclosure of Intelligence	Intelligence	4.69	1.2
79	Non-lethal Fires	Fires	4.67	1.2
80	Air over Water Operations	Movement and Maneuver	4.66	1.2
81	Network Operation and Capabilities	Command and Control	4.65	1.1
82	Combined (Multinational) Intelligence Collaboration	Intelligence	4.65	1.1
83	Mobility and Counter Mobility	Movement and Maneuver	4.64	1.1
84	Joint Special Operations History	Leadership	4.63	1.1
85	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Employment	Protection	4.63	1
86	Non-standard or Low Visibility Logistics	Sustainment	4.59	1.3
87	Casualty / Mortuary Affairs, Employment of Mental & Spiritual Support	Leadership	4.58	1.1
88	Theater Security Cooperation, Counter-Narco Terrorism Training, and Joint Combined Exchange Training	Leadership	4.56	1.1
89	U.S. Funding Categories	Leadership	4.55	1.2
90	Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs and BILATs)	Leadership	4.5	1.2
91	Joint Logistics Operations	Sustainment	4.5	1.2
92	Civilian Medical Treatment Considerations]	Protection	4.49	1.2
93	Multi-National Medical Treatment Considerations	Protection	4.45	1.3
94	Emergency Support Requests	Sustainment	4.43	1.2
95	Parachute Operations	Movement and Maneuver	4.39	1.3
96	Force Health Protection and Preventative Medicine	Protection	4.35	1.3

	2014 NSW Professional Development Topics Rated by Importance to Survey Participants	War Function	Mean Response Rating Scale 1–6	Std Dev
97	Contracting	Sustainment	4.34	1.3
98	NSW History	Leadership	4.31	1.2
99	NSW Riverine Operations	Movement and Maneuver	4.31	1.1
100	Strategic Lift Operations	Movement and Maneuver	4.26	1.1
101	SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Integration	Movement and Maneuver	4.21	1.4
102	Foreign Aide and Logistic Support / Funding	Command and Control	4.16	1.2
103	Naval Special Warfare Submarine Operations	Movement and Maneuver	4.04	1.4
104	Cyber-Network Policy	Command and Control	4.01	1.3
105	Enemy Medical Treatment Considerations	Protection	4.01	1.4
106	Joint Logistics Reporting	Sustainment	4.01	1.1
107	Tactical Radio Operation and Capabilities	Command and Control	3.94	1.3
108	USAID	Command and Control	3.82	1.4
109	Chemical and Biological Protection Measures	Protection	3.68	1.2
110	Humanitarian Organizations	Command and Control	3.67	1.4
111	Air Defense	Protection	3.56	1.3

**Any subject with a mean rating above 4.5 (numbers 1–91) was considered by survey participants to be Highly Important to NSW leaders assigned to O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces (according to Table 6).

**All of the subjects (numbers 92–111) were still rated above the mid-point (3.5), falling in the category of Important to NSW leaders assigned to O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces (according to Table 6).

**As previously discussed in Chapter II, Section E, it was determined that if two means differ by 0.3 or more, that difference is statistically significant ($p < .05$). However, if two means differ by less than 0.3, that difference is not statistically significant, so the ratings should be treated as equal in importance.

APPENDIX B. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

Table 21. Assessment versus Recommendations (List of Answer Frequencies from Questions 26 and 30).

<u>Preparation Event</u>	<u>Assessed: % Response Frequencies</u> <u>(1-6 Rating Scale)</u>						<u>Way Ahead: % Response</u> <u>Frequencies (1-6 Rating Scale)</u>					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
Command and Control	9	8	15	29	32	7	3	0	0	3	17	77
Leadership	11	8	13	28	23	17	2	0	3	3	19	73
Movement and Maneuver	8	9	11	21	31	20	3	0	4	12	33	48
Intelligence	16	19	23	21	19	2	2	0	3	14	34	47
Fires	15	15	17	29	21	3	3	0	3	20	33	41
Sustainment	15	16	26	30	10	3	1	0	6	22	33	38
Protection	14	10	23	24	24	5	33	0	7	29	28	33

Table 22. Preparation for Individual Positions (List of Answer Frequencies for Questions 27 and 31).

<u>Personnel Assignments</u>	<u>Assessed: % Response Frequencies</u> <u>(1-6 Rating Scale)</u>						<u>Way Ahead: % Response</u> <u>Frequencies (1-6 Rating Scale)</u>					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
Tactical Elements (Troop and Below)	8	7	11	23	26	25	1	4	6	13	15	61
Commanders	6	4	23	21	39	7	1	0	4	2	6	87
Senior Enlisted Advisors (SEAs)	14	6	17	27	33	3	2	0	4	7	16	71
Deputy Commanders	12	12	16	26	30	4	1	1	2	10	25	61
Operations SEAs	16	13	10	39	19	3	2	0	3	4	44	47
Operations Officers	13	14	22	33	17	1	1	0	1	3	25	70
Executive Officers	12	17	23	25	22	1	2	0	6	11	37	44
Operations Warrant Officers	22	22	23	26	7	0	3	7	4	16	39	31
Command Warrant Officers	30	21	24	17	8	0	3	10	11	21	21	34

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APPENDIX C. QUALITATIVE RESULTS

A. SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE QUESTION 29

First, 20 people mentioned that on-the-job training (OJT) was the most critical aspect of their preparation. Four example statements are listed below.

