

DIRTY FIGHTING: HOW TO COUNTER TOTAL WARFARE MENTALITY

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Art of War Scholars

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ABSTRACT

DIRTY FIGHTING: HOW TO COUNTER TOTAL WARFARE MENTALITY, by Major Craig D. Wilson, 101 pages.

The ability to fight dirty without losing support is a powerful advantage conferred by total war mentality. This study analyzes dirty fighting and proposes a theory of how it can change. Related themes are identified which have traditionally hindered the analysis of dirty fighting. Using case studies from conflicts in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Sri Lanka this study will assess how dirty fighting can be defeated.

What emerges is that the application of compromise and containment weaken the ability to fight dirty. However, the utility of forceful methods is also prominent. It is intended that this novel approach will inform and assist the analysis of, future conflicts where dirty fighting may well occur.

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ACRONYMS

COIN	Counterinsurgency
IRA	Irish Republican Army
LOAC	Law of Armed Combat
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (The Tamil Tigers)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SAS	Special Air Service (British)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

An army, although it may be attacked, is not to be attacked if it is in desperate circumstances and there is the possibility that the enemy will fight to the death.

—Sun Tzu, *Art of War*

What is Dirty Fighting?

Definition

Dirty fighting is the extension of combat power by the use of illegitimate and violent means that are attributable to a combatant entity. Dirty fighting aims to influence action by creating fear in some element of the opposing force, their support base, or among neutral actors. Dirty fighting is usually but not necessarily illegal.

Explanation

Illegitimate is a key word in the short definition of dirty fighting. Legitimacy essentially means righteousness, and there are differing views (often religious or culturally based) as to what is right and wrong. There is international agreement on legitimacy and this forms international law, particularly the law of armed conflict (LOAC).¹ However, it appears that in recent times, although large-scale interstate wars have declined, intrastate wars are flourishing where LOAC and other laws are flagrantly breached.² This study posits that there is a rational logic to the concept of dirty fighting, which must be understood for any western involvement in intrastate war to have success. That understanding results from recognition of what constitutes a legitimate justification to fight dirty.³

In U.S. military doctrine, the terms terrorism and terrorist tactics encompass much of dirty fighting. Terrorism is defined in U.S. joint military doctrine as, “The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.”⁴ Terrorism and terrorist tactics are described in U.S. joint military doctrine as often being part of an overall hybrid threat that many modern combatants pose.

The doctrinal definition of terrorism states that legality is the sole arbiter of legitimacy. Not all countries agree on all laws and thus once hostility starts there is usually a fundamental disagreement on the legality of any conflict. Additionally, laws change are designed to reflect the collective view of legitimacy held by those within a jurisdiction at a certain time.⁵ Legitimacy is defined by the collective will of a population, this definition is often what insurgents and revolutionaries seek to shape.⁶ Historical context can also change perception. In the past, western societies have justified brutal action for a greater good, yet many such actions are not labelled terrorist campaigns by those societies.⁷ The U.S. doctrinal definition of terrorism exposes a fundamental aspect of misunderstanding dirty fighting.

This study argues that the construction of a narrative that enables brutal and clearly immoral (by any code) action is partly logical and partly open to moral judgement.⁸ These sometimes-complex narratives use a perception (sometimes falsely or artificially generated) that a great and pressing need exists, which justifies the use of any means.⁹

Total war is a term that describes the enabling of maximum violence in warfare along with the mobilization of the full resources of a society in the conduct of war. Total war is the concept that western nations and military forces use when they need to harness their full power. The term dirty fighting is substituted for the concept of total war in this thesis partly because total war is overly associated with the scale of war, rather than the mentality and violence of warfighting. While scholars have identified the brutality and dirty fighting of total war in western history,¹⁰ there is also a popular trend to minimize the role of western troops in the brutality of such warfare.¹¹

Key parts of insurgent leader and theorist Che Guevara's Marxist classic *Guerilla Warfare* are an example of a narrative of total war.¹² It creates a great need for action along with inevitability of change, it then justifies both dirty fighting means, and the sacrifices required to achieve the goal. Guevarra guards against compromise, stating that only revolution and complete change (to communism) will see any change at all. Modern Islamists and other insurgent causes follow the same method simply with a different utopian goal. The powerful need for change is often represented as a survival narrative and in some cases with a strong foundation in fact.¹³

Strengths

Dirty fighting can create an advantage that extends the physical power of a combatant. Dirty fighting is a component of morale, which enables action that strengthens the ability of militants to maneuver and apply firepower. In relation to LOAC, perfidy is used to maneuver unseen, and brutality extends the psychological effects of local battlefield success. Dirty fighting is physically powerful, and physical power is very important in conflict.¹⁴

In modern intrastate conflict, dirty fighting is often used to create fear and engender action among the civilian population. A combatant that has adopted an effective dirty fighting mentality can demand greater resource support from the population and deny it to a less fearful opponent. That population support can be used to hide an insurgent force, draw resources, and ultimately further validate the narrative for more brutal force.¹⁵

The fear dirty fighting causes can produce favourable effects in many different ways. A 1991 example of the legal use of terror as a weapon was the carpet-bombing of Iraqi positions, followed by instructions on surrender used in the prelude to the Gulf War.¹⁶ The paying of hostage ransoms to groups such as Islamic State is a recent example of success achieved through the fear of dirty fighting.¹⁷

Fear caused by insurgents or anger at their actions can also induce a hasty, overly harsh, and ill directed reaction from an opponent. This over reaction can validate the survival narrative that motivates the insurgent movement. Professor Mary Kaldor is currently Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, where she is also the Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit. Kaldor observes dirty fighting interplay as many intrastate wars intensify and both sides use dirty fighting and counter narratives of total war.¹⁸

Weaknesses

The employment of dirty fighting normally has an inherent cost or weakness in the erosion of legitimacy when such means are used.¹⁹ This erosion of legitimacy occurs in the eyes of the international community, and can eventually cause the internal collapse of an organization that employs such means.²⁰ It follows that the perception of the dirty

fighting can also evolve to be seen as illegitimate as time passes.²¹ Sometimes it can take a long time for this perception to develop due to the facts available and the attitudes of a society as to what is fair and moral. A good example of this process occurring slowly is the acceptance by the New Zealand Government that some Maori tribes were treated unfairly (and sometimes illegally) during the colonial period of the 1800s. Well over a century passed before there existed the means and will to consider the facts and a legal remedy. During the 100 years of inaction, the colonial narrative that the Maori had ultimately benefitted from colonization, justified and concealed the actions of some colonists and the Crown who committed crimes in acquiring Maori land.²²

In free and open societies, where a literate population has ready access to accurate information are likely to judge more quickly and accurately the legitimacy of their government and other actors. Undeveloped states or areas that have conflict occurring, often have their information manipulated and therefore can be influenced more easily. This information environment between leaders and their supporters is what affects the control and development of a narrative that enables dirty fighting. This is an environment where resources can have a large impact, if understanding of the audience is effective.²³

The other main weakness of dirty fighting is that a counter narrative can develop that enables the opposing combatant to increase their use of force.²⁴ As previously stated, this natural and traditional response to dirty fighting and can be problematic.²⁵ However, if the physical response is well planned, accurately targeted, and complete it can devastate an insurgent. Coupled with an ongoing campaign to win the information war, the motivation to act can be decisive. This weakness is summed up in the final Hezbollah principle of war, that states: “Hurt the enemy, but not so deeply that he abandons

restraint.”²⁶ Che Guevarra’s manifesto also describes in detail the need to sustain and build the movement rather than try to defeat the enemy in the early stages of a revolution.²⁷

Elements that Produce Dirty Fighting

The circumstances that produce dirty fighting have four main components. First, there is a narrative that fuses legitimate with illegitimate messages in its composition. The legitimate message is one of survival or a great and pressing need that usually has some logical basis in fact.²⁸ Secondly, the narrative is transmitted powerfully and persuasively through the full spectrum of information operations.²⁹ Thirdly, the narrative is communicated to a receptive audience. Receptive audiences to dirty fighting narratives are usually populations that are poor, uneducated, or have a violent history. Finally, there are moral or illegitimate elements that affect dirty fighting which cannot be ignored. These elements include individual psychopathy, criminality, and or sociopathy. Another moral element is the influence of outside actors on a conflict. These final elements, along with the illegitimate aspects of the narrative are the areas where moral judgement should be rendered. These moral elements are frequently over emphasized or conflated with the more logical and rational components in the traditional explanation of dirty fighting.³⁰ This traditional view of dirty fighting can lead to action, which strengthens an opposing dirty fighting narrative. In simple terms, a combatant motivated by a survivalist mentality becomes stronger when attacked, because it proves a core part of their narrative correct. Additionally, dirty fighting combatants are often structured to avoid defeat rather than seek decisive victory in the armed confrontation.




Figure 1. The Logic of Dirty Fighting

Source: Created by author.

The post-Cold War, globalized, and connected world has changed how combatant entities structure themselves, their messages, and their delivery means. However, all combatant entities answer to some form of wider support, which has some construction of legitimacy. Finding what that source is and undermining the narrative in the eyes of that support is the essence of counterinsurgency (COIN). Traditionally, this has involved looking solely at an insurgent force and its supporters within a population. Today's wars see multiple decentralized and loosely aligned insurgent groups able to cooperate and their support can be complex webs that include private donors, state, and non-state sponsors as well as the population which happens to live in the area of conflict.³¹ This outside support is key in that it not only changes the military power, but can also affect the narrative they adopt.³²

When confronting a combatant it can be very difficult to decipher the details of their narrative, where their support comes from, and how they interact. However, this thesis suggests that consistent and highly visible acts of dirty fighting indicate not only moral illegitimacy but also a legitimate reason to fight. If this legitimate reason to fight is not respected, understood, and explained it is difficult to design an effective strategy to terminate the conflict.

This thesis proposes that the legitimate core of the enemy narrative can be undermined by a genuine willingness to compromise or reconcile. The public offer of compromise can expose the degree to which an opposing combatant is influenced by illegitimate factors. If compromise is seen to be rejected, this can commence the erosion of a combatants ability to fight dirty while maintaining their support.

In Kaldor's new war theory, combatants are likely to continue to resist after compromise is offered. However this raises the risk that their opponent will respond with increased force (including dirty fighting) if their opponent has the means and the will to use it.

The Problem

During the recent war in Afghanistan, the Taliban³³ resorted to brutally effective tactics against coalition forces, Afghan government troops, and the civilian population. This was evident against coalition forces in the rise in complex suicide attacks, continued ambushes, which leveraged the use of perfidy, and the rise of insider attacks from 2008 to 2013.

The coalition force plan to deal with the dirty fighting evolved to apply the doctrine of population centric COIN. However, to achieve their aims, the Taliban

appeared to increase the brutality, variety, and flagrancy with which they flouted the LOAC. This indicated anecdotally, that the insurgents thought such methods were effective. This also possibly suggested that progress in the COIN based strategy was questionable.

Coalition forces made a clear decision to not respond to dirty fighting in kind. The legitimacy of the conduct of the operation was paramount. The evolution toward the population centric COIN approach saw offensive action applied in a more restricted and targeted way, while conventional ground forces largely focused on protecting themselves and the population. There were no mandated reprisals and justice was handled by the local government, not military tribunals conducted by the force affected by the breaches in the laws of war.

Many force protection measures that were used to counter the threat of dirty fighting tactics were expensive and compromised the ability of the force to engage with the population. Dirty fighting also had a significant negative informational impact on a range of influential coalition audiences.

COIN doctrine and mechanisms to execute it developed significantly during the Afghan war. COIN was heralded as a breakthrough in the approach to dealing with the Afghan insurgency and transitioning the country to stability. However, what does the increase (or at the very least continuance) in dirty fighting indicate?

There appear to be emerging attempts to label the wars in Afghanistan (and Iraq) as a win, loss, or some other degree of merit or demerit.³⁴ A credible problem that is suggested by Doctor Douglas Cho of the Institute of Land Warfare is that the huge expense of what was done in Afghanistan was out of proportion with the benefits

achieved.³⁵ As a result, there appears to be no will to deal with other conflicts in the same way, even as appalling situations elsewhere seem to cry out for some form of significant intervention.³⁶

Research Questions

How can conflicts that involve dirty fighting be ended successfully?

This question leads to subsequent questions, which are listed as follows:

1. What is dirty fighting?
2. How has dirty fighting been dealt with successfully in the past?

Assumptions

1. The current principles and specifics of the LOAC are the standard for what is considered dirty fighting in warfare for this study unless otherwise defined.³⁷

2. Dirty fighting tactics when used by combatants are a sign of strong motivation, and enhance physical power. Their illegitimacy is relative to perception rather than a fixed legal standard.

3. This study assumes that approaches to intervention by western forces are intended to achieve peace and stability. The prospect of other national interests such as access to resources possibly having a greater strategic role without being publicly declared is not considered.

Limitations

The limitations on researching illegitimate violence in conflict are considerable. Any combatant who has perpetrated such violence has a strong vested interest in obscuring both the act and its illegitimacy. This makes the investigation of the interplay

between sides in brutal conflicts very difficult. The research methodologies that can mitigate this problem are best described by Professor Stathis Kalyvas in his critique of new war scholarship.³⁸ Strict adherence Kalyvas' methods are not possible given the resources of this study.

Delimitations

While this study looks at types of warfare (COIN and peacekeeping are examples), the critique of these theories is not intended to be complete. It is necessary to acknowledge and relate these methods or theories of warfare to the concept of dirty fighting to relate dirty fighting to conflict literature.

The concept of strategic narrative is a delimitation and applies to the case studies used in this thesis. In the case studies, the strategic narrative blends what was intended with what occurred. The strategic narrative is further discussed in chapter 2 as to how it is intended to be used in analyzing current conflict. However, in a historical case study the narrative allows established facts to influence a view of what was intended. This is helpful as even narratives such as that of Guevara are coy when announcing an intention to use dirty fighting. Similarly, no member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is unlikely to have ever clearly stated that unannounced bombings were justified; however the fact that they occurred made this part of their narrative.

