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THESIS

**DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND
REINTEGRATION OF FARC: A CHALLENGE FOR
COLOMBIA AND A STEP TOWARD ANDEAN REGION
STABILITY**

by

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CHALLENGE FOR COLOMBIA AND A STEP TOWARD ANDEAN REGION
STABILITY**

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ABSTRACT

The intention of this thesis is to determine the warning signals and preventive actions to conduct the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process successfully. Although Colombia has experienced multiple DDR processes during its recent history, political violence continues to plague the country. After each process, Colombia notes the mutation of criminal structures, which have deployed their tentacles to other Latin American countries. Understanding the salient issues that led to the success or failure of DDR processes will aid the Government of Colombia (GOC) in continuing to face the process with FARC.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACR	Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegracion, Colombian Agency for the Reintegration
ADM19	Democratic Alliance M19
ANC	African National Congress
AUC	Auto-defensas Unidas de Colombia, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
AZANLA	Azanian National Liberation Army
BACRIM	Bandas Criminales, Criminal Bands
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
CODA	Comite Operativo para la Dejacion de Armas, Operating Committee for the surrender of weapons
CONVIVIR	Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada, Special Services of Surveillance and Private Security
DANE	Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadisticas, National Administrative Department of Statistics
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
ELN	Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, National Liberation Army
FARC-EP	Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia - Ejercito del Pueblo, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional, Farabundo Marti Front for the National Liberation
GAHD	Grupo de Atencion Humanitaria al Desmovilizado, Group of humanitarian assistance to the demobilized
GOC	Government of Colombia
GOES	Government of El Salvador
IAG	Illegally Armed Group
INCCV	Investigative National Commission of the Causes of the Violence
M-19	Movimiento 19 de abril, April 19th Movement
MAPP	Mision de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz de Colombia, Mission for Colombian Peace Process Support
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe, Spear of the Nation

NF	National Front
NP	National Party
NPA	National Peace Accord
NSE	National Security State
OAS	Organization of American States
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission In El Salvador
PAHD	Programa de Atencion Humanitaria al Desmovilizado, Program for Humanitarian Assistance of Demobilized
PRVC	Programa para la Reincorporacion a la Vida Civil, Program for the return to civilian life
PNR	National Rehabilitation Plan
SAG	South African Government
TBVC	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei Defense Forces
TRC	South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
SADF	South African Defense Forces
SANDF	South African National Defense Force
UN	United Nations
UP	Union Patriotica, Patriotic Union
UNOMOSA	United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) has become one of the most contentious, complex, and difficult to implement aspects of post-war conflict resolution. If a conflict ends short of total victory for one side and the destruction or surrender of the defeated force, then a process to disarm the combatants and reintegrate them as productive members of society who accept the political outcome of the conflict must inevitably follow. Otherwise, the peace-building strategy may become irrevocably compromised, the conflict may reignite, or at the very least, an irreconcilable faction may continue to imperil the security environment. DDR has become a central feature of all United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations since in 1990s. They have generally been considered successful in places like El Salvador, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, less successful in the Balkans in the 1990s, and with mixed results in Nepal and South Africa.

DDR requires several elements for success: 1) an end to hostilities—a negotiated political outcome acceptable to all parties; 2) the participation of all belligerents in the process; and, 3) adequate resources not only to implement and monitor the DDR process, but also to reintegrate former combatants into society. The failure to reintegrate former belligerents is considered the “Achilles heel” of DDR.¹ DDR has become increasingly complicated in the last decade because of the increasing numbers of female and child combatants in insurgent groups, who require special and more focused programs.

Colombia has experienced a long history of internal conflict and reconciliation. At the time of writing, the Government of Colombia (GOC) is engaged in negotiations with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo* (FARC-EP) in Havana, Cuba. Within the peace process, the parties have reached an agreement over the first three items of the agenda: the drug trafficking problem, the distribution and use of land, and the political participation of minority groups in Colombia. The last two points

¹ Stephanie Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 16, 2007, <http://www.cfr.org/world/disarmament-demobilization-reintegration-ddr-africa/p12650>.

allegedly provoked the FARC's uprising more than 60 years ago. Because of this initial progress and because of the GOC's success in beating back the FARC challenge, many analysts dare to predict that the end of the prolonged war in Colombia is near.

Assuming the peace negotiations are successful, the objective of this thesis is to answer the question, what are the most salient issues to be faced by the GOC in the subsequent DDR process? Answering this question will be a complicated process on several levels. First, as a decentralized organization, will all FARC "fronts" accept the outcome of the process? Second, what might the process to disarm the insurgents look like? In other words, one of the great reasons is that insurgents are reluctant to disarm for fear of retaliation. Therefore, the experience of some countries, like El Salvador and South Africa, might offer interesting mechanisms for "confidence building." Finally, on the issue of reintegration, the GOC will be faced with the task of providing a meaningful livelihood for largely illiterate groups of former peasants whose only experience is conflict and criminal activity. In addition, FARC ranks contain a high percentage—perhaps as many as half in some regions—of women and children. How are they to be handled?

Experience from other nations may be instructive. But Colombia is no stranger to DDR. This process began with the end of *La Violencia*, the period of civil war between Liberals and Conservatives that lasted a decade from 1948 to 1958, through the demobilization of M-19 in the late 1980s. Both of these demobilizations required significant political compromises, including changes in the constitution and even the reintegration of former insurgent groups into the political process. A final DDR process occurred between 2003 and 2006 when the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC), a loose coalition of paramilitary forces that materialized in the 1990s ostensibly to combat the growing influence of left-wing groups in the country; but which had a strong criminal element, were demobilized during the presidency of Álvaro Uribe. While at the time this was considered a success, in retrospect, there appears to have been much skullduggery, deception, and side-deals that led many of these paramilitary groups to continue to exist as BACRIM (the acronym for criminal bands in Spanish), engaging in drug trafficking, sometimes in cooperation with their enemy, the FARC, but also in extortion and

kidnapping. Since 2002, the GOC has also run an individual demobilization and reintegration program for deserters from guerrilla ranks, which also contains lessons.

DDR is important because not only is the reconstruction of Colombian society at stake after 60 years of conflict, but also the stability of South America's northern tier. From its own history of demobilization processes, can Bogotá promote DDR with FARC that will facilitate full integration of its members into society, and avert the risks of renegade elements consolidating power and influence in certain regions, in this way creating yet another transnational criminal gang in Latin America?

B. IMPORTANCE

Since the signing of the Plan Colombia between the Governments of the United States and Colombia in 2000,² the Andean country became the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid behind Israel and Egypt.³ At first, that aid was directed to support the fight against the traffic in illicit drugs; however, in the wake of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress expanded the mandate to allow the funds to be used to support the fight against the terrorist organizations like the FARC. The reason was clear to both governments—the direct participation of the FARC and other organizations in the business of drug trafficking to finance their terrorist actions.

A successful DDR process of the FARC would lead to the disappearance of one of the largest drug cartels in Colombia, as well as a serious reduction in the crimes of human trafficking and drugs.⁴ The long-standing involvement of the United States with Colombia obviously gives Washington a stake in the outcome of the peace talks and the successful implementation of any agreement that flowed from it. Because the FARC maintains links with illegal organizations, and operates in Paraguay, Ecuador, Peru,

² Connie Veillette, *Plan Colombia: A Progress Report* (CRS Report No. 32774) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 17, 2005), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a573962.pdf>.

³ Adam Isacson, Joy Olson, and Lisa Haugaard, "Below the Radar: U.S. Military Programs with Latin America, 1997–2007," March 25, 2010, <http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/27932>.

⁴ Daniel Pécaut in his essay estimates that money from drugs trafficking represents among 50 to 70 percent of FARC's income. Daniel Pécaut, "Las FARC: Fuentes de su Longevidad y de la Conservación De su Cohesión," [The FARC: Sources of their Longevity and the Conservation of its Cohesion], *Análisis Político* 63 (May–August 2008), 22–50. <http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/20925.pdf>, 38.

Brazil and Chile, a successful cessation of hostilities, followed by a comprehensive DDR process, will provide a relief for the police and intelligence communities of those countries. It would also realize one of the main objectives of Plan Colombia, which was to “help Colombia promote peace and economic development because it contributes to regional security in the Andes.”⁵

After more than 60 years of bloody internal conflict that has resulted in hundreds of thousands deaths and literally millions of refugees in Colombia, peace now seems within reach. However, the consolidation of peace requires a successful DDR process. This requires institutionalizing the lessons and best practices not only of Colombia’s recent past, but also those of other nations. Successful peace and DDR would allow Colombia, which at present spends almost 6.5 percent of its GDP on war, to make infrastructure and social investments.⁶

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the elimination of a forty-year superpower competition caused a renewed emphasis on resolving regional tensions that previously had been interpreted in a zero-sum Cold War context.⁷ However, it soon became clear that the mere signing of a peace agreement offered an insufficient guarantee of a stable peace. In order to achieve this overall goal, former combatants had to be disarmed and reintegrated into society. Since the end of the Cold War, the common denominator for successful conflict termination, followed by a sustainable peace at the end of civil war or

⁵ Veillette, *Plan Colombia: A Progress Report*, 6.

⁶ Salomón Kalmanovitz, “El Impacto Económico Del Conflicto Interno Colombiano Y Un Escenario De Paz,” [The Economic Impact of the Colombian Internal Conflict and a Scenario of Peace], *United Nations Development Program* (2014), http://pnud.org.co/img_upload/36353463616361636163616361636163/El_impacto_económico_del_conflicto_interno_colombiano_y_un_escenario_de_paz_Salomón_Kalmanovitz.pdf, 5.

⁷ Marc W. Chernick, “Las Dimensiones Internacionales De Los Conflictos Internos En América Latina: De La Guerra Fría (a La Paz Negociada En Centroamérica) a La Guerra Antinarcótica,” [The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict in Latin America: From The Cold War (to a negotiated peace in Central America) to the Antinarcotic War], *Colombia Internacional*, Revista No 41 (April–March 1998), <http://colombiainternacional.uniandes.edu.co/view.php/324/index.php?id=324>.

protracted violence, has been an effective DDR process.⁸ DDR has taken many forms, some more successful than others. While it remains clear that there is no generic DDR formula applicable across conflicts, which generate their own dynamics, practices, and procedures, the study of this process can be used to warn of potential pitfalls in future DDR implementation.

According to the UN, “The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post- conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin.”⁹ Likewise, in *From Insurgency to Stability*, the authors argue that DDR’s objective “is to consolidate the transition (from peace to war) by ensuring the full reintegration of ex-combatants into a civilian setting.”¹⁰ Thus, it is clear if the DDR process ends in failure, the peace process is put at risk. Albert Caramés and Eneko Sanz reinforce this idea by stating that DDR breakdown can be “the reason for new hostilities.”¹¹

Once the objectives of DDR are established, one should explore the full range of options in the DDR process. In their book, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Nat Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer note that there are two types of DDR. The first one occurs after the victory of one of the conflict’s actors and the utter defeat of his opponents, in which case the DDR is hardly to be negotiated.¹² The second type occurs when neither side gains a clear victory but is locked in what

⁸ See among others, a United Nations (UN) report about “Overview DDR processes in Africa,” June 2007; Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) “Short Course on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” March 30–April 2, 2008; Albert Caramés and Eneko Sanz, report entitled “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs in the world during 2007, 2008; Antonio Giustozzi, book entitled “Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 20.

⁹ United Nations, “Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, (2006), http://img.static.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6006A636E254D809C125750D0036A0D4-UN_sep2006.pdf

¹⁰ Angel Rabasa et al., *From Insurgency to Stability: Volume I: Key Capabilities and Practices* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 51, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1111z1.html>.

¹¹ Albert Caramés, Vicenç Fisas, and Eneko Sanz, “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2005,” Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace (2006), 5, <http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf>.

¹² Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Directions in Development series (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996), 1.

scholars call “a mutually hurting stalemate.”¹³ A compromise peace, often brokered by an outside player,¹⁴ offers the optimal compromise, in which case the combatants must come to an arrangement to lay down their arms.¹⁵

Because the DDR process must adapt to the situation on the ground, experts generally agree that, “DDR is not a clean three-step process.”¹⁶ It is necessary to understand that these processes take time and must not be rushed.¹⁷ Nevertheless, it falls on states or international organizations to monitor each stage of the DDR process to insure within the best of their abilities a successful outcome.

Disarmament is the first stage of the process. If this occurs early in the DDR process and the weapons used during the conflict are destroyed, then DDR sends a strong political message of compromise by both parties. According to Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem, “by disarming, the combatants are forging a new social contract with the government and the international community.”¹⁸ The resulting message can become one of compromise and peace to the indigenous population as well as to the international community. Likewise, disarmament can contribute to future security and stability.¹⁹

Several scholars argue that the second stage—demobilization—includes two modalities. “Demobilization may take place at temporary locations or at larger, semi-permanent camps called cantonments.”²⁰ Demobilization also requires reduction or reform of state’s army following peace agreements, which happened in El Salvador,

¹³ United Nations, *Overview: DDR Processes in Africa* (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo: United Nations, 2007), 9, http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/DDR_Kinshasa_Final.pdf.

¹⁴ Ibid., 8.

¹⁵ Colletta et al., *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 6.

¹⁶ Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25:4 (Autumn 2002): 51, http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.4feil.html.

¹⁷ Caramés, Fisas, and Sanz, “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2005,” 5.

¹⁸ Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem, “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 4 (July 2004), 506, <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/41/4/499.full.pdf+html>.

¹⁹ United Nations, “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” United Nations, 2005, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/DDR_retrospective.pdf.

²⁰ United Nations, “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” 10.

Nicaragua, and South Africa. It is very important to note that, “identifying who belongs to an armed group and thus is eligible for demobilization and reintegration can be a challenging process.”²¹ It is not enough for any alleged combatant to demonstrate that he is eligible for DDR merely by the fact that he or she is armed. Instead, the DDR implementers must consider a broader criterion for eligibility into such programs, such as membership in a group.²²

The third stage corresponds to Reintegration, which according to the UN, “is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.”²³ The reintegration phase is an important part of the development and reconstruction of the post-war society. For this reason, it must be a long-term commitment for the country.²⁴ The United Nations in its report “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective” notes that this stage is an open time-frame process with the support, in several cases, of external actors.²⁵

According to Nicole Ball and Luc van der Goor, DDR has four guiding principles to fulfill in order to succeed.²⁶ First, the “DDR processes should be built on the foundation of national leadership and responsibility.”²⁷ It is necessary to keep in mind that the model is not a rigid one imposition by any particular multilateral organism, but rather is a “national[ly] owned”²⁸ process. The DDR process is not a generic prescription

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 4.

²⁴ Albert Caramés and Eneko Sanz, “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2007,” Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace (2008), 9, <http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr005i.pdf>.

²⁵ Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) “Short Course on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” March 30–April 2, 2008, 11; Caramés and Sanz, “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Programs in the World during 2007, 2008,” 27; United Nations (UN) “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” September 2010, 4.

