Counterinsurgency Lessons from Colombia: An Assessment of the Colombian Army Transformation from 1998 to 2010

Abstract

This thesis offers an account of how the Colombian Army recovered from a series of humiliating defeats inflicted upon it by illegal armed groups led by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the 1990s. It explains how a combination of internally generated, bottom-up and top-down organizational innovations, U.S. security assistance, and dynamic management from President Alvaro Uribe and a civilianized Ministry of Defense was able to restore Colombian Army morale, and to restructure and reorganize the military into an offensive force able to gain battlefield dominance and restore government authority over a greater part of the national territory.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 2014
Accession Number
ADA620857

Entities

People

  • David A. Camacho

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Counterinsurgency
  • Drug Trafficking
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • Insurgency
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Organizational Structure
  • Personnel Management
  • Public Policy
  • Societies
  • Terrorists
  • Urban Areas
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • Political Violence and Terrorism Studies.
  • Strategic Security Studies