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THESIS

**THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EFFECTIVE
UTILIZATION OF WOMEN AT ARMS**

by

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March 2015

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ARMS**

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ABSTRACT

Throughout history, humanity has perceived the military to be the domain of men. The reality is that this is a superficial perspective. Though the majority of combatants have always been male, there are numerous examples of women who have fought alongside, and even led, these men. Moreover, the female population has often been forced to endure some of the worst effects of war.

As society has evolved toward democracy and embraced liberal values, the military world has increasingly been expected to align itself with principles of gender equality and protection of human rights. This need was recognized by the world community in 2000 when the United Nations passed UNSCR 1325, ensuring that women would become greater participants in conflict resolution. In the years since, NATO has also worked to encourage more female presence in its own ranks.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACT	NATO Allied Command Transformation
APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
CWINF	Committee on Women in NATO Forces
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
FETs	Female Engagement Teams
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMS	International Military Staff
ITS	Integrated Training Service
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (NATO-Led Operation in Afghanistan)
JPT	Joint Protection Teams
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO-led Operations in Kosovo)
MC	Military Committee
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCGP	NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NOBATT	Norwegian Battalion in Lebanon
NOGP	NATO Office on Gender Perspectives
NRF	NATO Response Force
OWINF	Office on Women in the NATO Forces
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PRT	Physical Readiness Training
PSO	Peace-Support Operations

SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SLIP	Senior Leadership Induction Program
SML	Senior Mission Leaders Course
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNMOs	UN Military Observers
UNOMSA	United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa
UNSCR 1325	UN Security Council Resolution 1325
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia

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I. INTRODUCTION

Ukraine is a relatively young post-Soviet country with all the advantages and challenges that this status implies. The legacy of the recent past and the tensions of the present are, perhaps, most clearly felt in the realm of gender policy, specifically the equality for women in such sectors as the armed forces. Even though the previous regime did not officially discriminate against women in education or employment, real gender equality was never accepted in society or pursued by the government through, for example, the creation of institutional mechanisms to foster genuine gender equality to match the loftiest rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism.¹

The situation has not changed much during the years of Ukraine's independence, despite the high hopes for social liberalization that came with the so-called Orange Revolution in 2004. The new and improved Ukraine was supposed to elevate all citizens—men and women alike—to their full, democratic potential. And, indeed, in 2010, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense expanded the list of military specialties for women by 70 percent.² At the same time, however, the armed forces remain one of the few institutions in which women routinely are assigned the lowest-paid jobs, for example, telephone operator, clerical, and secretarial positions, among others.³ Restrictions preventing women from taking some specific jobs in the military also exist in Ukraine. According to the 1994 Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, women are not allowed to be commanders of artillery, of tanks, and of fighting vehicles; similarly a woman cannot be a de-miner or combat engineer, nor can she occupy other military positions associated with excessive strain on the body.⁴ In addition, gender bans persist for women in particular military jobs, for example, Special Forces positions, navy

¹ Dono Abdurazakova, *National Mechanisms for Gender Equality in South-East and Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia: Regional Study* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 9.

² Diana Eremenko, "The Defenders of the Motherland: The Attitude toward Women in the Military," *Tochka Net News*, last modified February 23, 2012, <http://news.tochka.net/ua/110206-zashchitnitsy-otechestva-kak-otnosyatsya-k-zhenshchinam-v-armii-foto/>.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Aleksey Sahno, "Women are Attacking...The Military," *Military Panorama*, last modified March 8, 2014, <http://wartime.org.ua/1325-zhnki-nastupayut-na-armyu.html>.

positions, and specialties dealing with explosives and with chemical substances. Furthermore, women cannot enroll in the military lyceums, the former Suvorov colleges. They are not allowed to enter the Sevastopol Military Academy, the Lviv Military Academy that prepares platoon commanders, or the Kharkiv Military Academy that prepares pilots and radio engineers.⁵

With such restrictions that Ukraine places on women, the effectiveness of the security forces (i.e., “the effectiveness of what the organization is supposed to be good at—using force, or the threat of force—for security, stability, or plain victory”)⁶ may suffer. One of the main challenges in the contemporary world is “to develop effective militaries...that are able to implement a broad variety of roles and missions.”⁷ Taking into consideration that, on the one hand, Ukraine’s military, like other national armies, has, until recently, spent less time protecting its own borders and more on international operations, while, on the other hand, that the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are opening more positions for women in military operations, it is important to train and prepare Ukrainian women soldiers to take part in missions that require their presence.

Twenty years on, at least half of Ukrainian society—the female half—continues to count as second-best soldiers and thus, quite possibly, second-best citizens. At the beginning of 2013, more than 47,000 women were serving and working in the Ukrainian army, and nearly one-third of these women were uniformed. More than 1,600 of these uniformed women were officers, 4,700 of them were sergeants and 9,770 were contract soldiers.⁸ Thus, women at arms make up an integral part of all military personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, even amid the career restrictions they face. There is, however, still a very low number of Ukrainian military women who take part in the military

⁵ Eremenko, “The Defenders of the Motherland.”

⁶ Robert Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” *Parameters* 43, no. 2 (2013): 34.

⁷ Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 29.

⁸ “More than 47,000 women are serving and employed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Governmental portal, accessed September 10, 2013, http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/ru/publish/article?art_id=246126441&cat_id=244277212.

missions abroad. Since 1992 more than 37,000 servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have participated in various peacekeeping operations.⁹ Of them, only approximately 50 were women.¹⁰ In 2012, 476 servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were participating in 11 peacekeeping missions and other operations.¹¹ In 2015 the number increased to 550 servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine participating in 10 missions abroad despite Ukraine's internal conflict,¹² but few women have participated. For instance, in 2013, there were only a handful of women (including Major Valeria Romanova, Officer of the Military Aid; and Major of Medical Service Adushkina Elena, Senior Officer of the Military Aid) from Ukraine taking part in military missions abroad.¹³

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Even though no legal prohibition related to the participation of women in combat or in other military operations exists in Ukraine, other kinds of restrictions, including social ones, cause a low rate of women's participation in military operations. Without the necessary experience in and of military operations, women can face unequal opportunities in the Ukrainian military because very often they are seen as second-rate military personnel who are not professionals.

The present thesis explores theories and facts that support and oppose deployment of women at arms in military missions abroad. The main focus, however, is placed on lessons learned from UN and NATO military operations, to see whether women at arms are necessary in military missions. The overarching research questions of this thesis are:

⁹ "Participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Multinational Peacekeeping Operations," Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, accessed January 2, 2015, <http://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/mirotvorchist/>.

¹⁰ "More than 47,000 women are serving and employed."

¹¹ "Ukrainian Peacemakers to Keep Watch Over Presidential Inauguration in Liberia," Worldwide News Ukraine, last modified January 11, 2012, <http://wnu-ukraine.com/news/politics/?id=1253>.

¹² "Participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in 2015," Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, accessed March 31, 2015, <http://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/mirotvorchist/uchast-zbrojnih-sil-ukraini-u-mizhnarodnih-operacziyah-z-pidtrimannya-miru-i-bezpeki.html>.

¹³ *Excerpts from the Orders about Personnel*, September 28, 2012, № 806 and № 170 from June 14, 2013. (Kyiv: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 2013).

What is the role of female soldiers in UN and NATO missions? What lessons, if any, can be drawn from these experiences to apply in Ukraine?

B. IMPORTANCE

Until recently, Ukraine's main goal was to transform its armed forces into a professional army that would be able to fulfill a variety of assigned tasks.¹⁴ Thus, the country had to undertake substantial changes in how its armed forces were structured, as well as reform how it conducted its military operations and understood its military identity. This process of change led to the goals outlined in "The Concept of Reform and Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the Period to 2017," which was formulated in 2012 and endorsed by then-president Victor Yanukovich.¹⁵ The primary purpose was to create new, highly qualified, well-equipped and -trained, professional, and mobile armed forces of the European type, which would be able to address contemporary threats.¹⁶ Simultaneously, the Ministry of Defense planned to transform the military into an all-volunteer force.¹⁷ The main goal of such changes was to make the armed forces of Ukraine not only smaller in number but also more professional and, thus, to enhance the effectiveness of the military. This new strategy for professionalization would apply to women, because they make up a substantial amount of military personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces; all of them are volunteers.¹⁸

¹⁴ Samuel Huntington posits that a professional military consists of soldiers, who are professionals in management of violence. To become such professionals, soldiers should gain expertise that is "acquired by prolonged education and experience," they should understand that the "responsibility to serve and devotion to...[their] skill[s] furnish the professional motive," and they should receive proper training necessary for professional competence that will help to establish the sense of unity in the military organization. Moreover, professionals should possess written codes of ethics. (in Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1954), 7–18.)

¹⁵ *The White Book of Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2012* (Kiev: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 2013), 9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ "Ukrainian Army Will Reduce its Personnel Number to 122 Thousand," *The Money*, last modified June 28, 2013, <http://news.finance.ua/ua/~1/0/all/2013/06/28/304288>.

¹⁸ "The Percentage of Females in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is Higher than the Percentage of Women in the Armed Forces of the USA," *The Comments*, last modified March 7, 2013, <http://ua.comments.ua/life/197248-v-ukrainskiy-armii-vidsotok-zhinok.html>.

However, the events that unfolded in the next two years interfered with these goals and contributed to Ukraine's decision to set aside its priorities of an all-volunteer, professional fighting force. By spring of 2014, the Euromaidan¹⁹ protests forced President Yanukovich to flee to Russia.²⁰ Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada removed him from office formally. Russia, in turn, annexed the Crimean peninsula and began supporting a full-scale insurgency in the Eastern region of Ukraine.²¹ The interim government of Ukraine felt compelled to reinstate conscription in order to address the threat in the

¹⁹ "Euro-Maidan," or literally "Euro Square," started as a wave of peaceful demonstrations in Independence Square in the capital of Ukraine—Kiev—in November 2013, after the president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, suspended preparations for signing the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement in favor of stronger ties with Russia (see Carmen Fishwick, "We Were So Naive and Optimistic: Ukraine Euromaidan Protesters Tell Us What's Changed for Them," *Guardian*, March 4, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/ukraine-crisis-protesters-kiev-euromaidan-independence-square>. Yanukovich decided to take a loan of 15 billion dollars from Russia and increase Ukraine's dependence on the Kremlin (see Timothy Heritage and Katya Golubkova, "Ukraine Leader Seeks Cash at Kremlin, Kiev Protest Planned," Reuters, December 16, 2013, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/16/uk-ukraine-protest-idUKBRE9BD0E420131216>.) To stop the peaceful demonstration, Yanukovich's government approved new anti-protest laws, eroding human rights and freedoms in Ukraine (see "Ukrainian President Approves Strict Anti-Protest Laws," *Guardian*, January 17, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/ukrainian-president-anti-protest-laws>.) The scope of the protests expanded, bringing in more demonstrators, because of the widespread government abuse of power, violation of human rights, corruption, and finally, violent dispersal of protesters (see "Ukraine Opposition Vows to Continue Struggle after Yanukovich Offer," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 25, 2014, <http://www.rferl.org/content/protesters-police-tense-standoff-ukraine/25241945.html>.)

²⁰ The revolution turned out to be very bloody. On February 18, 2014, some 77 unarmed demonstrators were killed within 48 hours and nearly 600 were wounded. (See "Why is Ukraine in Turmoil?," *BBC News*, February 22, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182823>.) Even though then-President Yanukovich tried to use the armed forces against protestors after February 18, the sitting Chief of General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Vladimir Zamana, refused to carry out the order and resigned. Throughout the protests, the military chose to remain neutral. (See "Yanukovich Was Planning to Use Military Forces to Stop Maidan Revolution," *Gordon*, February 24, 2014, <http://gordonua.com/news/maidan/SMI-YANUKOVICH-planirovat-ispolzovat-armiyu-protiv-Maydana-11320.html>.) Viktor Yanukovich first fled to Crimea, Ukraine and then Vladimir Putin (Russian president) helped him to flee to Russia. (See "Putin Declared That He Helped Yanukovich to Flee the Country," Informational Portal of the city of Lugansk, last modified October 24, 2014, <http://news.lugansk.info/2014/ukraine/10004259.shtml>.) According to independent opinions, V. Putin planned an invasion of Ukraine in advance after the Orange revolution in Ukraine (November 22, 2004–January 23, 2005). (See "Putin Bought Crimea from Yanukovich for Fifteen Billion Dollars," *Vlasti*, last modified March 9, 2014, <http://vlasti.net/news/189099>.)

²¹ After the Maidan revolution, following the change of government in Ukraine, the country's southern peninsula (Crimea) was annexed by Moscow on March 18, and the war over the east of Ukraine began, involving pro-Russian extremists, who support Moscow's influence in the region (because they were incited by Russian propaganda stating that "the next government of Ukraine will discriminate against Russian speakers") against those "who favor Ukraine free from interference from the Russia." (See Laura Smith-Spark, Diana Magnay, and Victoria Butenko, "Russian Soldiers Detained in Ukraine; Leaders Meet in Minsk," CNN, August 26, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/26/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html>. See also Palash Ghosh, "Ukraine Maidan: Tatars in Crimea Caught in a Complex Conflict with Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians," *International Business Times*, February 26, 2014, <http://www.ibtimes.com/ukraine-maidan-tatars-crimea-caught-complex-conflict-ethnic-russians-ukrainians-1558124>.)

east.²² However, even in the face of such a threat, the new strategy does little to bring more females into the ranks or to take advantage of the willingness of these volunteers to serve in combat or bring their special talents and perspectives to a complex, asymmetrical war.

In actuality, the new circumstances do not preclude the military from undertaking the reforms of 2012. Rather, the armed forces of Ukraine would be better prepared to face threats were they to have pursued the stated goals of a professional, all-volunteer military, staffed by well-trained and equipped soldiers with the patriotic desire to protect the country's borders. The decision of 2015 to draft men aged between 25 and 60 years old and women will do little to help make the armed forces more professional and able to effectively fight with the contemporary threats.²³ The decision to draft ex-military women, also, does not bring much of a difference if most of those women were low-ranking personnel in supportive positions, who were never provided proper education and did not gain experience from military operations in the past. Moreover, the long-term transformation of societies toward democratic civilian rule requires the crucial step of military professionalization. Improving the skills and professional standards of officers, non-commissioned officers, and individual soldiers can result in a reduction in services and force size, coupled with an increase in personnel quality and effectiveness.²⁴ Professionalization of the military remains one of the necessary steps in order for Ukraine to meet one of Euromaidan's main goals—integration into the European security system.²⁵

²² "Ukraine Reinstates Conscription as Security Deteriorates in Eastern Region," Voice of America, May 1, 2014, <http://www.voanews.com/content/russian-fm-calls-for-dialogue-in-ukraine/1905082.html>.

²³ "Ukraine Commences Three-Stage 2015 Military Draft," PressTV, January 21, 2015, <http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/01/21/394029/Ukraine-commences-2015-military-draft-->.

²⁴ "Tool Category C: Military Measures. Professionalization of the Military," Conflict Prevention Web, accessed January 26, 2015, http://extranet.creativeworldwide.com/CAIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIStaff/Dashboard_CAIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/toolbox6.htm.

²⁵ "The Program of the Revolution. The Program of Immediate Reforms of the Country after the Overthrow of Yanukovich's Regime," accessed January 26, 2015, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_mtqdQ7-UiWjUR0xaYXFPO1k/edit.

One of the main points about the professional armed forces is that “citizens have a right to expect the security forces to be effective in fighting organized crime, participating in PSO [peace-support operations] with other respected states, and providing humanitarian assistance when disasters occur.”²⁶ In such conditions, to become professional military personnel, women at arms—as well as men—must have opportunities to receive proper education and experience in the military organizations. These opportunities are intended to improve the effectiveness and readiness of military forces so that they are capable of defending their country’s interests when necessary.

Lynda Liddy notes that “professional development occupies a position between academic education and military training.”²⁷ She maintains that “the cultivation of the skills and knowledge necessary for a soldier to be operationally effective is an outcome that draws on both training and education processes.”²⁸ The professional development of military personnel is complemented by proper training—and military education to give troops greater knowledge about arms as a profession. Besides being well-trained in general infantry skills, soldiers will also have a proper understanding of the Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict, two crucial areas for contemporary militaries. In addition, soldiers are better equipped for the challenges of future missions through training in mediation and negotiation.²⁹

Liddy argues that we are approaching the era of the strategic corporal because our soldiers are obtaining a professional mastery of warfare.³⁰ “In military circles, the basic premise underlying the idea of a strategic corporal is a general belief that future

²⁶ Bruneau and Matei, *Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 35.

²⁷ Lynda Liddy, “The Strategic Corporal: Some Requirements in Training and Education,” *Australian Army Journal* 2, no. 2 (2005): 142, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/liddy.pdf>.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ “In general many senior officers view a strategic corporal as a highly trained professional soldier whose competence in war fighting must be supplemented by specific areas of educational knowledge that permit him or her to operate effectively in multidimensional operations. The main task facing trainers and military educators in the early 21st century is how to best equip the individual junior leader both mentally and physically for the challenges of a transformed security environment. In this sense, the strategic corporal concept is about adapting the Army’s ethos and older values to a range of new attitudes and codes of behavior that today ask facing trainers and military educators.” See Liddy, “Strategic Corporal,” 147.

operations will be more complex in character and will require an increased level of junior leadership.”³¹ The typical modern army in the West expects its soldiers to be able to supervise civil affairs or assist with humanitarian aid, as well as carry out activities to maintain order and stability and be skilled warriors.³² As a result of these trends, it is recommended that the Ukrainian Army begin promoting a military culture designed to prepare male and female non-commissioned officers to become strategic corporals.³³

Meanwhile, the demand for women in UN and NATO operations is growing. “Article II of the UN Charter clearly specifies that all members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes.”³⁴ As such, the Ukrainian armed forces must meet UN requirements to be able to provide necessary personnel when needed. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) (UNSCR 1325), one of the requirements for member states is that “the international community must be sensitive to and take special account of women’s vulnerable situation in times of war, and UN member states must cooperate to involve women in peace-building and conflict-resolution processes.”³⁵ Furthermore, female soldiers are essential for certain tasks in peace operations, such as body searches of women, information gathering from other females, medical assistance for other women, and tasks that require getting access to the areas where men cannot enter.³⁶ Women also can establish better unit relations with the community, support measures for good child care, monitor excessively violent behavior among male soldiers, and develop a better understanding of local culture.³⁷ In light of the fact that the “UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) started the gradual

³¹ Liddy, “Strategic Corporal,” 140.

³² *Ibid.*, 139.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Arturo Sotomayor, “Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations for Troop-Contributing Countries in South America: The Causes of Argentina and Uruguay,” in *Unintended Consequences, Complex Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Systems*, ed. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur (New York: United Nations Publications, 2007), 173.

³⁵ Anja Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective* (Stockholm: Editia Collins Printing, 2004), Foreword.

³⁶ Cheryl Hendricks and Lauren Hutton, *Defense Reform and Gender, Gender and Security Reform Toolkit* (Geneva: DCAF, OBSE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008), 3–6.

³⁷ Stephanie Groothedde, *Gender Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission*, 2nd ed. (The Hague, Netherlands: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, 2013), 16–76.

introduction of gender units and gender advisers into the peacekeeping operations after UNSCR 1325 was adopted,”³⁸ the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense must enact changes that would help to expand the possibilities for women to take part in peacekeeping missions to be able to meet UN demands when necessary.

NATO and its partners are taking concerted action to support implementation of the UNSCR.³⁹ The alliance has recognized that “the complementary skills of both male and female personnel are essential for the operational effectiveness of NATO operations, especially in light of the increasing complexity of civil-military interaction, public relations and information sharing.”⁴⁰ Ukraine signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document with NATO in 1994,⁴¹ and afterward “actively engaged with NATO in terms of tangible activity and interaction within the peacekeeping sphere.”⁴² And in keeping with the times, it is currently necessary to learn how to identify the various gender issues and how to integrate gender perspectives into all aspects of NATO deployment and peace support operations in accordance with UNSCR 1325.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Despite a significant percentage of women at arms in Ukraine’s armed forces, they have rarely been engaged in military operations. Thus it is important to investigate why Ukrainian female soldiers are not actively participating in military missions.

