Auction and Game Theory Based Recommendations for DOD Acquisitions
Abstract
This paper synthesizes auction and game theory literature into specific military acquisition improvement recommendations. We characterize acquisition environments into distinct categories, present the results of seminal literature that pertains to each category, and translate the literatures recommendations for military contracting practitioners. The relevant categories are procurement with unknown cost and no risk, item(s) with known costs and existent but understood stochastic risk, and item(s) with unknown costs and/or unknown stochastic risk. We break out these three categories into sub-categories depending on whether there are one or multiple potential competing vendors, and, if multiple, by whether we must buy one lot or potentially a schedule of lots from a host of vendors.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 24, 2015
- Accession Number
- ADA623801
Entities
People
- Andrew Cady
- Jake Elliott
- Justin Blott
- Nicholas Boardman
- Nick Mastronardi
- Parker Quinn
- William Griffin
Organizations
- United States Air Force Academy