²⁶ Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” Clingendael, Conflict Research Unit (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006), 7, http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20060800_cru_paper_ddr.pdf.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ United Nations, “Briefing Notes for Senior Managers on the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 4.

given by the UN, or any other organization, that can be applied to any country coming out of a protracted conflict. Second, “DDR should be approached as a process, not a program.”²⁹ DDR is not a set of linear activities that execute consecutively. On the contrary, it is a process, which although complex, must develop into a parallel and agile way between its different stages. Third, “DDR should be viewed as part of a broader security, stabilization and recovery strategy, rather than a stand-alone intervention.”³⁰ This point includes, among others aspects, “the relevance of financial reinsertion assistance”³¹ to former combatants. Without the appropriate funding to carry out a comprehensive reinsertion program of the former guerrillas, militias, or even armed forces, there is a big risk that can emerge from insecurity and instability in the country during the DDR process.

Fourth, “all DDR stakeholders—national, regional, and international—should make a serious effort to learn from past experiences.”³² The DDR processes differ from one country to other, and adjust to the political moment during which they are executed. Nevertheless, it is also true that successful DDR missions possess common characteristics, which must be integrated into the planning and initiation of new DDR processes.

As a consequence of the fourth principle, and to guide multiple peace missions around the world, what scholars have referred to as second generation DDR began around 2010. According to Ayaka Suzuki, head of the UN’s DDR Department, “second generation” became a “term to describe the emerging practices in various peace operations around the world.”³³ The “second generation” recognized that, despite the

²⁹ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Knight and Ozerdem, “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,” 499.

³² Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

³³ United Nations, “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” 15.

successes achieved in the past (e.g., El Salvador and Nicaragua), it is necessary constantly to revise and update the DDR model.

In its report, “Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Practices in Peace Operations,” the UN notes that it is necessary to take three groups of measures in order to improve DDR processes. First, “post-conflict stabilization measures of effectiveness (MOE) include emergency employment programs, reinsertion programs, and sub-national/community approaches.”³⁴

Second, “targeting specific groups with different approaches and incentives, includes disarmament and dismantlement of militias, commanders and senior officers incentive programs, at-risk youth and gang programs, pension schemes, and psychosocial recovery strategies.”³⁵ If it is evident that there are significant numbers of children and women combatants, it is necessary to design and execute a special program for those more vulnerable in order to adapt to the needs of these two vulnerable groups.³⁶

The third category of measures embraces “alternative approaches to addressing disarmament and unregulated weapons, [and the] delicate equilibrium between justice and peace, which every country must balance.”³⁷ This approach is required when disarmament stage is very complex, and it becomes almost impossible to collect all the weapons from the former combatants.

Finally, these four guiding principles—national ownership and responsibility; DDR as a process; DDR as a part of a broader security, stabilization and recovery strategy; and the ability to incorporate lessons from past experiences—and their complex

³⁴ United Nations, *Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Practices in Peace Operations* (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, January 18, 2010), 4, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Naval Postgraduate School, “Short Course on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” Monterey, California: Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, International Organization for Migration, Save the Children (U.S.), and Initiative for Inclusive Security (2008), 7, http://www.csr-nps.org/public/docs/ddr_2008.pdf.

³⁷ United Nations, *Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Practices in Peace Operations*, 5.

and comprehensive application through the “Second Generation” DDR, make up the basis for a lasting peace in those countries transitioning from war to peace.

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will examine DDR “best practices” and lessons learned through a comparative study in El Salvador, South Africa, and Colombia cases. This analysis will focus on the four DDR guiding principles of Ball and van de Goor—national ownership and responsibility; DDR as a process; DDR as a part of a broader security, stabilization and recovery strategy; and incorporating lessons from past experiences—to demonstrate the degree of success or failure in implementing DDR in each case. In addition this thesis will analyze the research’s findings on “Warning Signals and Preemptive Actions”³⁸ to ensure DDR in accordance with the ideal scenario laid out by Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, because, “there is much to be learned from the things that have gone wrong, to varying degrees in all of the programs to date.”³⁹

According to the fourth guiding principle of Ball and van de Goor, DDR in El Salvador was chosen as a case study mainly because of the predominant rural character in the FMLN, which has similarities to the origin of the FARC. Likewise, the two insurgent groups claim to share a common bond in land rights and the exclusion of the peasant classes by the dominant political power both in El Salvador and Colombia. A third important condition is that DDR in El Salvador is considered a successful example of such processes.⁴⁰

DDR in South Africa provides important lessons of reconciliation between parties involved in protracted conflicts. The complexity of the South African case, due to the presence of multiple actors and multiple human rights violations committed by state and

³⁸ Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 33.

³⁹ Ibid., 32.

⁴⁰ Segovia, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of El Salvador,” International Center for Transitional Justice, 6–7, <https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-ElSalvador-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf>.

non-state actors, constitutes an important reference for designing a DDR program in Colombia, a country which successfully faced many of the same issues.⁴¹

Because Colombia also has experience in DDR processes, it is important to recognize the lessons in these processes to help implement a new and improved DDR scheme. It is mandatory to undertake the challenge of reintegrating the FARC into Colombian society, so that Colombia's long conflict will cease to perturb regional peace and stability.

This thesis will rely upon secondary sources such as books, country studies of South Africa, El Salvador, and Colombia, government reports of those countries, and scholarly articles that contribute to the overall outcome of DDR in each case. Another important source is UN documents that explain the objectives, definitions, and characteristics of DDR.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will be divided into five chapters. Chapter I will look at the scholarly literature on DDR, its evolution, and guiding principles. Chapter II will give a general overview of DDR's successes and failures since the end of the Cold War in El Salvador and South Africa. Chapter III will look at Colombia's experience in DDR from the end of *la Violencia* in 1958 to the demobilization of the insurgent group M19 in the late 1980s. Chapter IV will examine Colombia's most recent DDR experience with the AUC from 2003–2006, as well as the “individual demobilization” programs for insurgents that have been in place in Colombia since 2002. Based on all those experiences, as well as those of other countries, Chapter V will consider the potential issues that a demobilization of the FARC may entail, given its decentralized structure, largely peasant or at least uneducated and ill-equipped membership to transition to what has become a booming Colombian economy.

⁴¹ African Union Panel of the Wise, *Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges in the Fight against Impunity*, The African Union Series (New York: International Peace Institute, February 2013), 9, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi_e_pub_peacejusticeafrica.pdf.

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II. DDR IN EL SALVADOR AND SOUTH AFRICA

The Truth Commission ignored completely that which was the goal of the peace process: to incorporate into the political life armed people.

—Alfredo Cristiani

A. DDR IN EL SALVADOR

1. Introduction

On March 6, 2014, the citizens of El Salvador went to the polls in the second round to choose the president for the period 2014–2019. For the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN), the victory of Salvador Sánchez Cerén represents the consolidation of its political project, since the outgoing president, Mr. Funes, also belongs to the same party. The previous fact constituted a clear evidence of democracy and the peace consolidation in El Salvador, from which 20 years ago the FMLN was formed as the largest armed opposition to the Government of El Salvador (GOES).

According to many scholars, El Salvador’s process is considered among the “most successful cases of implementing peace agreements in the post-Cold War period.”⁴² What were those successes and how did they come about? This section of the chapter will offer an overview of the main actors in the Salvadoran conflict and human rights issues. The second part will analyze DDR in El Salvador through Ball and van de Goor’s four guiding principles: national leadership and responsibility; DDR should be approached as a process; DDR is part of a broader security, stabilization, and recovery strategy, and DDR stakeholders must learn from past experiences.⁴³ Finally, with the conclusions, it will attempt to draw parallels to the Colombian case.

⁴² Segovia, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of El Salvador,” 6.

⁴³ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

2. DDR in El Salvador: Actors and Human Rights Issues

Scholars believe that the origins of the conflict in El Salvador lie with the exclusion of the majority of the population from political power. A second cause was the profound inequality in land distribution, which impoverished the peasant population. These two aspects were reinforced through a heavy militarization of El Salvador, and the subsequent military repression of discontent.⁴⁴ The El Salvadoran military had exercised total power in El Salvador from 1932 until 1979, through the succession of military dictatorships.

From 1980 to 1992, El Salvador was devastated by a civil war that caused the deaths of more than 74,000 persons, and forced the displacement of more than one million of its inhabitants.⁴⁵ In the wake of the dramatic levels of violence, social unrest, and the absence of a clear military victory for either of the warring parties, peace talks were initiated in 1990. However, the road to peace was not an easy one—indeed, earlier attempts to broker a peace in 1984 during the presidency of José Napoleon Duarte had failed.⁴⁶

a. Actors

The main actors in the El Salvador DDR process included the GOES, the FMLN, and the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

(1) GOES

In 1989, Alfredo Cristiani, candidate of the right-wing party ARENA, was elected president of El Salvador. Although analysts of the conflict were convinced that, due to Cristiani's political convictions, the president would intensify the struggle against the FMLN; the Salvadoran ruler on the contrary offered to negotiate.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Alpaslan Özerdem, *Post-War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (London, England: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009), 55–58.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 59.

⁴⁷ Simon A. Molina, *The Peace Process in El Salvador (1984 - 1992)* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 6, <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA309381>.

One of the reasons was certainly the financial and economic costs of the war—at the outset of Cristiani’s term, more than 50 percent of the budget of GOES was dedicated to support the war against the FMLN. Likewise, the military was viewed as a tool of the wealthy class of the country, which included Cristiani, and hence lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many. El Salvador became the sixth largest recipient of U.S. military aid, because, in the context of the Cold War, Washington viewed with concern the emergence of rebel movements that threatened the countries of Central America. “The United States provided the Salvadoran government with \$3.2 billion in economic aid and \$1.1 billion in military aid between 1980 and 1991, which was indispensable in preventing a victory by the Cuban- and Nicaraguan-backed rebels.”⁴⁸

(2) FMLN

The FMLN arose in 1980 as a result of the union of five rebellious groups that were seeking to overthrow the GOES. The name was adopted in honor to the founder of the Salvadoran communist party. The FMLN received support in the form of weapons, cash, and training from the former Soviet Union, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.⁴⁹

According to Alpaslan Özerdem, there were three principal factors to explain the formation of the FMLN. The first factor corresponds to the increasing number of human rights abuses carried out by officially tolerated death squads between 1979 and 1981. The second factor was the assassination of Oscar Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador and fierce advocate of human rights. The third was the peasant’s desire for revenge and protection against landlords and military forces.⁵⁰ The FMLN eventually numbered 15,000 members, including non-combatant wounded personal and political cadres.⁵¹ With this force, the FMLN launched two ‘final offensives,’ one in 1981, the other in 1989, in El Salvador, and especially against San Salvador. While these offensives failed

⁴⁸ Charles T. Call, “Democratization, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35 (November 2003): 827–862, 831, <http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/CallJLASI.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Molina, “The Peace Process in El Salvador (1984–1992),” 7–10.

⁵⁰ Özerdem, *Post-War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, 59.

⁵¹ Segovia, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of El Salvador,” 8.

to bring the FMLN to power, they testified to the strength and persistence of the rebels, which persuaded Cristiani to negotiate.

(3) ONUSAL

To ensure the success of the peace process in Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), in 1990 the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA).⁵² ONUCA became the first peace-keeping mission of the UN, and its mandate was promulgated to assist in the DDR process to the countries of that region.

United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was created in May 1991 with the explicit mandate “to verify implementation of all agreements between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional.”⁵³ ONUSAL operated in El Salvador from July 1991 to April 1995. Its mandate encompassed agreements verification, the exploration of land tenure issues, and the DDR process that included a reduction of the Salvadoran armed forces.

b. Human Rights

Inequality of land distribution in El Salvador was significant, where only 0.5 percent of the producers possessed 100 hectares or more for the development of agricultural production. By contrast, 71.3 percent of the producers possessed less than 10 percent of productive land, with properties averaging of less than 2 hectares.⁵⁴

The struggle for control of the land and political power led El Salvador into a spiral of violence in the 1980s, which in turn led to systematic violations of human rights by both parties in the war. The FMLN was responsible for massive displacement of Salvadorans due its policy of forced recruitment, and by the indiscriminate use of IEDs in the countryside. The GOES was charged with indiscriminate air bombardment of the

⁵² United Nations, “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” 16.

⁵³ United Nations, “United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusal.htm>.

⁵⁴ Daniel Flores, “El Salvador: Problematica Relacionada con las Tierras Excedantarias en el Marco del Acuerdo de Paz,” [El Salvador: Problems Related to Land Excedantarias in the Framework of the Peace Agreement], (San Salvador: 1998), 2, <http://www.repo.funde.org/620/1/AVANCES-13.pdf>.

peasant population, the killing of captured guerrilla members, and for the formation of death squads, which led a systematic campaign against human rights' defenders.⁵⁵

3. DDR in El Salvador: Four Guiding Principles

Ball and van de Goor established four guiding principles for “a framework within which DDR programming can occur.”⁵⁶ In the case of El Salvador, through the application of those principles it is possible to establish the scope and the shortcomings of the DDR process.

a. *National Leadership and Responsibility*

Without national leadership and responsibility, there is scant probability for success in DDR processes. The leadership of Alfredo Cristiani, El Salvador's president from 1989 to 1994, has already been mentioned. As an initial step, in September 1989, Cristiani restarted the dialogue with the FMLN, which had been initiated and then abandoned by his predecessor Duarte in 1984. However, this process was interrupted only two months later by the FMLN's second “final offensive” in November 1989. The FMLN's failure confirmed the stalemate.

Due the lack of confidence between the parties into the conflict, mainly caused by the extensive human rights violations, ONUSAL became a necessary facilitator of the peace process. Armed with a broad mandate, ONUSAL accomplished many crucial tasks “including a ceasefire and related measures, reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure, and other economic and social issues.”⁵⁷

Although the responsibility of the DDR was shared among the three main actors, the demobilization process concluded successfully. The parties were committed to ending the civil war that had bled El Salvador for 12 years. Unfortunately, shared responsibility meant that the process of reintegration went less smoothly.

⁵⁵ Molina, “The Peace Process in El Salvador (1984–1992),” 16.

⁵⁶ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

⁵⁷ United Nations, “United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador.”

b. DDR as a Process

DDR in El Salvador followed a complex timetable. However, “the Salvadoran experience shows that is not a direct or linear relationship among the different components of DDR.”⁵⁸ In that process, the stages were developed simultaneously.

The implementation of the agreements gave two very significant results for the society of El Salvador. First, it gave rise to a profound restructuring of the political system: many institutions were reformed, and the FMLN converted from a military organization into a political party. Second, the country’s security agencies were entirely revamped: the army shrunk by 50 percent and changed its doctrine; former members of the FMLN were incorporated into a new national police; and the entire system of national intelligence was reorganized. In numerical terms, this meant that approximately 30,000 members of the armed forces were demobilized, as were 8,000 FMLN combatants and 6,450 injured non-combatants and political cadres.⁵⁹ Despite its success, DDR in El Salvador was hardly flawless. Many of the reintegration programs never materialized and the special needs of women and children combatants were not taken into account in the process.

c. Security and Stabilization

The third principle corresponds to the statement that “DDR should be viewed as part of a broader security, stabilization and recovery strategy, rather than a stand-alone intervention.”⁶⁰ The lack of support to the reintegration of former FMLN combatants, and even former soldiers possibly contributed to the rise of criminal gangs. According to Thomas Bruneau in his book *Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America*, “Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street Gang gained ascendancy in the early postwar period.”⁶¹ Bruneau also emphasizes the participation that included old gangs in El

⁵⁸ Segovia, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of El Salvador,” 19.