The use of the generic term compromise delimits the need to discuss negotiation, unilateral concessions, reconciliation and other forms of compromise. Forms of compromise are discussed in this study, but detailed analysis and conclusions are not necessary.

The case studies are focused on the perspective of, and factors critical to dirty fighting between selected combatant entities. It is acknowledged that some fundamental themes or questions about warfare impact the ability to analyze dirty fighting. The essence of this thesis, is that these themes can be separated from analysis of the central processes that drive dirty fighting. Comment on the themes is necessary throughout the thesis to indicate the reason why dirty fighting has not been isolated as a concept in the past. However it is a delimitation that this thesis does not seek to take a final position on these themes.

Definitions

Combatant: The use of the term combatant in this study will stretch beyond the dictionary use of the term, which simply states, “a person engaged in fighting.”³⁹ The combatants for the purposes of this study are the parties engaged in a conflict. The use of the term in this study is designed to aid brevity by minimizing the complexity of combatant entities. This is to promote a focus on the broader narratives that enable the use of violence by one side or another.

Compromise: This term is used in this thesis to broadly cover the process whereby a combatant acquiesces to the legitimate needs of the other side. Sometimes this is done through formal negotiation and reconciliation. Other times it is done unilaterally through policy. Often in COIN, warfare policy moves and reconciliation are seen as part of a winning strategy while negotiation is a concession to an enemy that cannot be beaten. Using the term compromise deliberately conflates these two views and focuses winning or success on reducing violence.

Dirty Fighting: See first paragraph of this thesis.

Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.⁴⁰

Legitimacy: Legitimacy is the power for a government or other entity to act, conferred by the support provided to that entity. Usually this support is democratically based,⁴¹ but other resources can enable action, which is not democratically popular in the short term. In the long run, democratic support is generally the predominant influence of legitimacy. The law is an expression of democratic mandate as to the exercise of power. Thus, the law can be legitimately defied if eventually it comes to be seen by the plebiscite that such action was justified. All insurgencies, which become successful revolutions, are examples of this. Additionally, legal action can lose legitimacy and be changed, with conciliatory redress provided in some cases. Legitimacy varies over both space and time.

Strategic Narrative: The strategic narrative is the vision a combatant has which explains how they will achieve their aims. Expressed in the present tense it is forward looking and based on an understanding of the current operational and strategic environment. The concept encapsulates both reality and intention.

Case Studies

The selected case studies will analyze modern conflicts in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Bosnia. These conflicts all contained combatants who relied on dirty fighting, and yet conditions were created where they either no longer chose to use this approach, or this approach could not protect them. Three very different methods were used by their opponents and this study will seek to identify common elements which impact the theory of dirty fighting. Analysis of the cases is intended to use the component parts of a dirty fighting mentality to examine how it was successfully defeated in the recent past.

Each of the cases offers different insights based on the choices that combatants made, and events that occurred. Each case tells a different story of how a combatant that was able to employ dirty fighting without losing support, eventually lost that ability. The result in each case was the end of significant violence.

In modern warfare, very little is clear as combatants often evade clarifying where their core interests lie.⁴² Most theories on modern intrastate war suggest that problems can be solved if the right policy and plan matches certain conditions.⁴³ However, one of those conditions is an elusive and adaptive human entity. Therefore, conditions are rarely clear. Warfare can be confusing, however the violence inflicted on to one's own side by the enemy is usually definitive. This is often the only known point from which to plan.⁴⁴ The applicability of this thesis will be enhanced by determining what the observation of dirty fighting should imply to the military professional. It is strongly suspected that the answer is not to reply in kind, nor is it simply to protect one's self and hope that things get better, even though those are often the only choices that soldiers have tactically in the short term.

The thesis stated previously, indicates that when dirty fighting is observed the first step is to compromise genuinely and openly with the opponent to remove their legitimate reason to fight. If the combatant persists with hostilities, then one should either contain them until they collapse or evolve. If the dirty fighting persists or cannot be contained, one can use their loss of legitimacy to justify destroying them.⁴⁵ The case studies will test this thesis and enable more detailed comment.

Themes

As indicated previously, are three themes or underlying questions which attend this thesis. These themes must be acknowledged but separated from the main thesis. First, can ends justify means? Secondly, how important is the difference between legality and legitimacy? Finally, what constitutes victory, success or winning? Consideration of dirty fighting will touch on all of these ideas and some comment on each is warranted.

¹ This agreement is primarily expressed in the Geneva Convention and there are numerous precedents and antecedents that constitute LOAC.

² This is a common theme in contemporary conflict scholarship. An example that will be analyzed in detail is Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 3rd ed. (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

³ An example of this description of an overriding need is contained in insurgent manifesto documents such as Che Guevara, *Geurilla Warfare: A Method* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1963), *The Che Reader*, accessed April 28, 2015. www.oceanpress.com.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2010), I-1.

⁵ The concept of legality as opposed to legitimacy is discussed in Anthea Roberts, “Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force be Illegal but Justified?” in Philip Alston and Euan Macdonald, *Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force* (Oxford, UK: Oxford Knowledge Online, 2009). This reinforces the difficulty that legal academics have in relating law to bases of morality, justice, and other concepts of legitimacy. Roberts concludes that the strength of the law depends on its enforcement and the avoidance of allowing legitimacy undermine the law. She does not comment on whether this was ultimately for the best though, which avoids the problem presented by war.

⁶ Kitson refers to this as the battle of ideas, and other COIN theorists see such warfare as inherently political. U.S. doctrine also acknowledges the centrality of political issues in COIN.

⁷ Blocksom states that it is more humane to end wars quickly even if the application of brutality is required.

⁸ This concept is identified by Professor Mary Kaldor in that new war combatants are motivated by illegitimate particularist ends but use labels of legitimacy. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 79-90. This study sees these labels as more than superficial.

⁹ An example of this is the narrative of communist revolution in Guevara.

¹⁰ Hew Strachan, "From Cabinet War to Total War: The Perspective of Military Doctrine 1861-1918," in *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front 1914-1918*, eds., Roger Chickering and Stig Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 22.

¹¹ An example of this is Anthony J. Joe, "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines, 1898-1954," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, eds. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 39-46. This issue is further discussed in chapter 2.

¹² Guevara.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ This is a crucial point of contention between this study and the work of Professor Mary Kaldor and her presentation of new war theory. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*. Kaldor states that a loss of legitimacy is universal when brutality is used; however, this study contends that it is only the support required by a combatant that effects their actions.

¹⁵ The control of a population is the central theme of COIN and insurgency theory. Foundational theorists such as Galula, Kitson, and Thompson all acknowledge the importance of achieving the support of a population in intrastate warfare. These theorists also acknowledge the effectiveness of achieving such control through fear, at least in the short term. Kaldor notes the use of these COIN tactics by modern insurgents.

¹⁶ This action is described in David Hogg, "The Legal Use of Terror as a Weapon" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1992).

¹⁷ This funding related to terrorism is detailed in Janine di Giovanni, Leah McGrath Goodman, and Damien Sharkov, "How Does ISIS Fund Its Reign of Terror?" *Newsweek*, November 6, 2014, accessed April 21, 2015, <http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/how-does-isis-fund-its-reign-terror-282607.html>.

¹⁸ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 80-81.

¹⁹ This point is demonstrated in Stathis Kalyvas and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, "Killing without Dying: The Absence of Suicide Missions," in *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 209-232.

²⁰ The U.S. public reaction to the Vietnam War was an example of this.

²¹ The tolerance for coercive interrogation techniques following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States was an example of this.

²² The Waitangi Tribunal was the legal body which assessed the historical integrity of the evidence of illegal and illegitimate activity in many Maori land grievances. The recent case of the Tuhoe Tribal settlement demonstrated a changed willingness to confront past actions.

²³ The LTTE diaspora funding and information operations were an example of effective transmission of a narrative to an audience.

²⁴ This occurred with the LTTE enabling the Sri Lankan Army to take unprecedented steps in 2009 without the restraint that had previously been exerted by the international community.

²⁵ An insight into this view is contained in Brian King, *Application of Violence in Theater. Study From US Army Sergeant Majors Academy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 2007).

²⁶ Matt Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2012), 7.

²⁷ Guevara.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ This means that not only are supporting messages transmitted in a variety of effective ways, but access to alternate messages are blocked.

³⁰ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

³¹ This complexity of modern warfare is well described in military doctrine as Hybrid Threats, and Kaldor describes a specific mix of such interests. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

³² Kaldor notes the effect of criminal economies as being a type of support that shapes a narrative toward perpetuating conflict and instability in order to sustain the funding from the criminal enterprise. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 80-107.

³³ The term Taliban is used as a generic label for the combatant entity that opposed the U.S./NATO led coalition and the Afghan Government. It is recognized that this combatant was and is not a cohesive centralized organization.

³⁴ An example of this general trend is in Daniel Bolger, *Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014).

³⁵ This cost benefit problem is illustrated in comparing the rebuild of Korea in the 1950s and 1960s to the recent costs in Afghanistan and Iraq. Douglas Cho, "Afghanistan

and Korea: Lessons from History,” *AUSA Landpower Essay* 14, no. 3 (November 2014): 1-8.

³⁶ The case in point would be the Syrian and Iraqi situation with the emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, where the brutality involved and reaction to it would indicate a hands off approach is now favored. Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus: The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency,” *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2013): 10, accessed February 24, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2013-01-01/end-age-petraeus>.

³⁷ The principles of LOAC include proportionality, differentiation and military necessity and the laws result from numerous treaties and conventions. A central convention is the Geneva Convention.

³⁸ Kalyvas highlights the flaws in much interview-based research of conflict where brutal violence has occurred. This includes not having access to the perspective of both sides of specific incidents, as well as the conflict as a whole. Kalyvas also points out that the complexity of the build-up to individual violent incidents is often misrepresented by apparent victims who sometimes have had a role in aggravating the situation.

³⁹ Robert E. Allen, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, 8th ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), 224.

⁴⁰ This definition is taken from Army Field Manual 3-24 which is an accepted U.S. joint doctrinal definition. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2014), Glossary 5.

⁴¹ This democratic mandate is drawn from the traditional Lockean definition of political legitimacy.

⁴² This reflects the concept of friction in Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119-121.

⁴³ This refers to social science theories related to conflict.

⁴⁴ This is based on personal experience, and the theory of friction in warfare expressed in von Clausewitz.

⁴⁵ This is very much akin to the conclusion of van Creveld in Martin Van Creveld, “Brutality or Restraint: Learning from Two very Different Counter Insurgency Successes,” *IP* (Spring 2006): 78-89. However, this thesis adds the requirement to achieve an advantage in legitimacy before the exercise in brutality and reconcile afterwards, which Assad Pere did not do around the Hama massacre.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

History will judge us kindly, because I shall write the history.
— Winston Churchill, Quoted in John Charmley,
“Churchill: The Gathering Storm”

History Scholarship

Historians have an approach to studying warfare that is based on certain underlying premises. Prominent historian Sir Michael Howard states that history should be studied in depth, breadth, and context.¹ Although dirty fighting has always existed, there are good reasons why discussing its effectiveness has not been prevalent in history scholarship. First, history is written by the victor as the quote above alludes to. However, secondly and more crucially in insurgent warfare, societies change, and societal views on legitimacy change. For example, it is now rare to suggest that intense violence is a good method to apply to achieve any positive outcome in western policy.²

One example of distortion in the historical record is the relatively recent scholarship that analyzes the brutal warfare on the eastern front of World War Two. A traditional view had expressed that the Wehrmacht did not perpetrate atrocities in the same way the *Schutzstaffel* (SS) did. However, through the opening of former Soviet archives to western researchers and the deaths of promoters of contradictory material, a more accurate historical picture has emerged. Another good example is the changing views on the actions and merits of individuals during the U.S. Civil War and the Vietnam War.³ Kalyvas, while not a historian points out that numerous evidentiary fallacies can occur with a reliance on firsthand witness accounts and other recent data from intrastate

conflicts.⁴ It seems that it takes time and resources to process conflict information and to gain an accurate perspective.

Van Creveld points to another problem with historical research being the designation of funding. Very little scholarship is self-funded, and this can cause problems when an alternate approach is taken. Van Creveld wanted to study the Hama Massacre for its relevance to COIN, yet it appears he was not funded for reasons of political sensibility rather than the relevance of the research.⁵ Academics that study controversial issues can easily fall foul of popular opinion, even when pointing out academically logical conclusions.⁶

There is significant merit to a historical continuity-based approach towards the study of contemporary dirty fighting.⁷ First, this literature shows how the West has fought and viewed wars differently in the past. The Greek destruction of the Melians in the Peloponnesian War is a well-described ancient example of dirty fighting interplay.⁸ However, a better example comes in scholarship and primary documentation from the Phillipine-American War of 1898 to 1902. This war saw a genuine debate in public about whether it was more humane to end a war quickly with a higher level of violence.⁹

Unfortunately, the logic of the Phillipine-American War question was lost as the view of some of the actions of U.S. troops became more damning over time. The racism of the day and the actual number of seemingly flagrant excesses as opposed to controlled acts of coercion are inflated by some later analyses and minimized by others.¹⁰ The main hostilities in the Phillipine-American War were ended very rapidly given the situation relative to other insurgencies. Thus Blocksom's question of whether ends justify means appears a valid one.¹¹

The recently released historical book on irregular war, *America's Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror* by Crandall, embraces the subject of this thesis more directly and completely than any other.¹² The book is U.S. centric and concludes that dirty wars have little logic and evolve too fast to enable any preset formulaic response.¹³ Crandall shows how the United States has both well and poorly applied the lessons of history to irregular wars.¹⁴ Crandall grapples with Blocksom's question, acknowledging that bad things have at times seemed to yield favorable outcomes, but he concludes, "None of this is somehow to excuse American mistakes or atrocities," lest he be seen to be promoting brutality.¹⁵ Crandall reinforces many of the same points as this study, such as the problem with modern conflicts such as Afghanistan, is that of fighting a total war mentality with a limited war one.¹⁶ Crandall, in accordance with his historical approach, does not seek to find a theory that explains dirty wars, and thus his study is somewhat limited in application to current and future warfare.

