

IMPERIAL POLICY AND THE INTEGRATION OF
GAUL INTO THE ROMAN EMPIRE

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Military History

by

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ABSTRACT

IMPERIAL POLICY AND THE INTEGRATION OF GAUL INTO THE ROMAN EMPIRE, by MAJ Colin J. Pascal, 88 pages.

Unusual among the great states of antiquity, Rome managed to integrate many of the people it conquered into the very fabric of its society. Rome won and maintained loyalties by expertly leveraging a combination of what is today called hard and soft power. Undeniably important to the overall outcome were the military garrisons that enforced the writ of the state. But while the Army ensured compliance, the economic and cultural benefits of imperial life made recently conquered people willing participants in the life of the empire. Rome's generous granting of citizenship ensured conquered leaders could advance politically inside the empire. In the case of Gaul, the elite was largely coopted to the Roman project in a generation, though sporadic civil disturbances never fully disappeared. This thesis examines how the people of Gaul became integrated into the Roman world. It is a fascinating topic in its own right, but more importantly, may offer insight into future operations where the United States struggles to integrate formerly hostile nations into the American world order.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Rome is relevant. Two millennia before the US engineered the fall of Kabul and the American occupation of Baghdad, Roman legions conquered the once mighty tribes of Gaul. The circumstances separating these campaigns are great of course, but meaningful similarities abound. Then as now a defeated population needed to be fed, secured, and controlled until it could care for itself and accept a new imposed order. Economies were reshaped and cultures clashed. But Rome was able, for centuries, to enjoy the fruits of those efforts. Its success was made possible by a Gallic population that ultimately accepted its place in a re-ordered world.

The successful integration of Gaul into Rome's Empire stands in stark contrast to the muddled results of more recent attempts at remolding societies. In Iraq and Afghanistan, populations were less willing than the Gallic tribes to accept imposed changes and accept their status as conquered people. They were also less optimistic than the Gauls about the potential benefits of their defeat. The following chapters explore the factors that led to Rome's success. They also attempt to illustrate that Gallic integration was the result of a very specific mix of Roman policies and actions, one that suggests a formula for occupation and nation-building: Demonstrate extreme violence in war; offer benevolence and mercy in peace; ensure widely distributed economic development; be accepting of local culture; offer a path to political power in the new system; rule by local proxy; maintain as much as possible of the status-quo; and ensure a living standard higher than what previously existed. Rome did each of these things and succeeded.

The Roman conquest of Gaul is an extraordinary story in its own right. But it was the execution of specific post-conquest policies, and the profound changes they drove in Gaul, that makes this period in history most valuable to students of nation building in the present day. This brief thesis, which examines a single post-conquest occupation, is unable to draw sweeping conclusions about the best practices for nation building. It is not intended, in any case, to do so. What it offers is a concise and accessible illustration of a set of policies that worked for one world power, occupying one defeated enemy, during one relatively brief period of time. But by understanding the individual components of Rome's Gallic formula, modern scholars can and should explore its modern day applicability. And if studies of the world's other great occupations, the Ottomans in Arabia, the British in India, and many others, yield a similar formula, then perhaps modern policy makers can begin understanding the necessary components of post-conquest policy. Remembering that every situation is different and nuance always abounds, it might still be possible to determine a broad formula to shape modern day post-conquest success. Rome's occupation of Gaul, and this thesis, offers a place to begin.

The unfolding of events in Gaul during the first centuries BC and AD track closely with our best recent hopes for Iraq and Afghanistan's development over time. There too we hoped military victory would facilitate economic and cultural transformation and lead to acceptance of a new political order. An understanding of Rome's efforts in Gaul have a role to play in explaining more modern shortcomings. Much has changed in 20 centuries, but the value of this study lies in the deep and meaningful parallels that continue to exist. People will always be more inclined to accept

change when it benefits them personally, recognizes them as equals in the new system (if not initially, then certainly over time), and when it is brought by an agent with a compelling cultural and economic identity. People will also always respond in some way to the threat of force. How they do so largely depends on other circumstances shaping their lives. The decision to resist, after all, is a relatively simple calculation of pros and cons. When surrender is met with benevolence, stability, and economic progress, it seems to stand a good chance of acceptance among the conquered. When met by vengeance, disorder and stagnation, however, conquered people will often risk everything to overturn the loss. The benefits afforded by the Roman conquest, and the costs associated with rebellion, simply made persistent resistance unappealing to the Gauls. The equation was different for the Iraqis and Afghans.

It would be a mistake to think of Gaul as being consumed by Rome. Even after the conquest its gods continued to be worshiped, its leaders respected and many parts of its culture preserved. Greg Woolf, a well-known Roman scholar and prolific author, refers to the post conquest population of Gaul as Gallo-Romans, a nod to their dual identity.¹ But neither did Gaul reject Rome. For almost 500 years its people accepted that ultimate power rested with an emperor based far away. Latin became vernacular and roads and ports tied the Gallic economy decisively to the imperial enterprise. Cities grew that emulated their Italian counterparts and the great cultural monuments of Rome were recreated, in some fashion, by wealthy Gauls. These monuments, among them theaters and amphitheaters, were attended willingly by a Gallic population that adopted many of the cultural trappings of Rome.

Rebellion was certainly not unheard of from the time of conquest to the fall of the Western Empire. But insurrection in almost every case meant redefining or defending Gaul's place in the Roman world, not attempting to leave it. Even the Gallic empire of the 3rd century AD, which briefly declared itself independent of Rome, recreated the Roman political system with a senate and elected consuls, rather than revert back to the pre-conquest political state.² Woolf describes the rebellion as an effort to defend Gaul's Roman identity from the political instability in Rome itself, not as a rejection of Roman values.³ Even as rebels, the Gauls saw themselves as essentially Roman.

Military might alone could not have effected this type of change within Gallic society. Current US doctrine incorporates this understanding by seeing armed force as a component of efforts to stabilize troubled regions, rather than a solution by itself.⁴ To borrow a phrase, after a decade plus of conflict it is well understood that a military's coercive power can sometimes gain a population's compliance, but rarely its commitment to a new idea. Rome understood this. Gaul was made a willing partner in the imperial project by the security, economic, political, and cultural benefits made real by the power of the Roman state. By leveraging all the instruments of national power, Gaul was persuaded by Rome to accept the Imperial government and eventually adopt Roman ideals. In stark contrast, America has of late struggled to effect change in the nations it occupies. Rome's Gallic formula might yet have something to offer.

¹ Greg Woolf, *Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), x.