⁵⁹ Özerdem, *Post-War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, 61

⁶⁰ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

⁶¹ Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert and Elizabeth Skinner, *Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011), 48.

Salvador DDR process, since some of these organizations were used by the FMLN during its offensive. Because of this, those group members were included by the GOES as part of fighters to be reinserted into society after the cessation of hostilities.⁶² Although the author makes it clear that the failures in demobilization of combatants of the Salvadoran Civil War is not the main cause of the gangs in El Salvador, the cessation of the war and the mass deportation of young gang members, mainly from California, led to the growth of the criminal structures in El Salvador.⁶³

Failure to collect the weapons of the combatants added another variable to the continuation of violence inside the country. Criminal gangs, can easily find guns in hidden stockpiles remaining from El Salvador's war. Those factors have combined to make El Salvador one of the most dangerous countries in the world, with a homicide rate of 69 per 100,000, the second highest in the world in 2012.⁶⁴

d. Learn from Past Experiences

According to this principle, “all DDR stakeholders—national, regional and international—should make a serious effort to learn from past experiences.”⁶⁵ The DDR processes differ from one country to other, and must adjust to the political circumstances. Nevertheless, it is also true that successful DDR missions possess common characteristics that must be integrated into the planning and initiation of new DDR processes. Because El Salvador was one of the first DDR cases after the Cold War, there was little previous experience to rely on.

4. Conclusions

GOES engaged in the DDR process of its own military forces, because of the human rights violations of its members, and because of the military stalemate with the

⁶² Bruneau, Dammert, and Skinner, *Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America*, 48.

⁶³ Ibid., 49.

⁶⁴ Department of State of the United States, “El Salvador 2013: Crime and Safety Report,” *Bureau of Diplomatic Security*, <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13875>.

⁶⁵ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

FMLN. On the other hand, the FMLN lost its political and financial support after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and because of the change in Nicaraguan ruling party, the main sponsor of the insurgents in El Salvador. While the actors accepted DDR as an experiment, its application proved the best path to ending political violence in El Salvador. However, unresolved social conflicts, and the failure of reintegration of combatants into Salvadoran society transitioned the political violence of the civil war to another bloodier organized crime violence.

Likewise, human rights issues loomed large during the El Salvador conflict. In El Salvador, amnesty was one way to cut the Gordian knot of stalemate. However, more than 20 years after the end of the civil war, many Salvadorans are wondering if it is necessary to abolish the general amnesty law, to bring true and justice, in a way that the Salvadorans could reach reconciliation after have experienced a war.

Through the four guiding principles of Ball and van de Goor, the analysis of the DDR process in El Salvador highlights important aspects to take into account, beginning with President Cristiani's leadership in opting for negotiation over continued conflict. Although the responsibility and burden of peace negotiations, verification, and DDR was shared among three entities—the GOES, the FMLN and ONUSAL—this “burden sharing” failed to produce better outcomes for the reintegration phase. Although the actors in the DDR process accompanied the reintegration of former combatants, GOES have exercised its leadership more strongly, and taken charge of this stage. This would have avoided the dilution of reintegration, and enabled a better quality of life for former combatants. Second, despite its complexity and the limited timeframe for implementation, the DDR process in El Salvador had sufficient flexibility to be successful. Third, the security situation in El Salvador during and after the DDR process became worse than during the war. It is necessary to implement measures to avoid instability caused by former combatants who organize into criminal gangs. Fourth, during the DDR process in El Salvador, the three main actors created a new model to manage the reconstruction of a country after a protracted conflict.

a. Similarities with Colombia

Presently, in the Colombian case, the two main actors are the protagonists of the peace process, GOC and FARC. In both conflicts in Colombia and El Salvador, the origins of the armed groups have a common origin in the tensions of the Cold War. Both armed groups, FMLN and FARC, share the peasant characteristics of their combatants. Likewise, the two insurgent groups also share a common claim of land rights, and call for inclusion of peasants in the political process both in El Salvador and Colombia. According to the most recent national survey, the National Administrative Statistics Department (DANE) found that 42.8 percent of Colombian peasants live in poverty, and 19.1 percent live in extreme poverty.⁶⁶ This situation benefits FARC's recruitment efforts and popular support.

Additionally, as was proved in the DDR of the Colombian paramilitaries in 2003, to ensure transparency of the process and generate confidence among the parties, a mediator is required. In 2003, the Organization of American States (OAS) oversaw the process of disarmament and demobilization of the former Colombian paramilitary fighters. For this reason, it should be expected that in the event of a DDR process of the FARC, an international organization with credibility in both parties, would help guarantee the integrity of the process.

Unfortunately, many former fighters of the AUC preferred to turn to crime following the demobilizations of 2003–2006, rather than seek legal employment. This has resulted in a new post-conflict phenomenon in Colombia known as the *BACRIM*, organizations that participate in drug trafficking and extortion in areas of formerly under AUC influence. Because of this, one of the most salient concerns in Colombia is that criminal structures may emerge from a future demobilization of FARC fighters.

⁶⁶ Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas de Colombia (DANE), "Pobreza Monetaria y Multidimensional 2013," [Monetary and Multidimensional Poverty 2013], (Bogotá, Colombia: DANE, 2014), 22, http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/condiciones_vida/pobreza/pres_pobreza_2013.pdf.

B. DDR IN SOUTH AFRICA

Sport has the power to change the world, the power to inspire, the power to unite people in a way that little else can. Sport can create hope ... It is an instrument for peace.

—Nelson Mandela

1. Introduction

On June 24, 1995, during the Rugby World Championship Final, Nelson Mandela, then South African president, seized the opportunity to send a political message of nation building both to the international community and to his fellow citizens in South Africa. On that day, wearing the team colors, Mandela was acclaimed by 65,000 white rugby fans of his own country.⁶⁷ This was a remarkable turn-of-events given that the National Peace Accord (NPA) between the parties involved South Africa's protracted conflict had been signed barely two years previously.

Mandela's embrace of rugby, a primarily Afrikaans sport, was meant to strengthen the message of unity among South Africa's multi-racial community in Simon Kuper's words, "Playing fields alone cannot build a Rainbow Nation. Nation building does not depend on rugby or cricket alone. A multi-racial society is built on political decisions, not just on winning the World Cup."⁶⁸

Despite the symbolic importance of sport in creating a new national identity,⁶⁹ there are other aspects to be considered in order to explain the end of political violence in South Africa. One of the most important is the DDR process of former combatants, which was far from perfect in South Africa. Actually, according to psychologist Monica Bandeira, "in countries where aspects of the DDR process were poorly managed, such as

⁶⁷ Lynette Steenveld and Larry Strelitz, "The 1995 Rugby World Cup and the Politics of Nation-Building in South Africa," *Media, Culture & Society* 20, no. 4 (October 1998), 609–629, 621–622, <http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/20/4/609.full.pdf+html>.

⁶⁸ Simon Kuper, "Playing Fields Alone Cannot Build a Rainbow Nation Nation-Building does Not Depend on Rugby or Cricket Alone. A Multi-Racial Society is Built on Political Decisions, Not just on Winning the World Cup SIMON KUPER - ON THE GAME," *Financial Times*, July 13, 2002, 20, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/249305776?accountid=12702>.

⁶⁹ Steenveld and Strelitz, "The 1995 Rugby World Cup and the Politics of Nation-Building in South Africa," 609–610.

South Africa, the effects are long lasting and still being felt today.”⁷⁰ Taking into account precisely these shortcomings, and considering the current peace process between the Government of Colombia and FARC, the shortcomings of DDR in South Africa may serve as an important example for the Colombian Government when implementing its own process with FARC.

The purpose of this section is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of South Africa’s DDR process as a potential guide for the Colombian situation going forward, should the FARC agree to demobilize. The first part of this section will provide an overview of two principal characteristics of DDR in South Africa—the fate of the combatants, and the respect for human rights as integral to the process. It will then analyze DDR in South Africa through Ball and van de Goor’s framework.⁷¹ Finally, this section will evaluate the relevance of South Africa’s experience for Colombia, assuming a successful conclusion of negotiations between the GOC and the FARC.

2. South Africa’s Conflict: Actors and Human Rights Issues

The racial tensions between two civilizations, European and native, in South Africa, dated back to the first meeting of those same human groups on the soil of that nation and resulted in violent conflict. The arrival of Jan van Riebeeck from Holland to the Cape in 1652,⁷² began a long and tragic history of subjugation and apartheid that was only surpassed by the end of the 20th century.

Thus, it is precisely the end of the 20th century which is the focus of this analysis, for obvious reasons of time and space. In addition, during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, the political struggle of the black population in South Africa went from being a

⁷⁰ Monica Bandeira, “Ex-Combatants in South Africa: How to Address their Needs,” *Intervention: International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work & Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict* 7, no. 1 (2009), 61–66, <http://www.ourmediaourselves.com/archives/71pdf/71%20Bandeira.pdf>.

⁷¹ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

⁷² Murray Faure and Jan-Erik Lane, eds, *South Africa: Designing New Political Institutions* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1996), 12.

popular resistance movement to an armed struggle, due to the violent repression by the Government of South Africa.⁷³

The 1983 tricameral Constitution of South Africa, signed by whites, Indians, and coloreds, was the trigger for a popular revolt across the country. The reason is obvious; the black population, which represented the 74.8 of the total population of South Africa, was excluded from the new constitution, whose purpose was precisely to provide a political opening in the country.⁷⁴

Political violence in South Africa was not limited to the struggle between the black population and the South African Defense Forces. On the contrary, at the end of the 1980s, a larger number of murders came from the violence among black factions.⁷⁵ “Between 1985 and 1989, a total of 5,387 persons died as a result of political violence.”⁷⁶

Political violence, internal pressures, and isolation from the international community, led to the February 2, 1990, speech by President F. W. de Klerk during the installation of the sessions of the congress. Within the discourse, “de Klerk announced the unbanning of political organizations, the release of political leaders from prison, and free political activity for all.”⁷⁷ Following this, South Africa began the process of reconciliation that would end the apartheid regime.

a. Actors

The major players in South African DDR process were the South African Government (SAG) and the African National Congress (ANC); however, other important actors in the political and military arena included the Inkhata Freedom Party, Azanian

⁷³ Peter Gastrow, *Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord*, United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 3.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 8–9.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 10–11.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 9.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 4.

National Liberation Army (AZANLA); Azanian Peoples Organization, the Pan African Congress, and Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB).⁷⁸

(1) SAG

During the mandate of P. W. Botha (1984–1989), the National Party (NP), the party of government in South Africa, introduced the National Security State (NSE) in the country. Botha, supported in the South African Defense Forces (SADF), exercised an iron-fisted control of the majority black, Indian, and colored. NP implemented the NSE “as a response to the threat posed by revolutionary warfare against those Third World governments aligned with the West.”⁷⁹ However, Botha’s NSE was a complete failure. For that reason, in 1989, the SA president began a series of timid reforms to try to reduce racial and political tensions within South Africa, which had degenerated into political violence.⁸⁰

President F.W. de Klerk assumed the presidency in 1989 in the midst of a political crisis, which ended with the withdrawal of his predecessor P.W. Botha.⁸¹ Two months after assuming the presidency of SA, President F.W. de Klerk closed the NSE and ended the SA nuclear program.⁸² Those presidential decisions added to Nelson Mandela’s liberation and the unbanned of ANC, gave unmistakable signals to the entire country of a real willingness of SAG to begin a peace process with the ANC.

(2) ANC

The ANC was formed in 1912, with “its aim to bring all Africans together as one people to defend their rights and freedoms.”⁸³ There are four factors in the history of

⁷⁸ Philip Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm: The Armed Forces in South Africa’s Democratic Transition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 2.

⁷⁹ Chris Alden, *Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State* (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Macmillan, 1996), 272.

⁸⁰ According to Alden, P.W. Botha started “tentative contacts” with ANC secretly in early 1984 in Geneva. However, the informal negotiations with Mandela became public in 1988.

⁸¹ Alden, *Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, 265–272.

⁸² Ibid., 279.

⁸³ African National Congress web page, “A Brief History of the African National Congress,” <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206>.

ANC, before they attained power democratically. The first is the “Defiance Campaign” that started the organization in 1952 against SAG. The campaign consisted of “massive demonstrations, the burning of the hated passes critical to the maintenance of influx control, boycotts, and other acts of civil disobedience.”⁸⁴ Second, in March 1960, SAG killed 69 black protesters in the town of Sharpeville. SAG, in addition to the indiscriminate use of force, also imposed a state of emergency within the country. Political opposition in SA was banned, and the ANC was no longer legal.⁸⁵ The response of the ANC was to initiate an armed campaign, through its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, MK).⁸⁶ The aim was clear; there was no other way to achieve the goal rather than to overthrow the SAG.

The third factor was Nelson Mandela’s capture in 1962, just after the initiation of the ANC armed campaign.⁸⁷ Mandela’s term in prison was a source of leverage for the ANC in its political struggle against SAG. “Mandela became the symbol of the struggle against apartheid”⁸⁸ at the global level, and he knew how to exploit this fact. From 1986 onward, Nelson Mandela had begun to prepare the foundation for possible negotiations with SAG.⁸⁹

The fourth factor was the stalemate in the armed struggle between the SAG and ANC. Despite SAG’s leverage of power, it did not have “public support or legitimacy, and was isolated internationally.”⁹⁰ On the other hand, ANC did not have resources, “but it enjoyed broad legitimacy, public support, and wide international recognition and

⁸⁴ Alden, *Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, 18.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ *Mail & Guardian*, “Nelson Mandela Dies,” December 5, 2013, <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-12-05-nelson-mandela-dies>.

⁸⁹ Gastrow, *Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord*, 4.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

support.”⁹¹ By October 1986, the ANC admitted, “despite all our efforts, we have not come anywhere near the achievement of the objectives we set for ourselves.”⁹²

(3) Other Actors

At the beginning of the negotiations, SAG and ANC “agreed to exclude the ‘homeland’ and other non-statutory forces from participation in future discussions in order to avoid ‘complications.’”⁹³ These parties, excluded from the initial dialogs, were Inkhata Freedom Party, AZANLA, Azanian Peoples Organization, and the Pan African Congress. The intention of SAG and ANC was to use the process to create a synergy, which would allow other parties to join the accords without having to consider their claims. This was a risky decision that might have sabotaged the negotiations and destabilized the country itself. However, this situation was corrected in time, and minor actors, such as the “homeland” armies and Inkhata, had a presence at the talks, which guaranteed that at least their concerns and aspirations would be heard.⁹⁴

The ideologically and racially opposing ends were “the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB, or Afrikaner resistance movement), the most militant of the right-wing groups, the Afrikaner Volksfront, and the followers of General Constand Viljoen.”⁹⁵ All those groups “desire a white homeland or separate state rather than participation in a new multiracial state.”⁹⁶

With so many uneven actors within the DDR process, MK and SADF played an essential role “to secure a degree of internal order so political negotiations could continue.”⁹⁷ The most important parts of the DDR process, SAG and ANC, “were deeply

⁹¹ Gastrow, *Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord*, 4.

⁹² Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, 216.

⁹³ Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, 2.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 6–25.

