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**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 2010 IRAN-TURKEY-BRAZIL
NUCLEAR DEAL FOR TURKEY AND BRAZIL**

by

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**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 2010 IRAN-TURKEY-BRAZIL NUCLEAR DEAL FOR
TURKEY AND BRAZIL**

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ABSTRACT

Iran's nuclear program has been one of the main controversial topics within the field of international relations since the early 1980s. From that time to 2010, Western states, particularly the United States, sought to prevent Iran from developing its program through different methods—from sanctions to diplomatic attempts. Despite all these efforts, Western states failed to persuade Iran to negotiate its program in a transparent manner. When there was no belief in diplomacy, two emerging powers, Turkey and Brazil, convinced Iran to come to the table. Due to the skepticism of the great international powers, this attempt also failed, but it continued to mean more than a deal for Turkey and Brazil.

This thesis assesses the significance of 2010 Iran-Turkey-Brazil nuclear deal for Turkey and Brazil, and finds that Turkey and Brazil engaged in the deal because both of them had political and economic motivations. To understand the conditions that led Turkey and Brazil to engage in the deal, this study examines the evolution of Turkish and Brazilian foreign policies. Then, it focuses on the 2010 nuclear deal's political and economic significance for Turkey and for Brazil.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
B.	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION.....	2
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	2
1.	Studies on Historical and Current Patterns on Turkish Foreign Policy	3
2.	Studies on Historical and Current Patterns on Brazilian Foreign Policy	5
3.	Analyses on Nuclear Deal	9
D.	POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES	15
E.	RESEARCH DESIGN	16
F.	THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE.....	17
II.	THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY	19
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	19
B.	TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE COLD WAR.....	21
1.	The Ottoman Era (1774–1923)	21
2.	The First Period of the Republic of Turkey (1923–1946).....	24
C.	TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR (1946–1991)	27
D.	TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR (1991–TODAY).....	31
1.	Turkish Foreign Policy from 1991 to 2002	31
2.	The AKP Era (2002–today).....	32
E.	CONCLUSION	36
III.	BRAZIL’S FOREIGN POLICY	39
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	39
B.	BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE COLD WAR.....	42
1.	The First or Old Republic (1889–1930)	42
2.	Vargas Era (1930–1945)	46
C.	BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR ERA ...	49
1.	The Second Brazilian Republic or the Republic of ‘46 (1946–1964)	49
2.	Military Rule (1964–1985).....	52
D.	BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR	54
1.	1985–1995.....	54
2.	The Fernando Henrique Cardozo Era (1995–2003)	55
3.	The Lula da Silva Era (2003–2010)	56
E.	CONCLUSION	57
IV.	THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2010 IRAN-TURKEY-BRAZIL NUCLEAR DEAL FOR TURKEY	59
A.	POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE	62

1.	Turkey's Ambitions to be a Regional Power	62
2.	The Rivalry between Turkey and Iran for Regional Leadership..	65
3.	Nuclear-Iran as a Threat to Regional Balances	67
B.	ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE	68
1.	The Impact on Turkey of Sanctions on Iran	68
a.	<i>Bilateral Trade</i>	69
b.	<i>Turkish Companies Investments in Iran</i>	72
c.	<i>Tourism</i>	73
2.	Turkey's High Dependency on Foreign States for Oil and Natural Gas.....	75
3.	Turkey's Aims to be an Energy Bridge between East and West...	75
C.	CONCLUSION	76
V.	THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2010 IRAN-TURKEY-BRAZIL NUCLEAR DEAL FOR BRAZIL.....	79
A.	POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE	83
1.	Nuclear Reasons: Brazil Defended Its Own Position.....	83
2.	The Prioritization of Relations with Asian, African, and Middle Eastern States.....	86
3.	The Historical Legacy of Soft Power and Diplomacy.....	87
4.	Avoiding Direct Confrontation	88
B.	ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE	89
1.	Brazil's Economic Relations with Iran	89
a.	<i>An Overview of Brazil-Iran Economic Relations Since 1994</i>	90
2.	Brazil's Economic Relations with China and other Parts of the World	92
3.	Brazil's Economic Relations with the United States.....	95
a.	<i>An Overview of Brazil-U.S. Economic Relations Since 1994</i>	96
C.	CONCLUSION	98
VI.	CONCLUSION	101
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	105
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	119

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	An Overview of Turkey-Iran Economic Relations since 2003.....	70
Figure 2.	Value of Turkish Building Companies' New Projects in Iran between 2004 and 2012.....	73
Figure 3.	Change in Number of Iranian Tourists who Visited Turkey from 2010 to 2013.....	74
Figure 4.	An Overview of Brazil-Iran Economic Relations since 1994.	92
Figure 5.	An Overview of Brazil-U.S. Economic Relations since 1994.....	98

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	An Overview of Turkey-Iran Economic Relations since 2003.....	69
Table 2.	Top Five States in Iran's Export in 2013.	71
Table 3.	Top 5 States in Iran's Import in 2013.	71
Table 4.	Turkey's Building Contractor Services in Iran between 2004 and 2012.....	72
Table 5.	Change in Number of Iranian Tourists who Visited Turkey from 2010 to 2013.....	74
Table 6.	An Overview of Brazil-Iran Economic Relations since 1994.	91
Table 7.	Brazil's Top Trading Partners in 2013.....	94
Table 8.	An Overview of Brazil-US Economic Relations since 1994.....	97

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
AP	Justice Party
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India, China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
DP	Democrat Party
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
G77	Growing 77
HEU	high-enriched uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
IRCICA	Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture
LEU	low-enriched uranium
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
P5+1	UN Security Council Permanent Members and Germany
RP	Welfare Party
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
U.S.	United States
WTO	World Trade Organization

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

On May 17, 2010, Iran, for the first time, agreed to come to the table to negotiate its nuclear program. To the world's surprise, two middle powers, Turkey and Brazil, convinced Iran to "ship 1,200 kg of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey in return for nuclear fuel rods for a medical research reactor."¹ Moreover, Turkey and Brazil not only persuaded Iran to negotiate its nuclear program but also convinced Iran to accept the same conditions previously offered by the United States and other great powers seven months before. Right after the declaration of the success of the deal, however, the United States and other Western countries declared their skepticism about it and announced that they would not recognize it. It was Turkey and Brazil's turn to be surprised, because both countries' foreign ministers declared that the United States was aware of all the details of the deal from the beginning. Furthermore, Brazil's Foreign Minister Celso Amorim wrote an article in which he stated that the United States wanted both countries to engage in this deal.²

Despite the failure of the deal, which was followed by a fourth round of UN sanctions for Iran, it represents a turning point for Turkey and Brazil's foreign policies. In assessing the significance of that deal for Turkey and Brazil, this thesis will attempt to answer the following research questions:

- Does the Turkish-Brazilian nuclear weapons deal offered to Iran in 2010 reflect the aspirations of contemporary Turkish and Brazilian policymakers?
- Is the deal symptomatic of current foreign policy trends/approaches in Ankara and Brasilia?
- Why is the deal significant for Turkey and Brazil?

¹ Julian Borger, "Iran-Turkey Nuclear Swap Deal 'Means New Sanctions Are Unnecessary'," *Guardian*, May 17, 2010, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/17/iran-nuclear-uranium-swap-turkey>.

² Celso Amorim, "Seguranca Internacional: Novos Desafios para o Brasil," [International Security: New Challenges for Brazil] *Contexto Internacional* 35, no 1 (January-June 2013): 305.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Twenty years ago, neither Turkey nor Brazil had a foreign policy independent of NATO or U.S. policies. In the last decade, Turkey and Brazil have established independent policies and acted independently on a wide range of issues. Two countries that historically had nothing to do with one another, Turkey and Brazil came together and made an independent stand on nuclear weapons, which was unprecedented. The deal's symbolic meaning is more important than any other consequences for both states. It is symptomatic of both countries' aspirations to be more proactive, visible, and important.

This study will focus on its symbolic significance more than the actual policy itself. The case of France and French foreign policy perhaps provides a strong analogy for these cases. Although France is not a dominant economic actor and does not wield inordinate amounts of political or military influence in the world, it is often perceived to be an important nation and a major international actor. Turkey and Brazil have been crafting their foreign policies to achieve the same level of international influence.

This study is about the comparison of the development of independent approaches toward foreign policy in Brazil and Turkey. It is asking why the proposed nuclear deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey is important. Although it failed, the event itself is historically significant, and reveals a lot about the ambitions of both nations to develop foreign policies independent of the global power elite and based on their interests.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review is divided into three parts. The first two parts give general information about historical and current patterns in Turkish and Brazilian foreign policies, and the third part deals with specific analyses on the 2010 Iran-Turkey-Brazil Nuclear Deal.

An important goal of this study is to understand how Turkish and Brazilian foreign policies have evolved in the last century. That is why this thesis will initially analyze historical and current patterns on Turkish and Brazilian foreign policies. It will give the historical background that paves the way to understand why Turkey and Brazil took part in the nuclear deal with Iran.

1. Studies on Historical and Current Patterns on Turkish Foreign Policy

Works on Turkish foreign policy typically focus on issues such as European Union (EU) politics, terrorism, and NATO relations. There are very few works that deal with Turkey's relationship with the Middle East and even fewer on nuclear issues in the Middle East.

William Hale's *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000* is one of the most significant studies that explore the evolution of Turkish foreign policy since the second half of the 18th century. He focuses on the post-World War II era and argues that Turkey has an important place in the international system. He defines Turkey as a middle power that has the potential “to oblige other states to take actions which they would not otherwise have taken, and to resist pressure to do so from other states.”³ In other words he thinks that Turkey can sometimes resist powerful states' interventions while it can have an impact on the weaker ones' policies. According to Hale, four systems—balance-of-power, multipolarity, bipolarity, and uni-polarity—have shaped the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire and its successor Turkey, since the early 19th century. In his book, he emphasizes the significance of Turkey's geographical position, human and natural sources, and economic power as the main determinants of its position in the international system.⁴

Turkish Foreign Policy In Post- Cold War Era, edited by Idris Bal, has several useful chapters about the evolution of Turkish foreign policy. Like Hale, in the foreword, Ersin Onulduran defines Turkey as a “medium sized regional power,” noting that the country is generally “affected by global political happenings.”⁵ In his chapter “ Turkey and the World in the 21st Century,” in the same book, Faruk Sonmezoglu emphasizes that Turkey was not able to pursue foreign policies independent from NATO and the

³ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000* (London; Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 1.

⁴ Ibid., 5–7.

⁵ Ersin Onulduran, “Foreword,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Idris Bal (Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), vii.

United States until after the Cold War.⁶ Again in the same book, in his chapter, “Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulence of the Post-Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic Constraints,” Ramazan Gozen argues that imperial collapses lead to power vacuums that set the stage for a new international order and that regional and global powers try to fill these vacuums by adapting their policies to new conditions. Gozen considers the collapse of the Soviet Empire as a turning point for Turkish policy.⁷

Ahmet Davutoglu’s *Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu* (*Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position*) represents the most definitive work that summarizes both Turkey’s position historically and how the present government intends to approach the current international system. Davutoglu, who is currently serving as the Foreign Minister of Turkey, is the architect of the country’s contemporary foreign policy. Previously, he worked as the chief advisor to the AKP government since it came to power in 2002 and until he became foreign minister in 2009. *Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu* is comprised of three main parts. Davutoglu describes Turkey’s cultural and political heritage in the first part and seeks to define the power parameters that determine Turkey’s position in the international system. In the second part, he explores the country’s relationships with other territories that have historical connections with Turkey. In the last part of the book, Davutoglu reassesses Turkey’s strategic instruments and regional strategies and emphasizes the importance of multi-dimensional policies, which essentially are based on the concept of “new Ottomanism.” He speaks in praise of Turgut Ozal, former prime minister and president of Turkey, and new Ottomanism, which seeks to reorganize the state according to the new international system, to establish new political and cultural identity that is harmonized with both Western and traditional values, to integrate with European Union and follow compatible policies with the United States.⁸

⁶ Faruk Sonmezoglu, “Turkey and the World in the 21st Century,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy In Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Idris Bal (Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), 90.

⁷ Ramazan Gozen, “Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulence of the Post-Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic Constraints,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy In Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Idris Bal (Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), 29–31.

⁸ Ahmet Davutoglu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu* [Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position] (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001), 85.

Most of the international relations studies analyze the last 12 years of the Turkish foreign policy in terms of Davutoglu's principles due to his significant impact on the AKP government. The book *Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy* is an example of those works. Ozden Zeynep Oktay and some other Turkish academics try to answer the question of whether Turkey has changed its Western-oriented policies into Eastern-oriented policies in the 21st century. They believe that Turkey has stopped following one-dimensional policies, which have been strictly dependent on the NATO alliance and U.S. foreign policies, and started to follow more independent and multi-dimensional policies which necessitate rearranging its relations with the East.⁹ They attribute this conclusion to Davutoglu's concerns about how following one-dimensional policies prevents Turkey from being a great power in the world.¹⁰ Considering these changes in foreign policy, the authors especially examine Turkey's relations with the United States, EU, Russia, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Balkan countries in their chapters.

2. Studies on Historical and Current Patterns on Brazilian Foreign Policy

Works on Brazil's foreign policy usually concentrate on U.S. relations, Latin American politics, and the economic potential and development of Brazil. There are very few works that deal with Brazil's relationship with other parts of the world.

Like in Turkey, 2002 was a turning point in Brazil's foreign policy. Although most of the scholars think that the dramatic change started with Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the change in Brazil's foreign policy actually began during Lula Da Silva's era (January 1, 2003–January 1, 2011). So, it is possible to examine Brazil's foreign policy as before and after Lula da Silva's election in 2002.

New York Times reporter Larry Rohter is one of those writers who argue that Brazil has the potential to be a great power. He further states that Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva's elections were significant milestones in the way of reaching

⁹ Ozden Zeynep Oktay, et al., *Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10509087>.

¹⁰ Davutoglu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, 71.

this goal. In his book *Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed*, Rohter claims that while in the 1960s Brazil was not seen as a serious country and had punched “under its weight,”¹¹ at the end of the 20th century Brazil’s fortunes had changed. He states that Cardoso and Lula da Silva have been the main actors in this transformation.¹² Moreover, he argues that the United States had been the main actor in Brazil’s foreign policy in the 20th century and the cooperation reached its peak at the end of the century. After the election of Lula, Brazil began to follow independent and sometimes opposing policies. The reactions to the coup d’etat in Honduras in 2009 and Iran’s nuclear program can be considered as two significant recent events that reflect this change.¹³ He believes that “the hunger to be respected as a serious country” is the main motive for Brazil to maintain the transformation in the way of being a great power.¹⁴ He also states that Brazil has traditionally seen herself in the same league with regional powers and large states and feels superior to its neighbors.¹⁵ Like Rohter, in his article “Two Ways to Go Global,” Peter Hakim considers Cardoso’s election as the beginning of the transformation of Brazil into a regional and global power.¹⁶

G. Pope Atkins is another scholar who believes that Brazil has been subject to dramatic changes in terms of its foreign policies in the 20th century. However, unlike Rohter, he argues that the transformation started earlier. He defines Brazil as the “sleeping giant” of Latin America and states that until the 1960s, Brazil was under the auspices of Britain, followed by United States-oriented policies. Starting with the 1960s, however, Brazil realized its potential and began to follow independent foreign policies which set the stage for strong relations with other parts of the world.¹⁷

¹¹ Larry Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 223–225.

¹² Ibid., 252.

¹³ Ibid., 232.

¹⁴ Ibid., 226.

¹⁵ Ibid., 227.

¹⁶ Peter Hakim, “Two Ways to Go Global,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1 (January–February, 2002): 153.

¹⁷ G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 38.

In his recent article, “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” Harold Trinkunas defines Brazil as a middle power that is on the way to being a major power. Like other scholars, he considers Lula da Silva’s election as an important event in Brazil’s history in the way of being an effective actor in the new international order. He argues that, unlike major powers, Brazil is reluctant to use hard power to reach its goal. Instead, it prefers to use soft power and diplomacy.¹⁸

Giselle Datz and Joel Peters article “Brazil and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in the New Century: Between Ambition, Idealism, and Pragmatism,” is one of a few works that focuses on Brazil’s relations with the Middle East. In this article, the authors argue that the increase in the economic strength of Brazil has helped the country to become a global player in all other areas. They believe that Lula da Silva is the architect of this transformation.¹⁹ They note Lula Da Silva’s efforts to develop strong relationships with Middle East and to have a voice over international politics of that area. Moreover, they argue that, in addition to the desire for being a major power, Brazil has economic and demographic motives to increase its relationship with the Middle East. According to them, the more than 12 million Arab-Brazilians is one of those motives,²⁰ and Brazil’s desire to find new markets and investors is another.²¹

Like most of the scholars, in their article “The U.S. in Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” Carlos Malamud and Carola García-Calvo claim that Brazil seeks to increase its influence in the international arena by following policies independent from the United States. They state that in the last years of the Lula da Silva administration, this desire has worsened Brazil-U.S. relations. According to them, “The coup d’etat in Honduras, military bases in Colombia, the Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s tour of Latin America and the climate talks in Copenhagen,” are some of the main issues that Brazil and the United

¹⁸ Harold Trinkunas, “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” Working paper (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2014), 2.

¹⁹ Giselle Datz and Joel Peters, “Brazil and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in the New Century: Between Ambition, Idealism, and Pragmatism,” *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 7, no.2 (2013): 43.

²⁰ Ibid., 44.

²¹ Datz and Peters, “Brazil and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in the New Century,” 45.

States could not agree on.²² Moreover, they claim that Brazil tried to find new strong allies other than the United States and improved its relations with France to have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.²³

In her study “An Overview of Brazilian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,” Monica Hirst argues that in the Lula da Silva era (2003–2011) “Brazil has become more proactive in world economic, political and security affairs, and expanded its global and regional interests and responsibilities.” Moreover, she states that Brazil has started to question the fairness of world order in general and the structure of the UN in particular in the same period.²⁴

In her work, “Brazil as an Emerging Power: The View From the United States,” Shannon O’Neal analyzes Brazil’s rise and argues that although Brazil followed U.S.-oriented policies during the 20th century, it was not seen as “serious country” by the United States. But with the election of Lula da Silva, conditions have changed and especially the economic potential of Brazil makes it an important regional and global actor in the eyes of U.S. policy makers.²⁵

Riordan Roett is another scholar who argues that the elections of Cardoso and Lula da Silva were turning points in Brazil’s history. He examines Brazil’s economic development in his book *The New Brazil* and states that although Brazil was not seen as an important actor in 1980s, it has surprised analysts and become one of the most important actors in the international system in terms of economy.²⁶ Like Roett, Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz explore Brazil’s changing role in the international

²²Carlos Malamud and Carola García-Calvo, “The U.S. in Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” Real Instituto Elcano, ARI, 1, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/a587248041a014328e919e331fca0992/ARI31-2010_Malamud_Garcia-Calvo_US_Brazil_Foreign_Policy.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=a587248041a014328e919e331fca0992

²³ Ibid., 5.

²⁴ Monica Hirst, “An Overview of Brazilian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,” *South African Institute of International Affairs*, Policy Briefing 6, Emerging Powers Programme, December 2009, 2, <http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-briefings/an-overview-of-brazilian-foreign-policy-in-the-21st-century>.

²⁵ Shannon O’Neal, “Brazil as an Emerging Power: The View From the United States,” *South African Institute of International Affairs*, Policy Briefing 16, Emerging Powers Programme, February 2010, 2.

²⁶ Riordan Roett, *The New Brazil* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 1.

economy in their book *Brazil as an Economic Superpower: Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy* and seek to analyze Brazil's success in the economy especially in the 21st century.²⁷

3. Analyses on Nuclear Deal

There is a gap in the literature that seeks to explain the significance of the deal for Turkey and Brazil. Works on the nuclear deal mainly focus on the United States' reaction and the failure of the deal. Most authors who have addressed the subject mainly state that Turkey and Brazil's desire to be major powers and that the economic and political interests of both countries inspired them to engage in the deal. However, as mentioned earlier, the literature fails to provide detailed information about the economic aspect of the deal.

Trita Parsi's book *A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran* is one of the most important studies that seek to fill the gap in literature about the Iran nuclear deal. Parsi argues that Brazil and Turkey engaged in the nuclear deal because both countries had political and economic interests. According to Parsi, Brazil saw this agreement as an opportunity to prove its power in the international arena and to show its eligibility for permanent membership on the UN Security Council. Moreover, he claims that the agreement provided an important opportunity to question the unfairness of the existing world order and to begin reforming the international structure.²⁸ Furthermore, Parsi states that Brazil engaged in the deal because it wants to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes and to avoid being subjected to the same policies by the UN.²⁹ In addition, he asserts that Brazil considered the sanctions from a humanitarian perspective and tried to protect Iran from experiencing the same fate as Iraq.³⁰

²⁷ Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, *Brazil as an Economic Superpower: Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

²⁸ Trita Parsi, *A Single Role of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), 176–177.

²⁹ Ibid., 174.

³⁰ Ibid., 175.

Parsi also argues that, like Brazil, Turkey has a desire for regional and global leadership. This desire has two dimensions. The first shows its capability of being a great power, and the second controls Iran's influence in the region as a significant regional leadership opponent.³¹ Moreover, Parsi states that Turkey engaged in the deal because it wants to protect stability in the region and easy access to energy, which are two significant necessities for maintaining its growth and increasing its economic relations with Iran.³²

Similar to Parsi, in his article "Brezilya-Turkiye Yukselen Gucler,Yukselen Ortaklar," Ariel S. Gonzalez Levaggi assesses the nuclear deal as one of the first significant signs of Brazil and Turkey's desires to be great powers and to take part in big international issues. He also states that the deal shows the limits of Turkey and Brazil's rise as global powers.³³

In his study, "United States Slams Turkey, Brazil over Iran," Robert Dreyfuss states that Turkey and Brazil behaved "like adults when the United States began behaving like a petulant child, and they achieved a diplomatic victory."³⁴

Like Dreyfuss, Patrick J. Buchanan considers the deal as a success and criticizes the reaction of the United States. In his article "Take the Deal Mr. President," he argues that Brazil and Turkey "complicated" U.S. diplomacy and says that "an Iranian bomb would force Turkey to consider a Turkish bomb." He states that Turkey wants to prevent Iran

³¹ Ibid., 181.

³² Ibid., 180.