By scrutinizing the dominant theories arguing for or against female participation in military operations, this thesis is trying to determine whether the exclusion of women from the battlefield is justified. On the one hand is a hypothesis that supports women’s inclusion in the military operations. It is necessary for women at arms to take part in

³⁸ Gorana Odanovich, “Participation of Women in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” *Western Balkans Security Observer* 16 (January–March 2010): 74.

³⁹ “Women, Peace and Security,” NATO, last modified September 4, 2014, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/91057.htm>.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ “Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document,” NATO, last modified January 10, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm.

⁴² Greg Simons, “Ukraine’s Peacekeeping Activities: United Nations and Partnership for Peace; Promoting Ukraine’s Integration into European Security Cooperation” (SIPRI conference, Stockholm, 2010), 5, <http://www.sipri.org/research/security/old-pages/euroatlantic/ukraine/papers/SIPRIUkraineSimons.pdf>.

combat actions because when females in the armed forces are not participating in the essential act of a soldier—fighting—they are relegated to second-class status in the military and in the country they represent.⁴³ More broadly, Stephanie Groothedde argues that women improve the effectiveness of military missions.⁴⁴ Moreover, the contemporary military has changed because “the immature, ultra-masculine, and extremely aggressive character of the ideal warrior mindset has not done the armed forces any favors in Iraq and Afghanistan.”⁴⁵ In other words, not only do militaries need women but they need women more than ever now.

An alternate hypothesis opposes women’s greater inclusion in military operations. Robert Egnell, for example, argues that “the overwhelming focus of integrationists has been the argument for equal rights rather than national security,”⁴⁶ and, as a result, “the inclusion of women and gender perspectives will change the organization’s combat culture to reflect a civilian rather than a military ethos.”⁴⁷ Others argue, with various degrees of sophistication, that women’s presence can destroy team spirit and undermine fighting effectiveness.⁴⁸ These authors disagree about how women influence the effectiveness of military operations. They agree, however, that gender equality probably has a negative impact on a nation’s defense.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

There are some assumptions in society that foster a negative attitude toward women’s presence in the armed forces in general. Aristotle, for example, posits that women cannot be courageous at all, and thus they cannot be warriors who face the real possibility of death in war. The other side of the tautology holds for Aristotle as well:

⁴³ Robert L. Maginnis, *Deadly Consequences: How Cowards are Pushing Women into Combat* (Washington, DC: Regeneray Publishing, 2013), 193.

⁴⁴ Groothedde, *Gender Makes Sense*, 16–76.

⁴⁵ Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 41.

⁴⁶ Kingsley Browne, *Co-ed Combat: The New Evidence that Women Shouldn’t Fight the Nation’s Wars* (New York: Sentinel HC, 2007), 295.

⁴⁷ Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 33.

⁴⁸ James Haley, *Women in the Military* (Miami: Greenhaven Press, 2004), 7.

because women have never fought in wars, they cannot be brave.⁴⁹ According to Aristotle, experience marks a key factor that women lack to become courageous.

There are, however, many examples in history about the brave acts displayed by women during different wars, including some notable Ukrainian women warriors. During World War II, for example, a Ukrainian woman, Nadezhda Popova (1921–2013), flew a flimsy 1920s two-seat biplane, which had no parachutes, guns, radar, or radio. Using maps and compasses for navigation, she flew 852 missions in total, including 18 in a single night. She was given the highest honor and named a Hero of the Soviet Union,⁵⁰ proving to the world that women could no longer be considered as lacking courage. Popova is not the only example of women’s valor in combat. Female snipers are also well known in history, including Ukrainian Lyudmila Pavlichenko, who killed 309 German soldiers during the war. She has been recognized as the most successful woman sniper in history.⁵¹

Ukrainian women were also commanders of tanks. Aleksandra Samusenko, for example, was commander of a T-34 tank during World War II. Her tank crew defeated three German Tiger I tanks, for which she received the Order of the Red Star. For her overall bravery, she was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War 1st class.⁵²

Indeed, despite Aristotle’s somewhat stylized musings, women have always fought and died in various wars. “They have led men in battle, been prisoners of war, fired lethal weapons, and operated our most sophisticated systems. They fly combat aircraft and serve on combat ships. Women meet the military’s physical and mental standards, are technically proficient, and are highly trained war fighters and leaders.”⁵³

⁴⁹ Lawrence M. Hinman, *Ethics: A Pluralist Approach to Moral Theory* (Boston: Wadsworth, 2013), 263.

⁵⁰ “The ‘Night Witch’ Who Bombed the Nazis,” *The Week*, July 26, 2013, 35.

⁵¹ Pat Farey and Mark Spicer, *Sniping: An Illustrated History* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 129.

⁵² V. S. Murmantseva, “Soviet Women in the Great Patriotic War,” accessed September 15, 2013, <http://www.a-z.ru/women/texts/murman1r-13.htm>.

⁵³ “Should Women Be Allowed in Combat?,” Scholastic, accessed September 15, 2013, <http://teacher.scholastic.com/scholasticnews/indepth/upfront/debate/index.asp?article=0905>.

As Alma Persson notes, “for centuries women have played a vital (yet unrecognized) part in the military.”⁵⁴

The lack of recognition is not surprising, because many conservative theorists oppose women’s presence in the military operations. James Haley, for example, states that “the gender integration of the infantry and other ground combat units would significantly undermine the capability and readiness of the ... military.”⁵⁵

As a solution, Adam N. Wojack identifies equal treatment of both genders in the armed forces as vital for the military effectiveness. He posits that “as long as women are treated fairly and equally and men do not perceive them as receiving special treatment, there is no reason why men and women cannot bond to form effective combat units.”⁵⁶ King also argues that it is important to understand that the armed forces are focused on war-winning, not on employment equality, and that women’s integration in the all-volunteer professional forces should be judged purely by an individual’s competence. Thus, military positions should be filled on the basis solely of qualifications rather than on gender.⁵⁷

The inclusion of women in the military is not just a matter of fairness, however; it may also provide key benefits. Robert Egnell, Kingsley Browne, Lorry M. Fenner, Marie E. deYoung, and Lester L. Lyles all argue that women bring something special to the operation that is not connected to physical strength. These scholars emphasize that qualities unrelated to physical strength bring effectiveness to military missions. Fenner and deYoung write that “a team is made up of individuals. To be successful, the sum of their efforts must be greater than their individual efforts. Team members should not all be the same size and have the same skills if the team is to be successful.”⁵⁸ Scholars and

⁵⁴ Alma Persson, *Changing Boundaries, Defending Boundaries: Gender Relations in the Swedish Armed Forces* (Linköping, Sweden: LiU-Tryck, 2011), 29.

⁵⁵ Haley, *Women in the Military*, 7.

⁵⁶ Adam N. Wojack, “Women Can Be Integrated into Ground Combat Units,” *Military Review*, November/December 2002, quoted in Haley, *Women in the Military*, 27.

⁵⁷ Anthony King, “Women in Battle: The Female Soldier,” *Parameters* 43, no. 2 (2013): 13.

⁵⁸ Lorry M. Fenner and Marie E. deYoung, *Women in Combat: Civic Duty or Military Liability?* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 17.

policymakers, however, have not yet reached similar conclusions on the best way to utilize women at arms according to gender differences.

For one thing, the types of military engagement have also changed in the last few decades. Contemporary military operations include stability operations, peace operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular and asymmetric wars. These wars “involve a multitude of actors fighting for the hearts and minds of the local, as well as global, population whose perceptions of the conflict often determine the outcome.”⁵⁹ Thus, it is not currently clear whether force or cognitive skills have a greater impact on military missions.

Ellen Haring posits that women’s presence can actually strengthen every organization. Haring argues that there are clear links between organizational success and the number of females in the most successful organizations. Women improve quality and scope of decision-making. In addition, “well-trained women could become ... greatest source of asymmetric [unconventional] combat power [in the fight against terrorism].”⁶⁰ Female soldiers can gather information from other women, improve the unit’s relations with the community, develop better understanding of local culture, and get access to the areas where men cannot enter.⁶¹ According to the Executive Summary of *From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military*, “joint operations have demonstrated that a seamless integration of differences can be accomplished and can positively influence the outcome of the fight.”⁶²

According to Cheryl Hendricks and Lauren Hutton, gender integration brings experience, knowledge, and the interests of men and women to armed operations—which can make a crucial difference. Hendricks and Hutton highlight the necessity to respond to different security needs that are gender-sensitive within society (such as gender-based violence), the necessity to respond to the changing nature and needs of the defense sector,

⁵⁹ Fenner and deYoung, *Women in Combat*, 37.

⁶⁰ Wojack, “Women Can Be Integrated,” quoted in Haley, *Women in the Military*, 32.

⁶¹ Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 33–41.

⁶² Military Leadership Diversity Commission, *From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military* (Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 2011), 15.

the need to improve operational effectiveness, create representative defense forces, and strengthen democratic, civil oversight of the defense forces. The authors state that gender mainstreaming enables the defense sector to better perform peacekeeping tasks. Hendricks and Hutton argue that female peacekeepers can increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions because women can perform body searches on women, are more approachable and trustworthy, can gather information from other females and from local women's organizations, and can provide a positive image of women in the military for local women to join security or armed forces. Furthermore, women serve as monitors of excessively violent behavior among male soldiers.⁶³

Stephanie Groothedde states that women play a very valuable role in post-conflict peace-building. According to Groothedde, gender mainstreaming will make operations more effective and sustainable because, to see a full picture of an operation, there is a need for participation by both genders in the process of peace-building. For example, "safety" means "no more fighting" to men, but for women it means "more personal protection and good child care." Female peacekeepers support measures that help provide access to water, markets, clinics, and schools. Furthermore, the author points out that there is a need for the presence of women at higher levels and command positions to be able to participate in the decision-making process and bring about necessary changes.⁶⁴

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

A comparative approach is used in this thesis. Ukraine's experience in the utilization of women at arms is compared with the experiences of NATO and UN member-states' militaries, including the United States and other allied nations. The thesis focuses on the lessons learned from female military personnel taking part in UN and NATO peacekeeping operations. Moreover, such topics as what women bring to the UN and NATO missions and how professionalization increases thanks to women's participation in military operations are investigated in this work.

⁶³ Hendricks and Hutton, *Defense Reform and Gender*, 3–6.

⁶⁴ Groothedde, *Gender Makes Sense*, 16–76.

The sources outlined in the literature review section are augmented with public documents on policy or laws from the governments of Ukraine and the United States. Statistical data is gained from the World Bank, UN, and NATO. This thesis contains information from newspaper articles, scholarly journals, policy papers, and government reports, as well as books related to the topic of women's integration into the military.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis begins by taking a closer look at the debates surrounding female soldiers' participation in military operations. Arguments both for and against integration of women in armed forces are studied. Theories about professionalization of the military and effective use of force and methods to create effective military units with gender integration are also researched. The thesis continues by assessing the current state of women at arms in the Ukrainian armed forces (including identification of the problems that the Ukrainian military have today, and changes that are coming or need to come through) followed by an examination of the utilization of women in armed forces. Experiences and lessons learned from other militaries, which utilize females in military operations and have a vast amount of work regarding to this topic, are investigated. The research attempts to determine the overall effectiveness of the utilization of women at arms in military operations.

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II. WOMEN AT ARMS AS A CIVIL-MILITARY ISSUE AND AS A FUNCTION OF LIBERALIZATION/DEMOCRATIZATION

The decision to integrate women fully into the armed forces often is met with opposition. There are plenty of controversial theories that often are used to justify women's exclusion from the military. Some view the integration of women in the military as a misguided decision that would harm combat effectiveness. Others identify the integration of women into the armed forces as necessary for strengthening civilian control over the military and enhancing professionalization and effectiveness of the military. Thus, scholars disagree about the question of how women are influencing military organizations.

Though, to many, it sounds like an oxymoron, the term "military humanitarianism" has come into increasingly common use.⁶⁵ Thus, "the very missions of the military shift from primary war fighting or war deterrence to military deployments for peace and humanitarian purposes."⁶⁶ War fighting is very different from peace support operations. According to Don Kraus, Robert A. Enholm and Amanda J. Bowen, "peacekeepers require a daunting range of skills: they must be combat capable but also skilled negotiators and mediators; they need general knowledge of the U.N. system, mandates, and rules of engagement but also an understanding of civil-military cooperation to effectively interact with humanitarian agencies and local populations; and they require mission-specific knowledge of local politics, history, customs, culture, language, and conflict dynamics as well as more general skills to protect civilians from imminent violence."⁶⁷

Knowing that today's wars are very different, the forces that wage them should be different, as well. Moreover, the capacities of the soldiers, which are necessary for

⁶⁵ Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Don Kraus, Robert A. Enholm, and Amanda J. Bowen, *U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation* (Washington, DC: Citizens for Global Solutions Education Fund, 2011), 53, <http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf>.

military effectiveness, have also changed to comply with the new types of missions. The question remains—do female soldiers have different abilities and capacities from men? If so, may these women’s capacities enhance effectiveness of the armed forces and bring success to the contemporary military missions?

A. THE MODERN VERSUS THE POSTMODERN MILITARY

The fact is that, very often, the role of women is considered to be extremely limited in an institutional type of military organization. However, “the shift toward more occupational and especially postmodern patterns is supposedly associated with expanding employment opportunities for women.”⁶⁸ The U.S. armed forces, as well as those of the developed democracies of other Western states, are transitioning away from the modern military organization toward a postmodern form.⁶⁹

The modern military emerged in the nineteenth century and was associated with the development of the nation-state. The basic format of the modern military “was a combination of conscripted lower ranks of militia and professional officer corps, war-oriented in mission, masculine in makeup and ethos, and sharply differentiated in structure and culture from civilian society.”⁷⁰ The postmodern military, however, “undergoes loosening of the ties with the nation-state. The basic format shifts toward a volunteer force, more multipurpose in mission, increasingly androgynous in makeup and ethos, and with greater permeability with civilian society.”⁷¹ To understand why the postmodern military creates equal opportunities for women as well as men in the military, it is necessary to examine how the presence of woman at arms actually influences armed forces.

One of the five major organizational changes that shape the character of the postmodern military is the structural and cultural interpenetrability of the civilian and

⁶⁸ Helena Carreiras, *Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 84

⁶⁹ Charles C. Moskos identifies three stages of armed forces and society: Modern, Late Modern, and Postmodern. Moskos, Williams, and Segal, *Postmodern Military*, 1.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

military spheres.⁷² Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei explain how governments can develop strong civil-military relations (CMR). They identify three dimensions of CMR—control, effectiveness, and efficiency.⁷³ Control is important because civilian control over the military is a basis for liberal democracy.⁷⁴ Peter D. Feaver maintains that “because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection.”⁷⁵ Indeed, the civilian and military worlds are very different from one another, and equilibrium amid civilian control and military effectiveness is necessary,⁷⁶ because the lack of civilian control over the military may result in a creation of a state within a state or lead to a military dictatorship, and lack of military effectiveness may lead to the failure of the state to be able to protect its society. Matei argues that “the challenge in the contemporary world is not to assert and maintain civilian control over the military but also to develop effective militaries, police forces, and intelligence agencies that are able to implement a broad variety of roles and missions.”⁷⁷ If, however, the presence of women at arms in the military can influence at least two indicators of CMR—control and effectiveness (improving civilian control over military and enhancing military effectiveness), the acceptance of the female soldiers into armed forces can be justified as beneficial.

⁷² “The Postmodern military is characterized by five major organizational changes. One is the increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally. The second is the diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank, and combat versus support roles. The third is the change in the military purpose from fighting wars to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense. The fourth change is that the military forces are used more in international missions authorized (or at least legitimated) by entities beyond the nation state. A final change is the internationalization of military forces themselves. Here we have in mind the emergence of the Eurocorps, and multinational and binational divisions in NATO countries.” Moskos, Williams, and Segal, *Postmodern Military*, 2.

⁷³ Bruneau and Matei, *Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 30.

⁷⁴ “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces,” UK Essays, accessed May 22, 2014, <http://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/civilian-control-of-the-armed-forces-politics-essay.php>.

⁷⁵ Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 149–78.

⁷⁶ “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces.”

⁷⁷ Bruneau and Matei, *Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 29.

B. WHAT WOMEN BRING TO CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER MILITARY

Women are a part of society that has historically been shut out of military institutions. The presence of women in the armed forces, however, would help pass the norms and expectations of the society onto the armed forces, and thus, strengthen civilian control over the military.⁷⁸

This concept is better explained by one of the primary theorists in civil-military relations. Samuel P. Huntington, in his book, *The Soldier and the State*, described the differences between the military and civilian worlds. The two worlds consist of different institutions with opposing norms and rules. The military world is conservative (illiberal) by its nature. Thus, it is necessary to find methods of ensuring that the liberal civilian world keeps control over the military world.⁷⁹

According to Huntington, civilian control over the military has two imperatives: functional and societal. Societal imperative consists of two components: ideology (a world-view, which can be anti-military—liberal, Marxist—or pro-military—conservative, fascist) and structure (the legal-constitutional framework).⁸⁰ The functional imperative is the objective requirements of warfare.⁸¹ The widespread but wrong assumption is that “the existing military structure and culture are already well adapted to perform excellence in war; that the military organization looks like it does because of the ... functional imperative of the armed forces.”⁸² Huntington argues that “if the armed forces reflect only social values and societal culture, it is likely to be incapable of performing its military function. On the other hand, if it is shaped only by functional imperatives, it could become impossible to contain within the society it is supposed to

⁷⁸ Morris Janowitz, “The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait,” *Journal of Politics* 23, no. 1 (1961): 176–78; and Morris Janowitz, “The Social Demography of the All-Volunteer Force,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 406 (March 1973): 86–93.

⁷⁹ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 11–151.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 34.

⁸² *Ibid.*

protect.”⁸³ The solution is not to attempt to balance between the two imperatives, but rather to seek synergies.⁸⁴

Morris Janowitz came up with a theory to assist in the search for synergies between functional and societal imperatives and to eventually gain greater civilian control over the military, which is a prerequisite for the development of a democratic government.⁸⁵ Janowitz agrees with Huntington that the military is different from the civilian world, but his theory about ways to reduce the danger to liberal society is different from Huntington’s. Janowitz sees the military world as fundamentally conservative, and thus not able to adapt to changes as rapidly as many open civilian societies. Therefore, according to Janowitz, the military would benefit from an outside intervention.⁸⁶

Janowitz introduced a theory of convergence. According to this theory, clashes between the military and civilian world will eventually occur because of the essential differences that these two worlds have. Thus, he came to the conclusion that convergence of the two worlds can be the solution that will help to diminish differences because it will ensure that the norms and expectations of the society will be passed on to the military. Janowitz encouraged bringing different people in the officer corps in order for the military to be made up from those who represent the diverse nature of society. With this societal diversity within the military accomplished, the attitudes between the military and civilian world will be more closely aligned. Consequently, the civilians will gain greater control over the military.⁸⁷

His theory can be applied to the presence of women in the armed forces. Janowitz’s theory suggested including the diverse nature of society into the military to reduce tensions between the civilian and military world. Women represent one-half of

⁸³ Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 39.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces.”

⁸⁶ Janowitz, “The Professional Soldier,” 176–78; and Janowitz, “Social Demography,” 86–93.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

society, and as such, represent the values and culture of the half of population. Thus, they bring liberal societal attitudes into the armed forces and, consequently, strengthen civilian control over the military.⁸⁸

There are a few possible straightforward avenues in which women at arms can contribute to civilian control over the military. Matei argues that there are three sets of mechanisms utilized by civilians to exercise control over the military. They are: institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms.⁸⁹ “Institutional control mechanisms involve providing direction and guidance for the security forces, exercised through institutions that range from organic laws and other regulations that empower the civilian leadership, to civilian-led organizations with professional staffs.”⁹⁰ Some examples of such civilian-led organizations with professional staffs are: the ministry of defense, “one or more committees in the legislature that deal with policies and budgets, and a well-defined chain of authority for civilians to determine roles and missions, such as a National Security Council-type organization.”⁹¹ One possible way for women at arms to contribute to control is, after retiring from their military service, to become ministers of defense or members of the parliamentary committees on defense. Thus, they will be able to address problems and needs of half of the population (women) and combine the military “institutional knowledge” with “civilian” elements.