Van Creveld is an influential source in this study. Van Creveld sees recent changes in the world that are significant in historical context. Van Creveld's book, *The Transformation of War*, was his main work that predicted changes to warfare after the breakup of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.¹⁷ Van Creveld holds that the significance of nuclear weapons and other lethal technology, along with the changes in the global order from the cold war to a time with a single hegemonic power have changed warfare.¹⁸

Van Creveld has written updated works which generally support the concept of population centric COIN.¹⁹ The article, "Brutality or Restraint: Learning from Two very Different Counter Insurgency Successes," identifies a general lack of historic success in

COIN operations. Van Creveld's article states that only a high level of restraint as in Northern Ireland or sudden Machiavellian brutality as shown in the 1983 Hama massacre can defeat a popular insurgency.²⁰ Van Creveld's approach aims more to demonstrate the power of insurgency and its resilience. He holds that anything other than overwhelming force (which eradicates critical capabilities of the insurgency) only makes the insurgency stronger.²¹ Analysis of "Brutality or Restraint," greatly assisted in the critique of key aspects of Kaldor's new war theory, and the formulation of the theory proposed in this study.

There is good reason why van Creveld assists in adjusting the approach of Kaldor. Van Creveld is a realist to the point of being controversial in some of his views.²² Thus, van Creveld has an ability to diminish moral judgement in his analysis and focus on the sources of power that cause the result. Van Creveld is an Israeli who has studied the Nazi regime extensively in a dispassionate attempt to learn from World War Two. There was arguably no greater state manifestation of a dirty fighting mentality than the Nazi regime. As such, van Creveld's analysis of some of the modern combatant entities who leverage dirty fighting is extremely insightful.

A different and very contemporary approach to the effects of the modern world on warfare is undertaken by Strachan and his former student Simpson. While they focus on very similar topics to this study, their analysis is firmly rooted in the continuity of historic strategy. Strachan's past scholarship describes the mentality of total war in World War One and he is cognizant of the problem of an imbalance in combatant will.²³ However, he like Simpson focuses on a wider range of strategic misperceptions in recent wars. This strategic approach assists this study.

Strachan's book, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*, is a firm rejection that the nature of war itself has changed.²⁴ The book opens an excellent analysis of what strategy is, and what the role of governments is in relation to the military in the formation of strategy. In this area, Strachan sees significant problems with contemporary wars to which there are both historical precedents and lessons.²⁵

Simpson's book, *War from the Ground Up: 21st Century Combat as Politics* is heavily rooted in his experience as an Oxford educated (under Strachan) British Army Officer.²⁶ Simpson has served in key roles at key times in Afghanistan, where he has been able to conduct (albeit informally) what Kalyvas refers to as micro level research.²⁷ In simple terms, Simpson describes the importance of a disconnect between the operational and strategic view of a campaign, and the view from ground level.²⁸ Simpson is not necessarily unique in doing this, but his ability to write about the strategic implications of a disconnect with tactical reality separates him from many scholars. It also separates him from military doctrine writers who have access to the micro detail but cannot be seen to critique politicians, the media, allies, and interagency partners.

Simpson's main contribution to this study is his definition of and ability to use strategic narrative as a center point of analysis. U.S. Joint COIN doctrine also assists in defining the importance of narrative,²⁹ but Simpson's writing about Afghanistan demonstrates an analytic technique, that strongly influences this study.

Che Guevara's Communist insurgency manifesto is essentially a form of strategic narrative.³⁰ Like Guevara's manifesto, Simpson argues that strategic narratives in insurgencies should not be seen as declarations of war that define success against an

opponent, but more a political statement of how the whole national environment needs to change for the better.³¹ In this sense, what makes Guevara's narrative different from that of the peaceful U.S. civil rights campaigners in the 1960s is his statement that only ruthless violence can achieve his ends. Guevara's skillful justification of ends justifying means is worth quoting: "Revolution, in history, is like the doctor assisting at the birth of a new life, who will not use forceps unless necessary, but who will use them unhesitatingly every time labor requires them."³² This is the segue that tells an aggrieved individual they are justified to fight dirty.

Simpson essentially argues in *War from the Ground Up* that in addition to some significant operational and strategic mistakes, the Afghan War is widely misunderstood. He points out that what the military was tasked to achieve was neither possible nor necessary. This meant that the construction of the coalition's strategic narrative asked the impossible and ignored reality. Simpson implies that a realistic narrative would have better enabled coordinated initiative at the ground level.³³ The most influential COIN theorists like Robert Thompson, David Galula and particularly Frank Kitson write extensively about a similar need for strategic and tactical level alignment.

In a recent article Simpson has directed veiled criticism at the core U.S. doctrinal concepts of decisive action, and winning wars. He sees these as counterproductive to the construction of an effective strategic narrative.³⁴ This article reinforces the importance of the concept of what success is.

The concept of a narrative is relevant to this study because it cuts through policy statements and justifications and hints at reality. A strategic narrative is a way of accessing the true message that combatants send. This very much aligns with the way

information operations doctrine stresses that messages in a conflict are sent through both actions and words, from different sources to different audiences.³⁵

Where history can be incredibly effective in the analysis of dirty fighting, is the identification of continuities, which are likely to lead to a credible narrative for a combatant. Historical study is likely to elucidate the illegitimate narratives that may blend into that primary narrative also. However, it is difficult for history to predict the speed and full effect of changes where there is not a similar precedent in all of the factors present.

Social Science Theory

Social science based institutions have an inherent advantage in studying modern problems and change phenomena. Social science is rooted in theories of interaction, which attempt to predict the outcomes of processes that are visible.

The main social scientist of warfare was Carl von Clausewitz whose book *On War* analyzed the very essence of conflict and the interplay of violent confrontation.³⁶ Clausewitz's theories from the early nineteenth century are considered by nearly every scholar who attempts to advance any general consideration of warfare.³⁷ Simpson, for example, challenges Clausewitz in that he states that wars (in Clausewitz's era) used to be conducted by armies fighting, and then subsequently negotiating a political outcome. This conventional interstate warfare construct is where Clausewitz's theories apply. However, Simpson states that in many modern intrastate wars, each of the violent acts of the war is conducted to achieve a political effect, and thus the war itself is the negotiation.³⁸

Kalyvas is an influential social scientist who focuses on violence and its causes, type, and intensity in intrastate warfare. Kalyvas' book, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* is a compelling study. This book holds that as central combatants in civil war transition in power, local allegiances will compete to align with the combatants. Competition occurs to align with one group or another and local disputes and grievances are settled with greatly increased violence.³⁹ This process of local dispute resolution is empowered by the wider struggle, which validates the use of more extreme violence. This is a similar process as what this study refers to as fusing legitimate and illegitimate narratives. The local grievances are merged with the core messages of the conflict and are settled by the means of war rather than through a normal civil process.

Kalyvas' study shows how illegitimate violence can amplify when a combatant fights not for military objectives, but to gain political support.⁴⁰ This study is impressive in its detail and has application to this thesis. One could argue that the logic of violence in civil war demonstrates that an interventionist can create increased violence by tipping the scales of a conflict but not destroying the opposing combatant. The interventionist and its ally merely force the opposing combatant to fight dirty to survive and that has the effect (through changing allegiances) of enabling and amplifying the violence of any existing local conflicts.

The *Logic of Violence in Civil War* requires a degree of abstraction to relate to this study. However, Kalyvas has co-authored a chapter that gets to the heart of dirty fighting more directly. The well researched, "Killing Without Dying: The Absence of Suicide Missions," points to the dual aspects of suicide missions.⁴¹ Suicide missions usually kill indiscriminately, but they demonstrate the commitment to and thus a degree

of legitimacy in a cause or narrative. The chapter shows very clearly the relationship between the legitimacy of a cause and the willingness to use a means, which is the epitome of dirty fighting.⁴² The article addresses martyrdom, which validates a cause and is a physically effective means. It also analyzes why some mature and successful insurgencies chose not to sacrifice their legitimacy once they had begun to make gains in their struggle. The insurgents that rejected suicide missions in the study were all engaged in a process of achieving gains through negotiation. In essence, they had something to lose.⁴³ Kalyvas' work reinforces the fundamental theory of this study, which is that a combatant that is weakened and not destroyed will abandon restraint and fight dirty because their wider legitimacy becomes a secondary consideration to the need to survive.

The theory of new war proposed by Kaldor in her book *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Globalized Era*, was initially the main focus of this study.⁴⁴ New war theory presents a compelling perspective on modern intrastate war. It is persuasive because it incorporates the factors of post-Cold War globalization, the modern information revolution, small arms technology development, and a rise in dirty fighting into its description of modern intrastate warfare.

New war theory was criticized by scholars when first published, and so was evolved since its first proposal in the late 1990s.⁴⁵ The theory proposes that when governments lose their legitimacy, by allowing a faction or sect to use the apparatus of state to unfairly further their interests, opposition by the disenfranchised will eventually turn violent. In the globalized era, due to the lethality of weapons and the fragility of national economies, this then places great pressure on the state to resolve the impasse quickly. This can result in a descent into dirty fighting by both sides. The situation

quickly becomes desperate as the state fails, and the economy in the war zone is decimated. As a result, it is common for one or both sides to fund their activities through criminal activity, which further reduces the side's dependence on and ability to attain legitimacy.⁴⁶ Kaldor describes the breakdown in legitimacy (which she sees as fundamental to long-term power), as predatory combatant elements seek to maintain a state of war where they thrive. Kaldor shows how new war combatants retain labels of political legitimacy but end up acting like or at the behest of criminals, and herein lays her core thesis.⁴⁷

Kaldor, more than any other theorist, focuses on the duality of legitimate and illegitimate aspects within a combatant's narrative.⁴⁸ Kaldor is heavily influenced by victims from wars, and is a strong proponent of the need for human security to drive foreign policy.⁴⁹ While this is noble, it under emphasizes the importance of physical military power in warfare. Kaldor's theory could have far greater applicability, but the detailed description in *New and Old Wars* errs toward implying that any illegitimate action is fraudulent on the level of combatants in the Bosnian War. Kaldor senses the legalized illegitimacy in western force actions is relevant to new war interaction, but comparing U.S. actions in the early parts of the Iraq and Afghan Wars to the Bosnian Serb Army and its cohorts is not done effectively.⁵⁰

Kaldor states that the solution for new wars is for interventionists to act as cosmopolitan police. When Kaldor's description of what this term involves is related to military doctrine it would appear to largely imply using population centric COIN. However, this method would deploy proactively and not to take sides as long as the combatants are not harming the population. Because a side is not taken, cosmopolitan

policing would seem to be an argument for aggressive and proactive peacemaking, by neutral but effective troops.⁵¹

Kaldor's book has had a problem in gaining greater recognition away from likeminded circles of academia for a number of reasons. Kaldor overly generalizes the different phases of U.S. intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. This results in confusion as to what degree of culpability she attributes to the United States as a new war combatant. Kaldor also draws a very western view as to the standard of legitimacy that is required by any state. This is contrasted with the inference that violence needs to be stopped quickly to provide human security, which enables civil society to develop functioning and effective government.⁵² What is unclear in Kaldor's theory is whether agreement can be negotiated that sacrifices some of the human rights and fairness of a fully legitimate government, but allows the long-term development of these ideals. It is not clear whether Kaldor favors peace at the expense of temporary or partial human rights compromises, because she seems to indicate that both are essential. Kaldor conflates legality (international human rights law) with legitimacy, and as much as one agrees with her point of view, it robs her theory of logic and applicability.

The field of conflict resolution and conflict transformation is a highly instructive area of social science. This field deals with the process of combatants moving away from the degeneration described by Kaldor. Publications in the conflict transformation field assist in understanding obstacles to compromise such as splintering and spoiling in negotiations, and the challenges of balancing power sharing arrangements.⁵³ Reading this material has assisted in recognizing that the generic term compromise is best for this

study. Although it is a highly informative area of literature, detailed analysis of conflict resolution and transformation is largely outside the scope of this study.

Military Doctrine

Military doctrine draws on theory, history, and unparalleled information access to codify best practice for the military. Many militaries have resisted bringing operations other than conventional warfare into their core doctrinal view. However, the most progressive doctrine in this area is that of the U.S. Army.⁵⁴ The U.S. Army is the western military that has had the challenge of leading operations in modern intrastate war and has the resources to significantly and rapidly update their doctrine. The U.S. Army sees combat tasks complementing stability tasks and vice versa. This is expressed through the core concept of decisive action within unified land operations.⁵⁵

While the concept of population centric COIN is not new to the U.S. Army, it was reinvigorated relatively recently.⁵⁶ This updated COIN doctrine was designed to leap the skepticism that without the heavy-handed physical separation of the population from insurgents, COIN could not be effective. Population centric COIN became the method used to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq beginning around 2005. The doctrine is thorough, flexible, and leverages technological advances to remove the need for the more forceful aspects of traditional COIN. However, there is one negative aspect that stands out. The ability for the Army to take a role in achieving compromise is lacking, despite a core aspect of COIN being to only fight irreconcilable elements. It is the role of strategic actors to decide which main elements will be targeted and which will be compromised with, which works assuming strategic understanding is closely aligned with operational and tactical reality.