³³ Ariel S. Gonzalez Levaggi, "Brezilya-Turkiye Yukselen Gucler,Yukselen Ortaklar,"[Brazil-Turkey Rising Powers, Emerging Partners] *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Stratejik Arastırma Merkezi*, 2013, http://www.academia.edu/4329704/Brezilya-Turkiye_Yukselen_Gucler_Yukselen_Ortaklar

³⁴ Robert Dreyfuss, "United States Slams Turkey, Brazil over Iran," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Four Views, (August 2010), 28–31; <http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/357-washington-report-archives-2006-2010/august-2010/9745-four-views-the-turkey-brazil-iran-agreement-thanks-but-no-thanks.html>.

from producing nuclear weapons and engaging in a war with its NATO ally, the United States.³⁵

According to Harold Trinkunas, in addition to “asserting its role as a major power,”³⁶ Brazil engaged in the nuclear agreement with Iran “to protect its own commercial interests vis-à-vis Iran as well as the general principle that states have a right to peaceful nuclear development.”³⁷ Moreover, he claims that Brazil’s reluctance to use hard power to solve the international issues is another factor that forced Brazil to take part in the nuclear deal.³⁸

Similar to Trinkunas, Larry Rohter considers Brazil’s desire to be a major power one of the main reasons that forced it to engage in the nuclear deal. In his book *Brazil on the Rise* he criticizes Brazil’s incompetence and defines Brazil’s nuclear deal attempt as “ill-conceived or ineptly executed” policies on the “road to greatness.”³⁹

In her most recent study, *Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, Togzhan Kassenova seeks to fill the gap in the literature about Brazil’s ideas over nuclear energy and claims that “Brazilians paint a picture of an emerging power seeking nuclear independence and searching for its role in the global order.”⁴⁰ She considers Brazil’s engagement in 2010 nuclear deal as an indicator of its potential “to be an active player in global nuclear politics.”⁴¹

In his article “Brazil and the Nuclear Issues in the Years of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva Government (2003-2010),” Carlo Patti emphasizes the significance of nuclear diplomacy and argues that it has been an important instrument for Lula Da Silva to

³⁵ Patrick J. Buchanan, “Take the Deal Mr. President,” *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Four Views, (August 2010), 28–31; <http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/357-washington-report-archives-2006-2010/august-2010/9745-four-views-the-turkey-brazil-iran-agreement-thanks-but-no-thanks.html>.

³⁶ Trinkunas, “Brazil’s Rise,” 23.

³⁷ Ibid., 24.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 226.

⁴⁰ Togzhan Kassenova, *Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014, xii.

⁴¹ Ibid.

transform Brazil into a major actor in the international arena. That is why Brazil engaged in a nuclear deal with Iran.⁴²

According to Matias Spektor, the inequity of international systems is the main factor that forced Brazil to take part in this agreement. He claims that Brazil believes that the United States is not fair in its nuclear policies because “it puts pressure on an NPT member like Iran but rewards a nonmember like India, or...turns a blind eye to Israel’s nuclear capabilities.”⁴³

From the Turkish perspective, the comments are more detailed. Aylin Gurzel and Eyup Ersoy’s article “Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Program” is one of the most important studies that examine the nuclear deal. In this article, the authors argue that the dependency on Iran in terms of energy sources, developing trade relations, the AKP government’s religious roots, the unintended consequences of possible military intervention in Iran, and Turkey’s reluctance to pick a side between the United States and Iran were the main motives that forced Turkey to engage in a nuclear deal with Iran.⁴⁴

Similar to Gurzel and Ersoy, Fatma Sariaslan emphasizes the negative effects of sanctions on Turkey and Iran’s economic relations in her study “The Economic Relations between Turkey and Iran in 2000s.” Moreover, Sariaslan assesses the role of Turkey in the nuclear deal as the consequence of new Turkish foreign policy that uses soft power as the main instrument to solve regional issues.⁴⁵

⁴² Carlo Patti, “Brazil and the Nuclear Issues in the Years of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva Government (2003-2010),” *Rev. Bras. Polít. Int.* 53, no.2 (2010):178.

⁴³ Matias Spektor, “U.S. Nuclear Accommodation of Brazil a Model for Iran Policy?” *World Politics Review*, July 3, 2013, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13067/u-s-nuclear-accommodation-of-brazil-a-model-for-iran-policy>.

⁴⁴ Aylin Gurzel and Eyup Ersoy, “Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Program,” *Middle East Policy* 19, no.1 (Spring 2012): 39–40.

⁴⁵ Fatma Sariaslan, “The Economic Relations between Turkey and Iran in 2000s,” 86–87, http://www.akademikortadogu.com/belge/ortadogu14makale/fatma_sariaslan.pdf.

Patrick Seale emphasizes Turkey's ability to use diplomacy in his article "The Consequences of Iran's Nuclear Deal," and states that if the deal succeeded, it could only consolidate "Turkey's beneficent regional role as a mediator and peace-maker."⁴⁶

Bayram Sinkaya and Ali Kemal Yildirim consider the matter from a different perspective and argue that the nuclear deal is a strong indicator of the majority of the world's demands for reforming the existing international system. Furthermore, they believe that this deal means accepting Iran's right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, which is an important step to eliminate the monopoly of nuclear technology.⁴⁷

In their work *Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook*, Mustafa and Aysegul Kibaroglu argue that although the AKP government supports the idea of using nuclear energy for peaceful goals, Turkey doesn't want Iran to have the capacity of manufacturing nuclear weapons.⁴⁸

In 2013, Iran accepted to sign a nuclear agreement with permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany. A Turkish economy professor, Hayriye Atik, examines the possible consequences of that deal for Turkey in her article "Iranin Batili Ulkelerle Imzaladigi Nukleer Anlasmanin Turkiye'ye Etkileri [The Impacts of Iran's Agreement with Western States on Turkey]." Although she writes about a different deal, this article is useful to understand the significance of the 2010 deal for Turkey. In her article, Atik argues that the 2013 nuclear deal means a lot for Turkey in terms of economic and political consequences. She states that there will be six economic effects for Turkey. First, there will be a decrease in gold and oil prices, which may decrease Turkey's current account deficit. Second, the success of the deal may have turned Turkey into an energy bridge between Iran and Europe. Third, Turkey will have the opportunity

⁴⁶ Patrick Seale, "The Consequences of Iran's Nuclear Deal," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Four Views, August 2010, 28-31, <http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/357-washington-report-archives-2006-2010/august-2010/9745-four-views-the-turkey-brazil-iran-agreement-thanks-but-no-thanks.html>.

⁴⁷ Bayram Sinkaya and Ali Kemal Yildirim, "Türkiye-Brezilya-İran Mutabakatı ve Uluslararası Sistemde Değişim Sancısı," [Turkey-Brazil-Iran Reconciliation and Change Pains in the International System] Bayram Sinkaya, <http://bsinkaya.blogspot.com/2011/09/turkiye-brezilya-iran-mutabakat-ve.html>.

⁴⁸ Mustafa Kibaroglu and Aysegul Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security, 2009, 157-158.

to increase its relationship with Iran, which was adversely affected by the sanctions. Fourth, Turkish businessmen will have the chance to construct Iran's infrastructure. Fifth, the frontier trade will revive, and sixth the foreign exchange values will decrease, which will consolidate the Turkish economy. On the other hand, she states that the deal may have both positive and negative political consequences for Turkey. Preventing Iran from being a nuclear power in the region may consolidate Turkey's position. However, the removal of the sanctions may enhance Iran's economic and political power, which may decrease Turkey's effectiveness in the region.⁴⁹

On the other hand, the world press showed great interest in the 2010 nuclear deal. Almost all of the newspapers defined this attempt as unexpected and unpredictable. Western newspapers mostly approached the deal with skepticism and emphasized the necessity for approval by the United States and the other great powers. They mostly interpreted it as a problem for Western diplomacy. In particular, American newspapers like the *Washington Post* and *The New York Times* criticized Turkey and Brazil's attempt.

Glenn Kessler and Thomas Erdbrink, from the *Washington Post* considered Turkey and Brazil's enterprise as an obstacle in the way of the United States' efforts to reach international unity on sanctions. Moreover, they argued that Brazil and Turkey see "debates over Iran's nuclear program as an important test case for their own nuclear ambitions."⁵⁰

David E. Sanger and Michael Slackman expressed American policymakers' skepticism about the deal and accuse Brazil and Turkey of trying to "derail a fragile international consensus to increase pressure on Iran," for "their own economic interests."⁵¹

⁴⁹ Hayriye Atik, "Iranin Batili Ulkelerle Imzaladigi Nukleer Anlasmanin Turkiye'ye Etkileri," [The Impacts of Iran's Agreement with Western States on Turkey] Ankara Strateji Enstitusu, <http://www.ankarastrateji.org/yazar/prof-dr-hayriye-atik/iran-in-batili-ulkelerle-imzaladigi-nukleer-anlasmanin-turkiye-ye-etkileri/>.

⁵⁰ Glenn Kessler and Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran and Turkey Reach Unexpected Accord on Enriched Uranium," *Washington Post*, May 18, 2010.

⁵¹ David E. Sanger and Michael Slackman, "U.S. Is Skeptical on Iranian Deal for Nuclear Fuel," *New York Times*, May 18, 2010.

Alberto Negri, from the Italian newspaper *Il Sole 24 Ore*, argued that Turkey and Brazil were trying to be regional powers. He stated that the desire to be a permanent member at UN Security Council motivated Brazil to take part in the nuclear deal. On the other hand, he argued that the disappointments with EU relations forced Turkey to find other fronts to be a regional power. Moreover, he considered increasing economic relations and Turkey's energy dependency on Iran as other significant factors that inspire Turkey to take part in the deal.⁵²

Like the U.S. press, Israeli newspapers approach the deal with great skepticism. They mostly emphasize the unreliability of Iran. Zvi Bar'el, from the Israel newspaper *Haaretz*, defines Turkey as “deals big winner,” and states that the deal not only will consolidate Turkey's economy but also give Turkey some other political advantages. From the deal, Turkey will gain “a new status as a mediator.” Moreover, it will not have to pick a side between Iran and great powers, a decision that would disrupt its rise as a regional leader. On the other hand, he argues that Brazil expects to benefit from the deal especially in terms of economic relations, and that it already signed “a series of trade deals that are expected to increase bilateral trade between their countries to about \$10 billion.”⁵³

The Turkish press mostly assessed the deal as a coup of diplomacy. Taha Akyol's article summarizes the Turkish point of view about the deal especially well. In his column in the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet*, he cites Ahmet Davutoglu's comments after the deal and emphasizes that Turkey engaged in this deal for its economic and political benefits.⁵⁴

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Despite all the analyses and literature about the history and evolution of Turkish and Brazilian Foreign Policies and the 2010 nuclear deal, there is a gap in the literature

⁵² Alberto Negri, “Brazil and Turkey are Trying to Become Regional Power,” *Il Sole 24 Ore*, May 18, 2010.

⁵³ Zvi Bar'el, “Why Does Iran See Turkey as an 'Honest Broker' for a Nuclear Deal?” *Haaretz*, May 18, 2010.

⁵⁴ Taha Akyol, “Diplomaside Vizyon,” [Vision in Diplomacy] *Milliyet*, May 19, 2010.

that should tie them together. This thesis will try to fill that gap by analyzing the significance of nuclear deal for Turkey and Brazil. Although the deal failed, it is important to understand the current foreign policy patterns of both states that it represents.

This thesis has three hypotheses that, taken together, explain the policy of Turkey and Brazil. First, I hypothesize that the deal is symptomatic of current foreign policy trends in Ankara and Brasilia. The second hypothesis is that the deal reflects both Turkey and Brazil's aspirations to be major powers in the new international order. Third, economic interests played an important motivating role behind the deal.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis will examine the significance of the 2010 Iran nuclear deal for Turkey and Brazil through a historical study of the evolution of both states' foreign policies. The nuclear deal shows that there is a dramatic change in the foreign policy patterns of Brazil and Turkey. To understand the conditions that pave the way for Turkey and Brazil to engage in a nuclear deal with Iran, this study will analyze the historical and current foreign policy patterns of Turkey and Brazil in the first and second chapters. For Turkey, it will mainly rely on William Hale's book *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000* and Ahmet Davutoglu's book *Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth)*. For Brazil it will mainly use Harold Trinkunas' recent article "Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance."

This study's fourth and fifth chapters will address nuclear deal's significance for Turkey and Brazil, respectively. Since the nuclear deal is relatively new for academic issues, it is hard to find compiled information. Trita Parsi's *A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran*, Togzhan Kassenova's book *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, and statistical resources will be the central sources for these chapters. Moreover, the study will mainly use newspapers and columnists' articles to fill the literature gap in this field. In addition, to show the economic significance of the deal, the study will utilize governmental documents and international organizations' reports.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

After giving general information about the deal in the introduction, Chapter II will provide the historical and current patterns in Turkish foreign policy. It will seek to figure out how Ankara has traditionally approached foreign policy. How has this approach changed since the AKP's election? How has it not?

Chapter III will provide the historical and current patterns in Brazilian foreign policy and will try to figure out how Brasilia has traditionally approached foreign policy. How did this approach change since Lula Da Silva's election? How has it not?

Chapter IV and Chapter V will analyze the ways in which the deal reflects current tendencies in Turkish and Brazilian foreign policy respectively. In what ways does the deal reflect continuities in Turkish-Brazilian foreign policies, such as the relationship with the United States and support for a global consensus. Is there any other reason that makes the deal significant for Turkey and Brazil? The final chapter will provide the summary and the conclusion of the thesis.

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II. THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

A. INTRODUCTION

Turkey has been one of the most significant states in its region and in the world as it reigned over a wide and strategically critical territory for many years, first as the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) and then as the Republic of Turkey (1923–present).⁵⁵ Since the early centuries of the last millennium, it has experienced remarkable changes in terms of its power, boundaries, and politics. Especially after the failure of Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, its foreign policy transformed from one of offense to defense. Parallel with its shrinkage in size, Turkish foreign policy's goals were also downsized. In the transition from empire to republic, Turkey experienced a change in its foreign policy status from the point of a major power to a nation-state.⁵⁶

However, with the election of the AKP government in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has signaled a return to the powerful days of Ottoman Empire. Turkey's engagement in a nuclear deal with Iran in 2010 can be considered a significant milestone in this return. The purpose of this chapter is to present the evolution of Turkish foreign policy since the last days of Ottoman Empire and highlight the fundamental changes and new trends after 2002 with the AKP government. It will seek to determine why and how contemporary Turkish foreign policy under Ahmet Davutoglu and the AKP took shape. What interests and insecurities shape how Ankara looks at foreign policy? How does engagement in the nuclear deal show continuity in Turkish foreign policy? The answers of these questions are necessary to understand the significance of the 2010 nuclear deal with Iran for Turkey.

This chapter argues that there have been many determinants in the evolution of the foreign policy of Turkey since the establishment of the republic. The Ottoman Empire legacy, Turkey's geography, Westernization, political pro-status quo, external

⁵⁵ Sedat Lacinier, *A Complete Bibliography of Turkey and Turks in English: Turkey and the World*, Vol. 1 (Istanbul: Kaknus Yayinlari, 2001), 17.

⁵⁶ George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 4th ed, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1980), 121.

developments, and the Russian threat have been most significant ones. Turkish foreign policy can be examined in terms of its continuities in three main periods: from the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire to the beginning of Cold War (1774–1946), during the Cold War (1946–1991), and after the end of the Cold War (1991–today). The first period can be divided into two parts: the last period of the Ottoman Empire (1774–1923) and the first period of the Republic of Turkey (1923–1946). During the last period of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish policy makers followed balance of power policies to prevent the collapse of the empire. The Ottoman Empire became a part of the European concert but it was not considered an equal member. Western imperialism hindered Ottoman territorial, political, and economic sovereignty. Ottoman nationalists at the end desired a fully independent state that was free of Western control and able to operate in international affairs independent of foreign influence. During the first period of Republic of Turkey, policy makers adopted a political pro-status quo, nationalist, and neutralist foreign policy principles.⁵⁷ The second main period of the evolution of Turkish foreign policy was mainly shaped by Cold War conditions. Considering its inability to act on its own, similar to most of the other states, Turkey had followed U.S.-oriented policies. In the current main period, Turkey has signaled a return to the peak of the Ottoman Empire in terms of its foreign policy. From 1991 on, it emerged as a global power, and since the election of the AKP government in 2002, it has begun to follow autonomous policies.⁵⁸ This chapter seeks to analyze the evolution of Turkish foreign policy in three main periods to show the differences in Turkish foreign policy in the 21st century that set the stage for Turkey’s engagement in the Iran-Turkey-Brazil nuclear deal in 2010.

⁵⁷ Simon V. Vayall, *Turkey: Thwarted Ambition* (Washington, DC: McNair, 1997), 39–40.

⁵⁸ Ramazan Erdag and Tuncay Kardas, “Turk Dis Politikasi Ve Stratejik Kultur,”[Turkish Foreign Policy and Strategic Culture] *Turk Dis Politikasi Yilligi*, 2012, 79, <http://www.kardas.sakarya.edu.tr/sites/kardas.sakarya.edu.tr/file/1387670250-TuncayRamazan.pdf.pdf>.

B. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE COLD WAR

1. The Ottoman Era (1774–1923)

The Ottoman Empire was at the peak of its power in the 16th and 17th centuries in the fields of military, technology, economy, and administration. However, by the early 18th century, it lagged behind all of its major contemporaries in all these respects and its future became a challenge for both its governors and the great powers of the time.⁵⁹ From that time to the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and the great powers had been mainly shaped by the “Eastern Question,” (*Şark Meselesi*).⁶⁰ The definition of the “Eastern Question,” was first used as a political term in the 1815 Congress of Vienna to define the attempts of the European States to weaken the Ottoman Empire and seize portions of its territories.⁶¹

From the early 18th century on, the balance of power remarkably changed in favor of the West.⁶² These developments relegated Ottoman Empire in to an inferior position in the world order. It became highly dependent on great powers to maintain its integrity.⁶³ From that time to the end of the Cold War in 1991, there was a balance of power in the world. Morgenthau defines this system as “an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality.”⁶⁴ Since the Ottoman Empire was no longer able to protect its integrity on its own, Ottoman policy-makers had begun to follow balance of power policies to meet the requirements of the balance of power politics. During the 18th and 19th centuries, to deal with the problem of survival in the Balkans, the Straits, Egypt, and the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire attempted to exploit the balance of power among the great powers of the time. In that

⁵⁹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000*, 13–14.

⁶⁰ A. L. Macfie, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923* (London and New York: Longman, 1996), 1.

⁶¹ Rifat Ucarol, *Siyasi Tarih: 1789–2001*, [Political History: 1774–1923] 7th ed. (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 2008), 49.

⁶² Ibid., 48–50.

⁶³ Mustafa Aydin, “Security Conceptualization in Turkey,” In *Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualizing Security and Environmental Conflicts*, 345–357. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2003.

⁶⁴ Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power History and Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 4.

period, Russia started to follow expansionist policies over Ottoman Empire. Benefiting from the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, Russia adopted the policies of seizing the northern Black Sea and controlling the Caucasus, Straits, and Balkans to fulfill its main goals in foreign relation. It used its religious identity as an instrument to realize these ambitions. Due to these policies, both states engaged in various wars against each other. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774 that ended with the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca marked the opening of new period in which foreign powers began to intervene in the internal and external affairs of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁵ Russia's increasing influence over Ottoman territories disturbed other great powers of the time that tried to solve the "Eastern Question" in favor of their interests. So, Russia's imperial policies and ethnic fragmentation brought the empire closer to Britain and France to modernize its military and administration.⁶⁶ Imperial administrators at the time attempted to put into practice a generalized policy of reform in the nineteenth century. According to this policy, the Ottoman Empire first tried to westernize the state and become part of Europe; second, it created a legal regime of equality between Muslims and Christians in order to prevent the appearance of nationalist movements among non-Muslim groups.⁶⁷ Westernization first emerged as a formal policy that started with bureaucratic reforms.⁶⁸ In time, it spread to other areas, including the military and economy. Policy makers began to see it as the only solution to the existing problems. As a result of this perception, until the second half of the 19th century, Great Britain had been the main ally of the Ottoman Empire while Russia had been the permanent enemy. From 1870s to the end of the World War I, when Germany emerged as a global power, Ottoman policy makers picked Germany as an ally. All these attempts helped the empire delay its collapse.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Ucarol, *Siyasi Tarih: 1789–2001*, 65–66.

⁶⁶ Hasan Kosebalan, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 25.

⁶⁷ Behlul Ozkan, "The Collapse of Davutoglu's Pan-Islamist Foreign Policy," *Hurriyet Daily News*, November 5, 2014.

⁶⁸ M. Sukru Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 4th ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 62–64.

⁶⁹ Cengiz Okman, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814-2003," in *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Idris Bal (Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), 5–10.

The Ottoman Empire's 622 years of permanent rule formed a legacy which had both positive and negative impacts on Turkish foreign policy. Although Mustafa Kemal Atatürk attempted to completely reject the Ottoman legacy through abolishing monarchy and founding a secular republic, the Ottoman legacy has continued to be one of the main determinants of Turkish foreign policy.⁷⁰ On the one hand, this legacy has provided Turkey a significant potential to influence a wide geography; on the other hand, it had negative impacts on Turkey's relations with all its neighbors, which harmed Turkish foreign policy.⁷¹ All of the Turkey's current neighboring countries, except for Iran, were under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire in different times, which has had a great impact on Turkey's relations with them.⁷² In the early 19th century, for instance, ethnic nationalism began to pose a serious challenge to the empire's territorial integrity. Greeks and Serbs were the pioneer groups of rebellions. Romanians, Bulgarian and Macedonian Slavs, and Armenians followed them. On the one hand, these Christian minorities accused the Turks of being responsible for killing Greeks on the islands of Chios in 1822, committing atrocities in the Bulgarian Horror by suppressing the Bulgarian rebellion of 1876, and slaughtering and deporting the majority of the Anatolian Armenians in 1915. On the other hand, Turks accused these Christian minorities of killing approximately 5 million Muslims in the Balkans, Greece, the Caucasus, and the Crimea and expelling around 5.4 million of them from their lands as a result of Russian imperialism and Balkan and Greek nationalism.⁷³ Moreover, Syria, Bulgaria, Iraq, and Greece struggled against the empire to get their independence, which made Turks an eternal enemy in the eyes of their policy-makers and societies.⁷⁴ Most of them have designed since their history

⁷⁰ Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 15.

⁷¹ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy," 164.

⁷² Mesut Özcan, *Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2008), 81.

⁷³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000*, 16.

⁷⁴ İdris Bal, *Değişen Dünyada Uluslararası İlişkiler* [International Relations in Changing World] (Istanbul: Lalezar kitabevi, 2006), 652.

education systems on the basis of anti-Ottoman-Turkish trend. For instance, Georgia,⁷⁵ Armenia,⁷⁶ Syria,⁷⁷ Greece,⁷⁸ and Bulgaria⁷⁹ all depict Turks as a brutal people and accuse Turkey of being the source of most of their historical problems in their history books.⁸⁰ These perceptions isolated Turkey from its region and set the stage for passive and defensive policies until the end of the 20th century.

2. The First Period of the Republic of Turkey (1923–1946)

“Peace in the country, peace in the world.”⁸¹ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s famous saying reflects the essence of Turkish foreign policy during the 20th century. The Turkish Republic was established in 1923 on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his friends attempted to found a new nation on the basis of completely different principles from the empire.⁸² Turkey experienced a fundamental transformation and became a small nation-state devoted to the existing status quo and which was no longer following expansionist policies.⁸³ Despite the rise of contemporary totalitarian regimes such as the Nazis and the Soviet Union, which refused Western values, Turkey attempted to be part of West and adopted westernization as “an ideal worth struggling

⁷⁵ Arif Akpınar, “Gurcu Ders Kitaplarında Turk Dusmanligi,” [Turkish Hostility in Georgian Textbooks] *Haber7com*, December 13, 2010, <http://www.haber7.com/yazarlar/arif-akpinar/661453-gurcu-ders-kitaplarinda-turk-dusmanligi>.