² Virginia.edu, "A Short History of the Gallic Empire," University of Virginia Roman Coin Project, last updated 25 April 2001, accessed 24 November 2014, http://www.virginia.edu/artmuseum/VirtualExhibitions/Coins/gallic_empire.html.

³ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 247-248.

⁴ Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 201), iv.

CHAPTER 2

THE MILITARY FOUNDATION OF INTEGRATION

Rome's conquest of Gaul was driven by the tremendous ambition of Julius Caesar and a population hungry for stories of glory. But it was also driven by fear. The Rome of modern imagination is deservedly mighty, but the city's actual beginning is exponentially more humble. When, according to Roman legend, the city was founded by Romulus in 753 BC it was one of any number of competing states dotting the Italian peninsula.¹ Although Roman power grew consistently over the centuries from its founding, its rise was frequently interrupted and its very existence sometimes threatened. As late as the third century BC, Rome lost a major war against Epirus, a Greek city-state based across the Adriatic Sea. During the Second Punic War it suffered a 13 year Carthaginian occupation of southern Italy.² That war included the tremendous defeat at Cannae, a battle that cost the Romans 48,000 soldiers killed in a single day.³ Rome in its early centuries was not a city that felt invincible. Rather it rightly saw itself surrounded by powerful enemies, some of whom succeeded in reaching deep into Rome's Italian heartland. The ancient historian Polybius describes the fear which gripped Rome after its defeat at Cannae; the city's population, for a moment at least, was sure Hannibal's army would occupy them next.⁴ This sense of vulnerability helped define the Roman psyche and drove, in part, Rome's eventual conquest of Gaul.

The Gauls themselves contributed to this Roman sense of vulnerability. In 386 BC, after decades of incursions into northern Italy, they reached, besieged and overran the city of Rome.⁵ The sack of the capital encouraged Rome to see the Gallic tribes as an existential threat. And if further evidence of the Gallic threat was necessary, it was

provided by the large number of Gallic warriors who fought alongside Hannibal during the costly Second Punic War.⁶ But their alliance with Carthage left the Gallic tribes vulnerable when Hannibal withdrew from Italy and by 192 BC the Romans had expelled the last Gallic tribe from Italy.⁷ Still the tribes of Gaul, safe in their sanctuary beyond the borders of Italy, continued to menace Rome's imagination.

A significant portion of this chapter relies on Caesar's own account of the conflict, *The Conquest of Gaul*. As Michael Sage points out, the account's accuracy was called into question even by respected Roman writers in histories compiled just a few centuries after Caesar's own time.⁸ Sage is correct when he describes Caesar's writing as emanating from a politically charged time and equally right when he claims Caesar wrote to make himself look good in the eyes of Romans who mattered.⁹ But he is also accurate when he asserts, that no better source of information about Caesar's campaigns exist. Sage argues that a wholesale distorting of facts by Caesar is unlikely. Caesar was writing for contemporaries with some access to independent information and upper-class Romans, in fact, seem to have been well informed of unfolding events in Gaul.¹⁰ Sage argues they would have quickly identified fabrication. *The Conquest of Gaul* sometimes obscures Caesar's mistakes, and always interprets events as Caesar wished them portrayed. But the basic facts from the story, which this chapter relies upon, are not often called into question, even by the author of the only other major source of information on the Gallic War, the Roman writer Dio who interpreted motivations differently but failed to offer an alternative sequence of events.¹¹ It is probably fair then to question the explanations offered by Caesar in his account of the conflict, but the events themselves seem more than likely to have occurred as he described.

The Gallic War was fought between 58 and 50 BC and brought the longstanding Roman-Gallic struggle to a definitive end. The war, a collection of individual campaigns rather than a single conflict, succeeded in expanding Roman control beyond its established provinces in southern Gaul, across most of modern day France and Belgium, and parts of Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands. This extraordinarily feat of conquest is the foundation for Gaul's integration. Temporarily breaking the Gauls means to resist bought time for the Romans to exercise other aspects of national power. Perhaps most importantly, the conduct of Rome's forces always kept alive the prospect of reconciliation. Had the Roman Army sought vengeance as a goal or unreasonably exploited the population, resistance to integration, driven by hatred, would have certainly been stronger.

Julius Caesar is generally credited with starting the Gallic War in 58 BC when he refused permission for the Helvetii tribe to cross Roman land on a migration from today's Switzerland to modern-day western France. Caesar gave two reasons for the refusal in his history of the conflict: the Helvetii defeat of a Roman Army 50 years earlier and the inability of Rome to trust that the Helvetii would not damage Roman land or threaten Roman people along their way.¹² This refusal forced the Helvetii, their homeland under pressure from neighboring German tribes, along a more northerly route that violated the lands of the Aedui tribe, long a Roman ally. Caesar claimed the catalyst for his assault on the Helvetii was an appeal for help from the Aedui as their land was pillaged by the migrating tribe.¹³

Whatever Caesar's true motivation, and many, including the distinguished military historian J.F.C. Fuller suggest it was personal aggrandizement, he attacked the

Helvetii ferociously.¹⁴ After waiting until three quarters of their total number had crossed the Saone River, he unleashed three legions on the quarter that remained.¹⁵ The Roman attack took place in the early morning as the remaining Helvetii prepared to cross the river. Unaware of the Roman presence and not ready for a fight, the Helvetii suffered significant losses.¹⁶ The viciousness of Caesar's surprise attack, and the likely slaughter of women and children alongside the Helvetii warriors, set the tone for subsequent Roman operations in Gaul. Rome left no doubt about its willingness to employ extreme violence against those who opposed it.

Even in the first year of the conflict, Rome's reputation for military prowess, and at times savagery, was shaping Gaul in its favor. This is well illustrated by the Sequani tribe's pursuit and capture of 6,000 Helvetii who fled north after their defeat at the Saone river, an action undertaken by a powerful and still free Gallic tribe simply because Caesar had asked it.¹⁷ But violence alone is not a recipe for stability and Roman pragmatism often found uses for defeated enemies. Caesar could also show mercy when it best suited his objectives.

Because he feared a German occupation of the Helvetii's recently abandoned homeland, Caesar ordered the tribe home as a condition of its surrender.¹⁸ Having just directed the slaughter of a great number of Helvetii, he now ordered the Allobroge Tribe, a Roman ally, to provide them grain until their villages had been rebuilt.¹⁹ Mercy, in the form of this food aid and a general lack of retribution, is most persuasively ascribed to Roman self-interest, but it was mercy nonetheless, and it would have tempered Rome's reputation for brutality.

