



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN IN
XINJIANG AND HOW IT AFFECTS ETHNIC
INSTABILITY**

by

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March 2015

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE March 2015		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN IN XINJIANG AND HOW IT AFFECTS ETHNIC INSTABILITY			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Susan W.K. Wong-Tworek				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) To decrease ethnic instability in Xinjiang, the Chinese government's plan is to economically develop the region. Xinjiang is rich in natural resources, is geographically significant and has a special economic zone. China is also investing in Central Asia to further meet its energy demand. A network of pipelines and major rail systems connect sources from China to Central Asia and beyond. Xinjiang's economy will benefit from the network because it is the gateway and corridor to Central Asia and a hub for the Silk Road traffic. This study suggests that Xinjiang's economic development led to a few destabilizing elements, including Han migration, income disparity and employment discrimination. All of this is taking place while the government is also dealing with other cultural issues, such as religion and education. The author hypothesizes that China's economic development plan in the Xinjiang Uyghur (or Uighur) Autonomous Region increases, decreases or is a subsidiary factor to ethnic instability. This paper argues that China's economic development plan for Xinjiang affects ethnic stability in Xinjiang as a subsidiary factor.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS China, Xinjiang, Central Asia, Uyghurs, Turkic, Hans, Silk Road, Western Development, economic, disparity, discrimination, special economic zone, infrastructure, natural resources, religion, Islam, ethnic, conflict, violence, riot, instability, migration, peace, stability, education			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 92	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

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AFFECTS ETHNIC INSTABILITY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
(FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

To decrease ethnic instability in Xinjiang, the Chinese government's plan is to economically develop the region. Xinjiang is rich in natural resources, is geographically significant and has a special economic zone. China is also investing in Central Asia to further meet its energy demand. A network of pipelines and major rail systems connect sources from China to Central Asia and beyond. Xinjiang's economy will benefit from the network because it is the gateway and corridor to Central Asia and a hub for the Silk Road traffic. This study suggests that Xinjiang's economic development led to a few destabilizing elements, including Han migration, income disparity and employment discrimination. All of this is taking place while the government is also dealing with other cultural issues, such as religion and education. The author hypothesizes that China's economic development plan in the Xinjiang Uyghur (or Uighur) Autonomous Region increases, decreases or is a subsidiary factor to ethnic instability. This paper argues that China's economic development plan for Xinjiang affects ethnic stability in Xinjiang as a subsidiary factor.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
BCM/A	billion cubic meters per annum
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CE	Common Era
CITIC	China International Trust and Investment Corporation
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC	Chinese National Petroleum Corporation
CO ₂	Carbon Dioxide
CPC	Communist Party of China
ET	East Turkestan
ETIM	East Turkistan Islamic Movement
ETLO	East Turkestan Liberation Organization
ETR	Eastern Turkistan Republic
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
INA	Ili National Army
PAP	People's Army Police
PCC	Production and Construction Corp
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China's
PSB (Bovingdon)	Public Security Bureau
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEZ	Special economic zone
SOE	State own enterprises
TIRET	Turkish Islamic Republic Eastern Turkistan
UNRF	United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WUC	World Uyghur Congress
XJ	Xinjiang

XUAR

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to recognize a few people for this thesis. I want to thank my parents for taking care of everything while I focused on school. To my three daughters, thank you for understanding my absence, especially toward the end of each quarter. For my husband, I appreciate your help, patience and support.

I am grateful to my friends—I will not list names, because you know who you are—for sticking together through thick and thin. I will miss your friendship, spirit, inspiration and presence. I would also like to thank the library staff, Graduate Writing Center, and Thesis Processing Office for the help they have given me from the start of my thesis to the finish.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Tristan Mabry and Professor Robert Looney for their guidance, encouragement, understanding and patience. This thesis would have been impossible without you.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The “Great Western Development” of 1999¹ was China’s strategy to boost the economy of Xinjiang and other provinces in western China.² The campaign is one of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP, also known as Communist Party of China [CPC]) top economic development priorities to reduce poverty and decrease ethnic conflict between the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs.³ China is developing Xinjiang based on three factors—rich resources,⁴ the Silk Road⁵ and SEZ⁶ status. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has an abundance of rich resources that will help sustain and grow China’s economy.⁷ Xinjiang is also geographically located in the center of Asia, where the Silk Road crosses from different directions, bringing together traders and goods from China and Central and South Asia, the Middle East and Europe.⁸ To accommodate the traffic, China is developing Xinjiang into a cultural, financial, and logistical trade center.⁹ Because foreign trade has become an integral part of the XUAR’s economy over recent years, establishing stability through economic growth in that region

¹ Christopher Smith, “‘Flourishing Borders, Prosperous Nationalities,’ Campaign Expanded,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, February 1, 2005, <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/flourishing-borders-prosperous-nationalities-campaign-expanded>.

² Elizabeth C. Economy and Michael Levi, *By All Means Necessary*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), 155.

³ Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security, January 2008, <http://www.apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-separatism-in-xinjiang-china/>.

⁴ Nicolas Becquelin, “Staged Development in Xinjiang,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 178 (June 2004): XX, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192338>.

⁵ Chien-peng Chung, “The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China’s Changing Influence in Central Asia,” *The China Quarterly* 180 (December 2004): 1002, <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=275871&jid=CQY&volumeId=180&issueId=-1&aid=275870>.

⁶ “China’s Ambitions in Xinjiang and Central Asia: Part I,” Stratfor Analysis, September 2013, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-ambitions-xinjiang-and-central-asia-part-1?0=ip_login_no_cache%3D980c96aa102150f7c490c71e72ae41b6.

⁷ Economy and Levi, *By All Means Necessary*, 155.

⁸ “China’s Ambitions In Xinjiang and Central Asia, Part I.”

⁹ “China Focus: New Road Exemplifies Xinjiang Prosperity, Stability Drive,” ChinaDaily.com.cn, July 5, 2014, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0705/c90882-8751420.html>.

to attract business is crucial to Xinjiang's economic success.¹⁰ To boost Xinjiang's economic development, China designated Kashgar City in the southern Tarim Basin as a **SEZ** to attract foreign investments.¹¹

In addition to the XUAR, China has economic ties with Central Asia. Central Asia has more natural resources than Xinjiang, which could supply China with a constant flow of energy for decades.¹² For the resources to reach China, the PRC and Central Asia have been collaborating on pipelines and rail systems construction projects to link the sources to the China Seas. Construction projects further link China, through land and sea, to states as far as Belgium.¹³

XUAR is economically prospering, but instability continues to persist for a range of reasons, such as Uyghurs' desire for autonomy or independence, dissatisfaction with the government, Han migration, income disparity, employment discrimination, religious suppression and resistance to assimilation.¹⁴ These factors can threaten the region and the state's economy and security. Additionally, ethnic conflict may create economic roadblocks for the Chinese government in attaining its developmental goals such as China's Silk Road Economic Belt project.¹⁵ The region may encounter additional difficulties attracting foreign and Chinese investors who feel threatened for lack of a secure investment in that region.¹⁶

This thesis proposes three possible hypotheses: the PRC's economic development plan for Xinjiang increases ethnic conflict, decreases ethnic conflict, or is a subsidiary

¹⁰ Clifton W. Pannell and Philip Schmidt, "Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, China," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 47, no. 3 (May 15, 2013), 347, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rege20>.

¹¹ "China's Ambitions In Xinjiang and Central Asia, Part I."

¹² Economy and Levi, *By All Means Necessary*, 148.

¹³ "Why China is Creating a New 'World Bank' for Asia," *The Economist*, November 11, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-6>.

¹⁴ Davide Giglio, "Separatism and the War on Terror in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region," Peace Operations Training Center, <http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/giglio.pdf>.

¹⁵ Huhua Cao, "Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization: What is the Role of Spatial Distribution of Ethnic Groups? A Case Study of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in Western China," *Routledge Taylor & Francis Group* 44, no. 8 (October 2010): 972, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00343400903401550#.VQyeXtJ4omw>.

¹⁶ Economy and Levi, *By All Means Necessary*, 20.

factor to ethnic conflict. One of the CCP's top priorities is economic growth, with the hope that this facilitates ethnic stability between Uyghurs and Hans.¹⁷ Some scholars have proposed other important factors as well, including cultural and educational development, and ethnic policies to stabilize Xinjiang.¹⁸ This thesis will present in the literature review different scholarly perspectives of how China's economic development plan in Xinjiang affects ethnic instability in the XUAR.¹⁹

Chapter I of this thesis is the introduction, which introduces XUAR's background and the literature review. Chapter II focuses on the People's Republic of China's (PRC) economic development in the XUAR with the region's rich resources, the Silk Road and SEZ. This chapter will also expand on China's economic development with foreign states, especially with Central Asia's resources and major infrastructure construction projects, which links China to Europe. Chapter III analyzes the economic factors that increase ethnic instability in Xinjiang. The chapter will also include other destabilizing factors such as religious suppression and the education system. Chapter IV is the final chapter. It will conclude with the findings for the hypothesis.

A. BACKGROUND OF XINJIANG

The next few segments of this chapter will focus on the XUAR's demography, geography, resources, history, religion and conflict. Demography, geography and resources include many facts and figures. History, religion, and conflict, on the other hand, have dynamic timelines.

¹⁷ Shan Wei and Weng Cuifen, "China's New Policy in Xinjiang and its Challenges," *East Asian Policy* 2, no. 3, 60, <http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Vol2No3-ShanWei&WengCuifen.pdf>.

¹⁸ Arienne Dwyer, "The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse," East-West Center, 2005, 124. <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS015.pdf>.

¹⁹ Aisen and Veiga, "How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?" IMF Working Paper, January 2011, 9, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1112.pdf>.




Figure 1. Map of Xinjiang²⁰

1. Demography

The XUAR of China, sometimes known as East Turkestan (ET), Uyghuristan and Chinese Turkestan,²¹ is home to approximately 21.6 million people of different ethnicities.²² Xinjiang borders eight countries (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Mongolia) and three Chinese provinces (Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai and Gansu).²³ Its location gives Xinjiang a diverse population. In 2010, Xinjiang was comprised of 46.4 percent Uyghur, 39 percent Han,

²⁰ Pannell and Schmidt, "Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, China," 331.

²¹ "Who are the Uyghurs," Radio Free Asia, July 9, 2009, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghurs_facts-07092009163637.html.

²² "Xinjiang," The China Story, Australian Centre on China in the World, August 2, 2012, <http://www.thechinastory.org/lexicon/xinjiang/>.

²³ "Who are the Uyghurs."

seven percent Kazakhs, 4.5 percent Hui, 0.9 percent Kirghiz, 0.8 percent Mongols, 0.2 percent Tajik, 0.2 percent Sibe and the remaining Dagur, Manchu, Russian, Tatar, Uzbek and others.²⁴ The absolute population of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has been consistently rising. It was 3.6 million in 1945, 13.1 million in 1982, 16.8 million in 1996, and 21.3 in 2008.²⁵ In 2000, statistics showed that 27.3 percent of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang are between 0–14 years of age; 68.17 percent are 15–64, and 4.53 are 65 and above.²⁶ Compared to China, in 2014, 17.1 percent of the people are between 0–14 years of age, 73.2 percent are 15–64, and 9.6 percent are 65 and above.²⁷

2. Geography

Xinjiang is the most northwestern and largest province in China. Its total land mass is 1,660,001 square kilometers (640,930 square miles).²⁸ Approximately 41.2 percent of the land in Xinjiang is suitable for agriculture, forestry, and raising animals.²⁹ Due to Xinjiang's low and fluctuating precipitation, farmers rely on irrigation to water their crops. Although the climate is arid, the fertile land and long hours of sunlight are ideal for growing a variety of high quality produce such as potato, cotton, grapes and pomegranates.³⁰

²⁴ Due to lack of access to more recent statistics, 2010 is the most recent figures I found in this site. The statistics of the population breakdown were cited from the 2010 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook according to "Xinjiang," The China Story, Australian Centre on China in the World, August 2, 2012, <http://www.thechinastory.org/lexicon/xinjiang/>.

²⁵ Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan, "Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Hand and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 52, no. 1 (2011): 123, <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/597/403.pdf>.

²⁶ Peter Bernat, "The Uyghur Question and What is Behind It," Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies Analyses (Budapest: Zrinyi Miklos National Defence University, 2009). http://www.academia.edu/5894876/The_Uyghur_Question_and_What_Is_Behind_It.

²⁷ "China Age Structure," Index Mundi, access date February 8, 2015, http://www.indexmundi.com/china/age_structure.html.

²⁸ "Xinjiang Profile," BBC News Asia, October 23, 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16944155>.

²⁹ "Xinjiang 2004-The Year in Review," China.org.cn, accessed date January 20, 2015, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/ProvinceView/156243.htm>.

³⁰ Chengli, "Dawn of Modern Agriculture," Tianshannet, January 11, 2008, http://english.ts.cn/topic/content/2008-01/11/content_2389645.htm.

While agriculture is significant in Xinjiang, XUAR is a vital province to the Chinese government for many reasons. The Silk Road goes through Xinjiang, making this region the land bridge to South and Central Asia, a hub for trade, and a corridor for transporting energy resources.³¹ Xinjiang's natural geography forms a protective buffer with its deserts, mountains, plateaus and steppes, creating challenges for attacks from any directions.³² During the Sino-Soviet tension, XUAR was the barricade against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) threat. It also serves as a safety buffer between the Muslim Central and South Asian states and the rest of China.³³

3. Resources

Xinjiang is rich in natural resources such as coal, oil, gas, gold, uranium and nonferrous metals. Beijing estimates one-third of China's gas and oil reside in Xinjiang.³⁴ Xinjiang's oil has a history that dates back to the mid-seventeenth century during the Qing Dynasty. A river of crude oil was discovered in a mountain north-west of Kucha (or Qiuci). The native Kuchians used the smelly ooze as a rejuvenating remedy, while others used it for lamp-oil.³⁵ A lot of oil seeped to the surface, but the main field that was opened and developed was in 1955 in Karamay.³⁶ The city became synonymous with Xinjiang's petrochemical refining center. New oil and natural gas fields are discovered frequently, which increases China's energy reserve.³⁷ In 2005, state-owned oil company Sinopec claimed to have discovered a field with more than one billion tons of crude oil, and a Tarim Basin field with 59 billion meters of natural gas.³⁸ If the

³¹ Gardner Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, ((New York, Columbia University Press, 2010), 11.

³² Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 11.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads, A History of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 300.