⁷⁶ Salih Yılmaz, “Ermenistan Cumhuriyetinde Okutulan 10. Sınıf Tarih Ders Kitabında Turkler Aleyhine Ifadeler Ve Sozde Ermeni Soykırımı,” [Hostile Phrases in History Books Taught in the Republic of Armenia and So-called Armenian Genocide] *Turk Dunyasi Arastirmalari*, 177 (2008): 111–130.

⁷⁷ Yasin Atıloglu, “Suriyede Turk Imaji,” [Turkish Image in Syria] Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies, September 17, 2010, http://tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/1317/suriyede_turk_imaji.

⁷⁸ Taki Berberakis, “Okul Kitabında Turkler Yine Dusman Oldu,” [Turks are Still Enemies in School Textbooks] *Milliyet*, April 26, 2012.

⁷⁹ İsa Tak, “1980–1990 Yılları Arasında Bulgaristan’da İlköğretim ve Ortaöğretim Kurumlarında Okutulan Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Turk ve Osmanlı Algısı,” [Turkish and Ottoman Perception in the Primary and Secondary Schools’ History Textbooks in Bulgaria Between the Years 1980-1990] *Uluslararası Turk Eğitim Bilimleri Dergisi* 2, no. 2 (2014): 67–100.

⁸⁰ Bal, *Değişen Dünyada Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 650–660.

⁸¹ “Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 13, 2014, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mustafa-kemal-ataturk.en.mfa>.

⁸² Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, 13–14.

⁸³ Aydın, “Security Conceptualization in Turkey,” 346–347.

for.”⁸⁴ During this period, it adopted pro-status quo, nationalist, and neutralist foreign policy principles at the expense of the territorial ambitions that Atatürk originally harbored for his newly established country. From that time to the end of the 20th century, maintenance of the status quo had been one of the main principles of Turkish foreign policy.⁸⁵ In the aftermath of the First World War and due to Turkey’s “weak, exhausted, under-resourced, and distrusted,”⁸⁶ condition, Atatürk tried to protect the state through four main principles: “declared renunciation of aggressive, expansionist intent; the strongest possible defense of territorial integrity; international acceptance, particularly by the West; and regional security arrangements.”⁸⁷

In this era, Turkey continued to preserve its existence through peaceful attempts. To prepare suitable conditions for quick transformation at home, Turkey sought to solve external problems through diplomacy.⁸⁸ The power vacuum in the continent that was formed by the decline of Great Britain and the European States’ discontent of seeing the re-emergence of a new Turkish state as a power in the region set the stage for alignment with the USSR, which was very brief, in the first half of 1920s. During that era, both Turkey and the USSR were excluded from the international system and were suffering from problems of fundamental transformation. They signed the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality in 1925. On the other hand, in 1926, Turkey reached an agreement with Britain over the Mosul and Kirkuk oil fields. Moreover, to improve relations with Greece, Turkey signed a Greek-Turco treaty in 1930 that would maintain Turkey-Greek relations “correct, if not warm, until 1960s.”⁸⁹ In addition, to achieve the goal of international acceptance within a legal frame-work and to put an end to isolation, Turkey entered the League of Nations in 1932. It also settled a Balkan Pact in 1934 to provide regional

⁸⁴ Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 114.

⁸⁵ Talha Kose, “Turk Dis Politikasinin Ortadogudaki Yeni Kimligi Ve Catisma Cozumlerini Kesfi,” [New Identity of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East and Discovery of Conflict Resolution] *Turk Dis Politikasi Yilligi*, 2010, 624–25.

⁸⁶ Vayall, *Turkey: Thwarted Ambition*, 39.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 39–40.

⁸⁸ Okman, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814–2003,” 14.

⁸⁹ Vayall, *Turkey: Thwarted Ambition*, 39–40.

stability, and the Saadabad Pact in 1937 to arrange relations with allied states in the East.⁹⁰

When Ataturk was on deathbed in 1938, he said to his followers that “A world war is near. In the course of this war international equilibrium will be entirely destroyed. If during this period, we act unwisely, and make the smallest mistake, we will be faced with an even graver catastrophe than in the Armistice years.”⁹¹ Considering Ataturk’s warnings, Turkey continued to follow passive and neutral foreign policies after the death of Ataturk. In 1939, it signed a non-aggression agreement with France that gave the Republic of Hatay to Turkey. This attempt brought Turkey closer to Allied powers, because the Hatay issue was the last remaining grievance of Turkey against the West and it was eliminated through this pact. In the same period, the USSR and Nazi Germany concluded a non-aggression pact, known as Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that strained the relations between Turkey and the USSR. The world was again at the brink of a world war. Despite Turkey’s peaceful efforts to protect the status quo, such as sending its foreign minister Sukru Saracoglu to Moscow, the USSR’s unfriendly intentions over Turkey’s territory and resentment against Turkey’s increasing relations with the West left Turkey’s efforts fruitless. During the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy was based on the principle of protecting its boundaries from occupation by totalitarian powers. Turkey was afraid of offending both sides, so it tried to follow an “active neutrality policy” during the war.⁹² G. L. Clutton, Official of Foreign Office during the Second World War, defines Turkey’s active neutrality as:

An active neutral has a foot in both camps. It is permissible for him to have an alliance with one of the belligerents so long as he has a pact of friendship with the other. This policy enables the country to preserve its neutrality, but at the same time gives an opportunity for cashing in on the side of whichever belligerent wins the war. It also enables the neutral power to preserve its preference for one belligerent or the other. There is something Ghandiesque and positively immoral in this policy, but it is, I

⁹⁰Ibid., 41.

⁹¹ Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An “Active Neutrality”* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1–3.

⁹² Ibid.

fear, typically Turkish and its astuteness and cleverness cannot be denied.⁹³

As a requirement for this policy during the Second World War, Turkey's only move was closing the Straits in 1939 to foreign warships in line with the Montreux Convention. However, the entrance of the United States into the war and successful Allied diplomacy convinced Turkey to enter the war in February 1945 in a symbolic manner. Actually, Turkey attended the war to take part in the United Nations Conference at San Francisco.⁹⁴

C. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR (1946–1991)

The Second World War ended up with the defeat of Axis powers which set the stage for a new struggle between the world's two global powers: the United States and the Soviet Union. While the former was supporting the values of democracy and capitalism, the latter had a Marxist-Leninist ideology, which claimed to dispense justice all over the world. In a very short period of time, international order turned into a bipolar system and both states' rivalry jumped in to various territories including Turkey. Until the 1920s, the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity was under threat from Russia and this threat was eliminated temporarily by signing of Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality in 1925.⁹⁵ However, the transformation of the international system after the Second World War caused "the rise of old eastern question from its grave," for Turkey.⁹⁶ With the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union had again begun to follow expansionist policies. It abolished the Treaty of Friendship in 1945⁹⁷ and started to demand military bases in the Bosphorus and Dardenelles Straits and some territories from Turkey.⁹⁸ As it was not capable of defending itself on its own, and it had no other choice

⁹³ Gul Inanc, "The Politics of 'Active Neutrality' on the Eve of a New World Order: The Case of Turkish Chrome Sales during the Second World War," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42, no. 6 (2006): 907.

⁹⁴ Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 126–135.

⁹⁵ Vayall, *Turkey: Thwarted Ambition*, 41.

⁹⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000*, 109.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 111.

⁹⁸ Remzi Oner Ozkan, "Stalin Bizzat Türkiye'den Toprak İstemiş!" [Stalin Wanted Territory from Turkey Personally] *Milliyet*, December 1, 2007, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/12/01/son/sontur07.asp>.

(such as remaining neutral), the re-emergence of Russian threat forced Turkey to give up balance of power policies and take part in the Western camp.⁹⁹ Being the Soviet Union's neighbor and controlling the straits that were only ways for Soviet Union to reach the Mediterranean Sea made Turkey a significant ally for the United States to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁰ Since there was no other power in the region to oppose the Soviet's progress, the United States attempted to strengthen Turkey and Greece in economic and military fields thorough the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan between 1948 and 1951. These developments brought Turkey closer to the West.¹⁰¹ This change was more visible in Turkey's position in Arab-Israel relations. While Turkey supported the idea of establishing an independent Arab state in the region, after it received aid from the United States, it officially recognized Israel as a state in 1949.¹⁰² Turkey's shift in this policy set the stage for deterioration in its relations with Arab states in the region.¹⁰³ In addition to domestic developments, such as an economic downturn and the extensive discontent of society about the one-party regime, the need to convince the West about the power of democracy in Turkey urged the country to make the transition to a multi-party system in 1946. The Democrat Party was established by former members of the Republican People's Party (CHP), Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar and seized the power in 1950 after a democratic election. Similar to previous rulers, they preferred to act together with the West and they adopted American-oriented foreign and economic policies.¹⁰⁴ The Democrat Party's foreign policy principles were declared in official government programs, which obviously prioritized the relations with the United States and West.¹⁰⁵ During the first days of the DP government, the Korean War erupted,

⁹⁹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, 109–110.

¹⁰⁰ Haluk Ulman, "TDP'ye Yön Veren Etkenler (1923–1968)," [Factors that Shape Turkish Foreign Policy] *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* CXXIII, no. 3 (1968): 256.

¹⁰¹ Okman, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814–2003," 17.

¹⁰² Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, [1950s in the Turkish Foreign Policy] (Turkey: METU Press, 2001), 9.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000*, 111.

¹⁰⁵ Adnan Menderes, "IV. Menderes Hükümeti Programı," [Fourth Menderes' Government Program] Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, November 9, 2014, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP22.htm>.

and to attend NATO meetings and to strengthen Turkey's position in the West, the Menderes government agreed to send Turkish troops to Korea to fight against socialist North Korea.¹⁰⁶ In 1952, Turkey attended NATO as an important element, but one that was subservient to U.S. policy interests. From that time on, Turkey's alliance with the United States continued until the 1990s without any serious problems except for the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson's letter¹⁰⁷ regarding the Cyprus issue in 1964, and opium disagreement and the Cyprus invasion in 1970s.¹⁰⁸ Turkey signed an agreement with the United States to deploy mid-range Jupiter missiles in Izmir against the Soviet Union and make them operational in 1962.¹⁰⁹ Fearing the Soviet response, the United States asked Turkey to cancel the deployment of these missiles in 1961 and 1962, but Turkey refused this demand due to security concerns.¹¹⁰ In response, the USSR placed nuclear missiles in Cuba and the world came to the brink of a nuclear war in 1962.¹¹¹ In 1964, when the Rum side of Cyprus increased its pressure over Turkish Cypriots, Turkish government decided to conduct a military operation to the island that contradicted U.S. regional interests. President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote a letter, known as Johnson's letter, to Ismet Inonu in which he harshly warned Turkey not to act on its own. This letter discouraged Turkey from intervening militarily in Cyprus.¹¹² During the 1960s, Turkey was one of the main producers of opium and Western states began to accuse it of illegal opium traffic.¹¹³ In that period, the United States wanted Turkey to destroy its opium fields but Turkey refused to do this until 1971 because opium production was necessary for many Turkish citizens to earn their keep.¹¹⁴ However, the

¹⁰⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000*, 114.

¹⁰⁷ For the complete texts see, *Middle East Journal* 20 (Summer 1966), 386–393.

¹⁰⁸ Okman, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814–2003," 18.

¹⁰⁹ Aysegul Sever, "Yeni Bulgular Isiginda 1962 Kuba Krizi Ve Turkiye," [1962 Cuban Crisis and Turkey in the Light of New Findings] Ankara Universitesi, October 16, 2014, 651, <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/42/480/5596.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Taha Akyol, "Johnson Mektubu," [Johnson Letter] *Milliyet*, April 29, 2002.

¹¹³ "Türk Morfini 'yok' Satıyor," [Turkish Morphine is Sold in Great Quantities] *Aksiyon*, 2001. http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/dosyalar/turk-morfini-yok-satiyor_508245.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

United States succeeded in convincing Turkey after a regime change in 1971.¹¹⁵ In 1974, Cyprus experienced a military coup which threatened the existence of Turkish Cypriots. In response, Turkey, on its own, invaded the island on July, 20, 1974, to protect them.¹¹⁶ Due to this intervention, the United States imposed sanctions on Turkey from 1974 to 1978.¹¹⁷ Although the Soviet threat relatively decreased after Stalin's death in 1953, Turkey continued to follow U.S.-oriented policies.¹¹⁸ The DP government was overthrown with a military coup in 1960 that opened the era of military coups. From 1960s to the end of the Cold War, Turkey experienced three military interventions in its government on May 27, 1960, on March 12, 1971, and on September 12, 1980. Although these military coups were considered the main reason for democratic retrogression, they did not have a great impact in the direction of foreign policy for the leaders of all three military coups identified themselves with the Western world through their statements. For instance, after the 1960 coup, the National Unity Committee emphasized the importance of relations with the United States and Turkey's membership in NATO and CENTO in its announcement.¹¹⁹ Moreover, although the United States failed to convince the Justice Party (AP), which led the government between 1965 and 1971, not to increase its economic relations with the Soviet Union and to destroy Turkey's opium production, the United States reached its goal through the new government established after the March 12 memorandum in 1971.¹²⁰ Similar to 1960, on September 12, the leader of the coup Kenan Evren declared that Turkey was going to be faithful in all previous agreements, including NATO.¹²¹ Although, in general, military governments maintained good

¹¹⁵ Fahir Armaoglu, *20nci Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi*, [Political History of 20th Century] (Istanbul: Alkim Yayınevi, 2007), 824.

¹¹⁶ Kaan Kavusan, "Kıbrıs'ın Kaderini Değiştiren Harekât" [The Operation that Changed the Fate of Cyprus] *Aksam*, July 19, 2014,

¹¹⁷ "Türkiye - ABD İlişkilerinde KKTC'nin Rolü Ve Annan Planı," [Cyprus' Role in Turkey-U.S. Relations and the Annan Plan] TASAM, June 21, 2011, http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/2339/turkiye_-_abd_iliskilerinde_kktcnin_rolu_ve_annan_plani.

¹¹⁸ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, 121.

¹¹⁹ Ahmet Demirel, "Darbelerin İlk Halkası: 27 Mayıs," [The First Ring of Military Coups: May 27] *Taraf*, December 8, 2013.

¹²⁰ Armaoglu, *20nci Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi*, 824.

¹²¹ Faruk Arslan, "Yorumsuz 12 Eylül Belgeleri," [September 12 Documents without Comments] Faruk Arslan, 26, <http://www.farukarslan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/evren-80-12eylul.pdf>.

relations with the United States, Turkey had been politically and economically isolated from both East and West in their era.¹²²

D. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR (1991–TODAY)

The post-Cold War period can be divided into two parts: 1991–2002 and 2002–today.

1. Turkish Foreign Policy from 1991 to 2002

Turkey saw the end of the Cold War under the presidency of Tugut Ozal, who had a significant place in Turkish politics, first as prime minister from 1983 to 1989, then as president from 1989 to 1993.¹²³ Under his leadership, Turkish foreign policy experienced a fundamental transformation in terms of its goals.¹²⁴ Similar to previous governments of Turkey, he prioritized relations with the West. Turkey applied to be a member of the European Economic Community (EEC) during his era.¹²⁵ However, unlike previous leaders, he believed that Turkey should more like the Ottoman Empire and he increased foreign policy goals to the global level. He tried to give up the status quo perception¹²⁶ and attempted to expand Turkey's influence from the "Adriatic to the Great Chinese Wall," particularly through economic enterprises.¹²⁷ To reach these goals, he sought to reconcile eastern and western cultures and to use Turkey's relations with the United States, the Islamic World, and Central Asia as a tool.¹²⁸ For instance, he had good relations with the United States due to his free-market economy perspective and assistance on U.S. policies in the Middle East, Caucasasia, and Central Asia. Benefiting

¹²² Sedat Laciner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, January 1, 2009, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-ozalism.html>.

¹²³ Berdal Aral, "Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the Özal Decade, 1983–93," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 1 (2001): 72.

¹²⁴ Laciner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism."

¹²⁵ Aral, "Dispensing with Tradition?" 72–85.

¹²⁶ Baskin Oran, "Türk Dis Politikasi: Temel İlkeleri Ve Soguk Savas Ertesindeki Durumu Uzerine Notlar," [Turkish Foreign Policy: Basic Principles and Notes on Its Situation after the Cold War] *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 51, no. 1 (1996): 355.

¹²⁷ Aral, "Dispensing with Tradition?" 76.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

from the United States' Iraq policies, he envisaged how to get the former Ottoman territories of Mosul and Kirkuk back.¹²⁹ To take part in the new order more effectively and to show the change in its foreign policy perspective under Ozal's leadership, Turkey attempted to increase its relations with Turkic states in Central Asia and to engage in Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro issues. It opened 12 new embassies in Turkic states and other countries and granted many scholarships to the students from these states. Moreover, Turkey promised financial assistance to these states and Bosnia and supported them in the international arena. All these attempts helped Turkey to diversify its international relations and gain its self-confidence back in the international arena.¹³⁰ However, Ozal's unprecedented death in 1993 caused a delay in realizing Turkey's ambitions of being global player.¹³¹ After Ozal's death, Turkey's effort to be a part of the West through the European Union continued. However, due to some domestic problems, such as weak coalitions, Turkey's progress was limited with its entrance to the custom union in 1996.¹³²

2. The AKP Era (2002–today)

The election of the AKP government has been a turning point in Turkish foreign policy. During that era, Turkey has eliminated most of the limitations on its foreign policy that forced it to be passive and reactive in its relations with the world. The growing awareness and pride in its Ottoman past and the increasing economic/political significance of Turkey played an important role in this transformation. Ahmet Davutoglu, former foreign minister and current prime minister of Turkey, has been the architect of this change. Under his guidance, Turkey has revised its foreign policy goals and aimed at regional and global leadership. It has attempted to establish a *Pax Ottomana*¹³³ on the

¹²⁹ Ibid. 79.

¹³⁰ Oran, "Turk Dis Politikasi: Temel İlkeleri Ve Soguk Savas Ertesindeki Durumu Uzerine Notlar," 355–356.

¹³¹ Laciner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism."

¹³² For more information about Custom Union see, "Gumruk Birliği." Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, <http://www.ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=46234&l=1>.

¹³³ *Pax Ottomana* is a Latin term which was used by Bernard Lewis to define social and economic stability under Ottoman rule. It means "Ottoman Peace," Hasan Celal Guzel, "'Pax Ottomana'dan'Pax Turcica'ya," *Radikal*, November 15, 2007, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=238852>.

legacy of Ottoman Empire.¹³⁴ It has mostly eliminated the negative aspects of historical legacies, such as deep-rooted enmities with its neighbors that isolated it from the world and forced it to be passive and reactive in its foreign policy. It has begun to use the significant potential of Ottoman influence over a wide geographic area. Moreover, Turkey has turned the problematic nature of its region and geography into an opportunity by playing key roles in solving problems. On the other hand, while Turkey had adopted passive, reaction-based foreign policies until the late 20th century, it left pro-status quo policies and has started to follow more independent and active ones in the 21st century.¹³⁵ Furthermore, Turkey has started to take advantage of developments in the international order and diversified its relations with other parts of the world.

After the election of the AKP government, the Ottoman legacy has no longer been a problem for Turkey. Instead, Turkey has started to take advantage of it. Ahmet Davutoglu's "Policy of Zero Problems," which is an active interpretation of Atatürk's "Peace at home peace in the world," perception, played the key role in this change. This policy is based on the principles of "security for all," "political dialogue," "economic interdependence," "cultural harmony," and "mutual respect."¹³⁶ Turkey tries to achieve these goals through High Level Cooperation Councils, visa exemptions and free trade agreements.¹³⁷ As of June 2014, Turkey has canceled visas with 72 countries.¹³⁸ It has attempted to prepare a suitable environment for its development in social, political, and economic fields by solving its problems with neighboring countries through this new vision.¹³⁹ In addition to these efforts, Turkey has sought to solve historical enmity problems with its neighbors that date back to Ottoman Empire era and isolate it from the

¹³⁴ Baskin Oran, "Davutoglu Davutoglu'na Karsi," [Davutoglu versus Davutoglu] *Radikal*, October 31, 2014.

¹³⁵ Davut Ates, "2002–2008 Döneminde Türkiye'nin Güç Arayışı," [Turkey's Quest for Power between 2002 and 2008] *Uluslararası Hukuk Ve Politika* 5, no. 17 (2009): 23.

¹³⁶ "Questions," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 11, 2014, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/questions.en.mfa>.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ TC Basbakanlik Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü, "Türk Vatandaşları 72 ülkeye Vizesiz Seyahat Ediyor," [Turkish Citizens Travel to 72 Countries without Visa] June 2, 2014.

¹³⁹ "Questions," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

world. In 2008, for instance, Turkey and some countries in its region have begun to revise history books that used to have unfriendly statements about each other. The attempt to rewrite 400 years of shared history of the Ottoman Empire has been led by the Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA), an Istanbul-based organization. The first application has started with Syria and will continue with 21 other Arab countries.¹⁴⁰ Similar to these attempts, as a requirement of this “policy of zero problems,” Turkey tried to normalize its relations with Armenia. Due to the experiences of First World War, both states accused each other of carrying out genocide and did not accept to come to the table to improve their relations. However, in the AKP era, both countries’ presidents visited each other and watched their national teams’ soccer games in the stadium together.¹⁴¹ Considering the level of previous relations, these events can be seen as quantum leaps.

As a requirement for “Problems of Zero Policy,” Turkey has increased its relations with Russia and put an end to seeing Russia as a permanent threat. Peace and cooperation periods had been very short during 500 years of historical relations between Turkey and Russia.¹⁴² Until the end of the Cold War in 1991, Russia had been a serious problem for Turkey, due its expansionist policies that posed a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. Especially during the Cold War, this threat perception had played a significant role in the formation of Turkish foreign policy and brought Turkey closer to the West. This rapprochement compelled Turkey to be highly dependent on the West in its foreign relations. With the end of the Cold War the relations between Russia and Turkey have started to increase and after the election of the AKP in 2002, they reached a

¹⁴⁰ “22 Arap ülkesi Tarih Kitaplarını Yeniden Yazıyor, İlk Uygulama Suriye’de,” [22 Arabian States Rewrite Their History Books, Syria Will Be the First] *Zaman*, January 3, 2008, http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_22-arap-ulkesi-tarih-kitaplarini-yeniden-yaziyor-ilk-uygulama-suriyede_632382.html.

¹⁴¹ “Cumhurbaşkanı Gül Ermenistan’ı Ziyaret Etti,” [President Gul Visited Armenia] *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı*, September 6, 2008, <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/47535/cumhurbaskani-gul-ermenistani-ziyaret-etti.html>.