- Nothing prepares you more for Command Leadership than experience gained during multiple deployments in a Joint Atmosphere. If you haven't gained real world insights and dealt with them on a daily basis while deployed in a combat environment then no matter the amount of education you receive, your leadership will be marginal. Education relies on events and actions of the past... when faced with problems in real time you must have a combination of good practices in the past as well as reactive measures to counter act the present. Not everyone is meant to lead just because of their rank or their education.
- I've never had any formal staff preparation - all acquired via OJT and promotion to positions of greater responsibility.
- I would rate the self-training/OJT working at a SOTF/TSOC/CJSOTF ICW JMPE 2 as the most valuable training opportunities. NSW does an exceptional job on tactical training. However, understanding and using MDMP, graphics, ORDERS, integrating into conventional battle-space, working with other joint forces etc., are barely addressed - especially when compared to SF.
- In my particular case the keys to initial success were: 1) previous TSOC tour, 2) previous interagency experience, 3) civilian postgraduate degree, 4) sense of humor.

Second, there were nine mentions that Joint Exercises were critical to their preparation. Two example statements are listed below.

- I would have selected on the job training along with SITEX, CERTEX, FBP. The exercises I have participated in were very effective to prepare me. Of course this went hand-in-hand with on the job training.
- The only way that a TF sized element can truly adequately prepare to function as a TF is to be TF. This means bringing all the teams and groups under the TF together and running them through the ringer. This allows any shortfalls or kinks in the armor to be found and fixed, but more importantly, it teaches everyone how the TF will problem solve when the unknowns happen.

Third, four mentions that joint professional education was critical in their preparation. Three example statements are listed below.

- Prior to deployment—attended the former JOINT STAFF Course—TF focused—very helpful.
- JPME is great book knowledge that applies to working in a joint environment. Although, most of my experience has been on the job training. NSW does a terrible job building visionary leaders or fostering an environment for strategic thinking. NSW needs to invest in more than just tactical leaders and more in developing its senior leaders.
- JSOF SEA was invaluable.

Fourth, there were 20 mentions indicating that NSW professional development requires improvement to prepare leaders for O-5 and O-6 task force level roles. Two example statements from survey participants are listed below.

- Prior combat experience, while valuable, can potentially be a double-edged sword, leading some to think that they know more than they do due to prior experiences. A balance between the wisdom accumulated through prior combat activities, and a receptiveness to new situations where old lessons may not necessarily be applicable, is probably optimal.
- Unlike other services that have established schools at which many of these skills would be taught, it is impractical to do that for a few hundred NSW officers in the Navy. What this means is that the extent of professional education will vary widely from one officer to the next depending on his experience as opposed to his counterpart from the Army, for example, who will surely learn certain things at certain points in his career. Correcting this would require a formal curriculum and career path that achieves certain joint education and training milestones. The Army Captains Career Course is 22 weeks long before O3 command. We have nothing like that.

Finally, there were five comments that did not answer the question directly but pointed to other community issues. One example is listed below.

- Also, not all NSW commands deploy, or deploy in the same manner. SEAL Teams deploying to OIF/OEF became somewhat standardized, but the deployment of SBT, SDV, and SA function differently and may not deploy at all.

B. SUMMARY OF QUESTION 33

There were a total of 33 participants took the time to write support for improving NSW professional development in accordance with this study's suggestions. The input totaled seven pages (single spaced and 12-point font). This section breaks the responses into two categories: supportive and cautionary.

1. Supportive Responses

The most common comment (fourteen mentions) was a statement involving the need to rectify missing or enhance professional development. Specifically, Officers careers in general, Senior Enlisted Advisors prior to assignment on an Operations Team, and the Warrant Officers were repeatedly mentioned. Four examples of recommendations surrounding these gaps include the following statements from participants.