³⁶ Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 301.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

numbers are accurate and proven, that is an extra one third added onto China's current reserve.³⁹

In addition, one hundred twenty-two minerals exist in the province but natron saltpeter, muscovite, beryllium, serpentine and pottery clay are the most abundant.⁴⁰ Over 70 different non-metallic minerals including asbestos, gemstones and jade also exist in Xinjiang.⁴¹ The province has an estimated 730 million tons of iron ore, 318 million tons of salt, 170 million tons of mirabilite and over 2 million tons of natron saltpeter.⁴²

4. History

To illustrate the Uyghurs and the XUAR's rich history, this section will start with an ethnic heritage that dates to pre-historic time. Then, the focus shifts to territorial disputes, starting from the Qing Dynasty in the 1700s until the fall of East Turkistan in 1949. The final section transitions to the XUAR under Mao Zedong's Communist rule.

The history and origins of the Uyghur people differ from source to source. The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) states that Uyghurs were present 4,000 years ago;⁴³ historian Turgun Almas estimated the Uyghur population dates back 6,400 years ago based on the discoveries of Tarim basin mummies;⁴⁴ Muhemmed Imin Bughra, a historian of East Turkistan and a Uyghur politician, believed Uyghurs existed for 9,000 years.⁴⁵ A majority of the literature refers to the Uyghur as a Turkic people who were

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ "Xinjiang's Natural Resources," China Through A Lens, accessed date, January 22 2015, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/139230.htm>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ World Uyghur Congress is a pro-Uyghur Association. "Brief History of East Turkestan," access date January 21, 2015, <http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?cat=132>.

⁴⁴ Nabijan Tursun, "The Formation of Modern Uyghur Historiography and Competing Perspectives toward Uyghur History," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 6, no. 3 (2008): 93, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=105630>.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

native to the Central Asian basins of Junghar, Tarim, and Turpan.⁴⁶ The Uyghur American Association declares that Uyghurs are Central Asian Turks, not Chinese.⁴⁷

According to another source, the Uyghurs are Persian, descendants of the ancient Sogdians.⁴⁸ These were skilled traders who were known throughout Inner Asia as Iranian-speaking people.⁴⁹ Starting in the sixth century common era (CE) and continuing for the next 15 centuries, Sogdians facilitated trade throughout the Silk Road, which runs through the Eurasian steppe, Central Asia and China.⁵⁰ The primary goods they sold throughout this period were silk, silverware, musk and slaves.⁵¹ Physical Sogdian features are evident in modern day Uyghurs, especially along the heavily trod Silk Road.⁵² In the Uyghur bazaars of Kashgar, Khotan and Yarkhand, one will see people with exotic features from the west—hair with blond or brown color, and eyes with hazel and blue color.⁵³

According to some historians, the Uyghurs have been a nomadic Turkic people moving across the Mongolian Step in their early existence until they reached the modern area of Xinjiang.⁵⁴ Because they were nomads, they identified with their territories and their oasis cities rather than an overarching single title, which would describe who they were collectively.⁵⁵

⁴⁶ “Who are the Uyghurs.”

⁴⁷ About Uyghurs,” The Uyghur American Association, access date January 19, 2015, <http://uyghuramerican.org/about-uyghurs>.

⁴⁸ Ishaan Tharoor, “A Brief History of the Uighurs,” *Time*, July 9, 2009, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909416,00.html>.

⁴⁹ Étienne de la Vaissière, “Sogdians in China: A Short History and some New Discoveries,” *The SilkRoad Foundation Newsletter* 1, no. 3 (December 2003), http://www.silkroadfoundation.org/newsletter/december/new_discoveries.htm.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ “A Brief History or the Uyghurs,” London Uyghur Ensemble, 2007, <http://www.uyghurensemble.co.uk/en-html/uy-history1.html>.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

In 1759, the Manchus of the Qing Empire in China invaded East Turkestan and ruled it until 1864.⁵⁶ After 42 revolts, Uyghurs expelled the Manchus in 1864 and regained their independence.⁵⁷ Yakub Beg became their leader, and henceforth, the independent kingdom was renamed Kasharia. Russia, Great Britain and the Turkish Empire recognized its independence. In 1876, the Manchu Empire invaded the region and annexed it in 1884. To prevent Russia's tsarist expansion, Great Britain supported and funded the Qing Empire to conquer the area. After the Uyghurs' defeat, Manchus renamed the East Turkestan to Xinjiang, the "New Territory."⁵⁸ In 1911, the Chinese Nationalist (Guomindang) Party overthrew the Qing dynasty.

Shortly after, Uyghurs briefly achieved independence and established the Turkish Islamic Republic Eastern Turkistan (TIRET) from 1933 to 1934 and the Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR) from 1944 to 1949.⁵⁹ From 1933 to 1934, the TIRET held the southern region of Xinjiang from Kashghar to the southern border.⁶⁰ The ETR, with its Ili National Army (INA) gained independence from 1944–1949, and governed from Ghulja to the northwest.⁶¹ When the ETR fell apart due to insufficient manning to guard the territory, internal disagreements and external attacks, the CCP occupied Xinjiang from the ETR.

The soldiers who fought in this war demobilized and worked on paramilitary farms subsequently known as the Production and Construction Corp (PCC).⁶² Eventually, Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other ethnic minorities accused PCC soldier-farmers of being "Han colonialists." As a result, the CCP reinstated their effort to assimilate minorities.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Gardner Bovingdon, *Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent* (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004), 18, <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS011.pdf>.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

In October 1955, the XUAR was established.⁶³ While the CCP's autonomous region system was meant to give non-Hans control of their regions, in the government a Han majority ended up controlling Xinjiang. Uyghurs had little influence over their territorial affairs because the CCP controlled and crushed movements that hinted at promoting independence or "real autonomy."⁶⁴

In the beginning of 1958, Mao's "Great Leap Forward" program called for cultural homogenization, such that ethnic differences would be dissolved to create a unified people.⁶⁵ The CCP attempted to force compliance through cultural isolation of Islamic customs seen by the party as outdated and ancient. By doing so, they hoped to aid progress. The outcome of Mao's plan severely disrupted peoples' livelihoods across China. Party leaders took control out of Mao's hands in order to stabilize the economy. Though, the restructuring plan failed as well.⁶⁶ Famine continued. As a result, an influx of 800,000 hungry people and party-backed Hans migrated into Xinjiang between 1959 and 1960.⁶⁷ The PCC farms welcomed the refugees with land, which incited Uyghur resentment toward the Han Chinese.

By the mid-1960s, ethnic minority policies changed again. Renewed radicalization led to the "Cultural Revolution," and a demand for extreme cultural homogeneity.⁶⁸ Young Han Red Guards in Xinjiang battered non-Han culture. For example, policies instructed various minorities to wear Mao suits instead of their traditional hats, scarves, accessories and clothes. Red Guards forced Muslims to raise pigs, shaved Muslims' beards on the street and destroyed mosques as a way to forcibly promote the new age of China; progress and rapid assimilation.

After more than a decade of ethnic minority resentment, Mao's death on September 9, 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four brought on a new challenge for

⁶³ Bovington, *Autonomy in Xinjiang*, 13.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 14.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 19.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 20.

party leaders.⁶⁹ Segments of alienated populations throughout the PRC felt the Cultural Revolution was a political, social and identity assault.⁷⁰

5. Religion

For the Uyghurs, Islam is more than a belief—it is an identity intertwined into their lives, culture, economy, society and political system.⁷¹ A majority of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang are Sunni Muslims.⁷²

From a time before the Cultural Revolution to the present day, the Uyghurs have experienced different levels of state tolerance of religion. This section focuses on the pendulum swing of soft and hard policies under Mao's regime, Deng Xiaoping's administration, and into the aftermath of the United States' September 11, 2001 attack.

In 1966, religion in Xinjiang was loosely controlled. Kashgar District had approximately 5,500 mosques, and 107 of them existed in the city of Kashgar. During this time, the CCP had little tolerance for religion. In the 1970s, Mao and his Red Guards purged tradition, relics, history, antique, and religious establishments. Kashgar District was left with 392 mosques and Kashgar City with two. After Mao's death in 1976, Deng loosened cultural policies, which allowed religion to rebuild again. Between 1980 and 1981, Muslims reclaimed and rebuilt mosques until Kashgar District reached 4,700 mosques, and Kashgar City reached 93.⁷³

⁶⁹ Bovingdon, *Autonomy in Xinjiang*, 21.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 45,
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MT2D_0_eBPQC&pg=PA47&lpg=PA47#v=onepage&q&f=false.

⁷² Rudelson, *Oasis Identities*, 22.

⁷³ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 66.

On December 4, 1982, the CCP established the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, and within it, have an article about religious freedom:

No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.⁷⁴

While Article 36 provides citizens with freedom of religion, there are stipulations.⁷⁵ For example, children at any age can profess to be an atheist, but must be 18 to proclaim a religious faith. Furthermore, the article prohibits foreign domination over religion, religious rituals that impair citizens' health and activities that cause public disorder.⁷⁶

In 1990, shortly before the Soviet Union's collapse, a violent uprising in the city of Baren surprised Chinese officials.⁷⁷ Muslim activists proclaimed that Islam would defeat Marxism-Leninism.⁷⁸ The uprising and the fall of the Soviet Union led the CCP to overturn its liberal policy to limited religious tolerance. According to Gardner Bovingdon, "officials prosecuted 'illegal religious activities,' defrocking suspect clerics, breaking up unauthorized scripture schools, and halting the construction of mosques."⁷⁹ The government implemented new policies. For example, imams have to go through a political examination. Only those who are deemed patriotic and politically sound can remain in their position. The CCP also established a religious institution in Urumqi that new clerics must train in. The party took other measures including the destruction of seventy mosques or religious sites in Ili Prefecture, and twenty-one sites in Urumqi, the

⁷⁴ "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China," U.S. Constitution, accessed March 2, 2015, <http://www.usconstitution.net/china.html>.

⁷⁵ Kevin Newton, "Requirements of Religion in Xinjiang," Monitor, 2011, 43, <http://web.wm.edu/so/monitor/issues/16-SE/5-newton.pdf>.

⁷⁶ Newton, "Requirements of Religion in Xinjiang," 43.

⁷⁷ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 66.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

shutdown of underground schools, the exclusion of religion from education and the banning of students from fasting during Ramadan.⁸⁰

The aftermath of the United States' September 11, 2001 attacks further intensified the Chinese government's stance against alleged separatists and terrorists, especially when the Muslim population is involved. Along with China, other states such as Chechnya, Karabakh, Kashmir, Palestine and the Philippines associate separatist movements with terrorism.⁸¹ The Chinese government heightened its "Strike Hard, Maximum Pressure"⁸² campaign to suppress secular and religious conflict. In November 2001, in Kashgar, authorities closed thirteen illegal religious centers and arrested the fifty people who prayed in the facilities.⁸³ Restrictions continued to increase. For example, the loyalty requirement that used to apply only to clerics, now apply to all Muslims.⁸⁴

The CCP's soft and hard policies in Xinjiang swung back and forth for the last few decades from fierce punishments to accommodating the Uyghurs' religious practices. However, based on the past few years' record of ethnic conflicts, China responded with tougher restrictions and control.⁸⁵

6. Conflict

From 1949–2005, the XUAR has been plagued with protests and violent events between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. This section will provide glimpses of events that took place between 1949 and 1980, which will help contextualize contemporary conflicts inside and outside of Xinjiang.

⁸⁰ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 67–71.

⁸¹ Graham E. Fuller and S. Frederick Starr, *The Xinjiang Problem* (The John Hopkins University, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute), 14.

⁸² Ibid., 32.

⁸³ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 71.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 72.

⁸⁵ Fuller and Starr, *The Xinjiang Problem*, 35.

After the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) "peaceful liberation"⁸⁶ of the XUAR in 1949, armed uprisings and rebellions spread throughout the region. In 1950, Uyghur resistance leaders such as Khalibek organized one attack, while other leaders such as Abaydulla, Sultan Sarif, Janabil and Orazbay organized five rebellions against the PLA. The PLA quickly suppressed the rebellions.⁸⁷ In 1951, Uyghurs continued their quest for independence through armed struggles. The PLA, again, put down the rebellions. In 1952, religious rhetoric started interweaving into resistance efforts. Pan-Turkists allegedly established the "Islamic Alliance Party" to plot an armed uprising against the government, while other Uyghur resistance leaders established and led a "religious army" to rise against the CCP.⁸⁸

Activities in the years between 1953 and 1957 tapered off. In 1953, no protests or violence took place.⁸⁹ From 1954 to 1957, one to two Uyghur uprisings or insurgencies sprouted per year; and the government reacted by taking the participants prisoner.

In 1962, due to the hardship following the Great Leap Forward, a mass emigration of 62,000 Uyghurs and Kazakhs fled to Kazakhstan to escape famine.⁹⁰ From 1962 to 1966, according to Bovingdon, no protests or violent events took place between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. As for 1966 until 1979, previous sections already covered the struggles between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.⁹¹ Based on Bovingdon's accounts, protests and violent events before 1975 were instigated by Uyghurs mainly to rebel against the government for 'colonizing' Xinjiang.⁹²

In 1975, the trend of protest and violence changed. Han migrants in Xinjiang started protests and violent acts against Beijing for economic reasons.⁹³ Over 100,000

⁸⁶ Bovingdon, *Autonomy in Xinjiang*, 18.

⁸⁷ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 174.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 175–6.

⁹⁰ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 176.

⁹¹ Refer to the history and religion sections in the Introduction.

⁹² Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 177.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

protesters were young migrants sent by Beijing to settle along the USSR-Xinjiang borders in the 1960s. They were recruited to strengthen defense against the Russians from enticing Muslim Uyghurs into the Soviet Union. Many of the youths were recent junior and senior high school graduates from Shanghai who would have been unemployed had they stayed in the city.⁹⁴ In 1979, these Shanghai youths petitioned twice to return home. Beijing denied their requests. In 1980, the youths proceeded to demonstrate.⁹⁵ From this point on, the combination of Han and Uyghur dissatisfaction with the government, and each other, continued to escalate. Tension rose between Uyghurs and Han Chinese for political, cultural and economic reasons. For events between 1980 and 2005, refer to the appendix.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

There are many books published about China's grand economic development. However, books written about the XUAR and its economic growth in relation to ethnic instability are limited. Authors often focus on the region's violence, battle for greater autonomy, and cultural and religious freedom. Nonetheless, many writers have also published theses, articles in scholarly journals, daily news and blogs pertaining to economy and instability, which will become my main sources of reference for this thesis.

Timothy Beardson pointed out in his book *Stumbling Giant* that ethnic instability in China threatens the PRC's economic growth.⁹⁶ Beardson wrote a section about Xinjiang, indicating that the CCP's acknowledgment of the Uyghurs' discontent is primarily due friction associated with language, religion and economic challenges.⁹⁷

Ari Aisen and Francisco Jose Veiga agree with Beardson that political instability affects economic growth. The authors used data models that spanned 44 years and approximately 170 countries to prove the association through the use of data and the empirical model. Their hypothesis is that political instability can result in lower economic

⁹⁴ Topping, "Shanghai Youths Sent to Sinkiang."