⁹⁵ Diane L. Brook, Sherry L. Field, and Linda D. Labbo, “No Easy Road to Freedom: The New South Africa,” National Council for the Social Studies, Social Education Classrooms Focus (February 1995), 2, <http://static.ncss.org/files/lessons/CFFeb95.pdf>.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, 3.

concerned that “unstable elements” could derail political negotiations.”⁹⁸ DDR process in South Africa was a complicated case of negotiation due the multiplicity of actors, and the different ideologies and aspirations that these same actors had.

b. Human Rights Violations

A second important issue addressed in the peace talks was how to deal with human rights violations. Human rights violations in civil conflict have many sources—racism, gender violence, vilification and dehumanization of the enemy, weak state institutions and the absence of the rule of law, and the escalation of violence that, as Clausewitz noted, is a characteristic of conflict. The threat of punishment for human rights violations may actually prolong a conflict, because warring parties often continue to seek leverage with peace talks. Even with the successful conclusion of peace, some factions may choose to fight on, convert to predatory activities, or the state may be too weak or lack legitimacy in some areas or with some groups to impose its authority. In these conditions, political violence with concomitant violations of human rights is likely to continue.

In the South African case, the political rivalry between the ANC and Inkhata generated violence even as the peace process got underway, a violence fueled by accusations that the SADF was providing covert support to Inkhata armed elements.⁹⁹ Those events occurred mostly in the “KwaZulu-Natal region and the most violent period was from 1990 to 1994.”¹⁰⁰ According to Hugo van der Merwe and Guy Lamb, 33,713 human rights violations, mostly committed against young black males, were documented by The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

The TRC found that some agents of the South African state perpetrated different types of gross violations of human rights, including “judicial and extrajudicial killings; and the covert training, arming and funding of offensive paramilitary units or hit squads

⁹⁸ Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, 3.

⁹⁹ Hugo van der Merwe and Guy Lamb, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of South Africa,” 5, <https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-South-Africa-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

for deployment internally against opponents of the government.”¹⁰¹ Likewise, Inkatha and the ANC were responsible for the killing of almost 6,000 people in the period from 1980 to 1994. These groups also employed improvised explosive devices, which are explicitly proscribed by the rules of war.¹⁰²

In pursuit of reconciliation and stability in the country, South Africans chose to grant amnesty to all the actors in the conflict who had committed crimes, even human rights violations. These types of crimes were grouped under the rubric of ‘political violence.’ The amnesty applied both to members of SADF, as well as the so-called armies of liberation.¹⁰³

3. DDR in South Africa: Four Guiding Principles

The principles described by Ball and van de Goor are a very useful tool for determining the most important aspects of the DDR process in South Africa.

a. National Leadership and Responsibility

Without strong national leadership and responsibility, the probability for success in the DDR process is low. As Mandela’s predecessor and poster boy for the apartheid system, it was President F.W. de Klerk who initiated regime change. Under pressure from international isolation and lack of legitimacy of his country’s regime, and after more than three decades of conflict, President F. W. de Klerk reached out to the opposition to propose peace talks.¹⁰⁴

In February 1990, President F. W. de Klerk “opened the way to a political reform,”¹⁰⁵ and despite the opposition of radical sectors on both sides, he suspended the state of emergency in effect since 1984, which was designed to control and repress the black population. The state of emergency had allowed the militarization of towns affected

¹⁰¹ van der Merwe and Lamb, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of South Africa,” 6.

¹⁰² Ibid. This would also include the 1997 Convention prohibiting the use, stockpiling, transfer or production of anti-personnel mines.

¹⁰³ van der Merwe and Lamb, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of South Africa,” 7.

¹⁰⁴ Gastrow, *Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord*, 19–24.

¹⁰⁵ Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, 2.

by violence that could not be controlled by police forces.¹⁰⁶ The end of the state of emergency also ended the militarization of the country, and was a first step toward regaining civilian control of the SADF.

The citizens of South Africa largely embraced the DDR process; however, success was not guaranteed. In the wake of the Boipatong massacre of June 1992, Nelson Mandela requested UN intervention following the breakdown of talks between the ANC and the government of South Africa.

In 1992, under mandate of the General Assembly, the United Nations established the Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA). UNOMSA has the mandate “to help quell violence in South Africa in coordination with the structures set up under the National Peace Accord signed on September 14, 1991.”¹⁰⁷ However, the UN mandate was not limited to security issues; it also focused on “creating conditions for negotiations leading to the establishment of a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa.”¹⁰⁸

South Africans never delegated leadership and responsibility for DDR, although President F. W. de Klerk took the first step in the DDR process by accepting the accompaniment of the UN while his successor, Nelson Mandela, assumed the implementation and execution of DDR, its most complex part, during his term as president of South Africa.

b. DDR as a Process

DDR is not a set of linear activities to be executed sequentially. On the contrary, it is a process, which although complex, must develop in a parallel and flexible way between its different stages. In the South African case, the DDR process contemplated the creation of a new state military structure which would include all military factions in the conflict.¹⁰⁹ This complicated the process immeasurably, for not only was the size of

¹⁰⁶ Gavin Cawthra, *Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defense, Development, and Security in Transition* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 3.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations, “Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council,” http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/peacekeeping_missions.shtml#reg16.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, 101.

the security forces to be reduced, but also room in the new organization would have to be found for the soldiers of all parties. The idea was that South African National Defense Force (SANDF) must be legitimate and inclusive, conditions that serve as the basis for the construction of a true peace among South Africans.

The new SANDF also had to define a new chain of command, cope with budget restrictions, and create a unified force despite significant differences in the level of training and technical expertise among the combatants.¹¹⁰ The negotiations proved to be arduous, but had to be expedited to conclude before national elections. The agreements created the Defense Secretariat, which has the responsibility of “financial planning, research and development, procurement of weapon systems, and general administrative control over the daily activities of the armed forces.”¹¹¹ The authority of the Defense Secretariat was also clearly established to design policies relating to the management of internal security, while external threats fall under the purview of the president.

The next question was who would be incorporated in a new, if downsized, SANDF? All parties wanted their representatives present in the ranks; however, the differences in the level of training and technical expertise among the combatants made this an issue. Because they required greater technical expertise, the navy and the South African air force proved more reluctant to incorporate former insurgent combatants. This meant that most went to the army, which was executed under a complex training plan with advice and support of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT).¹¹²

Due to numerical and budgetary constraints, approximately 6,000 combatants chose voluntary demobilization. The SANDF integrated 6,600 former members of MK and APLA, 10,000 from Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei Defense Forces

¹¹⁰ Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, 188.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 106.

¹¹² Ibid.

(TBVC), and 66,000 original members of SADF were retained in the new security force.¹¹³

c. Security and Stabilization

The third principle holds that “DDR should be viewed as part of a broader security, stabilization, and recovery strategy, rather than a stand-alone intervention.”¹¹⁴ As soon as the decision to reach a peace was taken, “the new challenge to all political leaders was to manage the coming transition to minimize violence during a period when the planned political and constitutional reforms were not yet in place.”¹¹⁵

“As civil leaders appeared increasingly incapable of managing the violence outside the negotiation chambers,”¹¹⁶ the leaders of the SADF, the MK, and the Armed Forces of the ANC agreed to create the internal conditions to ensure the continuation of the political negotiations and to avoid incidents that could destabilize the country. The concern was to avoid “spoilers” from derailing the political process and compromising the upcoming presidential elections. This was a huge challenge, as the elections of 1994 would be the first time that the majority black population could choose one of their own as the new ruler of South Africa, and the country could finally be recognized as a democracy.

d. Learn from Past Experiences

“All DDR stakeholders—national, regional, and international—should make a serious effort to learn from past experiences.”¹¹⁷ The DDR processes differ from one country to other, and must adjust to the political environment and in-country conditions. Nevertheless, it is also true that successful DDR missions possess common

¹¹³ Cawthra, *Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defense, Development, and Security in Transition*, 149.

¹¹⁴ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

¹¹⁵ Gastrow, *Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord*, 9.

¹¹⁶ Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, 3.

¹¹⁷ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

characteristics, which must be integrated into the planning and initiation of new DDR processes.

Despite this principle, it is not very clear that the South Africans applied some lessons from other DDR processes such as El Salvador. However, UN observers who were deployed to South Africa had experienced DDR in El Salvador. For that reason, the presence of UN observers proved very useful in facilitating the settlement of disputes between the parties, and even to reducing the level of political violence in South Africa during the fulfillment of their mandate.

4. Conclusions

After the end of the Cold War, DDR became a prerequisite for peace in countries emerging from a prolonged conflict or civil war between its inhabitants.¹¹⁸ In the case of South Africa, the implementation of the DDR process was a condition for the construction of a new country. That process proved to be complex, in large measure due to the multiplicity of political actors in the conflict, who in turn possessed armies that they used to commit political violence. Likewise, the political violence continued even after the signing of the NPA.

Through the four guiding principles of Ball and van de Goor, the analysis of the DDR process in South Africa highlighted important aspects to take into account. First, South Africans assumed the leadership and responsibility for DDR in order to ensure the process' success. Second, despite its complexity and the little time for implementation, the DDR process in South Africa had sufficient flexibility, but the capacity required to carry out its execution. Third, the former combatants demonstrated, in a notable way, a commitment, vision, and restraint that allowed peace negotiations to proceed and brought stability to the country during the transitional period to democracy. The most important aspect was the joint effort of former enemies to design and implement the SANDF. Fourth, during DDR process in South Africa, the UN observers, the international stakeholder, possessed experience in processes of this nature and that contributed to the success of DDR in that country.

¹¹⁸ Naval Postgraduate School, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 1.

a. *Similarities with Colombia*

What are the lessons for Colombia in the South African case? The causes of the conflicts in the two countries overlap somewhat. In South Africa the tensions were racial and tribal in nature; however, these reflected economic inequality and political exclusion of a large group of citizens, characteristics shared by the Colombian case. Each country also has multiple actors to placate and human rights issues to resolve. The South African negotiations included multiple actors and were ultimately comprehensive. The GOC, however, has chosen to deal with its enemies piecemeal. At the time of writing, the ongoing negotiation in Havana involves only two actors, the GOC and FARC. The peace process and its future DDR implementation is leaving aside another armed group, the ELN. Despite its relative weakness, ELN maintains the capacity to perpetrate terrorist attacks in some peripheral areas inside Colombia. In the view of this author, the ELN remains an important actor and potential “spoiler” who should be invited to the negotiation table. Otherwise, a future DDR process could be seriously compromised.

As in South Africa, the violations of human rights are echoed in Colombia, where it has become a significant issue. According to statistics from the Office of the Attorney General of Colombia, more than 4,000 members of the Colombian military forces have been accused of crimes related to violation of human rights, especially for extrajudicial killings and support of illegal paramilitary groups.¹¹⁹ Likewise, FARC is responsible for crimes such as the recruitment of minors, kidnapping, and planting landmines in vast areas of Colombia. For that reason, FARC and GOC are debating how to deal with the problem of war crimes and human rights violations committed by all sides in the Colombian conflict. If the decision is made to declare an amnesty for all parties, then some transitional justice mechanism like the TRC in South Africa will have to be considered.

¹¹⁹ El Colombiano, “Fiscalía Investiga a Más De 4.200 Uniformados Por Falsos Positivos,” [Attorney General Investigates More than 4,200 Military by False Results Mounted During Operations (extrajudicial killings)], February 19, 2014, http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/F/fiscalia_investiga_a_mas_de_4200_uniformados_por_falsos_positivos/fiscalia_investiga_a_mas_de_4200_uniformados_por_falsos_positivos.asp.

III. COLOMBIA'S EXPERIENCE IN DDR FROM THE END OF LA VIOLENCIA IN 1958 TO THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE INSURGENT GROUP M19 IN THE LATE 1980s

If I advance, follow me; if I step back, push me; if I betray you, kill me;
if I die, avenge me.

–Jorge Eliecer Gaitan

A. THE COLOMBIAN DDR PROCESS DURING “LA VIOLENCIA”

Even before the dawn of its modern republican life in 1886, the history of Colombia has been stained by public violence and civil war. But Colombia has also witnessed episodes of, if not reconciliation, at least compromise between warring political rivals that intermittently usher in a demobilization of combatants as prelude to a nonviolent intercessional. This chapter aims to explore the lessons of more recent demobilizations of combatants in Colombia, beginning with the end of more than a decade of civil war known as *La Violencia* in 1958.¹²⁰

Although *La Violencia* ended almost 60 years ago, the subsequent demobilization in the wake of a power-sharing compromise between Liberals and Conservatives contain valuable lessons on how Colombian political factions have worked together to curtail the violence. That lesson will serve to shed light on the 21st century peace process with FARC. Second, the FARC emerged from *La Violencia* as a faction that refused to acknowledge the 1958 compromise, which it condemned as an elite agreement that did nothing to aid the peasants who the insurgents claimed to represent.¹²¹ Likewise, to evaluate the successes and failures of the DDR process historically in Colombia, one can apply the principles described by Ball and van de Goor.

¹²⁰ *La Violencia* (1946–1958), a civil war between partisans of the Liberal and Conservatives Parties constitutes without doubt the bloodiest period of violence in Colombian history. Scholars estimate the number of deaths at between 150,000 (Guzman, Fals & Umana) and 300,000 people (Palacios).

¹²¹ Pedro Antonio Marin aka “Tirofijo,” the legendary FARC founder, in his speech during the installation of “El Caguan Process” in 1999 used the political exclusion of the Colombian peasantry as justification for the FARC’s continued resistance. Aka Timochenko, current FARC leader, uses the same justification to continue fighting against the Colombian government.

1. The Peace Attempt of General Rojas (1953–1957)

Colombia's periodic cycles of violence were tied to a patronage system linked directly to the presidency. In 1946, a conservative was elected president after 16 years of Liberal Party rule. As conservatives began to displace liberals in government on the provincial and municipal levels, a rumble of violence began in the country which was given a huge impulse in 1948 by the so-called "Bogotazo"—a civil insurrection that engulfed the Colombian capital following the assassination of popular Liberal politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitan.¹²² As the country became increasingly ungovernable, the head of the army, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, seized the power on June 13, 1953. According to some Colombian scholars, both liberals and conservatives acquiesced to Rojas Pinilla's coup out of desperation.¹²³

Although identified principally with the conservatives, Rojas Pinilla adopted a populist posture that was meant to appeal across party lines. The dictator realized that rebel forces composed of small bands of armed insurgents could not be easily defeated in Colombia's vast hinterlands. Instead, it was preferable to encourage their demobilization with a generous peace offer. On June 22, 1953, Rojas Pinilla issued the Decree 1546, which declared an amnesty for persons who had committed political crimes that also included murders. Rojas sent delegations to different parts of the country to persuade the armed groups to demobilize.¹²⁴

a. Process Stages

At first, the results of this pacification campaign appeared promising, as about 6,500 men in arms of different groups—liberal and conservative guerrillas and local self-defense groups—agreed to demobilize.¹²⁵ Unfortunately, this DDR process was not well

¹²² "El Bogotazo" is the name given to the violent riots in Bogotá, capital of Colombia, due to the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a former presidential candidate and popular Liberal "caudillo." That event ignited political violence all over the country.

¹²³ Marco Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence*, trans. Richard Stoller (Durham and London: Duke University, 2007), 150.

