When Policy and Strategy Collide: U.S. Intervention in Lebanon 1982-1984
Abstract
Clausewitz believed that war and politics are inseparable that the grim realities of war are just a continuation of the laborious machinations of politics. This relationship is always complicated. States are rarely able to achieve the complete destruction of their foes, settling instead on using their military might to achieve limited political ends. When political goals are pursued by inappropriate or ill-considered military means, disaster may easily result. For the United States 30 years ago, the decision to send combat troops into Lebanon in an ambiguous, peacekeeping role tragically illustrates one such disaster. This thesis examines the U.S. intervention in Lebanon from 1982 1984 to historically analyze U.S. policy and strategy and illustrate the disparities between the strategic goals of the administration and the methods employed to achieve them. These events mark the beginning of direct U.S. military intervention in the post-colonial Middle East, a process that has grown steadily in scale and consequence ever since. Despite the accumulation of such hard-won experience in the region, the harmonization of military means and political ends remains as illusive today as it was at the start.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2015
- Accession Number
- ADA620764
Entities
People
- Jamie L. Jordan
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School