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Timothy Beardson, *Stumbling Giant, the Threats to China's Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 6.

⁹⁷ Beardson, *Stumbling Giant*, 223.

growth, affecting the rate of GDP per capita.⁹⁸ The authors also indicated that low economic growth can lead to increased government instability.⁹⁹ On the other hand, a free economy with a homogeneous population seems to have a positive effect on growth,¹⁰⁰ yet surprisingly they found that democracy had a slightly unfavorable effect on economic growth.¹⁰¹ Although their research was at the international level, the empirical data is applicable to Xinjiang's regional level as well. The authors' research contributed valuable data by identifying the effects of political instability to economic performance.¹⁰²

While Beardson, Aisen, and Veiga believe instability affects economic growth, Clifton W. Pannell and Philipp Schmidt have a different opinion.¹⁰³ They believe violence in Xinjiang is independent of its economic growth. The Chinese government is moving Xinjiang's development full speed ahead despite continued ethnic, social, and political instability. This move is not necessarily the solution to stability in Xinjiang. Pannell and Schmidt substantiated regional economic disparities in Xinjiang through models, and official statistical data.¹⁰⁴

In addition to economic growth, Pannell, Schmidt and Davide Giglio agree that violence between Han Chinese and Turkic Uyghurs had been related to disparity in employment due to ethnicity.¹⁰⁵ Because economic development is often perceived to benefit the Han-Chinese more than the Uyghurs, the employment inequalities lead to violence between the two ethnicities. Their data revealed obvious advantages for the Han. Even though Uyghurs are the majority ethnic group in Xinjiang, Han Chinese dominate the higher echelons, and attain higher living standards and occupy higher political and

⁹⁸ Aisen and Veiga, "How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?," 1.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 9.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 11.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 1.

¹⁰² Ibid., 25.

¹⁰³ Aisen and Veiga, "How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?," 9.

¹⁰⁴ Pannell and Schmidt, "Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, China," 349.

¹⁰⁵ Giglio, "Separatism and the War."

economic management positions.¹⁰⁶ Gardner Bovingdon identified the employment disparity in Xinjiang's state-run mining and export of oil and gas.¹⁰⁷ Beijing controlled the labor force, which resulted in almost 100 percent Han Chinese.¹⁰⁸ But are disparities the root causes of violence? Giglio argues that poverty and backwardness are the root causes of Uyghur violence.¹⁰⁹

Aside from employment disparity, Tyler Harlan compared the Han and Uyghurs in different sectors. He argued that self-employment and private enterprise are mainly concentrated in urban areas of northern Xinjiang. Xinjiang's private sector is important to its economy, yet Uyghur participation in the private sector is low compared to the Han. Uyghur entrepreneurs dominate the informal or unregistered private sector especially in trade and catering services.¹¹⁰

Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan's research focused on a different aspect: internal migration, specifically on Han-minority inequality. The authors substantiated their research by using 30 of Urumqi's service activities, and roughly 600 participants. Their research reported that recent Han migrants from other provinces migrated to Xinjiang on their own instead of being sponsored by the state. They are less educated and less skilled. They chose to migrate to Xinjiang because competition is less compared to the east coast. On the other hand, Uyghur migrants to Urumqi are generally young, highly educated, from the southern region, hired into the service and professional fields, and often earn higher salary than Han migrants.¹¹¹ The authors concluded that in this particular study, Hans were not exempted from disparities, and that Uyghurs were not discriminated from higher paying jobs.

¹⁰⁶ Pannell and Schmidt, "Structural Change and Regional Disparities."

¹⁰⁷ Bovingdon, *Autonomy in Xinjiang*, viii.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Giglio, "Separatism and the War on Terror."

¹¹⁰ Tyler Harlan, "Private Sector Development in Xinjiang, China: A Comparison between Uyghur and Han," *Espace Population Societes*, March 2009, 407–8, <http://eps.revues.org/3772>.

¹¹¹ Howell and Fan, "Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang," 199 and 136.

Scholars have varying opinions about economic development and its effects on stability. Giglio expressed his concurrence that long-term economic development policy is a necessary solution to an ethnically stable Xinjiang that is free of fanatic Islamist violence. An important aspect Giglio argued for is that development must be in conjunction with improvements and opportunities, which have to be more evenly spread among Uyghurs to reduce poverty.¹¹² Xinjiang is rich in resources yet the region is still in need of state funds to assist the Uyghurs in the private sector. Thus, Harlan and Webber advocate for government support to fuel corporate Uyghur entrepreneurship, taking the Uyghurs from the informal to formal economic market. Government support is crucial to encourage Uyghurs into businesses, boost the region's economic growth, and enhance ethnic stability.¹¹³ Nevertheless, Giglio praised Xinjiang for overcoming economic and cultural backwardness quite remarkably.¹¹⁴

Altay Atli, a lecturer in Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, Turkey, argued that China depends on Xinjiang for its continuous economic growth. To substantiate his argument, he compared Xinjiang's contribution to the nation, to other eastern provinces. According to his study, China is dependent on a stable Xinjiang for political and economic security.¹¹⁵ As Xinjiang's local and regional economy develops, Atli believes the XUAR transportation infrastructure, contacts and trades with its neighboring states will continue to improve and expand.¹¹⁶

In order to hypothesize whether China's Economic Development Program in Xinjiang is increasing interethnic conflict or not, it is necessary to research other causes of instability. Bovingdon argues that unrest in Xinjiang usually has multiple causes. To support his argument, he analyzed historical policy changes, and studied current policies

¹¹² Giglio, "Separatism and the War on Terror."

¹¹³ Tyler Harlan and Michael Webber, "New Corporate Uyghur Entrepreneurs in Urumqi, China," *Central Asian Survey* 31, no.2 (May 8, 2012): 176, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634937.2012.671993#.VBmt2ZRdWrY>.

¹¹⁴ Giglio, "Separatism and the War on Terror."

¹¹⁵ Altay Atli, "The Role of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the Economic Security of China." *OAKA, Journal of Central Asian & Caucasian Studies*, 2011, 123.

¹¹⁶ "China Focus: New Road Exemplifies Xinjiang Prosperity, Stability Drive."

in Xinjiang. Though this literature was published in 2004, his arguments are still important and valid for understanding the basis of Uyghurs' unrest.¹¹⁷ He used a sequence of events from 1950 when China had relative tolerance, to 1990 when Deng Xiaoping squashed a violent uprising in Xinjiang. Without economic development, will Xinjiang's ethnic conflicts persist? If Xinjiang's economic growth stops, will autonomy be enough to stabilize Xinjiang? As it stands for the time being, deep discontent has been brewing due to Beijing forbidding XUAR to openly express their frustration and dissatisfaction with their rights in the region.¹¹⁸

Giglio believes the root cause of Xinjiang's unrest is culture and religion. He believes Uyghurs are interpreting and fearing the CPC's cultural and religious restrictions in assembly, language, and religion as a way to assimilate the Uyghurs, whether that is the CPC's intention or not.¹¹⁹ He reports that past unrest was motivated more by non-religious demands than Islamic ideology. However, religion is becoming the Uyghurs' method of expressing their growing economic grievances. Beijing's concern is the radicalization of Uyghurs if they become influenced by foreign Islamic militants. Normally, Beijing's task is to strike a balance between containment of the separatist movements and genuine autonomy.¹²⁰

At this moment, the balance may be many years away. The government seems to be putting efforts into containment but not so much with entrusting Xinjiang with autonomy. For example, Xinhua reported in May 2014, that in front of Kucha County's government building, a group of people protested for the arrest of one hundred women and middle school girls for wearing head scarves, which is a dress code violation. The protest turned violent when participants hurled stones at the building and beat the school

¹¹⁷ Bovingdon, *Autonomy in Xinjiang*, vii.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., viii.

¹¹⁹ Giglio, "Separatism and the War on Terror."

¹²⁰ Ibid.

principal and a township official. As a result of the violent turn of events, policemen fired into the crowd trying to disperse them, killing at least two protesters.¹²¹

Ching Mun Rosalyn Lim argues that ethnic and religious differences are not enough to cause armed conflict. Contentions are generally complex and multi-layered. Religion is important to the Uyghurs, but to stereotype their conflicts with Islam can inherently exclude important contexts related to social relations, history and politics.¹²² Therefore, both Lim and Giglio argue along the same lines that Uyghur violence is more often motivated by secular demands, and less by Islamic fundamentalism.¹²³

Lim suggests a re-evaluation of the region's current policies to change from reinforcement of the Uyghur's distinction from the Han's, to the accommodation of the Uyghur's transition and inclusion into Chinese society. To stop and prevent further damage to inter-ethnic ties, the CPC should develop a reasonable and comprehensive approach to manage ethnic minorities.¹²⁴ According to Yan Sun, China President Xi Jinping is aware of the dilemmas in Xinjiang and is striving to make improvements to the region. He will support the protection of legitimate religion, but at the same time, abolish illicit religious practices.¹²⁵

Arienne Dwyer concedes that the underlying animosities and conflict between the government and the Uyghurs will persist unless cultural and religious issues are addressed.¹²⁶ Nonetheless, her study focused on another important topic: language and ethnic identity. Dwyer insists that official language policies can be a catalyst for conflict over ethnic nationalism. For major ethnic groups, the resolution to ethnic conflict has to

¹²¹ Shohret Hoshur, "Over 100 Detained after Xinjiang Policy Open Fire on Protesters," Radio Free Asia, May 23, 2014, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/detained-05232014165418.html>.

¹²² Ching Mun Rosalyn Lim, "Religion, Ethnicity, and Economic Marginalization as Drivers of Conflict in Xinjiang," Georgetown University, November 29, 2011, iii. https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558107/Lim_georgetown_0076M_11494.pdf?sequence=1.

¹²³ Giglio, "Separatism and the War on Terror."

¹²⁴ Lim, "Religion, Ethnicity, and Economic Marginalization," iii.

¹²⁵ Yan Sun, "The Roots of China's Ethnic Conflicts," *Current History, A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs* 113, no. 764 (September 2014): 237, http://www.currenthistory.com/pdf_org_files/113_764_231.pdf.

¹²⁶ Dwyer, "The Xinjiang Conflict."

include linguistic and cultural autonomy. Contrary to the CPC's policy, Dwyer argues for Beijing to support and maintain Uyghurs' unique language and identity—it will benefit China's goal in nation building. And, because Uyghurs are pro-Americans, Washington should clearly state to Beijing that the United States wants to cooperate with them—and the Uyghurs—on human rights, including cultural rights.¹²⁷

James Leibold argues that the current ethnic policy is a failure. CPC officials' are open to new approaches to reduce ethnic conflict and establish social stability, which is a prerequisite for regime stability in Xinjiang. Reformers believe China could take small, yet vital, consensus building steps to slowly decrease ethnic violence and separatist activities. In the meantime, to monitor ethnic violence, the government is using high-tech surveillance to increase security efforts in troubled areas.¹²⁸

Leibold continued to emphasize that if policy reform is the key to overcome regional instability, then the government has to make it a top-priority. CPC policymakers, Chinese scholars, and public leaders acknowledge the necessity of ethnic-policy reform to strengthen interethnic cohesion and national integration. However, ethnic policy reform is relatively low on the CPC's priority list.¹²⁹ Beardson pointed out that Beijing has the ability to change Xinjiang's future by involving the Uyghurs in the debate. Instead, Uyghurs have been excluded from participation. By restricting Uyghurs to peacefully oppose political issues in an open forum, the CPC only encourages violent opposition.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, when Uyghurs have the opportunity to debate, Leibold suggests for the Uyghurs to make clear to Beijing the root of the issues they are unhappy and dissatisfied with. Otherwise, the ethnic policy changes Beijing makes will be a wasted effort. All in all, Beijing will continue to uphold economic development and make it a top priority, even though some leaders do not believe money alone will solve Xinjiang's

¹²⁷ Arienne Dwyer, "The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse," East-West Center, 2005, 124. <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS015.pdf>.

¹²⁸ Leibold, "Ethnic Policy in China."

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Beardson, *Stumbling Giant*, 224.

ethnic and religious issues. The author pointed out that Ma Rong of Peking University and other scholars believe if long-term changes occur in China's ethnic policy, the progression will be nonlinear and long-drawn-out. Nonetheless, the effort should strengthen interethnic cohesiveness and national integration.¹³¹

Despite ethnic instability, Giglio suggested that Xinjiang's living standards have progressed with each year: life expectancy has been extended, the income gap between social classes has shrunk, food consumption has grown, quality of life has improved and the rate of death has decreased.¹³²

Although seldom discussed, Giglio acknowledged that some Uyghurs embraced and adapted to the Han's socio-economic change, and understood the necessity of progress. Lim pointed out that Uyghurs who have assimilated have better protection and enjoy greater autonomy. Notwithstanding, Uyghurs who are satisfied with the status quo experience prejudice from Han migrants and Uyghur separatist.¹³³

¹³¹ Leibold, "Ethnic Policy in China."

¹³² Giglio, "Separatism and the War on Terror."

¹³³ Ibid.

II. CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN IN THE XUAR

During the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping developed an economic plan to improve China's economy. The development plan was to start in the eastern coastal regions and then proceeded toward the west. As the east grew, so did the income gap between the east and the west. Beijing reacted in June 1999, by forming a group, led by Premier Shu Rongji with 17 ministerial-level officials to oversee the development of the western regions.¹³⁴

Chinese leadership understood that a lesser developed western region such as Xinjiang would affect the PRC's prosperity and political stability, attract Islamic extremism, and encourage ethnic separatism.¹³⁵ After the July 5, 2009, riot, China President Hu Jintao spoke in Xinjiang saying that "the fundamental way to resolve the Xinjiang problem is to expedite development in Xinjiang."¹³⁶ To assist with the XUAR development, 19 wealthy provinces and cities paired with different Xinjiang cities to provide funds, technology, human resources and management support. Shanghai, for example, paired with counties in Kashgar Prefecture such as Bachu, Shache, Yechang and Zepu.¹³⁷

President Xi emphasized the salience of economic growth during the 2014 Chinese New Year message, "Our ultimate goal in pushing forward [with economic development] is to make the nation more prosperous and strong."¹³⁸ In order to have a prosperous and strong China, he argued Beijing has to develop Xinjiang into an economically sound and ethnically stable region.

¹³⁴ Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China."

¹³⁵ Atli, "The Role of Xinjiang," 120.

¹³⁶ Wei and Cuifen, "China's New Policy in Xinjiang," 60.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ "Chinese President Xi Jinping Delivers 2014 New Year Message," YouTube video, 2:10, posted by Chinese News December 31, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QobjqUTdahQ>.

