They Might be Giants: Small-Scale RPAs as a Threat to Air Base Defense and Air Power Projection
Abstract
Over the past seventy years, the Department of Defense and its installations came under attack many hundreds of times, demonstrating an inability to defend the air base against harassing standoff attacks. These attacks did not attempt to overthrow, conquer, or seize an air base but sought instead to interrupt base operations and sortie generation. By doing so, enemies attempted to blunt the overwhelming power afforded by air power and its resources. This thesis argues that as technology advances, it will afford adversaries enhanced capability to execute precision standoff attacks through commercially available and adaptable small-scale Remotely Piloted Aircraft. This type of aircraft has undergone rapid expansion in capability, now offering longer range, greater payload ferrying ability, enhanced navigation by GPS and autonomous flight control systems, and ease of use. Coupled to malicious intent, these factors offer adversaries with an affordable and expendable method of exploiting the air domain without suffering the traditional costs associated with air power assets. Due to the low speed, low detectability, and increasing lethality of small-scale RPAs, a precision attack against high-value assets can successfully interrupt air power projection and the protection of ground forces.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2014
- Accession Number
- ADA620957
Entities
People
- Bert W. Adams
Organizations
- Air University