A second mechanism that civilians may utilize is oversight. According to Matei, “oversight is exercised on a regular legal basis by the civilian leadership to keep track of what the security forces do, and to ensure they are in fact following the direction and guidance they have received from the civilian chain of command.”⁹² Oversight can be exercised by formal agencies within the three main branches of the government

⁸⁸ Janowitz, “The Professional Soldier,” 176–78; and Janowitz, “Social Demography,” 86–93.

⁸⁹ Bruneau and Matei, *Routledge Handbook of Civil-military Relations*, 30.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*

(legislative, executive, and judicial), think tanks, independent media, NGOs, and some of the international organizations.⁹³ Thus, retired women at arms can become members of the judicial branch or journalists covering the armed forces and therefore contribute to control and combine military “institutional knowledge” with “civilian” elements.

Utilization of the professional norms is the third mechanism that, according to Matei, civilians use to exercise control over the military. “Professional norms are institutionalized through legally approved and transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, and promotion, in accordance with the goals of the democratically elected civilian leadership, thus internalizing the previous two control mechanisms.”⁹⁴ Consequently, women at arms may contribute to control by, after retirement, becoming professors at National Defense Universities, where their work will contribute to the creation of professional norms (professional norms can also improve military effectiveness).⁹⁵

C. WHAT WOMEN BRING TO EFFECTIVENESS

According to the citizen-soldier tradition favored by Janowitz and his followers, “as democratic citizens, women are the civic equals of men.”⁹⁶ Thus, women should be able to serve in the military as well as men do, because an obligation of every citizen is to protect their country against forces, “foreign or domestic, that threaten to undermine its democratic values.”⁹⁷ Very often, however, democracy is “understood more in terms of individual rights and freedom of choice, and less in terms of the shared responsibilities of civic republican citizenship.”⁹⁸ R. Claire Snyder posits that “the citizen-soldier has been and remains an important one because it is one of the few areas that recognize the

⁹³ Bruneau and Matei, *Routledge Handbook of Civil-military Relations*, 31.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁹⁶ R. Claire Snyder, “The Citizen-Soldier Tradition and Gender Integration of the U.S. Military,” *Armed Forces and Society* 29, no. 185 (2003): 186.

⁹⁷ Snyder, “The Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 186.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 187.

military as a central problem for democratic society.”⁹⁹ Therefore, it is vital to study and evaluate changes in terms of their effect on democratic values as well as their impact on military effectiveness.¹⁰⁰

Female inclusion in the military can be justified as willingness by the country to sustain and protect its democratic values, including gender equality. At the same time, effectiveness is a necessary requirement for the protection of the democratic society, and “it would make no sense to allow a one-track focus on the individual rights of women to serve in any capacity they choose to undermine military effectiveness.”¹⁰¹ Ideally, the military should both protect democratic society and help sustain democratic values.¹⁰² However, between choosing to either ensure military effectiveness or extend women’s rights, the reasonable decision would be to choose effectiveness, unless women bring something unique to the military, which actually helps to maximize military effectiveness.¹⁰³

Thomas C. Bruneau argues that there are six major roles for contemporary security forces: fight, and be prepared to fight external wars, internal wars or insurgencies, global terrorism, internal and external crime, and maintain the ability to provide support for humanitarian assistance, and to be prepared for and take part in peace support operations.¹⁰⁴ The effectiveness of the security forces is best determined by whether or not a state is prepared to fulfill any or all of the six allotted roles for contemporary security forces.¹⁰⁵ One of the three basic requirements for militaries to be effective in fulfilling any of the six roles and missions is that country must commit

⁹⁹ Snyder, “The Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 189.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 199.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 194.

¹⁰² Ibid., 185.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Bruneau and Matei, *Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 66.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

resources—money, personnel, equipment, and so forth.¹⁰⁶ Women constitute half of the population and thus can add to the numerical representation of the military forces. Moreover, “the accelerated integration of computer-age technologies into weapon system and military command and control networks ... carries the promise of greater military agility, precision, and potency, but it also requires large force reduction to finance the new technology.”¹⁰⁷ Those countries who abolish conscription while trying to switch to the small, professional army also should consider allowing more women in their armed forces because when it comes to the ability to operate new technologies intelligence matters more than brawn.

Indeed, women have usually been needed in the military when countries faced recruitment difficulties while trying to enlarge their armed forces.¹⁰⁸ When, for instance, in some countries the military life became less attractive to young men, because the armed forces suffered from a crisis of legitimacy, inclusion of women in the armed forces actually increased the number of personnel at lower costs, due to the gender differences in the labor market.¹⁰⁹ Thus, nations considering a transition from conscription to a volunteer system, for example, usually were content “to include plans to expand women’s military participation.”¹¹⁰

The presence of women in the armed forces tends to help a country not only to maintain an all-volunteer army, but also to professionalize the military. Helena Carreiras claims that according to empirical research, the armed forces of Western countries increased the number of women in their ranks when they abolished conscription; and a

¹⁰⁶ Three basic requirements for the security forces to be effective when fulfilling any of the six roles and missions are: first—there should be a plan (strategy, doctrine); second—“there must be structures and processes to both formulate the plans and implement them,” and third—countries must provide enough resources (political capital, money, personnel, equipment, trained forces, etc.) Bruneau and Matei, *Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 32.

¹⁰⁷ Moskos, Williams, and Segal, *Postmodern Military*, 5.

¹⁰⁸ Emmanuel Reynaud, “Reynaud, Emmanuel. “Women, Violence and the Army,” *Foreign Policy* 53, no. 3 (1988), quoted in Helena Carreiras, “The Role of Women in the Armed Forces of NATO Countries: Military Constraints and Professional Identities,” *Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military* 17, no. 3–4 (1999): 5.

¹⁰⁹ Carreiras, “The Role of Women in the Armed Forces of NATO Countries,” 4.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

relation was found between the higher number of accepted women and “the degree of specialization of the armed services (namely, the growing need for qualified personnel to fulfill new technically demanding functions).”¹¹¹ Early research into the U.S. armed forces has uncovered that the country has met its expectations for raising force qualification. According to Carreiras, “the presence of women has promoted an increase in educational levels, as women who volunteered for the armed forces were on average better educated than men.”¹¹² In the U.S. all-volunteer military, recruits who fail to finish their high school education “are expected to meet higher standards than graduates in the battery of tests given to prospective results.”¹¹³ Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach argue that “because the services have stipulated smaller quantitative goals for women, they have been able to be more selective and a far larger proportion of women than men have been high school graduates.”¹¹⁴ When compared to the all-volunteer military, educational level “is not normally included among the specific qualifications identified for enlisted positions.”¹¹⁵ The ability of the United States to maintain an all-volunteer army “has even been considered to depend on the effective use of the female labor force.”¹¹⁶

By virtue of their better education, women actually help to professionalize the military. According to Samuel P. Huntington, “the distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.”¹¹⁷ Military expertise includes education as a requirement of

¹¹¹ Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*, 84.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach, *Women and the Military* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977), 74.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*, 84.

¹¹⁷ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 7.

professionalization.¹¹⁸ Huntington states that professional education of professional men consists of two phases: “the first imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background, and the second imparting the specialized skills and knowledge of the profession. The liberal education of the professional man is normally handled by the general education institutions of society devoted to this purpose. The second or technical phase of professional education, on the other hand, is given in special institutions operated by or affiliated with the profession itself.”¹¹⁹ Huntington posits that the skill of the officer is incredibly complex, as it is “neither a craft (which is primarily mechanical) nor an art (which requires unique and nontransferable talent).”¹²⁰ Modern officer requirements include extensive study and training, translating to roughly one-third of his or her professional life spent in formal schooling.¹²¹

Huntington argues that the modern professional officer should have a general education, in addition to a military education. This is because the military officer must be familiar with a vast array of other subjects, including history, politics, economics, sociology, and psychology, in addition to natural sciences, including chemistry, physics, and biology. Military officers with a solid understanding of the relationship between military duties and these supplementary areas of knowledge will be best prepared for the challenges they might face. Additionally, a military officer “cannot really develop his analytical skill, insight, imagination, and judgment if he is trained simply in vocational duties. The abilities and habits of mind which he requires within his professional field can in large part be acquired only through the broader avenues of learning outside his profession.”¹²²

¹¹⁸ “Professional expertise also has a dimension in breadth which is lacking in the normal trade. It is a segment of the total cultural tradition of society. The professional man can successfully apply his skill only when he is aware of this broader tradition of which he is a part. Learned professions are ‘learned’ simply because they are an integral part of the total body of learning of society. Consequently, professional education consists of two phases: the first imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background, and the second imparting the specialized skills and knowledge of the profession.” Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 7.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 11–12.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² *Ibid.*

The necessary understanding of human attitudes, behaviors, and motivations required for the modern officer can be attained through the pursuit of a liberal education. This observation supports Helena Carreiras's argument that because those women who volunteered for the armed forces tend to be better educated than men¹²³ (they received higher education from a liberal educational institution prior to joining the armed forces, required, as Huntington states, for the first phase of professional education), the presence of women increased the educational levels in the military and, thus, helped to professionalize the military.

Moreover, the presence of women in the military tends to reduce disciplinary problems. As mentioned above, women who volunteer to join the military are more likely to be better educated when compared to their male counterparts. As research has indicated, higher levels of education result in fewer disciplinary problems, since people who dropped out of high school may have a harder time adapting to the rigors of a demanding military environment.¹²⁴ Also, regarding military disciplinary issues, women have been known to serve as monitors of excessive behavior among male soldiers. Servicewomen may observe male peacekeepers' actions and report violations. Such measures are necessary because "the presence of peace-keeping troops contributes to increasing the incidence of prostitution and sexual slavery."¹²⁵

Furthermore, it has been empirically demonstrated that women at arms play a valuable role in civil-military operations, because they can reach elements of society that men cannot; and they can provide medical care and humanitarian aid, which is very important for winning the hearts and minds of a fragmented population and thus bringing success to the missions.¹²⁶ Some question whether women who participate in peacekeeping operations should be military or civilians. It is necessary, however, to mention that civil servants who are engaged in military operations should possess the

¹²³ Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*, 84.

¹²⁴ Binkin and Bach, *Women and the Military*, 74.

¹²⁵ Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 1.

¹²⁶ Gail C. Long, "Effectiveness of U.S. Military Female Engagement Teams" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 37.

same physical fitness levels as the military, because there have been instances when interpreters could not physically fulfill required tasks, such as the ability to move quickly when necessary. For example, during one mission, a linguist assisting the military took a break after every 15 minutes of walking due to his medical conditions and age. Thus, the military, which depended on the services of the linguist, could not move quickly enough to achieve their stated mission goals.¹²⁷ Such recruitment of civilians can sometimes cause damage to the overall effectiveness of the mission.

Another important issue is that female military personnel sometimes receive inadequate civil-military relations training before being deployed and funds are often unavailable for projects that eventually could be beneficial to the local population. “To presume that a group with little training, little experience in other cultures, and no enduring presence can change social dynamics in a place like Afghanistan is arrogant and absurd.”¹²⁸ Thus, women at arms have to be properly prepared for their missions, and ways to properly fund projects necessary for the success of the mission should be found. “More focus should be put on employing qualified civilians or military Civil Affairs units.”¹²⁹ Furthermore, civil-military programs should have sufficient amounts of officers above the rank of Lieutenant, which represent critical leadership to define goals and shape team tactics.¹³⁰

Moreover, it is quite necessary for the military to learn to cooperate with other important actors in the area, such as humanitarian and civilian organizations. Eventually, that would be beneficial for them all because this will reduce the duplication of effort, waste of assets, and so forth.¹³¹ Time and again, peacekeeping efforts in places such as

¹²⁷ Matt Pottinger, Hli Jilani, and Clire Russo, “Half-Hearted: Trying to Win Afghanistan without Afghan Women,” *Small Wars Journal*, 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/370-pottinger.pdf>.

¹²⁸ Long, “Effectiveness of U.S. Military Female Engagement Teams,” 30.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 36.

Afghanistan and Iraq have proven that the military needs to have a more effective partnership with interagency and civilian development actors.¹³²

As a matter of fact, female liaison officers may be more adept at fostering cooperation between humanitarian organizations and the military.¹³³ According to Egnell, “male dominance of the military has been pointed to as one of the cultural features that create friction between military and humanitarian organizations.”¹³⁴ Major goals of humanitarian organizations are to save lives, alleviate suffering, and promote compliance with international law. This agenda requires “sustained interaction and dialogue by humanitarian actors with international military and peacekeeping forces. Such dialogue may involve raising awareness of the specific obligations of the forces concerned under international law and alerting them to the impact of their operations on civilians.”¹³⁵ Lyla Hoffman argues that women typically are more cooperative, tolerant, caring, and kind by their social conditioning, while men are more competitive and aggressive.¹³⁶ Because women are seen as more approachable, they are also seen as better interlocutors with humanitarian actors, and they release other regular soldiers for more traditional military duties.¹³⁷

Indeed, research conducted by Anita Woolley and Thomas Malone concluded that women are often better at reading the emotions of other people, and well-suited to work in a collaborative environment. According to their research, “the ability to perceive and sense emotional changes leads to more collaborative patterns of group behavior and

¹³² Long, “Effectiveness of U.S. Military Female Engagement Teams,” 35.

¹³³ Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 40.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Victoria Metcalfe, *Protecting Civilians? The Interaction between International Military and Humanitarian Actors* (HPG Working Paper) (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2012), 1, <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7768.pdf>.

¹³⁶ Lyla Hoffman, “Militarism and Sexism Control America,” in David L. Bender, *The American Military: Opposing Viewpoints* (St. Paul, MN: Greenhaven Press, 1983), 79–85

¹³⁷ Donna Bridges and Debbie Horsfall, “Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping: Toward a Gender-Balanced Force,” *Armed Forces and Society* 36, no. 1 (2009): 127.

women tend to score higher than men in this category.”¹³⁸ The study also demonstrated that groups dominated by only men or only women are “collectively less intelligent than groups where communication is evenly shared [between both genders].”¹³⁹ There is a link between the organizational success and the number of women in the organizations. The U.S. Catalyst Information Center that tracks different studies, for example, concluded that most of the studies reveal that “companies with the most women board directors, especially those with three or more women board directors, had better financial performance than those with the least women board directors.”¹⁴⁰ Thus, to enhance a team’s collective intelligence and improve executive-level decisions, it is necessary to include the second half of the population that is underutilized.¹⁴¹

Fenner and deYoung argue that diversity within a team is a crucial element of success, each individual brings his or her own contribution to the completion of the task.¹⁴² Lester L. Lyles claims that “current and future challenges can be better met by broadening our understanding of diversity and by effectively leading our uniformed men and women in ways that fully leverage their differences.”¹⁴³

D. THE DEBATE ABOUT WOMEN’S INTEGRATION INTO THE ARMED FORCES

Sexual integration of combat forces very often is seen by adversaries of women in the military as change that is “posing a significant threat to national security.”¹⁴⁴ First of all, they argue that the inclusion of females in the armed forces may create a segment of the military that is physically weaker and that women’s mental capabilities put the

¹³⁸ Anita Woolley and Thomas Malone, “Defend Your Research: What Makes a Team Smarter? More Women,” *Harvard Business Review*, June 2011, quoted in Ellen L. Haring, “Women in Battle, What Women Bring to the Fight,” *Parameters* 43, no. 2 (2013): 28.

¹³⁹ Haring, “Women in Battle,” 28.

¹⁴⁰ “Why Diversity Matters,” Catalyst Knowledge Center, last modified July 27, 2012, <http://catalyst.org/knowledge/why-diversity-matters>, quoted in Ellen L. Haring, “Women in Battle, What Women Bring to the Fight,” *Parameters* 43, no. 2 (2013): 29.

¹⁴¹ Haring, “Women in Battle,” 32.

¹⁴² Fenner and deYoung, *Women in Combat*, 17.

¹⁴³ Military Leadership Diversity Commission, *From Representation to Inclusion*, 3–4.

¹⁴⁴ Browne, *Co-ed Combat*, 289.

success of all missions at risk when it comes to combat actions.¹⁴⁵ Many still view female exclusion from the infantry as appropriate, if not necessary, due to the perception that women have physiological limitations.¹⁴⁶ The proponents of women in the military, however, claim that the arguments against women's integration into the armed forces have very little empirical support and are based on flawed assumptions. The arguments against integration rely on an expression of the gender roles that were established in the society a long time ago and are no longer relevant.¹⁴⁷

Adversaries of women in the military also posit that women are "less physically aggressive, able to withstand less pain, less willing to take physical risks, less motivated to kill."¹⁴⁸ The proponents of women in the military, however, claim that "aggressiveness and suitability for military service are learned social skills, they are not something one is born with."¹⁴⁹ Moreover, even though the United States, for example, has been involved in two major recent wars, "seventy-five percent of American soldiers currently do not fill combat positions, yet they execute vitally important military functions."¹⁵⁰ This example also translates to the military forces of other nations, which have not been engaged in the same level of combat operations.

Women are, indeed, more controlled than men in managing violence. Men are competitive by nature, and aggressiveness tends to escalate between men in a strongly male-dominated situation. Donna Winslow's research about Canadian units in a mission in Somalia concludes that hyper-masculinity of the troops resulted in a rise of violence

¹⁴⁵ Browne, *Co-ed Combat*, 291.

¹⁴⁶ King, "Women in Battle," 21.

¹⁴⁷ Snyder, "Citizen-Soldier Tradition," 194.

¹⁴⁸ Browne, *Co-ed Combat*, 291.

¹⁴⁹ Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 15.

¹⁵⁰ Snyder, "Citizen-Soldier Tradition," 195.

and criminal acts.¹⁵¹ Aggressiveness is less common when women are present because their influence reduces hyper-masculinity.¹⁵²

Furthermore, adversaries of women in the military argue that women are less suited to war because their deaths are seen by society as more disturbing than men's deaths. Experiences showed, however, that fatalities among female personnel in the armed forces in some countries, such as the United States, for instance, are perceived by the society in the same way as fatalities among male personnel.¹⁵³

Additionally, the adversaries of women in the military also state that the groups where females are added "become less disciplined and more subject to conflict related to sexual jealousy and sexual frustration."¹⁵⁴ The cases about harassment, bullying, and sexual abuse may be seen as validation that the integration of women into the armed forces has damaged the foundations of military discipline; in short, that women are to blame for the negative reaction of their male colleagues. The proponents of women in the military, however, claim that the problem with harassment, bullying, and sexual abuse itself is a lack of discipline and legislation.¹⁵⁵ Anthony King, for instance, writes: "The recognition of these discriminatory processes does not justify them nor can it be used as evidence that women should be excluded no more than the existence of racism in the US Army in the 1940s and 1950s was a legitimate reason for excluding black American soldiers from combat units. Yet these cultural realities are likely to complicate the accession of women into the infantry."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-Political Inquiry* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Resolution, 2000), quoted in Anja Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective* (Stockholm: Edita Collins Printing, 2004), 15.

¹⁵² Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 15.

¹⁵³ Linda Bird Franke, *Ground Zero. The Gender Wars in the Military* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), quoted in Anja Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective* (Stockholm: Edita Collins Printing, 2004), 14.

¹⁵⁴ Browne, *Co-ed Combat*, 291.

¹⁵⁵ Charles Stimson, "Sexual Assault in the Military: Understanding the Problem and How to Fix It," The Heritage Foundation, accessed September 27, 2014, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/sexual-assault-in-the-military-understanding-the-problem-and-how-to-fix-it>.

¹⁵⁶ King, "Women in Battle," 21.