Forcing the Helvetii home prevented a geographic power vacuum and discouraged the migration of German tribes towards Rome's frontiers. But the tribe would have been a poor buffer had Caesar allowed them to starve. Self-serving then as the food aid was, the hungry Helvetii must have appreciated it, even if they clearly understood Caesar's ulterior motives and resented their defeat. It is not hard to imagine them hating the Romans even more had they been allowed to starve, a fate easily possible in the cruelty of the ancient world. Instead, they suffered then benefited from a combination of Rome's brutality in war and relative benevolence in peace. This mixture would ultimately prove critical to Rome's subsequent conquest and integration of Gaul. As Gallic tribes considered whether to submit or resist they would have clearly understood both the costs and potential benefits associated with the choices. Rome had come to the aid of their ally the Aedui and brutalized their enemy the Helvetii. The contrast between a willingness to slaughter women and children and the provision of food aid well illustrated the two facets of Rome's Gallic policy. Violence mixed with mercy and loyalty to friends.

The defeat of the Helvetii and their return to modern day Switzerland increased Rome's reputation as a Gallic power. Having conquered no additional territory, Caesar had nonetheless demonstrated Rome's ability to influence events beyond its borders. The defeat of a quarter million Helvetii (not all of whom were warriors of course) by a much smaller Roman force increased the perception of Roman power among the Gallic tribes.²⁰ The magnitude of this shift is perhaps best demonstrated by the Gallic delegation that visited Caesar soon after this initial Roman victory. Though the Gallic tribes had been tormented by the German chieftain Ariovistus since at least 65 BC, it was only after the

Helvetii campaign five years later, that their leaders saw Rome as a power with both the ability, and as important, the will to intervene on their behalf.²¹ The leader of the Gallic delegation, a member of the Aedui tribe named Diviciacus, well understood the power of perception. He claimed that Rome's recent victory, and the "terror of its name," was capable by itself of deterring any further German migration west across the Rhine.²²

When Caesar agreed to act in support of this Gallic delegation he invoked Roman loyalty to allies as a primary reason.²³ This commitment to allies was critical to the Roman conquest that followed. It allowed the making and maintenance of alliances that provided Rome the local support it needed and prevented the Gauls from ever forming a truly unified resistance. People are more willing to make agreements when they see their negotiating partner as honest and reliable. Caesar's decision to support the Gallic delegation, especially the Aedui who had long been considered friends of Rome, demonstrated this loyalty and reliability. By the end of 58 BC, in the very first year of the Gallic War, Caesar had clearly demonstrated several Roman traits that proved fundamental to the conquest and integration of Gaul. The Helvetii campaign and the decision to support the Gallic tribes against Ariovistus demonstrated Rome's military prowess, its willingness to use brutality, its ability to show mercy and a steadfast loyalty to allies.

When Caesar agreed to aid the tribes against Ariovistus he did so with the expectation that they would provide his Army with necessary supplies.²⁴ This ability to obtain support from non-Roman people in the areas he campaigned was demonstrated throughout the Gallic War and allowed relatively small Roman forces operating far from friendly territory to defeat larger opponents. Whatever their fighting skill, no group of

Roman legions could long survive in an entirely hostile country. When Caesar moved against Ariovistus, however, he did so with all but one of the Gallic tribes as an ally.²⁵

Caesar spoke with Ariovistus in the Alsace region of modern day France to justify Rome's presence in Gaul and levy his demands. As a primary motivator for Roman intervention, Caesar cited Rome's long friendship with the Aedui tribe, demonstrating again Rome's commitment to the well-being of allies.²⁶ Whether such loyalty was self-serving was beside the point. This consistent commitment to vassals helped guarantee Rome the support it needed as it operated far beyond the bounds of Roman territory. The ability of Gaul's tribes to trust the Romans was one reason Rome rarely fought alone. Ariovistus refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Rome's presence and claimed the portion of Gaul he occupied to be a province of his tribe.²⁷ Their positions irreconcilable, the two leaders left the encounter to prepare their armies to fight.

Caesar leveraged his understanding of German superstition and chose to fight on a day Ariovistus and his men viewed unfavorably.²⁸ With a senior officer leading each of his six legions and allied troops left to guard his camps, Caesar broke the German lines and caused Ariovistus and his men to make a panicked retreat towards the Rhine. The presence of allied Gallic troops was again critical, as their ability to guard the Roman camp freed the legions for front line fighting.

Although Ariovistus made it safely across, most of his men were left on the west bank of the Rhine and slaughtered by the Roman cavalry.²⁹ Writing two centuries later, the Roman historian Dio mentions the death of women and children alongside Ariovistus' defeated soldiers.³⁰ Again, Caesar's post victory-brutality affirmed Roman resolve to punish those who opposed it. The Suibi, a German tribe that had intended to cross the

Rhine and aid Ariovistus, were sufficiently deterred by the Roman victory and the subsequent slaughter to abandon their plans and return home.

With the Suibi deterred and Ariovistus decisively defeated, a confederation of Gallic tribes called the Belgae, who were unwilling to trade a German for a Roman master, raised an Army to evict Roman forces from Gaul.³¹ Caesar responded by moving his army out of winter quarters and leading a march to the border of Belgae territory. The Remi tribe, part of the Belgae confederation but most exposed to Roman power because of their geographic location, chose to side with the Romans. They provided Caesar with a detailed description of the army being raised against him. The value of this intelligence was dwarfed, however, by the numbers of Remi soldiers who stood with, rather than against Caesar. Their absence significantly weakened the Belgae coalition arrayed against him.³²

Conceivably, the Remi could have been less helpful had Caesar's army not recently won two convincing victories and slaughtered a good number of its surviving enemies. In the end, Roman military might, coupled with the demonstrated will to brutally employ it, discouraged the Remi from opposing Rome. The tribe had a clear understanding of the potential consequences associated with resistance. A year earlier Rome had harried and fought the Helveti until, according to Caesar, 250,000 of its people had perished.³³ Even if modern estimates of the Helveti's total population are considered, the loss of life caused by Roman actions was considerable.³⁴ Rome's steeliness was demonstrated.

Even without the Remi, Caesar faced a combined Belgae force of nearly 250,000 fighting men, a number which would have been impossible to overcome without the aid

of allied Gallic tribes.³⁵ Although later forced to adjust his campaign plan, Caesar originally ordered the Aedui to invade the portion of Belgae territory that bordered their own and devastate it.³⁶ The implication of the order is clear: Caesar was absolutely prepared to destroy the farms and livestock that sustained his enemies, regardless of the suffering those actions inflicted. And he had allied forces available to carry out his will.