¹⁴² Erhan Buyukakinci, “Soğuk Savastan Gunumuze Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri,” [Turkey-Russia Relations from the Cold War to Today] *Academia*, October 13, 2014, https://www.academia.edu/2104741/Soğuk_Savaştan_Günümüze_Türkiye-Rusya_İlişkileri.

peak, particularly in the economic field. As of 2013, Russia has become Turkey's top trading partner in imports.¹⁴³

Turkey is located among four main problematic regions of the world: Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, and Persian Gulf. Moreover, due to its bridge position, it was stuck between East and West and it experienced an identity problem. However, since the election of the AKP government Turkey has turned its geography and identity into opportunity by being active in the field of mediation. It has been the eyes and ears of the great powers, particularly the United States, in the region, which has strengthened its strategic-ally position. Turkey has carried out effective mediation initiatives and played important roles in many peace agreements such as those in Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Iran.¹⁴⁴

Until the 21st century, Turkish foreign policy was based on the status quo, which made Turkey passive and reactionary in its foreign relations. During the 20th century, Turkey was not very interested in international issues unless they posed direct threat to its position. However, in the 21st century, Turkish policy-makers have begun to follow multi-dimensional and pre-emptive policies which mean that "Turkey steers developments by taking initiatives rather than merely watching them unfold and determine a stance accordingly."¹⁴⁵

Since the early 18th century, Turkey was highly dependent on great powers of the time and it had to follow a balance of power policy to maintain its existence. It was not completely autonomous in its foreign relations. Especially, since the second half of the 20th century, it followed U.S.-oriented foreign policies. However, with the new foreign policy vision of Davutoglu, it has begun to make decisions that serve its interests regardless of the reactions of great powers. Its opposition to the usage of its territories

¹⁴³ "List of Supplying Markets for the Product Imported by Turkey in 2013," Trade Map, August 8, 2014, http://www.trademap.org/Country_SelProductCountry.aspx.

¹⁴⁴ "Questions," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁴⁵ "Policy of Zero Problems with Our Neighbors," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 11, 2014, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa>.

during the Second Iraq War by the United States, known as the March One Permit,¹⁴⁶ and disallowance of the U.S. Navy's entrance to the Black Sea during the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 were two main examples of this new policy.¹⁴⁷ After the election of the AKP government, Turkey has revised its Westernization perspective. In this era, while it has continued to attempt to reach the democracy standards of the West through policies of compliance with the laws of the European Union, its foreign relations have no longer been limited with West. It has discovered other parts of the world and increased its relations with them in all fields, particularly the economic field. According to 2013 data, for instance, Russia and China ranked as the top two trading partners of Turkey.¹⁴⁸

E. CONCLUSION

In summary, Turkish foreign policy can be examined in three different periods in terms of its continuities: the period between the beginning of decline of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the Cold War (1774–1946), during the Cold War (1946–1991), and after the end of the Cold War (1991–today). The first period can be divided into two eras: the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire (1774–1923) and the first years of the Republic of Turkey (1923–1946). During the last centuries of the empire, Ottoman foreign policy makers followed balance of power policies to protect the integrity of empire. In the first years of the Republic of Turkey, Turkish foreign policy was passive and reactionary. It aimed to preserve the status quo, because Turkish foreign policy-makers of the time considered this as the only way to protect the formation and independence of a new state. In this era, due to a lack of power, Turkey also had to follow the balance of power policies. During the Cold War era, Turkish foreign policy became highly dependent on the United States and Western states. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, Turkish foreign policy entered a new era. The collapse of the Soviet Union provided new opportunities for Turkey. Turkish foreign policy makers, under the

¹⁴⁶ "Gul'den 1 Mart Tezkeresi Itirafi" [Marc 1 Permission Confession from Gul] *CNN Turk*, November 11, 2010.

¹⁴⁷ Ergin Saygun, "Amerikan Gemisini Karadenize Sokmadik," [We Didn't Let the U.S. Ship Enter the Black Sea] *Aydinlik*, September 27, 2012.

¹⁴⁸ "List of Supplying Markets for the Product Imported by Turkey in 2013," Trade Map.

leadership of Turgut Ozal, started to question former policies that were based on the status quo. However, Turkey failed to use this opportunity to take a significant part in the new world order that was created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Weak coalition governments and other domestic problems played a significant role in this failure. With the election of the AKP in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has entered a new era in which Turkey attempts to be a regional and global player. In this era, Turkey has eliminated most of the limitations that forced it to be passive and reactionary. It put into effect the “Problems of Zero Policy,” and increased its relations with neighboring countries, including Armenia, Russia, and Syria, all of which had a permanent hostility against Turkey due to the Ottoman legacy. In addition, while in the past Russia was considered a serious threat that had been a significant determinant in the formation of Turkish foreign policy during the 20th century, with the new vision in foreign policy Russia has become an important economic partner. Moreover, Turkey has started to take advantage of its geographic position by engaging in regional issues as a strategic partner of great powers, particularly the United States. In addition, it has stopped having Western-oriented foreign policies and diversified its international partners. Furthermore, it gave up status quo-based foreign policies and has started to follow active ones that best serve its interests. In addition, while Turkey was highly dependent on great powers in its foreign relations and it had to follow the balance of power policies to maintain its existence, in the 21st century it has started to follow autonomous policies regardless of the reactions of great powers. Again in this period, Turkey has diversified its foreign relations, which were limited to the West during the 20th century, and increased its relations with other parts of the world, such as China, through economic enterprises.

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III. BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY

A. INTRODUCTION

As the world's seventh-largest economy, the fourth-largest democracy by over 200 million people, and "a country of continental size," the position of Brazil in the international order has been a controversial topic in the field of international relations and history in the last 150 years.¹⁴⁹ It has made quantum leaps in both the domestic and foreign arenas in the 21st century, such as its remarkable economic development, its participation in the G-20 group of Economy and Finance Ministers, signing of the nuclear deal with Iran, and hosting the 2014 World Cup in soccer and the 2016 Summer Olympics. These all put Brazil in the international spotlight and spurred the debates over its international status again. Although there have been various types of comments about its position in the international system, most of the scholars agree on one point: Brazil constantly "punches under its weight."¹⁵⁰ A detailed explanation of the reasons for the huge difference between Brazil's potential and its international status is beyond the scope of this study.

Instead, to understand Brazil's role in 2010 nuclear deal with Iran, this chapter examines why and how contemporary Brazilian foreign policy has taken shape over time and what interests and insecurity have influenced how Brasilia looks at foreign policy. It divides the history of Brazil's foreign policy into three main phases—before, during, and after the Cold War—and seeks to show how Brazil has adjusted itself to new conditions to develop economically, while also maintaining its adherence to historical legacies of its respect of world peace, sovereignty, disarmament, non-intervention and the resolution of disputes through diplomacy.

Since the early 19th century, Brazil has followed pacifist, legalist, and pragmatic foreign policies.¹⁵¹ From that time on, economic interests have been the main

¹⁴⁹ Alfred P. Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune* (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2014), 1–2.

¹⁵⁰ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed*, 225.

¹⁵¹ Carlos Vidigal, "Brazil: A Cordial Power? Brazilian Diplomacy in the Early 21st Century," *RECIIS* 4, no. 1 (March 2010): 35.

determinant in its foreign relations irrespective of regime types. In other words, regardless of whether they have been monarchists or republicans, democrat or dictator, nationalists or liberals, all of the decision makers attempted to use foreign policy as an instrument to assist the national development of country. The disagreements have only emerged about the models of development. Throughout this period, policy makers have been mainly divided into two groups in terms of their development perception. One group has advocated a dependent development model which requires international support, while the other has been in favor of an independent development model based on national sources.¹⁵² Since its independence, Brazil has not been a self-sufficient state and has not possessed adequate economic and military capabilities to shape international order on its own.¹⁵³ Moreover, it has not been eager to assume the costs of being a rule maker.¹⁵⁴ Considering all these facts, Brazilian decision makers have preferred to adjust their foreign policies to new conditions in ways that serve Brazil's best economic interests.¹⁵⁵ Brazil's changing tactics to increase its status in the international system in the last century was comprised of its attempts to benefit from emerging opportunities which were created by great powers competitions.¹⁵⁶ Given that Western states have been hegemons in the last 150 years, Brazil has mainly followed Western-oriented, particularly U.S.-oriented, foreign policies. Although, it has been mostly believed that Brazil has had a strong desire to be included among these great powers, its historical track in foreign relations and most of its governors' understanding of rise, which was only economic, proved that Brazil did not attach that much importance to "take up a place at the top table," unless it was necessary for the country's economic development.¹⁵⁷ Were Brazil

¹⁵² Amado Luiz Cervo, "Political Regimes and Brazil's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy and Political Regime*, ed. by Jose Flavio Sombra Saraiva (Brasilia: Instituto Brasileiro de Relacoes Internacionais, 2003), 353–54.

¹⁵³ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 152.

¹⁵⁴ Trinkunas, "Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance," 22.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 10–11.

¹⁵⁷ Mark S. Langevin, "A Brazil Works Review of Harold Trinkunas' 'Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance'," Brazil Works Analysis and Advisory, August 29, 2014, <http://brazil-works.com/?tag=harold-trinkunas>.

to have the economic capabilities of Canada, for instance, we would not speak about its efforts to become a major power.

Brazil's historical legacy of sovereignty, disarmament, non-intervention, and the resolution of disputes through diplomacy, has been the chief factor in determining its approaches to international issues since its independence.¹⁵⁸ Amado Luiz Cervo extends this list slightly and defines the foundations that have shaped historical Brazilian foreign policy as: "a) self-determination, non-intervention and peaceful solution of controversies; b) legalism; c) normative multilateralism; d) cooperative and non-confrontational external action; e) strategic partnerships; f) realism and pragmatism; g) official cordiality in the treatment of neighbors; h) development as a direction; i) independence of international insertion."¹⁵⁹ These "universalistic, cooperative, and pacifistic," characteristics of Brazilian diplomacy have been constant irrespective of regime and government types with some small exceptions, such as frictions with Argentina regarding Peron's interventionist policies in the late 1940s and the River Plate Basin disagreement in the late 1970s.¹⁶⁰

Brazil has historically used diplomacy for three main functions: "securing territorial sovereignty, delimiting boundaries, and development."¹⁶¹ After ensuring its regional security and solving border problems in the early years of the 20th century, Brazil started to use diplomacy as a means for development. The 1930 revolution was a breaking point in this transition. The revolution also marked the beginning of the idea of nationalism, which became popular again in the 1950s and 1960s. According to nationalism, Brazil should be autonomous in both domestic and foreign policies and the main purpose of governments should be "to identify, on the international stage, which foreign resources may be mobilized to meet the internal development imperative."¹⁶² Being autonomous here refers to "a foreign policy free from constraints imposed by

¹⁵⁸ E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 9 no. 2 (April 1967), 195.

¹⁵⁹ Vidigal, "Brazil: A Cordial Power?" 35.

¹⁶⁰ Cervo, "Political Regimes and Brazil's Foreign Policy," 344.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 346.

¹⁶² Vidigal, "Brazil: A Cordial Power?" 36.

powerful countries.”¹⁶³ Brazil has continued to seek autonomy in three ways from that time on: autonomy by distance, autonomy by participation, and autonomy by diversification. Their definitions will be given in detail in the relevant sections.¹⁶⁴

B. BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE COLD WAR

1. The First or Old Republic (1889–1930)

This period can be defined as the era of the “consolidation of national space,” and the foundation of the basic guidelines of Brazil’s contemporary foreign policy.¹⁶⁵ Brazil experienced a regime change in 1889 that resulted in an axis shift in its foreign policy. Until the establishment of the first republic in this year, Europe was the dominant power in both the domestic and foreign policies of Brazil. The European capitalist states were very effective in the region, especially between 1808, in which the Portuguese Court moved to Rio de Janeiro, and 1844, in which trade treaties with Britain expired. Between those years, Brazil had to sign around twenty one-sided agreements that only served European interests. These treaties not only helped the European states enforce their interests and the rules of their international society in the region, but they also made Brazil highly dependent on European states in its foreign policy.¹⁶⁶ However, in the second half of the century, the balance of power started to change gradually in favor of the United States. Brazil experienced a transition from empire to republic on November 15, 1889, with the deposition of Emperor Dom Pedro II by Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca.¹⁶⁷ The monarch was dethroned not because of foreign policy but because of Brazil’s failure to modernize during the 19th century.¹⁶⁸ The proponents of the republic

¹⁶³ Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, translated by Leandro Moura (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009), 1.

¹⁶⁴ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 8.

¹⁶⁵ Celso Lafer, “Brazilian Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” *Daedalus* 129, no. 2 (Spring, 2000): 214.

¹⁶⁶ Cervo, “Political Regimes and Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” 348.

¹⁶⁷ Boris Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 148.

¹⁶⁸ Thomas E. Skidmore, “Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas: A Case of Regime Type Irrelevance,” in *Foreign Policy and Political Regime*, ed. by Jose Flavio Sombra Saraiva (Brasilia: Instituto Brasileiro de Relacoes Internacionais, 2003), 323.

believed that Brazil could not be a hemispheric economic power with a monarchy.¹⁶⁹ Europe, particularly Britain, did not warmly receive the new administration at that time, which strengthened ties between the United States and Brazil. That was why, to get foreign credits and to ensure the recognition of the new formation of the country as a republic, the new rulers considered it necessary to establish a constitution compatible with Western values. This attempt of the government was important to show Europe's ongoing impact on the region. The replacement of the Brazilian delegate with Salvador de Mendonca in the First International Congress of the Americas in Washington, D.C., who was known to have similar views with the United States, was a significant milestone in Brazil's track change in foreign relations.¹⁷⁰ The assignment of Baron Rio Branco, who was considered to be "father of Brazilian diplomacy,"¹⁷¹ to the Ministry of Foreign Relations had been another important landmark in Brazil's diplomatic shift from London to Washington. He worked with four different presidents as Brazil's foreign minister from 1902 to 1912 and had been the most important political figure in Brazil's foreign policy throughout the 20th century. He attempted to transform Brazil into a significant player in its region and world by introducing a new foreign policy perspective, which later on became traditional and was adopted by almost all of his successors in the rest of the century. His foreign policy perspective was based on four main principles: "Close relations with the United States; Pan Americanism; Latin American leadership; and international prestige."¹⁷²

He completed the change of Brazil's diplomatic focus from London to Washington and established close relationships with the United States. During the 19th century Britain dominated the financial and trade fields in Brazil and Brazilians took it as a model for the Second Empire. However, the United States started to throw its weight by the end of the century and became a new political advisor of Brazil with the adoption of the 1891 constitution. At the same time, North America replaced European capitalist

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 151.

¹⁷¹ Ruy Castro, *Rio de Janeiro: Carnival under Fire*, translated by John Gledson (New York; London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 67.

¹⁷² Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy," 199.

states in Brazil's export market. In addition, Brazilian elites, such as Segio Teixeira Macedo, Tavares Bastos, and Salavador de Mendoca, formulated society's thoughts in favor of the United States by their works. All of these developments brought Brazil closer to the United States in the political, economic, and emotional fields. Anticipating that the United States would be a global power, Rio Franco believed that the best way to protect Brazil's interest was by prioritizing its relationship with the United States in foreign policy. The United States responded in the same way and the two states sent ambassadors to each other in 1905.¹⁷³ The other important reason that made the United States an appropriate partner was its similar perspective of opposition to the status quo as a rising power. Similar to the United States, Brazil was critical of the unfairness of international system at that time. According to Branco, this common ground would help Brazil change global order.¹⁷⁴

Due to its monarchical structure, Brazil was isolated from other parts of the hemisphere throughout the 19th century. But the convergence of the transition to republic in 1889 with the emergence of the modern Pan-American movement put an end to Brazil's continental solitude. Brazil's extraordinary efforts to consolidate association and cooperation between the American states under Rio-Branco's guidance, including hosting the third Pan-American conference in 1906 in its capital, played a significant role in the development and maintenance of a Pan-American project and Brazil's fusion with other states in the region. Rio-Branco also attempted to assume the leadership position in Latin America. With his efforts, Brazil established diplomatic missions in every state that did not have a Brazilian delegation until that time. He organized the recognition of Panama by Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. Brazil also played a key role in arbitrating a disagreement between Peru and Ecuador, solving the Alsop claims issue between the United States and Chile, and convincing the United States to establish a permanent diplomatic mission to Paraguay. Moreover, Rio Branco tried to enhance Brazil's status in the world by increasing the number of diplomats, attending critical international

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Trinkunas, "Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance," 11.

congresses like the Hague Peace Conference, and inviting prominent foreigners to the country.¹⁷⁵

During his era, Brazil managed to resolve 400-year-old border disputes with its neighbors, including Uruguay, Peru, and Colombia, through diplomacy. In that period, Brazil confronted Bolivia regarding the sovereignty of an Amazonian territory, Acre, which became suddenly valuable due to the rubber boom. Despite the fact that Acre was mainly inhabited by Brazilians, it was considered Bolivia's district. Eventually, in 1903, Brazil and Bolivia signed the Treaty of Petropolis, in which Bolivia accepted Brazil's authority in Acre in return for 2.5 million pounds.¹⁷⁶ He also laid the foundations for the Brazil-U.S. partnership "which was to be touchstone of the Brazilian foreign policy for the rest of the century."¹⁷⁷ In the pre-World War I era, Brazil tried to be a significant international player by increasing its military power—particularly its naval power— and monopolizing the international coffee market. On the one hand, it bought two ultra-modern battleships in 1904, which transformed it into a major naval force in the world. On the other hand, it tried to manipulate coffee prices to strengthen its economic position in the international arena.¹⁷⁸ Word War I was important for Brazil for two main reasons. First, the war increased the demand and prices of raw materials, which was very beneficial for Brazil's economy.¹⁷⁹ Second, it was the first significant opportunity for Brazil to become involved in international issues with great powers. To protect its trade, largely of coffee, Brazil preferred to stay neutral at first.¹⁸⁰ Germany's attacks on Brazil's merchant ships off the Brazilian coast in 1917 marked the end of Brazil's neutrality. This time, to benefit from the victory, Brazil declared war and made a symbolic attempt to take part in the war by establishing a field hospital. Its efforts during the war increased the expectations of the government in the sense that they became the

¹⁷⁵ Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy," 197–199.

¹⁷⁶ Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 152.

¹⁷⁷ Skidmore, "Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas," 324.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Soul Brasileiro, "The Old Republic," <http://soulbrasileiro.com/main/brazil/brazilian-history/3-the-old-republic-1889-1930/republica-velha-1889-1930/>.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

equal of the great powers and they should become a permanent member of National League. With this in mind, President Artur Bernardes made a speech in Brazil's Congress and said that "great harmony of action in both America and Europe, where our entry into war gave us a position of real distinction."¹⁸¹ Brazil's attempt to be a permanent member in the National League ended up with great frustration. Spanish America's lack of support played a significant role in this defeat. In 1926, due this great disappointment, Brazil left the National League permanently. But in terms of its economic interests, it continued to have an aspiration to be an international player in the rest of the century.¹⁸²

2. Vargas Era (1930–1945)

Getulio Vargas assumed the presidency on November 3, 1930, which marked the end of the First Republic and the start of an authoritarian era.¹⁸³ As it was in the establishment of the First Republic, economic reasons set the stage for his presidency. He was defined as "Machiavellian, a chameleon, and a sphinx," by his opponents.¹⁸⁴ This definition and his interpretation of diplomatic relations as a selfish economic game of developed powers reflected the essence of Brazilian foreign policy in his era.¹⁸⁵ Under his presidency, Brazil's foreign trade policy was shaped by three principles:

Firstly to take advantage of the rivalry between the antagonistic blocs that divided the world, with the intent to increase internal competition and external bargaining power; secondly to maintain liberal trade with the United States, forcing this country to take decisions that were required by Brazil's new bargaining power; thirdly, to carry out barer trade with Germany and Italy, which was considered more adequate to the expansion of national industry.¹⁸⁶

By the end of the World War I, authoritarian and totalitarian movements started to emerge in Europe. Mussolini assumed power in Italy in 1922. Likewise, Lenin was

¹⁸¹Skidmore, "Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas," 326.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 191.

¹⁸⁴Skidmore, "Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas," 327.

¹⁸⁵ Cervo, "Political Regimes and Brazil's Foreign Policy," 351.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 350.

elected as president in 1917 and Stalin came to power in 1928 in the USSR. Moreover, Nazis took control in Germany in 1933. At that time, people started to see liberal democracy and capitalism as responsible for unemployment and poverty. The perception of the roles of capitalism and liberal democracy in the global economic depression helped the aforementioned regimes strengthen their positions.¹⁸⁷ The Great Depression in 1929 hastened the fall of British hegemony, and increased that of the United States. In the same period, the international arena witnessed the rise of Nazi Germany in 1933. At that time, Brazil tried to follow pragmatic policies by utilizing the competition among the great powers. As a result of this perception, Germany remarkably increased its share in Brazilian foreign trade between 1934 and 1940. Germany ranked first in Brazil's cotton exportation and second in Brazil's coffee exportation. Germany's increase in Brazil's importation was more remarkable. Its share in Brazil's importation was 13 percent in 1929, while the United States' share was 30 percent. By the year 1938, Germany's share increased to 25 percent, and the United States share decreased to 24 percent. In the same year, the United States' share in Brazil's exportation was 34 percent, while Germany's share in Brazil's exportation was 19 percent. At that time, in addition to Germany's significant role in Brazil's exportation, Brazilians believed that they were desperately in need of Germany's support for industrialization and modernization. In response, Germany tried to weaken Brazil's relations with the great powers.¹⁸⁸

In response to Brazil's strong economic ties with Germany, the American public wanted its government to take severe measures to punish Brazil economically. However, Roosevelt refused to put into effect that kind of measure for fear of making Brazil an ally with Germany. Two camps emerged in that period in Brazil: American supporters and Germany sympathizers. Similar to previous period, Brazil continued to follow pragmatic policies, but by the end of the 1930s, Vargas showed his preference in foreign policy by assigning Osvaldo Aranha, who was known to be in the American camp, as minister of foreign affairs. This preference marked the beginning of the decline in Brazil-Germany

¹⁸⁷ Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 209.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 226.

relations. The Brazilian government declared the German ambassador as *persona non grata* and deported him.¹⁸⁹

The eruption of World War II had been a significant determinant in Brazil's foreign policy in the Vargas era. German trade in Latin America remarkably decreased due to Britain's blockade. The United States took advantage of this decrease and strengthened its position in the region. Before the beginning of World War II, due to security concerns, the United States tried to gather the American states under the umbrella of Pan-American Conferences, regardless of their regime types. These attempts brought Brazil closer to the United States. However, Brazil continued to be pragmatist in its foreign policy. With the United States entrance to the war in 1941, it openly took the side of the Americans in exchange for economic and military support. In the same year, the United States opened military bases in the northern part of Brazil without waiting for official permission from the Brazilian government. At the beginning of 1942, despite the opposition of some members of the military high command, Brazil abruptly ended its relations with the Axis. In the same year in May, it signed a clandestine military and political agreement with the United States. The German attacks on five Brazilian merchant ships from August 5 to 17 were the straw that broke the camel's back and forced Brazil to enter to the war in the same month. Moreover, without the demand of the Allies, Brazil sent an expeditionary unit called the Forca Expedicionaria Brasileira (FEB) to fight with the American 5th Army in Northern Italy on its own.¹⁹⁰ By doing so, the Brazilian government intended to clear away Britain's opposition and U.S. restrictions. Brazil participated in the fight in Europe with more than 20,000 troops. By the middle of the 1940s, Britain was no longer Brazil's primary trading partner. France lost its impact on Brazilian culture and Germany was no longer a significant provider of capital goods. All these vacuums were filled by the United States.¹⁹¹

Despite the fact that Brazil was one of the few South American nations that played an active role in the war, it failed to get a permanent seat in the UN Security

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 227.