Population centric COIN doctrine emphasizes empowering and assisting host governments in making decisions around compromises with threat groups. With reconciliation and power sharing in the hands of others, and population security reliant on proactively engaging insurgents, the only area for a military to contribute to a COIN campaign is then to both protect the population and to disrupt and neutralize insurgents. The military enables governance improvement and sustainable development, but does not actually deliver these outcomes. These things must ultimately be delivered by host nations. This makes it harder for the military to encourage insurgents that they have something to lose if they break the rules and fight dirty.

A macro view of a belief in the capacity to transform an enemy was the doctrine of containment strategy. *The Long Telegram* by George Kennan and the resulting National Security Council Report 68 policy were masterpieces of strategy that won the Cold War. Indeed Simpson argues that a clear understanding of strategic narrative was the very reason for the term cold being suffixed with war in relation to containment. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was seen as an enemy of and a threat to the United States, but their capacity to change was also recognized.

Population centric COIN is very much like containment theory. However, like containment theory, it does not assist in deciding how aggressively to conduct the strategy. The Cold War altered between strong point containment and perimeter containment, particularly during the 1960s.

The former British Special Air Service (SAS) commander and Northern Ireland veteran Sir Graeme Lamb was a key proponent of reconciliation and led reconciliation efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is also notable that British COIN doctrine says more

about reconciliation process than U.S. doctrine.⁵⁷ The British understanding of transformation is shaped by their own radicalization of the PIRA in the 1970s, and then the slow process of delegitimizing the extremists in the 1980s and 1990s.

The increasing use of historical vignettes in doctrinal publications (these are notable in COIN doctrine) is one way the military carefully suggests best strategic practice. Another way that the military can suggest best strategic practice is when doctrinally aware scholars leave the military and write or comment on policy and strategy in different media. The comments of retired U.S. General Mark Hertling on the television news channel Cable News Network in the United States is one example, which shapes public and political opinion. Another example is the book *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* by Sir Rupert Smith.⁵⁸ This work can potentially influence policy indirectly by educating and persuading the public, the media, and political actors.

Case Study Literature

The Bosnian and Northern Ireland conflicts have been thoroughly analyzed and reported on with quality sources of information available. In the case of Bosnia, it is interesting to see how analysis of this war led Kaldor to see the differing aspects of narrative and the power the different combatants retained. Another important source is Smith whose book *The Utility of Force* states that the modern age has fundamentally changed warfare from “Industrial war” to “war among the people.”⁵⁹ Smith’s insights into the Bosnian War are powerful because of his status in that war and his unparalleled experience in irregular warfare throughout his career.

The Troubles in Northern Ireland have one source in this study, which directly addresses the heart of the issues addressed in this thesis. Bradley W. C. Bamford well

documents what he terms the success and effectiveness of British intelligence operations. He shows that these operations were crucial to the overall campaign and had effects on all other aspects of the civil and security operations, a point that is validated in other COIN literature regarding the central nature of good intelligence. He then asks whether the ends justify the means. Bamford's conclusion is disappointing in that he simply seems to state that western nations have to play by the rules in spite of his own argument to the contrary.⁶⁰ This is yet another reminder for this study of the importance of considering what constitutes success in COIN. It is assumed in this study that an early and cheap end to hostilities is a success. However, in reality, strategic objectives are why wars are fought, so to ignore this completely would be disingenuous.

The Sri Lankan War is heavily disputed and negatively affected by disinformation from both sides. A favored reference in this study is a Master of Military Art and Science thesis by Mr Herman Llorin entitled "The Effective Use of Elements of National Power in Counterinsurgency: A Study on the Lessons from Sri Lanka 1983-2004 and 2005-2009."⁶¹ The reason this study is favored is that its sources are largely U.S. Department of State reports, which are assessed as relatively well informed, accurate, and impartial. This does not imply that the conclusions of the study are supported; however, information it contains is considered reliable. Another Master of Military Art and Science thesis by Major Ruwan B. Ehelepola, entitled "Reintegration of Former Combatants in Sri Lanka" is also interesting in that it promotes a program of reconciliation by the Sri Lankan Government after the main conflict.⁶² Given that this study is written by a Sri Lankan Army officer, it is certainly evidence that the Sri Lankan approach to the post-conflict

phase of their war can be seen to be attempting to fit within a COIN framework, rather than perhaps that of a conventional war.

The Bosnian War case study intends aligning the perspective of this study with a non-COIN western intervention. As such, it does not analyze the dirty fighting dynamics between the primary combatants. This limited approach does not require detailed research as it focuses on the interplay that saw North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces eventually compel Serb forces to compromise and consider what might have happened if a different approach were taken.

Summary

The bulk of the time in researching this paper was spent trying to align the problem and research questions with existing scholarship. It was Kaldor's theory of new war, which led to the proposal of the dirty fighting theory more than any other did. However, by focusing on and attributing the core of insurgencies to particularist interests (which this study terms morally illegitimate factors); Kaldor curtails the usefulness of her approach. Following additional research, this study has taken the approach of acknowledging a fusion of legitimate and illegitimate narratives. This way, a mostly legitimate combatant can look at smaller parts of their illegitimacy, just as a new war combatant who is mostly illegitimate can be deconstructed.

Undoubtedly, there are situations where new war is an apt description, where moral factors are at the root of and drive the conflict, and where the legitimate aspects of the narrative are merely labels. However, Kaldor understates the legitimizing effect of a survival or great need based narrative, and her suggestion that a different organization

and operational method (cosmopolitan policing) can make the difference, suffers as a result.

The literature in this study enables the explanation of and research into the dirty fighting theory and the advancement of this thesis. The key themes have regularly arisen in the literature used to define dirty fighting. Success seems to be more than just defeating an enemy or reducing violence, it appears to be some mix of the two. Legitimacy in warfare is crucial, and it is not as simple as a unilateral declaration by one side. Finally, dirty fighting was often confronted using reciprocal covert or clandestine means in the past. In an age where it is harder to keep secrets, these means would appear to be relevant but are perhaps limited in what they can achieve.

¹ Sir Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Parameters* 11, no. 1 (March 1981): 9-14.

² This is pointed out in Brigadier General Franklin J. Bell, letter to Bisbee, Manila, Luzon, March 30, 1900, provided by Brian M. Linn to Art of War Scholars Course Material, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015.

³ Examples of this are the analysis of U.S. Civil War generalship at the Battle of Gettysburg. The view of Generals Sickles and Meade slowly took a different tone after the persuasive, outspoken, and longer lived Daniel Sickles died. With regard to archives, the declassification of U.S. archives enabled General H. R. McMaster to produce *Dereliction of Duty*, which cast new light on the perspective of the Vietnam War.

⁴ This is a pointed reference to the research techniques of some new war theorists in Stathis Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Wars: A Valid Distinction?" *World Politics* 54 (October 2001): 99-118.

⁵ van Creveld, "Brutality or Restraint," 85.

⁶ An example of this was Professor Glyn Harper in New Zealand, who ignited some controversy in Italy with his examination of the battle of Monte Cassino. Harper's analysis was seen to diminish the blame on General Bernard Freyberg in the destruction of the historic religious site of the Monte Cassino monastery.

⁷ The best example is Crandall.

⁸ Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Free Press, 1996).

⁹ Blocksom, 215-226.

¹⁰ Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 39-48, which was promoting population centric COIN in the mid-2000s is an example of the minimization of Phillipine brutality. Joe's chapter focuses on the policy of attraction and barely mentions the policy of chastisement that followed. Further discussion of the promotion of COIN is contained in Kaplan.

¹¹ Blocksom, 215-226.

¹² Although from a methodological point of view, it was obtained near the end of the study. Thus, its influence is more one of reinforcing points.

¹³ Crandall, 467-470.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 470.

¹⁶ Part of a superb analysis in Crandall, 412-456.

¹⁷ van Creveld, "Brutality or Restraint," 78-89.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid. The Northern Ireland method of restraint expounds the lack of aggressive targeting, and contrasts this with the need for total victory when violent aggressive tactics are employed.

²⁰ Ibid. Van Creveld's definition of success is interesting though, and is open to review given recent events in Syria. This has highlighted the need for this study to remain cognizant of how success is defined.

²¹ Ibid. Hence, van Creveld's article assisted in the formulation of the base theory of this study, along with a reading of Kaldor.

²² Ibid. His offhand comment about casualty numbers in East Timor is an example of this.

²³ Strachan, "From Cabinet War to Total War," 19-33.

²⁴ Hew Strachan. *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Emile Simpson, *War From the Ground Up: 21st Century Combat as Politics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- ²⁷ This attribute of personal experience is used in this study also.
- ²⁸ Simpson, *War From the Ground Up*.
- ²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24, II-4.
- ³⁰ Guevara.
- ³¹ Simpson, *War From the Ground Up*. 179-236.
- ³² Guevara.
- ³³ Simpson, *War From the Ground Up*. 230-244.
- ³⁴ Emile Simpson, "Afghanistan 2013: Time to Evolve the Strategic Narrative," *Foreign Policy* (January 11, 2013), accessed February 14, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/02/why-the-war-in-afghanistan-was-lost-from-the-start-coin-taliban/>.
- ³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2014), I-1-I-3.
- ³⁶ von Clausewitz.
- ³⁷ Martin van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought* (New York: Harper Collins, 2000).
- ³⁸ Simpson, *War From the Ground Up*, 179.
- ³⁹ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca, 209-232.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.
- ⁴⁵ The evolution is demonstrated in Mary Kaldor, "In Defense of New Wars," *Stability* 4, no. 2(1) (March 2013): 1-16.

- ⁴⁶ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 95-118.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 75-95.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁹ This comment is based on Kaldor's other works.
- ⁵⁰ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 151-184.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 133-136.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 185-201.
- ⁵³ An example is Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999).
- ⁵⁴ Changes to capstone doctrine since 2000 indicate this.
- ⁵⁵ Unified Action is expressed in Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, *Operations* and subordinate Field Manuals.
- ⁵⁶ This occurred with the publishing of Field Manual 3-24 in 2006.
- ⁵⁷ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Army Field Manual, *Countering Insurgency*, vol. 1, part 10 (London: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2010), 8-2.
- ⁵⁸ General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Random House, 2005).
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁰ Bradley W. C. Bamford, "The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland," *Intelligence and National Security* 20, no. 4 (2005): 581-607.
- ⁶¹ Herman Llorin, "The Effective Use of Elements of National Power in Counterinsurgency: A Study on the Lessons from Sri Lanka 1983-2004 and 2005-2009" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2011).
- ⁶² Ruwan B. Ehelepola, "Reintegration of Former Combatants in Sri Lanka" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2013).

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A Novel Concept?

The term dirty fighting evolved in this study to look at the mentality that drives combatants to brutal actions, while maintaining a belief that their actions are legitimate. This was partially an attempt to reframe the observation that the West is not prosecuting the illegal actions of insurgent opponents to the full extent of the law. Instead of leaping to the conclusion that this lack of enforcement is wrong, it is attempted here to find a way to reconcile the idea that there can in fact be a legitimacy to illegal brutality. If this concept is applied to insurgent groups, it might also apply to friendly force actions.

What has been described as dirty fighting is the moral component of total war.¹ However, the term total war is encumbered with a number of additional concepts that detract from a focus solely on the motivation to fight. Thus, the term dirty fighting is used in this study. The term is designed to embrace the absurdity of minimizing the war crimes that enable many current dirty fighting tactics employed against both armies and civilians. However, this minimization of the morality of the acts assists this study to separate and discuss the logic of totality from the inherent immorality in many acts without appearing to condone such action. Crandall uses the same term and is similarly conscious of being seen to condone brutality.

The illegality of insurgent actions in Afghanistan did not seem to be treated as the breaches of the LOAC that they were.² This was particularly true of the perfidy and constant use of civilians as a shield against escape in improvised explosive device attacks. They were perhaps seen by coalition forces as combatants who fought dirty, that

there was somehow an excuse for our enemies to have a different set of rules to ours. Yet any suspected breach of the LOAC by coalition soldiers was diligently investigated and prosecuted if necessary. It was as if the rule for Afghanistan was that the imbalance in rule enforcement was acceptable. Perhaps this was because the coalition had the troops, resources, and knowledge to deal with the Taliban without the need to deter illegal action through reprisals or a harsh wartime justice mechanism.³

The analysis of new war and Kalyvas' work in particular revealed the balance between legitimacy and brutality, and how this changed with a perception of survival or an urgent need to fight.⁴ Upon reading Kaldor's view, a model was developed that separated legitimate and illegitimate motivating narratives. This created the tentative thesis that negotiation and compromise, which addresses the legitimate aspects of an insurgent narrative, will remove the ability to fight dirty and retain legitimacy. However, it was still unclear whether combatants would act rationally when presented with these circumstances. This required qualitative case study research to assess combatant behavior in conflicts where dirty fighting was evident.

Terminology

The use of terms has been fundamentally difficult in this study. Generic terms have been used to avoid over complicating what is a theoretical and grand strategic study of intrastate war. It is anticipated that this study, like that of Kaldor will face similar terminology based criticisms under scrutiny. Kalyvas has recommended more generic and theoretical study of the dynamics of violence in intrastate war, and this study attempts to follow that suggestion.⁵ However, this study does not have the resources to conduct the depth of research Kalyvas recommends.

Studies of Changes in the Equation

Three case studies that demonstrate changes in dirty fighting violence are identified. They exhibit differing tactical and operational approaches, but achieved success as strictly defined by reducing the violence of opponents who relied on dirty fighting. These cases are studied to highlight the key components that influence dirty fighting, and the resolution of conflict that results.