- Tactically I have been well prepared for my deployments... however we cannot stay “On Target” our whole careers and JPME COIs are a way to prepare use for “Big Picture” type jobs. Currently, NSW CWO’s do not have a required JPME COI. So, everything I have learned has been through trial and error. Trial and error is one way to learn however I think there are much better ways.
- If NSW can’t build and sustain an O3 PME, consider attending (whole or portions) USA or USMC O3 PME (EWS or Captain’s Course).
- The skill sets needed to function effectively as a tactical NSW leader and as a relatively senior Joint commander vary greatly. NSW has a good pipeline for the tactical piece, but the Joint assignments tend to be more ad hoc. Formalizing it would be helpful. The future is also Joint, and this should be an area of emphasis.
- The two week XO school is substandard in preparing an executive officer to fill primary responsibilities: what right looks like in detailing (staggering PCS shifts of wardroom); disciplinary measures, reviewing and emending Operation Orders to support CO’s vision, command way ahead. There are no prerequisite TSOC indoctrination or staff schools in NSW prior to OPS, XO tours. This hinders us when compared to SF field grade peers that have the institutional background in writing theater campaign plans. NSW is exceptional at crisis response but falls short in developing campaign plans for an area of responsibility because of limited knowledge in how to do it. JPME I and II at NPS is a secondary effort to receiving the MS in Defense Analysis. And it’s mostly centered on conventional operations, which also applies to war colleges.

The second most common theme had thirteen mentions. They included statements that generally supported a Career long program that culminates by producing effective O-5 and O-6 echelon leaders. Three examples of these recommendations are provided below.

- Troop CDRs should receive an ILC-equivalent COI. CDRs should receive something useful for the CO course from NSW or USSOCOM that prepares them for the operational environment. JPME 2 or Senior War

College should be a requirement for command - not something the CO screening board views as a period where an office is not contributing to the community.

- As NSW pulls out of Afghanistan and pulled out of Iraq (in force), the lessons there do not necessarily translate directly to AOs like AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM. NSW is a small force and cannot be everywhere at once and cannot be experts at conducting O5/O6 Task Force missions in the various AOs. There must be a pipeline for Commanders to learn the nuances of commanding an O5/O6 level TF in various AOs. Simply going down and sitting with the General or his Ops O doesn't cut it. Shaking hands and getting "guidance" does not always translate well to successfully executing that guidance. Again, our force is small, and one bad mistake by a leader affects the reputation and trust of the entire force.
- In general, we have tactical leadership training covered. We should focus on operational and strategic level education for 'top five' and management skills for Departmental, Troop, and Platoon leaders.

The third category "other" included nine novel recommendations. They included recommendations for investment in micro-education, Interagency, logistics training, war-gaming, more joint exercises, looking at other services professional development pipelines, and suggestions for re-analyzing NSW task organization. Four examples of these recommendations are provided below.

- Incorporation of senior leader decision making training scenarios and vignettes at the operational and strategic level -- similar to the tactical-level practical exercises promulgated in the Ethos magazine last year, but at the operational level focused on campaign planning and incorporating conventional forces, enablers, logistics, authorities, funding and country team level issues.
- JSOU needs to become a greater part of NSW's educational investment pipeline for SEAL Officers, senior enlisted and SBT warrants, enlisted. Navy War College in Newport, RI is not a substitute to providing the asymmetric and unconventional warfare schooling background our leaders need on a routine basis; every two years there should be mandatory formal education for at least two weeks. How does Apple's operations team manage day-to-day business? What about senior level business practices by Google Executives? Why not make no-kidding Intel training by the CIA mandatory for upcoming SEAL CDRs/CMCs? Shouldn't some courses at JSOU be mandatory for us? We can be so much better as a force. There needs to be a re-focused effort in short, intense executive education (outside of conventional war colleges) beyond the tactical level (two weeks to 1-2 months every two years at least) for our upcoming command

team leaders (O4-O-6, E7-E9). Keep our brightest minds intellectually stimulated through continuous investment of executive education.

- I believe we need to work harder up front with our young officers to treat their career as a profession...to treat their junior years as the equivalent of a 'residency' on their way to being future TF leaders, with the ultimate goal of commanding. Enforcement of the NSW Officer career path (with mandatory Diversity tours between leadership tours) helps, and there are all kinds of other opportunities with the current forward TF's operational today.
- Although most of our NSW officers lament their staff tours, I find that very few actually understand or even value staffing. This is evidenced in the placement of NSW officers. Consider the SEAL Team. Under the current construct, there are 27 SEAL officers at the SEAL Team. Of those 27 officers, just one is in staff--the Operations officer. That means that exactly 1/27 or 4% of the wardroom is in staff at a Battalion level command. In the same construct, there are 15 SEAL CPOs, including the OPS MCPO and CMC. Of those 15 SEAL CPOs, four of them are in staff, including one E9. That equates to 30 of the SEAL Chief Mess is in staff. That ratio is completely inverted. This same construct will then form a TG/SOTF/Battalion battle-staff. That staff will be made up of entirely non-SEAL personnel. Under this model, there is no way for a SEAL officer to learn the staff side of the house.

2. Cautionary Statements

There were a total of eleven cautionary mentions or suggestions that fell outside of that provided by military channels, totaling about three pages (single spaced and 12-point font). The most common recommendation with five mentions in the qualitative section was prioritizing diverse civilian perspectives over military professional development. Three examples of recommendations for increased civilian interaction include the following statements from survey participants.