E. PHYSICAL REALITIES

Women's bodies and physicality stand out as long-standing and prominent concerns. Kingsley Browne argues that women are not as physically strong as men and thus can face problems in performing necessary functions on the battlefield. Such authors and scholars as Rosemarie Skaine, Anthony King, and Michael J. Frevola argue that physical strength is necessary for military organizations and that females should achieve the same athletic standards as their male peers and should be treated equally to men to form an effective combat unit.¹⁵⁷ Frevola also emphasizes that physical requirements should be the same for both genders and decided by position, rather than by gender.¹⁵⁸ Equal physical requirements will undercut the argument that women are unqualified to be soldiers.¹⁵⁹ Ellen Haring argues that many women can meet the physical standards required by the military, and thus athletic fitness is not a problem at all.¹⁶⁰

Research from the United States reveals that “over 52 percent of female cadets, albeit a select group, passed the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) using the male standards. In short, a percentage of women are just as physically capable as men.”¹⁶¹ Moreover, the evidence collected from the American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that women can successfully perform in tasks required for infantry soldiers. MAJ Kellie McCoy, an engineer platoon leader, for instance, twice ran through enemy fire to rescue wounded soldiers in Iraq. She received the Bronze Star with Valor. SGT Julia Bringloe rescued or recovered eleven wounded or killed soldiers during a particularly daunting 40-hour period. She was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. SSG Jessica Packard from the U.S. Air Force “scored the fastest course time of both sexes in the 2009 Firefighter Combat Challenge which included carrying a 175-pound victim while wearing

¹⁵⁷ King, “Women in Battle,” 27.

¹⁵⁸ Michael J. Frevola, “Damn the Torpedoes: Full Speed Ahead; The Argument for Total Sex Integration in the Armed Services,” *Connecticut Law Review* 28 (Spring 1996): 637–41.

¹⁵⁹ Rosemarie Skaine, *Women at War: Gender Issues of Americans in Combat* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1999), quoted in James Haley, *Women in the Military* (Miami: Greenhaven Press, 2004), 19.

¹⁶⁰ Haring, “Women in Battle,” 27.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

full bunker gear.”¹⁶² Consequently, it is very possible that women can perform well physically if they receive proper training.

Judith Stiehm’s research showed that with proper training women can become stronger and be able to pass physical requirements.¹⁶³ According to Stiehm, empirical data from military academies proved that women had some dramatic changes in their physical performance. For instance, their capacity to do pushups had increased by 46 percent for the researched period to comply with the physical standards. This change “may have occurred more through learning than through conditioning.”¹⁶⁴ Learning during the physical training is important for cadets because they learn how to fit into the profession.

Women had improvements in their physical achievements, but this had happened only through overachievements. Indeed, “women’s performance may be highly valued when compared to that of other women but devalued when compared to that of men.”¹⁶⁵ Women have had hard time adjusting to the physical requirements in the armed forces because, first, military traditions were developed during the times when only men were citizen-soldiers and,¹⁶⁶ second, women have different physiological traits from men. Indeed, when talking about athletic requirements in the military, it is important to keep in mind that the military was created by men for men and female recruits are, first of all, women that are trained to become soldiers with the male standards established a long time ago. R. Claire Snyder continues that “because the logic of liberalism requires individuals to be treated equally, understood to mean the same, liberal policies have been

¹⁶² Mathew McGovern, “Air Force Firefighters Demonstrate Skills at 2009 Scott Firefighter Combat Challenge,” *U.S. Air Force Military News* (November 20, 2009), quoted in Ellen L. Haring, “Women in Battle, What Women Bring to the Fight,” *Parameters* 43, no. 2 (2013): 31.

¹⁶³ “A 1997 study to determine the effectiveness of adding an extra 8 hours per week of physical training for female soldiers demonstrated that after 14 weeks, 78 percent of participants could successfully achieve male-level standards but only to the minimum passing level.” Clark Summers, “Women: The Combat Multiplier of Asymmetric Warfare,” *Military Review* (July-August 2013), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130831_art013.pdf.

¹⁶⁴ Judith Hicks Stiehm, *Bring Me Men and Women: Mandated Change at the U.S. Air Force Academy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 168.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 163.

¹⁶⁶ Snyder, “Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 186.

unable to treat women fairly in circumstances where gender difference requires accommodation.”¹⁶⁷ It is, however, more important to use empirical research to identify and apply the physical demands as required by each branch of the military to fulfill their goals than to rely upon a blanket set of outdated masculine standards for all recruits to meet, regardless of the tasks they will perform.

Robert Egnell posits that military effectiveness relies on the ability to succeed on the battlefield, and traditional theories have overemphasized physical strength as a key factor necessary for the effectiveness of the armed forces. The assumption that any changes pose a danger to the functioning system because the structure and culture in the military are already adapted and capable of performing well in war is mistaken.¹⁶⁸

Unfortunately, athletic tests in the military academies, and especially in the air forces, still tend to emphasize the kinds of strength that are characteristically male—whether or not these strengths are useful to the tasks at hand.¹⁶⁹ For example, Judith Stiehm emphasizes that physical requirements may be irrelevant because pilots, as one example, do not need the kind of upper-body strength demanded by the criteria specified in the military academies.¹⁷⁰ Similarly, fitness standards remain skewed toward a male ideal. Stiehm posits that “the academy’s physical testing may distinguish men with higher overall strength and endurance and with more positive attitudes from ‘lesser’ men, but the tests make little presence of relating to professional needs.”¹⁷¹ Indeed, “physical size is not controlling in technological, conventional, or guerrilla warfare.”¹⁷² Thus, existing physical requirements may not always reflect the demands of duty.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁷ Snyder, “Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 190.

¹⁶⁸ Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 33.

¹⁶⁹ Stiehm, *Bring Me Men and Women*, 147–73.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 152.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

In the U.S. Air Force Academy, for example, research indicated that cadets were gaining too much weight to meet physical requirements,¹⁷⁴ and even though they were considered fine athletic specimens by the academy football coaches, the pilot trainers identified them as overweight and unfit.¹⁷⁵ The fat concern became widely discussed in the air force. Air force pilot trainers did not want prospective female cadets to obtain the higher levels of muscle mass necessary to match male physical requirements, as muscle is identified to be heavier than fat. Thus, the question here becomes whether women should achieve the same physical standards as men or if they should have to receive different training with different standards.

Another question is “whether cadets could be treated as a unit with women clustered in the lower half of the distribution or whether the two groups would better be treated separately.”¹⁷⁶ The decision was made to teach physical development to the women and men separately.¹⁷⁷ “The solution was to develop substitute courses for the women based on physiological differences and to use the general term ‘competitives’ for both the women’s and the men’s most rigorous courses.”¹⁷⁸ “The physical training programs were said to have as their purpose not attaining equal absolute strength, not managing one’s own body weight, but giving equal efforts.”¹⁷⁹

The different physiological characteristics that women have actually may be beneficial in different situations. John Nicholson, for instance, posits that women have more flexible body joints than men, are less bothered by living in crowded conditions, and are more capable of withstanding the very hot or very humid weather conditions.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁴ “PFT tests scores showed that the cadet women were becoming more fit; scales showed they were getting heavier. Since lean muscle is 25 percent heavier than fat, both findings were perfectly expectable. The women could simultaneously be heavier, healthier, and less fat.” Stiehm, *Bring Me Men and Women*, 171.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 166.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 163.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 156.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 159.

¹⁸⁰ John Nicholson, *Men and Women: How Different Are They?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 89–90, 100, 137.

R. Claire Snyder states that “men have greater upper body strength, but women have better endurance; men can run faster, but women have better eye-hand coordination.”¹⁸¹ Consequently, it is reasonable to have such training standards, which would benefit each gender and improve their abilities and skills. Such standards should be “rigorous enough that they actually challenge women to achieve their maximal level of physical fitness.”¹⁸²

F. COHESION

Another example of the military practices developed in the era when only men were citizen-soldiers is that traditionally, the military was trying to lure young men by promising to transform each recruit into “a real man.” The following advertisements were used: “Join the army, be a man;” “The army will make a man out of you;” or “We only take a few good men.”¹⁸³ R. Claire Snyder posits that “while turning basic training into a test of manhood functions effectively in that it makes young males want to become soldiers, this approach, unfortunately, often entails the denigration of women.”¹⁸⁴

Sometimes, drill instructors refer to recruits as feminine, portraying women in negative terms. They use comparisons with women to signify “the epitome of all that is cowardly, passive, untrustworthy, unclean, and undisciplined.”¹⁸⁵ Recruits may be criticized by being told “you run like a bunch of women.”¹⁸⁶ This phrase is used to motivate soldiers in the military,¹⁸⁷ but it also communicates the message that women cannot be effective soldiers and undermines the credibility of women at arms and, thus, civic equality in the whole society.

An environment that tolerates sexism can teach soldiers to link violence and sexual aggression with the denigration of women. As shown in the Tailhook debacle of

¹⁸¹ Snyder, “Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 196.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 193.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

1991, these soldiers may direct their aggression toward females.¹⁸⁸ Consequently, it is better to prohibit such practices in the military because the main goal of the armed forces is to defend society and its democratic values, including gender equality.¹⁸⁹

At the same time, the tactics that contain sexism have played a valuable role in military socialization for a long time, prior to the inclusion of women in the armed forces. Sexism was used to create male bonding (cohesion) in the military.¹⁹⁰ Cohesion is very important for military organization, as it creates connections between soldiers and makes them responsible for each other in the battlefield. Thus, cohesion is essential to military effectiveness.¹⁹¹ When allowing women in the armed forces, the tactics to establish cohesion without sexism have to be found. To understand how cohesion in the military can be created when integrating gender, there is a need to identify the important elements of cohesion.

According to the RAND Corporation, which conducted a review of studies on unit cohesion in 2010, there are two elements of unit cohesion: social and task cohesion. Social cohesion “is the extent people like each other; task cohesion is the shared commitment group members have toward accomplishing a goal.”¹⁹² Task cohesion is more important to unit performance than social cohesion. Moreover, high social cohesion may actually cause negative group behaviors. Ellen L. Haring states that “high social cohesion is shown to lead to groupthink and polarized attitudes which often result in poor decisions by the group.”¹⁹³ Anthony King also posits that “the social identities of soldiers, and especially their social homogeneity, is less important than whether each fulfills his or her allotted role. Whether they can do the job is more important than likeness.”¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁸ Snyder, “Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 192–93.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 193.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 191.

¹⁹² Haring, “Women in Battle,” 30.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ King, “Women in Battle,” 15.

Consequently, military cohesion relies more on training and professional competence than on personal friendships.¹⁹⁵ U.S. Army Sergeant O’Byrne, for example, observed that in one of the Airborne Brigades, there are guys who openly hate each other. The paradox is that these guys would also die for one another. What cohesion was based on in this case “was not necessarily dependent on personal affection; it was based on competence.”¹⁹⁶ In combat, soldiers are “united around their training, their drills, and the execution of these collective practices, whatever their personal differences.”¹⁹⁷

R. Claire Snyder argues that “sex-segregation might increase levels of unit cohesion...achieving the new soldier identity.”¹⁹⁸ U.S. Lieutenant General Van Riper also posits that to build effective, cohesive, gender-integrated operational units, it is necessary to create “a training environment that builds progressively to that end.”¹⁹⁹ One of the proposed measures that may improve unit cohesion is “the use of one opposite-sex trainer in each operational training unit and the pairing of same-sex units for cooperative exercises.”²⁰⁰ After basic training, it is suggested for soldiers to go through gender-integrated advanced training. Thus, women and men have the opportunity to get to know each other better in long-term work relations, and they learn how to treat each other not as sexual categories, but as individuals.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁵ King, “Women in Battle,” 15.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Snyder, “Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 196.

¹⁹⁹ Paul K. Van Riper, “Gender Integrated/Segregated Training,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 81 (November 1997): 65, quoted in King, “Women in Battle,” 19.

²⁰⁰ Snyder, “Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 197.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

G. WOMEN IN COMBAT: TOOTH VERSUS TAIL

Skaine's research shows that "women have always and everywhere been involved in war."²⁰² Even though women have played a valuable role during war times, their courageous acts are not so well known and recognized as men's are. Linda Bird Francke argues that "the combat issue was never about women but about men."²⁰³ In the Gulf War, for example, some female soldiers were exposed to the direct combat, but these women did not receive the promotions commensurate with what they did.²⁰⁴

Today, women may be assigned to combat billets and serve in close combat specialties in many countries, for example, in Australia, Norway, Canada, Germany, Romania, Poland, Denmark, Finland, France, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, and Sweden.²⁰⁵ According to a 2005 study in Israel, women have superior skills "in discipline and motivation, maintaining alertness, shooting, managing tasks and organization, and displaying knowledge and professionalism in weapons use."²⁰⁶ Moreover, the Norwegian military "has employed women in all ground combat specialties, and in all units, since the early 1980s. The Norwegians report women increase operational effectiveness and there is no evidence that unit cohesion is affected."²⁰⁷

The proponents of women's integration into the infantry identify competence as a key for allowing women into combat units. According to Anthony King, "women might be integrated into the infantry if they are judged like their male peers purely on their performance, not their gender, just as ethnic minorities and gay men have been before them. Arbitrary social criteria became less important for inclusion than competence."²⁰⁸ Mady W. Segal states that there is an analogy between racial integration and women's

²⁰² Rosemarie Skaine, *Women at War: Gender Issues of Americans in Combat* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1999), 19.

²⁰³ Skaine, *Women at War*, 25.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ Haring, "Women in Battle," 30.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ King, "Women in Battle," 17.

integration in the armed forces. At the beginning, racially mixed units were less effective than all-white or all-black units, but over time their performance increased.²⁰⁹

However, prohibition of women from combat positions is still seen as necessary by adversaries of women's integration into the infantry. Some authors suggest that women at arms should not be assigned to the billets with high risk of combat exposure.²¹⁰ As the arguments in support of gender-specific military assignment, policy scholars often "include an increased risk of depression, anxiety, suicide ideation, and posttraumatic stress syndrome for females in combat."²¹¹

Contrasting research, however, shows that the experience of combat actually influences the strength of the individual's mental health. For example, "research on data collected between 1994 and 2001 suggests...women in combat support positions required hospitalization less frequently for mental health issues than women in less strenuous assignments."²¹²

Some scholars identify mental qualifications as more important to the combat than brawn and provide strong arguments in support of allowing female-soldiers to serve in combat roles. According to Rosemarie Skaine "brain and agility are the key elements to combat aircraft, not brawn."²¹³ Women as well as men possess mental qualifications,²¹⁴ and it is also wrong to not give freedom to one-half of the human intellect.²¹⁵ Furthermore, "modern weaponry is more technologically operated than in the past."²¹⁶ The weapons are getting lighter and easier to operate.

²⁰⁹ Christine L. Williams, *Gender Differences at Work: Women and Men in National Occupations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 10.

²¹⁰ Lawrence V. Fulton et al., "Policy Implications for Female Combat Medic Assignment: A Study of Deployment and Promotion Risk," *Armed Forces & Society* 38, no. 3 (2012): 500.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 501.

²¹² *Ibid.*

²¹³ Skaine, *Women at War*, 27.

²¹⁴ Manuel Davenport, "Women in Combat," *Southwest Philosophy Review* 8, no. 2 (1992):13–21.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ Skaine, *Women at War*, 25.

The other strong argument in support of allowing female soldiers to serve in combat roles is that “the old front line no longer exists because present day conflicts are peacekeeping tasks.”²¹⁷ However, even though combat actions and tasks, which are traditionally labeled as support functions, are different types of military missions, there is, indeed, a very blurred line between them. Soldiers in support non-combat units may also be exposed to the direct combat, hostile fire, or risk of capture. Women at arms work in dangerous billets when they are assigned to search the female indigenous population. Such tasks are traditionally labeled as support functions, but “may require females to engage in direct combat.”²¹⁸

According to the RAND report, women presently hold military jobs in combat support missions in Iraq or Afghanistan, which include, among others gunners, medics, helicopter pilots, truck drivers, and military police, which are all considered to be very dangerous occupations. To view these women at arms as those who are not recognized as participants of combat actions is not quite right because a lot of female soldiers who are taking support positions are also involved in the war actions and at risk to lose their life. The most dangerous occupation of the military positions in non-traditional warfare situations is to drive a truck, and it is still considered as a combat support role.²¹⁹

Moreover, medics, for example, have to risk their lives to save soldiers during combat. Specialist Monica Brown (a U.S. military combat medic), for instance, “earned the Silver Star for operations in Afghanistan, after she ran through insurgent gunfire and used her body as a shield to protect soldiers injured in an improvised explosive device attack.”²²⁰ Such scholars as Lawrence V. Fulton, Matthew S. Brooks, Timothy K. Jones, Matthew J. Schofield, and Hershell L. Moody agreed that “although the decision to remove gender coding of billets for combat medics would require moral courage and face

²¹⁷ Skaine, *Women at War*, 25.

²¹⁸ Fulton et al., “Policy Implications,” 503.

²¹⁹ Penny Venetis et al., *Targeting Youth: What Everyone Should Know About Military Recruiting in Public High Schools* (Newark, NJ: Constitutional Litigation Clinic, Rutgers School of Law-Newark, 2008), 47. <https://law.newark.rutgers.edu/files/u/MilitaryRecruitingReportConLitFinal.pdf>.

²²⁰ Fulton et al., “Policy Implications,” 502.

political opposition, the necessity to do so in current operations has evidentiary support.”²²¹

To sum up, often the opponents of gender integration imagine a traditional type of warfare, fought by armies on well-defined battlefields. However, this ideal is rarely the case in contemporary conflicts. For a military to succeed in the challenging conflicts of today, it must actively seek out personnel who are technologically adept and able to make correct decisions when presented with complicated circumstances. Research has shown that women are not only capable of performing the required tasks, but in many cases, may excel in these areas. Additionally, if women gain full acceptance into combat roles, the female soldiers who have already performed admirably in peacekeeping operations may finally gain the recognition that their actions deserve.

²²¹ Fulton et al., “Policy Implications,” 509.

III. DESCRIPTION OF WOMEN IN UN FORCES

The formation of UN peacekeeping forces began in 1948, during the early years of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the decades since, UN peacekeepers have been deployed in 69 operations around the world.²²²

The United Nations has no standing army. It instead relies upon the contributions of its member states, who send troops from their own militaries or police forces to participate in various peacekeeping operations.²²³ Personnel contribution levels vary from state to state. Often, poorer nations contribute a larger force than some of the larger world players. For instance, Tanzania currently contributes 2325 police, military experts, and troops, while the United States only contributes 127. Ukraine, for its part, presently supplies 569.²²⁴

The United Nations peacekeeping force consists of roughly 125,000 police, military, and civilians. Only three percent of the military personnel are women. Women are making the largest gains within the police.²²⁵ Between 2005 and 2010, the number of female police officers in UN peacekeeping missions doubled, reaching six percent.²²⁶ By 2012, the number had reached 10 percent, and the UN created a stated goal of 20 percent by the end of 2014. There are currently three all-female police units in deployment around the world. Notably, India sent a force of 103 female police officers to Liberia that also brought along 22 men in supportive roles as cooks, mechanics, and drivers.²²⁷

The UN has no restrictions excluding women from any military appointments for their peacekeeping operations. “Women participate as logistic officers, medical staff,

²²² “History of Peacekeeping,” United Nations, accessed January 20, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml>.

²²³ “Troop and Police Contributors,” United Nations, accessed January 20, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ “Women in Peacekeeping,” United Nations, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml>.

²²⁶ Doreen Carvajal, “A Female Approach to Peacekeeping,” *New York Times*, March 5, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/06/world/africa/06iht-ffpeace.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>.

²²⁷ Ibid.

trainers, operations and legal officers, pilots and navigators, in intelligence, communication, technical, administrative, engineering and liaison functions.”²²⁸

While the staff at UN headquarters are mostly even in terms of gender, there are gains to be made within the civilian staff for peacekeeping missions. Of the 6,800 international civilian workers participating in peacekeeping and special political missions, women make up 29 percent of international staff and only 17 percent of national staff.²²⁹

About thirty-one women have held senior leadership positions in UN operations since 1948. “The first female special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) was appointed in 1992, Margaret Joan Antsee of the United Kingdom to the UN Angola Verification Mission.”²³⁰ In 2012, however, a noticeable decrease in the participation of women at the director level occurred.²³¹

The UN has identified seven broad barriers that have impeded gender parity. These include a lack of mechanisms to properly maintain accountability, oversight and enforcement, inadequate measures designed to attain a gender-equal environment, as well as a non-existent focal point system, inflexible work arrangements, poor recruitment outreach, insufficient numbers of qualified female applicants, and poor data regarding female personnel attrition rate causes.²³²

UN personnel policies also play a factor in the unequal gender distribution of personnel. For instance, personnel may be offered a position with long absences from home. Such an opportunity may be viewed by a man as a career booster; for a woman,

²²⁸ Annette H. Leijenaar, “Women’s Participation in Peacekeeping Forces” (presentation, Santiago, Chile, November 5, 2002), 2, www.oocities.org/womenpeacekeeping/ppleijenaar.doc.