Each case study focuses on the key factors that caused a transition to a point where dirty fighting was no longer possible. The parts of figure 1 that changed, and conformation with or divergence from the thesis are the focus. The case studies are heavily reliant on qualitative analysis, but are anchored to the death statistics from the conflicts as an empirical, although slightly inaccurate guide to the level and distribution of dirty fighting. The case studies aim to analyze what common factors occurred in differing but ultimately successful approaches to reducing contemporary dirty fighting.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Deductive conclusions will relate the findings from the case studies to the problem conflict (Afghanistan) and U.S. Army COIN doctrine, which had such an influence on that conflict. The conclusions will also address the validity of a focus on dirty fighting. Recommendations as to the need for doctrinal change and future study of the topic will follow from the conclusions drawn.

¹ A very similar term is used in Crandall and the same comparison is made. Crandall.

² This frustration is echoed in Louis Rene Beres, "America, Afghanistan and the Law of War of International Law," News With Views, accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.newswithviews.com/your_govt/your_government2.htm.

³ These comments are based on personal observation of incidents that occurred during the Afghan War.

⁴ Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca.

⁵ Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Wars: A Valid Distinction?” 117-118.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Case Studies

The following case studies are not intended to be complete studies of the conflicts. The studies look to identify the impact of the situation and events in the conflicts on the dirty fighting equation. What altered the legitimate need to fight? What affected the illegitimate aspects that were fused into that narrative? What adjusted the receptiveness to the message and accompanying actions? Were there any moral factors and outside influences involved? And finally, how should the results be viewed?

The case studies will be related to U.S. doctrinal terminology as much as possible. This thesis is not seeking to attribute any individual credit or apportion any blame. This may lead to overstatement or understatement of the role of specific individuals or entities. The focus is on identifying outcomes and their impact on the rationale that justified dirty fighting and the conduct thereof.

Western military forces have the resources to expedite the processes of intrastate war transitioning to peace. If this process can be visualized, expedited, and completed with the minimum of resources then this is what winning looks like in the absence of any other national ends. It is in this context that success is assessed in the following cases.

Northern Ireland's Troubles

Overview and Context




Figure 2. Northern Ireland Conflict Death Statistics

Source: Michael McKeown, “Database of Deaths Associated with Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969-2001,” version 1.1, Conflict Archive on the Internet, February 4, 2013, accessed February 24, 2015, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/mckeown/index.html>.

The Troubles in Northern Ireland have a long history and are rooted as far back as the establishment of the Protestant community in Northern Ireland in the 17th Century. By 1969, a situation had developed where the economy of Northern Ireland was economically depressed, and where a polarization of elements of the Catholic and Protestant communities had occurred. The Catholic community, particularly in Belfast had genuine grievances and began to mobilize around a Republican (and therefore largely Catholic) movement. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) became a vehicle for the organization of a Nationalist/ Republican movement. While the Ulster Volunteer Force became a unionist movement, that harnessed extremism in the Protestant community.¹

The Protestant dominated authorities had neglected progress in improving the rights and opportunities of Catholics by the late 1960s. The political dominance of this group and especially the prevalence of Protestants in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) gave the appearance of state capture and dominance by one group at the expense of another group. The B Specials of the RUC were a group that embodied illegitimate physical domination of Catholics by Protestants. Housing, healthcare, gerrymandering, and welfare were areas of the greatest dispute and alleged anti-Catholic bias.²

In the early 1970s, a number of incidents and security force policies marked a descent into violence, that peaked in 1972. The key aspects to the descent towards worsening violence were a limited connection between what would become the PIRA and any form of political representation, and the fears of unionists. The strength of the Republican cause at this point was deeply opposed to a political settlement and rejected the Sunningdale Accord. The Sunningdale Accord was an attempt to negotiate a solution to the troubles, but was also opposed by Unionists who saw the influence of the Republic of Ireland as threatening their interests.

The attempt by the British Government to quickly resolve the Troubles through the Sunningdale process in 1973 to 1974 did see a drop in violence, which peaked in 1972.³ However, negotiations towards the Sunningdale Agreement proved the distance apart of significant factions. This also affected the view of the Republic of Ireland, whose support and influence over the PIRA decreased.

Thus in the mid-1970s the Troubles resembled an insurgency. The PIRA was completely opposed to the British State and any elements loyal to it; however, in 1981 this changed slightly with the establishment of the Sinn Fein political party. Sinn Fein

represented the PIRA position and was led by persons who had held leadership positions within the PIRA. The violence noticeably lessened during the 1980s, although there was hardly an overnight change.

The 1980s saw a clarification of violence as being primarily between the Catholic and Protestant extremist groups. These were certainly the vehicles used for the perpetration of the dirtiest acts of violence. As the political process advanced, with the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and then the 1994 ceasefire agreement, the extremist groups' violent acts lost their power to the point where they were effectively useless by the ceasefire.⁴

There was the potential for violent actors within the communities to regain legitimacy as the ceasefire broke down in 1996. However, a backlash against some of the violence that occurred during this period saw a renewed move toward compromise. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 is seen as the end of the Troubles. Even so, there has been political violence since that time, and there have been continued structural adjustments to governance and power sharing in Northern Ireland.⁵

Analysis

There is a perception that the method of resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland was successful because it ended the conflict without secession. This analysis will focus more on the reduction in violence as a measure. The British approach to resolving the conflict saw them use invasive population centric COIN techniques from 1972 to around 1976. Initially the British were unprepared for COIN and hoped that support for the Northern Irish authorities would resolve the crisis. However after the failed Sunningdale Agreement and the imposition of home rule, the British approach de-escalated to one of

support to law enforcement after the late 1970s and sought to use the military primarily to enable the greatly enhanced police force. The British policy was officially one of counter terrorism, where they refused to acknowledge the PIRA as a legitimate military combatant in any way. In this sense, the decision in 1981 for key PIRA linked figures to participate in Sinn Fein was both fortuitous and crucial.⁶

The removal of political status for prisoners led to the hunger strikes and the symbolic election of Bobby Sands to the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament. This led to Sinn Fein being formed, and the PIRA commencing the path to trading dirty fighting for legitimate political representation.⁷ This period highlights the fact that the combatants had a similar conception of legitimacy rooted in the law.

A dirty fighting perspective in assessing the Troubles brings the focus to the many compromises, which robbed the PIRA of its legitimate mandate. There were a number of key points. First, the Sunningdale Agreement, which while rejected, undercut the sense that the Republic of Ireland was actively committed to reunification. Secondly, there was the emergence of Sinn Fein after the hunger strikes of 1981. Aligned to this was the security forces gradually reducing their perceived level of force, while maintaining containment of the PIRA. There was also the Anglo-Irish Accord of 1985. Finally, the American brokered peace settlement of the 1990s.⁸

What sustained the PIRA ability to fight dirty was the British regularly fueling the Republican narrative. This occurred because of the perceived slow pace of security reform. The employment of non-deniable violence such as collusion between the RUC Special Branch, British Intelligence, loyalist paramilitaries, and overreach by the military were examples of this.⁹

Strategic Narrative

The legitimate part of the strategic narrative for the PIRA was that in 1972, Catholic people faced visible disadvantages in many parts of Northern Ireland. This disadvantage was institutionalized and as the Bloody Sunday violence, internment practices, and other incidents in the early 1970s showed, any struggle would be put down by force.¹⁰ Thus, ruthless and violent means were justified in seceding from the UK, as it was the only way to not remain oppressed. The Irish Republic also still had a constitutional mandate to govern Northern Ireland; this and other outside support movements also reinforced the narrative. The PIRA aligned with a long historical narrative related to the IRA struggle in the Republic, and identified with civil rights movements in the United States, which added to the justification to secede.¹¹

The heavy-handed practices of the British security forces, combined with the lack of enforcement of loyalist paramilitaries reinforced this narrative through the 1970s and 1980s. The Sunningdale Agreement though dealt a blow to the narrative as Ireland and the UK agreed on a process to allow Northern Ireland self-determination. This agreement failed on two main counts. The loyalists/unionists were worried about losing a vote to secede in the long run, and the Republicans were worried about only getting a short run opportunity, as well as there being a lack of general Catholic support to secede. However, the offering of the olive branch, coupled with the significant increase in security forces made it very difficult for the PIRA to sustain the levels of the worst violence.¹² The numbers of deaths indicate that the attempt at compromise in Sunningdale assisted in a reduction in violence.

The narrative became more and more strained as security practices evolved and contained all but the most ruthless violence through the 1970s. The PIRA adjusted and used less brutal methods such as the hunger strikes, and bombing economic targets in the UK. In the end, the agreement that finalized the conflict was remarkably similar to the Sunningdale Accord. However, two key things changed. The Irish Republic adjusted their constitution, and reform of the RUC was formalized.¹³ Both of these processes had begun before the ceasefire of 1996, and with sustained U.S. mediation, the formal agreement robbed dirty fighting of the last remaining elements that supported its legitimacy.¹⁴

In 1988 a string of incidents demonstrated the problems of dirty fighting to the British. First, the SAS shootings in Gibraltar in 1988 and the negative publicity thereafter occurred. These shootings of PIRA operatives preparing a bomb attack were seen as assassinations by the PIRA. At the funeral of one of the Gibraltar operatives the Milltown massacre occurred when loyalist gunman Michael Stone attacked the funeral party with grenades and small arms fire killing six. Then at the funeral procession of these victims, the Corporals killings publicized a brutal reaction to the British and their proxy.¹⁵ In this incident, two plain clothed British soldiers were trapped, beaten, and killed by a mob in plain view of television cameras. The Corporals killings were such clear public brutality that they showed the depth of feeling in the Catholic community in a similar way that the hunger strikes had. While there was condemnation of the Corporals killings, there was also a feeling that the Gibraltar killings combined with the Milltown massacre had caused the public brutality. Even vocal loyalists and detached politicians in London could see the negative interplay through these publicly televised events.¹⁶

The British maintained security through even more advanced means from this point forward. They still used sophisticated targeting, but they increasingly used the RUC to arrest rather than the feared SAS to kill.¹⁷ This new approach achieved containment without legitimizing the PIRA narrative, even if that narrative was becoming more and more constrained due to Catholic conditions improving. Part of the security force reform and strategy was also a more high profile pursuit and condemnation of loyalist violence.¹⁸ Proxy forces such as the Ulster Volunteer Force had no place in the conciliatory strategy of the late 1980s and early 1990s. They had a similar effect that the SAS had when used publicly but often without the efficiency in conducting the task.

With renewed peace overtures, and sustained British security discipline, support for the main PIRA dirty fighting weapon (unannounced bombings) began to turn against them. This was particularly clear when the bombing in Omagh in 1997 discredited dissident Republicans and validated the peace process that Sinn Fein advocated.¹⁹

The legitimate narrative switched subtly from a pure and strict secession policy by the PIRA, to a compromise where the power to achieve fair treatment for Catholic interests was provided. The British enabled the possibility of secession, but it has not occurred. The illegitimate means advocated were severely damaged at the start of the Troubles by the Sunningdale Accord, and the commencement of security sector reform and improvements. The PIRA ability to fight dirty was sustained by a lack of policy outcomes and the use of force that was seen as illegitimate by many Catholics.²⁰

Delivery of the Narrative

The Sinn Fein and PIRA narrative was sustained very carefully, and it involved maintaining a sense of victimhood, and building legitimacy. Key operations that had an

effect on the strategic narrative, not that they were necessarily planned as such, were the death of the hunger strikers and the assassination attempt on Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein. In addition, the PIRA attempted Hezbollah style quasi governance by controlling aspects of housing and local justice within communities where their movement was strong.²¹

The PIRA was very limited in its ability to build popular support in Northern Ireland, but had more success among Irish diaspora in the United States, and with anti UK countries during the Cold War and into the 1990s. PIRA and Sinn Fein support in Ireland also evolved to the point where the vote to adjust the Irish Constitution was supported overwhelmingly. It was ironic that Ireland, the country to which secession was intended, did not seem to want the new addition.²²

The British Government slowly reformed housing and welfare, which lessened the influence of the ghetto like conditions of the 1970s in some urban areas. Improvements in justice and frequent formal public rebukes to the security services such as the Stevens inquiry, robbed the PIRA and Sinn Fein of the distinction as the sole defenders of Catholic interests.²³

The narrative in the United States, Ireland, and the wider anti-British network also evolved. The breakup of the Soviet Union reduced anti-British support in the 1990s. The involvement of US Senator George Mitchell in the peace process changed the relationship with popular support in the United States, and the Republic of Ireland showed a willingness to finalize the process.²⁴

However, while the PIRA could sustain its activities, ultimately it was strong Catholic support in Northern Ireland that was essential. The division of this support has

meant that even as self-determination was achieved, there is no democratic mandate for secession. In spite of this study's assumption that reducing violence is the sole arbiter of victory, this fact adds to the perception that the British method was a success.²⁵

Receptiveness to the Narrative

It was the receptiveness to the narrative that changed most significantly in Northern Ireland. The primary driver has been the improved economy and improvements in the delivery of public services. This change being the main area to affect dirty fighting best explains the slow and steady decline of the violence in Northern Ireland.

Perhaps the best thing Northern Ireland teaches western militaries is that the public, media, and politicians who react to their cue need to see the complexity of conflict where dirty fighting exists. The series of events that surrounded the Corporals killings provided this in the UK and Northern Ireland for a large segment of the population.

The economic transformation of the Northern Irish economy has been significant. With the loss of the shipbuilding and other manufacturing industry in the 1970s, Northern Ireland was severely depressed. The economy has now transformed, and with the growth of the European Union, many differences between European countries have receded greatly. This has added to a perception that the benefits for Catholics of secession will be negligible.

With the Irish economy also transformed, the decision by the Republic to support overwhelmingly the constitutional change that enabled the Good Friday accord was another crucial factor in ending the conflict.²⁶ Throughout the conflict, the public

tolerance for violence was low, as one would expect in a well-educated first world country.

Legitimacy mattered to the PIRA and Sinn Fein because they were generally reliant on external and internal support from free and democratic communities. Their ability to fight dirty was always relatively constrained in terms of the brutality of the violence inflicted. It is noted that they shunned more radical methods such as suicide bombing, and took care to justify actions that damaged their legitimacy. Similarly, the PIRA went to significant lengths to promote the illegitimacy of British actions wherever they could.