- The "leadership" warfighting function might benefit most from exposure to civilian agencies...both the U.S. IA community, but also corporate leadership, academic leadership, NGO leadership, civilian academic programs, etc. This recommendation may seem in some ways to be counterintuitive, but it shouldn't be...even among the broad range of students attending service schools, there are limitations to the breadth of perspective, and there is great potential for "group think," or "limited think," even among very bright leaders who are under the impression that they are embracing divergent perspectives. Understanding how foreign diplomats, or foreign-based NGO leaders, or UN-affiliated organizations view U.S. hegemony, could help better inform U.S. military leaders...not

by changing their views, but by helping them develop a more complete understanding of regional/global concerns, thereby becoming better equipped to find enduring solutions to the US' challenges.

- Need more civilian schools...from well respected universities. Project Management, decision making, speaking, writing.”
- In addition to JPME, NSW leaders should become familiar with other high-performance organizations, to include for-profit business and technology companies (Google, Apple). This may help prevent a reliance on standard military structures and may help to keep pace with topics like social media exploitation, cyber warfare, and IT network issues.

The second category was “other” in the qualitative section. These statements were diverse covering topics of being a self-starter, to building relationships, and issues with NSW task organizations. Two examples of these recommendations include the following statements from survey participants.

- A good leader has the discipline and drive to do all the other things to prepare himself for the upcoming tasks assigned.
- Ideally, the 05/06 Commander is comfortable in the Joint realm and well versed in intelligence. The Commander does not need to be a fires, JAG and intel SME, but needs to cultivate a staff relationship with these key entities that is very close.

There were three statements that cautioned against spending too much time off the battlefield. For example, one participant stated that NSW leaders who were “*out of touch with the deploy-ers*” had “*huge impacts on the lives of those under them.*” These participants seemed to think anytime off the battlefield was potentially detrimental to NSW's performance. The other two cautionary statements are listed below.

- Deployment experience is invaluable, as are exercises as shake-outs for the real thing. I'm concerned that occasionally a leader spends too much time in other staff assignments with insufficient battlefield experience, then finds himself in a command position deployed. Tours in acquisitions, personnel, and training commands prepare leaders for organizational leadership, but they do not prepare a leader for combat leadership roles.
- Will this make us better fighters on the battlefield” ???...or just better negotiators within the Joint realm, I guess only time will tell. From my experience.... early on in conflicts you need warfighters...good ones! later on after establishment of forces you need the education of everything this survey represents. Education is an element of War, ‘but’ Men are the difference makers... be that good or bad. So I ask you.... where do the Leaders of these men make the difference? ‘something to ponder...

APPENDIX D. SURVEY QUESTIONS

NPS Enterprise Survey - NSW PRODEV:

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NSW PRODEV:

Naval Special Warfare Professional Development

This research is designed to answer the following question. What are the practical skills required to be a SEAL leader today and are these competencies being developed into NSW's future leaders? To accomplish this goal, the survey will ask questions that tap into the experience gained by senior members of the NSW community -- leaders who spent the last thirteen-plus years running deployed Task Forces (e.g. Squadrons, Special Operations Task Forces, Combined Joint Special Operations, etc.). Survey participants will include former Command Teams (Commanders, Deputies, Senior Enlisted Advisors, Command Warrant Officers, and Executive Officers) and Operations Teams (Operations Officers, Senior Enlisted Advisors, and Warrant Officers). The answers to these questions will be used to help improve NSW's process for developing the talent required to staff, plan, and lead Task Forces at the O-5 and O-6 echelon. The survey assumes that future special operations will require senior Officer and Enlisted SEALs to run Joint, Interagency, and Multi-national Task Forces in combat and contingency operations.

There are 33 questions in this survey

Naval Postgraduate School - Consent to Participate In Research

<https://survey.nps.edu/admin/printablesurvey/sa/index/surveyid/826585>

10/17/2014

1

Consent to Participate in Research:

You are invited to participate in a study designed to support the Naval Special Warfare's Professional Development and Education program. It is endorsed by the Center for SEAL and SWCC and will be conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) under the supervision of Professor Kalev Sepp (Primary Investigator) and Professor Susan Hocevar (Co-Investigator). I will be the student investigator for the research.

This survey intends to use your experience to answer the following research question: What are the practical skills required to be a SEAL leader today and are these competencies being built into future leaders?

Procedures: It will take place online - simply consent to take the survey. There are 33 questions and it should not take more than 30 minutes to complete.

Cost: No financial cost to participate in this research study.

Compensation for Participation: No compensation will be given.

Voluntary Nature of the Study: Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you choose to participate, you can still change your mind at any time, and withdraw from the study without penalty.

Potential Risks: Although unlikely because of software safeguards, a potential risk of participating might be, if an electronic breach of confidentiality occurred and your identity was revealed, then an unauthorized person or persons could see your responses.