²²⁹ “Women in Peacekeeping.”

²³⁰ Sahana Dharmapuri, *Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping (Providing for Peacekeeping no. 4)*, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2013), 3, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/IPI-EPub-Not-Just-a-Numbers-Game.pdf>.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² Elizabeth F. Defeis, “The United Nations and Women—A Critique,” *William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law* 17, no. 2 (2011): 424.

accepting this position may elicit criticism from others and be regarded as abdication of her family responsibilities.²³³

A. CREATION OF THE UNSCR 1325

In the 1990s, the world watched as the wars that raged in Bosnia, Rwanda, and West Africa demonstrated a disturbing trend: the targeting of civilian populations, use of sexual violence against women as a weapon, and exclusion of female voices from peace processes. It became abundantly clear that the global community needed to work toward greater participation, protection, and relief for women in conflict zones.²³⁴

When it was Namibia's turn to chair the UN Security Council in 2000, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, who was the country's Minister of Women's Affairs at the time, took the opportunity to initiate UNSCR 1325, which, in large part, used the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action as its basis. Namibia, who themselves had sent peacekeeping troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998, worked in coordination with Jamaica and Canada to pass UNSCR 1325. Notable was the involvement of various NGOs, including the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO WG), which also helped to educate Security Council members on the resolution. Due in large part to these efforts, UNSCR was adopted unanimously on October 31, 2000.²³⁵

The main objective of the UNSCR 1325 is to strengthen the participation of women in peace and security efforts. It emphasizes that "the international community must be sensitive to and take special account of women's vulnerable situation in times of war, and UN member states must cooperate to involve women in peace-building and conflict-resolution processes."²³⁶ Successful implementation of UNSCR 1325 requires an increase in the number of women peacekeepers in peace support operations, and

²³³ Defeis, "The United Nations and Women—A Critique," 424–25.

²³⁴ Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik, and Aisling Swaine, *Women in Peace and Security through United Nations Security Resolution 1325: Literature Review, Content Analysis of National Action Plans, and Implementation* (Washington, DC: Institute for Global and International Studies, 2014), 12–13.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 4.

supporting local women's peace initiatives.²³⁷ "According to UNSCR 1325, appointing or recruiting more women leaders, decision-makers, military or police officers, and foot soldiers is a means of better protecting the safety and rights of women and girls."²³⁸ The resolution also stresses the importance of education in mainstreaming gender perspective because the inclusion of women in military operations does not automatically mean that the gender perspective is guaranteed.

B. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

The recruitment process of all potential military UN peacekeepers is done on the national level. This means that potential female peacekeepers must compete with their male counterparts during the pre-selection process.²³⁹ A majority of the military "are recruited collectively as formed units (infantry battalion, engineering company, etc.)."²⁴⁰ However, specialized military personnel, such as staff officers, make up a small percentage of all military personnel and are recruited individually. Uniformed peacekeepers undergo a pre-selection and vetting process in their countries since they apply through a national authority, such as a ministry of defense.

Because officers are contributed by many countries with different policing systems and training standards, the UN developed pre-deployment training standards for potential peacekeepers to bring all participating nations to the same level of preparedness. In 1999, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which was composed of individuals experienced in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, created the document, known as the Brahimi Report, in which specific recommendations for change in the existing peace operations were made. The importance of military training was recognized in the Brahimi Report, and recommendations about how troop-

²³⁷ Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 4.

²³⁸ Katherin M. Jennings, *Women's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Agents of Change or Stranded Symbols?* (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, September 2011), 3.

²³⁹ "Getting Involved," United Nations, accessed January 20, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/recruitment.shtml>.

²⁴⁰ Alberto Cutillo, *Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for United Nations Peacekeepers (Providing for Peacekeeping no. 5)* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2013), 5, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi_epub_deploying_the_best.pdf.

contributing countries should train future peacekeepers provided in the report.²⁴¹ According to the Panel, UN peacekeeping missions require adequate resources and equipment, and deployed personnel must be well-trained and well-informed about the mission environment, and conduct operations using mandates that are clear, credible and achievable.²⁴²

In addition to the recommendations about training standards provided in the Brahimi Report, in 2008 UN drafted its first comprehensive strategy for training.²⁴³ UN strategy has identified three primary phases of peacekeeping training: pre-deployment training, induction training, and ongoing training. The pre-deployment training for military and police units is the responsibility of the member states, while for civilian personnel this training is left to the Integrated Training Service (ITS). Pre-deployment training is mission-specific and based on UN standards. Induction training can be conducted at UN headquarters or during the deployment as mission-specific training. It can be generic and specialized, and includes training for civilian personnel as well as military police. The final phase is ongoing training for military, police, or civilian personnel, which is performed at headquarters or in the field after induction training.²⁴⁴

Before and during deployment, uniformed personnel are given training that covers “the protection, rights and needs of women and girls, the importance of the participation of women in operations and missions and cultural communication to understand the specific gender context in the area of operations.”²⁴⁵ Specific training for gender advisors may be provided by some nations before deployment.²⁴⁶

²⁴¹ Cutillo, *Deploying the Best*, 1.

²⁴² “‘Brahimi Report’—Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000),” United Nations, accessed January 20, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml.

²⁴³ Cutillo, *Deploying the Best*, 1.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁴⁵ Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz, “Women, NATO and the European Union,” in *The Role of Women and Gender in Conflict* (La Rioja: The University of La Rioja, 2012): 96, <http://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4056000/1.pdf>.

²⁴⁶ Ruiz, “Women, NATO and the European Union,” 97.

Uniformed personnel—women and men—who are applying for the positions of the UN military observers (UNMOs), however, have better defined tasks and training needs compared to other uniformed personnel, because UN guidelines on the training of UNMOs were adopted as early as 1997, which is earlier than guidelines on the training of other military personnel. The guidelines assume that military observers have gained many of the required skills during the normal path of a military career, and also presupposes that donating countries will conduct national-level training for the UNMOs themselves.²⁴⁷

Overall, training activities can be general or specialized. Specialized training “is meant to provide trainees with skills and knowledge that are required regardless of their specific area of expertise (UN’s basic role and structure, international law, safety and security, sexual exploitation and abuse, code of conduct, etc.).”²⁴⁸ General training “targets specific functions (human resources management, logistics, computer skills, language skills, etc.).”²⁴⁹ Senior leaders receive specific and ad hoc training activities through “the Senior Leadership Induction Program (SLIP) and the Senior Mission Leaders Course (SML).”²⁵⁰

The objectives of the SLIP course are “to provide newly appointed senior leaders in a UN peacekeeping operation with an orientation on peacekeeping issues, such as the main challenges faced when implementing mandates and the relationship between the field and UN headquarters.”²⁵¹ The SLIP, a mandatory program, is facilitated by Integrated Training Service (ITS) and takes place twice annually at UN headquarters in New York.²⁵² The SML’s objective is to prepare potential mission leaders for the roles and responsibilities of senior leaders in UN peacekeeping operations. SML enables “member state officials responsible for UN peacekeeping issues to better understand how

²⁴⁷ Cutillo, *Deploying the Best*, 5.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² *Ibid.*

current UN peacekeeping operations are managed.”²⁵³ SML courses are organized “by a host member state and DPKO, represented by ITS.”²⁵⁴ As explained here, attention has been paid by the UN to both, the training for potential peacekeepers and training for leadership roles for military personnel; however, underprepared personnel have been deployed to the field.²⁵⁵

C. WOMEN AT ARMS: EXPERIENCES FROM UN

According to international research, the presence of servicewomen in peace support operations has helped to create stable relations with the local population of the area affected by the conflict, and enhance trust in the efforts to reconstruct their countries and build democracy.²⁵⁶ Women police-peacekeepers in missions in Namibia (UNTAG), South Africa (UNOMSA), and Rwanda (UNAMIR) were seen by locals as less threatening, less violent, and more willing to listen.²⁵⁷ Experiences from NOBATT, the Norwegian battalion in Lebanon, showed that female peacekeepers developed very good relations with women from the local population; thus peacekeepers have gained access to valuable information needed for the success of the mission. An all-woman battalion of Ghanaians that was participating in the United Nations Mission in Liberia “established a relationship that improved intelligence gathering by connecting informally with local women who were initially reticent to report crimes or suspicious activities.”²⁵⁸

The presence of UN servicewomen in conflict areas has been shown to improve the security of the local female population and reduce sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). From February 2009 to July 2010 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) set up about 60 Joint Protection Teams (JPT) in areas affected by conflict, tasked with making assessments and providing more effective protection to local populations. Forty percent of JPT personnel

²⁵³ Cutillo, *Deploying the Best*, 6.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 1.

²⁵⁷ Dharmapuri, *Not Just a Numbers Game*, 7.

²⁵⁸ Kraus, Enholm, and Bowen, *U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping*, 33.

were women. Local women reported that JPT reduced the numbers of attacks on females who were going to the markets, wells and fields. Furthermore, female peacekeepers were “seen by local women as the best interlocutors for addressing sexual and gender based violence.”²⁵⁹

Also, the presence of females within a peacekeeping operation is a strategy that works “against the undisputed trend of some male soldiers behaving badly when deployed overseas.”²⁶⁰ In practice, more females within a peacekeeping operation reduce the number of sexual assaults committed by UN personnel. “With regard to the problem of sexual exploitation or abuse committed by UN personnel, women are less likely to be perpetrators, thus lowering the overall level of sexual exploitation or abuse committed.”²⁶¹ In addition, an Indian all-female peacekeeping unit securing Monrovia introduced self-defense classes and night patrols for teenage girls to prevent SGBV in the community. Women peacekeepers’ presence, “alongside focused activities, effectively eroded intimidation and provided reassurance for vulnerable groups, creating a more hospitable environment for civilian women.”²⁶²

Furthermore, women peacekeepers provide positive role models for local women; and thus “help contribute to more equitable gender relations within the local society.”²⁶³ In the UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone, for example, “female police peacekeepers have played a critical role in enhancing the skills of national female police and influenced the recruitment of more women into the police forces.”²⁶⁴ Likewise, a 103-strong, all-female peacekeeping unit from India policing Monrovia inspired local Liberian women to join the police force. Indian female peacekeepers’ visits to Liberian high schools and colleges “reportedly contributed to an increased registration of girls and women in the

²⁵⁹ *Ten-Year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping, Final Report to the United Nations* (New York: UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, 2010): 27, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/10year_impact_study_1325.pdf.

²⁶⁰ Bridges and Horsfall, “Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping,” 127.

²⁶¹ Jennings, *Women’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 3.

²⁶² Kraus, Enholm and Bowen, *U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping*, 33.

²⁶³ Jennings, *Women’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 4.

²⁶⁴ *Ten-Year Impact Study*, 27.

security sector.”²⁶⁵ When more Liberian women joined the police force, the number of exploitations and abuses by peacekeepers decreased.²⁶⁶

Additionally, female peacekeepers in the UN missions are a good example of women’s empowerment. Women peacekeepers in the UNTAG mission in Namibia, for example, inspired local women to aim at achieving independent elections regardless of gender and creation of a gender-equality-based, democratic constitution.²⁶⁷ The UNTAG mission in Namibia “is considered to be one of the UN’s most successful missions.”²⁶⁸ Another example is from a mission in Sierra Leone, when one of the peacekeepers’ tasks was to encourage women to vote and participate in the peace-building processes. The goal of the mission was to create a new social structure and to support the opportunity for women to take decision-making positions. The mission was accomplished successfully with the help of female peacekeepers, and provided support for women to be able to generate an income and take advantage of communal childcare.²⁶⁹

“Having female and male peacekeepers working side-by-side can be catalytic in breaking down traditional views that discriminate and marginalize women.”²⁷⁰ Consequently, after four sequential rotations of the UN all-female units, “there is significant erosion of long-standing harmful practices that have inhibited women (specifically rampant child marriage, polygamy and prostitution).”²⁷¹

Thus, “the UN rightly highlights female soldiers as absolutely essential for certain tasks in peace operations.”²⁷² Therefore, all member states are encouraged to send more

²⁶⁵ *Ten-Year Impact Study*, 27.

²⁶⁶ Hendricks and Hutton, *Defense Reform and Gender*, 4.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 12.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ Kraus, Enholm, and Bowen, *U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping*, 34.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 40.

women to peacekeeping operations.²⁷³ The UN recognizes that the number of women-peacekeepers that is needed for operations should be leveled about 30 percent. Inger Skjelsba, in her research, concluded that 30 percent is a critical mass of women that have to be present in the military systems in order to be able to exercise influence over the majority of men.²⁷⁴ However, counting heads does not automatically mean that success is guaranteed for the organization. If, for example, a military organization “has up to 15-percent women within its ranks, but they all cook and clean, this cannot be seen as being in line with the intentions of UNSCR 1325. The number of women in a given national military, as well as within an international military operation, must be weighed against the positions and ranks these women hold.”²⁷⁵

Even though some efforts have been made to increase the percentage of women’s presence in the military and police forces of member states, they are not sufficient. Women who were sent to peace support operations have not been holding decision-making posts.²⁷⁶ Thus, peace support operations often lack gender perspective that has to be carefully prepared. Anja Stegen posits that “women must be allowed to work together with men in creating conflict-resolution and peace processes that allow equal terms for men and women. Lasting peace and democracy are not achieved by protecting women from different forms of gender-related violence, but by including them in important decision-making positions in the community.”²⁷⁷ It is important to mention that “those in command play a vital role when it comes to policies involving gender being implemented and gender equality aspects being reinforced in initiatives and in the host country.”²⁷⁸

²⁷³ Inger Skjelsbæk, *Gender Aspects of International Military Interventions: National and International Perspectives* (Report to the Norwegian Ministry of Defense), (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2007), 27.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁶ Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 5.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

One important step toward the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is the creation of National Action Plans (NAPs)²⁷⁹ or other national level strategies (S/PRST/2004/40 and S/PRST/2005/52)²⁸⁰ for certain member states.²⁸¹ National Action Plans and national level strategies are developed by both governments and civil society.²⁸² “To date, there are 48 countries that have adopted a National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security.”²⁸³ “National Action Plans offer a tool for governments to articulate priorities and coordinate the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 at national level. NAPs serve as a guiding national policy document that is able to capture the diverse set of government bodies and stakeholders tasked with security, foreign policy, development and gender equality.”²⁸⁴

To conclude, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 was a necessary step in order to put an end to institutionalized discrimination of half of the population—women—in conflict areas, and also helped to identify new roles that women play in peacekeeping operations. After introducing women at arms into the peacekeeping forces, it became obvious that women possess specific qualifications that benefit military missions.

²⁷⁹ Statement by the President of the Security Council, Women, Peace and Security (October 31, 2002): “The Security Council ... encourages Member States, the entities of the United Nations system, civil society and other relevant actors, to develop clear strategies and action plans with goals and timetables, on the integration of gender perspectives in humanitarian operations, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, including monitoring mechanisms, and also to develop targeted activities, focused on the specific constraints facing women and girls in post-conflict situations, such as their lack of land and property rights and access to and control over economic resources.” *From Local to Global: Making Peace Work for Women* (New York: NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security, 2005), 48.

²⁸⁰ “UN Security Council Resolution 1325—National Action Plans,” The Women’s UN Report Program and Network, accessed January 26, 2015, http://www.wunrn.com/news/2011/02_11/02_21/022111_un6.htm.

²⁸¹ Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, four additional resolutions on women, peace and security have been adopted (UNSCR 1820, 1888, 1889, 1920). Each of them introduces more new expectations from UN member states.

²⁸² Groothedde, *Gender Makes Sense*, 31.

²⁸³ “Concept Note for Side Event: High-Level Interactive Dialogue Towards a Continental Results Framework on Women Peace and Security in Africa,” UN Women, accessed January 27, 2015, <http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/news/stories/2015/osaa%20concept%20note%20%20csw%2059%20%20%20wps%2010%20march%20%20final.pdf>,

²⁸⁴ “Key Victims Know Too Little about National Action Plan,” The Himalayan Times, last modified June 20, 2014, <http://www.peacewomen.org/content/nepal-key-victims-know-too-little-about-national-action-plan>.

Women, however, constitute a very small percentage (three percent within military personnel and 10 percent within police force) of the UN peacekeeping force when compared to men. This goes against the requirement of UNSCR 1325, which urges member states to send more women peacekeepers in peace support operations (the UN recognizes that the minimum level of women-peacekeepers necessary for operations is about 30 percent). Moreover, poorer countries contribute a larger force and the pre-deployment training is done by member states using the UN standards, which may influence the quality of the deployed personnel. In total, the efforts that were made to increase the presence of women in peacekeeping missions are not sufficient, and women who were sent to peace operations have not been holding any decision-making posts. It was found, however, that senior leaders play an important role in providing opportunities for women to grow in their career and reach decision-making posts.

Moreover, because the recruitment of potential female peacekeepers is done on the national level, which forces servicewomen to undergo a pre-selection and vetting process in their own countries, it is recommended for member states to eliminate the policies and processes that are complicating approval of women-volunteers by the national authorities.

Member-states are encouraged to prepare NAPs as this is an important step toward integration of UNSCR 1325 at the national level. NAPs help member states to set preferences as they deal with the resolution's implementation.

IV. DESCRIPTION OF WOMEN IN NATO FORCES

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on 4 April 1949.”²⁸⁵ NATO is an alliance of 28 member states. It has no standing army and relies upon the contributions of its member states, partner countries, and other troop-contributing countries.²⁸⁶ “National capitals take the final decision on whether to contribute to a NATO-led operation or mission.”²⁸⁷

NATO has its “high readiness and technologically advanced force comprising of land, air, sea and special forces units capable of being deployed quickly on operations wherever needed.”²⁸⁸ It is named NATO Response Force (NRF). “Any decision to use the NRF is a consensual political decision, taken on a case by case basis, by all 28 Allies in the North Atlantic Council (NAC).”²⁸⁹ “NATO’s two Joint Force Commands, based in Brunssum (the Netherlands), and Naples (Italy), take one-year turns to command the NATO Response Force (NRF).”²⁹⁰ “Joint Force Command Naples is in the Standby Command for NRF 2015.”²⁹¹

During the Chicago Summit in 2012, Allied leaders agreed to set a goal of deployable, interoperable, and sustainable forces (NATO Forces 2020). Such forces will be equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded according to the same standards, “to be

²⁸⁵ “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),” Boundless, last modified November 14, 2014, <https://www.boundless.com/u-s-history/textbooks/boundless-u-s-history-textbook/the-cold-war-1947-1991-27/the-cold-war-211/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato-1173-11110/>.

²⁸⁶ “Troop Contributions,” NATO, last modified January 7, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50316.htm.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ “The NATO Response Force,” NATO, March 9, 2015, <http://www.aco.nato.int/page349011837.aspx>.

²⁸⁹ “JFC Brunssum’s Role,” Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, NATO, accessed January 23, 2015, <http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/jfcbrunssum/operations/nato-response-force/history-in-brief.aspx>.

²⁹⁰ “The NATO Response Force.”

²⁹¹ “JFC Brunssum’s Role.”

able to meet NATO's level of ambition and able to operate together and with partners in any environment."²⁹²

In its 65-year history, however, NATO has never had a female secretary general, nor has a woman served as deputy secretary-general. The closest a woman has come to either of these positions was Croatia's president-elect Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, who served as Assistant Secretary-General for Public Diplomacy from 2011 to 2014. The organization has also never had a female supreme allied commander for Europe. Currently, according to the organizational chart of top civilian and military leaders only three women hold top positions in NATO's organizational structure (Csilla Würtz, Secretary of the Council since 2013;²⁹³ Oana Lungescu, NATO Spokesperson since 2010;²⁹⁴ and Mariët Schuurman, Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security since 2014²⁹⁵) in contrast to 80 men.²⁹⁶ If one of the NATO goals is to set example for other nations and to use gender perspective effectively during the operations, then there should be more women at the top level of the organization.