Moral Factors

In comparison to many combatants, the PIRA was disciplined and relatively legitimate. They were careful to distance themselves from organized crime, although it is suspected that there has been involvement. The PIRA's destruction of the Irish National Liberation Army, supposedly for their involvement in the drug trade was an example of their sensitivity to the de-legitimizing influence of the moral factors associated with dirty fighting.

Perhaps because of their adherence to western moral norms, and need to be legitimate in the eyes of a western population, the PIRA carefully tried to conceal the adverse morality of their actions. In this sense, the Corporals killings were an interesting affair in that the PIRA felt the need to claim that the executed soldiers were SAS members under cover as opposed to the British claim that they were Signalers who were lost. Many bombings saw similarly contrived statements justifying their actions.²⁷

The more blatant criminality of many loyalist paramilitary groups and of splinter groups such as the Irish National Liberation Army damaged both sides. Over time, the main combatants cast these groups aside as a full political settlement neared. The use of the term attributable in the definition of dirty fighting seems particularly relevant to The Troubles. The British method was to hurt the PIRA as much as possible but without being seen to be over using force in the eyes of audiences that supported the PIRA. It was this method and the ability to keep the compromise of political representation open that influenced the PIRA to commit to politics through Sinn Fein.

One aspect that is not supported by complete evidence is a link between the targeting of leadership, and a resolve to effectively get revenge. This illegitimate narrative or moral factor manifests itself in a more violent security policy, which in turn deepens the conflict. The assassination of Lord Mountbatten a British royal family member and the targeting of a Tory party conference in Brighton were examples of targeting leadership. How much influence these attacks had on policy and tactics is not clear in this conflict. What was clear was that the British showed considerable restraint in not increasing the visibility of the targeting of Sinn Fein and PIRA. British tactics kept Sinn Fein contained and enabled the final compromises.²⁸

Conclusion

The Troubles present an interesting transition that spanned the end of the Cold War and an economic revival. The republican cause had to choose between a war for secession and a political process to achieve the result of that secession. The ability to advocate violently for that secession was eroded as Sinn Fein became more and more engaged in the political process.

From the first Sunningdale negotiations, Gerry Adams and his cohort have maintained both control over their movement, and the ability to compromise. Had Adams been assassinated successfully in 1983, this control and pragmatism may not have been as great by his replacement.

The British Government took a hard line strategy for much of the Troubles. There was also collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and the security forces, which damaged British legitimacy, and gave life to republican justifications for violence. By the time of the Mitchell intervention in the 1990s, dirty fighting had lost its power and the actions between 1996 and the signing of the Good Friday accord confirmed this to those invested in violence. Loyalists lost the last pillar of their resistance with the adjustment of the Irish constitution and a framework to end the conflict was agreed.

The Troubles highlight the way an aligned interest can derail a containment strategy. Over militarism at the start of the Troubles and on occasion throughout sustained the PIRA narrative, but this militarism was also necessary to contain the PIRA. The sophisticated, thorough, and disciplined security operation by the British, combined with conciliatory action allowed the British to keep Northern Ireland as a peaceful state. Rather than crush the desire for secession, they promoted the desire for Northern Irish Catholics to remain part of the UK.

The Troubles strongly support the theory of dirty fighting. The violence was low but very sophisticated. The British motivation to retain Northern Ireland was high and as such, they were prepared to pay a very high price in both restraint and financial cost. This strategy required fighting by the intelligence and special operations component of the security operation. The effects of these operations were not dirty, unless they were

attributable. Therefore, in this operation, the ends justified the means. However, a key point emerges in this dirty war and that is that the crime is being caught.²⁹ The SAS and intelligence services learned this lesson very quickly in the 1980s and adjusted accordingly. The PIRA were left with only one legitimate choice, and were rational enough to take it.

The Tamil War for Independence in Sri Lanka




Figure 3. Sri Lanka Death Statistics, 2000-2009

Source: Southeast Asia Terrorism Portal, “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Sri Lanka, 2002-2015,” Institute for Conflict Management, accessed February 24, 2015, http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/annual_casualties.htm.

Overview and Context

The Sri Lankan Civil War was a brutal conflict that raged between Tamil separatists and the Sri Lankan Government for the secession of a Tamil state in the

northeast of Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan War is divided into four periods of conventional fighting with periods of relative peace ranging to insurgency in between. The war began in the late 1970s as Tamil militant nationalism rose amidst some provocation by Sinhalese government and non-government elements.³⁰

From 1983 to 1987, the conflict intensified, and a number of Tamil militant groups existed, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) being one of them. The Indian Government initially supported these groups and then undertook a role in ending the war and acting as a peacekeeping force from 1987 to 1990. The Sri Lankan Army had been on the verge of a conventional military victory in 1987. However, Indian peace keeping forces became engaged in significant violence against Tamil rebels during their deployment. It was also during this period that the LTTE gained strength as the main Tamil militant group.³¹

The Indian Army left Sri Lanka in 1990 with their prestige damaged and the LTTE later assassinated Indian President Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, using a female suicide bomber. These events greatly reduced any perception of the legitimacy of the LTTE and the Tamil cause in India.³² Meanwhile, from 1990 to 1993 renewed hostilities saw the LTTE consolidate their position in the northeast. The LTTE had developed a sophisticated worldwide network of diaspora who funded their cause and were able to ship supplies to Sri Lanka. The LTTE also possessed a navy called the Sea Tigers who were an effective element in supporting the ground operations of the LTTE.³³

A change in government saw a Sinhalese effort to promote a negotiated solution to the war in the mid-1990s. However this period of relative calm saw struggle within the Tamil and Sinhalese sides to the war. It also saw a mix of insurgent, terrorist, and

unconventional warfare tactics cause the peace process to break down. The Sri Lankan Government then began a policy of war for peace where the Sri Lankan Army began pursuing limited objectives in what would become the third period of open warfare in the late 1990s.³⁴

In 2000, both sides called for international mediation to the conflict, which was led by Norway. In 2002, a ceasefire was agreed and over a period of just over a year through a series of negotiations, a power sharing agreement was reached. The LTTE gave up its quest for full independence and the Sri Lankan Government devolved more power to the Tamil regions than it ever had previously. Other key features saw an exchange of prisoners and the appointment of a European truce-monitoring mission.³⁵

There was a gradual breakdown in the peace process and in 2006; the conflict began in earnest again. Through this period, the Sri Lankan military had been strengthening and putting in place the strategic conditions to enable it to destroy the LTTE. Initially an LTTE split occurred between the Karuna faction of the LTTE in the eastern area of Tamil control. This split saw the Karuna faction become an insurgent movement in that area with LTTE members assuming control. Although it was concealed at the time, the Karuna faction was positioning itself to assist the Sri Lankan Government and become the dominant Tamil faction after the coming war.³⁶

The battle to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the international community ran throughout the civil war. However, the Sri Lankan Government worked to take concrete steps to cut off the physical, financial, and materiel support for the LTTE, as well as build up conditions where they would be able to complete the task of physically annihilating the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Government had experienced the problems of pushing the

LTTE to the brink and then backing off.³⁷ It had produced an increasingly sophisticated, resilient, and determined adversary who knew how to leverage dirty fighting and offset this with sophisticated information messaging which painted the brutality of the struggle as a necessity of survival.³⁸

The Sri Lankan Government, under increasing control of Mahendra Rajapaksa enabled the Sri Lankan military to modernize and plan in depth for the next major war. It is even claimed that the Sri Lankan Armed Forces clandestinely perpetrated some key events that caused the descent to war. The first military step was the interdiction of the LTTE's supply fleet and the destruction of the LTTE navy. This isolated the LTTE on the mainland. Then the military conducted a thorough clearance of Tamil held territory. With the acquiescence of the Karuna faction providing intelligence and reducing the requirement for troops to hold cleared areas, the east was cleared first. Assisting the control of the operation was the mobilization of reserves and available naval and air force personnel. This freed up Army units to clear thoroughly the north and east without the LTTE being able to escape the tightening net.³⁹

Targeting and intelligence operations were efficient and the Army's campaign was tactically skillful in forcing the LTTE to fall back to its Millaitivu stronghold. The final brutal phase of the campaign saw the LTTE leadership attempt to use human shields to halt the offensive and then enable escape of the Army offensive. The Sri Lankan Army restricted media access to the war zone and completed the annihilation of the LTTE.⁴⁰

There has been a significant backlash toward the Sri Lankan Government over human rights abuses and war crimes since the final phase of the war. However the peace since 2009 raises a question as to whether such brutality is necessary when faced with a

threat such as the LTTE. It would appear to be a valid method of ending a conflict, assuming the Sri Lankan Government can promote a degree of welfare and improvement in the Tamil community to avoid a slide back into violence.⁴¹

Analysis

The LTTE was a combatant that engaged in dirty fighting. However, perhaps the crucial aspect of the Sri Lankan Civil War was how the Sri Lankan Government took advantage of the LTTE's loss of legitimacy, which they used to fight dirty, destroy the LTTE, and end the conflict. The plan for this conflict could have been lifted directly from van Creveld's brutal COIN description.

Van Creveld describes the Machiavellian approach to suppressing an insurgency as practiced during the Hama massacre.⁴² That approach brought the Assad regime thirty years of peace, but the uprising of 2013 has been far better prepared and has plunged Syria into a crippling civil war.

Perhaps Sri Lanka will suffer the same fate as Syria if the reconciliation efforts promoted by the regime are not delivered. For now, the peace has held well and the opportunity for reconciliation exists. In a sense, the Sri Lankan method is textbook COIN, with a violent application followed by reconciliation.

Strategic Narrative and Delivery of the Narrative

We are just a few Sinhalese, but the Tamils are millions, here and in South India. They can go to India, where there are so many Tamils. They can go all over the world. Who will take me, a Sinhalese? I must live and die on this island! . . . Does no one see that for us, the Sinhalese Buddhists, it is a problem of survival? It is the perishing of a race.⁴³

The LTTE was a brutal organization that was able to wear two faces very effectively. It could recruit and employ child soldiers and suicide bombers, and at the same time, it could operate Hezbollah style welfare programs. The LTTE information campaign was highly sophisticated, as was its offshore diaspora funding and logistic network. The LTTE, like many other such movements was adept at playing the victim and was aided by many Sinhalese acts of violence.⁴⁴

The narrative of the LTTE was very simple and stated that the Tamil homeland was under threat of extinction by the Sinhalese, and any means was acceptable to protect it. The Sri Lankan narrative was always one of security and limited war. The previous pullouts from military campaigns had attested to this. However the LTTE broke the last rule of Hezbollah's principles of war, in that they hurt the Sri Lankan public, which allowed the government forces to lose restraint.

The LTTE was perhaps a victim of its success in information operations. It was extremely influential in the Tamil north and through the global diaspora. The LTTE was technologically sophisticated, and adapted quickly to globalization. However, their success in operations and sustainment blinded the LTTE to the importance of the wider international community and the changes therein. They did not adapt effectively to being labeled a terrorist organization by the United States, and they failed to regain the regional (Indian) political support that had been lost with the assassination of popular Indian President Rajiv Gandhi. India may not have supported the LTTE, but they may have placed greater restraint on the Sri Lankan Government as they did in 1983. The final blunder in the area of information operations was the Tamil abstention from the elections that brought Mahindra Rajapaska to power. Perhaps the LTTE felt they were losing

ground and renewed hostility would highlight their cause, but in light of the other changes that were occurring, the LTTE did not respect the potential for dirty fighting to be combined with the increased capability of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces. This shows that even those who wield dirty fighting, can be limited in their understanding of its power and interplay.

Sri Lankan dirty fighting power was enabled by suicide attacks on Colombo Airport, the Temple of the Tooth, and a number of assassination attempts on senior government and security officials, that occurred in the late 1990s. This set the tone for the 2000s, and then following the terror attacks of September 2001, some key events occurred. The LTTE had its financial operations damaged by being declared a terrorist organization by the United States. Mahendra Rajapaska was also able to finance the modernization of the army through a loan from China, which was crucial due to the increasing effect the conflict was having on the economy.⁴⁵

Militarily, the Rajapaska method was achievable due to the relatively small area, that the LTTE occupied. The role of Colonel Karuna⁴⁶ in enabling the entrapment of the LTTE in Mullaitivu is not fully known. However his group's role was undoubtedly helpful. Karuna has certainly been well rewarded by a government against whom his group committed atrocities. Initially his defection enabled a significant advantage in intelligence. This may well have assisted in enhancing the effects of the strategic strikes, that crippled the LTTE ability to react effectively to the 2008 to 2009 ground offensive. Secondly, Karuna's defection enabled the military advantage of speeding the clearance of the eastern Tamil zone and requiring less of a troop presence to hold this area as the operation shifted to the north.⁴⁷

Viewed in light of the defection of Colonel Karuna, the Sri Lankan operation was a textbook COIN clearance operation. The terms enemy centric and population centric are arguably misleading. The Sri Lankan strategy simply identified the entire LTTE leadership as irreconcilable and dangerous to the point where it had to be destroyed. The Sri Lankan Government has not diluted the federalized power sharing arrangement that had been negotiated in 2002, and has attempted to continue a process of reconciliation since 2009. Thus, to imply that the military victory was a traditional Clausewitzian victory where the Tamils should be bent to Sinhalese will would seem an over statement.⁴⁸

Receptiveness to the Narrative

The Sri Lankan economy was generally a developing economy that is neither rich nor poor by world standards. The level of education in Sri Lanka is generally good, resulting from a generally free and democratic system of government. However in the Tamil north during the war, an alternative system of governance was established. This system was generally worse off in all measurable areas, but was designed to retain legitimacy for the LTTE.⁴⁹

The Tamil population could be seen to be marginalized relative to the rest of the country. Their history of warfare was also significant and the excesses of militant Sinhalese created significant receptiveness to the narrative of the LTTE.