The XUAR's economic growth and stability depends heavily on its rich natural resources with oil and mineral bringing in the greatest wealth. In the process of exploiting the region's natural resources, the PRC also has plans to revive the Silk Road, which runs through the XUAR. With Xinjiang as a crossroad, China plans to develop the region into a financial, trade, education, science and cultural hub. To attract investors to the southern Tarim Basin, which is poorer than the northern Dzungarian Basin, China designated Kashgar a SEZ in 2010 to attract investors.¹³⁹ SEZs have unique policies and flexible policies to encourage economic growth.

China's economic development in the west goes beyond Xinjiang's border. The PRC expanded economic relationship with the Central Asian republics including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, to meet its energy demand and lessen its reliance on sea-lanes in the South and East China Seas.¹⁴⁰ China is tapping into Central Asia's resources, and major pipelines and rail system construction projects have already linked Central Asian states to China.

A. RESOURCES

China's economic development in the XUAR is mainly in energy. Investment in mining and energy sectors spiked 33 percent for both 2011 and 2012. From January to September 2012, the fixed-asset investment in the XUAR was \$66 billion.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, one of the world's largest untapped thermal coal reserves resides in the XUAR. In 2012, the coal output was 141 million metric tons. The forecast is that by 2020, its output will be approximately 750 million metric tons. On July 30, 2013, Sinopec Group, or China Petrochemical Corporation, was one of 35 companies that submitted a bid to lead a \$32 billion project to create synthetic natural gas. Moreover, the government has a plan to extend the XUAR's operation to becoming the center to process and store oil, gas, coal, chemical, and wind power generation.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ "China's Ambitions In Xinjiang and Central Asia, Part I."

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² "China Focus: New Road Exemplifies Xinjiang Prosperity, Stability Drive."

In the past, the region's economic development, infrastructure and workforce faced a lot of constraints, which limited its growth. Up until recently, Xinjiang did not have the resources, technology and manpower to capitalize on the region's mineral and petroleum deposits. To catch up to the national average GDP, the government's 10th Five Year Development Plan implemented the "Western Development" plan (*xibu dakaifa*), from 2001 to 2005, to quicken central and western regions' development and to equalize the economic growth between regions. The government's investment into the region encouraged Chinese people from the east to "Go West," to gain prosperity.¹⁴³ At the same time, the increase of migrants increased the workforce, boosted the number of skilled tradesmen, transformed regional innovation, advanced urbanization, established sustainable agricultural practices and developed a sound electrical distribution system to provide green power to the modernization effort.¹⁴⁴ The plan raised the XUAR's economic strength, despite the contention between the Uyghurs and Hans over economic dynamics. With the influx of migrants and skills, the region's GDP within the last 10 years experienced periods above the national GDP.¹⁴⁵ Based on Peter Bernat's study, there was a time frame in the 2000s when the XUAR GDP increased from an annual 150 billion to 220 billion yuan.¹⁴⁶

The CCP has been strengthening the XUAR's infrastructure and economic robustness. Large scale infrastructure has been in construction, especially pipelines and railways to transport resources and provide access to Central-Asia's even larger natural resources fields. For example, to accommodate the east coast's energy demand and to boost Xinjiang's economy, China announced in Spring 2000, the national "Develop the West" program to develop a 12–20 bcm/year (billion cubic meters per year) pipeline that links the west to the demand centers of eastern China. In June 2001, PetroChina and

¹⁴³ Howell and Fan, "Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang," 121.

¹⁴⁴ "China: Xinjiang Province," The World Bank Saber Country Report, 2014, http://wbfiles.worldbank.org/documents/hdn/ed/saber/supporting_doc/CountryReports/WFD/SABER_WfD_China_Xinjiang_CR_Final_2014.pdf.

¹⁴⁵ "Province: Xinjiang," Deutsche Bank Research, February 2015, [https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?addmenu=false&document=PROD0000000000247542&rdShowArchivedDocus=true&rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD\\$RMLCHPM&rwobj=ReDisplay.Start.class&rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD](https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?addmenu=false&document=PROD0000000000247542&rdShowArchivedDocus=true&rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD$RMLCHPM&rwobj=ReDisplay.Start.class&rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD).

¹⁴⁶ Bernat, "The Uyghur Question and What is Behind It."

consortia partnered to develop the Tarim Basin gas fields and construct the “West-to-East” gas pipeline. Exxon-Mobil, Gazprom, Shell, China Light and Power, Hong Kong and China Gas, and Sinopec agreed to make its first oil and gas deliveries through the 4,200 pipeline to Shanghai in 2004.¹⁴⁷ In 2004, the pipeline promptly transported 29 billion cubic meters of gas to the eastern region.¹⁴⁸ Another ongoing project is the \$196 billion power generation expansion and ultra-high voltage transmission lines connecting the XUAR coalfields to consumers in the east. In addition, the government also has plans for a \$392 billion rail network expansion for high-speed rail and national freight transports to encourage.¹⁴⁹

B. INVESTING FOR FUTURE GROWTH: SILK ROAD

Aside from developing the XUAR with its rich resources, Beijing is also reviving the historic Silk Road. The Silk Road has a salient role in the XUAR and vice versa. China is planning, and in some cases, already, modernizing transcontinental highways, railroads, and telecommunications lines. The enhancements will boost the infrastructure and industrial and financial cooperation with the emerging markets that reside along the route.¹⁵⁰

The Silk Road is vital to the XUAR because it is the hub for visitors from South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe as they enter China. Historically, nomads, diplomats, pilgrims, soldiers, generals, monks, traders and investors traversed the route, with Marco Polo and Kublai Khan leaving their famous footprints. The international Silk Road trade route was not an actual fixed road. A better way to describe it is that it is a network that traders used to exchange a plethora of consumer goods: silk, coins, paper,

¹⁴⁷ Philip Andrews-Speed, *Energy Policy and Regulation in the People's Republic of China* (Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2004), <http://www.kluwerlaw.com/Catalogue/titleinfo.htm?ProdID=9041122338>.

¹⁴⁸ Bernat, “The Uyghur Question and What is Behind It.”

¹⁴⁹ “China’s Ambitions in Xinjiang and Central Asia: Part 2,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, October 1, 2013, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-ambitions-xinjiang-and-central-asia-part-2?0=ip_login_no_cache%3D64588ce110c2f8281f2251b62a9a41df.

¹⁵⁰ Mandy Zuo, “China Pushes for Revival of Silk Road to Boost Trading Links with Neighbours,” South China Morning Post, February 17, 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1657213/road-chinas-past-future>.

spices, art, utensils and even ideas.¹⁵¹ The Silk Road may function similarly in contemporary time except in greater capacity and speed.

The XUAR is important to China's rejuvenation of the Silk Road because it is China's gateway to the west and the crossroad for Russia, Kazakhstan, and China.¹⁵² In late 2013, Beijing proposed the "Belt and Road" project. President Xi called to its neighbors to accelerate the linking of infrastructures and cooperation in construction.¹⁵³ Beijing's strategy to extend the Silk Road from China through Central and Western Asia to Europe is known as the Silk Road Economic "Belt" project. This economic trunk line may affect more than 40 Asian and European countries and possibly three billion people.¹⁵⁴ On October 24, 2014, China and 21 Asian states established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to finance the building of regional connectivity, such as roads and cell phone towers, and infrastructure of the Belt-and-Road.¹⁵⁵ As of January 2015, AIIB's member count increased to 26, including Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. In February 2015, Chinese leaders presented the priorities for initiatives, emphasizing the transport infrastructure, financial collaboration, trade and investment expedition, and cultural interactions.¹⁵⁶

Improved network and infrastructure on the Silk Road could mutually benefit China and other users, enhancing economic interaction, integration and cooperation. To accommodate Xinjiang's foreseeable growth, CCP tasked the region to reform its financial, logistical, and trade centers. The southern region will become a major traffic

¹⁵¹ JunJie Ma, "The New Silk Road and the Power of Ideas," *The Diplomat*, February 10, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-new-silk-road-and-the-power-of-ideas/>.

¹⁵² Ma, "The New Silk Road."

¹⁵³ "Chronology of China's 'Belt and Road' Initiatives," Xinhuanet, February 5, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-02/05/c_133972101.htm.

¹⁵⁴ Ma, "The New Silk Road."

¹⁵⁵ "Why China is Creating a New 'World Bank' for Asia."

¹⁵⁶ "Chronology of China's 'Belt and Road' Initiatives."

hub. Its transportation network will spread in all directions, connecting China to Europe; and West, South and Central Asia.¹⁵⁷ In addition to the Silk Road bringing in economic prosperity, President Xi also claims it will bring peace, security and stability to China.¹⁵⁸

C. SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE

The economy in southern Xinjiang, comparatively, has not performed as well as northern Xinjiang. To give the southern region an economic boost, Beijing designated Kashgar as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in May 2010.¹⁵⁹ As Kashgar is a SEZ, investors may benefit from preferential policies in finance, taxation, industries, trade and land use. Using Shenzhen as an example, the Chinese government plans to develop Kashgar into a booming economic hub.¹⁶⁰

The SEZ reform was Deng Xiaoping's plan to enhance the PRC's economic growth. He saw the open market as the future to China's prosperity. At the start, Deng mainly identified coastal cities and provinces such as Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenzhen as the targets to "receive foreign investment, establish joint ventures, and export." Eventually, SEZ allowed overseas companies to invest.¹⁶¹ The SEZ plan succeeded. At the state level, China's economy experienced double digit growth for more than 25 years.¹⁶² At the city level, Shenzhen, a rural fishing village outside of Hong Kong, became an SEZ. Between 1980 and 2004, Shenzhen's GDP averaged 28 percent growth per year and in 2004, per capital GDP was \$7,161, which was the highest of any mainland China city.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁷ "China Focus: New Road Exemplifies Xinjiang Prosperity, Stability Drive."

¹⁵⁸ Xinhua, "China to Share Development with Countries along Maritime Silk Road," ChinaDaily.com.cn, February 13, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-02/13/content_19580300.htm.

¹⁵⁹ Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China."

¹⁶⁰ Wei and Cuifen, "China's New Policy in Xinjiang," 64.

¹⁶¹ Economy and Levi, *By All Means Necessary*, 20.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ "Facts and Figures," North American Representative Office of Shenzhen, P.R.China, accessed date February 19, 2015, http://www.shenzhenoffice.org/aboutsz/Facts_Figures.htm.

Shenzhen Export Value 1980 – 2000




Figure 2. Shenzhen Export Value (1980–2000)¹⁶⁴

However, it is unclear if other SEZs follow the same developing model. In 2010, a large banner that read, “Learn from Shenzhen, Pay Tribute to Shenzhen” hung in Kashgar’s People’s Square. Kashgar is growing. Kashgar Airport is Xinjiang’s second busiest airport. It accommodates China’s longest interstate air route of 7.5 hours from Kashgar to Shenzhen. China’s vision is to build a “Silk Road in the air” that will connect the XUAR to Central Asia, East Asia, and Europe.¹⁶⁵ Although the government invested in Kashgar’s infrastructure, such as the airport, it is uncertain whether Kashgar can develop as successfully as Shenzhen. Shenzhen has the advantage of being a coastal city located close to Hong Kong in the Pearl River Delta area, which has attracted a lot of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ “Facts and Figures.”

¹⁶⁵ Cui Jia, “A Silk Road in the Air,” *China Daily*, International ed, (December 31, 2014), <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1640916720/DA7C99D33C4C4BA3PQ/1?accountid=12702>.

¹⁶⁶ Christopher B. Primiano, “China Under Stress: The Xinjiang Question,” *Palgrave Macmillan, International Politics* 50, no 3 (March 22, 2013), <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v50/n3/full/ip20137a.html>.

Kashgar may be less likely to attract such FDI as it is landlocked by mountains and desert.¹⁶⁷ China's hope is that financial aid and infrastructure improvements will encourage foreign and domestic investors to see the same potentials in Kashgar as they saw in Shenzhen,¹⁶⁸ However, because Shenzhen and Kashgar are drastically different, Wang Ning, director of the Economic Research Institute at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences in Urumqi, and her team proposed a tailored model for Kashgar. Shenzhen is an industrialized city with a heavy emphasis in manufacturing, high-tech and finance. While the Shenzhen model worked for China's major coastal cities, Wang proposed that in the early phase, Kashgar's economic development should focus on tourism, while being supported by growth in agriculture, manufacturing and local service industries. Kashgar should start by capitalizing on its rich culture, old architecture and native art scene. After tourism matures, manufacturing and other sectors are likely to follow.¹⁶⁹

D. DEVELOPMENT BEYOND CHINA'S BORDERS

In addition to domestic economic development in Xinjiang, China invests heavily in energy across the western border with its Central Asian neighbors. Central Asia has resources, and China needs more energy than Xinjiang can provide. Xinjiang plays an important role as the gateway and land bridge between China and Central Asia for pipelines and infrastructures. The PRC's rapid economic growth in recent years resulted in energy consumption being outpaced by production.

¹⁶⁷ Primiano, "China Under Stress."

¹⁶⁸ Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China."

¹⁶⁹ Wang Yan, "Securing the New Silk Road," *News China*, February 2012, <http://www.newschinamag.com/magazine/securing-the-new-silk-road>.




Figure 3. China's Oil Production and Consumption (1993–2015)¹⁷⁰

The Chinese government is well aware that an energy shortage in China could damage the nation. Negative economic performance may cause instability, which the government dreads, especially in Xinjiang, because economic instability can lead to ethnic instability. China must seek energy beyond its borders. Since 1995, China has become dependent on energy imports. Central Asian states are supporting China's development with their resources.¹⁷¹

1. Xinjiang: The Gateway and Land Bridge to Foreign Investment

Xinjiang is crucial to Beijing's energy investment in Central Asia; it shares 3,700 kilometers of border with its western neighbors, and it is the only gateway and land bridge between the PRC's core provinces and Central Asia. As a transport corridor and resource hub, the resources that flow through the XUAR are important for uninterrupted supply and continuous industrialization from Xinjiang to the South and East China

¹⁷⁰ "China," U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 4, 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf>.

¹⁷¹ "China's Ambitions In Xinjiang and Central Asia, Part I."