When the two armies met near the town of Bibrax, Caesar scored a decisive victory against a large group of Belgae who were attempting to envelop his forces.³⁷ This defeat, combined with the Aedui threat to their homeland, convinced the separate tribes of the Belgae confederation to disband their combined force and return to their respective territories, although each promised to continue aiding the others in the event of a Roman attack.³⁸ Although the Belgae no longer constituted an immediate threat to Roman territory, Caesar chose to pursue their forces as they dispersed, killing many as they effected their retreat.

The Roman pursuit, in fact, was a slaughter. Disciplined Roman forces systematically cut down the disorganized and fleeing Belgae Army. Rome's willingness to brutally punish those who opposed it was again demonstrated. Had nightfall not compelled the recall of Rome's pursuit, the easy killing of Belgae would have continued.³⁹ Instead the Roman slaughter of Belgae was limited to a single day. In this episode Rome benefited from the compartmentalized nature of its enemies. The Belgae army, after all, split into its tribal components after their initial defeat. As Caesar split his enemies the Aedui were advancing on Belgae territory. The Gauls were fragmented. It would be easy to credit this disunity for Caesar's great victories without realizing that

Roman policy created and exploited many of these rifts. The loyalty Caesar displayed towards the Aedui, for instance, was one important reason they answered his call.

The slaughter of the retreating Belgae was followed in short order by the Roman siege of Noviodunum, a fortified town controlled by the Suessiones, one of the tribes Caesar had recently defeated and pursued. Already shaken and intimidated by Roman siege craft, the Suessiones offered to surrender. The Remi, whose loyalty to Rome had earned them influence, interceded on the Suessiones behalf and encouraged Caesar to accept the surrender.⁴⁰ Caesar's agreement and decision to spare the enemy town further destruction is another example of the mercy to those who submitted that tempered Roman brutality. His decision to take seriously the advice of the Remi was important. It showed the Gallic tribes that they could have a voice in questions of policy. They were partners, albeit junior ones, rather than subjects. This willingness to seek and then heed council complimented Rome's readiness to inflict pain and its ability to show mercy, all of which ultimately encouraged the Gauls to accept their place in the Roman world.

The importance of Rome's reputation for both brutality and mercy was evident in the quick surrender of the Bellovavi tribe, the largest member of the Belgae confederation.⁴¹ The surrender took place without a fight and was followed in quick succession by the surrender of the Ambiani tribe, who also chose to lay down their arms rather than face Caesar's army again.⁴² Rome's reputation for military prowess obviously intimidated both tribes, but each was still capable of offering resistance had Rome's reputation for mercy not been well established. History is littered with examples of groups fighting against all odds because the consequences of surrender were perceived as horrific. The Bellovavi and Ambiani chose to surrender because they believed their

treatment at the hands of the Romans would be just, a fact so recently demonstrated by the benign handling of the Sussions. It is important to remember that Caesar's forces in Gaul were considerable but finite. Because of this ability to consolidate gains without sacrificing soldiers, specifically the ability to encourage surrender without fighting, his relatively small force was able to exert tremendous influence over Gaul.

In 57 BC, however, there were still Gallic tribes willing to oppose Rome in the field. The Nervii, promised support by the Atautuci tribe who were marching to their aid, surprised Caesar's army as it was establishing camp and came close to defeating it.⁴³ It was only Caesar's energy, the skill of his soldiers, and the timely arrival of reinforcements which granted Rome a hard fought victory in the end. As their army disintegrated the surviving Nervii-mostly old men, woman, and children sued Caesar for peace. Even though Roman soldiers still bled on the battlefield, Caesar refrained from punishing the Nervii. Instead he promised to protect them from harm, guaranteed them possession of their territories and warned their neighbors against threatening them in their weakened state.⁴⁴ Mercy was afforded even to an enemy who had nearly destroyed Caesar's army by attacking it as it chopped trees, hauled baggage, and was generally unprepared for a fight. A less sophisticated man leading less disciplined forces could have focused on punishing the Nervii for the dead Roman soldiers littering the battlefield. Instead, Caesar understood the value of further convincing Gaul that surrender to Rome would be met with mercy. The battle against the Nervii demonstrated again the two components of Roman power in Gaul: battlefield ruthlessness followed by relatively benign surrender terms for the vanquished. The tribes of Gaul were beginning to understand that subjugation to Rome offered benefits, one of which was the guarantee of

borders, as when Rome promised to protect the Nervii from their neighbors. Resistance to Rome, conversely, most often led to calamity.

The Aduatuci tribe, marching to aid the Nervii, turned back when they received news of the Roman victory. Rather than fight in the field they chose to resist from a fortress in modern day Belgium. Feigning surrender at the sight of Roman siege engines the tribe threw a portion of their weapons over the wall as Caesar had directed, claiming this act left them fully disarmed. During the night, however, they emerged from the stronghold wielding weapons not previously disclosed and attacked what they thought would be an unprepared Roman force. Caesar, though, had kept his defenses in a high state of readiness and the Aduatuci were defeated, suffering 4,000 killed. The remainder of the attacking force withdrew into their fortress.⁴⁵ The Aduatuci, who had originally been promised generous surrender terms, were instead punished for their treachery when Roman forces breached the stronghold. Caesar ultimately sold 53,000 people into slavery, a far cry from the mercy he offered his more compliant vanquished foes.⁴⁶

Rome's war in Gaul in 58 and 57 BC was mostly successful. The Helvetii had been returned to their homeland, Ariovistus pushed east of the Rhine and out of Gaul and the Belgae coalition had been decisively defeated. The fact that the defeated Gallic tribes relied on Rome for protection against their enemies (the promise of protection, as discussed earlier, was often part of Rome's generous surrender terms) shows the degree to which Rome was now the dominant power broker in Gaul. Rome's reaction to setback was as important to the future integration of Gaul as its more numerous successes. In late 57 BC a Roman force guarding an Alpine force was attacked in the village of Octodurus.

Fighting against great odds, the garrison escaped the Gallic siege and returned to the safety of Roman territory, but the position it had occupied was lost.⁴⁷

The evacuation under pressure of a Roman force failed to dampen Rome's resolve to shape events in Gaul. Each time the Gauls believed a defeat would discourage Roman meddling they were proved wrong. Even in defeat Caesar was committed to the Roman cause in Gaul. This willingness, stemming from Caesar but present in the army as well, to continue campaigns in the face of setback was an important facilitator of Rome's eventual domination of Gaul.