¹²⁴ German Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna, *La Violencia en Colombia*, [The Violence in Colombia] 2nd ed., vol. I (Bogotá, Colombia: Taurus, 2005), 118.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

organized, as their main effort was devoted to disarm and demobilize the combatants, the two first stages of DDR. The reintegration phase was not approached properly. Former guerrilla fighters and members of self-defense groups did not receive adequate support from GOC, and many fighters had forfeited their land and lost their livelihood. Disarming was also dangerous in the absence of a general political agreement—in small towns and villages where police forces were appointed by conservative mayors, and vigilante groups and blood feuds persisted, with retribution as a constant threat. For that reason, a great number of fighters were forced to return to the criminal groups out of a sense of survival, or drift to the cities where they tried to find anonymity and scratch out a livelihood.

b. DDR Principles

In the Ball and van de Goor framework, “national leadership and responsibility”¹²⁶ were missing from Rojas Pinilla’s DDR effort. He involved neither the leaders of the political parties nor by the landowners; principal actors inside the tragedy through that Colombia was living, in his outreach. Instead, Rojas Pinilla directed the DDR campaign only through the military.¹²⁷ Likewise, there was no unified control of the rebellious forces with whom he could deal. Rather, these were locally organized forces with their issues, leaders, and dynamics, who answered to no national command authority. All of this made it difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate a process that would include to all the combatants.

Second, “DDR should be approached as a process, not a program.”¹²⁸ Despite the creation of an Office of Rehabilitation and Help, tasked to deal with issues like land ownership, physical and social rehabilitation, and maternity-child protection,¹²⁹ this government office lacked the authority, resources, and capacity to coordinate a comprehensive reintegration program for the demobilized. Third, “DDR should be

¹²⁶ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

¹²⁷ Guzman Campos, Fals Borda, and Umana Luna, *La Violencia En Colombia*, 117.

¹²⁸ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

¹²⁹ Guzman Campos, Fals Borda and Umana Luna, *La Violencia En Colombia*, 120.

viewed as part of a broader security, stabilization and recovery strategy, rather than a stand-alone intervention.”¹³⁰ Unfortunately, the process that was initiated in 1953 was limited only to the demobilization of combatants. The causes of the conflict were not adequately addressed, and violence continued to claim lives in Colombia for another five years and beyond.

Fourth, “all DDR stakeholders—national, regional and international—should make a serious effort to learn from past experiences.”¹³¹ Despite the countless civil wars that Colombia had suffered since the nineteenth century, never before had the GOC attempted a DDR process on that scale. Additionally, there does not exist an official document that it suggests that GOC had studied foreign experiences to tackle the DDR. The president and the members of the Office of Rehabilitation were learning on the job, which contributed further to the inadequacies of the DDR process of 1953.

Additionally, the Colombian Communist Party seized upon the political vacuum of leadership to assume the cause of the peasant “self-defense” movement. The communist “won the allegiance of peasant groups who chose not to accept the government’s offer” of peace.¹³² Because of this, the Colombians wasted an opportunity to reconcile their country.

2. The Military Board

A military junta forced Rojas Pinilla to step down in May 1957, as a prelude to a transition to civilian power. Despite its short time in power, the military junta acknowledged that the causes of “La Violencia” had not been addressed, and so created the Investigative National Commission of the Causes of the Violence (INCCV). However, the goal of this Commission was much more ambitious, and rather than simply carry out fieldwork on the causes of the violence in Colombia, the Commission approached insurgent groups to persuade them to reintegrate into civil society. This

¹³⁰ Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles,” 7.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence*, 164.

outreach allowed the INCCV to arrange 52 local peace agreements throughout the country.¹³³ This success caught the attention of the military junta which guaranteed its continuity with the transition to civilian governance. In fact, the military transitional government conducted consultations with President-elect Alberto Lleras Camargo, the first ruler of the National Front (NF)¹³⁴ to give continuity to the functions of INCCV and thus ensure that the pacification effort did not lose momentum.

3. First Peace Attempts of National Front

The National Front was a compromise between liberals and conservatives that ensured that they would alternate as president for a decade. Furthermore, control of the police was taken away from the mayors and placed under the Ministry of Defense. The conclusion of a national political agreement gave new impetus to the demobilization process. Groups of rebels laid down their arms, and some even won seats in departmental legislative assemblies.¹³⁵ Additionally, with the rotation of power that had been agreed upon between liberals and conservatives, the patronage system came to an end, and the police were depoliticized. From the second term of NF, violent deaths dropped dramatically in Colombia.¹³⁶ From the initial estimate of 129 guerrilla and bandit groups (depending on your point of view) in 1949, by 1963 only 47 remained, of which 22 continued to carry out violent acts.¹³⁷ For Colombia, this was indeed significant progress.

One of the characteristics of the GOC and its presidents is an absence of policy continuity. The government gave the INCCV 60 days to wrap up its work; however, due

¹³³ Guzman Campos, Fals Borda, and Umana Luna, *La Violencia En Colombia*, 130.

¹³⁴ The National Front (Frente Nacional) was an agreement between the leaders of the Liberal and Conservador party to overcome the political violence inside Colombia. The conversations took place in 1957 in Spain where Laureano Gomez and Carlos Lleras, the leaders of both Colombian parties, agreed to alternate the presidency, and all the government's positions in perfect symmetry and coordination. The first term was corresponding to the Liberals (1958–1962), the following one the Conservatives (1962–1966). Nevertheless, this political compromise did not solve the fundamental problems of Colombian society. On the contrary, it widened the divisions between the elites and the dispossessed.

¹³⁵ Marco Palacios, *Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958–2010*, [Public Violence in Colombia: 1958–2010] (Bogota, Colombia: Ediciones Fondo de Cultura Economica Ltda, 2012), 90–92.

¹³⁶ David Bushnell, *Colombia: Una Nacion a Pesar de si Misma*, [Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself] 14th ed. (Bogota, Colombia: Editorial Planeta Colombiana S.A., 2007), 321–22.

¹³⁷ Richard Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973), 8.

to the overwhelming avalanche of testimonies of victims and perpetrators, as well as groups who demobilized, the INCCV's task extended by a total of nine months.¹³⁸

a. Process Stages

The INCCV was the principal actor in this new effort to pacify the country. The Commission had two fundamental objectives, the first of which was the signature of local peace agreements.¹³⁹ As previously noted, in just nine months of operation the commission concluded more than 50 peace agreements, a remarkable achievement for DDR in Colombia in the 1950s.

The second INCCV objective was to organize social and economic assistance to the affected regions.¹⁴⁰ The members of the Commission were convinced that it was necessary to “socially engineer” the nation by changing the very structure of Colombian society to ensure conditions of stability and security that would allow the country to develop economically. However, these aspirations were beyond the mandate of the INCCV, which was limited “social diagnosis and humanitarian or palliative assistance.”¹⁴¹ With the recommendations emanating from the INCCV, and due to strong political pressure, the Lleras Camargo government created the Office of Rehabilitation. This agency's main function was to create the infrastructure that INCCV had recommended in those areas hardest hit by the violence.¹⁴² The main effort was directed infrastructure development, not the reintegration of the combatants or justice and restitution for victims of violence.

b. DDR Principles

The four guiding principles of Ball and van de Goor were only partially met under the National Front. Although the INCCV was formed from members of two political

¹³⁸ Jefferson Jaramillo Marin, “La Comision Investigadora de 1958 y la Violencia en Colombia,” [The Investigative Commission of 1958 and the Violence in Colombia] *Universitas Humanistica* 72 (July–December 2011): 43 <http://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/univhumanistica/article/view/2146>.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 47.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 50.

¹⁴² Ibid., 51–52.

parties, the Catholic Church and the army, other sectors of society were excluded, including members of rebellious groups. Having been alienated, many of these turned toward the communists, who gained greater influence in the wake of *La Violencia*.

Second, while several scholars agree that the INCVV's success exceeded expectations, it did not approach DDR as a "process." There was no follow-on support for its local peace agreements to reintegrate former combatants who were left with only a handshake and a signed agreement that they would not again take up their weapons. In addition, the needs of the victims of violence were not properly addressed. The process of demobilization, which began with good intentions, limited itself to reducing once again the number of men in arms. Only a few leaders of the communist guerrillas received lands from the GOC in compensation for rejoining to the society.¹⁴³ These policies were both too little and inequitable, which deepened differences with the communist's parties and laid the groundwork for more violence.

Third, while this second post-1958 attempt to curtail violence was more thorough and better organized than that of Rojas Pinilla, it failed to recognize that the "DDR should be viewed as part of a broader security, stabilization, and recovery strategy, rather than as a stand-alone intervention."¹⁴⁴ In addition to INCVV, the GOC had created the Office of Rehabilitation and instituted a Committee of Public Order formed by the most important cabinet ministers to monitor the country's security conditions. The INCVV had made a comprehensive diagnosis of country's war-torn areas. Its work remained incomplete, and its time too short. To be successful, the DDR process must have a broad time horizon to undertake all the tasks necessary to achieve the permanent conditions of security and stability in the country.

Fourth, while the National Front effort exceeded that of Rojas Pinilla, it failed to draw lessons it might have from the earlier failed peace process. Had it done so, Colombia might GOC have avoided another 50 years of fratricidal fighting? On the other hand, geopolitical conditions had changed as the Cold War settled in Latin America,

¹⁴³ Palacios, *Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958–2010*, 92.

¹⁴⁴ Ball and van de Goor, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles," 7.

especially following Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution in Cuba. The confrontation between the GOC and guerrilla groups became much more ideological than had the murderous, but ideologically flaccid differences between Liberals and Conservatives, which drew their inspiration more from the 19th century than from the 20th.

4. Conclusions

Through several administrations beginning with 1953, the GOC tried unsuccessfully to end *La Violencia*. Although the government understood that peace is not simply about disarmament, the lack of commitment and resources did not permit the reintegration of ex-combatants into Colombian society. With this prominent fault in the DDR process, no country can achieve stability and security that would enable it to recover after a conflict. In Colombia, little effort was made to either reintegrate rebel combatants or to attack the profound economic and social tensions that had triggered the conflict. In both of the DDR processes analyzed from the 1950s, the GOC effort was concentrated on demobilization and disarmament, but devoted very little support, resources, and time to reintegration, a vital stage to build a lasting peace after years of conflict and hundreds of thousands of deaths.

These two DDR processes failed to mobilize Colombian society to deal with the issues post-war justice and restitution for victims of violence, the concomitant of DDR. Rojas Pinilla approached DDR as a military operation. Members of the elite in Colombia, the military, political parties, and the Catholic Church led the NF process; however, it had an overwhelmingly political focus that ignored economic and justice issues that were taken up by the communists and other extreme revolutionary groups.

Finally, the civilian government did not capitalize on the lessons from the failed DDR process of Rojas. While it is true that the political conditions had changed from one government to another with the growing influence of communists within the rebel forces, the causes of the conflict, the social and economic conditions of the combatants remained the same, or even worse.

B. THE DDR PROCESS OF THE M19

Unlike the DDR processes of the 1950s, many scholars consider the DDR of the guerrilla group M19 that took place between 1986 and 1991 as a success.¹⁴⁵ To understand why this was the case, one must first understand the political conditions in Colombia in the late 1980s. One must also understand that, in the Colombian context, M19 was an atypical guerrilla group. The insurgencies that persist in Colombia (FARC and ELN) have as their common roots, directly or indirectly, in *La Violencia*. In addition, the FARC and ELN operate mainly in Colombia's rural regions where they claim to represent peasant interests.

Although the M19 counted among its founding members former FARC adherents, “El EME” (“the M” as it was known in Colombia) came together—somewhat ironically given the former dictator’s devotion to DDR—as disgruntled supporters of Rojas Pinilla, following his failed bid in the presidential election of 1970. In their view, Rojas Pinilla had been cheated of certain victory by a corrupt political system.¹⁴⁶ Some members of Rojas Pinilla’s Anapo party joined with other political sectors to take up arms to challenge the Colombian State. The M19, at its core a collective of university students, conceived of itself as an urban insurgency, as opposed to the peasant focus of the FARC and the ELN. There was almost a college prank dimension to their operational style which focused on “theatrical armed actions” aimed at protesting a corrupt political system rather than murdering large numbers of people.¹⁴⁷

1. The Dove Peace of Betancur (1982–1986)

Belisario Betancur had been elected President of Colombia in 1982 on a promise of ending the strict security measures of his predecessor and bringing peace to the country. Consequently, Betancur had adopted the dove as his political symbol. On

¹⁴⁵ Rodrigo Pardo, in his book *De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas* [On First Hand, Colombia 1986–1994: Between Conflicts and Hope], considers that the DDR process of the M19 was successful, since the process was achieving the transformation of a rebel group in a group of broad-based political support in Colombia. Leon Valencia, a political analyst and demobilized in that process, considers that the DDR process of M19 was successful as well.

¹⁴⁶ Marco Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence: a History of Colombia, 1875–2002*, 189.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 196.

assuming office, he passed a law that granted “automatic, unconditional and comprehensive amnesty for all political prisoners and those who laydown their weapons.”¹⁴⁸ As a result of Act 35 in 1982, the doors of Colombia’s jails swung open to release hundreds of prisoners, many of them belonging to the M19.¹⁴⁹ As a further act of reconciliation, he created a series of commissions to coordinate all aspects of the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements. He also conceptualized the National Rehabilitation Plan (PNR) to address the underlying causes of conflict, as well as a myriad of boards and committees to monitor ceasefires and dialogue with the groups of insurgents.¹⁵⁰

During this period, Betancur sought to establish dialogues with the main guerrilla organizations of Colombia, which in this period included the FARC, the EPL, the ELN, and M19. He had some success, at least on paper, arranging ceasefires and political agreements. One of those was an agreement reached between GOC and FARC known as the “Agreement of La Uribe” (May 1984). Through that agreement, the guerrilla organization was allowed to organize a political party, which it called the Patriotic Union (UP). The UP achieved some modest success, sending representatives to the congress of Colombia, and to some town halls in small villages and medium-sized cities as municipal councilors. However, the ELN boycotted peace negotiations with the Colombian government, demonstrating the rifts in the insurgency.¹⁵¹

In spite of the enormous efforts of Betancur, the president was unable to fulfill his campaign promise to bring peace to Colombia. For, if the guerrillas were divided, so were the Colombian people over Betancur’s olive branch to the insurgent groups. In any case, the President’s outreach to the Left was given its *coup de grâce* when M19, in

¹⁴⁸ Palacios, *Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958–2010*, 142.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 143.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

keeping with its “theatrical armed actions” strategy, undertook a bloody assault on Bogotá’s Palace of Justice in November 1985.¹⁵²

a. Process Stages

Although Betancur achieved significant advances with the guerrilla organizations, the previously mentioned negotiations did not culminate in successful DDR processes. The GOC reached ceasefire agreements and even produced the concentration, prior demobilization, of members of the M19 in some camps to the south of Colombia.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, Betancur failed to achieve the disarmament or the reintegration of this group, as all parties violated the ceasefire agreements. The guerrillas took advantage of the truce to build up their strength, while the Colombian armed forces initiated operations in areas of guerrilla influence.¹⁵⁴ Likewise, the president had taken the perilous step of authorizing the FARC to create a political group, the UP, without a DDR agreement. In this way, Betancur had played into FARC hands by validating its strategy of “combining all forms of struggle.”¹⁵⁵

A contrary interpretation is that the leadership of the FARC, notably Tirofijo, never wanted to participate in the political process, a strategy he saw as a threat to the integrity and cohesion of his essentially insurgent organization. This point of view would see Betancur as a master strategist who was derailed by right-wing elements in Colombia

¹⁵² On November 6, 1985, an M-19 team took over the Colombian Palace of Justice. According to Palacios, in his book *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia*, “the assault was intended as armed theater, in early M-19 style: Betancur was to be tried for ‘betraying the peace process.’ But what began as propaganda, and potentially even comedy, ended in national tragedy.” During the two-day assault, nine Supreme Court Judges were assassinated as well as 60 M-19 members (Felbab-Brown, p. 91).