Perhaps the key factor for support and the subsequent regulation of legitimacy for the LTTE was that their key support came through the operation of fundraising and logistic supply from the global Tamil diaspora. This network was largely based on willing donations and not organized crime, yet it remained supportive of the Tamil cause

as the employment of more illegitimate means rose. It would appear that money raised through the Tamil diaspora, was raised under the auspices of the legitimate part of the Tamil narrative, and then used with a greater emphasis on the illegitimate. This is certainly a different type of support to dirty fighting than other non-population based forms of support, but like the other methods it distorts the natural relationship between the need for legitimacy and the ability to fight dirty.

Moral Factors

The leader of the LTTE, Villupillai Prabhakaran, launched his career as a rebel leader by personally publicly assassinating an unarmed mayor in Jaffna. He then led the development of the suicide cadres of the LTTE.⁵⁰ To say that moral issues were not at play in the Sri Lankan War would be an understatement.

The deliberate direct lethal targeting of Prabhakaran and his inner circle (including his young son); indicate that the Sri Lankan military were heavily influenced by the belief that this could end the war.⁵¹ This targeting approach was very thorough, and it would appear that the reconstruction of Tamil political entities to date has been significantly less violent with the demise of Prabhakaran.⁵²

The important point of the Sri Lankan conflict is that the LTTE became exposed as much more illegitimate than the Sri Lankan Government in 2005. Their constant breaches of the 2002 peace agreement saw the Scandinavian monitors cease their mission.⁵³

Conclusion

The Sri Lankan War proves why Hezbollah has the last principle in how they operate—not to provoke a stronger enemy to the point where they lose restraint. The LTTE also enabled the Sri Lankan Government by not reacting to the changes that allowed the aggressive end game of 2006 to 2009. Sri Lanka won the battle of the narratives and then used that legitimacy to motivate a final brutal assault.

One thing that seems clear from this case study is that dirty fighting is an interactive process. Even combatants like Norway and New Zealand, which have no motivation to fight dirty themselves, need to consider their interaction with others who fight dirty during COIN and other operations. To train and enable allied combatants in professional military techniques and not ensure that there is no potential for those techniques to be misused may be naïve.⁵⁴ Perhaps this is akin to the funding provided by the Tamil diaspora, which was probably not intended to enable the tactics for which it was used.

The Sri Lankan War is still the subject of much conjecture. The truth is elusive but the following is the narrative that explains Sri Lankan success. The LTTE was a brutal and illegitimate terrorist group that cynically projected legitimacy. Then their breaches of the 2002 peace agreement exposed them as unwilling to compromise because of their hold over the Tamil population. The Sri Lankan Government had no choice to achieve the great need of permanent peace, other than to destroy brutally the LTTE. This was done as humanely as possible but still entailed the loss of innocent life. This cost was considered worth a permanent peace.

This narrative is heavily disputed by Tamil diaspora, but demonstrates the interaction and power of a dirty fighting mentality. If one accepts the Sri Lankan narrative, which many do not, the LTTE was a new war combatant that would never allow civil society to compromise or regulate its behavior. The Sri Lankans simply argue that the ends justified the means they used.

Bosnia in the 1990s

Military Status	Sex	Muslims	Serbs	Croats	Others	Total
Civilians	Men	16,788	5,364	1,047	1,262	24,462
Civilians	Women	5,019	1,006	379	386	6,791
Militaries	Men	35,904	12,965	6,033	2,567	57,468
Militaries	Women	281	63	84	38	465
Total	Total	57,992	19,398	7,543	4,253	89,186

Figure 4. Bosnian War Total Casualty Figures (as reported in June 2009)

Source: Jan Zwierzchowski and Ewa Tabeau, “The 1992-95 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Census-based Multiple System Estimation of Casualties’ Undercount” (Conference Paper for the International Research Workshop on ‘The Global Costs of Conflict,’ February 1, 2010), accessed May 10, 2015, http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_undercount_conf_paper_100201.pdf, 18.

Overview and Context

The Bosnian War in the 1990s occurred after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Serbia sought to claim territory it considered greater Serbia and support Serb nationalists in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. Initially the Serbian Army sought territory in Croatia. In 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina was declared independent from Serbia and a large part of the Serbian Army was effectively detached to Bosnia where

they augmented their force with local and Serbian militia forces and commenced the capture and control of territory from Bosniak (predominantly Muslim) and Bosnian Croat dominated areas.⁵⁵ The three sides to the conflict were defined and initially the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks cooperated against the Bosnian Serb forces; however, later in the war these forces would also violently clash over disputed territory.⁵⁶

The military confrontations of the war saw a Serb force that was well equipped with heavy weapons dominate the military clashes. However, the steep mountainous topography of Bosnia often negated the advantage of heavy maneuver forces and the war settled into a series of trench warfare stalemates around key pockets of terrain.⁵⁷

Behind the front lines, the Bosnian Serb forces conducted an organized program of population displacement or ethnic cleansing which led to war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the Croat and Bosniak areas there were also atrocities committed, and similar practices perpetrated, but on a smaller scale.⁵⁸ The intention of the population displacement was to create areas of clear Serb, Croat, and Bosniak political control.⁵⁹ Many of the worst practices of this war behind the front lines were conducted by outside extremist militia forces. These forces were constituted for carrying out the worst of the brutality, and included criminals, extremists, and foreign fighters prominently.⁶⁰

The United Nations (UN) and later NATO deployed peace keeping and peace enforcement forces to monitor the relative stalemate in front line fighting and attempted to alleviate the suffering caused by the collapse in the Bosnian economy and the population displacement. The conflict is now remembered for the failure of the UN peacekeeping troops to stop the ethnic cleansing that was occurring behind the front lines.

In some cases, this was in areas that had been designated as safe zones and which were under the protection of the peacekeepers.⁶¹

A series of negotiations arranged a truce that formalized the territorial partition between the Croat, Bosniak, and Serb entities. Serb forces had resisted entering negotiations and this resulted in air strikes by the UN and NATO forces. Combined with increased offensive ground operations by the now united Bosniak and Croat forces the Serbs had begun to lose ground.⁶² This combined with diplomatic pressure achieved the engagement and agreement to a peace that has held.

Analysis

The Bosnian War is hard to envision as relating to COIN. It was fought by combatants who were all invested in dirty fighting, and as Kaldor describes, they steadily increased the brutality of their approach with very little regard for the wider consequences.⁶³

The key aspect of the Bosnian War was the unwillingness to engage in compromise. The Serb forces in particular, aimed to prepare the ground to maintain their long-term power in Bosnia before the inevitable democratic compromise that would favor the more populous Bosniaks. The Bosniaks and Croats eventually engaged in similar actions but on a smaller scale as shown in figure 4.

The international community was focused on a compromise agreement but had to wait until relative Serb illegitimacy was so clear that they could use force to reduce Serb military power, this exposed them to retribution and compelled their compromise. The international force was risk averse and slow but it should be remembered that the extent of the atrocities were not immediately clear and atrocities were occurring on both sides.

The severity of atrocities has added to the perception that the UN and its contributors failed.⁶⁴

Strategic Narrative

The Bosnian War is used as the original case study of new war by Professor Mary Kaldor. The partition of elements of the combatants and the blatant criminality of the war serve to underline many aspects of new war. The brutality was arguably the most severe case of recent memory, especially because of the relative harmony in which Bosnians lived prior to the conflict.⁶⁵

The strategic narrative of the Serbs was based on historic grievances and the fears associated with the changes imposed by the breakup of Yugoslavia. It essentially stated that the Bosniaks and the Croats will conspire to destroy Serbs in Bosnia if we do not destroy their influence in our areas first. This strong survivalist, fear driven narrative was a powerful one for Serbs.⁶⁶

The aspects of Kaldor's new war thesis were very much at play in Bosnia, and this affected dirty fighting significantly. The Bosnian Serbs were beholden to outside support that had no conception of their own need for legitimacy. Slobodan Milosevic played the part of a cold war dictator, sponsoring the subversion and sabotage. The end of the Cold War, and the arrival of the information age created a more visible battlefield. This meant that the excesses of groups like the Serbian militia group Arkans Tigers became more visible than in the past (eventually). The resulting international outrage and response ensured that these acts were eventually traced back to their origin.⁶⁷

Perhaps Milosevic also misread Russia's acquiescence to the international operation. Russia needed focus to be reduced on the Chechen War, or at least put in perspective, and this may have contributed to Milosevic's miscalculation.

The criticism of many that comment on the Bosnian War is that the international force waited too long to use the force that they eventually used to force the Serbs to the negotiating table.⁶⁸ However, regardless of the actual level of truth that has emerged, the Serb information campaign at the time made it extremely difficult for the UN force to take more decisive action at the time.⁶⁹ This campaign often involved highlighting and magnifying the other side's illegitimate actions, while hiding and diminishing Serb atrocities.

Transmission of Narrative and Acceptance of Narrative

As stated above, the transmission of the narrative did not require much of the average Bosnian Serb. The worst of the dirty fighting was well hidden at the time and conducted with ruthless efficiency and speed.

What was key was that the Bosnian Serbs were a relatively centralized and organized group. Thus, their brutality was on an industrial scale. The fear from UN operational planners was that Bosnia's geography and the state of the conflict could easily turn an early forceful approach into a far worse situation.⁷⁰ If they had taken sides earlier, insurgent tactics could have risked the physical destruction of UN forces. There is a long history of brutal guerilla warfare in the Balkans, and planners could see the problems with aligning with either side.⁷¹ As it was, the UN troops were subjected to regular attacks designed to limit the UN mission, and keep observers from discovering the full extent of the ethnic cleansing.⁷²

Kaldor suggests that the same basic approach, but more forceful implementation may have helped.⁷³ However, it may have allowed the Serbs to justify attacking the peacekeeping force. Militarily, this could have been disastrous.⁷⁴

Thus, it is understandable how the UN force was delayed in communicating the truth about the conflict and building the will to act more decisively. There was also a delay in response as the United States intended to encourage multilateralism, yet they were the only forces with the capability to dominate the Serbs. Kaldor's analysis seems to discount the difficulties of dealing with misinformation, and the effects of the dangers of miscalculation.⁷⁵

Moral Factors

The blatant use of criminality by agents that were Nazi like in their execution of brutality was breathtaking during the Bosnian War. Many of those involved have since answered for their crimes. The excesses of the violence make it very difficult for scholars to apportion logic to the conflict. Yet the peace agreement brokered at the Dayton Accord ended the conflict relatively quickly.

The operations of groups such as Arkans Tigers were widespread during the Bosnian War and all sides employed such groups.⁷⁶ The war saw a stalemate in conventional fighting develop, with the ethnic cleansing of areas under the control of different combatants.⁷⁷

Conclusion

The Bosnian War showed the amplifying effect of illegitimate brutality when added to well organized conventional military power. This was matched with leaders who were new to the information age and operating in a time of geostrategic upheaval.⁷⁸

The western military response at the time deserves some criticism for its weakness and pace of response, but this needs to be assessed in line with the risks that existed in alternate approaches. The criticism of the intervention understates the difficulty of conducting a large multi-national operation in a form that was relatively new. The steps that were taken showed a highly effective intervention compared to other wars with similar complexity, yet it is not portrayed as any sort of success to be emulated.⁷⁹ Thus, aggressive peace enforcement and the merit of not taking sides in intrastate conflict were not retained as successful concepts.

From the perspective of this study, Bosnia proves the ability of negotiation to rapidly reduce violence. However, parties who intend to fight dirty can foresee this process and try to delay and manipulate their negotiating positions. Such organized and cynical manipulation does not seem to have been deterred by the subsequent pursuit and prosecution of leaders in this conflict for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The UN and NATO forces did avoid being dragged into the conflict by not taking sides. Unfortunately, the drawback of this cautious approach is that information was greatly manipulated which confused the UN as to where legitimacy lay. In the case of Bosnia, this resulted in genocide. There is merit for Kaldor's idea of a cosmopolitan police force dedicated solely to humanitarian intervention. However, when such a force has to fight for information it is easy to imagine the disaster that would have occurred if

this force had become engaged with the Bosnian Serb Army in a guerilla war. Neutrality would have provided no protection. Perhaps what may have worked better would have been the identification of the danger of the survival-based rhetoric in Yugoslavian communities before the war. Regardless of the wider legitimacy of this rhetoric, its power and legitimacy in the Yugoslav world should have warned of the potential for disaster.

Summary of Findings

Compromise is the core process that reduced the justification to fight by any means in the case studies. Illegitimate combatants were exposed by their refusal to enter into compromise or abide by agreements; this affected the Bosnian Serbs, the PIRA, and the LTTE. When this happened, force could be used effectively by their opponents.

When force was used, containment or destruction was used. The limited nature of the force used on the Serbs was containment, as was the force used to influence the PIRA. Any strategy beyond containment appeared to only strengthen the resolve and increase the legitimacy of an opponent with a dirty fighting mentality. The ability of the IRA, LTTE, and Serbs to claim victim status showed this clearly.

Outside influences, and moral factors complicated all of the cases studied. However, the logical core of the dirty fighting was a legitimate survival or a great need based narrative. All combatants in the cases except the UN and NATO forces in Bosnia used such narratives to enable action. The British and Sri Lankan Governments both fought dirty with success because their action was strategically well-planned and executed with discipline and resolve. How long the success lasts may yet differentiate these approaches.

The UN and NATO could have done more to prevent the Bosnian genocide, but they would have to have used the same process of exposing Serb aggression before taking action. How any intervention force could have achieved this without prematurely taking a side in that conflict is difficult to see. With NATO remaining detached from the rhetoric of the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs had nowhere to go but the negotiating table once force was applied sufficiently.