Resolve was necessary in 56 BC as the defeat at Octodurus was followed in quick succession by a significant revolt of northwestern Gallic tribes. These tribes, led by the Veneti, were talented seafarers who controlled the few useable harbors on Gaul's northwest coast. All had submitted to Roman rule the previous year. They had provided hostages to the small Roman force in the area, a common contemporary practice to assure their loyalty. Convinced the terrain and their control of the seas afforded them a commanding position, they took the Roman envoys sent to requisition grain prisoner and offered their return only when their own hostages were released.⁴⁸ Caesar understood the danger a successful revolt in the northwest presented to Rome's entire position in Gaul. Over the previous two years the Gallic tribes had submitted to Roman rule after being defeated and then offered generous surrender terms. But favorable as the terms were, the tribes were not free. They might rebel if they believed resistance was possible, if it stood even a chance of success.⁴⁹ To maintain the image of Roman invincibility, important in a populous country occupied by a relatively small number of soldiers, Caesar knew the northwestern revolt had to be crushed.

The Veneti and their allies presented a particular challenge to the Roman forces marshalled against them. Their strong points were located on peninsulas whose approaches were submerged by water during high tide. Even beyond the fortified positions, the terrain was broken by tidal inlets that made maneuver difficult. At sea, the Venetian coastline was difficult to navigate, tides were strong and the Roman sailors unfamiliar with its waters.⁵⁰ Caesar understood the challenges, but also the risks if the revolt succeeded. Here Caesar again demonstrated the resolve to fight, even against difficult odds. This determination ultimately helped ensure Gaul's subjugation and encouraged its integration into the Roman world.

Caesar's navy played an important role in Rome's victory over the Veneti as its commander's devised new tactics to attack previously impregnable Venetian ships. The Roman navy was supported by a number of Gallic ships provided by tribes nominally allied (in reality recently conquered) with Rome.⁵¹ These ships augmented the limited Roman fleet, and again Caesar was able to harness the strength of one group of Gallic tribes and leverage it against another. Similar to Caesar's dispatch of the Aedui against the Belgae, his ability to call on local reserves proved critical to overcoming the enemy's numerical superiority. By destroying the Veneti fleet and preventing their escape to the sea, Caesar's forces prevailed. As punishment for their treachery, as they had submitted to Rome only a year earlier, and to set an example for the other Gallic tribes, Caesar executed the entire Venetian senate and sold the rest of the population into slavery.⁵² Here again opposition to Rome, especially perceived treachery, was met with characteristic brutality.

Gaul was largely pacified following the defeat of the Veneti and a concurrent campaign in Aquitaine. Roman power had forced or cajoled most of the Gallic tribes into submission. In 55 BC, however, peace was broken when two German tribes, the Usipetes and the Tencteri, crossed the Rhine into Gaul with 430,000 people (not all of whom were soldiers).⁵³ Caesar was concerned that the presence of such a large population would provide the Gallic tribes a potential ally and upset the new balance of power. As he had to the Helvetii three years earlier, Caesar refused the tribes' request to settle in Gaul and moved his army close to the German camp. As negotiations between the Romans and Germans continued, a German cavalry force attacked a larger but unprepared detachment of Roman cavalry and scattered it. It remains unclear to this day why the attack took place or who ordered it. But the day after the skirmish the senior leaders of the German tribes came to Caesar's camp to apologize and forestall a larger conflict. Caesar, however, was resolved to fight, and he detained the delegation when it arrived and led his army out of camp⁵⁴.

What followed was perhaps the most brutal episode of the Gallic War. Supported by Gallic cavalry provided by allied tribes, Caesar's legions surprised the Germans while they were still in camp. With their leaders detained and their army unprepared to fight, the German soldiers were slaughtered before they could mount a proper resistance. The women and children fled the battle pursued by Roman cavalry, who killed a significant number of them as they ran. Those who survived hurled themselves into the Rhine River in a last attempt to escape. Most perished by drowning.⁵⁵

The massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri tribes was bloody even by Roman standards and as many as 400,000 died.⁵⁶ The numbers, even if not wholly accurate, are

staggering. Roman forces under Caesar's command nearly exterminated the two tribes. The only survivors were elements of the enemy's cavalry, which had been away foraging when the massacre took place.⁵⁷ Unwilling to leave any part of the tribes unpunished, Caesar ordered his forces across the Rhine into Germany in pursuit of the cavalry that had escaped slaughter. But the cavalry was protected by the Sugambri tribe who had gathered their forces in dense woodlands at the approach of the Romans. Instead of risking a pitched battle in difficult terrain far from support Caesar contented himself with ravaging Sugambri territory over an 18 day period. Rome was not averse, in this case or others, to burn villages and destroy crops.⁵⁸ Caesar also understood the psychological necessity of mounting an expedition across the Rhine.⁵⁹ Rome's enemies would find no refuge beyond a river they previously thought would protect them.

Caesar's short German campaign in 55 BC again demonstrates how powerful Rome's reputation had become. As he crossed the Rhine with a relatively small force, a number of German tribes in the area sent delegations professing their friendship, rather than oppose his crossing. And these were not the first German tribes Rome subdued through reputation alone. The Ubii tribe had previously allied themselves to Caesar, believing Rome's powerful reputation afforded them protection from enemies. This alliance is perhaps the best example of the psychological power Rome exerted in Gaul and the border regions of Germany. Rome's military victories and the fearsome way it treated enemies helped it earn allies who saw Roman power as guarantor of their own security. Remembering the relatively small number of Romans actually operating in Gaul (and briefly across the Rhine in Germany), the ability to garner local support was absolutely critical. Caesar knew this and continued to make every effort to honor

alliances and support Rome's friends. Tribes, after all, would be less willing to support Rome if Caesar failed to support them in their hour of need. So, as it had been with the Aedui against Ariovistas, Rome honored a friend's request for aid.⁶⁰ It was an Ubii appeal for help against the rival Suibi tribe which had, at least in part, convinced Caesar to cross the Rhine.⁶¹ Caesar had honored another promise.

His German expedition complete, Caesar turned his attention to Britain, an island that had long been a source of support for hostile Gallic tribes. Gaul and Britain were linked by deep trade and cultural ties and Caesar believed that Gaul could only be controlled if Britain was brought into the Roman orbit.⁶² In the fall of 55 BC Caesar crossed the channel with two legions and their associated cavalry. The small force, which was primarily intended to gather information about Britain and its inhabitants, was attacked after landing by a coalition of Britain's tribes but managed to prevail. The tribes sued for peace and Caesar agreed, demanding a significant number of hostages to guarantee their loyalty. By 54 BC, however, with Caesar back in Gaul, only two of the many tribes that had promised hostages complied and the Romans prepared for a second, larger expedition to exert Roman influence over the island.⁶³

When Caesar left Britain after his first short stay in 55 BC it was possible the tribes believed it unlikely the Romans would ever return. The journey from Gaul to Britain was difficult, impeded as it was by the English Channel, and the island fraught with danger for a force isolated from speedy reinforcement. But the second Roman invasion of Britain again demonstrated Rome's unusual resolve, its willingness to take risks, and its determination to punish those who opposed it.