Mitigation of Risks: No responses will be attributable to you due to the fact that the survey asks for only limited PII (personally identifiable information) and the Lime Survey software maintains participant anonymity. Additionally, the survey records will be stored on government computer systems and a secure web site.

Anticipated Benefits: The results of this study will support the Navy, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and NSW by capturing your experiences, opinions, and advice on how to best prepare tomorrow's leaders for senior deployed leadership roles.

Confidentiality & Privacy Act: Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep your personal information confidential, but total confidentiality cannot be absolutely guaranteed.

Points of Contact: If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience an issue, or have questions about your experience while taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Kalev Sepp, 831-656-2116, kisepp@nps.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be

addressed to the Institutional Review Board Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, lgshattu@nps.edu.

Statement of Consent: I have read the information provided above. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I do not waive any of my legal rights. *

Please choose only one of the following:

- ☐ I consent to participate in the research study.
- ☐ I do not consent to participate in the research study.

Section 1**Individual - Demographics:****2****What is your current rank?**

Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:

Answer was 'I consent to participate in the research study,' at question '1 [Z1]' (Consent to Participate in Research). You are invited to participate in a study designed to support the Naval Special Warfare's Professional Development and Education program. It is endorsed by the Center for SEAL and SWCC and will be conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) under the supervision of Professor Kalev Sepp (Primary Investigator) and Professor Susan Hooever (Co-Investigator). I will be the student investigator for the research. This survey intends to use your experience to answer the following research question: What are the practical skills required to be a SEAL leader today and are these competencies being built into future leaders? Procedures: It will take place online - simply consent to take the survey. There are 33 questions and it should not take more than 30 minutes to complete. Cost: No financial cost to participate in this research study. Compensation for Participation: No compensation will be given. Voluntary Nature of the Study: Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you choose to participate, you can still change your mind at any time, and withdraw from the study without penalty. Potential Risks: Although unlikely because of software safeguards, a potential risk of participating might be, if an electronic breach of confidentiality occurred and your identity was revealed, then an unauthorized person or persons could see your responses. Mitigation of Risks: No responses will be attributable to you due to the fact that the survey asks for only limited PII (personally identifiable information) and the Lime Survey software maintains participant anonymity. Additionally, the survey records will be stored on government computer systems and a secure web site. Anticipated Benefits: The results of this study will support the Navy, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and NSW by capturing your experiences, opinions, and advice on how to best prepare tomorrow's leaders for senior deployed leadership roles. Confidentiality & Privacy Act: Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep your personal information confidential, but total confidentiality cannot be absolutely guaranteed. Points of Contact: If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience an issue, or have questions about your experience while taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Kalev Sepp, 831-656-2116, kisepp@nps.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Institutional Review Board Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, lgshatt@nps.edu. Statement of Consent: I have read the information provided above. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I do not waive any of my legal rights.)

Please choose only one of the following:

- ☐ E8
☐ E9
☐ CWO4
☐ CWO5
☐ O4
☐ O5
☐ O6
☐ O7 or above
☐ Other

3

How many times have you deployed in the following positions while assigned to an O-5 or O-6 Task Force (TF K-bar, SOTF-W in Iraq, SOTF-SE in Afghanistan, CJSOTF, SOCFWD, etc.)? Indicate the number of deployments that you completed in each position.

	Number of deployments
Operations Senior Enlisted Advisor	
Operations Warrant Officer	
Operations Officer	
Executive Officer	
Command Warrant Officer	
Command Senior Enlisted Advisor	
Deputy Commander	
Commander	

4

Indicate the highest level the level of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) that you have achieved:

Please choose only one of the following:

- ☐ No JPME Qualifications
- ☐ Senior Enlisted JPME
- ☐ CWO JPME
- ☐ JPME Level I
- ☐ JPME Level II
- ☐ Joint Officer Qualified

Section 2**Preparation of the Operations Team - Demographics:**

The next few questions focus on the preparation of Task Force "Operations Teams" at the O5 and O6 echelon. For the purpose of this survey, an Operations Team = Operations Officer, Operations Senior Enlisted Advisor, or Operations Chief Warrant Officer.

5

Preparation of the Operations Team at the O5 and O6 echelon (J3 or N3 Shop)

Before your assignment / work up for your first Operations Team, how much total time (in months) did you spend in staff or planning schools (Amphibious Planner, Fires Support Coordination, etc.) specifically designed to prepare you for Task Force assignments? Do not include JPME, Command and Staff College, or any College / Master degrees.

Only numbers may be entered in this field.

Please write your answer here:

6

Preparation of the Operations Team at the O5 and O6 echelon (J3 or N3 Shop)

Before your assignment / work up for your first Operations Team, how much total time (in months) did you spend in Task Force level pre-mission training simulations / computer based training exercises? Do not include exercises where you only participated in as a member of a tactical element (Troop and below).

Only numbers may be entered in this field.