Northern Ireland best demonstrated the problems with even being seen to take sides in a conflict. Unionist and loyalist influences delayed and complicated the compromise that eventuated in Northern Ireland. This suggests that there are no easy strategic choices when entering and influencing conflict.

¹ Rod Thornton, "Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army's Deployment to Northern Ireland (1969-1972)," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 1 (2007): 73-107.

² Marston and Malkasian, 158.

³ The Agreement was signed in December 1973 and abandoned in May 1974. Negotiations for the agreement were held in secret for some time prior to the signing and that is why there is a degree of attribution given toward its role in the drop in violence after 1972.

⁴ John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: Palestine to Northern Ireland* (Chippenham, England: Antony Rowe, 2002), 151-194.

⁵ Marston and Malkasian, 173-174.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 163.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 151-194.

⁸ Newsinger, 151-194.

⁹ Thomas H. Henriksen, *What Really Happened in Northern Ireland's Counterinsurgency: Revision and Revelation* (Hurlbert Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2008), 27-29.

¹⁰ Thornton, 73-107.

¹¹ Henriksen, 20-23.

¹² Newsinger, 151-194.

¹³ Marston and Malkasian, 164-165.

¹⁴ George J. Mitchell, *Making Peace* (New York: Alfred A Knoph, 1999).

¹⁵ While there was strong support for the SAS action, the boost it gave the republican cause meant that SAS operations were conducted in a far less visible manner after this incident. Bamford, 581-607.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The tight control and eventual disbandment of the locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment was another example of the continuing compromise in security force reform.

¹⁹ Newsinger.

²⁰ Bamford, 581-607.

²¹ Newsinger.

²² Marston and Malkasian, 164-165.

²³ Although the Stevens inquiry began in 2003, it had a forerunner in the 1980s as discussed in Bamford, 581-607.

²⁴ Mitchell was selected as an influential and centrist facilitator who had the support of President Clinton. Mitchell.

²⁵ Marston and Malkasian, 164-165.

²⁶ Henriksen, 47.

²⁷ Newsinger.

²⁸ Marston and Malkasian, 174.

²⁹ Bamford does not conclude this, but his argument shows the importance of intelligence operations to containment of the PIRA. He then says all operations have to be legitimate, which gives the appearance of a fear that he will be accused of advocating

illegitimate violence. Bamford is interesting because he does more than most to show the effectiveness and importance of intelligence and special operations.

³⁰ C. Christine Fair, *Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons learned from Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 16-20.

³¹ During this time the LTTE eliminated and marginalized its rivals. Fair, 23-24.

³² Support for the Tamil movement was seen as a way to placate Tamil nationalism in India.

³³ Fair, 28.

³⁴ Llorin, 8.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Fair, 24-36.

³⁹ Llorin.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.* This is the suggestion of the author.

⁴² van Creveld, 78-89.

⁴³ Bobby Wickremasinghe, Sri Lankan Deputy Minister for Prisons, quoted in John Lee Anderson, "Death of the Tiger: Sri Lanka's Brutal Victory over its Tamil Insurgents," *The New Yorker*, January 17, 2011, accessed February 23, 2015, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/17/death-of-the-tiger>.

⁴⁴ Llorin.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Colonel Koruna is the nom de guerre for Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ This is in response to the assessment of the operation as conventional war by Simpson, *War From the Ground Up*, 1.

⁴⁹ Fair, 16-68.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Anderson.

⁵² Ehelepola.

⁵³ Llorin.

⁵⁴ This particularly relates to the current coalition mission in Iraq.

⁵⁵ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 47-50.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 46-47.

⁵⁷ “Overview, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Washington Post*, updated October 1998, accessed March 18, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/overview/bosnia.htm>.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Kaldor, 47-58.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 49-58.

⁶¹ Ibid., 59-70.

⁶² Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic, *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 218-235.

⁶³ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 32-70.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Dusan Babic, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: The War Of Narratives–Analysis,” *Eurasia Review*, May 26, 2012, accessed March 18, 2015, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/26052012-bosnia-and-herzegovina-the-war-of-narratives-analysis/>.

⁶⁷ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 32-70.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ This is evident in Rupert Smith’s admission of the information available at the time of the Srebrenica massacre and in general, Smith, 360.

⁷⁰ General Sir Michael Roses reference to crossing the Mogadishu Line was a reference to the dangers of getting drawn into a conflict when not equipped to do so. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 66.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² “Overview, Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

⁷³ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 66.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 67.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 32-70.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 49.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 53-58.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 40-53.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 32-70.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The concept of dirty fighting that is presented in this study is novel but is touched on in much conflict literature. An analysis that relates to dirty fighting is the theory of new war proposed by Kaldor. The historical analysis by Crandall of American irregular war experience has also identified the challenge of dealing with combatants that break the rules. Crandall discusses many aspects of the theory of dirty fighting, but he like others is constrained by the moral and philosophical themes that are entwined in such an enquiry. Literature reveals that dirty fighting is an age old problem, that has specific manifestations in the modern globalized world.

The themes that block a clear and rational analysis of dirty fighting are; the difference between legality and legitimacy; whether illegitimate means can be justified by legitimate ends, and; whether victory is about ending war or achieving strategic goals. It is very difficult to suggest with any credibility that doing something illegal or immoral might be for the best in the long run. Blocksoms article indicates that it has been historically acceptable to confront dirty fighting themes. The analysis in Bamford's article is a case of the failure of logic that results in many modern analyses where this issue is raised. The Bosnian War shows that ending a complicated and vicious civil war (relatively) quickly, may not be sufficient. This reinforces the point that winning is not as simple as ending violence, but does not indicate a solution.

The theory of dirty fighting proposed in this study enables the themes mentioned previously to be acknowledged but set aside. The core of dirty fighting separates the

legitimate components that drive dirty fighting from the illegitimate. A broad variety of examples are cited to support the foundation of the theory. Guevara's forceps metaphor that justifies brutality illustrated the key fusion of the legitimate with the illegitimate. Wickramesinghe's quote showed how even a dominant combatant can construct a belief that their survival is threatened. Dirty fighting theory further describes how a narrative for war is perpetuated and influenced, to support dirty fighting. Thus, a small piece of legitimacy can enable a great deal of illegitimacy.

The thesis that results from analysis of what constitutes dirty fighting is that compromise is necessary to remove the legitimacy that enables dirty fighting. Once this legitimacy is gone, the dirty fighter can evolve into a less illegitimate entity as the PIRA evolved into Sinn Fein. What can also occur with compromise, is that combatants can define themselves as illegitimate and worthy of severe force being applied to them. Bosnian Serb resistance to peace talks enabled the NATO air strikes but did not allow the Serbs to justify a decentralized insurgency enabling real compromise at the Dayton talks that has led to lasting peace. The demise of LTTE showed that much of the international community will sanction state brutality, when there is a well constructed justification for it. However, it should be pointed out that all such justified force must be minimized to be effective. Bamford shows how the British had to use the SAS to contain the PIRA. The Gibraltar, Milltown and Corporals incidents demonstrate how an overstep in force that was within the law, gave life to the PIRA's justifications for violence. This experience greatly advanced British understanding of the utility of force in intrastate warfare and addresses whether ends justify means. The Gibraltar incident showed how legal action can be illegitimate, and how critical legitimacy is.

Throughout history, dirty fighting has been replied to in kind. A close study that is in context reveals that dirty fighting interplay has changed very little. Many examples from chapter one and two indicate the longer term historical continuity of dirty fighting interplay. The cases all indicate a trend for over militarist solutions to dirty fighting. The Troubles saw a constant tension in the British strategy between containing the PIRA while trying not to justify retaliation. The Sri Lankan war saw a purely militarist solution applied. The hope of the Sri Lankans is that by doing it quickly, quietly and completely that reconciliation can now be effective in achieving compromise. In Bosnia, manufactured mutual fear drove sudden and terrible dirty fighting. However, the UN force approach in Bosnia shows a strict desire to avoid that force becoming involved in the interplay. What seems true, is that it is harder for forces to fight dirty in the modern world and keep it a secret. In the current information environment the truth tends to emerge more quickly and clearly, and this rapidly impacts the conduct of operations.

It is due to the key changes in the modern world that modern cases were selected for study. The cases all show dirty fighting being defeated, and add detail to the thesis of this study. The cases echo van Creveld's thesis that either brutality or restraint work, anything in between produces a more resilient adversary. Applying dirty fighting theory to the cases showed how difficult compromise is to achieve. This explains why an entire field academia is dedicated to conflict transformation and resolution. The theory of dirty fighting sees compromise as inevitable in an age where insurgencies are supported by outside funding and sanctuary, and where decentralization has become simple. The willingness to negotiate and actually delivering the outcomes that are sought are both

factors in compromise. However, the cases also show the utility of force in compelling compromise or destroying those who will never truly settle.

The British won in Northern Ireland because they delivered what Catholics wanted and legitimately deserved. That stated the PIRA had the legitimacy not to block improvements in Catholic conditions. So the PIRA may well argue that they too won. The final negotiations were an example of convincing all parties that they had won and that the conflict was thus not a zero sum game.

The same can not be said in Sri Lanka. Here a peace agreement broke down and led to a brutal end game where the Sri Lankans won, and the LTTE lost. However, the Sri Lankans claim that Tamil interests have won also. In their new move toward reconciliation, steps such as official recognition of the Tamil language are intended to avoid a reincarnation of Tamil militancy. If van Creveld's example of Syria is noted by the Sri Lankans, there is much riding on the success of reconciliation. Also, if the example of colonial expansion in New Zealand is considered, it can be over a century and reconciliation will still be an issue. The Sri Lankan war may appear to be a modern case of conventional Clausewitzian war, but it should be viewed in the same light as any other bitter intrastate war, and dirty fighting theory enables this.

The Bosnian war was a complicated example of Kaldors new war. What is frustrating about Bosnia is the lack of respect that is accorded to the commanders of the UN and NATO forces for what did not happen. Had the war turned into a Serbian insurgency, outcomes could well have been worse. The Bosnian War showed the tragic consequences of the survivalist/ nationalist narrative that Serbs developed at the time of

the break-up of Yugoslavia. The potential for what occurred was not identified until it was already happening, and those responsible have been judged accordingly.

The application of dirty fighting theory to conflict is not straight forward. It is very difficult to set aside fundamental questions posed by the themes discussed previously. Dirty fighting is a framework to analyze the commitment level of a combatant and how this can amplify their power. This study has looked at the interplay of dirty fighting within conflict and has observed the transformation of combatants through compromise or lack thereof. Dirty fighting mentality can be defeated, but if it is strongly constructed it can require significant compromise. If that compromise is too great, war can be a logical solution.

Recommendations

Doctrine

U.S. doctrine, particularly the latest draft operating concept states that war is fundamentally a battle of wills.¹ General H.R. McMaster, the current U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Centre commander discusses this concept and posits that winning wars requires “a rational determination to achieve a sustainable outcome, usually a political outcome, consistent with vital interests.”² This thesis provides a way of thinking about warfare that gets to the heart of the battle of wills and how they can be manipulated. McMaster’s suggested definition of winning is aligned with the discussion of success in this thesis. It is suggested that there are other themes and conclusions that relate to the battle of wills that this thesis can explain.

Stability operations are containment operations and thus focus on enemy or threat groups as clearly as offensive or defensive operations. Stability operations should

synthesize information operations to a greater degree, recognizing that the fight against different opposing group narratives is what creates the conditions to achieve most military and national end states. What appears to be missing in much stability doctrine, is an acknowledgement of the need to compromise with potential threats, so as to remove their ability to fight dirty.

U.S. Army COIN doctrine should include more detail covering the actions required for forces to facilitate reconciliation. In addition, forces could be guided as to the information required to facilitate reconciliation at a higher level. The brief section in the British Army Field Manual, *Countering Insurgency* (2010), provides an example for U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.

Further Study

The theory expounded in this study warrants further examination. The theory could be scientifically tested within a controlled environment where a game is played by research subjects, and a referee allows cheating. Responses could be measured for the intensity with variables adjusted like the need to win the game increasing and the ability to mediate or compromise removed. Cheating in an important game, and resultant anger, could substitute for dirty fighting in warfare.

Better measures for empirical testing could potentially prove, disprove, or adjust the theory in this study.³ Empirical questions related to the theory could measure factors such as the strength of a combatant, and the severity or amount of illegitimate action with which theythey engage. What would be important would be defining compromise behaviours and relating these back to conflict intensity.

A quantitative study of conflicts could prove the theory of dirty fighting with a question such as: In conflicts where a combatant fought dirty (relative to the era and their paradigm), how long did the combatant regime remain in existence? If the narrative at the time of the dirty fighting could be established, and change criteria applied, such a study could perhaps apply quantitative methods to begin to measure the relative power of a dirty fighting mentality.

The historical study should build off the work of Crandall but perhaps better grapple with the theory and themes of this research. This study assumes that winning means ending violence, but in reality, countries have strategic needs. How countries identify and pursue these needs when violence commences, is not as simple as peace being the sole aim. Other themes of this study such as the separation of legality and legitimacy, what constitutes winning or victory, and whether ends justify means would all seem to be wise additions to the study of the history of war.

This study may assist historians familiar with a range of eras in relating historical continuities to the present. The Thirty Years War is an example of an information revolution that partially fueled brutal war. It would be interesting to see if scholars of such periods see any correlation with the ideas of this study. Finally, it has been suggested that there may be examples of how to avoid dirty fighting before it commences by addressing minority group interests before they justify conflict.

¹ U.S. Army Draft Operating Concept 2015.

² Herbert R. McMaster, "Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking about Future War," *Military Review* 95, no. 2 (March-April 2015): 11.

³ An example of such research is that being conducted by Sean Gourley and his company Quid. Quid uses advanced physics modeling related to impressive data capture, to advance a theory related to combatants' willingness to engage in negotiations.

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