Seas.¹⁷² The XUAR is also the crossroad for imports and exports of resources from South Asia, the Middle East, Eurasia and Europe. Its crossroad explains President Xi's reason for reviving the Silk Road with commerce expanding in several directions from Xinjiang. Pipelines and transportation infrastructures have been, and are being, built to connect the China Seas' coastal centers, Xinjiang, South and Central Asian states, Europe, and the Indian Ocean Basin

2. Central Asia Resources

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, international oil companies quickly purchased newly available Central Asian republics' resources. Unlike international companies, China did not take immediate action. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) waited until 1997 to purchase its first oil and gas field, Kazakhstan's Aktobe field. In 2005, CNPC spent \$4.2 billion to acquire a 67 percent stake in PetroKazakhstan.¹⁷³ In 2009, CNPC cooperated with KazMunaiGas, and spent \$2.6 billion to buy MungistauMunaiGas. Other Chinese investors such as Sinopec, Sinochem, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) invested, to a lesser degree, in Kazakhstan's oil and gas industry. By 2010, China possessed 23 percent of Kazakhstan's oil production shares. In 2009, China invested with Turkmenistan. China Development Bank loaned \$4 billion to Turkmenistan to build the Galkynysh gas field. Instead of financing the loan with currency, the parties agreed to pay back with natural gas exports to China.¹⁷⁴

Even though Xinjiang's Tarim Basin has untapped oil reserves, the government is aware that the amount is insufficient to meet the PRC's continuous energy demands. Therefore, to ensure China has enough energy to support its economic growth, the PRC has been heavily dependent in Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's ample oil and gas supply.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² "China's Growing Interest in Central Asia," YouTube video, 4:07, posted by "STRATFORvideo" on September 27, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UK-Ghu_nqIQ.

¹⁷³ Economy and Levi, *By All Means Necessary*, 152.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Pannell and Schmidt, "Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, China," 333.

Kazakhstan owns approximately two percent of the world's proven oil reserves, and possibly a larger unproven reserve. The proven reserve is enough to supply China with nearly six years of oil. In 2011, Kazakhstan produced 1.8 million and Turkmenistan produced 200,000 barrels of oil a day.

Turkmenistan, in the meantime, possesses 11.7 percent of the world's proven gas reserves, an equivalent of roughly one-third of Europe and Eurasia's gas. Its gas reserve, which is the largest in Central Asia, is enough to supply China with nearly twenty years of gas.¹⁷⁶

As for natural gas, Kazakhstan produced two billion cubic feet (.057 billion cubic meters) daily, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each produced six billion cubic feet (.17 billion cubic meters) of natural gas. Eight billion cubic feet (.23 billion cubic meter) of natural gas a day meets almost a third of Chinese's daily demand.¹⁷⁷

3. Infrastructure

Ever since Central Asian republics gained their independence, the region was primed to expand its trade. China reciprocated with great interest.¹⁷⁸ In 1997, the PRC and Kazakhstan started cooperating with an intergovernmental agreement about collaborating in oil and gas fields. One such project was the Central Asia-China gas and oil pipelines to transport resources from the west to the China Seas. The two states also linked rail lines to connect people from the China Sea to the Atlantic Ocean.

In September 2004, shortly after the 4,200 km West-to-East pipeline started delivering oil from the Tarim Basin to Shanghai, Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev and President Hu, signed a contract worth \$3.3 billion¹⁷⁹ to extend the pipeline from the Tarim Basin another 2,830 km to Atasu in north-western

¹⁷⁶ Economy and Levi, *By All Means Necessary*, 148.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 149.

¹⁷⁸ Pannell & Schmidt, "Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, China," 334.

¹⁷⁹ Bernat, "The Uyghur Question and What is Behind It."

Kazakhstan.¹⁸⁰ The pipeline was essential to meet China's energy demand, and was portrayed as "a bridge of friendship between two people."¹⁸¹ In November 2005, the transnational Atasu pipeline was completed.¹⁸² During the same meeting, the two presidents also signed other agreements to jointly explore and develop oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea, and considered plans for a natural gas pipeline to connect gas fields in the Caspian Sea to China.

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also cooperated with China to build pipelines. On April 3, 2006, the late Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov, and President Hu signed an agreement to collaborate on oil and gas, such as a Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline. Ever since the agreement was signed, the three countries swiftly completed the construction of Lines A and B.¹⁸³ The 1,830 km Line-C construction started in September, 2012. A year later, the pipelines were welded, allowing the initial segment of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline in Uzbekistan to operate. Starting from Gedaim on the border of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Line-C runs parallel with Lines-A and -B. Line-C, then, enters China at Horgos, Xinjiang, to link up with the third West-East Gas Pipeline. By the end of 2015, the Line-C supporting facilities will be completed, which will allow Line-C to operate in full capability to transport 25 billion cubic meters per annum¹⁸⁴ (bcm/a).¹⁸⁵ The combined delivery capacity of the three lines of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline will amount to 55 bcm/a. Aside from satisfying 20 percent of China's natural gas demand, replacing standard coal with natural gas will reduce carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide emissions.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁰ Ernar Sagatov, "Atasu-Alashanko Pipeline," November 20, 2010, <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2010/ph240/sagatov2/>.

¹⁸¹ Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 301.

¹⁸² Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China."

¹⁸³ "Line C of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline becomes Operational," Pipelines International, June 5, 2014, http://pipelinesinternational.com/news/line_c_of_the_central_asia_china_gas_pipeline_becomes_operation_al/087545/.

¹⁸⁴ "Turkey as an Energy Hub: Opportunities and Challenges," Hazar Strateji Enstitusu (blog), April 23, 2014, http://www.hazar.org/blogdetail/blog/turkey_as_an_energy_hub_opportunities_and_challenges_796.aspx.

¹⁸⁵ "Line C of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline."

¹⁸⁶ "Line C of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline."

In September 2013, Tajikistan's President Rahmon Emomali and China's President Xi participated in the opening ceremony for the construction of the fourth Central Asia-China Line-D gas pipeline.¹⁸⁷ The 620-mile (998-kilometer) pipeline will start operating from the Galkynysh field in Turkmenistan at approximately one bcm/a.¹⁸⁸ The route for gas pipeline networks A, B and C's is Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China, while line-D's route is Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-China.¹⁸⁹ The four operational pipelines will have a combined capacity of 80 bcm/a of gas to China, meeting 40 percent of the PRC's overall imported gas supplies.¹⁹⁰ Line-D is expected to come online in 2016 to increase China's gas import and meet the PRC's demands.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ "Construction Starts on the 4th Gas Pipeline from Central Asia to China," Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Projects Office of the Federal Coordinator, September 18, 2014, <http://www.arcticgas.gov/2014/construction-starts-4th-gas-pipeline-central-asia-china>.

¹⁸⁸ "Construction Starts on the 4th Gas Pipeline."

¹⁸⁹ Yen Ling Song, "Fourth Link of Central-Asia-China Gas Pipeline to Start Construction this Year," Platts McGraw Hill Financial, March 10, 2014, <http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/beijing/fourth-link-of-central-asia-china-gas-pipeline-26749048>.

¹⁹⁰ Song, "Fourth Link of Central-Asia-China Gas Pipeline."

¹⁹¹ "Construction Starts on the 4th Gas Pipeline."

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III. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND REGIONAL INSTABILITY

China's economic development plan in Xinjiang has not reduced ethnic conflict in the region. Since 1978, China's market reform from state-owned enterprise to a free market model led to 10 percent average annual GDP growth, and alleviated 500 million or more people from poverty.¹⁹² In the eyes of the PRC, economic development should have the side effect of fostering better social relations. The ideas that higher income, better living conditions, and more chances to lead a better life, generally calms restless people on the edge of survival. Economic development in Xinjiang, paradoxically, seem to increase ethnic conflict due the interplay of new economic such as Han migration, income disparity, and restrictive and discriminatory policies and practices with existing social factors such as religion, education and alienation.

A. HAN MIGRANTS

The Han migration to Xinjiang is one cause of instability in the region. Unlike *bingtuaner* (Chinese for military corps), whom Uyghurs looked upon more favorably, Uyghurs' opinions of some contemporary migrants are negative. Between 1950s to 1970s, the Mao-era, migrants such as convicts, state-mandated border supporters (soldiers), and workers sent for state resettlement purposes, for the most part, adapted to the Uyghur environment and lifestyle, and made the region their home.¹⁹³ Some Hans even identified themselves as *Xinjiangren*, or natives of Xinjiang, or *Lao Xinjiang*, meaning old Xinjiang native.¹⁹⁴

This section will touch on early migrations, the perception of migration, the for-profit migrants, the disorder migrants bring to the region, the socially displaced migrants and how the Uyghurs and Hans needs each other to develop the region and state.

¹⁹² Beardson, *Stumbling Giant*, 3.

¹⁹³ Fuller and Starr, *The Xinjiang Problem*, 11–12.

¹⁹⁴ Agnieszka Joniak-Luthi, "Han Migration to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Between State Schemes and Migrants' Strategies," *Dietrich Reimer Verlag*, 2013, 170.

The early Han migrants to the XUAR were soldiers. After the PLA took control of Xinjiang in 1949, soldiers remained to work in areas such as agriculture and animal husbandry, road building, irrigation channel construction and industrial development. In 1954, Beijing established a state-run military organization call PCC, or the *bingtuan* to administer 100,000 demobilized soldiers, who became known as *bingtuaners*. The PCC had jurisdiction over areas scattered throughout the region that totaled the size of two Taiwans. The soldiers were given land and they settled in Xinjiang.¹⁹⁵

The government's "go west" plans to benefit the XUAR are often perceived differently by the Uyghurs. To develop the XUAR, the Chinese government established programs to benefit everyone involved. Many Uyghurs cannot associate Han migration to benefiting local ethnic minorities. For instance, the "Develop the West" campaign was an initiative to recruit millions of Han laborers to move to the western borderlands to build road, railroad, and infrastructure construction.¹⁹⁶ Uyghurs view of the government's push for the Han Chinese to move west was interpreted as a CCP motive to weaken the Uyghurs' status. Also, Uyghurs perceive Han migrants as given the better paying jobs, while Uyghurs occupy the lower paying and harder labor jobs.¹⁹⁷ By the late 1980s, the push to the west attracted and brought in profit-driven migrants. Due to relaxed household registrations, contemporary migrants have options to be mobile, flexible, and indeterminate stay.¹⁹⁸

Due to this fact, recent migrants, or "self drifters," voluntarily left their *hukou* (household registration) in search of a better life.¹⁹⁹ While migrants may have voluntarily moved to seek profit, central and local governments may have also created favorable environments to entice companies to build factories, and lure people with skills to move and work in Xinjiang. The migrant pool, however, did not necessarily match with the

¹⁹⁵ "Circling the Wagons," *The Economist*, May 25, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21578433-region-plagued-ethnic-strife-growth-immigrant-dominated-settlements-adding>.

¹⁹⁶ Fuller and Starr, *The Xinjiang Problem*, 11.

¹⁹⁷ Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China."

¹⁹⁸ Joniak-Luthi, "Han Migration to Xinjiang," 170.

¹⁹⁹ Fuller and Starr, *The Xinjiang Problem*, 11–12.

government's intention. Instead of attracting skilled personnel and long-term settlers to Xinjiang, many recent migrants are seasonal and temporary peasant workers and entrepreneurs who are in the XUAR with only profit in mind.²⁰⁰ In turn, Xinjiang's Han demographic problem is not all within the CCP's control.²⁰¹

For-profit migrants flocked to Xinjiang in the 1980s when the region was presented as "the land of opportunity where...money can be easily earned."²⁰² Whether migrants were resettled by the government or individually motivated to go to the XUAR, net migration to work large industries and construction projects increased. In the beginning, Xinjiang offered employment to Han migrants to work in the industrialized north of the Tengri Tagh/Tianshan Mountains. Due to tax breaks and inexpensive land, private and state-owned enterprises from eastern China invested in Xinjiang. Han migration continued into southern Xinjiang, particularly to work the railway and road construction sites, urban construction projects, Taklamakan Desert's oil fields, Tarim Basin extraction sites, and Aqsu and Kashgar cotton fields. On the surface, economic growth may seem to profit the XUAR, but data collected between 2011 and 2012 proved that most of these enterprises used Han Chinese labor, not Uyghurs.

Seasonal and temporary migrants to Xinjiang sometimes referred to as the "Floating Population,"²⁰³ bring disorder to the region.²⁰⁴ They do not observe local regulations nor have a settlement pattern, which is a challenge to the CCP. Han migrants have threatened the XUAR's social stability such as with the birth-control policy. They breach one-child policy, and do not necessarily adhere to the local law and order.²⁰⁵ Without the prospect to permanently settle, a Han Chinese once said during an interview, "Xinjiang is not a place you want to live after retirement."²⁰⁶ For this reason, even after

²⁰⁰ Joniak-Luthi, "Han Migration to Xinjiang," 168.

²⁰¹ Fuller and Starr, *The Xinjiang Problem*, 11–12.

²⁰² Joniak-Luthi, "Han Migration to Xinjiang," 168.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 169.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ Joniak-Luthi, "Han Migration to Xinjiang," 169.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

years of living in Xinjiang, many Hans keep their original *hukou* status and do not see the need to establish *hukou* in the region where they are making money. For example, rural farmers with farmland can lease their land during their absence from their *hukou*. They benefit from additional rental income and the money they make in Xinjiang. Floaters are self-driven and susceptible to relocating to the next employment opportunity. The government is suspicious of floaters because their patterns are erratic and most do not satisfy the CCP's plan of increasing Han settlement in the XUAR.²⁰⁷

Another negative Han migrant factor is perceived social displacement. Some Han migrants had difficulties integrating with society. Some migrated to the UAR only for money and not the people, land, or culture. Many profit-driven Han entrepreneurs bring their families with them but have no intention to stay. While there are floaters, some migrants have transferred their *hukou* so their children receive education and health care.

In the meantime, some migrants become socially dissatisfied because they do not feel compatible even with those from their native home. For example, due to dialectic differences, Hans do not understand, relate or associate with all Hans. As an example, a Sichuanese will most likely socialize with a Sichuanese instead of a Cantonese because their language and possibly, culture are differences.

Social displacement can be a problem among Uyghurs and Hans, and Hans and Hans. Some migrants are so intimidated by the local language and culture that they preserve close ties with their families back home, shop in stores with products and produce they are familiar with, cook their own traditional dishes, eat at restaurants that serve their own specialties, and socialize with their "fellow natives."²⁰⁸ Some of these migrants earn money and remain socially segregated. The negative depiction reinforces Uyghurs' and long-term Han settlers' negative perception that floaters are in Xinjiang only to make profit; lack ecological interest; are nonchalant with the people, history, culture and land; and voided responsibility for the region.

²⁰⁷ Joniak-Luthi, "Han Migration to Xinjiang," 169.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 170.

B. INCOME DISPARITY

Income disparity is another destabilizing factor between the Hans and ethnic minorities. Income disparity between urban-rural zone in Xinjiang stemmed from the Mao era when state-owned projects such as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and construction and development of natural resources were dominated by Hans. Hans tended to own companies and manage private- and state- owned transport and telecommunications industries.²⁰⁹ Uyghurs lived in unfavorable locations that lacked infrastructure and human resources, which negatively affected their economic development and income. This section will use two examples to explain Uyghur-Han income disparity: spatial segregation and a study conducted by Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan specifically on market differences and wage gaps in Urumqi.