Please write your answer here:

7**Preparation of the Operations Team at the O5 and O6 echelon (J3 or N3 Shop)**

Before your assignment / work up for your first Operations Team, how much total time (in months) did you spend in Task Force level field exercises (SITEXs, CERTEXs, Final Battle Problems, etc.)? Do not include exercises where you only participated as a member of a tactical element (Troop and below).

Only numbers may be entered in this field.

Please write your answer here:

8**Preparation of the Operations Team at the O5 and O6 echelon (J3 or N3 Shop)**

Before your assignment / work up for your first Operations Team, how much total time (in months) did you spend as an augment on a deployed O5 or O6 echelon staff? Do not include augments where you were assigned to a tactical element (Troop and below).

Only numbers may be entered in this field.

Please write your answer here:

Section 3**Preparation of the Command Team - Demographics:**

The next question will focus on the preparation of Task Force "Command Teams" at the O5 and O6 echelon. For the purpose of this survey, a Command Team = Commander, Deputy, Senior Enlisted Advisor, Command Warrant Officer, or Executive Officer.

9

Preparation of the Command Team at the O5 and O6 echelon:

Before your assignment / work up for your first Command Team, how much total time (in months) did you spend in training and or school focused on preparing you for a command position? Do not include schools already accounted for in the OPS section or JPME, college, and master's degrees in your answer.

Only numbers may be entered in this field.

Please write your answer here:

Section 4: Warfighting Functions (Joint Publication 3-0 and Field Manual 3-0)

Function: 1. Leadership

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon - consider both Command and Operations Teams (i.e. SOTF, CJSOTF, SOCFWD etc.).

10

Leadership: Types of Warfare for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level

Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Conventional Warfare (Enemy Centric)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Irregular Warfare (Population Centric)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

11

Leadership: Levels of Warfare for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level

Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Tactical (wins battles)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operational (wins campaigns)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strategic (wins wars)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

12**Leadership: SOF Campaign Planning at the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
U.S. Policy Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
U.S. Funding Categories	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Authorities and Approvals	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
SOF Operational Doctrine and Design	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Status of Forces and Bilateral Agreements (SOFAs and BILATs)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Law of Armed Conflict and Rules of Engagement	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enemy, Detainee, Collateral Damage, and Civilian Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

13**Leadership: Types of Operations for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Unconventional Warfare	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Direct Action	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Special Reconnaissance	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Counter Terrorism	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Counter Insurgency	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Preparation of the Environment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Theater Security Cooperation, Counter-Narco Terrorism Training, and Joint Combined Exchange Training	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Information Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

14**Leadership: Knowledge, skills, and capabilities for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Recent NSW History (i.e. lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Philippines, etc)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
NSW History	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Joint SPECOPS History	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tactical / Operational Vignette Case Studies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision-making	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Negotiations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Casualty/Mortuary Affairs, Employment of Mental & Spiritual Support, etc.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Public speaking	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Team Building	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Section 5

Function: 2. Command and Control

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon (consider both Command and Operations Teams).

15

Command and Control (C2): For the O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon

Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Commander's Visualization	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mission Command	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Military Decision Making Process	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

16**Command and Control (C2): Technical aspects for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Network Operation and Capabilities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tactical Radio Operation and Capabilities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cyber-Network Policy	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Battle Tracking Systems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ISR Integration and Employment Systems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

17**Command and Control (C2): Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Operations for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Military Advisor (to Foreign Military Leaders and Organizations)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Culture Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Foreign Aide and Logistic Support / Funding	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Negotiating / Cooperation Building with Foreign Cultures	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Combined or Multinational Operations (NATO, Allied and Coalition Partners)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regional Studies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
State Department and Embassy	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Intelligence Agencies (NSA, CIA, DIA)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Department of Justice and Law Enforcement (FBI, NCIS, et. al.)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
USAID	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Humanitarian Organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Joint Service Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Section 6

Function: 3. Intelligence

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon (consider both Command and Operations Teams).

18**Intelligence: Skills for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
General Intelligence or the Intelligence Process	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
National Level Intelligence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Theater Level Intelligence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Counter Intelligence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Combined (Multinational) Intelligence Collaboration	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) Targeting	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Human Intelligence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Signals Intelligence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Foreign Disclosure of Intelligence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Human Domain / Network Analysis	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ISR Employment and Integration	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Knowledge Management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Section 7**Function: 4. Fires**

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon consider both Command and Operations Teams.

19**Fires: Skills for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Friendly Fires Capabilities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enemy Fires Capabilities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Practical Application of Fires Approvals and Employment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Indirect Fires	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Joint Fires	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Non-lethal Fires	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fires Targeting Process	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fires Case Studies (Good, Bad, and Lessons Learned)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Section 8

Function: 5. Movement and Maneuver

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon consider both Command and Operations Teams.