¹⁹⁰ Skidmore, "Brazilian Foreign Policy under Vargas," 339.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

Council and had to be content as one of the founding members of the United Nations due to the developed states' reluctance to share their powers.¹⁹²

C. BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR ERA

1. The Second Brazilian Republic or the Republic of '46 (1946–1964)

The competition between communism and capitalism shaped Brazil's foreign policy in this era. The Cold War between two superpowers restricted room for maneuvering in the international arena for Latin American states that sought development through diversification. Economic dependence on the Western bloc strengthened U.S. authority over the region and forced Latin American countries to become partners in the United States American system project, which was realized through the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in 1947 and the establishment of Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948. The former arranged the military issues, while the latter dealt with regional diplomatic negotiations. With the start of the Cold War, the United States developed new policies against the Communist threat that shaped Latin American foreign policies in general and Brazil's policies in particular. The United States attempted to "to preclude Soviet ideological, economic and military penetration; promote internal stability for friendly governments, regardless of their dictatorial or democratic nature; secure the continuity of the raw materials trade to U.S. industry; and assure Latin American support for Washington's foreign policy," through these new policies.¹⁹³ During this era, Brazil continued to be critical of the unfairness of the international system. From 1946 to 1964, it tried to increase foreign relations with newly-emerged states that were also critical of the international order. However, the military coup of 1964 marked the end of this attempt and delayed it until the beginning of the 21st century.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Paul M. Edwards, "United Nations Participants in the Korean War: The Contributions of 45 Member Countries," Library of Congress, 2013, 168–169.

¹⁹³ Guilherme Conduru, "The Robore Agreements (1958): A Case Study of Foreign Policy Decision-making Process, in the Kubitscheck Administration," University of Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies Working Paper Series, 9–10, <http://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/sites/sias/files/documents/Conduru24.pdf>.

¹⁹⁴ Trinkunas, "Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance," 9–10.

After authoritarian rule for sixteen years, Brazil re-adopted democracy as a regime type in 1946. In the economic field, it tried to increase its relations with the great powers of international capitalism, while in the ideological and political fields it adopted Western values that were suggested by the United States. The new government renounced the ideas of the first Vargas era and accepted the dominance of the West.¹⁹⁵ Similar to its neighbors, the Cold War prevented Brazil from finding new trade partners and starting new financial relations. Due to international conditions, Brazil could not establish commercial relations with either the Soviet Union or with newly independent countries.¹⁹⁶ Despite the fact that U.S. security policies undermined Brazil's development intentions, Brazil continued to be in line with them. With the beginning of the Cold War, Eurico Gaspar Dutra government started to suppress the Communist Party mostly due to changing balances among developed powers. It prohibited the activities of the Communist Party in 1947 and tried to remove all of the traces of communism in the country. Actually, the government's concern was weakening domestic opposition, which was comprised of communism-supporting unions, in the name of struggling with Communism. In the economic field, the Dutra government began to move away from Estado Novo and follow more liberal policies.¹⁹⁷

On January 31, 1951, the second Vargas era began after an election and continued until he committed suicide in 1954.¹⁹⁸ Vargas mainly attempted to follow the same nationalist policies he had followed earlier, but in a different regime. Since Brazil became a democracy, unlike in his previous experience, he tried to strike a balance among different groups. For example, topics such as the internal political economy and Brazil's foreign policy caused an ideological split within the army. These ideological factions emerged as nationalists and their adversaries, who were known as "capitulaters" or *entreguistas*. In terms of foreign relations, the nationalists advocated the idea of opposing the United States, while their rivals were in favor of unconditionally moving together

¹⁹⁵ Cervo, "Political Regimes and Brazil's Foreign Policy," 360.

¹⁹⁶ Conduru, "The Robore Agreements (1958)."

¹⁹⁷ Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 239–40.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 198.

with the United States against Communism. In the beginning, Vargas nominated a nationalist former officer and president of the Clube Militar, Estillac Leal, to be the minister of war, which was one of the most important ministries that had a significant impact on Brazil's foreign policy. Yet the struggle between nationalists and their adversaries ended with the victory of latter when their candidate became director of the Clube Militar in 1952. In the same period, the struggle between the West and Communism that continued in different fronts resulted in Korean War.¹⁹⁹

When the Korean War broke out, Brazil was in the middle of moving its capital from Rio de Janeiro to the center due to economic reasons. Like other United Nations members, Brazil's government admitted the war as an attack on a member state and supported UN intervention. Although, at the beginning, it seemed eager to fulfill the requirements of the UN that were stated in Article 49 of the charter,²⁰⁰ no matter the cost, including sending troops to the military force created by the UN to take active role in Korea. But when it came to turning words into deeds, Brazil looked for a way out of the mission by responding evasively. As stated in the State Department memo of conversation, Brazil offered to assist the military force of the UN without openly defining the time and size of its support. That is why the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not take this offer into consideration at that time.²⁰¹

After the end of the second Vargas era, significant events such as the Suez crisis and the Hungarian Revolution set the stage for Brazil to follow more nationalist policies.²⁰² In that period, Juscelino Kubitschek, president of Brazil from 1956 to 1961, continued to be in line with the United States. Paulo Visentini divides the Kubitschek era into two phases: "(1) 1956–1958, a period of automatic alignment with the U.S.; (2)

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 243–44.

²⁰⁰ According to Article 49 "The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council." For more information see Charter of the United Nations at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.

²⁰¹ Paul M. Edwards, "United Nations Participants in the Korean War: The Contributions of 45 Member Countries," Library of Congress, 2013, 168–169.

²⁰² Celso Lafer, "Brazilian Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future," *Daedalus* 129, no.2, Brazil: The Burden of the Past: The Promise of the Future (Spring 2000): 225.

from mid-1958 to 1961, a period of nationalistic bargaining with the U.S.”²⁰³ During his administration, Kubitscheck made military and diplomatic concessions in exchange for technical assistance and financial support. On the one hand, Brazil’s agreement to let the United States use the archipelago of Fernando de Noronha as a military base and to send a military expeditionary force to the Middle East for a peacekeeping operation following the Suez crisis were two remarkable military concessions of that time. On the other hand, in the diplomatic field, the implementation of the Operation Pan-America (OPA), which prioritized regional relations and attempted to find solutions to Brazil’s weak economy through multilateral policies, was the one of the most important diplomatic events of Kubitscheck’s period that showed how the United States dominated Brazilian foreign policy. Moreover, Brazil’s attempts to be arbitrator between Cuba and the United States in 1961 were significant signs of its desire to assume regional leadership.²⁰⁴

2. Military Rule (1964–1985)

On March 31, 1964, the Brazilian military established a dictatorship that would last until 1985 in a so-called effort “to free the country from corruption and communism and to restore democracy.”²⁰⁵ It is possible to divide this era into two phases, 1964–1969 and 1969–1985, in terms of its foreign policy tendencies.

When Castelo Branco assumed power in 1964, he openly declared that Brazil would follow traditional policies, according to which world peace, disarmament, self-determination, non-intervention, and anti-colonialism would be the main principles. He also stated that his administration’s foreign policy intended to enhance national power through economic and social improvements.²⁰⁶ Similar to the second republic period, in the first three years of the military regime Brazil’s foreign policy continued to be parallel to that of the United States under his administration. Castelo Branco’s statement that “in order to worthily represent Brazil abroad, you need to have nothing more before you than

²⁰³ Conduru, “The Robore Agreements (1958).”

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 280.

²⁰⁶ Burns, “Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 195.

the teachings of Rio-Branco” was sufficient to define his perspective on foreign policy.²⁰⁷ Under his presidency, Brazil continued to make concessions in return for developmental aid. Brazil’s military support to the United States in the name of “Inter-American Peace Work” to end the civil war in the Dominican Republic in the years of 1965–1966 was important to show the continuity in Brazil’s foreign policy during his era.²⁰⁸ After Castelo Branco, Costa e Silva became president in 1967. There were authoritarian nationalists and hardliners in the Brazilian army who supported Costa e Silva in the hope that he would change Branco’s U.S.-oriented policies. However, Costa e Silva disappointed them by following policies that were more liberal than expected.²⁰⁹ Brazil achieved a substantial amount of economic development during the first period of military rule. But, due to economic growth, Brazil became highly dependent on the international trade and monetary system, as well as some imported products, particularly petroleum.²¹⁰

In the second phase of military rule, the nationalists’ ideas from the 1930s rose again in the form of *autonomy by distance*.²¹¹ Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni define autonomy by distance as

a policy of contesting the norms and principles of important international institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT, etc.); a diplomacy that opposes the liberalizing agenda of the great powers, particularly the United States; the belief in autarchical development, guided by the expansion of the domestic market and by economic protectionism; resistance to international regimes interpreted as freezing world power, in favor of the status quo.²¹²

On the one hand, economic concerns continued to be the essence of foreign policy.²¹³ On the other hand, the relative decline of U.S. power, the economic resurgence

²⁰⁷ Ibid. 196.

²⁰⁸ Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 285.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 286–87.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 294.

²¹¹ Cervo, “Political Regimes and Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” 360.

²¹² Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 7.

²¹³ Peter Dauvergne and Deborah Farias, “The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power,” *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 5 (2012), 907.

of Japan and Western Europe, the increasing effects of Third World in the international arena, particularly in the UN and General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT), and the softening of relations between socialist and capitalist poles were the main factors that shaped Brazil's foreign policy in that phase.²¹⁴ During 1970s, Brazil tried to stay away from the United States politically. It maintained its economic development that started in 1960s and became one of the main arms exporters to great powers. It also started a nuclear program for both peaceful and military purposes that was supported by Germany in spite of the United States' disapproval. Moreover, it rejected the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty supported by the United States on account of the fact that it would increase inequality in the international order.²¹⁵

D. BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

1. 1985–1995

After the rule by a military regime for 21 years, Brazil made the transition to democracy when Jose Sarney assumed power in 1985. Unlike the second re-democratization period, Sarney continued to follow nationalist policies and to use “autonomy by distance” methods of former military regime at the beginning.²¹⁶ Due to the great debt crisis that was inherited from the former regime, Brazil focused on economic development and stability in this period.²¹⁷ In the late 1980s near the end of the Cold War, the spread and increase of liberal values through globalization and the domestic economic impasse forced Brazil to change its foreign policy from the concept of “autonomy by distance” to the concept of “autonomy by participation,” which means “growing interaction, negotiation, and participation in the formulation of international norms and rules.”²¹⁸ Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni define this concept more broadly as:

²¹⁴Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 5.

²¹⁵ Trinkunas, “Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” 10.

²¹⁶ Cervo, “Political Regimes and Brazil's Foreign Policy,” 360.

²¹⁷ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 11–12.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5–14.

adherence to international regimes, including those of a liberal slant (such as the WTO), without losing the capacity to manage foreign policy. In this case, the objective would be to influence the very formulation of the principles and rules governing the international system. It is felt that the national objectives would be more effectively achieved along these paths.²¹⁹

The years between 1990 and 1995 were a transition period in which Brazil started to abandon long-established foreign policy ideas. After Sarney, Collor De Mello became president in 1990. Neither he nor his successor, Itamar Franco (in office between 1992 and 1995), could develop a consistent foreign policy because of economic and political instability. In their era, Brazil rejected its traditional foreign policy perspective and started to adopt the “autonomy through participation” concept by opening Brazil’s market to the world and supporting free trade. By doing so, they sought to consolidate Brazil’s relations with great powers, particularly the United States. They prioritized economic relations with the United States, which transformed it into Brazil’s main trading partner at that time. These presidents not only attempted to increase Brazil’s relations with the developed world, but also continued to attach importance to regional interactions, which resulted in the establishment of Mercosur with the involvement of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1991. During this period, Brazil became more familiar with concepts such as human rights and preservation of the environment, which set the stage for more participation in international issues. This period was important because these presidents laid the foundations of Brazil’s new foreign policy that was shaped by their successors Fernando Henrique Cardozo and Lula da Silva.²²⁰

2. The Fernando Henrique Cardozo Era (1995–2003)

Fernando Henrique Cardozo had a great impact on Brazilian foreign policy, first as Itamar Franco’s foreign minister between 1992 and 1993 and later as president from 1995 to 2003.²²¹ He completed the transition from the “autonomy by distance” policy to

²¹⁹Ibid., 7.

²²⁰ Ibid., 37.

²²¹ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 156.

“autonomy by participation.”²²² Brazil changed the isolated and nationalist policies of previous authoritarian regimes under his leadership and started to work hard to increase its international credibility.²²³ On the one hand, Brazil began to follow proactive foreign policies instead of reactive ones in his era. On the other hand, economic development remained at the center of foreign relations.²²⁴ During his era, Brazil’s economy connected to international institutions and the OECD state’s economic interests.²²⁵ He focused on improving Brazil’s position in international commerce and laid the foundations for Brazil’s multilateral policies of Lula’s era.²²⁶ Cardoso gave Europe and the United States precedence in Brazil’s relations but he did not neglect South America.²²⁷ He saw the United States as Brazil’s primary partner due to its role in the international order and attempted to improve Brazil’s relations with it.²²⁸ During his presidency, Brazil accepted the Missile Technology Control Regime and signed the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons that brought it closer to the United States.²²⁹ On the other hand, as an indicator of his prioritization of relations with Latin America, he organized a summit for South American leaders in Brazil in 2000 that laid the foundations for the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).²³⁰

3. The Lula da Silva Era (2003–2010)

In the early 21st century, the waning of the post-Cold War unipolar system and the emergence of new actors in the international arena provided Brazil a new opportunity

²²² Tullo Vigevani, Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira and Timothy Thompson, “Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration,” *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 5 (September 2007), 58.

²²³ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 157.

²²⁴ Vigevani, Oliveira, and Thompson, “Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration,” 58.

²²⁵ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 157.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 156.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 158.

²²⁸ Vigevani, Oliveira, and Thompson, “Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration,” 67.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 158.

for growing and urged it to replace “the autonomy through participation,” policies with “autonomy through diversification.”²³¹ Vigevani and Cepaluni define autonomy by diversification as

adherence of the country to international principles and norms by means of South-South alliances, including regional ones, and of agreements with non-traditional partners, such as China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East etc. The aim is to reduce asymmetries and increase the country’s international bargaining capacity in its relations with more powerful countries, such as the USA and European Union (EU) countries. An important characteristic is the capacity to negotiate with more powerful countries without ruptures, with the perspective of breaking unilateralism and striving for multi-polarity and equilibrium.²³²

Development, democracy, and diversification had been three main components of Lula’s foreign policy. During this era, Brazil tried to internationalize its companies, diversify foreign ties, and take greater roles in international mechanisms. Economic development continued to be the main purpose of foreign policy. In this era, Brazil sought to find new trading partners and take active roles in the establishment of new international agencies such as BRIC, IBSA, and G20.²³³ Different from Cardozo, Lula prioritized cooperation with Asian and African states, in addition to Latin American ones. He paid more than 70 percent of his official trips to these regions.²³⁴ Moreover, during his era, Brazil intensified its foreign financial aid and technical missions to these countries.²³⁵

E. CONCLUSION

Since the establishment of the first republic in 1889, particularly after the 1930s, economic concerns have been the main determinants in shaping Brazilian foreign policy, regardless of regime types. During that first period, Brazil preferred to follow more pacifist, legalist, and pragmatic policies. The principles that guided Brazilian foreign

²³¹ Trinkunas, “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” 12.

²³² Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 7.

²³³ Vidigal, “Brazil: A Cordial power? Brazilian Diplomacy in the Early 21st Century,” 33–36.

²³⁴ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 157.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 157.

policy date back to the early 20th century. On the other hand, Brazil has always been critical of the unjustness of the international system. Given that it has not been a self-sufficient country and strong enough to change the international order on its own, it has adjusted its foreign policies to the emerging opportunities that have been created by competition among great powers. In the 1930s, after securing its territory and solving border problems, Brazil started to seek autonomy in its foreign relations and to use diplomacy and foreign policy as instruments for economic development. It used three main methods: autonomy through distance, autonomy through participation, and autonomy through diversification. Despite Brazil's efforts for autonomy, it has always been dependent on the United States in its foreign policy with some exceptions. The emergence of new global actors at the beginning of the 21st century has decreased U.S. impact on Brazil and opened room for free maneuvers in the international arena. With the waning of the unipolar system, Brazil has had the opportunity to diversify its relations with Asian and African states.

IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2010 IRAN-TURKEY-BRAZIL NUCLEAR DEAL FOR TURKEY

Iran first met with nuclear energy by dint of the United States in 1950s when Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi signed an agreement with the Dwight D. Eisenhower government under the program of U.S. Atoms for Peace, according to which the United States committed to establish a nuclear research reactor and power plants in Iran.²³⁶ Iran started to work on its nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Before long, however, Shah Reza Pehlevi began to demand to use it in developing nuclear weapons on the grounds that Iran needed this kind of high-level weaponry to protect its territory against external threats.²³⁷ Considering Iran's strategic position in the region, such as its oil reserves and significant position against Soviet expansionism, the U.S. government reluctantly accepted Iran's request and helped to establish necessary infrastructure.²³⁸ In addition to the United States, prominent European states, including Britain, France, and Germany, played important roles in this engagement.²³⁹ During the 1960s and 1970s, Iran acquired significant scientific capability to develop the technological infrastructure of nuclear works through the agency of these great powers.²⁴⁰ However, it signed the NPT and became a non-nuclear weapon state in 1970.²⁴¹ The Islamic revolution in 1979 changed the regime and Imam Khomeini became the leader of Iran. From that time on, the strategic partnership between Iran and the West turned into strategic hostility. The regime change and new rulers' denial of everything Western interrupted the nuclear program of

²³⁶ "Timeline on Iran's Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, November 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-timeline.html?_r=0#/time243_8917.

²³⁷ Mustafa Kibaroglu. "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 2 (2007): 223.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ "Blasts from the Past: Western Support for Iran's Nuclear Program." *Iran Affairs*. May 30, 2006, http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2006/05/blasts_from_the.html.

²⁴⁰ Kibaroglu. "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West," 223.

²⁴¹ "Iran: Overview." NTI, November 1, 2014, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/>.

Iran.²⁴² In addition, the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988 was another factor that disrupted the nuclear program of Iran.²⁴³ However, war with Iraq revealed the necessity for nuclear energy to meet the requirements of domestic consumption and motivated Iran to secretly restart its nuclear programs in 1984.²⁴⁴ Since Western states supported Iraq during the war, by the 1990s Iran turned to China and Russia, which have supported Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes so far, to maintain its program.²⁴⁵

During the 1990s, the United States started to express its concerns over Iran's nuclear program and to take some measures on its own, such as imposing sanctions. Since the beginning of the 21st century, it has increased its pressure on Iran and begun to claim that Iran has reached the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons.²⁴⁶ Discovery of the uranium enrichment facility with the support of an opposition group in Natanz and the water production facility in Arak in 2002 was a turning point for world public opinion.²⁴⁷ Until this discovery, other states were not very interested in the U.S. claims, but after this discovery, they actively allied themselves with the United States. The United States considered the facilities in Natanz and Arak as indicators of Iran's secret nuclear weapon development program and an obvious breach of the NPT.²⁴⁸ Fearing a U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iran accepted the inspections of IAEA and partly suspended its nuclear program in 2003.²⁴⁹ The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was known for his overt hostility towards Israel and the United States, was the other

²⁴² Arzu Celalifer Ekinci. "İran'ın Nükleer Teknolojiyle Tanışma Süreci Ve Nükleer Programının Tarihsel Arka Planı." [Iran's First Meeting Process with Nuclear Energy and the Historical Background of Its Nuclear Program] Usak Stratejik Gündem. January 1, 2009, <http://www.usakgundem.com/ders-notu/10/İran'ın-nükleer-teknolojiyle-tanışma-süreci-ve-nükleer-programının-tarihsel-arka-planı.html>.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ "Timeline on Iran's Nuclear Program," *New York Times*.

²⁴⁵ Ekinci. "İran'ın Nükleer Teknolojiyle Tanışma Süreci Ve Nükleer Programının Tarihsel Arka Planı."

²⁴⁶ James Risen and Judith Miller, "C.I.A. Tells Clinton An Iranian A-Bomb Can't Be Ruled Out." *New York Times*, January 17, 2000. <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/17/world/cia-tells-clinton-an-iranian-a-bomb-can-t-be-ruled-out.html>.

²⁴⁷ Gurzel and Ersoy, "Turkey and Iran's Nuclear Program," 38.

²⁴⁸ Kibaroglu, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West," 237.

²⁴⁹ "Timeline on Iran's Nuclear Program," *New York Times*.

turning point in Iran's nuclear program. In 2006, Iran resumed production in Natanz, which stimulated IAEA to bring the issue to the UN Security Council. From 2006 to the 2010, the UN Security council adopted three resolutions that specified sanctions for Iran.²⁵⁰ During that period, every diplomatic effort, including five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain) and Germany's attempt in 2009, failed to convince Iran to negotiate its nuclear program according to NPT standards.

When there was no hope for diplomacy to solve the issue, on May 17, 2010, Brazil and Turkey convinced Iran to come to the table and negotiate its nuclear program under the same conditions which were offered by the P5+Germany a couple of months before. Turkey and Brazil's success was a historic event, but the P5+Germany did not recognize the agreement, alleging that Iran played for time. They adopted the fourth rounds of sanctions against Iran anyway, which left this attempt fruitless. Although the deal ended with failure and missed the chance to be an historic event, it continued to be significant for Turkey and Brazil in itself. This chapter seeks to examine the significance of this deal for Turkey and argues that the deal was important for Turkey both politically and economically. The deal was politically significant for Turkey, first because it was seen by Turkish policy makers as an important step towards becoming a global power and to meet the requirements of new Turkish foreign policy principles. Second, Turkey and Iran are historically rivals, and by playing a key role in solving problems between Iran and the West, Turkey sought to move one step forward in the struggle for regional leadership. Third, a nuclear Iran was a big threat for Turkey's security and regional balances. According to Turkey, nuclear Iran may start a nuclear arms race in the region and it may lead the United States to intervene. Both scenarios were threatening regional stability, which would have negative impacts on Turkey's global ambitions and regional policies, as seen in the previous Iraq wars. Since Turkey was unable to prevent Iran on its own from developing nuclear weapons and to convince the United States not to use military power, it attempted to use diplomacy. For Turkey, the deal also made sense

²⁵⁰ "Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1737 (2006)." United Nations, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/resolutions.shtml>.

economically. First, the sanctions had negative impacts on economic relations between Turkey and Iran. Turkey sought to prevent sanctions and increase its relations with Iran by solving the issue. Second, Turkey was highly dependent on the outside in terms of oil and natural gas. A tension between Iran and Western states, particularly the United States, had a high potential to increase oil prices, which may have caused a huge deficit in Turkey's budget. Finally, if Turkey could solve the disagreement between Iran and West, Iran could sell its oil to the world without any restrictions, which would turn Turkey into an energy bridge.

A. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

1. Turkey's Ambitions to be a Regional Power

The power structure of the world considerably changed since 19th century. From that time on, imperial collapses led to power vacuums that set the stage for a new international order. Regional and global powers tried to fill these vacuums by adapting their policies to new conditions.²⁵¹ As a result of these changes, from the 19th century to 21st century, the world witnessed four systems—balance-of-power, multi-polarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity—that have been one of the main determinants of the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire and its successor, Turkey.²⁵² While the world was multi-polar before the Second World War and Britain, France, and Germany were the dominant powers, it became bipolar after the war, for power was shared by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War marked the end of bipolarity and beginning of unipolarity, and was the most significant turning point for Turkish foreign policy.²⁵³ At the end of the Cold War, Turkey abandoned passive, reaction-based policies and re-emerged as a potential global power in the newly-established international order. However, due to some domestic problems, such as weak coalitions and economic downturns, it failed to translate its leadership rhetoric into action

²⁵¹ Gozen, "Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulence of the Post-Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic Constraints," 29–31.