The proportion of female soldiers in NATO member states "varied considerably, with some countries as low as just 3 percent and others as high as 18 percent."²⁹⁷ For instance, in 2012 "number of women in the armies of NATO member states ranged between 20 percent in Hungary and 2.1 percent in Poland."²⁹⁸ Of the Eastern European

²⁹² "Connected Forces Initiative," NATO, last modified September 16, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_98527.htm.

²⁹³ "Secretary of the Council 2013: Csilla Würtz," NATO, last modified October 13, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_113741.htm?.

²⁹⁴ "NATO Spokesperson 2010: Oana Lungescu," NATO, last modified December 18, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_69016.htm.

²⁹⁵ Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security 2014: Mariët Schuurman, last modified October 24, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_114060.htm.

²⁹⁶ Lauren Harrison, "Why NATO Should Have Chosen a Woman as Its New Leader," *Washington Post*, April 7, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/04/07/why-nato-should-have-chosen-a-woman-as-its-new-leader/>; and "Who's Who?," NATO, last modified October 24, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/who_is_who.htm.

²⁹⁷ Ruiz, "Women, NATO and the European Union," 99.

²⁹⁸ "NATO: Boost Number of Women Troops," *Military.com News*, July 10, 2012, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/07/10/nato-boost-number-of-women-troops-chiefs.html>.

states, Hungary ranks highest in integrating women into the military. Poland, in contrast, is at the bottom of these rankings. It should be noted that Poland began to open more positions to women in the armed forces after joining NATO; however, NATO membership alone has not been demonstrated to be the deciding factor on gender inclusiveness in the military.²⁹⁹

Balkan countries are also showing improvements in employing more women in the armed forces. As of 2010, approximately 14 percent of Croatia's police force was constituted of women and government was working to increase this number.³⁰⁰ In 2014, 9.5 percent of Croatian military were women.³⁰¹ Moreover, the first female general officer was appointed in Croatia recently.³⁰² It is noteworthy that Croatia's new president elected in 2015 is a woman, who was previously an assistant secretary general at NATO.³⁰³

As of March 2011, 14 percent of Bulgaria's army was made up of women, with 19 percent in the air force. Of the 165 personnel sent to missions in Afghanistan by Bulgaria in 2011, 13 were women.³⁰⁴

Since 2012 Albania has set a goal of achieving 15 percent female recruitment for its armed forces, though it has not indicated how long this will take. As of 2013, the

²⁹⁹ Lana Obradovic, *Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces: Cross-National Analysis* (Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 126.

³⁰⁰ "Report Establishing the South East Europe Women Police Officers Network Presented in Zagreb," South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, November 5, 2010, <http://www.seesac.org/news.php?id=285>.

³⁰¹ Jennifer Cragg, "Afghan, ISAF Leaders Discuss Gender Integration Into ANSF," NATO Afghanistan Resolute Support, last modified September 21, 2014, <http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-news/afghan-isaf-leaders-discuss-gender-integration-into-ansf.html>.

³⁰² "First Female Army General," *CroatiaWeek*, April 3, 2013, <http://www.croatiaweek.com/first-female-army-general/>.

³⁰³ Joanna Berendt and Joseph Orovic, "Croats Elect Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic as Their First Female President," *New York Times*, January 11, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/world/europe/croats-elect-kolinda-grabar-kitarovic-as-their-first-female-president.html?_r=0.

³⁰⁴ Ivan Dikov, "The Bulgaria 2011 Review: Defense," Sofia News Agency, last modified January 6, 2012, <http://www.novinite.com/articles/135492/The+Bulgaria+2011+Review%3A+Defense..>

percentage of female personnel was 11.2 percent, which actually declined from 13.42 percent in 2012.³⁰⁵ Women make up 29.8% of decision-makers in Albania's Ministry of Defense, and 51.2% of its specialists.³⁰⁶ Currently, only few Albanian women participate in peacekeeping missions.³⁰⁷

“Deputy Secretary General Bisogniero...explained the specific steps taken by NATO to promote the participation of women in peace and security, including: developing guidelines to integrate gender issues into all levels of planning and operations, establishing a code of behavior for all military personnel, deploying gender advisors at NATO headquarters in Kosovo and Kabul, and employing gender experts in several provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan.”³⁰⁸ Moreover, the Deputy Secretary also added that senior leaders play key roles “in promoting the participation of women at all levels of decisionmaking.”³⁰⁹

The majority of NATO member states has opened most military occupations to women and has implemented gender-neutral training standards.³¹⁰ Women and men, thus, are trained using the same instructions and materials.³¹¹ Female personnel are gradually filling different positions in the armed forces. Thus, the numerical proportion of the positions occupied by women in the military is growing. However, this indicator does not show the full scope of integration policy. “The number indicates only the quantitative presence, while the other indicators help measure the quality of that presence.”³¹²

³⁰⁵ Megi Llubani, *Beyond Numbers: Women Representation in the Security Sector in Albania* (Tirana: Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2014), 5.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁰⁷ Gëzim Visoka, “Contributor Profile: The Republic of Albania,” *Providing for Peacekeeping*, last modified June 10, 2014, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Albania-Visoka-12-June-2014-FINAL.pdf>.

³⁰⁸ Ruiz, “Women, NATO and the European Union,” 99.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ Obradovic, *Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces*, 51.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

³¹² *Ibid.*, 52.

Even though most member states have opened military academies to both genders, “the actual percentages of women who have successfully climbed the ladder vary from state to state.”³¹³ Elimination of the restrictions preventing women from reaching the top of the military hierarchy by almost all NATO member states since 2000 does not guarantee women access to the top positions, because, besides other restrictions, often “combat restrictions make it hard for women to rise through the ranks, especially in most Army and Marine corps.”³¹⁴

Greece was among the last member states to remove grade ceilings, and now women and men have the same opportunities for official promotion and training in the military. Bulgaria, however, still has some informal restrictions. According to a 2010 report of the Bulgarian delegation, there are no limitations related to application for study from both genders; however, women are not allowed to be educated in all specialties and thus, they are not given the same opportunity for future career development as men. “The Turkish armed forces seem to be the only ones openly limiting promotional opportunities, primarily because women are not allowed to enlist as privates, and therefore cannot attain ranks that demand field experience.”³¹⁵

The states that still have conscription are recognized to be “the least responsive to gender integration while the states that have undergone recent professionalization and modernization are more responsive.”³¹⁶ States’ accession to NATO influences the policy change, and most NATO members have changed their policy regarding the draft. “With the exception of Turkey, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Germany and Lithuania, all NATO member states have officially abandoned conscription and fully adopted a new all-volunteer and professional armed services model.”³¹⁷

³¹³ Obradovic, *Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces*, 56.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 64.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

A. GENDER INTEGRATION IN NATO

NATO had debates concerning the role of women soldiers in the Alliance prior to the creation and approval of UN Resolution 1325 by the UN. In 1976 NATO's Military Committee (MC) established the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF).³¹⁸ The CWINF is an annual conference comprising of the Chairperson, three Deputy Chairpersons and one Delegate (often senior military personnel working on gender issues within their military forces) from each NATO member state having a representative in the MC.³¹⁹ "Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) nations are normally invited to participate as Observers to the annual CWINF Conference."³²⁰ To support the work of CWINF the office on Women in the NATO Forces (OWINF) was established in 1998 in the International Military Staff (IMS), with the main goal of providing information on gender and diversity.³²¹

NATO, like the UN, notes, "The deployment of female peacekeepers has become not just desirable, but an operational imperative."³²² Therefore, in 2007, NATO "adopted the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325."³²³ One of the committee's most important documents—the *Committee on Women in the NATO Forces: Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming* report—was adopted during the annual meeting in Berlin in June 2007. "This was the Alliance's first major contribution from a perspective of mainstreaming gender into military operations, particularly in three areas: operational planning, education and training and assessment."³²⁴

³¹⁸ *The Committee on Women in the NATO Forces: Best Practices to Improve the Gender Balance* (Brussels: NATO, 2008), 5.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

³²¹ Obradovic, *Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces*, 52.

³²² Skjelsbæk, *Gender Aspects of International Military Interventions*, 29.

³²³ Groothedde, *Gender Makes Sense*, 37.

³²⁴ Ruiz, "Women, NATO and the European Union," 92.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 influenced NATO's further decisions about gender mainstreaming in peace operations. After adoption of both resolutions, the committee's mandate was expanded and had to include incorporation of gender perspectives into NATO missions.³²⁵ In May 2009, CWINF and the Office changed their names to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) and the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives (NOGP).³²⁶

NATO NCGP so far is the only International Military Staff committee that has women in charge. The Committee "consists of military officers and their civilian equivalents from every NATO nation, who are charged with ensuring familiarity with the latest gender-related developments in their country."³²⁷ The Office on Gender Perspectives is collecting, supplying, and sharing information on national policies, programs, and procedures relating to gender. NCGP is managed by an Executive Committee, composed of a chairwoman and a chairwoman-elect (those two should be women officers on active service, who are designated at national level), and two vice-chairwomen.³²⁸

The NATO Action Plan on Mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 into NATO-led operations and missions was approved in 2010. This plan "included clear actions to be taken by the Commanders of the NATO-led operations in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR)."³²⁹ Moreover, "according to NATO's BI-SC Directive 40-1, the full integration of gender perspective within NATO extends to the planning, execution and evaluation phases of NATO-led operations."³³⁰ "The Chicago Summit Declaration (2012) further reinforced this position and underscored a high-level commitment to UNSCR 1325."³³¹

³²⁵ Obradovic, *Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces*, 52.

³²⁶ Ruiz, "Women, NATO and the European Union," 92.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 93.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

³²⁹ Groothedde, *Gender Makes Sense*, 37.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 39.

The priorities of UNSCR 1325 are identified through the NATO partnership frameworks. Thus, partner nations of the Alliance address Women, Peace and Security priorities through Individual Partnership Cooperation Programs, Individual Partnership Action Plans, Planning and Review Process and Annual National Programs.³³² “Currently 17 NATO members and 12 partner nations have National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions.”³³³

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, heads of state and government mandated the “Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and Missions.” In 2013, NATO completed the Review, “which focused on the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the Kosovo Force, recognized that while significant progress has been made, there is still a general lack of awareness among NATO military leaders and their troops.”³³⁴ According to the Review, shortcomings in overall integration of gender perspective into NATO operational planning still exist. Moreover, other shortcomings in such specific areas as training, education, and the provision of gender advisers were found. To address existing problems, the NATO Military Authorities developed an implementation plan, and in October 2013, NATO defense ministers endorsed it.³³⁵

Support of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspective has become an important part of the planning of NATO-led operations in post 2014 Afghanistan; and “the first general officer to serve as the Gender Advisor in NATO-led operations [was] deployed with ISAF in Afghanistan in April 2014.”³³⁶ Furthermore, the Alliance approved such policies and regulations for Human Resources Strategy to promote equality as “a policy on the Prevention and Management of Harassment,

³³² “Progress Report on the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security,” NATO, last modified September 5, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112846.htm?selectedLocale=en.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid.

Discrimination and Bullying in the Work Place.”³³⁷ The Alliance have been also “strengthening the recruitment processes and mentoring [programs].”³³⁸

Moreover, NATO has been stimulating nations to implement gender policies in their governments. The alliance has been collecting data “on national initiatives related to UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions through the NATO Defense Planning Capability Survey and through national reports on recruitment and retention of women and gender training in national armed forces.”³³⁹ In addition, annual reports on gender policies, recruitment, training and education of female personnel in the Armed Forces and during the operations were requested by The Office of the Gender Advisor in the International Military Staff.³⁴⁰

B. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

Military personnel (women and men) are recruited for NATO missions on the national level with the approval of the national authorities. According to the Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) *Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming*, Alliance nations should encourage participation of female personnel in NATO operations because NATO aims at achieving male/female mixed teams in all military missions.³⁴¹ The Alliance highly encourages the creation of gender advisors to support all NATO operations from force generation to re-deployment and the creation of gender action plans that are specific to each NATO operation.³⁴²

Because NATO relies upon the contribution of its member states, the alliance stresses the responsibility of the countries to be able to provide fair recruitment at the national level. According to the NATO’s report, *Best Practices to Improve the Gender Balance*, recruitment of women as well as men at the national level should be no

³³⁷ “Progress Report on the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy.”

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ “CWINF Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming,” NATO, accessed January 12, 2015, http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/cwinf_guidance.pdf.

³⁴² *Committee on Women in the NATO Forces*, 22.

different. Female and male applicants have to meet physical fitness criteria standards in order to be selected for military service. The same tests for both genders should be provided during physical testing, but standards and scores during the fitness tests should be adjusted taking into account biological differences between the two genders. However, “standards for physical tests related to certain functions (e.g., pilot, combat diver)...[should be] the same for men and women.”³⁴³ The score on the fitness test should be included in the applicant’s overall score, and the best candidates should be recruited regardless of their gender.³⁴⁴ Thus, to promote equal opportunities for women and men, it is highly recommended that applications from women be welcomed when they volunteer into the military. They should be able to enter the Military academies if they fulfill requirements.³⁴⁵

To inspire more women to join the military, widespread information campaigns are recommended. They may outline “possibilities to develop military careers for women and to combine professional and family life by men and women.”³⁴⁶ Women at arms may be represented on recruitment websites and brochures, in recruitment centers, and during campaigns, school visits and other events.³⁴⁷ Women should receive full information about their career prospects in the military. Furthermore, to bring more females into the armed forces, the minimum targets should be “established for Recruitment and Education selection for women.”³⁴⁸ It is recommended that the percentage of women to be recruited into the military should be set every year and efforts should be made to obtain the goal that was set.³⁴⁹ Motherhood should not be an obstacle for women who are performing the physical test, as the assignment can remain open while the test is postponed.³⁵⁰ Moreover, the presence of women in the recruitment and selection boards is necessary,

³⁴³ *Committee on Women in the NATO Forces*, 9.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

because it will provide “the female point of view and perspective and gives a positive perception that the boards are fair and representative.”³⁵¹

During their employment, male and female personnel (military and civilian) should have the same rights and duties and receive equal pay for equal positions.³⁵² Countries should create laws securing equal opportunities for both genders within the military in order to prevent gender discrimination and “improve the compatibility of family life and military service.”³⁵³ An institution or committee responsible for issues regarding military and civilian women, which can provide assistance for women to identify gender specific issues and concerns, should be established.³⁵⁴ Moreover, the creation of a gender adviser advisor would provide “a focal point in which gender issues may be raised by serving female members and also acts as an adviser for senior leadership within the Armed Forces.”³⁵⁵

In addition, it is necessary to recognize women’s “body differences in the procurement of protective equipment and organizational clothing.”³⁵⁶ Female personnel should have uniforms, safety vests, and other equipment that would fit their bodies and allow maximum protection and functionality.³⁵⁷ Women also should be provided with separate accommodations and ablutions. “For officers, small facilities can be shared with the use of a flip sign or time-shared schedule.”³⁵⁸ During the time of pregnancy, women should be reassigned to modified duties “without risk of losing their assignment.”³⁵⁹ All these measures will help countries not only to promote gender equality, but also to recruit more qualitative personnel.

³⁵¹ *Committee on Women in the NATO Forces*, 13.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 15.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, 18.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

In order to move forward on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, it is recognized that NATO and its partners must focus on the key tools of education, training and exercises.³⁶⁰ In fact, the NATO Gender Perspectives Committee prepared Recommendations on Implementation of UNSCR 1325, which emphasized that education and training have a positive effect on gender issue awareness and can help apply gender perspectives to operations. Accordingly, action plans were to be developed to include NATO-provided trainings for trainers. This would help countries meet standardization and interoperability requirements.³⁶¹

Indeed, because coherence and interoperability are recognized as a necessity for Allied operations in such a multinational organization as NATO, the alliance stresses the need for exercise programs between nations. Military exercises are often scheduled by a NATO commander.³⁶² “Geographically, NATO is working with a larger number of countries through its cooperation with partner countries and through the creation of NATO training missions as far away as Afghanistan and Africa. Institutionally, education and training have been reinforced through the creation in 2002 of Allied Command Transformation, entirely dedicated to leading the ongoing transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine.”³⁶³ Open access to education and training for both genders is recognized by NATO as required for achieving interoperability and advancing gender equality. Gender perspective training is promoted by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT).³⁶⁴ In 2010 NATO created the *Template for Pre-Deployment Gender Training*. According to the recommendations provided in this document, gender experts in the creation and implementation of the pre-deployment gender training should be created and used for the improvement of pre-

³⁶⁰ “Progress Report on the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy.”

³⁶¹ Ruiz, “Women, NATO and the European Union,” 98.

³⁶² “Exercises and Training,” NATO, accessed February 4, 2015, <http://www.act.nato.int/exercises.aspx>.

³⁶³ “Education and Training,” NATO, last modified February 13, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49206.htm.

³⁶⁴ Amanda L. Kilpatrick, “NATO ACT Promotes Global Gender Perspective Training,” NATO, Allied Command Transformation, last modified January 16, 2015, <http://www.act.nato.int/nato-act-promotes-global-gender-perspective-training>.

deployment training, and lessons should be taught by the gender trainers in mixed-gender teams.³⁶⁵

According to the NATO *Best Practices to Improve the Gender Balance*, gender education in the military should be provided for all military personnel because it raises awareness of individual responsibility for gender equality and creates a foundation for equal treatment of both genders. Gender education should include principles of gender equality, applicable legal regulations, leader responsibilities, train the trainer programs, and publicity of gender rights regulations. Trainings for both genders (such as sexual harassment and equal opportunity) should be provided.³⁶⁶ Gender training should be done during the pre-deployment training and include “gender awareness and cultural considerations with regard to gender.”³⁶⁷ Gender training supposes to create “an environment where all personnel respect each other,”³⁶⁸ increase unit cohesiveness, enhance operational effectiveness, and build respect for NATO missions.³⁶⁹ Integrated military training should be provided for both genders throughout the period of their service, because it “builds solidarity and unity between personnel,”³⁷⁰ and “establishes gender equality from entry into military service.”³⁷¹

Integration of the gender perspective into career development should include creation of the specific programs, which will help to promote equal career opportunities for female personnel.³⁷² It also should include promotion of family-friendly policies to “ensure that family does not disadvantage female personnel’s career development.”³⁷³

³⁶⁵ *Template for Pre-Deployment Gender Training: Topics and Learning Objectives* (Brussels: NATO, Gender Training and Education, 2010), 29.

³⁶⁶ *Committee on Women in the NATO Forces*, 19.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 36.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, 37.

Finally, the presence of both sexes in selection boards should be balanced to even the decision-making process.

Even though some efforts have been made by NATO to improve gender balance, the lack of women in NATO operations is still a reality. There are too few women at the decision-making level. This exclusion also extends to reconstruction and peace processes; and women are underrepresented in operating and tactical posts. Despite the understanding that female participation can improve the security situation of a society and reduce sexual violence, NATO, in practice, has not allocated enough of the resources (knowledge, commitment, training, capacity, and willingness) to boost female participation.³⁷⁴

Because the military traditions of the various member states differ, present and potential NATO requirements cannot be met, as there currently are not enough gender specialists. Overcoming these deficiencies will need time.³⁷⁵

C. WOMEN AT ARMS: EXPERIENCES FROM NATO

Skills of both female and male personnel are recognized as “essential for the operational effectiveness of NATO operations, especially in light of the increasing complexity of civil-military interaction, public relations and information sharing.”³⁷⁶ Female presence “maximizes the potential skills base, drawing on the intellectual, practical/technical and social skills.”³⁷⁷ Local communities perceive female personnel as less threatening. Anja Stegen posits that female personnel are “more inclined to respect and cooperate with the local population in reaching peaceful solutions than the male personnel.”³⁷⁸ British units using female engagement teams (FETs), for example, “were

³⁷⁴ Ruiz, “Women, NATO and the European Union,” 103.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 104.