20

Movement and Maneuver: Current Operations skills for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level

Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Combined Arms / Joint Warfighting	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Maneuver Warfare	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Battle Staff or JOC Procedures (i.e. Practical Application of C2 during Mission Execution)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operational Risk Management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Joint / Conventional Force Planning and Integration	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mobility and Counter Mobility	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

21**Movement and Maneuver: Maritime Operations skills for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Sea basing Command and Control	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Amphibious Operations / Littoral	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Special Boats integration	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Maritime Interception Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Naval Special Warfare Riverine Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Navy integration and Surface Ships in Support of NSW	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Integration	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Naval Special Warfare Submarine Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Air over Water Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

22**Movement and Maneuver: Air Operations skills for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Strategic Lift Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Rotary Wing Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fixed Wing Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Parachute Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Section 9

Function: 6. Protection

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon consider both Command and Operations Teams.

23

Protection: Defense skills for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level

Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Air Defense	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Force Protection and Security	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Green on Blue Counter Measures	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operational Security (OPSEC)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cyber Security	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Chemical and Biological Protection Measures	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Personnel Recovery	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Employment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Force Health Protection and Preventative Medicine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

24**Protection: Medical Operations or the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
U.S. Service Member Medical Treatment Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enemy Medical Treatment Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Civilian Medical Treatment Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Multi-National Medical Treatment Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Section 10**Function: 7. Sustainment**

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon consider both Command and Operations Teams.

25**Sustainment: Skills for the O-5 and O-6 Task Force level****Rate the importance of developing expertise in the following:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Importance (1)	2	3	4	5	High Importance (6)
Joint Logistics Operations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Casualty Evacuation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Funding (Pots of Money)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Joint Logistics Reporting	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Emergency Support Requests	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Contracting	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Non-standard or Low Visibility Logistics	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Section 11

Assessment:

This section asks you to assess how well the current pipeline prepares NSW for deployed leadership roles at the O5 and O6 Task Force echelon consider both Command and Operations Teams.

26

Assessment: Developing O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leaders

The current pipeline sufficiently prepares SEALs in the seven warfighting functions:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Strongly Disagree (1)	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree (6)
Leadership	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Command and Control	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Intelligence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fires	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Movement and Maneuver	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Protection	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Sustainment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

27**Assessment: Developing O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leaders:****NSW sufficiently prepares the following positions in the Seven War Fighting Functions.**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Strongly Disagree (1)	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree (6)
Tactical Element Leaders (Troop and below)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operations Senior Enlisted Advisors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operations Chief Warrant Officers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operations Officers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Executive Officers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Command Warrant Officers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Senior Enlisted Advisors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Deputy Commanders	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Commanders	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

28**Assessment: Developing O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leaders:****How well was (were) your Team (s) prepared for running a Task Force?**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Poorly (1)	2	3	4	5	Exceptionally (6)
Operations Team	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Command Team	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

29

If you felt sufficiently prepared to function on an O5 or O6 level Task Force, then please identify the most essential element of your preparation from the list below. Please provide additional comments / helpful insights in the comment box (i.e. valuable schools or training events).

Please choose only one of the following:

- ☐ Military Command and Staff College
- ☐ Joint Professional Military Education
- ☐ Staff or Planning Schools (EWTGLANT or PAC)
- ☐ Exercises (SITEX, CERTEX, FBP)
- ☐ On the Job Training (deployments)
- ☐ Self Study of Doctrine
- ☐ Not Adequately Prepared

Make a comment on your choice here:

Section 12**Way Ahead:**

The next section asks you to use your experience and judgment to identify how best to prepare NSW for future deployed leadership at the O5 and O6 echelon consider both Command and Operations Teams.

30

Way Ahead: Improving preparation for O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leadership:

SEALs should be formally developed in the Seven Warfighting Functions.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Strongly Disagree (1)	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree (6)
Leadership	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Command and Control	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Intelligence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fires	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Movement and Maneuver	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Protection	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Sustainment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

31**Way Ahead: Improving preparation for O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leadership:****Prioritize the following levels for development in the Seven Warfighting Functions:**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low Priority (1)	2	3	4	5	High Priority (6)
Tactical Element Leaders (Troop and below)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operations Senior Enlisted Advisors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operations Chief Warrant Officers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Operations Officers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Executive Officers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Command Warrant Officers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Senior Enlisted Advisors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Deputy Commanders	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Commanders	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

32**Way Ahead: Improving preparation for O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leadership:****Prioritize the usefulness of the methods listed below for increasing NSW's expertise in the Seven Warfighting Functions.**

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Lowest Priority (1)	2	3	4	5	Highest Priority (6)
Greater participation in existing in Exercises (SITEX, CERTEX, FBP)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Greater participation in existing Staff or Planning Schools (EWTGLANT or PAC)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Greater participation in existing Military Education (i.e. Command and Staff College, JPME, etc)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Greater investment in On the Job Training (more deployments)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Greater investment Self Study of Doctrine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
New investment focused on developing Joint Task Force leadership (i.e. training and education)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

33

Way Ahead: Improving preparation for O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leadership:

Provide any comments relevant for a future curriculum?