¹⁵³ Javier Giraldo, “Trece Años en Búsqueda de la Paz,” [Thirteen Years Searching for Peace] *Desde los Margenes*, <http://www.javiergiraldo.org/spip.php?article16>.

¹⁵⁴ Palacios, *Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958–2010*, [Public Violence in Colombia: 1958–2010], 144.

¹⁵⁵ According to Marco Palacios, the FARC were the guerrillas “more prepared to accept the truce, the ceasefire and its verification,” and participate in democratic elections. But, at the same time, the FARC took advantage of the truce to strengthen its military plan. FARC and M19, in the words of Palacios, were “fanning the fire, under the shield of peace.”

who attacked the UP with a campaign of exclusion and assassination.¹⁵⁶ This was another strategy of disaggregation of the insurgency that was undone by the lack of a common strategy on the GOC side.

b. DDR Principles

Whatever one's interpretation, President Betancur's strategy proved to be overly complex. NPR was characterized by the multitude of commissions and State agencies that became an obstacle, because responsibilities were diluted and uncoordinated. No one was in charge of the process. Furthermore, Betancur created a civil-military relations problem when he offered insurgent groups "agreements of bilateral ceasefire that ... treat(ed) equally the Army and the guerrillas."¹⁵⁷

Second, Betancur raised expectations beyond realistic levels. The reality of Colombia in the 1980s was that there was no way that insurgent groups would accept the political status quo, or that demobilized fighters could be integrated into the legitimate economy.¹⁵⁸ Third, while the "Agreement of La Uribe" was an innovative bet to marginalize the FARC, it showcased the disjunction of the existing peace efforts of GOC and the reality of violence that lived Colombia. La Uribe failed to account for "spoilers," most notably the paramilitaries and drug traffickers who took the opportunity to attack the FARC via the UP. Over a period of five years, more than a thousand militants of the UP were killed, including two presidential candidates, as well as heads of the political

¹⁵⁶ In his book, *De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos Y Esperanzas*, Rafael Pardo, ex-Peace Commissioner and former Colombian Ministry of Defense, denies that the political murders of members of the UP were continuous. That political party, which was born in the Agreements of the Uribe, directly accused the Armed Forces of Colombia of the "dirty war" against its organization. The accusations were difficult to disprove, according to Pardo, due to the zero progress in the investigation of these murders. Even so, the same Attorney General accused 59 members of the Army of being allied with a paramilitary group, the Magdalena Medio, linked with political assassinations.

¹⁵⁷ Rafael Pardo Rueda, *De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas*, [On First Hand. Colombia 1986–1994: Between Conflicts and Hope] (Bogota, Colombia: Cerec, Norma, 1996), 16.

¹⁵⁸ Joaquin Romero Herrera and Juan Carlos Gardeazabal Rodriguez, "Evolucion y Antecedentes Historicos de la Reintegracion En Colombia," [Evolution and Historic Background of the Reintegration in Colombia] *Estudios En Seguridad Y Defensa* 5, no 2 (November 2010): 11–12, <http://www.esdegue.mil.co/sites/default/files/10.pdf>.

arm of the FARC.¹⁵⁹ It may have been that Marulanda was secretly pleased, because the debilitation of the UP confirmed the strategy of armed struggle as the only viable way forward.

Finally, one cannot accuse Betancur of being ignorant of the lessons of the past. Betancur had been part of the “Contadora Group,” an organization seeking to achieve peace agreements in Central America.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, it was apparent that the President and his closest collaborators were well informed about the DDR experiences in Central America. Nevertheless, the GOC committed some of the same errors that had characterized previous frustrated attempts in Colombia, most notably the failure to give a seat in the peace commissions to all the sectors. In fact, Betancur erred in the other direction in that he excluded the military from the negotiations with the illegal groups.

2. Barco’s Presidency (1986–1990)

The absence of continuity in the approach to Colombia’s problems was apparent during the government of Virgilio Barco (1986–1990). First, in order to distance himself from the Betancur regime, the new president eradicated the word “peace” from documents and government statements in an attempt to lower popular expectations. In its place, he substituted concepts like reconciliation, normalization, and rehabilitation, to mark a break with the Betancur approach.¹⁶¹ Second, he sought to replace the numerous commissions which had characterized Betancur’s approach to peacemaking, with a single authority to coordinate negotiations.¹⁶² President Barco promulgated Law 77 of 1989 “which empowered the President of the Republic to grant pardons to members of insurgent groups to allow them to participate in the peace process, express their

¹⁵⁹ Bushnell, *Colombia: Una Nación a Pesar de si Misma*, 374.

¹⁶⁰ Pierre Gilhodes, “Contadora: Al Servicio Del Restablecimiento de la Paz,” [Contadora: At the Service of the Restoration of Peace], *Nueva Sociedad*, no. 72 (July-August 1984): 4, <http://bdigital.binal.ac.pa/bdp/artpma/contadora.pdf>.

¹⁶¹ Pardo Rueda, *De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas*, 10–15.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

willingness to lay down their arms and return to civilian life.”¹⁶³ So far at least, it looks as if Barco was following the Betancur playbook.

If most groups maintained an attitude of defiance, M19 appeared ripe for demobilization. First, President Barco took advantage of the weakening military and political prestige of the M19 in the aftermath of its failed assault on the palace of Justice in Bogota.¹⁶⁴ Second, Barco strengthened the PNR program, most probably because he had worked in a similar program during the Lleras Camargo government in the decade of the 1960s,¹⁶⁵ and the president was a first-hand witness of the program’s success.

All these pre-conditions and contingent circumstances allowed the signing of an agreement between the GOC and the M19 in 1990, with the Catholic Church as a guarantor, abandoned by the Colombian middle class to which its principle militants belonged and discredited by the Palacio de Justicia fiasco, the M19 demobilized and formed a political party called the Democratic Alliance M19 (ADM19), which achieved some success at the polls.¹⁶⁶

a. Process Stages

The GOC orchestrated the Disarmament and Demobilization stages of M19. The first step was to place them in camps previously agreed to with these guerrillas and under the supervision of technical commissions.

¹⁶³ Carlos Prieto and Joanna Rojas Roa, “Análisis Comparativo entre la Negociación del M19 y Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG),” [Comparative analysis between the Negotiation of the M19 and Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)], *Boletines De Paz* 25 (2010): 3, <http://archive.ideaspaz.org/images/M-19yURNG.pdf>.

¹⁶⁴ According to Rex A. Hudson in his article “Colombia’s Palace of Justice Revisited: A Critique of the Conspiracy Theory,” there are four facts that reveal the link between M19 and the Medellín cartel in the takeover of the Palace of Justice. First, the cartel had threatened to kill the judges who were going to take a decision on the extradition treaty between Colombia and the United States. Second, it was no coincidence that “the M-19 attack took place on the very morning when the Constitutional Chamber was beginning to deliberate on the treaty.” Third, M-19 included among their demands to the president that he was to issue a law against extradition. However, members of the guerrillas were not threatened by that Treaty; on the other hand, traffickers were. Four, there is evidence of the delivery of weapons by the cartel of Medellín to the M19, and the use of a boat by both groups. The boat named “Karina” was used both for the transport of drugs from the cartel, as well as to introduce weapons to Colombia for the M-19.

¹⁶⁵ Pardo Rueda, *De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas*, 20.

¹⁶⁶ Romero Herrera and Gardezabal Rodríguez, “Evolución y Antecedentes Históricos de la Reintegración en Colombia,” 11–13.

The success of the negotiations depended upon the concentration of guerrillas in protected camps, which allowed guerrilla leaders—in conjunction with politicians—to control their troops, and the GOC to control the M19 leadership.¹⁶⁷

The stage of reintegration was complete, in addition to the measures of financial support to sustain the fighters and their families. The M19 militants formed a political party, which became the third largest political party in Colombia,¹⁶⁸ and won almost a third of the seats in the constituent National Assembly in 1990.

b. DDR Principles

Why was the DDR of M19 a success? Leadership played a part: President Barco led the process and, in contrast to Betancur, designated a single state agency effort to demobilize guerrilla groups. The High Adviser for Peace controlled the PNR, which meant that a single office coordinated efforts. Likewise, the president was behind the process.¹⁶⁹ Second, the GOC was able to deploy the capabilities of the state through the agencies that President Barco had created and strengthened. The president also designed the legal tools in the congress and integrated the functions of the armed forces in pursuit of peace.

Third, the GOC had a holistic approach to DDR through the PNR which Barco elevated to a true anti-subversive strategy. The GOC laid out the goals and strategy of the PNR, which had at its core improving the conditions of the poorest people in Colombia. In this way, the PNR also served as a social and political weapon to counter the arguments of the guerrilla organizations.¹⁷⁰ Likewise, the High Commissioner for Peace took advantage of the margin of maneuver created by the PNR to pursue talks with guerrilla groups. Fourth, Barco, with his experience drawn from Betancur's failed peace process, but also from lessons learned from the DDR failures of the NF governments, was

¹⁶⁷ Palacios, *Violencia Publica en Colombia: 1958–2010*, 147.

¹⁶⁸ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2010), 92.

¹⁶⁹ Pardo Rueda, *De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986–1994: Entre Conflictos y Esperanzas*, 21.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

able to capitalize on the failures and successes of these processes to achieve a great political triumph at the end of the process of DDR of the M19.

3. Conclusions

Although Betancur made enormous efforts and risked his political prestige, he could not induce any guerrilla group to demobilize. The causes of that failure reside first in a strong opposition from military and political sectors of the country to the peace process that many believed pandered to the communists. Second, the guerilla groups took advantage of the peace offers, ceasefires, and opportunities to talk, to rebuild. Third, the government ignored “spoilers” in the form of the paramilitaries and drug trafficking groups. The DDR of the M19 represented a real hope to reach the longed-for peace. The government of the President Barco set the conditions for a peaceful and successful DDR process. Nevertheless, the results were not optimized because the two most powerful guerrillas (FARC and ELN) were excluded from this process.

Although the peace failed to materialize for Colombians, the M19’s DDR process testified to the fact that a guerrilla organization could demobilize and participate in the political process. For the first time since independence, Colombians could cast their votes for options other than the two traditional parties with their well-oiled patronage systems.

Political violence continued that cost the lives of three presidential candidates, as well as a large number of members of the UP and ADM19. Another dimension that continues to cause considerable controversy in Colombia is the amnesty granted to the M19, especially as those officers who retook control of the Palace of Justice have been sentenced to long terms for alleged human rights abuses and excess of force in that military operation.

Finally, the experience of the Betancur and Barco governments allows one to conclude that President Santos should direct the efforts of the state to achieve a process of DDR of the FARC, one which takes into account the following aspects: the reality of the violence affecting Colombia with criminal gangs, to prevent demobilized members of guerrilla organizations to transfer to criminal organizations. Second, the DDR process is based on effective coordination of all agencies of the state to ensure its success. Third,

the DDR process is sequential and results in the successful reintegration of former combatants into Colombian society. Finally, the DDR process will be guided by the four DDR principles described in this document.

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IV. DDR PROCESSES IN COLOMBIA POST-9/11

Because we will not lose heart until the last of the terrorists are defeated, those who wish to make peace with the Colombian State have merely to demobilize.

—Álvaro Uribe Vélez

The Government of Colombia has two immediate precedents to guide a possible FARC DDR process. The first is the collective DDR between 2003 and 2006 of over 30,000 members of the AUC. The second example is the process of individual mobilization in place since 2002 aimed principally at the combatants of FARC and ELN in Colombia. The individual demobilization process became an essential part of the counterinsurgent struggle of the GOC.

This chapter examines the implementation and the results of these two DDR processes to highlight those lessons that might be applicable in negotiations between the GOC and the FARC in Cuba. Like all DDRs, the collective demobilization of the AUC took place in particular circumstances. The second part of this chapter will analyze the process of DDR of the AUC, developed exclusively during the first administration of President Uribe. The third section will tackle the process of individual demobilization of combatants from insurgents groups between 2002 and 2012, a process that is still in effect today. This chapter will reiterate the stages of every process of DDR, both collective and individual, and compare them to the general principles of DDR as described by Ball and van de Goor.¹⁷¹ The final part of the chapter will attempt to assess the effectiveness of each DDR approach in Colombia.

A. THE POLICY OF DEFENSE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY: THE URIBE LEGACY

The situation encountered by Álvaro Uribe when he became president in 2002 was far from reassuring. The government of Uribe's predecessor, Andrés Pastrana (1998–

¹⁷¹ Ball and van de Goor, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles," 7.

2002), had engaged in more than three years of fruitless dialogue with the FARC. In the process, the COG had conceded a vast demilitarized area of the south of the country, known as the Caguán or *despeje* (“cleared zone” meaning cleared of government presence). Rather than accept the *despeje* as a gesture of good will and confidence building, the FARC had used it as a base to escalate the terrorist attacks and to draw out negotiations while they grew stronger politically and militarily. These circumstances tried the patience of the Pastrana government, who broke off negotiations in February 2002.¹⁷²

By 2002, the stability of the COG had become an issue of international concern. The level of violence exceeded the capacities of the state to deal with it, not only because of the threat of the leftist guerrillas, but also that of the AUC. The AUC, a confederation of criminal paramilitary groups who legitimized themselves in the name of patriotism and the inability of the COG to deal with the guerrilla threat, occupied large areas of the country, sometimes with the complicity of segments of the military, the intelligence services, and regional government leaders. Paramilitary groups had expanded in the wake of a vacuum of government authority since the presidency of Betancur (1982–1986). Segments of the military were complicit because they opposed periodic amnesties for the guerrillas, and as a reaction to the popular fear of being unprotected by the state.¹⁷³

A further powerful factor in paramilitary expansion was the atomization of the drug trafficking following the dismantling of the Cartels of Cali and Medellin, in large part as part of the U.S. “war on drugs” strategy.¹⁷⁴ In other words, U.S. counterdrug policy had actually contributed to the destabilization of Colombia. These conditions created fertile ground for the establishment of private armies that threatened to transform Colombia into a failed state. These powerful paramilitary groups did not limit their criminal actions to drug trafficking—on the contrary, they diversify their sources of criminal financing through kidnapping, extortion, and forced displacement of people with

¹⁷² In his book *Violencia Publica en Colombia: 1958–2010*, [Public Violence in Colombia: 1958–2010], Marco Palacios highlights that Pastrana had understood that, after the attacks of 9/11, the dialogue with drug organizations, such as the United States considered the FARC, was unsustainable.