²⁵² Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, 5–7.

²⁵³ Gozen, "Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulence of the Post-Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic Constraints," 29–31.

until the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. With the election of the AKP, Turkey has experienced a dramatic change in foreign policy, from just aiming to protect the borders of the nation-state and maintaining its presence to having global ambitions.

First, the nuclear deal was politically significant for Turkey because it was considered by Turkish policy makers as an important step on the way to being a regional and global power.²⁵⁴ By convincing Iran, Turkey sought to do a job that could only be done by great powers.²⁵⁵ Ahmet Davutoglu, former foreign minister and current prime minister of Turkey, explains Turkey's involvement in the nuclear deal with Iran in terms of the change in Turkey's methodological and operational principles in foreign policy during the AKP era. According to Davutoglu and different from former administrations, Turkish foreign policy has been shaped by three methodological and five operational principles in the 21st century that set the stage for Turkey's involvement in the 2010 nuclear deal. In terms of methodology, Turkey has adopted visionary, consistent and systematic, and soft power-based foreign policy principles. Different from previous governments, Turkey abandoned reaction-based approaches and began to follow visionary ones, in which Turkey began to follow autonomous policies. Since then, it has started to make decisions according to its understanding of the events instead of trying to counterbalance other states. As a second methodological principle, Turkey adopted a consistent and systematic perspective by which its policies against different parts of the world do not contradict each other. Its vision for Asia does not differ from its vision for the Balkans. That is why it has been trying to improve its relations with Europe and other states such as Iraq, Greece, Syria and, the Russia Federation at the same time. For the third methodological principle, Turkey adopted soft power-based policies in its foreign relations. According to this principle, although it keeps a strong military, Turkey gives precedence to its civil-economic power and aims to increase its economic relations with its neighbors. In addition to these three methodological principles, after the election of the AKP, Turkey has adopted five operational principles in foreign policy: balance

²⁵⁴ Parsi, *A Single Role of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran*, 180.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

between security and democracy, zero problems towards neighbors, proactive and preemptive peace diplomacy, adherence to multidimensional foreign policy, and rhythmic diplomacy. According to the balance between security and democracy principle, Turkey has opposed the policies that limit freedoms in the cause of security and has sought to promote freedoms and human rights without weakening security. As a second operational principle, Turkey put into practice a zero problems policy and has attempted to solve its deep-rooted problems with its neighbors. It established high-level-strategic boards with Greece, Syria, Iraq, and Russia and canceled the need for visas with many states, including Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Russia, which set the stage for a remarkable increase in economic and political relations. Moreover, Turkey has adopted proactive and preemptive peace diplomacy, according to which it attempts to take precautions before problems appear. Its mediator role between Israel and Syria, Sunni-Shiite settlement in Iraq, ceasefire affords in Palestine and Lebanon, and reconciliation attempts between Bosnia and Serbia are important examples of these principle. For the fourth operational principle, Turkey has adopted multi-dimensional foreign policy. According to this principle, it maintains its relations with the West through the EU while it increases its relations with other parts of the world, including Russia and China. Rhythmic diplomacy is the fifth operational principle that has shaped Turkish foreign policy in the 21st century. In accordance with this principle, Turkey has begun to be more active in the international arena through global organizations. It was elected to the UN Security Council with 151 votes in the first round in 2008. Moreover, in 2009 and 2010, Turkey assumed the leadership position in South-East European Cooperation process, which was founded to promote dialogue among Balkan states. It also actively took part in the Arab league and became a member of G-20, which is considered as the symbol of economic success. It opened 15 new embassies in Africa and two new embassies in Latin America.²⁵⁶

Considering the changing principles of Turkish foreign policy in the 21st century, it is possible to say that Turkey's engagement in the nuclear deal was the result of these

²⁵⁶ Ahmet Davutoglu. "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 20, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu-published-in-foreign-policy-magazine-_usa_-on-20-may-2010.en.mfa.

changes that are applied to turn Turkey into a global power. In other words, the deal was significant for Turkey because it was seen as necessary to provide continuity in new foreign policy perceptions and considered by Turkish policy makers an important step toward becoming a global power.

2. The Rivalry between Turkey and Iran for Regional Leadership

Second, the nuclear deal was politically significant for Turkey because it was an important step in the Turkish-Iranian rivalry.²⁵⁷ If Iran could solve the issue on its own, as it did in 2013, Turkey would lose its importance in the eyes of great powers as a strategic ally, and Iran would move one step further in the regional leadership rivalry. On the other hand, if the deal succeeded, it could consolidate “Turkey’s beneficent regional role as a mediator and peace-maker,”²⁵⁸ and help Turkey to increase its role in regional and global leadership. So, by engaging in the deal, Turkey attempted to control Iran’s influence in the region as a significant regional leadership opponent.²⁵⁹

The relationship between Turkey and Iran has been mostly characterized by rivalry.²⁶⁰ Although since the election of the AKP, the relations with Iran have followed an increasingly positive pattern, the nuclear deal with Iran was one of the very few examples when the two states collaborated actively in history.²⁶¹ The two neighbors’ struggles date back to the Ottoman and Safavid Empires eras in the 16th century when the Shiite Persian Safavid’s expansionist policies conflicted with the Sunni Ottoman Empire’s interests.²⁶² Turks engaged in wars with Iranians more than any other states, including its permanent rival Russia, between 1514 and 1823.²⁶³ Although the Treaty of Kasr’i Shirin in 1639 decreased the tension a little bit and drew the current boundaries,

²⁵⁷ Parsi, *A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran*, 181.

²⁵⁸ Seale, “Consequences of Iran’s Nuclear Deal.”

²⁵⁹ Parsi, *A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran*, 181.

²⁶⁰ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook*, 152.

²⁶¹ Gareth H., Jenkins. *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey’s Relations with Iran*. Washington, DC: Silk Road Studies Program, 2012. 7.

²⁶² Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook*, 152.

²⁶³ Alexander, Mikaberidze, *Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia*. Vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 692–699.

contrary to common belief, it did not completely eliminate rivalry. By the first half of the 19th century, both states' rivalry played second fiddle to European expansionism. By the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire's capital became a shelter for Iranian insurgents and opposition groups.²⁶⁴ In the same period, however, Iran allowed Armenian nationalists to use its territories for preparations of raids against the Ottoman Empire.²⁶⁵ During World War 1, the Ottoman Empire occupied the Persian city of Tabriz, but it had to retreat at the end of the war due to its defeat, which urged Iran to demand territorial concessions from the Ottoman Empire at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919–20.²⁶⁶ From the establishment of Republic of Turkey in 1923 to the regime change in Iran in 1979, the relations were relatively good.²⁶⁷ Particularly during the early years of the Cold War era, both states became regional allies against Soviet expansionism by establishing international organizations such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the RCD, which became the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985.²⁶⁸ However, the regime change marked the end of improvements in relations when Iran attempted to export its regime to secular Turkey.²⁶⁹ From the 1980s to today, Turkey has accused Iran of supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a terrorist group, while Iran accused Turkey of protecting political opposition groups such as *Mujaheddin-e Khalq* (People's Warriors).²⁷⁰ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused a power vacuum in Central Asia and the Caucasus and set the stage for another competition between Turkey and Iran.²⁷¹ The two countries policies continued to conflict in these fields. In 1992, for instance, while Turkey supported Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Iran took the side of Armenia.²⁷² During the 1990s, Iran was considered a

²⁶⁴ Jenkins. *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran*, 11.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 12.

²⁶⁷ Sariaslan, "The Economic Relations between Turkey and Iran in 2000s," 71.

²⁶⁸ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook*, 153.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Jenkins, *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran*, 17.

²⁷² Ibid., 18.

serious threat to Turkey's secular regime, and the Turkish secular elite accused Iran of killing famous secular intellectuals.²⁷³ When the Welfare Party (RP) assumed power on June 28, 1996, its leader Necmettin Erbakan made his first trip to Iran, and the new government's Islamic-oriented policies increased concern about the regime in Turkey, which set the stage for military intervention on February 28, 1997.²⁷⁴ Although, the election of the AKP government softened the relations with Iran, the power struggle between Turkey and Iran continued in the 21st century. The deployment of patriot missiles in Turkey, Iran's constant support for the PKK and the difference between both states perceptions of the Arab Spring uprisings are some of the main controversial topics between Turkey and Iran during the AKP era.²⁷⁵ So, in engaging in the nuclear deal with Iran, Turkey's chief goal was to prevent Iran from becoming a strategic ally for Western states and to reinforce its regional leadership.²⁷⁶

3. Nuclear-Iran as a Threat to Regional Balances

Third, the nuclear deal was politically significant for Turkey because although the AKP government supports the idea of using nuclear energy for peaceful goals, Turkey does not want Iran to have the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.²⁷⁷ It considers nuclear weapons a big threat to stability in the region.²⁷⁸ According to Turkey, a nuclear Iran may cause a regional nuclear arms race.²⁷⁹ Moreover, the United States was planning to take various kinds of measures against Iran, from imposing sanctions to a military attack, which was viewed by Turkey with great skepticism on account of the fact that a military intervention in Iran might destabilize the region as it did in the Iraq war.²⁸⁰

²⁷³ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook*, 154.

²⁷⁴ Jenkins, *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran*, 24.

²⁷⁵ Cengiz Candar, "Turkey Claims Iran Providing Logistical Support for PKK," *Al Monitor*, December 30, 2012.

²⁷⁶ Jenkins, *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran*, 6.

²⁷⁷ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey*, 157–158.

²⁷⁸ Gurzel and Ersoy, "Turkey and Iran's Nuclear Program," 38.

²⁷⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2013), 28.

²⁸⁰ "The U.S. and Iran: Is Washington Planning a Military Strike?" *Der Spiegel*, December 30, 2005.

Since Turkey was not capable on its own of preventing Iran from producing nuclear weapons and convincing the United States not to use hard power to solve the problem, it attempted to solve the issue through diplomacy.

Although Iran's nuclear program has been a controversial topic in the international system since the second half of the 1990s, Turkey preferred to be unresponsive to the issue for a long time.²⁸¹ After the election of the AKP government, Turkey declared that it was supporting Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.²⁸² However, due to increasing pressure from the United States and Iran's emergence as a threat to regional stability, by 2005 Turkey began to state its concerns publicly over Iran's nuclear program and formalized its attitude by putting Iran's nuclear works into a National Security Policy Document in 2005.²⁸³ In 2006, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul declared that "the IAEA Director General's reports have revealed the fact that Iran concealed its nuclear program for years, which creates suspicions about Iran's intentions. The emergence of the possibility of Iran's possessing a nuclear weapon disturbs Turkey as all the members of international society."²⁸⁴ Considering a potential U.S.-Iran war and a nuclear arms race in the region, Turkey attempted to bring Iran to the table to negotiate its nuclear program. By doing so, it sought to maintain regional stability, which was important for its increased role in the international arena.

B. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE

1. The Impact on Turkey of Sanctions on Iran

One of the main economic reasons that made the nuclear deal significant for Turkey was the sanctions' negative impacts on Turkey's economic relations with Iran. By engaging in the deal, Turkey sought to prevent the UN Security Council from adopting a fourth round of sanctions and also trying to increase its economic relations with Iran. Sanctions negatively affected Turkey's economy in three ways. First, they decreased the

²⁸¹ Gurzel and Ersoy, "Turkey and Iran's Nuclear Program," 38.

²⁸² Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook*, 158.

²⁸³ Gurzel and Ersoy, "Turkey and Iran's Nuclear Program," 40.

²⁸⁴ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook*, 159.

trade volume between Turkey and Iran; second, they prevented Turkey's multinationals to make investments in Iran; third, they caused a decrease in Iranian tourism to Turkey.

a. Bilateral Trade

Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a remarkable increase in bilateral trade between Turkey and Iran.²⁸⁵ Between the election of the AKP government in 2002 and 2011, trade volume increased more than tenfold from \$1.25 billion to \$16.05 billion.²⁸⁶ However, sanctions reversed the increasing pattern in bilateral trade between Turkey and Iran (see Table 1 and Table 2).

Table 1. An Overview of Turkey-Iran Economic Relations since 2003.²⁸⁷

Years	Export (Thousand Dollars)	Change (%)	Import (Thousand Dollars)	Change (%)	Volume (Thousand Dollars)	Balance (Thousand Dollars)
2003	533,786.00	59.8	1,860,683.00	102	2,394,469.00	-1,326,897.00
2004	813,031.00	52.3	1,962,059.00	5.4	2,775,090.00	-1,149,028.00
2005	912,940.00	12.3	3,469,706.00	76.8	4,382,646.00	-2,556,766.00
2006	1,066,902.00	16.9	5,626,610.00	62.2	6,693,512.00	-4,559,708.00
2007	1,441,190.00	35.1	6,615,393.00	17.6	8,056,583.00	-5,174,203.00
2008	2,029,760.00	40.8	8,199,689.00	23.9	10,229,449.00	-6,169,929.00
2009	2,024,758.00	-0.2	3,405,896.00	-58.5	5,430,654.00	-1,381,138.00
2010	3,042,957.00	50.3	7,644,781.00	124.5	10,687,738.00	-4,601,824.00
2011	3,590,410.00	17.9	12,461,359.00	63	16,051,769.00	-8,870,949.00
2012	9,922,688.00	176.4	11,964,613.00	-4	21,887,301.00	-2,041,925.00
2013	4,193,950.00	-57.7	10,383,154.00	-13.2	14,577,104.00	-6,189,204.00

²⁸⁵ Sariaslan, "The Economic Relations between Turkey and Iran in 2000s," 73.

²⁸⁶ Jenkins, *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations With Iran*, 7.

²⁸⁷ TUIK, "Foreign Trade Statistics," http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046.




Figure 1. An Overview of Turkey-Iran Economic Relations since 2003.²⁸⁸

As can be seen in the chart, there was a dramatic increase in Turkey's exportation to Iran in 2012. In fact, this increase was misleading. Since sanctions did not include precious metals, Turkey began to pay for the oil and natural gas with gold to breach the sanctions and registered these transactions as its exportation to Iran.²⁸⁹ For an overview of Iran's export and import relationships in 2013, see Tables 2 and 3.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Sariaslan, "The Economic Relations between Turkey and Iran in 2000s," 77.

Table 2. Top Five States in Iran's Export in 2013.²⁹⁰

TOP 5 STATES IN IRAN'S EXPORT IN 2013		
STATE	IRAN'S EXPORT (2013) (BILLION)	STATE'S SHARE IN IRAN'S EXPORT (2013) (%)
1) CHINA	25.4	40.4
2) TURKEY	10.38	16.5
3) INDIA	10.03	15.9
4) JAPAN	6.93	11
5) SOUTH KOREA	5.56	8.8
Iran's total exports in 2013 = \$62.92 billion		

Table 3. Top 5 States in Iran's Import in 2013.²⁹¹

TOP 5 STATES IN IRAN'S IMPORT IN 2013		
STATE	IRAN'S IMPORT (2013) (BILLION DOLLARS)	STATES'S SHARE IN IRAN'S IMPORT (2013) (%)
1) CHINA	14.39	31.6
2) INDIA	5.43	11.9
3) SOUTH KOREA	4.48	9.8
4) TURKEY	4.19	9.2
5) GERMANY	2.5	5.5
Iran's total imports in 2013 = \$45.58 billion		

While Turkey was 17th in Iran's imports in 1999 with \$227.6 million, it ranked fourth in 2013 with 4.19 billion.²⁹² Moreover, while Turkey ranked fourth in Iran's exports in 1999 with \$198.62 million, it became the second largest country in Iran's

²⁹⁰ Trademap, "Trade Statistics for International Business Development," http://www.trademap.org/Country_SelProductCountry.aspx.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² The World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution, Accessed on August 14, 2014, [http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/IRN/StartYear/1999/EndYear/2003/TradeFlow/Import/Indicator/Trade%20Value%20\(US\\$%20Thousand\)](http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/IRN/StartYear/1999/EndYear/2003/TradeFlow/Import/Indicator/Trade%20Value%20(US$%20Thousand))

exports in 2013 with \$10.38 billion.²⁹³ The balance of trade has always been in favor of Iran because Turkey is highly dependent on Iran in terms of oil and natural gas, and the majority of its imports from Iran have been these products. When oil and natural gas are excluded, the trade volume between Turkey and Iran is very low in comparison to other states.²⁹⁴

b. Turkish Companies Investments in Iran

Due to the sanctions against Iran, Turkey's construction companies had to pay a heavy price. Although they made contracts with Iran and started their projects, sanctions forced them to discontinue their work.²⁹⁵ Turkey sought to prevent sanctions on Iran to take part in the construction of its infrastructure through multinational companies. For an overview of these contractor project values between 2004 and 2012, see Table 4 and Figure 2.

Table 4. Turkey's Building Contractor Services in Iran between 2004 and 2012.²⁹⁶

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
TOTAL VALUE OF NEW PROJECTS(Million Dollars)	77	40	215	17	442	45.7	933	76	1855

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Jenkins, *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations With Iran*, 7.

²⁹⁵ Ankara Strategy Institute, "News", Accessed on February 14, 2014, <http://www.ankarastrateji.org/haber/turkiye-deki-iranli-sirketler-705/>.

²⁹⁶ TUIK, Foreign Trade Statistics, Accessed on February 28, 2014, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046.




Figure 2. Value of Turkish Building Companies' New Projects in Iran between 2004 and 2012.²⁹⁷

c. *Tourism*

Tourism is an important source of income for Turkey. Due to sanctions, from 2010 to 2013 there was a substantial decrease in the number of Iranian tourists who visited Turkey. While there were around 1.885 million Iranian tourists who visited Turkey in 2010, this number decreased by 36.5 percent and became 1.196 million in 2013 (Figure 3).²⁹⁸ Sanctions had a negative impact on the standard of life in Iranian society, which prevented them from visiting other states.²⁹⁹ As one of the main destinations for Iranian tourists, Turkey sought to prevent great powers from imposing sanctions on Iran by solving the issue with diplomacy. On November 2013, when Iran and the great powers made a temporary agreement on Iran's nuclear program, which partly lifted sanctions, travel agents and hotels in Turkey reported that there was a remarkable increase in

²⁹⁷ TUIK, "Foreign Trade Statistics," http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046.

²⁹⁸ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "Statistics," <http://www.ktbayatirimisletmeler.gov.tr/TR,9854/sinir-giris-cikis-istatistikleri.html>

²⁹⁹ Ozum S. Uzun. "Economic Sanctions on Iran: Is It Iran's Nuclear Program or the Government Getting Fragile?" *Ortadogu Analiz* 5, no. 54 (2013): 68.

bookings from Iranian tourists.³⁰⁰ The impact of the temporary softening the sanctions on tourism is important to understand the sanctions' negative effects on tourism in Turkey.




Figure 3. Change in Number of Iranian Tourists who Visited Turkey from 2010 to 2013.³⁰¹

Table 5 provides a year-by-year comparison of the change in the number of Iranian tourists who visited Turkey between 2010 and 2013.

Table 5. Change in Number of Iranian Tourists who Visited Turkey from 2010 to 2013.³⁰²

YEAR	VISITORS FROM IRAN TO TURKEY (Million)	CHANGE RATE ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS YEAR (%)	IRANIAN VISITORS RATE TO TOTAL VISITORS OF TURKEY (%)
2010	1.885	36.28	6.58
2011	1.889	-0.31	5.97
2012	1.186	-36.87	3.73
2013	1.196	0.88	3.43

³⁰⁰ Yeliz Candemir and Joe Parkinson. "Turkey Expects Boon to Trade With Iran from Nuclear Deal Easing Sanctions." *Wall Street Journal*, November 28, 2013.

³⁰¹ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "Statistics," <http://www.ktbayirimisletmeler.gov.tr/TR,9854/sinir-giris-cikis-istatistikleri.html>.

³⁰² Ibid.

2. Turkey's High Dependency on Foreign States for Oil and Natural Gas

A potential crisis, such as imposing new sanctions on Iran or war between Iran and the West, may increase petroleum prices in the world. Since Turkey is highly dependent on foreign states for oil and natural gas, this kind of situation would raise the current account deficit of Turkey.³⁰³ Thus, by engaging in the nuclear deal with Iran, Turkey attempted to prevent a potential crisis or war, which would have had serious impacts on its economy.

Iran has the fourth largest proved oil reserves and the second largest natural gas reserves in the world.³⁰⁴ According to the data from OPEC in 2010, the proven crude oil reserve of Iran is 151.17 billion barrels.³⁰⁵ Having huge reserves of oil and important oil producing capacity make Iran an important actor in determining the crude oil price. According to a report from the IMF, the crude oil prices can rise up to 30 percent if Iran stops its oil exports completely as a result of the sanctions.³⁰⁶

Turkey is paying more than \$60 billion per year for energy imports. If the deal was successful, Iran would increase daily production of oil that might reduce oil prices. Considering that sanctions on Iran caused a 10 percent increase in oil prices so far, a decrease in oil prices would reduce Turkey's current account deficit around \$6 billion per year.³⁰⁷

3. Turkey's Aims to be an Energy Bridge between East and West

Finding secure energy sources and establishing permanent supply are two of the main concerns of many countries that lack necessary natural resources and are highly dependent on other states. As the Caspian and Middle East region have a significant

³⁰³ Abdurrahman Yildirim. "Anlaşma En Çok Türkiye'ye Yarar," [An Agreement Would Mostly be to the Advantage of Turkey] *HaberTurk*, November 26, 2013.

³⁰⁴ Sariaslan, "The Economic Relations between Turkey and Iran in 2000s," 77.

³⁰⁵ OPEC, "Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011," Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Vienna, Austria, 2011.

³⁰⁶ Lesley Wroughton and Timothy Gardner "IMF: Halt in Iran Oil Could Push Crude Up 30 Percent," Reuters, January 25, 2012.

³⁰⁷ Yildirim. "Anlaşma En çok Türkiye'ye Yarar."

amount of energy resources, such as oil and natural gas, establishing secure energy lines with these regions increased in importance in the 21st century.³⁰⁸

Turkey's geographical position constitutes a linkage point between east and west. As a natural geographic bridge, Turkey is the door between Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan and Europe. Its success in energy projects such as the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline contributed to its reputation and strengthened its place as reliable energy partner for European Countries.³⁰⁹ As a result of this partnership, Turkey is considered the most feasible and viable route for energy transportation both in political and economic terms for transporting energy sources from Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, to the West.³¹⁰

Turkey's geostrategic position, its secure political and economic environment, and Western dependency on energy sources are important factors to understand Turkey's significance as a potential energy bridge. Peace between Iran and the West would make Iran an important energy exporting country and contribute enormously to energy supply, which would definitely strengthen Turkey's role as an energy bridge. Lifting the sanctions imposed on Iran would boost its return to the world trade and oil market, which would turn Turkey into a significant player in the energy market. Thus, the potential economic benefits of being an energy bridge between East and West was the third economic reason that made the deal significant for Turkey.