Please write your answer here:

Thank you again for participating. As stated, the results of this survey will be used to support the Center for SEAL and SWCC's professional development curriculum.

Submit your survey.
Thank you for completing this survey.

APPENDIX E. SURVEY APPROVAL LETTER



Naval Postgraduate School Human Research Protection Program

From: President, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
To: Dr. Kalev Sepp, Defense Analysis Department (DA)
Dr. Leo Blanken, Defense Analysis Department (DA)
Dr. Susan Heccevar, Graduate School of Business and Public
Policy (GSBPP)
LCDR Jeremiah Teti, USN
Via: Chairman, Institutional Review Board (IRB)
Subj: PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE LEADERS
Encl: (1) Approved IRB Initial Review Protocol

1. The NPS IRB is pleased to inform you that the NPS President has approved your initial review protocol (NPS IRB# NPS.2014.0058-IR-EM2-A). The approved IRB Protocol is found in enclosure (1). Completion of the CITI Research Ethics Training has been confirmed.
2. This approval expires on 31 December 2014. If additional time is required to complete the research, a continuing review report must be approved by the IRB and NPS President prior to the expiration of approval. At expiration all research (subject recruitment, data collection, analysis of data containing PII) must cease.
3. The requirement to obtain documented consent is waived in accordance with 32 CFR 219.117 (c).
4. You are required to report to the IRB any unanticipated problems or serious adverse events to the NPS IRB within 24 hours of the occurrence.
5. Any proposed changes in IRB approved research must be reviewed and approved by the NPS IRB and NPS President prior to implementation except where necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to research participants and subjects.
6. As the Principal Investigator (PI) it is your responsibility to ensure that the research and the actions of all project personnel involved in conducting this study will conform with the IRB approved protocol and IRB requirements/policies.

Subj: PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE LEADERS

7. At completion of the research, no later than expiration of approval, the PI will close the protocol by submitting an End of Experiment Report.



Lawrence G. Shattuck, PhD
IRB Chair
Institutional Review Board



Ronald A. Route
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
President, Naval Postgraduate School

Date: AUG 15 2014

APPENDIX F. EMAIL INVITATION

From: Teti, Jeremiah (LCDR) [<mailto:jjteti@nps.edu>]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 1:36 AM
To: NSW Survey Distro
Cc: Wisotzki, Stephen C CAPT USSOCOM NAVSOC; Voigt, Bradley D Mr CIV USSOCOM NSWCEN
Subject: Naval Special Warfare PRODEV Survey

Gentlemen,

You are invited to participate in a study designed to support the Naval Special Warfare's Professional Development and Education program. It is endorsed by the Center for SEAL and SWCC and will be conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School under the supervision of Professor Kalev Sepp (Primary Investigator) and Professor Susan Hocevar (Co-Investigator). I will be the student investigator for the research as part of my master's thesis project. This survey intends to capitalize on your experience, which was gained over the last thirteen-plus years of running Joint & Multi-national Task Forces. The research question: ***What are the practical skills required to be a SEAL leader today and are these competencies being built into future leaders?***

Procedures: It will take place online - simply click the link {below}. The first page will repeat some of this information and asks you to give your consent to take the survey. There are 33 questions and it should not take more than 30 minutes to complete. Once you start the survey, you cannot stop part way through and finish it later; it must be done in one sitting due to the anonymity settings.

Timeframe: Please complete survey before **29 August 2014**.

Link: <https://survey.nps.edu/826585/lang-en>

Disclaimer: You will see the same info (below) on the first page of the survey as part of the procedures of the Institutional Review Board's oversight of all institutional research.

Anticipated Benefits: The results of this study will support the Navy, United States Special Operations Command, and Naval Special Warfare by capturing your experiences, opinions, and advice on how to best prepare tomorrow's leaders for Task Force leadership roles.

Cost: No financial cost to participate in this research study.

Compensation for Participation: No compensation will be given.

Voluntary Study: Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you choose to participate, you can still change your mind at any time, and withdraw from the study without penalty.

Potential Risks: Although unlikely because of software safeguards, a potential risk of participating might be, if an electronic breach of confidentiality occurred and your identity was revealed, then an unauthorized person or persons could see your responses.

Mitigation of Risks: No responses will be attributable to you due to the fact that the survey asks for only limited PII (personally identifiable information) and the *Lime Survey* software maintains participant anonymity. Additionally, the survey records will be stored on government computer systems and a secure website.

Confidentiality & Privacy Act: Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep your personal information confidential, but total confidentiality cannot be absolutely guaranteed.

Points of Contact: If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience an issue or have questions about your experience while taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Kalev Sepp, 831-656-2116, kisepp@nps.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, lgshattu@nps.edu.

Very Respectfully,

JT

**LCDR Jeremiah Teti Naval
Postgraduate Student
jjteti@nps.edu
757-377-8532**

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