Figure 4. Spatial Distributions of Different Ethnic Groups in Xinjiang, Western China²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ Cao, "Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization," 969.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 970.

Uyghur-Han spatial distribution is split into two: ethnic minorities dominate the less developed and agricultural rural southern Xinjiang and the majority of Hans live in modern and developed urban centers of northern Xinjiang. Southern Xinjiang is composed primarily of Uyghurs living in rural areas. One quarter of Xinjiang's cities are located in the southern region. Agriculture is the base of the southern economy. While 47 percent of the XUAR population lives in this region, 90 percent are ethnic minorities. This region is geographically disadvantaged with socio-economic obstacles. The region lacks infrastructure, especially roads. The attempt to transport produce to Urumqi is a great challenge for minorities.²¹¹ The government designated 20 of its 25 counties "poverty-stricken counties."²¹²

Northern Xinjiang, where most Han urban dwellers live, is more urbanized, industrialized and developed. The Tianshan economic belt on the northern slope, for example, has developed transportation infrastructure, copious human capital and rich natural resources. The area provides all the ingredients for economic development. While the area covers only five percent of the XUAR's territory, 20 percent of Xinjiang's population lives here.²¹³

²¹¹ Cao, "Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization," 975.

²¹² Ibid., 972.

²¹³ Ibid.

Table 1. Demography of Urban Uyghurs and Hans in Xinjiang (2002)²¹⁴

Name & States of the Administrative Unit	Uyghur Population (%)	Han Population (%)	Per Capita GDP (yuan)
Karamay (north)	13.6	77.9	43,926
Urumqi (north)	12.8	73.2	16,493
Turpan (north)	69.6	23.5	12,831
Shihezi (north)	1.2	94.6	9,738
Changji (north)	4.0	74.8	8,399
Kumul (north)	18.4	68.7	7,351
Ili (north)	15.9	44.9	5,344
Aksu (south)	74.9	25.0	4,939
Kashgar (south)	89.2	9.1	2,411
Khotan (south)	90.7	3.0	1,643
Source: 2002 Xinjiang tongji nianjian, op cit , pp 106, 110–115, 713, 715; 2002 Zhonguo tongji nianjian, op cit , p 51			

Educational disparity is a factor that increases the income gap. Southern Xinjiang's illiteracy rate ranges from 8.7 percent to 14.2 percent. The eastern side of Xinjiang ranges from 6.5 to 8.7 percent. The most northern part of the XUAR ranges from 2.2 to 6.5 percent.²¹⁵ The urban-rural income disparity is due arguably to inadequate education in rural areas. Less educated Uyghurs create less skilled and insufficient labor in remote minority areas and in the cities. This analysis may explain the large Han-Uyghur income gap and Uyghurs' slow but rising quality of life , as compared to the Han.

Howell and Fan conducted a study in 2008 that focused on Urumqi Uyghur migrants' and Han migrants' choice of markets, and how their differences affected their wage gaps. A 2008 statistic illustrated that since 2005, 11 percent of Uyghurs received pay raises, while 36 percent of Hans received pay raises. Also, the Uyghur-Han wage gap in the XUAR averaged 28 percent higher for the Hans without consideration for their

²¹⁴ Remi Castets, "The Uyghurs in Xinjiang-The Malaise Grows," China Perspectives, September 2003, <http://chinapersonpectives.revues.org/648>.

²¹⁵ Cao, "Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization," 975.

professions.²¹⁶ This particular study, using specific parameters, showed that urban Uyghur migrants' wages were not at a disadvantage compared to Han migrants.²¹⁷

Sources often suggest that Uyghurs are economically disadvantaged when compared to Hans. For instance, Howell conducted another study that combined ethnicity, gender and migrant status. This research revealed that Uyghur native, compared to Han natives and Han migrants, had the greatest disadvantage regarding income disparity.

C. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES

This section will cover historical discriminatory labor practices, the labor law, and more recent employment discriminatory practices.

Employment discrimination in the XUAR is not a new phenomenon. During the early Republican era, Hans, not Uyghurs, occupied Xinjiang province and subprovince official positions. Han officials deprived the Uyghurs of a fair chance in politics and employment, and further invited Han migrants to the region to settle. Officials would entice Han migrants to settle by presenting them with favoritism, such as gifting them with prime farmland take from Uyghurs who had been evicted.²¹⁸

On July 5, 1994 the Eighth National People's Congress promulgated the Labour Law of the People's Republic of China.²¹⁹ Article 12 states: "Labourers shall not be discriminated against in employment due to their nationality, race, sex, or religious belief."²²⁰ Article 14 declares: "In respect of the employment of the disabled, people of minority ethnic groups, and demobilized army men, where there are special stipulations

²¹⁶ Anthony J. Howell, "Chinese Minority Income Disparity in the Informal Economy: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis of Han-Uyghur Labour Market Outcomes in Urumqi's Formal and Informal Sectors Using Survey Data," CIJ 11, no. 3 (December 2013): 17, http://www.tonyjhowell.com/papers/Minority_income_disparity_in_Xinjiang.pdf.

²¹⁷ Howell and Fan, "Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang," 132–133.

²¹⁸ Gardner Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent," East-West Center Washington, Policy Studies 1–96, 5.

²¹⁹ Database of Laws and Regulations, accessed date March 9, 2015, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383754.htm.

²²⁰ "Labour Law of the People's Republic of China," China.Org.CN, accessed date March 9, 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/living_in_china/abc/2009-07/15/content_18140508.htm.

in laws, rules and regulations, such stipulations shall apply.”²²¹ While the PRC now has a labor law in place, adherence to regulation is another matter.

Discriminatory employment practices are still present in Xinjiang. Uyghurs feel insignificant in the region’s administrative, technical, and professional arena because the high-skill service sector predominately hires Hans. Scholars have also noted that in Xinjiang, Han migrants “are given priority over minorities in obtaining urban employment, a source of persistent inequality between Han and minorities.”²²² To give minorities bigger advantages, the PRC has been enforcing hiring quotas for State-owned-enterprises (SOE).

Since the late 1970s, SOEs have been required to employ a certain percent of minorities. The exact quota percentage was difficult to locate and the number gap between each source varied a lot: James Leibold stated that there was a 70 percent quota,²²³ Shan and Weng quoted no less than more than 60 percent,²²⁴ and Shan and Chen stated 15 percent of SOE employees, management included, to be ethnic minorities.²²⁵ During the 1970s, the state sector endowed the region with GDP growth. Since the SOEs had lots of industrial and service job positions, they hired as many Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and other non-Hans as they could.²²⁶ As private enterprises flourished, SOEs shrank. More and more minorities had to quit the SOE and search for private sector jobs. Private companies, though, were not bound by the preferential policy as the SOEs were. Private owners had the freedom to choose; many chose not to hire Uyghurs because they did not have the technical and language skills that the employers

²²¹ “Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China.”

²²² Howell and Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang,” 121.

²²³ James Leibold, “Xinjiang Work Forum Marks New Policy of ‘Ethnic Mingling,’” The Jamestown Foundation 14, no. 12 (June 19, 2014), http://www.jamestown.org/regions/chinaasiapacific/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42518&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=52&cHash=e382c60e99ad9bfe6cd7453376dc25a0#.VQyqjdJ4omw.

²²⁴ Shan Wei and Chen Gang, “The Urumqi Riots and China’s Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang,” *East Asian Policy* 11, no. 3, XX, http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Vol1No3_ShanweiChenGang.pdf.

²²⁵ Shan Wei and Chen Gang, “The Urumqi Riots and China’s Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang,” *East Asian Policy*, 14–22 (20), http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Vol1No3_ShanweiChenGang.pdf.

²²⁶ Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” East-West Center Washington, Policy Studies 1–96,38.

needed.²²⁷ Without the necessary skills, Uyghurs were at a disadvantage when compared to Hans in the private sector.

In the late 1990s, some private enterprises advertised jobs, but indicated that Uyghurs, whether conspicuously or inconspicuously, “need not apply.”²²⁸ Employers were so hesitant to hire non-Hans that Uyghur parents “paid substantial bribes to officials in hopes of securing desirable jobs for their children.”²²⁹ Meanwhile, the CCP encouraged large-scale SOEs, such as energy giants PetroChina and Sinopec, to invest and develop in the Tarim Basin region. Unlike the earlier SOEs which had to meet ethnic minority hiring quotas, these SOEs employ Hans due to their technical skills. On another note, these SOEs pay income tax to Beijing or Shanghai instead of Xinjiang because “they are registered in Beijing with their oil and gas pipeline subsidiaries registered in Shanghai.”²³⁰ The discrimination and tax factors intensified economic disparity between minorities and Han in Xinjiang and the rest of the PRC.

D. OTHER DESTABILIZING FACTORS IN XINJIANG

Xinjiang’s economic development has negatively affected ethnic stability because factors related to economic growth such as Han migration, income disparity and discrimination practices compounded the existing complex mix of destabilizing factors. Other destabilizing factors include, but are not limited to, social displacement, assimilation, colonization, cultural suppression education, lack of autonomy or independence, politics and strong nationalism.²³¹ This section will focus on religion and education, and how each created tension among Uyghurs and Hans in the region.

²²⁷ Wei and Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang,” 59–60.

²²⁸ Bruce Gilley, “Uighurs Need not Apply,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 164, no. 33 (August 23, 2001): 26.

²²⁹ Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” East-West Center Washington, Policy Studies 1–96, 39.

²³⁰ Wei and Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang,” 60.

²³¹ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 3.

1. Religion

Religious tensions between Uyghurs and the government are major causes of minority unrest.²³² Because religion is tightly interconnected to many facets of Uyghurs' lives, nearly any act of dissent can qualify as religiously motivated.

In the early 1980s, many Xinjiang public schools were secular and restricted from religious teachings. Religious educational deprivation led many Uyghur students in Xinjiang to quit their secular education with the public school. Instead, they attended private Muslim academic institutions called madrassas.²³³ Uyghur parents wanted their children to learn Islamic traditions, values, rituals and scripts instead of the government's secular teachings. This demand for institutions with Islamic teachings eventually contributed to the introduction of underground Islamic sects in Xinjiang.

Cultural factors, such as religion, have been a pivotal element of ethnic instability in the XUAR. For example, Xinjiang legislators passed a law in December 2014 that banned the wearing of burqas in public. Because Islam is woven into every aspect of Uyghurs' lives, restricting cultural garments may easily be interpreted as religious suppression even though "burqas are not traditional dress for Uygur women, and wearing them in public places is banned in countries such as Belgium and France."²³⁴ Still, local legislators instituted the ordinance in response to a spate of violent attacks, such as the March 1, 2014 attack at Kunming's railway station where attackers with knives stabbed 31 people to death and wounded 141.²³⁵ Aside from the ban on burqa, in August 2014, due to a sport competition in Karamay, the XUAR temporarily prohibited passengers with long beards, head scarves, veils, hijab, burqas, and garments with Islamic crescent and star symbols to board public transportation.²³⁶ The government took security

²³² Sun, "The Roots of China's Ethnic Conflicts," 232.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Frances Martel, "China Passes Burqa Ban in its Largest Muslim City," Breitbart, January 13, 2015, <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/01/13/china-passes-burqa-ban-in-its-largest-muslim-city/>.

²³⁵ Katie Hunt, "4 Found Guilty of Railway Station Knife Attack in China," CNN, September 12, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/12/world/asia/china-kunming-attack-trial/>.

²³⁶ Loveday Wright, "Xinjiang: Restrictions on Religion May Lead to 'Uighur Radicalization,'" DW, August 8, 2014, <http://www.dw.de/xinjiang-restrictions-on-religion-may-lead-to-uighur-radicalization/a-17841070>.

measures in an effort to curb potential Islamic terrorism in China.²³⁷ One last example: during 2014's Ramadan, certain students, teachers and government employees were banned from fasting because the government feared fasting would lead to violence. Observers claimed that during "Ramadan rage," the combination of fatigue, thirst, and hunger contributed to the increase of violent acts—deaths, assaults, disputes, fights, accidents, burning of religious structures, and beating of women and children.²³⁸

Understanding the PRC's response to past violence may help one see why local and state governments administer certain restrictions against contemporary conflicts. Without the background information, one could misinterpret the government's actions as religious suppression rather than security measures.²³⁹ Understanding the minority actions that caused the government to implement certain religious policies may reveal that the government is putting effort into stabilizing the region. Nonetheless, despite government efforts, religious policies are widening the cultural gap between the XUAR and the state.²⁴⁰

2. Education

The education system in Xinjiang is another factor that causes friction between ethnic minorities and Hans. Hans claim reverse discrimination due to preferential treatments that give ethnic minorities advantages on their college entrance exams.²⁴¹ Uyghurs, in the meantime, are not content to participate in bilingual education.

Han students in Xinjiang feel that educational preferential treatment is reverse discrimination due to colleges' different admission criteria that favor minorities, crippling Hans' chances. Ethnic minorities are given extra points for their college entrance

²³⁷ Martel, "China Passes Burqa Ban."

²³⁸ Jeremy Wilson, "Ramadan Rage: How Crime Increases During the Muslim Holy Month," *Breitbart*, July 7, 2014, <http://www.breitbart.com/Breitbart-London/2014/07/07/Ramadan-Rage-How-Crime-Increases-During-the-Muslim-Holy-Month>.

²³⁹ Wright, "Xinjiang: Restrictions on Religion."

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ Sun, "The Roots of China's Ethnic Conflicts," 236.

exams.²⁴² For example, in 2004, minorities who took the Mandarin (or Putonghua, meaning “common speech”²⁴³) exam were awarded 50 points if both their parents were minority, or 10 points if one parent was a minority.²⁴⁴ In more disadvantaged regions, minorities have the option to take college entrance exams in Mandarin or Uyghur. The exam in Uyghur is easier in content than the Mandarin exam, and the minority students are still supplemented with ample extra points.²⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the score gap between minorities and Hans has been narrowing.²⁴⁶

Preferential policies encouraged, developed and trained a sizeable pool of minorities in a number of fields. A 2009 survey conducted by the Xinjiang Bureau of Education showed 89,538 (37.5 percent of the total enrollment)²⁴⁷ minorities in tertiary institutions, and 1,705 (14.65 percent of the total enrollment) minorities in postgraduate school. Nonetheless, without preferential hiring policies, minority graduates experience fewer employment opportunities than Han graduates.²⁴⁸ Critics of the preferential policy argued that lower academic standards and lack of Mandarin fluency for minorities negatively affected their post-college employment prospects. Henceforth, to level the playing field for minorities and Hans, the PRC instituted bilingual education, specifically Mandarin and the native language, in colleges to enhance minorities’ competitiveness with Hans.²⁴⁹

The ability to speak Mandarin and another language promotes upward movement, but minorities have reservations about the educational plan. China’s legislation gives Xinjiang’s education administration the freedom to develop its own education program.

