Back to the Future: Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Pacific
Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed relatively uncontested access from which to stage and generate air power worldwide. Coupled with the lack of a credible threat to airfields, access led the Air Force toward a model of air base operations that emphasized the use of main operating bases (MOB). These bases, fortified with substantial numbers of aircraft, had little concern for their vulnerability to high-end antiaccess, area-denial (A2/ AD) attack simply because a credible threat did not exist. In Clausewitzian terms, these MOBs are centers of gravity-not only a source of strength for the United States and its allies but also a potential vulnerability subject to attack and exploitation by a savvy and capable adversary. The A2/ AD formula is straightforward and persistent throughout history: use all available means to gain control of an area while simultaneously denying the enemy the ability to do the same, primarily by preventing access and disrupting operations. Although the concept is ancient, in the last decade, new and emerging A2/ AD tactics and technologies have allowed possible adversaries to challenge the US and coalition airpower advantage. In light of these increasingly capable A2/ AD systems and tactics, today's security environment demands that we operate differently, particularly in the Pacific theater where distance and diversity rule supreme and where controlling an area while denying the same to the opponent is particularly difficult.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 2015
- Accession Number
- ADA622600
Entities
People
- Jason M. Teague
- Kenneth R. Dorner
- William B. Hartman
Organizations
- Air University