³⁷⁶ “NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives,” NATO, last modified February 18, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_101372.htm?

³⁷⁷ Hendricks and Hutton, *Defense Reform and Gender*, 4.

³⁷⁸ Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 12.

less frequently ambushed and experienced fewer IED [improvised explosive device] attacks than all-male patrols.”³⁷⁹

The presence of women in NATO missions also strengthens situational awareness in the area of the military operation. The Swedish Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, for instance, gained valuable information about upcoming major events in the town through direct dialogue with local women, and this allowed the Swedish PRT “to create a plan for monitoring the flows of people and helped redirect mission assets and personnel.”³⁸⁰ When military knew details about the upcoming weddings in the area, this could help prevent an escalation of tensions between local community and the military. “Without a benign explanation, personnel could interpret the movement as an insurgent tactic or other form of aggression, which could lead to immediate violence as well as longer-term risks to the force from a resentful community.”³⁸¹ Thus, women at arms in NATO operations helped to strengthen situational awareness and “avoid a misunderstanding that would have had negative implications for mission security.”³⁸²

Women at arms are also needed to perform specific tasks such as body searches, because some cultures do not allow men to search women. Thus, female military personnel are needed at roadblocks, airports, and so on, to perform body searches on women who, for instance, could be smuggling weapons while using pregnancy as a cover.³⁸³ NATO countries, for example, assigned women to FETs, “which were formed to interrogate and conduct body searches of Muslim women suspects because religious sensitivities prevented such activities by male soldiers.”³⁸⁴ According to Kirsten

³⁷⁹ Tobie Whitman and Jacqueline O’Neill, *Attention to Gender Increases Security in Operations: Examples from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)* (Washington, DC: The Institute for Inclusive Security, 2012), 6, http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/NATO-Report_8.pdf.

³⁸⁰ Whitman and O’Neill, *Attention to Gender Increases Security in Operations*, 8.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*

³⁸² *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁸³ Kirsten Holmstedt, *Band of Sisters: American Women at War in Iraq* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2008), 2.

³⁸⁴ Peter Saracino, “Women in Combat: Year In Review 2013,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, last modified October 30, 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1945930/Women-in-Combat-Year-In-Review-2013>.

Holmstedt, “while patrolling the streets and searching homes, every Iraqi had to be checked, including women and children. There were no exceptions.”³⁸⁵

The Dutch battalion in Afghanistan also had success because of the presence of the female personnel in their mixed team. Female military members established contact with both men and women alike. They were accepted by the local men “because they were seen as soldiers rather than women.”³⁸⁶ Afghan men found Western women to be interesting and were prone to be more open and talkative with them. Female soldiers established contact with the local male population and “were sometimes even invited by the men to visit their homes to talk to their wives.”³⁸⁷

In mid-2010, a U.S. woman corporal from a female engagement team working in Afghanistan approached a male farmer in a village that had not yet been patrolled. They began a conversation about his crops. The man was very happy to talk to someone who had interest in growing his favorite crop, watermelon. The man gave the corporal watermelons as a gift, which she accepted. They continued talking, and the man revealed information he knew about “the location of several IED [improvised explosive device] belts laid in the area, as well as key Taliban conspirators in that region.”³⁸⁸ “The intelligence staff later verified and corroborated the information.”³⁸⁹ This information was crucial to the mission success in the area. Thus, women at arms play a valuable role in establishing relations with the local population and gaining valuable information.

To conclude, NATO, along with the UN, understands that the deployment of female peacekeepers benefits military missions. NATO, as an international military organization, urges its member states and partners to mainstream gender equality in the military. Specific steps have been taken by the Alliance to promote the participation of women in peace support operations. Even though NATO highly encourages the creation of gender advisors to support all NATO operations from force generation to re-

³⁸⁵ Holmstedt, *Band of Sisters*, 2.

³⁸⁶ Groothedde, *Gender Makes Sense*, 48.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁸ Whitman and O’Neill, “Attention to Gender Increases Security,” 12–13.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

deployment and the creation of gender action plans that are specific to each NATO operation, a lack of proper gender training, education and the provision of gender advisers has been found, as well as shortcomings in the overall integration of gender perspective into NATO operational planning.

NATO relies upon the contribution of its member states, which have different policies concerning women in the military. Even though majority of the member states have opened most military occupations to women and implemented gender-neutral training standards, the lack of women in NATO operations is still a reality (women are underrepresented in operating and tactical posts), and there are not enough women at the decision-making level. There is a general lack of gender awareness among NATO military leaders and their troops. Moreover, NATO has never had a female secretary general, nor has a woman served as deputy secretary-general, and neither has there been a female supreme allied commander for Europe. Presently, only three women hold top positions in NATO's organizational structure in contrast to 80 men. There should be, however, more women senior leaders because senior leaders play key roles in the promotion of the participation of women at all levels of decision-making, and the presence of both sexes in selection boards should be balanced to even the decision-making process. In addition, some restrictions such as, for example, combat restrictions, should be abolished by members and partner-states because these restrictions make it hard for women to rise through the ranks.

The recruitment of potential female personnel for NATO forces is done similar to UN practices—on the national level, and women at arms undergo a pre-selection and vetting process in their own countries. Thus, NATO encourages members and partner-states to provide fair recruitment at the national level.

NATO, in keeping with the UN, identifies the value of the adoption of National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325. So far, 17 NATO members and 12 partner nations have created NAPs, which help countries identify priorities while implementing UNSCR 1325.³⁹⁰

³⁹⁰ "Progress Report on the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy."

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V. UKRAINE'S MILITARY POST-INDEPENDENCE AND ATTEMPTS AT WESTERNIZATION

For more than a decade, Ukraine has been undergoing changes in its economic and socio-political spheres in order to integrate into the European community.³⁹¹ Even though this process is not a fast or easy undertaking, Ukraine is making progress little by little. An important step forward was taken on September 16, 2014, when Ukraine's parliament "ratified an agreement to deepen economic and political ties with the European Union."³⁹² This change has happened after "the revolution of dignity," also known as Maidan or Euro-Maidan, that took place at the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014.

"The revolution of dignity" showed that Ukrainian society demands pivotal changes in the policy of its government that should direct Ukraine away from the Soviet-oriented past toward the European future, raising Ukrainian nationalism to influence all state agencies to enforce democratic principles. One of the main demands of the society after the revolution was the European integration of the country.³⁹³ This process involves reforms and changes in government institutions.³⁹⁴

³⁹¹ Anatoliy Grytsenko, *Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: On the Way from Form to Substance* (Kyiv: NATO Fellowship Programme, 2000), 4, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/grytsenko.pdf>.

³⁹² "Ukraine Ratifies Landmark Agreement with European Union," CBCnews, September 16, 2014, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-ratifies-landmark-agreement-with-european-union-1.2767449>.

³⁹³ Elena Slobodyan, "What Maidan Protesters Want?" *Arguments and Facts*, December 3, 2013, <http://www.aif.ru/euromaidan/uadontknows/1036302>.

³⁹⁴ Members of the public created the so-called "Program of the Revolution"—a plan for immediate transformation of the country after the victory of the Maidan revolution. It includes a wide range of goals. For instance, the people of Ukraine demand:

a) immediate resumption of unconditional implementation of paragraph 2 Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine "On Domestic and Foreign Policy," Law of Ukraine "On State Program of Adaptation of Ukraine's Legislation to Legislation of European Union" and ensuring Ukraine's integration into European political, economic and legal space for the purpose of gaining membership in the European Union;

b) finding ways to spread guarantees of the European collective security system to Ukraine, regardless of joining them. See "The Program of the Revolution."

A. GENDER EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIZATION, ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN UKRAINE

Considering the preceding discussion, the Ministry of Defense is one of those institutions that needs reform to provide adequate control over the armed forces of Ukraine, in order, first and foremost, to be able to protect a developing democratic society and help sustain democratic values. Second, it also must comply with European standards of military interoperability (to be able to deploy troops in UN and NATO missions if necessary).³⁹⁵

Gender equality is the key point for both—developing a democratic society in Ukraine and complying with UN and NATO standards.³⁹⁶ UN and NATO identify that capacities of both genders are necessary for the success of the peacekeeping missions.³⁹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1325 “stresses the critical role women can play in all efforts to promote peace and security.”³⁹⁸ UN and NATO emphasize the need for partner- and member-countries to promote women’s participation in the peacekeeping missions.

Moreover, “the cultural changes associated with changing gender roles and the ‘feminization’ of leadership styles are closely linked with the spread of democratic institutions,”³⁹⁹ “In a sense the link between women’s representation and democracy should be self-evident, since women account for over half the population of most

³⁹⁵ Snyder, “Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 185–204.

³⁹⁶ Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, and Christian Welzel, *Gender Equality and Democracy* (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 2004), 2, <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Gender%20equality%20&%20democracy.pdf>; and Georgi Ivanov, “Women and Security: How NATO and the UN Advance Gender Equality,” Policy.Mic.com, last modified November 23, 2012, <http://mic.com/articles/19476/women-and-security-how-nato-and-the-un-advance-gender-equality>.

³⁹⁷ Katharine Wright, “NATO’s Implementation of UN SCR 1325,” E-International Relations, last modified September 22, 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/22/natos-implementation-of-un-scr-1325-supporting-a-militarist-agenda/>.

³⁹⁸ UN News Centre, “UN Mission in Afghanistan Condemns Attacks on Schools by Insurgents,” UN, accessed January 22, 2015, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41984>.

³⁹⁹ Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel, *Gender Equality and Democracy*, 22.

societies: if the majority doesn't have full political rights, the society is not democratic."⁴⁰⁰

However, "support for gender equality is not just a consequence of democratization. It is part of a broad cultural change that is transforming many aspects of industrialized societies and supporting the spread of democratic institutions."⁴⁰¹ Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, and Christian Welzel agree that "both women's representation in parliament and a society's level of democracy seem to reflect an underlying cultural shift linked with economic development."⁴⁰² Economic growth "transforms gender norms and brings democratization and rising numbers of women in parliament."⁴⁰³ "For reasons that are deeply rooted in the nature of advanced industrial society, the 'female' leadership style tends to be more effective in these societies than the hierarchical, bureaucratic (and masculine) style that prevailed earlier."⁴⁰⁴

In post-communist countries "democracy is measured by an average of the indicators of political rights and civil liberties reported by the Freedom House."⁴⁰⁵ Liberalization, however, is an even more broad and complex process, and it is "measured by an average of various reform indicators developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development covering privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange, competition policy, and banking and securities markets."⁴⁰⁶ Interaction between democracy and economic liberalization differ because of its complexity and the specificity of every country.⁴⁰⁷ A

⁴⁰⁰ Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel, *Gender Equality and Democracy*, 2.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid., 21.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., 7.

⁴⁰⁴ "While men are relatively likely to emphasize competition, women tend to emphasize cooperation; and while men tend to stress domination, women tend to have a more supportive leadership style." Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel, *Gender Equality and Democracy*, 22.

⁴⁰⁵ Paola Giuliano, Prachi Mishra, and Antonio Spilimbergo, *Democracy and Reforms: Evidence from a New Dataset* (July 2010), 7, http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/IMG/pdf/FMI-PSE-Reforms_July12th.pdf.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

positive relationship between the indices of liberalization and democracy, however, was found.⁴⁰⁸ It turned out that economic liberalization can be the event of becoming a democracy, “where democracy is defined by strictly positive values of polity.”⁴⁰⁹

Paola Giuliano, Prachi Mishra, and Antonio Spilimbergo mention several studies in their research, which prove the connection between democratization and economic liberalization. One of them is the Giavazzi and Tabellini study, which was conducted using a panel of 140 countries from 1960 to 2000, the feedback effect that economic reforms can cause political reforms was found, but the majority of cases showed that political reforms cause economic reforms.⁴¹⁰ Reforms, indeed, play a valuable role in achieving economic liberalization. Research conducted by Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo shows that “The impact of democracy seems to be relevant for the overall tendency of a country to reform.”⁴¹¹ They found that “the more democratic the country is initially, the easier it is to reform.”⁴¹² Thus, democracy itself eases the possibility of the country’s making reforms to achieve economic liberalization.

Another study cited in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo’s research is by Dethier, Ghanem and Zoli. In their work, which was conducted using data from 25 post-communist countries between 1992 and 1997, it was found that “political freedom and civil liberties facilitated economic liberalization.”⁴¹³ Also cited was a study by Milner and Mukerjee, which concluded that democracy promotes trade and capital account

⁴⁰⁸ Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, *Democracy and Reforms*, 7.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴¹⁰ Francesco Giavazzi and Guido Tabellini, “Economical and Political Liberalizations,” *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52 (2005): 1297–1330, quoted in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, *Democracy and Reforms*, 7.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴¹³ Jean-Jacques Dethier, Hafez Ghanem and Edda Zoli, “Does Democracy Facilitate the Economic Transition? An Empirical Study of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union” (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2194, 1999), quoted in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, *Democracy and Reforms*, 6–7.

liberalization,⁴¹⁴ and Grosjean and Senik's research, which found that democracy significantly impacts market liberalization. Grosjean and Senik did not find any evidence of a feedback effect.⁴¹⁵

Indeed, evidence for the assumed feedback effect of economic reforms to democratization is not clear.⁴¹⁶ As an example, economic liberalization may promote the higher quality of democratic institutions if it empowers the democratic society's middle class. However, democracy could also be reduced by economic liberalization if it happened before democratization of the society, causing income inequality to decrease, potentially resulting in violence or political discord.⁴¹⁷

Democratic government can benefit from economic liberalization through the increase in the number of working women. At a societal level, gender equality is a matter of fundamental rights, but it also can bring benefits to the economy,⁴¹⁸ as equal access to economic opportunities improves well-being. "When women work, economies grow."⁴¹⁹ Higher women's employment rates correspond with an increase in a country's gross domestic product. Furthermore, elimination of discrimination against female workers boosts productivity per worker.⁴²⁰ Thus, promoting gender equality is not only a necessary step, but also a beneficial one for the future development of the country.

⁴¹⁴ H.V. Milner and B. Mukerjee, "Democratization and Economic Globalization," *Annual Review of Political Science* (2009): 163–181, quoted in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, *Democracy and Reforms*, 6–7.

⁴¹⁵ Pauline Grosjean and Claudis Senik. "Should Market Liberalization Precede Democracy? Causal Relations Between Political Preferences and Development" (EBRD working paper no. 103, 2007), quoted in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, *Democracy and Reforms*, 7.

⁴¹⁶ Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, *Democracy and Reforms*, 5.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ "Benefits of Gender Equality—Online Discussion Report," European Institute for Gender Equality, last modified September 24, 2014, <http://eige.europa.eu/content/document/benefits-of-gender-equality>.

⁴¹⁹ "Facts and Figures: Economic Empowerment; Benefits of Economic Empowerment," UN Women, accessed January 22, 2015, <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/facts-and-figures>.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*

B. CIVIL-MILITARY REFORM IN UKRAINE

Before the Maidan revolution and growing Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense had already undertaken certain reforms to strengthen the military and allow more women in the armed forces, including the adoption of the Concept of Reform and Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the Period until 2017. The main purpose of this military reform was to create new, highly qualified, well-equipped and well-trained, professional and mobile armed forces of the European type, capable of addressing contemporary threats.⁴²¹ This new professional military has had to help form more effective military organization than previously. Such military organization had to be “one that succeeds in performing the core tasks that the political leadership requests.”⁴²²

According to the Law of Ukrainian Armed Forces, among other roles, the military has to protect the country against internal and external threats, be prepared to fight terrorism, and take part in international military operations.⁴²³ Today, Ukraine is drawn into fighting internal asymmetrical warfare in the eastern part of the country, where Russia is using Special Forces, rebels, and mercenaries as “a conscious strategy to take advantage of the power of asymmetry.”⁴²⁴ The best strategy for fighting such wars is still being researched, and the willingness for the organizational structure to undergo reforms will be a crucial part of finding the best solution.

Furthermore, Ukraine is a charitable donor of its men of arms for international military operations worldwide. For example, the Ukrainian government has sent

⁴²¹ *White Book of Ukrainian Armed Forces*, 9.

⁴²² Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 36.

⁴²³ *Law of Ukraine about Armed Forces of Ukraine* (1934-12: June 21, 2014), <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1934-12>.

⁴²⁴ Fareed Zakaria, “How West Should Handle Russia,” Fareed Zakaria GPS (blog), last modified July 20, 2014, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/20/how-west-should-handle-russia/>.

approximately 37,000 service-members to peacekeeping missions since 1992;⁴²⁵ but only 42 of them were women (5 officers, 2 ensign, 35 sergeants and privates).⁴²⁶

C. THE CONSCRIPTION CONNECTION

As Ukrainian society began to exert its influence over the military, the Defense Ministry was forced to alter some of its positions. For instance, societal opposition to the draft, along with other factors, affected the decision of the Defense Ministry to reduce the term of conscript service in 2005 to 12 months⁴²⁷ and the conscription was planned to be abolished with the transition to a professional military by 2015.⁴²⁸ One more important step in the reformation of military forces in Ukraine—the adoption of a decree that was set to curtail the draft in 2014—was made. This document was signed in 2013 by the Ukrainian president, who would later be deposed.⁴²⁹ More women joined the armed forces after the adoption of the decree.⁴³⁰ Interestingly, the largest proportion of women in Armed Forces of Ukraine have been contract-based personnel ranked from the regular privates to sergeants, with the majority of them in support positions in subdivisions. They are communicators, medics, staff experts, and air traffic controllers, and even sergeant-instructors.⁴³¹ These women at arms, however, do not take high-ranking positions, even though many of them have been working for decades in the military already. Such uneven distribution of rankings between men and women in the armed forces can be questioned.

⁴²⁵ “Participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”

⁴²⁶ “Is There Any Future for Women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Ivano-Frankivsk Latest News, accessed January 3, 2015, <http://news.if.ua/news/31491.html>.

⁴²⁷ “The Length of the Service in the Conscripts—Driven Military Service in the Armed Forces is Reduced to 12 Month,” Governmental Portal, accessed March 17, 2015, http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=13950320.

⁴²⁸ Yevhen Akmaldinov, “Development of Civil-Military Relations in Independent Ukraine,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 35, <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA414525>.

⁴²⁹ “Yanukovich Has Canceled Conscripts—Driven Military Service in the Armed Forces,” *Week*, October 14, 2013, <http://tyzhden.ua/News/91474>.

⁴³⁰ “Guarding Peaceful Life of the Ukrainian People,” Cherkassy Regional State Administration, accessed December 31, 2014, <http://www.oda.ck.ua/?lng=ukr&article=120140>.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

The military places some restrictions on “what roles women can perform and have ceilings for their level of advancement within the decision-making ranks of the military.”⁴³² Often, there are policies that restrict women from participation in combat actions or from rising to the highest ranks, and after identification, these policies should be reviewed and amended.⁴³³ Ukraine, for instance, lacks women who have been trained for command and engineering specialties due to the existing governing documents containing gender restrictions. Without this training, gender balance is impossible in the Ukrainian military.⁴³⁴

Even though some kind of restrictions have existed for servicewomen to grow among the ranks throughout the history of independent Ukraine, the abolishment of conscription in total had to be a step ahead in allowing more women-patriots into the institution, which could benefit from their presence, and thus promote gender equality per se. Conscription, however, was quickly reinstated by the Ukrainian government in 2014 as a necessary response to the deteriorating security situation in the Eastern Region (in April 2014, Ukraine’s acting President Alexander Turchynov signed the decree that reinstated the draft for non-exempt Ukrainian men between 18 and 25 years old).⁴³⁵ Retaining the draft is a measure meant to increase the numerical composition of the armed forces, but it is also seen as a decision that may, first of all, harm the professionalization of the military and, secondly, complicate women’s access to the military institution that is already full of gender restrictions.

In support of the point that conscription may harm professionalization of the military, Huntington, for instance, argues that “the vocation of officership meets the principal criteria of professionalism;⁴³⁶ and the enlisted men subordinate to the officer corps are a part of the organizational bureaucracy but not of the professional

⁴³² Hendricks and Hutton, *Defense Reform and Gender*, 5.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ “Is There Any Future for Women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”

⁴³⁵ “Ukraine Reinstates Conscription.”