Taking advantage of Caesar's British distraction, the Treveri tribe, located in eastern Gaul, decided not to submit to Roman authority any longer. As the British invasion fleet was being constructed, Caesar led an expedition to the Gallic German border and was ultimately able to subdue the Treveri without a single fight. Backing one of the two Treveri leaders who were vying for tribal dominance, Caesar bought the tribe's loyalty as the price of his support for one of the claimants.⁶⁴

By leveraging this internal power struggle Caesar conserved his forces for the invasion of Britain. His ability to mediate the Treveri dispute, to choose one of the competing leaders, is illustrative of important changes taking place in Gaul. It shows clearly that Rome was increasingly looked to as the ultimate arbiter of events in Gaul. The Treveri had split themselves into rival camps, but Caesar reunited them simply by backing one of the candidates for leadership. In Illyria, on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea, Caesar's arrival earlier in 54 BC had compelled the Pirustae tribe to halt their raiding activity, and after Caesar's officials had assessed the damage caused, pay restoration to the damaged parties. The resolution of the Treveri leadership question shows Roman arbitration spreading from more established parts of the empire, in this case Illyria, into what was becoming Roman Gaul. It indicates that Roman rule was being accepted.⁶⁵

When Caesar sailed to Britain in 54 BC he forced a number of tribal chieftains from Gaul to accompany him. With only three legions remaining in Gaul while the British expedition was away, this was an insurance policy against rebellion.⁶⁶ When Dumnorix, who led an anti-Roman faction of the usually loyal Aedui tribe protested the forced trip and fled, Caesar dispatched a cavalry detachment, killing him as he resisted

capture.⁶⁷ While the other Gallic leaders probably shared Dumnorix's hostility, they understood their lives were in danger if they resisted. Dumnorix's death illustrated the fact clearly. In the end the harsh strategy worked. There was no general rebellion in Gaul during the months Caesar campaigned in Britain.

Caesar's Roman army landed in Britain unopposed. As the Roman ships approached shore large numbers of Britons had gathered near the beaches but were terrified by the size of the fleet and ultimately fled.⁶⁸ Here and elsewhere, Rome benefited from the relatively unsophisticated nature of its enemies. Roman siege craft had intimidated the defenders of Noviodunum during the Belgae campaign of 57 BC. The bridge across the Rhine awed and encouraged the cooperation of the German tribes in 55 BC. And the massive fleet, much larger than anything ever seen in Britain, facilitated an unopposed landing. Caesar understood the psychological power of Roman engineering and ordered the Rhine bridge built in 55 BC even though ships were available for the crossing.⁶⁹ Although not always intentional (Caesar had a large number of ships, for instance, simply because he was transporting a large number of troops) Rome's technical prowess could shock defenders and weaken their resolve. The shock was even more effective when coupled with rumors of Rome's brutality.

However, it was Rome's reputation for honoring commitments, not its reputation for brutality that played the decisive role during Caesar's second campaign in Britain. Although Caesar was victorious each time the Britons chose to fight he failed to cause the surrender of Cassivellaunus, leader of the most prominent British tribe. Midway through the campaign a prince from the Trinovantes tribe approached Caesar and asked for Roman protection against Cassivellaunus, just as the Ubii had earlier sought Roman

protection from the Suebi. At the cost of 40 hostages and a supply of grain for his army, Caesar agreed to install the prince as king of his tribe under Roman protection.⁷⁰ Here Rome's reputation for loyalty to allies paid off as five other British tribes soon surrendered to Roman benevolence.⁷¹ The movement of these tribes to the Roman side deprived Cassivellaunus of reinforcements and other support and provided Caesar a valuable source of intelligence about his enemy. It is hard to imagine these tribes submitting peacefully to Roman rule without the mercy Caesar had recently shown those who submitted. Faced with competing threats, many of the tribes of Britain chose Roman rule as their best available option.

Caesar returned from Britain in the winter of 54 BC to find his garrisons under attack by a large confederation of Gallic tribes. The tribes managed a significant victory at Samarobriua when they destroyed an entire Roman legion as it attempted to withdraw from camp under pressure.⁷² But their momentum was smashed when a second Gallic siege was broken by a Roman relief force and the large besieging army defeated.⁷³ At the site of the siege Caesar encountered ramparts, towers and ditches in the Roman fashion, fortifications which had not been possessed by the Gauls before their extensive contact with Rome.⁷⁴ The adoption of this technology certainly made life harder for the Roman forces operating in Gaul. But it also demonstrated another aspect of Gaul's ongoing Romanization. Roman technology, in this instance military technology, was finding a place among the Gauls.

The victory at Samarobriua was inspiring enough to keep the Gallic revolt alive and it would take most of 53 BC to subdue the tribes now resisting Rome. The Treveri tribe, despite the capture and killing of their leader Indutiomarus by Roman cavalry,

made continuing efforts to recruit German mercenaries and inspire neighboring Gallic tribes to attack the Romans. The German tribes near the Rhine frontier, however, had twice been beaten by the Romans and refused their support.⁷⁵ Indutiomarus's successors were able, however, to obtain support from German tribes living farther east of the Rhine.⁷⁶ These tribes had had less contact with the Romans and therefore had developed less respect for their military prowess.

To subdue the latest rebellion Caesar unexpectedly attacked the Nervii during the winter of 53-52 BC and routed them. He subsequently advanced towards the territory of the Senones, a tribe that had joined the coalition of Gauls in revolt. Unprepared, the Senones agreed to abandon their resistance and provide the Aedui tribe, long a Roman ally, a hundred hostages to insure their loyalty. The Aedui, in fact, had intervened on behalf of the Senones and convinced Caesar to grant them pardon. By receiving the Senonian hostages and facilitating the tribe's capitulation, the Aedui had spared Roman troops a lengthy campaign to subdue them. Caesar relied on the Aedui, backed by the promise of Roman military support, to control the Senones, allowing him to focus his full attention on the Treveri tribe, instigators of the current revolt, and on Ambiorx, the Gallic leader who had destroyed the Roman legion earlier in the revolt.⁷⁷