¹⁷³ Douglas Porch and Maria Jose Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” *Studies in Conflicts & Terrorism* 31, no. 6 (June 2008): 520–540, 523, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10576100802064841#.VGsKQodN3FI>.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 525.

the goal of seizing their land with the phrase that became notorious in Colombia: *plomo o plata*.¹⁷⁵

Faced with such a situation, newly elected President Uribe designed and implemented the most ambitious counterinsurgency strategy ever carried out in Colombia, which he labeled the policy of Defense and Democratic Security. Uribe's Democratic Security was also accompanied by an effort to diminish the conflict with the implementation of DDR. Both the DDR process of the AUC and the current individual demobilization of guerrillas originated within the framework of the Uribe government. The irony was that the man—who many considered to be Colombia's most warlike president—led his offensive with an effort to convince his enemies to disarm peacefully.

Uribe was able to capitalize on the discontent of his countrymen, after the bitter experience of the failed process of Caguan. This discontent fuelled the first component of Democratic Security, the fight at the military level against the guerrillas and paramilitaries. At the same time, President Uribe was also supported by the U.S. Government, which in the wake of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, authorized the GOC to use the funds from the Plan Colombia in the fight against the “terrorists” of the FARC, ELN, and AUC.

Uribe based the second aspect of his security policy on the call to the illegal armed groups to demobilize. To this end, the president gave a boost to the existing legislation by strengthening the state agencies responsible for advancing the process of demobilization. Uribe implemented these reforms in the wake of the failures of both the governments of Samper and Pastrana.¹⁷⁶ The combined action of these two measures—military pressure combined with the strengthening of the DDR process—allowed the GOC to reap unprecedented results. President Uribe's initiative demobilized more than 4,000 fighters in Colombia's protracted conflict; however, not all of these results were as they seemed.

¹⁷⁵ Literally, “lead or silver,” meaning “bullets or money;” i.e., take the money or we kill you.

¹⁷⁶ Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 525.

B. THE DDR PROCESS OF THE AUC

From the perspective of the AUC, the advantages of DDR lay in its timing. The AUC had emerged out of the *Convivir* program launched in 1994 under President Samper, which mobilized privately armed groups to supplement an increasingly under performing Colombian military. An acronym for *Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada*, *Convivir* had been enthusiastically embraced by Uribe when he was Governor of Antioquia in 1995–1997. But these paramilitary groups had quickly turned into armed thugs who terrorized the populations in areas they controlled, often with military and government complicity, and became enmeshed in organized crime, most notably drug trafficking. Indeed, Uribe’s promotion of the *Convivir*, and other internal security programs like *Autodefensas Campesinas*, was used against him by his political enemies. AUC excesses that included drug trafficking as well as heinous crimes such as massacres of groups suspected of supporting the guerrillas and forced displacement of people whose land they coveted, had lost them popular support even among those once sympathetic to them. Therefore, the DDR of the paramilitary groups had at least three advantages for Uribe. First, it was an attempt to terminate a failed security experiment and regain control of the internal security dynamic for the state. Second, it would strengthen his hand with the guerrillas, who argued that they could never disarm while their paramilitary enemies, with active support of Bogotá, remained in existence. A third factor of great importance in the DDR process was pressure from the United States for the GOC and its armed forces to clean up their act by severing all connection with the paramilitary groups as a precondition for U.S. security assistance.¹⁷⁷ Finally, from the perspective of the AUC leaders, this was their best chance to cut a favorable deal with the GOC that would give them relative immunity from prosecution for their horrendous crimes.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 525.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 526.

1. Stages of the Process

The DDR of AUC was fraught with controversy, beginning with the large numbers of people who sought to take advantage the process. While the COG estimated the numbers of paramilitaries at between 10,900 and 20,000 fighters,¹⁷⁹ fully 31,698 people stepped forward to demobilize.¹⁸⁰

The explanations on the difference between the estimate and the final number of demobilized members of the AUC vary according to which source one consults. According to the former commissioner of peace in the Uribe government, Luis Carlos Restrepo, the numbers of demobilized swelled beyond government estimates because, in addition to the fighters, AUC supporters and collaborators, such as drivers, suppliers, and informants, also sought immunity in the program.¹⁸¹ However, it is clear that the ringleaders of the AUC included gang members in cities like Medellín to inflate the numbers of demobilized and thus exaggerate their power and the scope of their sacrifice to gain further concessions from the state.¹⁸²

As in all DDR episodes, a second issue in Colombia was the number and quality of surrendered weapons. According to official figures of the GOC, 18,501 weapons were turned over by the AUC,¹⁸³ which meant that only the 58 percent of those demobilizing gave up a weapon. That is to say, only six in every ten people within the DDR process surrendered a weapon. Furthermore, while some experts believed that the weapons were

¹⁷⁹ Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 528.

¹⁸⁰ Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, [Colombian Agency for the Reintegration], <http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Documents/colombia.pdf#search=reintegracion%2520en%2520colombia%253A%2520hechos%2520y%2520datos>.

¹⁸¹ Ivan Briscoe, Maria Derks, and Hans Rouw, “A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in Colombia,” *Clingendael* (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2011), 21, http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20110700_briscoe_derks_colombia.pdf.

¹⁸² OAS, “Décimo Informe del Secretario General al Consejo Permanente sobre la Misión Mapp/Oea,” [Tenth Report of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Council on the Mapp/OAS Mission], (Washington, 2007), 2–4, http://fes-seguridadregional.org/index.php?option=com_booklibrary&task=view&id=1494&catid=0&Itemid=0.

¹⁸³ Vincenç Fisas, “Introducción al Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (DDR) de excombatientes,” [Introduction to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants], *Quaderns de Construcció de Pau No 24*, Escola de Cultura de Pau (Cataluña Noviembre de 2011), http://escolapau.uab.es/img/qcp/introduccion_ddr.pdf.

of excellent quality,¹⁸⁴ others claimed that, as in many DDR events, obsolete weapons were surrendered while the best were retained for later use.

The numbers and quality of weapons were pale in comparison with the controversies over the reintegration of former combatants. According to Carlos Andrés Prieto, recidivist rates of former combatants were 14 percent, which formed the core of the *Bandas Criminales*, BACRIM (criminal gangs).¹⁸⁵ Those criminal structures quickly filled the vacuum left by the demobilization of the AUC to continue drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion in former territories of paramilitary presence.¹⁸⁶ DDR merely transformed the threat that the AUC represented into a new security challenge. Unfortunately, this is an old story in the history of DDR processes that Colombia has experienced in its long-standing conflict.

Why does Colombia always seem condemned to repeat its DDR failures? First, although Colombia has vast experience in DDR processes, the lack of resources to support the former combatants in their reintegration phase is a constant in the history of the country. The government's support for each of the AUC demobilized consisted of 18 to 24 months of financial support.¹⁸⁷ That allowance was approximately \$179 a month, which hardly offered a sufficient disincentive to join the criminal gangs that ensured a greater flow of income for people with experience in life outside the law. Furthermore, many of these fighters were taken to a collective process of DDR, which was not very well structured or documented. Many of them even belonged to purely drug-trafficking

¹⁸⁴ Spagat Michael, "Colombia's Paramilitary DDR: Quiet and Tentative Success," Department of Economics Royal Holloway, University of London and Centro de Recursos para Analisis de Conflictos (CERAC), 2, http://www.cerac.org.co/assets/pdf/UNDP_DDR_V1.pdf. Also Nicolas Urrutia, Miguel Ortega, and Gustavo Andrade, "Rastreo de Armas: Perspectivas sobre control, Trafico y Uso de Armas Ilegales en Colombia," [Tracking of Weapons: Perspectives on Control, Traffic and Use of Illegal Weapons in Colombia], Fundacion Ideas para la Paz and Universiteit Gent (Bogota, Colombia: November 2009), <https://biblio.ugent.be/input/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=909955&fileId=910000>.

¹⁸⁵ Carlos Andrés Prieto, "Las Bacrim y el Crimen Organizado en Colombia," [BACRIM and Syndicated Crime in Colombia], *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* (March 2013), <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/la-seguridad/09714.pdf>, 3.

¹⁸⁶ OAS, "Décimo Informe Del Secretario General Al Consejo Permanente Sobre La Misión Mapp/Oea," [Tenth Report of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Council on the Mapp/OAS Mission].

¹⁸⁷ Porch and Rasmussen, "Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?" 528.

structures, not the AUC per se. The demobilized who had belonged to these structures simply returned to, or continued, their old criminal activities.¹⁸⁸

2. Guiding Principles

In order to understand in a more detailed fashion the DDR process of the AUC, with its strengths and weaknesses, one must consider the assumptions made by the various actors. President Uribe adopted DDR as a central pillar of his security policy. He put in place reforms, not only within the state bureaucracy, but also led legislative initiatives to provide legal tools to advance the process of DDR of the AUC. Luis Carlos Restrepo, a man who enjoyed Uribe's confidence, was appointed High Commissioner for Peace, with a clear mission to carry out a successful conclusion of the DDR process.

For its part, most of the AUC leaders agreed to participate in the DDR for reasons stated above, and so ordered their "blocks" to surrender their weapons. However, the AUC was rife with disputes over control of drug trafficking which resulted in an internal war that saw the death of AUC leader Carlos Castaño.¹⁸⁹ Even as they demobilized, some AUC leaders continued to pursue their criminal activities. In light of these blatant violations of the DDR agreements and the law, Uribe decided to extradite 12 paramilitary leaders to the United States on May 13, 2008.

Extradition revealed the lack of an adequate legal framework for the process of DDR. The issue of justice for former fighters and leaders of the AUC, rather than their simple demobilization, represented a failure in the planning of the GOC to deal with the process. Because of concerns about AUC criminals walking away free, Law 975 (the Law of Justice and Peace) was passed by Congress in 2005 as the process drew to a close.¹⁹⁰ The foregoing was due to the differences in the GOC itself and the "Uribista coalition (party of President Uribe), on the level of impunity that the GOC could be

¹⁸⁸ OAS, "Décimo Informe Del Secretario General Al Consejo Permanente Sobre La Misión Mapp/Oea," [Tenth Report of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Council on the Mapp/OAS Mission].

¹⁸⁹ On April 16, 2004, Carlos Castano was killed under his same brother's orders. The main hypothesis about that crime is that the deceased paramilitary leader had been talking with U.S. authorities in order to submit himself to U.S. justice.

¹⁹⁰ Briscoe, Derks, and Rouw, "A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in Colombia," 19.

granted to the demobilized.”¹⁹¹ Why this was overlooked? Any possible answer is confusing, because one of the primary concerns of President Uribe was not to offer full amnesty to the demobilized, as had happened in the processes of the 1980s and 1990s

To make sure that the international community ratified the process, the GOC invited the Organization of American States to act as a guarantor of the process. This required the creation of MAPP OEA.¹⁹² In 2004, OAS established, according its mandate No 1397, the *Mision para Apoyar el Proceso de Paz de Colombia* (MAPP) as the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia. The main objectives of the OAS mission in Colombia included: 1) “assisting that country in the field of verification and counseling in the process of demobilization and reintegration of the illegal armed groups;”¹⁹³ and 2) “accompanying peace efforts emanating from institutions and communities.”¹⁹⁴ While MAPP OEA was integral to the process, though, it acted as an observer in the name of the international community, not as an active part of the DDR process.

To give coherence and continuity to the DDR of the AUC, the High Commissioner for Peace tackled the process in three phases for all the structures of the AUC throughout the country. The first phase consisted of “awareness-raising and preparation for demobilization of the ex-combatants.”¹⁹⁵ The second phase assembled AUC combatants at demobilization sites, while the third phase consisted in the formal demobilization and the start of the reintegration process.¹⁹⁶ All the stages were supported by the *Comite Operativo para la Dejacion de Armas* (CODA), which supervised the surrender of arms. CODA was comprised of one representative of each of the ministries of the Interior, Justice, Defense, Family Welfare, the Public Prosecutor’s office, and

¹⁹¹ Marco Palacios, *Violencia Publica En Colombia: 1958–2010*, 172.

¹⁹² OAS, *Mision para Apoyar el Proceso de Paz de Colombia* (MAPP), Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia. MAPP <http://www.mapp-oea.net/documentos/resoluciones/resolucion859.pdf>.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Briscoe, Derks, and Rouw, “A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in Colombia,” 20.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

Attorney General.¹⁹⁷ CODA's task was to oversee disarmament of the combatants and to verify their status. The office of the Commissioner of Peace could start the process of reintegration only after have received CODA's confirmation that each demobilized combatant had been certified.

While the DDR of the AUC was incorporated into the overall framework of democratic security, the GOC failed to foresee a situation that left vacuums of governance in those areas of paramilitary presence, a situation that gave rise to the emergence of the BACRIMS.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, the resources invested in the reintegration processes failed to meet the needs and expectations of the former combatants. As already mentioned, for some demobilized AUC members it made more sense to enter the then-nascent criminal gangs, which meant that cases of murder and extortion in some areas of the country were actually increased by DDR.

C. INDIVIDUAL DDR

Beginning in 2002, military pressure of the GOC became increasingly intense on the FARC and the ELN. This was the result of the increased number of troops, equipment, and supplies available to the Armed Forces, as well as targeted intelligence. President Uribe created this advantageous situation by obtaining greater resources from new taxes, and because of increased military aid from the United States. These military operations convinced many guerrilla fighters that the easy victories over the Colombian Army during days of the *despeje* had closed, and they needed to demobilize if they wanted to live. Although officially the stages of demobilization and disarmament of the AUC had already finished, individual DDR had continued with an accelerated pace of individual guerrillas demobilized. This process reached its peak between 2002 and 2010 to include close to the 20,000 demobilized guerrillas.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷ Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Presidential Decree number 128 on January 2008.

¹⁹⁸ OAS, "Décimo Informe Del Secretario General Al Consejo Permanente Sobre La Misión Mapp/Oea," [Tenth Report of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Council on the Mapp/OAS Mission].

¹⁹⁹ ACR and CMSC, "Desarme, Desmovilizacion y Reintegracion DDR en Colombia: Lecciones Aprendidas y Resultados del Proceso 2002–2010," [Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegracion (DDR) in Colombia: Lessons Learned and Results of the Process 2002–2010] (Bogota: July 2010), 123.

The individual DDR process makes demobilized fighters eligible for the benefits like a stipend and retraining as preparation for reinsertion into civilian life. That is the biggest difference between the processes of DDR in the 1980s and 1990s and the current individual DDR process. With this condition clearly established, the GOC in 2006 created the *Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración*, or Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR). The ACR replaced the *Programa para la Reincorporación a la Vida Civil* (PRVC), which had been established in 2002. These changes were not merely cosmetic but also aimed to link the demobilized with the community.

1. Stages of the Process

The process of individual DDR in Colombia falls under the Ministry of Defense. The person interested in demobilization applies to any authority—judicial, civil, or even religious. This authority alerts the local unit of the Armed Forces which transfers the person to the CODA. At the start of the demobilization phase, the applicant is subject to verification by the CODA, which confirms that the individual indeed belongs to an illegal group. Once a person is certified, he or she makes a transition to the ACR.²⁰⁰

In the ACR, the former combatant initiates “the path of reintegration, which is the way that each participant in a process guided by the ACR must travel fully to reintegrate into social and economic life.”²⁰¹ This process consists of coordinating, between the ACR and the demobilized, a reintegration plan within that will lead to a legal existence.