²⁴² Sun, “The Roots of China’s Ethnic Conflicts,” 236.

²⁴³ Qiu Gui Su, “Putonghua-Standard Mandarin Chinese,” About Education, accessed date March 12, 2015, <http://mandarin.about.com/od/chineseculture/a/Putonghua-Standard-Mandarin-Chinese.htm>.

²⁴⁴ James Leibold, *Minority Education in China: Balancing Unity and Diversity in an Era of Critical Pluralism*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014) 142.

²⁴⁵ Leibold, *Minority Education in China*, 142.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Sun, “The Roots of China’s Ethnic Conflicts,” 236.

The XUAR has two types of schools: minority and Hans.²⁵⁰ As long as a language has a written script, minorities are permitted to have separate schools using their native language for primary instruction; Kazakh schools speak Kazakh, and Uyghur schools speak Uyghur. Both schools also learn Mandarin as a second language starting in grade three. Han schools, on the other hand, speak Mandarin but their second language is English.²⁵¹ Minority school students, though started bilingual education since third grade, may not be proficient in both the minority language and Mandarin.²⁵² Their low competency in Mandarin could be a contributor to their lack of competitiveness in the job market against Hans, which often leads to friction between the minorities and Hans.




Figure 5. Number of Violent Incidents between Uyghurs and Hans (1980–2014)^{253, 254}

²⁵⁰ Ablimit Baki, “Language Contact Between Uyghur and Chinese in Xinjiang, PRC: Uyghur Elements in Xinjiang Putonghua,” Academia.edu, 2012 (41-62) 47, http://www.academia.edu/1770107/Language_Contact_between_Uyghur_and_Chinese_in_Xinjiang_Uyghur_Elements_in_Xinjiang_Putonghua.

²⁵¹ Baki, “Language Contact Between Uyghur and Chinese,” 47.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ “Uyghurs: The Troubled Fate of a Minority,” Radio Free Asia, accessed date March 2, 2015, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/UyghurUnrest/Home.html>.

²⁵⁴ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 177–190.

IV. CONCLUSION

To the CCP, economic instability can lead to ethnic instability.²⁵⁵ China has been economically developing Xinjiang, in hopes that economic stability will decrease ethnic violence in the XUAR. Xinjiang's economy has been growing steadily since the implementation of the "Western Development" Program. China is exploiting the region's rich natural resources to meet the state's energy demand. In addition, China is rejuvenating the Silk Road, which goes through the XUAR. Xinjiang is China's gateway to the west; a crossroad for Russia, Kazakhstan and China; and the hub for traffic from South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. To geographically link the different states to Xinjiang, China and its neighbors have plans to improve the network and infrastructure along the Silk Road, which could enhance economic interaction, integration and cooperation. To further advance Xinjiang's economy, the CCP designated Kashgar a SEZ to attract investors by giving investors breaks in finance, tax, industries, trade and land use. Moreover, China is investing in Central Asia's natural resources to ensure the state has enough energy to sustain economic growth and stability. Central Asia and China have been cooperating in major pipeline and transportation infrastructure projects to connect the east coast of China to Europe.

²⁵⁵ Aisen and Veiga, "How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?," 9.




Figure 6. Province: Xinjiang²⁵⁶

China's economy is growing, but how is growth affecting ethnic stability in the XUAR? Is it a determining factor that either increases or decreases ethnic conflict, or is it merely a secondary factor? While Giglio argues that long-term economic development is a necessary component of Xinjiang's ethnic stability, he believes the root cause of Xinjiang's unrest is culture and religion.²⁵⁷ Bovingdon²⁵⁸ and Lim²⁵⁹ argue along the same lines that Xinjiang's unrest has multiple causes. Xinjiang's economic development created additional ethnic tension between minorities and Hans. Therefore, in addition to the existing social ethnic conflict factors, minorities and Hans have to deal with Han migration, income disparity and employment discrimination.

Han migration is integral to the development of Xinjiang because Hans have the skills to build infrastructure.²⁶⁰ While the region is modernizing with highways, railroads, and telecommunications lines, which have been attracting an array of investors,

²⁵⁶ "Province: Xinjiang."

²⁵⁷ Giglio, "Separatism and the War on Terror."

²⁵⁸ Bovingdon, *Autonomy in Xinjiang*, viii.

²⁵⁹ Lim, "Religion, Ethnicity, and Economic," iii.

²⁶⁰ Wei and Cuifen, "China's New Policy in Xinjiang," 59–60.

Uyghurs perceive development benefiting Hans and not them.²⁶¹ Furthermore, for-profit, temporary and seasonal migrants tend to bring disorder to the region.²⁶²

Income disparity is generally perceived as being in favor of Hans, but after analyzing the contributing factors, such as spatial segregation, and Urumqi's market differences and wage gaps, income disparity is more fluid. The gaps could narrow, or reverse, if minorities alter their social and professional characteristics to the majority of China. However, Howell and Fan's study was specific to minority migrants and Han migrants in Urumqi.²⁶³ The complexities revealed by this work could shift the perception of income disparity and the outlook on opportunities available to minorities. Their individual job preferences can heavily determine wages compared to Hans. Nevertheless, if minorities do not see the potential of different job markets and continue to resist adaptation, then income disparity will persist, along with ethnic instability.

Employment discrimination causes tension between minorities and Hans, especially when employers discriminate based on "nationality, race, sex, or religious belief."²⁶⁴ Minorities who are fluent in ethnic languages but not scientific and technical terms can hinder their capabilities to communicate, acquire a trade and be offered employment. Minorities may consider emphasizing their fluency in Mandarin. Proficiency in the national language can help them advance in the same trades Hans are learning, thereby reducing the chances of employment discrimination.

Between the two social factors of religion and education, religion is more volatile than. The three economic destabilizing factors of Han migration, income disparity and employment discrimination. See appendix for a chart of incidents between Uyghurs and Hans. Religious differences, if allowed to escalate, can potentially destabilize Xinjiang's economic development significantly. The existence of social conflicts can manifest into ethnic instability, which the CCP sees as a key threat to economic growth.²⁶⁵

²⁶¹ Fuller and Starr, *The Xinjiang Problem*, 5.

²⁶² Joniak-Luthi, "Han Migration to Xinjiang," 169.

²⁶³ Howell and Fan, "Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang," 132–133.

²⁶⁴ "Labour Law of the People's Republic of China."

²⁶⁵ Beardson, *Stumbling Giant*, 6.

Chapter I introduced three possible hypotheses: 1) the PRC's economic development plan for Xinjiang increases, 2) decreases, or is a 3) subsidiary component of ethnic conflict. Upon analyzing the XUAR's economic growth and destabilizing factors, this paper argues and concludes that the PRC's economic development plan affects ethnic stability in Xinjiang as a subsidiary factor.




Figure 7. Correlation of GDP of Xinjiang (1990–2012)²⁶⁶ with the Number of Violent Incidents Between Uyghurs and Hands^{267, 268}

Bovingdon's 1949 to 2005 account of Xinjiang's violent events (see the appendix for years 1980 to 2005) and Radio Free Asia's 2008 to 2014 data (see Figure 7) further support this thesis' findings. As the graph of Xinjiang's GDP illustrates, the trend of economic growth since before the "Great Western Development" persistently increased. In the meantime, the violent incident graph between the years of 1980 and 2014 showed a trend of ebb and flow.

Because the trends of the two graphs do not match, one can argue that ethnic conflict does not affect economic growth because, whether the number of violences rises or falls each year, economic growth continues to climb annually. On the other hand, this study argues that economic growth can affect ethnic stability in two ways: increasing ethnic instability, or decreasing ethnic instability.

²⁶⁶ Yin Weiwen, "The Natural Resource Curse of Xinjiang," accessed date march 10, 2015, <http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/courses/2014/documents/graspp2014-5140143-2b.pdf>.

²⁶⁷ "Uyghurs: The Troubled Fate of a Minority."

²⁶⁸ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 177–190.

One can argue that economic growth increases ethnic instability due to the addition of economic destabilizing factors to existing social factors. Han migration, income disparity and employment discrimination, together with religious suppression and education, may have exacerbated minorities' pool of grievances. Minorities could potentially use these factors to mobilize and to justify their violent actions against the government, Han Chinese and other minorities. These combined social and economic factors could possibly explain the spike of incidents since 2011.

In order to create long-term ethnic stability and economic development in Xinjiang, China needs to confront the deeper and more historical roots of the social factors that affect XUAR's violent activities. The author argues that social factors effect stability the most when the economy is underdeveloped, or in the process of development. Once the region achieves a certain developmental threshold, the social factors can be lessened by the pursuit of stability and prosperity.

If this brief assessment is plausible, it explains the PRC's ongoing economic development in the XUAR, despite increasing or decreasing ethnic conflict. The social factors, which are the root of many conflicts, should be the PRC's main focus. Long-term stability and prosperity in Xinjiang may require the CCP to institute fair policies, equal education opportunities and open communication. This thesis argued that Xinjiang's economic growth can negatively and positively affect regional ethnic stability, but only as a subsidiary factor, as China continues to exploit Xinjiang's natural resources, expand the Silk Road network, develop Kashgar into the next Shenzhen, and invest with its Central Asian neighbors.

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APPENDIX

ORGANIZED PROTESTS AND VIOLENT EVENTS IN XINJIANG, 1980–2005 ²⁶⁹				
DATE (and DURATION)	LOCATION	TYPE	# INVOLVED	COMMENTS
1980-01 (--)	Aqsu	Demonstration (Han)	4,000	Shanghai youths seeking right to return home
1980-04-09 (2 days)	Aqsu	Riot, clash	3,000	Public Security Bureau (PSB) employee Huang Zhen killed a Uyghur “drunk” in custody; demonstrators paraded with the body, shouted “Down with Hans, Hans go home”; attacked government offices.
1980-06-27 (4 days)	Atus	Riot, clash, demonstration	500	Several hundred Uyghurs attack military organs, make trouble in barracks and on the street. Propaganda and “detaining the leaders of the troublemaking” resolved the problem.
1980-08-02 (Days)	Urumci	Shooting, riot		Production and Construction Corp (PCC) clerk killed Uyghur farmer’s ox, then a Uyghur roadworker. After clerk received a death sentence, other Hans stormed jail and freed him. Later sentenced to manslaughter.
1980-08-20 (--)	Qaghiliq	Incident	--	--
1980-11-12 (40 days)	Aqsu	Riot (Hans)	8,000	“Sent down” youths seeking to return home; 1,000 staged a hunger strike; martial law in effect through December 26, 1980.
1981-01-13 (4 days)	Qaghiliq	Riot	2,000	Talips rioted after a mosque fire, accusing a Uyghur PSB official as arsonist. Slogans: “Follow Allah,” “Long live the Islamic Republic,” “Kapirs out.” Attacked government offices.
1981-05-27 (--)	Payziwat (Jiashi)	Insurgency	150	Insurgents stole weapons, planned to establish an independent East Turkestan (ET) Republic; led by Hasan Ismayil, Dawut Sawut.
1981-10-30 (Days)	Kashgar	Riot, “racial incidents”	6,000	Riots after Han shot Uyghur youth with a hunting rifle. Rioters stormed the post office, party committee, bank; attacked 600, injured 200; shouted “Long live Uyghurstani/Islamic Republic, “Down with Qitay.”
1985-12-12	Urumci, Khotan, Aqsu, Bole	Demonstrations	2,000	Later spread to Nanjing, Beijing, Shanghai; 2,000 students from 7 universities involved. Students

²⁶⁹ Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land*, 177–190.

(4-days)				shouted separatist slogans: Hans out, Independent Xinjiang (XJ) sovereign; Yuan Qingli says antibirth planning, transfer of convicts—personal observation.
1988-04 (1-day)	Ghulja	Demonstrations (Qazaq)	--	Protest against “White house in the distance,” with Qazaq students from 6 colleges.
1988-06-15 (3-days)	Urumci	Demonstrations	300	Racist slogans on toilet door; demonstrations at major universities in Urumci; organized by “student scientific/cultural association”; Dolqun Isa claims responsibility 2006.
1989-02-08 (Days)	Southwest Taklamakan (prison sites not revealed)	Prison riot	80	More than 80 prisoners at a remote labor reform farm used hammers and knives to kill guards, take hostages, and burn buildings. There had reportedly been 11 major riots in 23 camps with 96 escapes in the previous year.
1989-05-13 (1 day)	Urumci	Sit-in (Han)	130	Former uranium mine workers protested problems of radiation sickness and also supported students. Met by government officials and PCC officials (who employed them). They were promised redress but told that their sit-in was “inappropriate.”
1989-05-16 (1 day)	Urumci	Demonstration	--	--
1989-05-18 (1 day)	Urumci	Demonstration	--	--
1989-05-19 (1 day)	Urumci	Riot	3,000	Over the book <i>Sexual customs</i> , initially described as “orderly march in support of Beijing democracy movement”; degenerated into a riot; 1,000 PSB, 1,200 People’s Army Police (PAP) dispatched.
1989-06-05 (1 day)	Urumci	Sit-in	100	More than 100 students protested outside a district government office; protest posters “appeared at every university.”
1990-1-15 (1 day)	Qaghiliq County	Demonstration	200	Some 200 Talips petitioned the county government and “made trouble.” Although the trouble was squelched expeditiously, the Uyghur imam was criticized for dereliction of duty.
1990-03-25 (1 day)	Moyu County	Arson	--	A small group of people reportedly led by Talips burned the family-planning technology station (where ultrasounds and abortions would be performed).
1990-04-05 (2 day)	Baren	Armed uprising	200	Started in a mosque.
1990-09 (--)	Northwest Xinjiang	Disturbances	--	--