C. CONCLUSION

In sum, the 2010 Iran-Turkey-Brazil nuclear deal was both politically and economically significant for Turkey. The deal was politically significant for Turkey because it was seen as an important step by Turkish policy makers to maintain the newly adopted foreign policy perspective and to continue in the way of being a regional and

³⁰⁸ Cenk Pala. "Turkey: Energy Bridge between East and West," *Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics* 2, no. 4 (2007): 58.

³⁰⁹ Tuncay Babali. "The Role of Energy in Turkey's Relations with Russia and Iran," CSIS, March 29, 2012, 6. http://csis.org/files/attachments/120529_Babali_Turkey_Energy.pdf.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

global power. With the election of the AKP in 2002, Turkey has dramatically changed its foreign policy perspective and revised its goals in the international order. It started to strive for regional and global leadership and designed its foreign policy according to this goal. Turkey left passive, reaction-based approaches and began to follow more active policies. To reinforce its regional leadership role and to show continuity in its new foreign policy perspective, Turkey attempted to take over a mediator role in the deal. The deal was also politically significant for Turkey because Turkey considered it as an important opportunity to move one step further in its historical rivalry with Iran. Although there has been no armed conflict between Turkey and Iran since 1823, both states have been struggling for regional leadership for a long time. There are very few examples that they agreed on and acted together in history. So, Iran's success in solving the nuclear issue on its own could decrease Turkey's importance in the eyes of great powers as a strategic ally and provide a significant advantage for Iran in its struggle with Turkey for regional leadership. Finally, the deal was politically significant for Turkey because a nuclear Iran was a big threat for regional stability, which was an important goal for Turkey to realize its global leadership ambitions.

According to Turkey, nuclear Iran would destabilize the region in two ways. First, it may start a nuclear arm race in the Middle East; second, it may lead the great powers, particularly the United States, to intervene militarily. Both cases would have negative impacts on Turkey in terms of its politics and economy. In addition, the deal was economically significant for Turkey because of the negative impacts of the Iranian sanctions on Turkey. Sanctions impact Turkish-Iranian economic relations in three aspects. First, they reversed the increasing pattern in bilateral trade and decreased the trade volume. Second, due to sanctions, Turkish multinationals could not enter Iranian market and increase their investments there. Third, sanctions weakened Iranian society economically, which resulted in a remarkable decrease in Iranian tourism to Turkey. The deal was also economically significant for Turkey because Iran is one of the main suppliers of oil and natural gas; a potential crisis or war might considerably increase oil prices. Since Turkey is highly dependent on foreign states for oil and natural gas, a rise in oil prices would increase the current account deficit of Turkey. Finally, the deal was

economically significant for Turkey because tension between Iran and the West prevented Turkey from taking advantage of its geographical position in the energy market. If Turkey could solve the issue, it would have been an energy bridge between East and West that would have huge contributions to its economy.

V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2010 IRAN-TURKEY-BRAZIL NUCLEAR DEAL FOR BRAZIL

Iran's nuclear program has been one of the most controversial and polarized topics within the field of international relations since 1979.³¹¹ Although the United States and other European states were the main players in establishing nuclear facilities in Iran during the 1950s and 1960s, after the regime change in Iran in 1979, they—particularly the United States—began to strongly oppose the nuclear program of Iran.³¹² Starting with the hostage crisis in 1979, the relationship between Iran and the United States was broken.³¹³ From that time on the United States has tried to deter Iran from continuing its nuclear program with economic sanctions. Until the end of the 20th century, almost all sanctions were unilateral and devoid of multilateral support.³¹⁴ Moreover, they caused friction between the United States and other states including China, Russia, EU members, and Japan, because they were disproportionate and not based on solid grounds.³¹⁵ Considering China and Russia's opposition until 21st century, the United States did not look for UN approval to impose sanctions on Iran.³¹⁶ However, the discovery of the uranium enrichment facility with the support of an opposition group in Natanz and a water production facility in Arak in 2002 changed the approach of opposing countries, particularly EU states, and brought them closer to the United States, which wanted to bring the issue to the UN Security council.³¹⁷ Although Iran seemingly stepped back for a while against international pressure, it toughened its stance after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 and resumed its uranium enrichment at Natanz in 2006,

³¹¹ Gurzel and Ersoy, "Turkey and Iran's Nuclear Program," 37.

³¹² "Blasts from the Past: Western Support for Iran's Nuclear Program," Iran Affairs, May 30, 2006. http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2006/05/blasts_from_the.html.

³¹³ Uzun, "Economic Sanctions on Iran: Is It Iran's Nuclear Program or the Government Getting Fragile?" 66.

³¹⁴ Richard N. Haas, ed., *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Book, 1998), 85.

³¹⁵ Ibid., 90.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 89.

³¹⁷ Gurzel and Ersoy, "Turkey and Iran's Nuclear Program," 40.

which motivated the IAEA to bring the issue to the UN Security Council.³¹⁸ From 2006 to 2009, the UN Security Council adopted five resolutions against Iran: in July 2006, Res.1696; in December 2006, Res.1737; in March 2007, Res.1747; in March 2008, Res.1803; and in September 2008, Res.1835.³¹⁹

Despite measures taken by great powers, Iran continued to develop its nuclear program and increased its supply of low-enriched uranium (LEU).³²⁰ If it could enrich its LEU to 85 percent, it could transform it into high-enriched uranium (HEU) that could be used to produce a nuclear warhead.³²¹ Iran needed around 25–50 kg of high-enriched uranium, which could be converted from 1300 kg of low-enriched uranium, to manufacture a warhead and by the middle of 2009 it gathered more than 1500 kg of LEU.³²² These developments increased the concerns of the great powers. However, in June 2009, Iran notified the IAEA that it was looking for fuel pads for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), a medical reactor considered by permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany as a tacit message for negotiating its nuclear program.³²³ Considering this attempt an olive branch, the United States, other permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Germany began to prepare an offer that would satisfy both sides. Knowing that directly requesting a suspension from Iran did not work, the United States focused on taking “confidence-building measures.”³²⁴ Based on this idea, during the preparation period, the United States wanted to benefit from Brazil’s increasing relations with Iran and sent its diplomats to Brasilia to get Brazil’s support in convincing Iran to accept the nuclear agreement.³²⁵ In October 2009, Iran in principle accepted P5+1’s offer according to the following:

³¹⁸ “Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” *New York Times*.

³¹⁹ Kelsey Davenport, “UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran,” Arms Control Association, August 1, 2012, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran>.

³²⁰ Parsi, *A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran*, 114.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Kassenova, *Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 70.

³²⁴ Parsi, *A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran*, 115.

³²⁵ Kassenova, *Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 70.

- Iran exports 1,200 kilograms of LEU in a single batch before the end of the 2009.
- Russia further enriches Iran's LEU to about 20%, a process producing about 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium for the TRR fuel rods.
- France manufactures the TRR fuel rods for delivery about one year after the conclusion of the agreement, prior to the depletion of the current TRR fuel supply.
- The United States works with the IAEA to improve safety and control implementation at the TRR.³²⁶

However, due to domestic opposition, Iran finally refused the deal, and this attempt ended with failure.³²⁷

On March 2010, Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State, paid a visit to Brazil to negotiate Iran's nuclear issue. Moreover, in April, Recep Tayyip Erdogan along with Lula da Silva met with Barack Obama in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC and discussed engaging a new deal with Iran. One week later, Obama sent a letter to Brazil's president regarding the potential deal with Iran, which was considered by Brazilian officials as an indicator of U.S. readiness to engage in a deal with Iran under the same conditions of the deal of 2009.³²⁸

After long negotiations, on May 17, 2010, Brazil, along with Turkey, managed to convince Iran to agree to a nuclear deal under the same conditions as the one on October 2009.³²⁹ Most of the world press announced the deal as unprecedented and an indicator of Brazil and Turkey's success as rising powers.³³⁰ However, due to the concern of the great powers, including the United States, Europe, and Russia, that the deal was "a deftly timed attempt to throw the sanctions effort off track,"³³¹ the deal failed. Later on, Celso

³²⁶ Arms Control Association, "History of the Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue," updated January 2014, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Kassenova. *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 72.

³²⁹ For the text of the deal, see "Nuclear Fuel Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil," BBC News, May 17, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8686728.stm.

³³⁰ "Uranyum Takası Dünya Basınında," [Uranium Swap in the World Press] *Sabah*, May 18, 2010.

³³¹ Sanger and Slackman, "U.S. Is Skeptical on Iranian Deal for Nuclear Fuel."

Amorim, the Brazilian foreign minister of the time, surprisingly declared that both Brazil and Turkey engaged in the deal because the United States wanted them to do so.³³² His revelation seemed to weaken the consideration of Turkey and Brazil as significant global players. Moreover, it ostensibly decreased the significance of the deal for Brazil and Turkey. However, this chapter argues that the nuclear deal with Iran was a win-win game designed in a way to benefit both the United States and Brazil in different ways. The United States used Brazil and Turkey as a tool to strengthen its hand to legitimize sanctions both inside and outside of the country. It not only punished Iran but also limited its influence over it by imposing unilateral sanctions. Until recently, the United States' sanctions failed to secure multilateral support, which increased Iran's resistance against U.S. measures.³³³ Although the United States could partly affect the Iranian economy through sanctions, it failed to completely isolate Iran from the world.³³⁴ Iran continued to take advantage of the division in the UN Security Council and world public opinion to evade the destroying impacts of sanctions.³³⁵ Russia, for instance, had an important trade and nuclear collaboration with Iran that diminished the effects of sanctions.³³⁶ By using different actors, like Brazil and Turkey, the United States attempted to show that Iran was not open to any diplomatic enterprise and sanctions were the best way to solve the issue. If Iran had refused the deal, the United States would have convinced the opponents of sanctions both inside and outside, which would have decreased domestic pressure and increased the impacts of sanctions. Brazil accepted to take part in this deal because the deal suited its political and economic interests. The deal was politically significant for Brazil because it also has nuclear motivations. It signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with hesitation in 1998³³⁷ and continues to oppose nonproliferation measures at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) level by not signing

³³² Amorim, "Contribuicao Especial, Seguranca Internacional: Novos Desafios Para o Brazil," 305.

³³³ Haas, ed., *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, 85.

³³⁴ Uzun, "Economic Sanctions on Iran: Is It Iran's Nuclear Program or the Government Getting Fragile?" 66.

³³⁵ Parsi, *A Single Role of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran*, 120.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Patti, "Brazil and the Nuclear Issues in the Years of the Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva Government (2003–2010)," 181.

additional protocol.³³⁸ In defending Iran, Brazil was in part defending its own position regarding nuclear safeguards, IAEA inspections, militarized nuclear programs, and nuclear autonomy.³³⁹ Second, Brazil prioritized its relations with Asian, African, and Middle Eastern states during the Lula da Silva Era. So, by defending Iran, Brazil tried to strengthen its position in the eyes of these states that believed that the world order should change. Third, Brazil has historically supported diplomatic solutions to international disputes. As a requirement of this policy, it opposed sanctions. Fourth, by accepting the demand of the United States, Brazil avoided a direct confrontation with the United States that did not serve its interests. When it comes to economic significance, Brazil tried to kill three birds with one stone by engaging in this deal. First, trying to prevent sanctions against Iran meant supporting its economic interests because Brazil had an increasing economic relationship with Iran, which was threatened by sanctions.³⁴⁰ Second, Iran was in the group of states like China and Russia that also criticized the current unipolar system. So, by supporting Iran, Brazil attempted to consolidate its economic relations with other parts of the world. Third, by accepting the U.S. request to engage in the deal, Brazil sought not to endanger its economic relations with the United States.

A. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

1. Nuclear Reasons: Brazil Defended Its Own Position

One of the main political reasons that made the deal significant for Brazil was Brazil's nuclear ambitions. The nuclear deal was important for Brazil because by defending Iran, Brazil was defending its own position in nuclear issues. In other words, Brazil wants to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes and to avoid being subjected to the same policies by the United States and the United Nations (UN).³⁴¹ It aimed to bring the issue to the public agenda and show the double-standard of the great powers.³⁴² In

³³⁸ "Nuclear Weapons Programs," Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/brazil/nuke.htm>.

³³⁹ Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 82.

³⁴⁰ Bar'el, "Why Does Iran See Turkey as an 'Honest Broker' for a Nuclear Deal?"

³⁴¹ Parsi, *A Single Role of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran*, 174.

³⁴² Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 4.

2010, Brazil claimed that the nonproliferation regime was unfair, for it only serves nuclear countries and it applies disproportionate pressure over non-nuclear-states.³⁴³ According to Brazil, the difference between U.S. attitudes toward Iran and other states such as Israel and India is obvious evidence of this injustice.³⁴⁴ For instance, although India developed nuclear bombs in 1974 and 1998 and it did not sign NPT, the United States made an agreement with India in 2008 “to sell nuclear fuel, technology, and reactors to New Delhi for peaceful energy.”³⁴⁵ Moreover, Brazil argues that great powers arbitrarily use the Nonproliferation Treaty as an instrument to suppress weak states.³⁴⁶

Brazil’s first serious attempt to develop nuclear technology dates back to the early 1950s.³⁴⁷ It has approximately 5 percent of the total uranium reserves of the world and wants to take advantage of this prosperity.³⁴⁸ The regime change in 1964 accelerated Brazil’s efforts and its nuclear works peaked between 1964 and 1985.³⁴⁹ Although Brazil claimed to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, foreign nuclear experts of the time believed that it sought to develop atomic weapons through its nuclear programs, particularly between the 1970s and early 1990s.³⁵⁰ In 1975, for instance, Brazil signed a nuclear deal with West Germany to get necessary technical support, which some Western states considered as an attempt to develop atomic bombs. Brazil’s refusal to sign the NPT and Tlatelolco agreements, its rivalry with Argentina and its regime of military dictatorship strengthened concerns in the international arena. However, economic conditions of the time prevented Brazil from reaching its ambitions of using nuclear

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Spektor, “U.S. Nuclear Accommodation of Brazil a Model for Iran Policy?”

³⁴⁵ Arturo C. Sotomayor, “Brazil and Mexico in the Non-proliferation Regime,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 20, no.1 (2013): 96.

³⁴⁶ Matias Spektor, “Why Brazil Is a Broker with Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 17, 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/brazil/why-brazil-broker-iran/p22139>.

³⁴⁷ Kassenova. *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 36.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 45.

³⁴⁹ “Nuclear Power in Brazil,” World Nuclear Association, 2014, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Brazil/>.

³⁵⁰ NTI, “Brazil-Overview,” October 2014, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/brazil/>.

energy.³⁵¹ By the 1990s, due to the impact of the transition to democracy, Brazil joined the non-proliferation regime, but it continued to criticize the unjust structure of the regime.³⁵² In 1991, it signed the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).³⁵³ As a result of long discussions, Brazil accepted the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994 and with hesitation became a full member of the NPT in 1998.³⁵⁴ A significant number of Brazilians opposed the signing of the deal arguing that it was a strategic mistake.³⁵⁵ Lula da Silva, presidential candidate of the Workers' Party of the time, highly criticized the Cardoso government on the grounds that signing the NPT would only serve the interests of the great powers and support the unfair international order.³⁵⁶

After the election of Lula da Silva, Brazil continued to have problems with the international non-proliferation regime. In 2004, he prevented IAEA inspectors from entering some parts of its nuclear reactor at Resende, which was under construction at that time, citing the need to defend “proprietary technological and commercial information.”³⁵⁷ He also re-established a military plan to produce nuclear-propelled submarines.³⁵⁸ Brazil wanted to produce nuclear-propelled submarines, because policy makers considered it a significant step in the way of national technological development.³⁵⁹ In the same period, Iran limited inspections in its nuclear facilities as well. To escape from being compared to Iran, Brazil preferred to postpone the

³⁵¹ Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1997, 1, <http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/barletta.pdf>.

³⁵² Arturo, Sotomayor, “U.S.-Latin American Nuclear Relations: From Commitment to Defiance,” *Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Report 2012-2013* (2012), 2.

³⁵³ Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 63.

³⁵⁴ Sotomayor, “Brazil and Mexico in the Non-proliferation Regime,” 93.

³⁵⁵ Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 53.

³⁵⁶ Patti, “Brazil and the Nuclear Issues in the Years of the Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva Government (2003-2010),” 179.

³⁵⁷ Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 11.

³⁵⁸ Sotomayor, “U.S.-Latin American Nuclear Relations: From Commitment to Defiance,” 2.

³⁵⁹ Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 37.

inauguration of Resende for a short period of time.³⁶⁰ IAEA members and Brazil reached an agreement in November 2004 and Brazil completed and opened its Resende nuclear facility to enrich uranium for commercial purposes on May 6, 2006.³⁶¹ However, these developments did not change Brazil's opposition to the IAEA, for it was desperately in need of nuclear power to solve its energy shortage problem.³⁶² Brazil is highly dependent on hydro-resources to meet its electricity requirements.³⁶³ Hydro-resources constitute more than 80 percent of its electricity production while gas constitutes 6 percent, biomass and waste constitute 6 percent, and nuclear only constitutes 3 percent.³⁶⁴ In 2008, Brazil declared that it would not sign the IAEA's Additional Protocol unless nuclear-states "have made progress towards nuclear disarmament."³⁶⁵ In Brazil, there are currently two nuclear power reactors in operation, ANGRA 1, and ANGRA 2. A third one, ANGRA 3, is scheduled to be operational as of December 2015.³⁶⁶

2. The Prioritization of Relations with Asian, African, and Middle Eastern States

A second political reason that made the nuclear deal significant for Brazil was Brazil's priority of relations with other parts of world in the 21st century. With the election of Lula da Silva in 2003, Brazil had begun to prioritize its relations with Asian, African, and Middle Eastern states.³⁶⁷ Brazil has since made this focus concrete through multi-lateral networks such as: BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), an economic group; IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa,) an emerging democratic powers' group; BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), a group regarding climate change; G77, group of developing countries; MERCOSUR, a regional common market

³⁶⁰ Sotomayor, "Brazil and Mexico in the Non-proliferation Regime," 97.

³⁶¹ Daphne Morrison, "Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present," NTI, September 1, 2006, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/brazils-nuclear-ambitions/>.

³⁶² Sotomayor, "Brazil and Mexico in the Non-proliferation Regime," 97.

³⁶³ Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 41–42.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ NTI, "Brazil-Overview."

³⁶⁶ "Nuclear Power in Brazil," World Nuclear Association, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Brazil/>.

³⁶⁷ Trinkunas, "Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance," 20.

established in 1991 with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay; and UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations. The common denominator of these groups is criticizing the injustice of the current system. Central to Brazil's claim to take part in these groups is being the voice of aggrieved states against this inequality.³⁶⁸ According to Brazil, "the global nuclear order is a microcosm of the global world order."³⁶⁹ By defending Iran, Brazil tried to strengthen its position in the eyes of these states that believed that the world order should change.³⁷⁰ On the other hand, Brazil's prioritization of its relations with Asian, African, and Middle Eastern states, particularly in the Lula da Silva era, at the expense of its relations with developed world can be explained by Roman general and statesman Julius Caesar's psychology: "I had rather be first in a village than second at Rome." As a result of long term exclusion by the great powers from critical decision-making positions, such as permanent membership in the UN Security Council, Brazil turned its face from the developing world and tried to increase its relations with them in the 21st century. As a result of this change, during that period it opened more than thirty new embassies all around the world.³⁷¹ Brazil has currently 34 embassies in African states and Lula da Silva made eleven official visits to this continent, comprising 25 countries.³⁷²

3. The Historical Legacy of Soft Power and Diplomacy

Another significant political aspect of the nuclear deal for Brazil was its historical legacy of diplomacy. Brazil has constantly favored the use of diplomacy throughout history.³⁷³ It has always intended to be seen as a soft power state that reaches its goals through peaceful solutions instead of brute force.³⁷⁴ Brazilian decision makers have put

³⁶⁸ Ibid., 20–21.

³⁶⁹ Kassenova. *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 14.

³⁷⁰ "Nuclear Weapons Programs," Global Security.

³⁷¹ Spektor, "Why Brazil Is a Broker with Iran."

³⁷² Julia E. Sweig and David Herrero, "Brazil As an Emerging Global Power: Implications for U.S.-Brazil Relations," Aspen Institute, http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/congressional/Sweig_Essay_0.pdf.

³⁷³ Trinkunas, "Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance," 22.

³⁷⁴ Kassenova. *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 10–11.

this perspective in their federal constitution to arrange their foreign relations. According to Article 4 of their constitution, “national independence, prevalence of human rights, self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, equality among states, defense of peace, peaceful conflict resolution, rejection of terrorism and racism, cooperation among peoples for the progress of humanity and concession of political asylum,” are the leading principles of Brazil in its foreign relations.³⁷⁵ As a requirement of this perspective, Brazil opposed sanctions and supported Iran’s right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Considering that Brazil’s last war in the region was against Paraguay in the 1860s, it is possible to see diplomacy’s significance for Brazil in international relations.³⁷⁶ As a temporary member of the Security Council in 2010 and 2011, Brazil’s efforts against the United Nations’ interventionist resolutions towards Libya and Syria were the two latest examples that showed Brazil’s adherence to soft power measures.³⁷⁷ Moreover, encouraged by long-term diplomatic experience, Brazilian diplomats believe that they have a unique ability in reconciling different groups, so President Lula da Silva hoped to “showcase Brazil’s unique ability to convene opposing parties.”³⁷⁸

4. Avoiding Direct Confrontation

The other political aspect of the nuclear deal for Brazil was directly related to U.S.-Brazil relations. Although it was believed at first that Brazil and Turkey engaged in the deal on their own, the Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim’s statements revealed that the United States wanted them to do so.³⁷⁹ Brazil historically has the policy of non-confrontation with the United States.³⁸⁰ Throughout history, both states sporadically experienced tensions, but never confrontation.³⁸¹ By accepting the demand of the United States, Brazil avoided a direct confrontation that did not serve its interests. In this case

³⁷⁵Vidigal, “Brazil: A Cordial Power? Brazilian Diplomacy in the Early 21st Century,” 36.

³⁷⁶ Kassenova. *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 7.

³⁷⁷ Sweig and Herrero, “Brazil As an Emerging Global Power: Implications for U.S.-Brazil Relations.”

³⁷⁸ Trinkunas, “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” 24.

³⁷⁹ Amorim, “Contribuicao Especial ,Seguranca International: Novos Desafios Para o Brazil,” 305.

³⁸⁰ Vidigal, “Brazil: A Cordial Power? Brazilian Diplomacy in the Early 21st Century,” 35.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

Brazil behaved opportunistically, which “reflected the contradictions inherent in its approach to international relations.”³⁸² While it has tried to strengthen its position in the developing world by criticizing the existing international order, it has maintained good relations with the United States. This two-faced policy best serves its economic interests.

B. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE

The economy has been one of the main determinants in the formation of Brazil’s foreign policy throughout history. Since the early 20th century, considering economic interests has been a prerequisite before taking steps in foreign policy. Brazil’s engagement in the nuclear deal with Iran is an example of continuity in this perception. The nuclear deal with Iran had three different aspects for Brazil in terms of its economic significance. First, Brazil attempted to prevent sanctions that had a negative impact on its economic relations with Iran. Second, by appearing to defend Iran, Brazil attempted to reinforce its position in the eyes of developing world, which played a key role in its economic increase in the 21st century. Third, by doing what the United States wanted it to do, Brazil sought not to endanger its economic relations with the United States. Although its words contradicted with its deeds, this was a requirement for one of its foreign policy principles: pragmatism.