⁴³⁶ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 10.

bureaucracy.”⁴³⁷ Because they may lack the proper intellectual skills and the officer’s professional responsibilities, they can only be considered “specialists in the application of violence not the management of violence. Their vocation is a trade not a profession.”⁴³⁸ Additionally, “the ranks which exist in the enlisted corps do not constitute a professional hierarchy.”⁴³⁹ By maintaining such a division, armed forces prevent themselves from having a single hierarchical structure from top to bottom.

As Huntington states, “the difference between the officer and enlisted vocations precludes any general progression from one to the other.”⁴⁴⁰ While there are occasions in which enlisted men do climb the ranks to join the officer corps, they are infrequent because the officer corps requirements in both education and training are very far from the grasp of the enlisted soldier.⁴⁴¹ Consequently, a nation that relies heavily on conscription may see the professionalization of its military suffer.

Indeed, professionalization in the Ukrainian military is already lacking, and the transition from conscript-based forces to a contract-based army remains necessary. For one thing, Ukraine’s conscripts serve a limited amount of time (12 months)⁴⁴² in the military before being allowed to return to civilian life. Soldiers are constantly rotated out after one year of service. One year is not enough for the Ukrainian government to maintain a long-standing, well-trained force.⁴⁴³

More fighting units are needed, but the national treasury is bankrupt, and there is a mass desertion of the Ukrainian army and increasing number of missing people. Poor outreach and preparedness means conscripts often do not understand the necessity of their

⁴³⁷ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 14.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² “Ukraine to End Military Conscription after Autumn Call-Ups,” United Press International, last modified October 3, 2013, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/10/03/Ukraine-to-end-military-conscription-after-autumn-call-ups/UPI-95521380772920/.

⁴⁴³ Jeremy Bender, “Russia’s Pullback from the Ukrainian Border Exposes Its Army’s Dependence on Conscripts,” *Business Insider*, last modified May 28, 2014, <http://www.businessinsider.com/russian-pullback-caused-by-conscription-problems-2014-5>.

deployment and therefore, they become unwilling to fight. Thus, in July 2014, more than 40 Ukrainian soldiers refused to fight on the Ukrainian side and fled to Russia.⁴⁴⁴ Furthermore, insufficiently protected and poorly armed soldiers are facing harsh and dangerous conditions in the east. This overall situation affects the combat readiness of the troops and makes it harder for Ukraine's government to continue the anti-terrorist operation in the east of the country.⁴⁴⁵ Anti-war and anti-conscription protests that have been known to happen in Ukraine are also contributing to the already complicated situation.⁴⁴⁶

Before transitioning back toward conscription, shortages of qualified men in the armed forces to fulfill military recruitment needs could be filled with women who were willing to serve, supported by the crafting of plans for expanding women's military participation.⁴⁴⁷ By reinstating conscription, the government, however, implies that women are not counted as equal citizen-soldiers to men and are not competent for protecting their homeland.

There were instances in Ukraine when women who were willing to serve in the military came to recruitment centers and volunteered to sign up for the armed forces to defend their country alongside recruited men in the East of Ukraine. When men volunteered, they were accepted. Women volunteers, however, were rejected by the military.⁴⁴⁸ The desire of women to help their own country faces opposition, and thus, Ukraine's commitment to democratic values is questioned, as well as its compliance with European Union gender equality standards.

⁴⁴⁴ “‘Refusing to Kill Their Own’: Over 40 Ukrainian Soldiers Flee to Russia,” *Russia Today*, last modified September 6, 2014, <http://rt.com/news/175888-ukrainian-soldiers-border-russia/>.

⁴⁴⁵ “Poroshenko Receives Report of Massive Ukraine Army Desertions,” *Dublinmick's Breaking News*, last modified July 25, 2014, <http://dublinmickdotcom.wordpress.com/2014/07/25/poroshenko-receives-report-of-massive-ukraine-army-desertions/>.

⁴⁴⁶ Roger Annis, “Ukraine: Antiwar and Anti-Conscription Protests. Kiev Regime Wages All-Out War in East Ukraine, NATO Threatens Russia,” *Global Research*, last modified August 1, 2014, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/antiwar-and-anti-conscription-protest-across-ukraine-kyiv-regime-wages-all-out-war-in-east-ukraine-nato-threatens-russia/5394449>.

⁴⁴⁷ Carreiras, “The Role of Women in the Armed Forces of NATO Countries,” 5.

⁴⁴⁸ Olga Kulko, “Men are Drafted to the Armed Forces, Women are Protesting,” *Free Life*, accessed January 3, 2015, <http://freelife.cv.ua/golovne/4124-cholovkam-prihodyat-povstki-zhnki-protestuyut.html>.

D. WOMEN IN UKRAINE’S MILITARY: CURRENT ROADBLOCKS FACED BY WOMEN WHO ASPIRE TO MILITARY SERVICE

Democratic societies open opportunities for both genders—men and women alike—to be able to join the armed forces because gender equality is a key tenet of both the development of modern democratic society and military compliance with UN and NATO requirements.⁴⁴⁹ The presence of women in the armed forces, however, does not automatically guarantee gender equality per se. It is necessary “to distinguish between...first recruitment of women or...increase in their numbers and the conditions and circumstances for statutory change (equalization of status, hierarchical progression, uniforms, salaries, suppression of all-female corps, etc.); access to jobs, specialties, and combat positions; and opening up of military schools and academies to women.”⁴⁵⁰

Although Ukraine is striving to achieve Westernization and accomplish democratic reforms, which include gender equality, the country still has restrictions that prevent women from taking some specific jobs in the military (including the use of women on warships and combatant aircrafts) and enrolling in the military lyceums and some military academies.⁴⁵¹ These restrictions limit the success that servicewomen could achieve in the armed forces. The military and other security agencies “are workplaces that offer opportunities for citizens to gain education and international exposure and experience.”⁴⁵² When the opportunities for sections of society to gain education and experience are taken away, those people are denied access to opportunities for professional advancement. Thus, “women’s access to certain military positions, namely those related to combat, access to...positions of power inside the ranks is very uneven, and women are still, in fact, largely absent from decision-making spheres regarding

⁴⁴⁹ “National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000),” United Nations, Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, accessed January 4, 2015, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/national_level_impl.html.

⁴⁵⁰ Carreiras, “The Role of Women in the Armed Forces of NATO Countries,” 4.

⁴⁵¹ Eremenko, “The Defenders of the Motherland.”

⁴⁵² Hendricks and Hutton, *Defense Reform and Gender*, 5.

defense and military issues.”⁴⁵³ The democratic values of civil equality are questionable in Ukraine as long as discriminatory practices within the military exist.

If women are discriminated against by the military institution and cannot join the armed forces or fully participate in military activities, the country may waste an opportunity to increase the number of patriotic citizens within their military ranks. Indeed, because conscription applies constraints on their ability to serve, some women from the first fully female squadron of the 39th Self Defense Hundred of Maidan,⁴⁵⁴ who are all civilians, found a way to go to the east of Ukraine, where combat actions are taking place; and now these women are defending their country.⁴⁵⁵ Moreover, the soldier battalion Idar, which was established in May 2014, also includes civilian women, who volunteered to go to the eastern region of Ukraine. These women are currently on the front lines (they are performing many front-line tasks, including taking part in the combat actions, securing territory, and performing support functions, such as cooking and nursing),⁴⁵⁶ and they are defending the country, as are others who are dedicated to their homeland.⁴⁵⁷ The women in these examples are not military personnel, and when the war ends, they will not receive any benefits associated with military service, nor any recognition or honor from the government.

Ukrainian women who actually are contracted soldiers and desire to serve their country in a military context often face severe restrictions. Currently, Ukrainian mass media is discussing the case of Nadia Savchenko, a woman in the Ukrainian Armed

⁴⁵³ Carreiras, “The Role of Women in the Armed Forces of NATO Countries,” 2.

⁴⁵⁴ “‘Women’s Squad’ (Zhinocha Sotnia), an all-women self-defense brigade. (The literal translation is ‘Women’s Hundred,’ ‘hundred’ referring to the common grouping of soldiers into squads of 100.)” Sarah D. Phillips, “The Women’s Squad in Ukraine’s Protests: Feminism, Militarism, and Nationalism on the Maidan,” *American Ethnologist* 41, no. 3 (2014): 417, https://www.academia.edu/8241376/The_Womens_Squad_in_Ukraines_Protests_Feminism_Militarism_and_Nationalism_on_the_Maidan.

⁴⁵⁵ “Those Women Who Were Participating in the Maidan Revolution Are Now Continuing Their Fight in Hotspots of Ukraine,” Public Radio, last modified June 12, 2014, <http://hromadskerradio.org/2014/06/12/zhinki-yaki-proyshli-cherez-maydan-prodovzhuyut-borotbu-u-garyachih-tochkah-ukrayini-sotnik-anna-kovalenko/>.

⁴⁵⁶ Max Levin, “Soldier Jane,” LB.ua, last modified September 27, 2014, http://blogs.lb.ua/maks_levin/280757_vita.html.

⁴⁵⁷ Lily Dvoretzkaya, “Ukraine ATO: Girl-Soldier Battalion ‘Idar,’” Free Republic, last modified July 5, 2014, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3176347/posts>.

Forces who is presently imprisoned in Russia. Savchenko, who hoped to realize her lifelong dream of becoming a fighter pilot, faced significant obstacles in the achievement of this goal from the Ukrainian military system. After three previous attempts to enter the University of the Air Forces in Kharkiv were rejected on the basis of her gender, she finally received an appointment with the general, who told her that she should first serve a year in the conscript military (which is akin to telling her to stop trying, given the previously stated challenges and restrictions women in Ukraine face when volunteering to join the conscript military) prior to entering the university. Following this exchange, Savchenko joined the Armed Forces as a contractor, where she was given the job of radio operator. Unsatisfied with this position, she joined the Marines (she passed a required run of 15 kilometers in the snow while carrying a 15-kilogram backpack), and she chose to be sent to Iraq to serve alongside male Marines.⁴⁵⁸

Upon returning from this tour in Iraq, she again applied at Kharkiv's University of Armed Forces, but this time was told she did not have enough military experience. Persistently, she petitioned Anatoliy Grytsenko (then Ukraine's Minister of Defense), who finally granted her request. However, after her graduation as a specialist in SU-24, she was told that the Ministry of Defense prohibited women from flying reactive-engine aircraft, and she was forced to settle for a navigator position onboard an Mi-24 helicopter.⁴⁵⁹ During the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Nadia Savchenko was captured by separatists and sent to Russia, where she has been charged in what many view as a politically motivated case.⁴⁶⁰

Nadia Savchenko, who was clearly dedicated to her goal of military service, was forced to endure significant systematic discouragement by the military academic organization in Ukraine. Helena Carreiras explained that "officers trained in military academies and schools or those employed in combat-oriented functions tend to score

⁴⁵⁸ Lilia Gudushyan, "Who is Nadia Savchenko," *Espresso*, last modified July 9, 2014, http://espresso.tv/article/2014/07/09/viyskovyy_lotchyk_nadiya_savchenko_muzhniy_soldat_vitchyzny.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

much higher on institutional features than the remaining personnel.”⁴⁶¹ Institutional orientation is important in order for the military officers to move to the higher ranks. Those who are represented in top hierarchical positions possess wide knowledge of the institutional features. Women, who are restricted from entering military academies and employment in combat-oriented functions, thus, receive a message from the military that undermines female institutional values, promoting an occupational orientation instead of institutional occupation.⁴⁶² Consequently, Nadia Savchenko’s experience highlights a need for Ukrainian military academies to implement new policies that encourage female applicants, rather than discourage them.

E. WHY INCREASE WOMEN’S ROLE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE?

Ukrainian armed forces can become effective⁴⁶³ in fulfilling the roles required of a modern military after they obtain the necessary capabilities and readiness.

Ukraine has been participating in peace support missions since 1992 (about 37,000 soldiers have taken part in different missions worldwide).⁴⁶⁴ Very few women at arms from Ukraine have taken part in these operations when compared to men, so there are many fewer female soldiers than male in Ukraine that have received the experiences necessary to address contemporary threats, including the situation in Eastern Ukraine.

Recalling the example of Nadia Savchenko, who was told that she did not have the necessary military experience to enter the air force academy, even after serving a tour in Iraq, it is apparent that the Ukrainian military institution is biased against women. How can women be expected to gain necessary military experience when the existing military system actively discourages them from participating?

⁴⁶¹ Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*, 85–86.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

⁴⁶³ As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of the military forces is best determined by whether or not a state is prepared to fulfill any or all of the major roles, including fight, and is prepared to fight external wars, internal wars or insurgencies, global terrorism, internal and external crime, and maintain the ability to provide support for humanitarian assistance, and to be prepared for and take part in peace support operations. Bruneau and Matei, *Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 66.

⁴⁶⁴ “Participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”

The Maidan revolution in 2013–2014 showed that people want Europeanization (Westernization) of the country, which implies compliance with the European security system and promotion of human rights, including gender equality. Moreover, the Constitution of Ukraine already promotes human rights and liberties and guarantees equality between men and women,⁴⁶⁵ yet women still face discrimination. Democratic society, which Ukraine is striving to develop, supposes to open opportunities for both genders—men and women alike—to be able to join the armed forces and be treated as equals inside the institution because gender equality is a key tenet of both the development of modern democratic society and military compliance with UN and NATO requirements.⁴⁶⁶

The Ukrainian government stays passive—or, rather, impassive—about the desire of women to serve in the military, and thus, to have the same rights and responsibilities as men. Western countries, however, understand the advantages of the utilization of women in military missions, with peace support operations given priority.

Why not effectively utilize women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, therefore reducing costs connected with maintaining conscription, improve intelligence gathering, and reduce soldiers' exposure to attacks and ambush in Eastern Ukraine? As the Ukrainian government plans to increase the number of servicemen in 2015,⁴⁶⁷ women may fill a critical personnel resourcing requirement by being available to serve in the armed forces. Would Ukraine and specifically, the Ukrainian military, accept women as warriors and send them into combat? This is a complicated question to answer. This question “points to the deep anxiety about changing a well-established cultural paradigm.”⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁵ *Constitution of Ukraine*, “Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine,” <http://portal.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/27396.pdf>.

⁴⁶⁶ “National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000),” http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/national_level_impl.html.

⁴⁶⁷ “Ukraine Defense Doctrine,” Global Security, accessed January 17, 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/doctrine.htm>.

⁴⁶⁸ Tessa Poppe, “Women’s Right to Fight Has Nothing to Do with Push-Ups,” Task & Purpose, June 9, 2014, <http://taskandpurpose.com/womens-fight-right-fight-push-ups/>.

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VI. CONCLUSION

For much of human history, military culture has been hyper-masculine, and, indeed, has often helped to denigrate women and their chances for a greater role in society. The rise of the postmodern military has coincided with the relatively recent trend to increase the role of women in democratic societies, and along with this we have seen a dramatic change in how women are viewed in the military context.

Women represent half of the society and diversity of it, and according to Janowitz's theory, females can reduce tensions between civilian and military world and thus strengthen civilian control over the military. They also help to professionalize the military and reduce disciplinary problems as women who volunteer for the armed forces are better educated than men. Even though female soldiers tend to have different abilities and capacities from men, these differences may bring success to the mission.

Women indeed can enhance the effectiveness of the armed forces as they are well suited for the roles in contemporary military operations. The most common types of wars today are more intellectual and have new objectives: "they involve a multitude of actors fighting for the hearts and minds of the local, as well as global, population whose perceptions of the conflict often determine the outcome."⁴⁶⁹ Consequently, for a military unit to be successful it must be prepared to fight these new types of wars, and women at arms play valuable role in war winning. The presence of servicewomen in peacekeeping missions, for instance, is recognized by NATO and the UN as vitally needed and irreplaceable. UNSCR 1325 stresses the need of participation of women in peace and security efforts. Women at arms in UN and NATO armed forces, indeed, have validated that female presence while dealing with local population yields positive results, such as reduced tensions and enhanced credibility with the civilian population.

Experiences from NATO and UN peacekeeping operations identify that female soldiers bring success to the mission because they are known to be more effective in specific roles. One of the benefits of the use of female soldiers in peace support

⁴⁶⁹ Egnell, "Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting," 37.

operations is the improvement to tactical intelligence, thus actively reducing soldiers' exposure to ambushes and IED attacks.⁴⁷⁰ Female soldiers also perform specific tasks (such as body searches), which men cannot do due to the cultural restrictions in some countries.⁴⁷¹ Furthermore, it is understood that the side that finds ways to control the civilian population will have victory in the war, and "by improving trust and credibility with the civilian population, host nation civil-military interaction becomes more effective, reducing the amount of time needed to achieve success."⁴⁷² Women are recognized to be better interlocutors and at making connections with locals, and thus they are adept at winning the hearts and minds of the population while freeing other soldiers to perform traditional functions.

Moreover, the less aggressive nature of women can be an advantageous characteristic for personnel that take part in peace support operations because these specific operations require more intelligence than force. According to Anja Stegen, "in peace support operations, personnel are expected to keep aggression under control and strive for understanding; violence in this context is a failure."⁴⁷³

In addition, female military personnel serve as monitors of excessive behavior among male soldiers. Even though the presence of women cannot guarantee that no sexual abuse will happen, a strong presence of women reduces the amount of such incidents.

Despite all the efforts made by UN and NATO to promote gender equality in the military; however, the lack of women in UN and NATO operations is still a reality. The low percentage of women in military operations is the consequence of the policies of the nation-members, because UN and NATO have no standing army and rely upon the contribution of their member states and donor-states. Potential female peacekeepers undergo a pre-selection and vetting process in their countries, competing for the position

⁴⁷⁰ Whitman and O'Neill, "Attention to Gender Increases Security in Operations," 12–13.

⁴⁷¹ Holmstedt, *Band of Sisters*, 2.

⁴⁷² William Kornblum, *Sociology in a Changing World*, 8th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Learning, 2008), 75.

⁴⁷³ Stegen, *Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective*, 15.

not only with their male counterparts but also dealing with challenges relating to their own government policies. Moreover, the UN put responsibilities for pre-deployment training on the donor-countries, and thus underprepared personnel have sometimes been deployed to the field.

The presence of female military personnel, however, should not be seen as needed in the military only because women are expected to bring gender-specific unique capabilities into the armed forces; instead they must be seen as equal-rate soldiers in an environment where diversity is respected. The military has been forced to adapt to other changing societal perspectives on civil rights issues in the past, and the integration of women is no different.

Very often women's exclusion from the military was justified with flawed assumptions. However, for every critique against the inclusion of women in the military, strong evidence to the contrary was found. Even though women at arms have proven that they have the abilities necessary to pass rigorous testing and endure real life military situations, female inclusion in the armed forces should not be seen as a matter of physical achievements, but rather a matter of allowing the second half of the population into a previously closed-off institution.

Ukraine is in a stage of change today, which was brought with the Maidan revolution in 2013–2014. Thus to comply with the demands of the society for better life in democratic European society, respecting human rights and equality, Ukraine's military should encourage, rather than discourage, female participation in military operations and begin effective utilization of the capabilities of women at arms. Women are choosing the military as a career path today. To dedicate oneself to a certain career path, one should feel confidence in her own chances of success.⁴⁷⁴ Consequently, when allowing women to join the military, the possibilities for equal personal career growth should be considered.

⁴⁷⁴ Joanna Zyga, "Women in Security: Climbing a Very Long Ladder," NATO, accessed January 24, 2015, <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2013/Women-Conflicts/Women-Security-Climbing-long-ladder/EN/index.htm>.

The creation of the National Action Plans for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in Ukraine will help the government to articulate priorities and coordinate the implementation of the resolution.⁴⁷⁵ It will, however, take time for women to start holding command posts as this requires proper education, institutional awareness, field training, and experience, but, as large number of nations believe, the momentum is there to make this an eventual reality.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷⁵ “Key Victims Know Too Little.”

⁴⁷⁶ Obradovic, *Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces*, 56.

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