2. Guiding Principles

As an ongoing process executed over a long period that covers several governments in Colombia, it is interesting to analyze the individual DDR process through the guiding principles described by Ball and van de Goor. This analysis will assess the strengths and flaws of Colombia’s DDR process. In the light of the first principle,

²⁰⁰ With information from Programa de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD), [Program of Humanitarian Assistance to the Demobilized], “Desarme, Desmovilización, y Reintegración,” [Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)], *Ministry of National Defense of Colombia*, (power point presentation Bogota, Colombia, July, 2014).

²⁰¹ With information from Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración de la Presidencia de Colombia, Colombian Agency for the Reintegration, “Ruta de Reintegración,” [Route of Reintegration], <http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Paginas/ruta.aspx>.

national leadership and responsibility, we can see that the process has been a constant in the history of Colombia. Since the Government of Belisario Betancur (1982–1986), most of the Colombian presidents have enacted decrees to encourage individual DDR. However, only in the first Government of Uribe (2002–2006) did individual DDR become a real strategy in the counterinsurgency fight, with resources, including legislation and administrative support, to back it up.

Next, the process of individual DDR has been subjected to constant revisions to adapt it to the evolving requirements of recognition of victim rights, and with international standards of truth, justice, and reparation. However, they have produced meager results on this front, and virtually all the offenses committed by combatants remain unpunished. One of the main reasons for this impunity is that demobilization would not be attractive to the guerrillas if they were to face prison time.

The third principle of DDR—that it is part of a broader policy of security rather than treated as a stand-alone—has been a constant under Uribe; however, it is necessary that the GOC made greater efforts to prevent recruitment of minors into guerrillas. Despite the high number of demobilized, the guerrillas continue to maintain a force greater than the 7,000 men in arms.²⁰² The number of combatants still represents a real threat for the consolidation of the state in large areas of Colombia.

The fourth principle requires one to learn from past practices. The GOC has made great strides and has successfully implemented an entire organizational structure with well-established protocols to meet the changing needs of DDR. Nevertheless, resources remain scarce. The COG has also been transparent about its DDR process, inviting the international community to play an observer role within processes.

D. THE GOVERNMENT OF JUAN MANUEL SANTOS

The government of President Juan Manuel Santos (August 2010–present) has given continuity to the DDR process within the GOC’s counterinsurgency strategy.

²⁰² Juan Guillermo Mercado, “Desmovilización, principal arma contra las guerrillas,” [Demobilization, Main Weapon against the Guerrillas], *El Tiempo*, September 23, 2013, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13077339>.

According to statistics from the *Grupo de Atencion Humanitaria al Desmovilizado* (GAHD), 5,595 guerrillas have embraced the benefits of the individual DDR since 2010. According to the GAHD, 84.1 percent of those demobilized belonged to the FARC, while 14.4 percent are former members of the ELN.²⁰³

Should the ongoing peace talks in Havana between the GOC and the FARC prove successful, one may witness the collective demobilization of the FARC. However, one impediment to collective DDR is Law 1148, better known in Colombia as the Law of Victims. Passed in June 2011, this law requires the Colombian State to provide “care and comprehensive reparation to the victims of the internal armed conflict.”²⁰⁴ In addition, the Law of Victims has a strong component of land restitution, the central axis of the Colombian conflict. This law sought to create a space for national reconciliation by recognizing the victims, regardless of the origin of the victimizers. It is very important to stress that the Victims’ Law contains a full section, the seventh, devoted exclusively to “comprehensive protection for children and adolescents victims.”²⁰⁵

In the same way, president Santos passed the Legislative Act 01 of 2012 or the *Marco Juridico para la Paz*, a legal framework for peace.²⁰⁶ That act corresponds to the implementation of a new model on demobilization of the GOC. Act 01 was driven in order to advance the demobilization of the insurgent groups that persist within the Colombian conflict, FARC and ELN. Within the act, GOC established:

- 1) The possibility to classify and prioritize the various offences so that the Judicial Branch to focus on the investigation and punishment of those who had the greatest responsibility in the occurrence of extreme events; 2) the legislator may order the waiving of the criminal prosecution of the cases that are not selected or prioritized; 3) members of armed groups outside

²⁰³ With information from the Programa de Asistencia Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD), [Program of Humanitarian Assistance to the Demobilized], from the *Ministry of National Defense of Colombia*.

²⁰⁴ Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Ley 1448 de 2011 (Law 1448, 2011), <http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/Leyes/Documents/ley144810062011.pdf>.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Acto Legislativo 01 de 2012, “Marco Juridico para la Paz” [Legal Framework for Peace], <http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/actos-legislativos/Documents/2012/ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%20N%2001%20DEL%2031%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202012.pdf>.

the law to demobilize may gain access to posts of popular election and be appointed as public servants.²⁰⁷

E. CONCLUSIONS

The main innovation of the processes of DDR, both collective and individual, is that they performed in the absence of formal peace negotiations between illegally armed groups and the GOC. However, by taking that route, GOC was faced with situations that demonstrated amateurism, inexperience, and a lack of planning, as happened with the DDR of the AUC. During that DDR process, the legal framework to accommodate the combatants, the Justice and Peace Law, was adopted almost at the end of the formal demobilization of the combatants. This situation created enormous loopholes and injustices in the demobilization of the AUC, especially those that de-legitimized the process. The DDR of the AUC also revealed inconsistencies about the number of demobilized and the quantity and quality of weapons surrendered. For that reason, it is necessary that GOC implement more efficient mechanisms to identify people who seek benefits from the process of DDR. In its haste to demobilize, the state must guard against becoming a victim of deception with the surrender of obsolete weapons.

Individual DDR, revitalized during the first term of Uribe's presidency, continues to prove an effective strategy as more than 20,000 combatants, the vast majority of them FARC, have preferred to abandon weapons and qualify for the benefits of DDR. Nevertheless, the big question is, why after more than 12 years of implementation has the process not reached its culminating point of victory? The guerrilla groups managed to replace their losses to DDR with few problems and continue to pose a significant menace in some areas, while the GOC continues to resource a strategy that fails to contribute to state security. Indeed, many demobilized complain that they lack the resources to reintegrate successfully into Colombian society, while taxpayers resent having to pay to rehabilitate former bad actors. This is likely to become a significant issue should the negotiations in Havana prove successful, causing the GOC to pay the costs of reintegrating literally thousands of guerrillas. Santos' ambitions to end the conflict in

²⁰⁷ Universidad de los Andes, "Marco Legal para la Paz," [Legal Framework for Peace], Congreso Visible, Proyectos de Ley, <http://congresovisible.org/proyectos-de-ley/por-medio-del-cual-se/6437/>.

Colombia may have outrun its resources, although the counter argument is that it is cheaper to feed a guerrilla than to try to kill him.

The budget considerations are not the only concerns of Colombians. According to many scholars, the primary concern is that the collective DDR of the FARC, like that of the AUC, will simply swell Colombia's significant criminal underworld. The fear is not unfounded; on the contrary, the intelligence agencies of Colombia have fully documented the existing contacts between members of the FARC guerillas and the BACRIM. A FARC-BACRIM alliance, in addition to casting doubts on the desire for peace of some FARC leaders, leads also to consider the possible transformation of guerrilla fronts into dangerous criminal gangs. Unfortunately, several of the members of those fronts may choose drug trafficking over reintegration via DDR.

Finally, in Havana over the coming months, the GOC and FARC will discuss the process of DDR of the guerrilla group. By that time, Colombians, and the international community, will discover whether Colombia actually has learned the DDR lessons, and more importantly, whether DDR can at last achieve a stable and lasting peace in the country.

V. CONCLUSIONS

At the time of this writing, peace talks between the GOC and the FARC have entered their third year in Havana with no clear end in sight. The parties have reached an agreement on three issues of the original agenda—political participation, the problem of combating drugs, and access to land. However, two aspects remain: DDR and victim compensation, which will require significant compromises by both parties to gain the approbation of the entire country and bring negotiations to a successful conclusion. The most recent statements by the FARC in Havana have cast uncertainty over whether a process of DDR can be agreed. The FARC's opening position is that this process should include both the Colombian Army and the FARC, with the guerrilla group retaining its weapons.²⁰⁸

Given the significant Colombia's 60-year experience with DDR, this thesis does not predict failure. One is allowed to take inspiration from other successful cases of DDR, such as those of El Salvador and South Africa, both of which provide valuable lessons to guide the GOC, which has updated its legislation and administrative procedures to accommodate a potential DDR of FARC. The institutions created—mainly ACR and PAHD—combine significant experience in both collective and individual DDR, in a manner that ensures that the lessons of earlier processes at least are taken into account should the FARC demobilize.

The Colombian legislation on DDR has been updated and adapted to evolving conditions, both to the Colombian conflict and the latest international trends in regard to human rights, transitional justice, and reparations. This adaptation in itself has proved to be a source of instability as successive presidents have made changes to the Colombian legal codes during their respective mandates. Furthermore, demands for post-conflict justice may actually prove an impediment to DDR. Although it is not clear yet what possible role the International Criminal Court, of which Colombia is a signatory, would

²⁰⁸ Noticias RCN, "Las Farc reiteran que no entregarán armas una vez que se firme la paz," [The FARC Reiterated Do Not Give up Arms once the Peace is Signed], <http://www.noticiasrcn.com/nacional-pais/las-farc-reiteran-no-entregaran-armas-una-vez-se-firme-paz>.

play in prosecuting crimes against humanity; that body is on record as saying that the FARC leadership should face trial.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, the U.S. government also seeks to prosecute the ringleaders of the FARC for crimes against American citizens as well as drug-related crimes.

Current programs, most notably the individual DDR processes mainly of FARC guerrillas that have been in place for over a decade, offer hope for success of a generalized agreement. However, one cannot be blind to the fact that there are multiple actors in the Colombian conflict, any of whom may threaten to derail the process with the FARC. This situation was present also in South Africa. With this in mind, this thesis will conclude in two sections. First, the findings in the different processes of DDR, both in Colombia, El Salvador, and South Africa are important, because they point to potential pitfalls in the DDR of the FARC.²¹⁰ The actors involved, the issue of human rights, the diverse stages of the process, and principles to apply in DDR processes are aspects that demand the upmost attention of the parties successfully to complete a DDR process.

Second, it is important that GOC deploy preventive actions²¹¹ at the first sign of systemic breakdown of the process. Preventive action is especially important because of Colombia's history of the transformation and mutation of political violence at the end of each peace process. As this thesis has noted, something similar also happened in El Salvador and South Africa at the time of DDR implementation.

A. WARNING SIGNALS

1. In accordance with analyses in the different cases referred to in this thesis, the signing of peace agreements does not automatically end hostilities. On the contrary, immediately after the peace treaty was signed and the DDR program agreed upon, political violence and violations of human rights actually increased. The reasons for this are several, but may spring from the implementation of a total amnesty for the combatants, which generates a feeling of powerlessness and thirst for revenge in the victims. Also,

²⁰⁹ El Nuevo Siglo, "CPI Podría Actuar si Cabecillas de las Farc no Van a la Cárcel," [ICJ Might Act if Leaders of the FARC Do Not Go to Jail], October 29, 2014, <http://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/10-2014-cpi-podr%C3%ADa-actuar-si-cabecillas-de-las-farc-no-van-la-c%C3%A1rcel.html>.

²¹⁰ Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 33.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 33.

DDR creates power vacuums in a country that former combatants may struggle to fill.

2. DDR must include all of the actors within the conflict in order to reach lost lasting peace. Otherwise, the GOC runs the risk that the factions left to one side become spoilers who can derail the DDR process.
3. Reintegration programs become the Achilles heel of the DDR processes in the cases studied. Demobilized combatants complain about the paucity of assistance received, which falls short of expectations when they laid down their arms. Disappointment, even a sense of betrayal, becomes fertile ground for criminal organizations that arise to fill the void of legitimacy with violence and illegality in the wake of DDR. When these organizations have illegal connections and resources in other countries, as is the case of the FARC, the risk of transformation into a criminal organization increases. Furthermore, the DDR process should have protocols for the identification of bona fide combatants who are members of the insurgent structures, and exclude ordinary criminals or opportunists who want to take advantage of DDR for their own gain. The absence of such a process helped to discredit and undermine the DDR of the AUC between 2003 and 2006, and contributed to the emergence of the BACRIM.

B. PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

1. The GOC has updated its legislation in regards to transitional justice and victim reparation. However, the GOC cannot repeat the mistakes of the past to grant a blanket amnesty to future demobilized. The Colombian population is very skeptical about a hypothetical amnesty to the FARC. For this reason, combatants who have committed crimes against humanity should be tried and punished for their misconduct. That measure would increase the legitimacy of the process, not only in the view of the Colombian population, but also to the international community. In addition, it is necessary to ensure equal treatment before the law in a general manner to all persons who have committed crimes, including members of the Armed Forces.²¹² Justice may also be undermined if, in the course of the Havana negotiations, the GOC may grant seats in parliament to a future FARC political party, as this may grant them immunity from prosecution or provide them with a vehicle to sabotage legislatively the natural course of justice.²¹³ GOC must apply

²¹² In Colombia recently Major General (R) Arias Cabrales was sentenced to 35 years in prison for his alleged involvement in the disappearance of hostages in the recovery operation of the Palace of Justice after the bloody socket of the M19. In the meantime, the former members of the group enjoy total amnesty and some of its leaders are now senators and mayors.

²¹³ Ana Maria Montoya, "Colombians' Views of the FARC as a Political Party," *Americas Barometer Insights: 2014*, no. 117, (Vanderbilt University), <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO907en.pdf>.

the fourth principle of the successful DDR processes: learn from past experience. Colombia must not repeat the errors of previous DDR processes, which are still a source of contention in Colombian society.

2. Although the GOC has initiated an exploratory dialogue with the ELN, there has been no official notification at the time of writing that the ELN has agreed to become part of the Havana process. Demobilizing one insurgent group for the benefit of another will not bring peace. Likewise, the GOC should view the DDR of the FARC as part of a broader security strategy (the third principle of DDR) that also takes into consideration the problem of BACRIM. It would be self-defeating if demobilized FARC fighters simply enlist in the BACRIM. A comprehensive approach would be an important step in breaking the cycle of perpetuation or mutation of violence after each process of DDR in Colombia.
3. The FARC is estimated at present to have around 7,500 guerrillas under arms. These are the people that DDR should target, not the opportunistic looking for money or legal benefits derived from the agreements; (b) the benefits of the DDR process must be made sufficiently attractive to the demobilized so that they do not simply transition to the BACRIM. (c) The GOC must occupy the spaces vacated by the DDR of the FARC so that they will not merely be filled with other non-state actors. (d) To meet the policy objectives of DDR, the funds for the reintegration of the FARC must be obtained in collaboration with the international community. Otherwise, the risk is that funds will be inadequate to guarantee the full reintegration of combatants. This could have catastrophic consequences for the stability of the country. (e) Mechanisms for cooperation should be established with the countries of Central and South America to prevent likely dissident groups of the FARC from establishing themselves in these countries, either as armed groups or to create financial, arms trafficking, or illegal drug havens. Should this happen, these countries would face a threat of instability. The last thing that Colombia desires to achieve with DDR is to infect its neighbors with the same problems that have plagued Bogota for the last 60 years.

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