1. Brazil’s Economic Relations with Iran

Brazil’s formal relations with Iran date back to the beginning of the 20th century. After the signing of the Cultural Cooperation Agreement in 1957, both states have made 46 more agreements in the fields of economy, trade, science, and education.³⁸³ Both states’ economic relations peaked in the 21st century. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) started to inspect charges of Iran’s secret nuclear activities in 2002 and concluded that Iran violated the IAEA safeguards agreement. It brought the issue to the United Nation Security Council in 2006, which approved six more resolutions

³⁸² Trinkunas, “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance,” 22.

³⁸³ Embassy of Islamic Republic of Iran-Brasilia, “History of Iran and Brazil’s Relations,” <http://brasilia.mfa.ir/index.aspx?fkeyid=&siteid=232&pageid=28565>.

until 2014, including resolutions in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013.³⁸⁴ Resolution 1929³⁸⁵ was accepted right after the 2010 nuclear deal on June 2010.³⁸⁶ These resolutions had a negative impact on trade volumes in Brazil and Iran, which made the deal economically significant for Brazil.³⁸⁷ Before the 2010 deal with Iran, Brazil signed “a series of trade deals that are expected to increase bilateral trade between their countries to about \$10 billion.”³⁸⁸

a. An Overview of Brazil-Iran Economic Relations Since 1994

As shown in Table 6 and Figure 4, Brazil’s economic relations increased very much in the 21st century and reached their peak in 2010 and 2011. However, these relations experienced significant decreases, particularly right after the UN Security Council’s resolutions against Iran. Although some other factors, such as the 2008 economic crisis, played important roles in these decreases, the UN Security Council’s resolutions impact is undeniable.

³⁸⁴ United Nations, “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1737 (2006),” <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/resolutions.shtml>.

³⁸⁵ IAEA, “Resolution 1929 (2010),” June 9, 2010, http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf.

³⁸⁶ Paul K. Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations,” (CRS Report No. R40094) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 1.

³⁸⁷ Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 82.

³⁸⁸ Bar’el, “Why Does Iran See Turkey as an ‘Honest Broker’ for a Nuclear Deal?”

Table 6. An Overview of Brazil-Iran Economic Relations since 1994.³⁸⁹

Years	Export (Thousand Dollars)	Change (%)	Import (Thousand Dollars)	Change (%)	Volume (Thousand Dollars)	Balance (Thousand Dollars)
1994	184,020.24	-28.6	298,694.88	-11.8	482,715.12	-114,674.64
1995	256,270.48	28.2	254,986.13	-14.6	511,256.61	1,284.35
1996	184,086.40	-28.2	536,802.34	110	720,888.74	-352,715.94
1997	244,761.28	24.7	344,553.86	-36	589,315.14	-99,792.58
1998	489,530.94	50	150,947.78	-56	640,478.72	338,583.16
1999	494,529.46	1	54,287.56	-64	548,817.02	440,241.90
2000	292,842.55	-40.8	9,936.21	-81.6	302,778.76	282,906.34
2001	441,954.57	51	3,255.00	-67	445,209.57	438,699.57
2002	491,530.88	11	9,180.37	182	500,711.25	482,350.51
2003	869,163.68	77	13,842.04	50	883,005.72	855,321.64
2004	1,132,776.06	30	2,695.76	-80	1,135,471.82	1,130,080.30
2005	968,631.11	-14.5	2,962.24	1	971,593.33	965,668.87
2006	1,568,168.32	62	30,897.54	943	1,599,065.86	1,537,270.78
2007	1,837,597.51	17	10,999.68	-64.3	1,848,597.19	1,826,597.83
2008	1,133,379.11	-38	14,782.92	34	1,148,162.03	1,118,596.19
2009	1,218,107.18	7.5	18,977.49	28.3	1,237,084.67	1,199,129.69
2010	2,120,323.82	74	123,257.40	549	2,243,581.22	1,997,066.42
2011	2,332,247.36	1	35,245.45	-71.4	2,367,492.81	2,297,001.91
2012	2,183,927.96	-6	23,720.38	-32.6	2,207,648.34	2,160,207.58
2013	1,609,136.60	-26.3	8,613.48	-63.6	1,617,750.08	1,600,523.12

³⁸⁹ World Bank, "Country Profiles," [http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/BRA/StartYear/1989/EndYear/1993/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/Trade%20Value%20\(US\\$%20Thousand\)/Partner/IRN/Product/All%20Groups](http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/BRA/StartYear/1989/EndYear/1993/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/Trade%20Value%20(US$%20Thousand)/Partner/IRN/Product/All%20Groups).




Figure 4. An Overview of Brazil-Iran Economic Relations since 1994.³⁹⁰

Food ranks first in Brazil's exports to Iran. Brazil became Iran's largest provider of beef in 2011. Moreover, in Lula's first year in office in 2003, Iran made an agreement with the Brazilian state-owned oil company Petrobras for an off-shore exploration privilege, which did not last because that area of exploration was not feasible for commercial investment. This agreement cost Brazil \$178 million.³⁹¹

2. Brazil's Economic Relations with China and other Parts of the World

Especially from the second half of the 20th century, Brazil has tried to head the Third World to reorganize the international economic order.³⁹² According to some analysts, these attempts, including the South-South foreign policy approach, prevents it from increasing its economic relations with the United States and the European Union because Brazilian policy makers believe that this kind of increase might have a negative

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 82.

³⁹² Cervo, "Political Regimes and Brazil's Foreign Policy," 346.

impact on Brazil's relations with developing world.³⁹³ As a requirement for this perspective, supporting Iran against the United States and Europe would strengthen Brazil's economic relations with other parts of the world.

During the Lula da Silva era, Brazil had attempted to increase its economic and political relations with the developing world through different enterprises. The South-South policy is one of those ventures, based on the idea that existing international financial and political organizations did not sufficiently represent the South.³⁹⁴ That was why India, Brazil, and South Africa established IBSA in 2003, which "covers a number of areas, from defense and energy to trade and health."³⁹⁵ Moreover, Brazil, along with Russia, India, China, and South Africa, founded BRICS in 2009, which attempts to increase representation of its members in international financial organizations. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the deep interest of Asian states, particularly China, in Brazil's commodities has helped Brazil strengthen its economy.³⁹⁶ While Brazil was not among the wealthiest economies of the world with around \$203 billion in 1983, it became the world's seventh largest economy with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$2.245 trillion in 2013.³⁹⁷ While China ranked 12th among Brazil's export partners in 2000 with around \$1 billion and 1.8 percent share, it became Brazil's first export partner in 2013 with around \$46 billion and 19 percent share.³⁹⁸ Table 7 shows Brazil's top trading partners in 2013.

³⁹³ Priscilla Yeon, "Brazil and the United States: Trade Agendas and Challenges of the Bilateral Relationship," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Brazil Institute Special Report (April, 2008), 3.

³⁹⁴ Kassenova. *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*, 11–12.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ John Whalley and Dana Medianu, "The Deepening China Brazil Economic Relationship," *CESifo Working Papers*, 3289 (2010), 3.

³⁹⁷ The World Bank, "World Development Indicators Database," <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>.

³⁹⁸ "United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database," BEC, <http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.aspx?cc=TOTAL&rg=2&px=BE&r=76&y=2013>.

Table 7. Brazil's Top Trading Partners in 2013.³⁹⁹

	Export(2013)			Import(2013)		
		Value (Million Dollars)	%		Value (Million Dollars)	%
1	China	46,026	19	China	37,302	15.6
2	USA	24,866	10.3	USA	36,280	15.1
3	Argentina	19,615	8.1	Argentina	16,463	6.9
4	Netherland	17,326	7.1	Germany	15,182	6.3
5	Japan	7,964	3.3	Nigeria	9,647	4

Moreover, during the Lula da Silva era, Brazil increased its economic relations with other parts of the world through multinationals and government organizations. These groups spread to different parts of the world and began to work in the fields of telecommunication, technology, energy, food, agriculture, transportation, and mining, which returned as an input to the Brazilian economy.⁴⁰⁰ Some of the leading multinationals of Brazil that played a key role in economic boom in the 21st century are: Embraer, a commercial aircraft manufacturer operating in the United States, China, Portugal, Singapore, and France; Vale, metal and mining company, operating in all continents; Petrobras, oil company, operating in 27 countries including Angola, Benin, Gabon, Namibia, Nigeria, and Argentina; and Odebreacht, engineering and construction company, operating in particularly Africa.⁴⁰¹ Thanks to these enterprises, for instance, Brazil increased its trade with Africa to \$20.6 billion in 2013.⁴⁰² Similarly, Brazil's trade with MERCOSUR increased 86 percent, with Andean states 253 percent, and with Mexico 121 percent between 2000 and 2009.⁴⁰³

³⁹⁹ "United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database," <http://comtrade.un.org/db/mr/daReportersResults.aspx?bw=B>.

⁴⁰⁰ Lourdes Casanova and Julian Kassum, "Brazilian Emerging Multinationals: In Search of a Second Wind." *Faculty & Research Working Paper*, 2013, 3.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Sweig and Herrero, "Brazil as an Emerging Global Power: Implications for U.S.-Brazil Relations."

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

3. Brazil's Economic Relations with the United States

Despite all of its criticism regarding the injustice of the international system, which is mainly dominated by the United States, Brazil continues to attach importance to its economic relations with the United States. That was why, by accepting the United States' demand to engage in the 2010 deal, Brazil sought to strengthen its economic relations with the United States. The United States was the top trading partner of Brazil until 2009, when China unseated it from that position.⁴⁰⁴ However, it continues to be the second largest trade partner of Brazil (see Table 7).⁴⁰⁵ On the other hand, Brazil is also a significant trading partner for the United States. As of 2013, it is the seventh largest importer from the United States, at around \$44.1 billion.⁴⁰⁶

During Lula da Silva's era, trade between Brazil and the United States increased threefold. Between 2006 and 2011, Brazil's goods and service imports from the United States increased more than twofold from \$26 billion to \$62.7 billion. From 2002 to 2011, Brazil's goods imports from the United States tripled from \$12.4 billion to \$42.9 billion. In the same period, Brazil's service imports from the United States tripled, too, from \$5.1 billion to \$19.9 billion. By the end of 2010, Brazil's capital investment in the United States was \$15.5 billion, which made Brazil the leader of Latin America in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI). Between 2003 and 2012, Brazilian companies made 81 agreements to make investments in the United States, which costs around \$3.37 billion.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁴ "United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, 2009," <http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.aspx?cc=TOTAL&px=BE&r=76&y=2009>.

⁴⁰⁵ "United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, 2014," <http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.aspx?cc=TOTAL&px=BE&r=76&y=2013>.

⁴⁰⁶ "List of Importing Markets for the Product Exported by United States of America in 2013," Trade Map. http://www.trademap.org/Country_SelProductCountry.aspx.

⁴⁰⁷ The White House, "Fact Sheet: The U.S.-Brazil Economic Relationship," April 9, 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/09/fact-sheet-us-brazil-economic-relationship>.

Some analysts argue that Brazil's foreign and trade policies are so entwined that the Ministry of Foreign Relations is more effective than other agencies in shaping the country's trade policies.⁴⁰⁸ Moreover, they believe that due to the dominance of the foreign ministry in trade policies, commercial interests are being sacrificed for the sake of foreign policies.⁴⁰⁹ In addition, they claim that, despite the fact that economic cooperation with the developed world would be more beneficial for Brazil in terms of its economy in the long run, Brazil has concentrated on strengthening its leadership position in MERCOSUR and improving its economic relations with Asian, African, and Middle Eastern countries to increase its international profile.⁴¹⁰ Considering the trade volume between Brazil and the United States, these arguments do not reflect the truth. Although it is a fact that Brazil is afraid of offending its developing world allies by increasing its relations with the United States,⁴¹¹ it does not sacrifice the relationship with the United States in this cause. Instead, Brazil behaves opportunistically and tries to balance both sides.

a. *An Overview of Brazil-U.S. Economic Relations Since 1994*

As shown in Table 8 and Figure 5, Brazil's economic relations with the United States have a steady rising trend with some exceptions, such as 2008 economic crisis.

⁴⁰⁸Peter J. Meyer, "Brazil-U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, January 21, 2009, 9.

⁴⁰⁹Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Yeon, "Brazil and the United States: Trade Agendas and Challenges of the Bilateral Relationship," 2.

Table 8. An Overview of Brazil-US Economic Relations since 1994.⁴¹²

Years	Export (Thousand Dollars)	Change (%)	Import (Thousand Dollars)	Change (%)	Volume (Thousand Dollars)	Balance (Thousand Dollars)
1994	8,968,930.30	11.7	8,202,661.38	30.8	17,171,591.68	-8,202,661.30
1995	8,799,186.94	-1.8	12,751,772.67	55.4	21,550,959.61	-3,952,585.66
1996	9,312,372.74	5.8	12,631,657.47	-0.9	21,944,030.21	-3,319,284.66
1997	9,407,879.17	1	15,243,851.78	20	24,651,730.95	-5,835,972.53
1998	9,888,893.95	5.1	14,318,668.80	-1	24,207,562.75	-4,429,774.85
1999	10,867,537.24	9.8	12,413,572.93	-13.3	23,281,110.17	-1,546,035.70
2000	13,389,888.58	23	13,037,379.87	5	26,427,268.45	352,508.70
2001	14,398,230.08	7.5	13,050,768.72	0.1	27,448,998.80	1,347,461.40
2002	15,559,315.19	8	10,440,316.22	-20	25,999,631.41	5,118,999.00
2003	16,937,180.79	8.8	9,731,968.19	-6.8	26,669,148.98	7,205,212.60
2004	20,403,165.98	20.4	11,538,691.15	18.5	31,941,857.13	8,864,474.80
2005	22,810,093.52	11.8	12,854,779.95	11.4	35,664,872.00	9,955,313.10
2006	24,774,417.48	8.6	14,856,489.42	15.6	39,630,906.90	9,917,928.10
2007	25,335,516.49	3.8	18,889,840.24	27.1	44,225,356.73	6,445,676.30
2008	27,734,718.96	9.4	25,849,679.70	36.8	53,584,398.66	1,885,039.20
2009	15,744,930.25	-43.2	20,214,137.73	-21.8	35,959,067.98	-4,469,207.50
2010	19,240,185.21	22.2	27,200,503.12	34.5	46,440,688.33	-7,960,317.90
2011	25,942,952.81	34.8	34,233,525.68	25.8	60,176,478.49	-8,290,572.90
2012	26,849,876.49	3.5	32,607,902.41	-4.7	59,457,778.90	-5,758,025.90
2013	24,865,952.84	-7.3	36,280,346.30	11.26	61,146,299.14	-11,414,293.50

⁴¹² World Bank, "Country Profiles," [http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/BRA/StartYear/2009/EndYear/2013/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/Trade%20Value%20\(US\\$%20Thousand\)/Partner/USA/Product/All%20Groups](http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/BRA/StartYear/2009/EndYear/2013/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/Trade%20Value%20(US$%20Thousand)/Partner/USA/Product/All%20Groups).




Figure 5. An Overview of Brazil-U.S. Economic Relations since 1994.⁴¹³

C. CONCLUSION

The nuclear deal with Iran was both politically and economically significant for Brazil. It had four main political aspects: First, the deal overlapped with Brazil's nuclear interests. Brazil had similar nuclear ambitions to Iran, which were restricted by the unfair non-proliferation regime. By engaging in the 2010 deal, it attempted to defend its position. Second, in the 21st century, Brazil increased its relations with the developing world by arguing against the injustice of the existing international order. By defending Iran, Brazil tried to strengthen its position in the eyes of its new allies. Third, Brazil has a historical legacy of solving disputes through diplomacy. As a requirement of this legacy, it sought to prevent the United Nation Security Council from imposing sanctions against Iran. Fourth, Brazil adopted the principle of non-confrontation with the United States throughout its history. It took part in the deal because the United States urged it to do so. By fulfilling the request of the United States, Brazil attempted to not to confront with the United States and strengthen relations with it. In addition, the deal had three main economic aspects for Brazil: First, Brazil increased its economic relations with Iran, and

⁴¹³ Ibid.

the resolutions of the UN affected these relations negatively. Second, in the 21st century, Brazil has been developing its economic relations with other parts of the world that have been critical of the existing system. So, by taking part in the deal, Brazil attempted to reinforce its relations with these states. Third, although Brazil allegedly criticizes the international order, which is mainly governed by the United States, the United States continues to be one of the largest trade partners of Brazil. So, by joining the 2010 deal with Iran, it fulfilled the request of the United States and tried to not to jeopardize its economic relations.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Iran's nuclear program has been considered as one of the primary threats against the regional balance of power policies in the Middle East since the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Although Western powers, particularly the United States, played important roles in introducing nuclear power to Iran in the 1950s and 1960s, after the regime change in Iran in 1979, they have become the main opponents of its nuclear program due to security concerns. Their concerns regarding Iran's nuclear intentions increased in the mid-1990s and peaked in 2002 with the discovery of nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak.⁴¹⁴ Until then, there was not a consensus in the world about Iran as a nuclear threat. That was why the United States was the unique power that tried to deter Iran from its nuclear program through active measures, such as sanctions, without securing the United Nation's support. However, the discovery of nuclear facilities in 2002 helped the United States to convince other main actors that have a voice in international issues, such as the European Union. From 2002 to 2009, all attempts, including the UN Security Council's adoptions of resolutions against Iran and diplomatic initiatives, failed to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear program due to Iran's resistance and both parties' mutual distrust. When the issue came to a deadlock and there was no belief in diplomacy for solving the problem, the world saw a sudden light at the end of the tunnel. To the world's surprise, on May 17, 2010, two emerging powers, Turkey and Brazil, convinced Iran to negotiate its nuclear program and signed an agreement with it. Due to the skepticism of the great powers, particularly the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, regarding Iran's secret intentions and their opinion that Iran was playing for time, the deal ended with failure. However, it continued to be politically and economically significant for Turkey and Brazil.

There were three main political and three main economic elements of the deal for Turkey. The deal was politically significant for Turkey because Turkish policy makers considered it an important step to be a global power and to show continuity in their newly

⁴¹⁴ Gurzel and Ersoy, "Turkey and Iran's Nuclear Program," 40.

established foreign policy perspective. In the transition from empire to republic in 1923, Turkey modified its foreign policy goals and downsized its ambitions from a global level to the point of just aiming to protect the borders of the nation-state and maintaining its presence. From its establishment in 1923 to the end of the Cold War, the Republic of Turkey adopted passive and reactive foreign policies and tried to protect the status quo. However, the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of new era for Turkey when Turkish policy makers began to question old approaches and aim at regional and global leadership. With the election of the AKP government in 2002, Turkey has begun to materialize its global ambitions through active policies and signaled a return to the powerful days of the Ottoman Empire. It left passive and reactive policy perceptions and started to have a voice over international issues. As a requirement for this new policy perspective and increasing its leadership profile, the nuclear deal was an important opportunity for Turkey. The deal was also politically significant for Turkey because it was an important event in the historical Turkish-Iranian rivalry for regional leadership. If Iran had solved the issue on its own, it would become a strategic ally of the great powers in the region, which would undermine Turkey's regional leadership goals. By being a part of solution, Turkey attempted to prevent Iran from increasing its profile in the eyes of the great powers. Finally, the deal was politically significant for Turkey because Turkey considered a nuclear Iran a big threat to its security and the regional balance.

According to Turkey, a nuclear Iran might stimulate a nuclear arms race in the region and encourage the United States to intervene militarily. Both scenarios would have serious negative impacts on Turkey. In addition, there were three main economic reasons that made the deal significant for Turkey. First, sanctions had negative impacts on Turkey-Iran economic relations, such as the trade volume, Turkish multinational investments in Iran, and tourism. Turkey sought to solve the nuclear disagreement to increase its economic relations with Iran in all fields and to effectively take part in Iranian market. Second, a tension between Iran and other states caused an increase in oil and natural gas prices. Since Turkey is highly dependent on foreign states for these items, the increase in prices meant an increase in the budget deficit. So, Turkey tried to prevent any tension in the region to keep oil and natural gas prices under control. Third, due to

sanctions, Turkey could not take advantage of its geography as an energy bridge. The solution of the problem would boost Iran's oil production and turn Turkey into an energy bridge between the East and West, which meant a remarkable income for Turkey.

When it comes to Brazil, there were four main political and three main economic reasons that made the deal significant for Brazil. First, the deal was politically significant for Brazil because Brazil also had nuclear motivations. By defending Iran, Brazil sought to defend its own position regarding nuclear safeguards, IAEA inspections, militarized nuclear programs, and nuclear autonomy. The second political significance of the deal was that Brazil considered it an important tactic to strengthen its position in the eyes of Asian, African, and Middle Eastern states, which was important for its newly established foreign policy perspective in the 21st century. Third, Brazil historically supported the solution of international disputes through diplomacy. So, as a requirement for this perspective, it opposed sanctions and tried to bring Iran to the table to solve the issue through diplomacy. The fourth political aspect of the deal was Brazil's historical non-confrontation policy with the United States. Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim's explanations in 2010 showed that the United States wanted Brazil to engage in the deal. So, by taking part in the deal, Brazil sought not to subvert their alliance with the United States. In addition, there were three main economic reasons that made the deal significant for Brazil. First, similar to Turkey, sanctions had negative impacts on Brazil's increasing economic relations with Iran. By solving this issue, Brazil attempted to maintain the increasing pattern of its commercial relations with Iran. Second, since Iran was in line with the states that criticized the unfairness of the existing system, Brazil sought to reinforce its position in the eyes of those states by supporting Iran, which was significant for its economic interests. Third, economic relations with the United States were also essential for Brazil. By accepting the U.S. demand, it did not jeopardize its already increased economic relations with it.

Iran's nuclear program continues to be one of the most important topics in the international agenda. From the failure of the Turkey-Brazil-Iran nuclear deal in 2010 to

today, the UN Security Council adopted five more resolutions regarding the issue.⁴¹⁵ In 2013, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, known for his overt hostility towards Israel and the United States, handed over the presidency to Hassan Rouhani, known as being more moderate in foreign relations. Taking new steps to lift the sanctions and increasing the standard of living in Iranian society were two main promises of Hassan Rouhani in the inauguration ceremony.⁴¹⁶ Under his presidency, Iran has made a temporary accord with the P5+Germany on November 2013 that entered into practice on January 20, 2014. Rouhani agreed to end the installation of the machines used for the purpose of uranium enrichment in exchange for easing the sanctions.⁴¹⁷ Although this attempt was considered by the P5+Germany as an important step to solve the issue, both parties have failed to reach a permanent agreement so far.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁵ United Nations. "Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1737 (2006)," <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/resolutions.shtml>.

⁴¹⁶ "İran'da Ahmedinejad Dönemi Resmen Sona Erdi," [Ahmedinejad Era Officially Ended in Iran] Haber7.com, August 3, 2013.

⁴¹⁷ "İran'la Nükleer Anlaşma 20 Ocak'ta Yürürlüğe Giriyor," [The Nuclear Deal with Iran Will Enter into Force on January 20] BBC Türkçe, January 13, 2014.

⁴¹⁸ "İran ile Nükleer Görüşmelerde Anlaşma Yok," [There is No Agreement in Nuclear Talks with Iran] BBC Türkçe, November 24, 2014.

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