By burning their villages, enslaving parts of their population, and stealing their cattle, Caesar compelled the Menapii tribe to break its alliance with Ambiorx and the Treveri.⁷⁸ Here again Rome exercised brutality to extract its will. When the Gallic alliance was broken, a Roman legion camped close to the Treveri's main force feigned retreat, lured the enemy onto unfavorable terrain, and destroyed it.⁷⁹ The tribes from eastern Germany who had joined the Treveri fled west across the Rhine, and Caesar

installed Cingetorix as the Treveri's new leader. In a trick often repeated in Gaul and elsewhere, the Romans used a pliant local king, in this case Cingetorix, to exercise control of a conquered population. This allowed them to reduce the size of their garrisons and devote their limited military resources elsewhere. Elsewhere, in this case, meant a second crossing of the Rhine to punish the German tribes who had supported Gaul's rebellion. Caesar intended to ensure, as he had during the first Rhine crossing in 55 BC, that the river did not provide a safe haven for Germans or retreating Gauls.⁸⁰

Thomas Huber explains the importance of safe haven to a weaker force in the opening chapter of the edited work *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot*.⁸¹ The safe haven, which can be protected by a boundary that a strategically superior state refuses to cross, prevents a weaker army from ever being completely destroyed. Wellington's ability to elude Napoleon's France by retreating to Portugal is a classic example. The Vietcong's ability to find refuge in Cambodia is another. Caesar understood that a rebellious Gallic king, in this case Ambiorx, could raise new forces and present new threats when operating from a sanctuary in Germany. It was for this reason, and to punish the Germans who had allied with the Treveri, that Caesar led forces across the Rhine for the second time in two years.⁸²

Relying in typical Roman fashion on a local ally for support, Caesar learned from the Ubii tribe that the Suebi had been the ones who fought alongside the Treveri.⁸³ The Suebi, however, had retreated far from the frontier and Caesar understood the perils involved with operating in an alien country, far from reinforcement and surrounded by enemies. He chose not to pursue the Suebi to their hiding places. As he crossed the river back to Gaul, Caesar left half of the bridge standing as a reminder of his ability and

willingness to reach into Germany. Although unbloodied by Roman arms, the Suebi had been forced to abandon their homes and seek refuge in a distant forest, an intrinsically disruptive action.⁸⁴ The Ubii, meanwhile, and the German tribes living close to the Rhine were reminded of Rome's ability to influence events in Germany. Deterrence failed to pacify every German tribe, a fact demonstrated by the plundering of Roman a supply depot soon after Caesar left Germany, but it almost certainly limited the number of Germans who dared operate in Gaul.⁸⁵

Caesar's quick withdrawals from Germany in 55 and 53 BC, and the short duration of his two British campaigns showed a deep understanding of Rome's limitations. Caesar was quick to launch punitive expeditions against remote enemies but he never tried to occupy ground beyond Rome's ability to hold. This was a model the British Empire used extensively much later in history and one that prevented Rome from hemorrhaging resources in pursuit of futile objectives. Rome's restraint played an important part in its eventual conquest of Gaul. Later Roman emperors and countless other historical figures would trade the value of punitive expeditions for more ambitious operations. Most would suffer for it.

Caesar spent the remainder of 53 BC pursuing Ambiorx, the Gallic leader who had destroyed a Roman legion at Atuatuca the year before. Ambiorx escaped after an extensive search but the Roman forces who pursued him, comprised largely of cavalry recruited from loyal Gallic tribes, burned every house and consumed every bit of grain belonging to his people. Caesar was sure that Ambiorx's tribe, spared from death or slavery by hiding, would certainly starve in any case.⁸⁶ He was willing, in effect, to commit genocide to quiet the Gallic countryside.

Having punished Ambiorx by driving off and starving his people, Caesar held a council of Gallic leaders in a town controlled by the friendly Remi tribe. It was decided that Acco, leader of the Senones who had rebelled the year before, should be whipped and put to death by beheading. A year earlier Caesar had acted pragmatically by not having Acco executed immediately, entrusting his loyalty to the Aedui tribe as previously mentioned instead. But with the rebellion largely defeated, Caesar felt secure enough to convene the council that ultimately condemned Acco. Justice, to Roman eyes at least, was delayed but not absent in the end. The assembled leaders of Gaul were provided another reminder of treachery's cost.⁸⁷

The victories of 53 BC pacified large portions of Gaul but the will to resist had not yet been broken. In 52 BC Rome faced the most serious threat to its position of the Gallic war. Political disorder at home had made Caesar and the Roman state look weak. Commius, a Gallic chieftain who had previously declared loyalty to Caesar, took advantage of the situation to overrun the Roman grain depot at Cenabum.⁸⁸ His success encouraged a number of Gallic tribes to once again ally against the Romans. They committed their forces to the leadership of a nobleman named Vercingetorix who had previously served as an officer in Caesar's Gallic cavalry. Vercingetorix immediately led his army south to threaten Provincia, Rome's northern most province and long considered part of the Roman Republic proper. It was as governor of this province, in fact, that Caesar had launched the Gallic war in 58 BC.⁸⁹

Rejoining his 10 legions by making a daring trip north from Roman territory around Gallic lines, Caesar campaigned against Vercingetorix and his allies throughout 52 BC. Pressed hard at the Battle of Avaricum in the midst of this campaign, Caesar's

army was ultimately successful at breaching the walls of the town. Inside the fortifications the Romans massacred nearly 40,000 men, women and children.⁹⁰ Rome's policy of savagely punishing treachery remained intact.

From the victory and massacre at Avaricum Caesar led his legions against Vercingetorix's main force near Gergovie, modern day Clermont-Ferrand in France. Gergovie, however, was well situated for defense and Caesar suffered his only personal defeat of the war beneath its walls.⁹¹ The Roman loss inspired other Gallic tribes to commit themselves to Vercingetorix and join his campaign to rid Gaul of the Romans. The Aedui, who shared a long history of friendship with Rome, remained momentarily loyal to Caesar, though they would defect later and ally themselves with Rome's enemies. Already outnumbered, Aedui hostility at this point might have tipped the balance against Caesar and the history of Western Europe might have developed very differently. That the Aedui were loyal was more than a stroke of luck. Caesar had long cultivated the relationship, and the battle of Gergovie, which he fought at a known disadvantage, was in fact initiated to defend territory which the Aedui controlled.⁹²

From Gergovie the Roman's re-formed and marched south towards Provincia. En route, however, they were attacked by Gallic cavalry, though the attack was subsequently repulsed. Making what is generally accepted as a tactical error, Vercingetorix failed to commit his army's main body after the cavalry attack had been defeated, deciding instead on a retreat to the stronghold of Alesia. Understanding that Vercingetorix was not provisioned for a long siege, Caesar abandoned his march south and began fortifying the area surrounding the stronghold.⁹³

Vercingetorix was not without recourse, however, and he successfully summoned a relieving force at least as large as the Roman army he faced.⁹⁴ But the force, after three attempts, failed to break Caesar's siege and Vercingetorix retreated again into Alesia while the majority of his broken army was pursued by the Romans. He surrendered to Caesar and was held captive in Rome until 46 BC, when he was executed by strangulation as part of Caesar's triumph. The victory at Alesia marked the end of large scale resistance to Roman rule in Gaul for a hundred years.⁹⁵ The way in which the military victory was achieved, as much as the victory itself, would facilitate Gaul's rapid integration into the expanding Roman Empire. It laid the groundwork for Gaul to quickly become part of Rome's heartland.