1991-02-28 (1 day)	Quca	Bombing	--	A second bomb failed to detonate.
1991-05 (2 days)	Cocak	Demonstration, gunfight	140	Armed rebellion calling for independence, political parties, <i>minzu</i> army; armed demonstrators occupied Tacheng government building, demanded government "hand over power"; gunfight left 140 kill, wounded, arrested.
1991-06-11 (2 days)	Bole	Demonstration, gunned down	3,000	Demonstration for democratic elections, some called for right to join Soviet Union, looting, shootings, 500 killed or wounded.
1992-02 (--)	Ghulja	Bombing	--	--
1992-02-05 (1 day)	Ruumci	Bombing	--	A series of bombings reported; January 21 document attributes them to "Islamic Reformers' Party."
1992-03-05 (4 days)	Khotan, Kashgar, Quca, Cocak, Bortala	Bombings	--	--
1993-03 (--)	Lop Nor	Demonstration	1,000	Antinuclear.
1993-06 (--)	Ili region	Kazakhs clash	--	--
1993-06-17 (1 day)	Kashgar	Bombing	--	Attack on government; January 21 document claims bombings continued through September; Shu Bangzao attributes it to the ETDIP.
1993-07 (--)	(Not specified)	Assassination attempt	--	Targeted Hamundun Niyaz, chairman of the XUAR People's Target
1993-08-01 (1 day)	Yarkand	Bombing	--	In the video parlor of a trade company.
1993-08-04 (--)	Kashgar	Bombing	--	Bombings in a total of 5 cities (other cities not cited).
1993-08-19 (1 day)	Khotan	Bombing	--	--
1993-08-24 (1 day)	Qaghiliq	Assassination attempt	--	Attempt on Abliz Damolla, parliamentary member, head of great mosque.
1994-07-18 (days)	Toqsu (Xinhe)	Bombings	--	--
1995-04-22	Ili Zhou Mongolkure,	Protest	50,000	Possibly up to 100,000 protestors at climax. Protestors reportedly called for a "Qazaq state,"

(3 day)	Capcal, Nilqa, Takas, Kunes			“The end of Communist rule,” and “Long live Uyghurstan.” Note: Not mentioned in any mainland Chinese sources. [Although scholars such as Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, and Michael Dillion report this event as established fact (Benson and Svanber 1998: 194–195; Dillon 2004, no. 949:68-69), James Millward expresses skepticism, since it was reported only in a Hong Kong magazine that regularly retails stories unflattering to the CCP. Millward raises three important objections: first, if as large as reported, it would have been one of the most serious antigovernment protests since 1949; second, news of a protest of the size proposed would almost certainly have traversed the border into Kazakhstan; and third, having reported the violent uprisings in Baren in 1990 and Ghulja in 1997, CCPofficials would have had no obvious reason not to publicize this event as well (Millward 2007, no. 1640: 329).]
1995-07-07 (1 day)	Khotan	Riot	1,000	Protest at the dismissal of the molla of Beytulla Mosque.
1995-08-14 (--)	Ghulja	Demonstration	--	A protest at the jailing of Abdulhelil, leader of <i>masrap</i> ’ described by Chinese sources as “illegal protest.”
1996-02-10 (79 day)	Aqsu: Onsu, Toqsu (Xinhe), Sayar, Quca	Violent clashes	--	Arsons, assassinations, robbery, bombings
1996-02-13 (--)	Urumci	Bombing, violent uprising	--	Separatists blew up a car at a police substation and committed violence.
1996-02-24 (1 day)	Sayar Township	Robbery	4	15,000 <i>yuan</i> stolen from vice chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Congress, Rehmetulla Hidayet, by 4 masked men.
1996-03-22 (1 day)	Toqsu (Xinhe)	Assassination	2	Hakim Sidiq Haji, vice chairman of the Islamic committee, mosque head.
1996-03-27 (1 day)	Sayar Township	Robbery	4	6,975 <i>yuan</i> stolen from Imin Saqi, an iman, by 4 masked men.
1996-04-12 (1 day)	Sayar County	Gunfight	--	--
1996-04-16 (1 day)	Khorgos	Weapons smuggling	--	East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) members reportedly imported weapons into Xinjiang.
1996-04-29 (Days)	Quca	Bombing spree	10	After April 27, 1996, boarder agreement by Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

1996-04-30 (Days)	Multiple sites	Street fighting	--	Followed SCO boarder agreement previous day.
1996-05-12 (--)	Kashgar	Assassination attempt	3	Attempt on cleric and parliamentary delegate Harunkhan Haji, by 3 “fanatical and inhuman” splittists.
1996-07 (--)	Sayar	Bombing	--	Chinese Foreign Ministry attributes the bombing to the Islamic Justice Party.
1996-07-15 (Days)	Sayar	Prison break by “separatists”	12	Splittists broke out of the Tarim Prison, stole weapons, and killed police, army, and civilians; Beijing attributes the break to the ET Islamic Justice Party
1996-08-27 (--)	Qaghiliq	Assault	6	6 base-level cadres and masses injured; 4–5 killed.
1996-10-23 (1 day)	Yerkand	Murder	--	Splittists murdered an “innocent Han and two helpers”; there was supposedly a later plot to kill 40 people, but the plan collapsed.
1996-11-20 (1 day)	Yerkand (several places)	Murder	9	3 farmers murdered at home.
1997-02-05 (2 day)	Ghulja	Riot	5,000	Biggest incident since Baren.
1997-02-23 (1 day)	Aqsu	Assassination	--	Killed Omarjan, head of <i>bingtuan</i> .
1997-02-25 (1 day)	Urumci	Bombing	--	PRC consulate website claims it was the work of “ET National Solidarity Union.”
1997-03-23 (1 day)	Aqsu	Assassination	--	Mamatjan Sadiq, party committee secretary of a <i>minzu</i> farm, Bingtuan no. 1 division; Ziley Abdurazaq, a woman encouraging other women to take off their veils and use family planning; assassinated by “splittists and violent terrorist.”
1997-04-26 (1 day)	Ghulja	Riot at execution	1,000	--
1997-06-04 (1 day)	Moyu, Khotan; Qiaqike Township	Assassination	4	Mamatrozi Mamat, cadre.
1997-06-26 (1)	Ining County, Fanjin Township	Assassination	--	Qasim Masir, the chairman of a township village public-order group, was killed by “splittists” at home.
1997-07-01 (1)	Poskam County, Gulbagh Township	Assassination	3	Mamat Seyit, party branch secretary, was killed by 3 members of an “illegal religious organization.”

1997-07-03 (1 day)	Baslik, Awat	Assassination	--	Killed Turdiniyaz, village cadre in Beshlik, and wife.
1997-09-22 (6 day)	Toqsun, Shawan, Pichan, Khutubi, Hejing, and Khoshut	Armed rebellion and riots	3,200	Multiple rebellions in widely spaced towns with 3,200 involved. 800 staged an armed attack on Hejing and Khoshut party and government buildings. Officials first denied the reports but later acknowledged them.
1997-09-28 (1)	Sayar County, Sayar Township, Yengi Mehelle	Assassination	--	Aziz Abbas, imam of the Yangi Mahata Mosque, helped break a 500,000-yuan robbery and capture the head of the bombing on February 5, 1997; assassinated by "splittists and violent terrorists."
1997-11-06 (1 day)	Bay, Aqsu Assassination	--		Killed Yonus Sidiq Damolla, Islamic association, head of Bay mosque: blamed on separatists.
1998-01-27 (1 day)	Qaghiliq	Assassination	--	Abliz Haji, head of Qaghiliq mosque; blamed on separatists.
1998-02 (1 st week)	Ghulja	Disturbance	--	1,000 police dispatched.
1998-02-22 (37 day)	Qaghiliq	Bombings	--	6 bombings total through March 1998; economic damages of 100 million yuan.
1998-04-07 (1 day)	Qaghiliq	Bombings	--	8 bombings in one day.
1998-04-20 (1 day)	Ghulja (Hudiyayuzi)	Gunfight	--	PSB official Long Fei was killed. PSB blamed it on Mamtimin Hazrat and the ETLO. Not originally attributed to terrorists in 1998.
1998-05-21 (--)	Aqsu	Battle	--	PSB officials encircled "violent terrorists" in their Black Hills hideout; the suspects kept up a barrage of hand grenades until all were killed or blown up.
1998-05-23 (3 day)	Urumci	Arson (40)	--	15 successful; no injuries.
1998-05-28 (--)	Ili District	Gunfight	--	Reportedly 1 of 4 gunfights in the second quarter of 1998.
1998-06-02 (--)	Khotan District	Battle	--	2 "violent terrorists" pursued by PSB fought them with knives, injured police, and took hostages. Outcomes not specified.
1998-06-26 (--)	Ili District	Gunfight	--	Reportedly 1 of 4 gunfights in the second quarter of 1998.
1998-07-22 (1)	Awat County, Tamtughraq Township	Gunfight	--	Ablat Tayip, chairman of the Ustun Aral village committee, was killed while helping police break up a "violent terrorist gang."

1998-08 --	Northwest Xinjiang	Murder of police	--	--
1998-11-02 (1 day)	Yarkand County, Igerci Township	Stabbing	--	Tas Razaq, secretary of Politics and Law Committee, stabbed while apprehending head of “violent terrorist gang.”
1999-02-10 (1 day)	Urumci	Gunfight	--	Murat Rustam was killed while trying to apprehend suspects in a major robbery-murder case; by 2005 they had become “terrorists.”
1999-02-16 (1 day)	Urumci	Riot, clash with police	300	Police tried to arrest 30 Uyghur men shouting “independence for XJ” after a night of drinking. Crowd growing to 300 surrounded police, who clashed with 150.
1999-03-17 (1 day)	Changji city	Bombing	--	PAP headquarters admitted that 30 officers had died in a motorcade bound for Shihezi; military insiders say it was “definitely” a bomb set by separatists. There also were gunfights with suspected separatists in Hutubi.
1999-07-10 (1 day)	Hejing County	Attack and bombing	12	Reported separatists attacked a power station on a military base in Hejing, blowing up, killing or wounding 12; 12 armed separatists were killed in police pursuit afterward.
1999-07-17 --	Khotan	Armed attack	2,000	2,000 protestors surround and attack the PSB after a fruit seller was challenged for not having a business license.
1999-07-23 --	Khotan	Armed attack	300	300 people mob the PSB as security personnel try to apprehend Hebibolla, suspected in the Hotan event of July 7, 1995.
1999-08-09 --	Lop	Armed attack (riot at execution)	6,000	Riot at the execution of Murtaza; Chinese sources describe as “very serious.”
1999-08-20 (1 day)	Khotan: “Sidituwei mosque”	Religious incitement	--	The molla of the mosque (and apparently some worshippers) reportedly shouted “Drive out the ‘kapirs.’”
1999-08-23 (1 day)	Poskam County, Poskam Township	Assassination	10	Khudahardi Tokhti, head of a patrol station; blamed on separatists.
1999-08-24 (1 day)	Khotan area	Assault	--	Uyghurs riding a motorcycle and beating one or more Hans(s).
1999-08-27 (1 day)	Khotan area	Assault	--	Head of the Nurbagh police substation was attacked and left bleeding from the head, sent to hospital.
1999-09-04 --	Khotan area	Killing	21	Police shot and killed Kuras, called a “terrorist leader” by the government; 21 others arrested.

1999-10-21 (1 day)	Poskam County, Gulbagh Township	Killing	--	A government driver, Tursun Qadir, and a township communications specialist, Qadir Mamat, wounded; the killings were blamed on Yasin Mamat.
1999-10-24 (1 day)	Poskam	Assault	--	Attack on Sayri Township PSB; describe in Chinese sources as being like Baren.
1999-11-08 (1)	Awat County, Bas Eriq Township	Assassination	--	Turghun Aqniyaz, a policeman, was killed by “violent terrorists” on his way home.
1999-12-15 (1)	Khotan County	Arrest battle	4	In trying to arrest suspected separatists, the PAP officer Abduqeyum Jumeniyaz was killed
2000-09-28 --	Almaty	Murder	--	Chinese Foreign Ministry claims 2 Qazaq police were murdered by members of the ULO.
2001-02-03 (1 day)	Shufu, Kashgar	Assassination	--	Mamatjan Yacquip, cadre.
2001-08-07 (1 day)	Urumci	Riot	200	Started when inspectors challenged an unlicensed fruit vendor; people threw fruit, rocks, bricks at inspector; people surrounded substation after police collared a suspected ringleader, police arrived to break up.
2001-08-07 (1 day)	Quca	Gun battle, aborted uprising	--	Police surprised a house full of suspected separatists; 4 died in the gun battle, including the chief, Chen Ping; a cache of weapons was reportedly found; report of a plan to storm a government building and raise the Uyghur flag.
2001-09 --	Zhangmu entry port, Tibet	Weapons smuggling	--	ETLO reportedly imported weapons into Tibet. Reports identified two Uyghurs, Ablet Tursun and Ahmet (family name not specified) as the ones responsible.
2001-10 (1 day)	Qaraqas	Protest	180	Some 180 people protested the destruction of a mosque deemed too close to a school, thus a “negative influence” on students. A Chinese official said it was the third such mosque destruction that year.
2001-11-02 (1)	Atus City, Ustun Atus Township	Gunfight	--	Feng Tao, the head of special antiseparatist PSB unit “110,” was shot while trying to apprehend “violent terrorists.”
2001-12-24 (1)	Khotan	Protest	100	A day-long protest by 100+ workers after 200+ were laid off at a textile factory that originally had 1,300 workers, of which 80% had been Uyghur. Workers were worried they’d get no severance; local government officials assured them they would.
2002-05	Khotan	Stabbing	2	A teacher, an advocate of an Islamic state, was

(1 day)				dismissed during a patriotic education campaign; stabbed the principal.
2002-05-27 (1)	Poskam County, Yima Township	Attack	2	Yasin Mamut, party committee vice secretary and head of a police substation, was killed while inspecting stand selling religious texts; Yusupqadir Idris, PAP vice head, was killed “protecting a cadre” in a struggle with “violent terrorists.”
2003-03-07 (1 day)	Khorgos	Student protest	100	A whole class (<i>minzu</i> unspecified) boycotted and staged a sit-in in over “exam immigrants”; said to have “threatened social order.”
2003-03-18 (1 day)	Manas	Student protest	300	Some 300 students boycotted classes at the peak, reason unknown; said to have “threatened social order.”
2003-04-05 (1)	Ucturpan County, Aqtoqay	Attack	1	Sa’atquiz Tokhti, an assistant in the family-planning office, was killed by the husband of a pregnant woman being examined.
2004-03-02 --	--	Bombing of PAP barracks	--	Wang Lexiang, deputy PSB chief, deputy PSB chief, announced the “successful” 2004 bombings in August 2006, after claiming the PSB had foiled other bombing attacks (suspicious report by Xinjiang government given attempt to prove there are terrorists years later).
2004-06-11 (1)	Qapsaghay (Ili Prefecture)	Protest	1,000	A day-long protest by farmers, foresters, and herdsmen. A hydropower station under construction would require the relocation of 18,000 people; 38,000 <i>yuan</i> compensation offered, only 880 was given; 16 people arrested.
2004-09-05 --	--	Combing of rail line	--	See entry for March 2, 2004, event.
2005-03-12 (1)	Poskam	Fight	22	17 to 18 Uyghur students fought with Hans; all were arrested, and 4 were sentenced; 4 teachers were also arrested.
2005-04-16 (3 days)	Korla	Strike	100	Korla taxi drivers stuck over a newly announced tax of 4,000 <i>yuan</i> per year; on day 3, scabs were driving with covered license plates; the number of participants is an estimates.

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