Strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Abstract
In this paper, I draw upon the US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan to highlight key lessons for integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations into military campaigns and major operations. I point out how the US military s adherence to a Cold War era collection management doctrine creates obstacles for ISR integration. This system of managing competing requirements as a basis for ISR operations has proven ineffective repeatedly in military operations due to the emphasis on collection statistics that do not account for operational realities. I argue that a strategy-oriented approach that balances ISR ends, ways, and means will more effectively meet commanders needs and expectations. Using this approach, I suggest means by which commanders can steer the vast, organizationally complex ISR enterprise toward problem solving over production. A vital part of that process is articulating the commander s intent for ISR that links campaign goals to intelligence problem sets, ISR roles and missions, and ISR objectives. By comparing ISR in Iraq and Afghanistan, I identify the advancements in resourcing, organization, and procedures that made considerable impacts on the battlefield. Using these lessons, I make practical recommendations on how commanders and staffs should organize and operate to effectively execute an ISR strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2014
- Accession Number
- ADA621222
Entities
People
- Jason Brown
Organizations
- Air University