Caesar's ability to win and maintain Gallic allies prevented the full strength of Gaul from ever fully uniting against him. As importantly, Gallic auxiliaries requisitioned from the allied tribes augmented his own limited forces throughout the war. Early in the conflict, for instance, the Remi backed Rome during the Belgae campaign. Later, cavalry recruited from friendly Gallic tribes punished Ambiorx's followers. The instances are numerous. But maintaining allies who are culturally inclined to support one's enemies is difficult and Caesar accomplished it by combining savage violence with uncommon mercy. The Helvetii, for instance, were provided grain, following their defeat in the Gallic War's opening campaign. The population of Avaricum, which failed to capitulate during a later campaign, was massacred. The Gauls understood the risks associated with resistance and the relative benevolence associated with surrender. This caused many to maintain their alliance with Rome, or at least withhold support from their Gallic cousins

who challenged it. Had the yoke of Roman domination been heavier many more might have opposed Caesar's legions.

As the economic and cultural benefits of Roman rule began to accrue in Gaul, the behavior of Rome's army, even during the conquest, was evenhanded enough for the population to accept Roman rule. Equally important though, it was also savage enough to make the alternative unappealing. A year after the end of major operations in 52 BC, Caesar's legions burned the homes, plundered the villages and killed or captured the followers of his old foe Ambiorix, who had remained at large.⁹⁶ At Uxellodunum, following the last major siege of the Gallic War, the Romans amputated the hands of every enemy soldier before their release.⁹⁷

This type of brutality did much to deter the German tribes from interfering in Gaul. Had German numbers been added to Gallic, Caesar would have been hard pressed to contain Gaul's rebellions. His two brief expeditions to Germany demonstrated Rome's ability to influence events beyond the Rhine and translated Rome's reputation into action. The submissiveness with which Caesar was greeted by the German frontier tribes shows the deterrent power of that reputation. The Ubii, in particular, were quick to deny supporting Caesar's enemies when he crossed the Rhine crossed for a second time in 53 BC. Instead, they chose to provide useful information about Rome's actual enemies. Although Germany remained beyond Rome's ability to govern it was certainly not beyond its ability to influence. By intimidating the Germans Caesar denied their country's use as a safe haven for retreating Gauls and a recruiting pool for those instigating rebellion.

Rome's demonstrated will was equally foundational to victory. Whether it was the difficult campaign against the Veneti, the second invasion of Britain, or the two crossings of the Rhine, Caesar continuously demonstrated Rome's commitment to victory. Each time an enemy force calculated Rome would fail, it held. In an age of slow transport and great distance, the promise that Rome would eventually honor its commitments and punish its enemies, helped maintain and advance the Roman position.

Finally, time and again Caesar showed himself to be a pragmatist. He forgave tribes that rebelled and then capitulated when it suited Roman interests. On at least one occasion he delayed the gratification of executing enemies when his attention was needed elsewhere. He understood the limits of Roman power and the need to coopt some number of the Gallic ruling class. He relied on a number of tribes, the Aedui in particular, to enforce his will when he could not be present personally. In perhaps the ultimate act of pragmatism, he forgave the Aedui when they joined Vercingetorix in the great rebellion of 52 BC. Their soldiers, along with those of another previously friendly tribe called the Arverni, were returned home in exchange for renewed loyalty. The remainder of Vercingetorix's followers were distributed as booty to Caesar's soldiers to be sold as slaves.⁹⁸ As always, Roman policy included elements of mercy and extreme brutality.

¹ Greg Woolf, *Rome: An Empire's Story* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1.

² *Ibid.*, 3-4.

³ Robert L. Connell, *The Ghosts of Cannae: Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the Roman Republic* (New York: Random House, 2010), 1-2.

⁴ Polybius. *Histories*, trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (1889 reprint; Bloomington: Macmillan, 1962), accessed 10 May 2015, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D118>.

- ⁵ Ramon L. Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts* (New York: Sarpedon, 1996), 28.
- ⁶ Ibid., 29.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Michael M. Sage, *Roman Conquests: Gaul* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2011), 28.
- ⁹ Ibid., 29.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 30.
- ¹² Julius Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, trans. Jane Gardner and S. A. Handford (London: Penguin, 1982), 31.
- ¹³ Ibid., 33.
- ¹⁴ J. F. C. Fuller, *Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier, and Tyrant* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 102.
- ¹⁵ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 33.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Sage, *Roman Conquests*, 39.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Fuller, *Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier, and Tyrant*, 106.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 43.
- ²² Ibid., 44.
- ²³ Ibid., 45.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 49.
- ²⁵ Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts*, 58.
- ²⁶ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 51.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 52.

- ²⁸ Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts*, 61.
- ²⁹ Fuller, *Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier, and Tyrant*, 109.
- ³⁰ Dio, *Roman History, Volume III*, trans. Earnest Cary (London: W. Heinemann, 1914), 305.
- ³¹ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 58.
- ³² Sage, *Roman Conquests: Gaul*, 48.
- ³³ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 42.
- ³⁴ Fuller, *Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier, and Tyrant*, 101.
- ³⁵ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 59-60.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 60.
- ³⁷ Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts*, 68.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 69.
- ³⁹ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 63.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 64.
- ⁴¹ Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts*, 71.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 73.
- ⁴⁴ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 70.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 72.
- ⁴⁶ Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts*, 75.
- ⁴⁷ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 74.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 77.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 79.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Fuller, *Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier, and Tyrant*, 118.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Sage, *Roman Conquests: Gaul*, 74.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁵⁶ Plutarch, *Plutarch's Lives*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1919), 7, accessed 10 May 2015, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0244%3Achapter%3D22>.

⁵⁷ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 94.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 94.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 97.

⁶³ Fuller, *Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier, and Tyrant*, 123.

⁶⁴ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 106.

⁶⁵ Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts*, 117.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁶⁸ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 109.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 114.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*, 121.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁷⁴ Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts*, 169.

⁷⁵ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 131.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 134-135.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 135.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Thomas Huber et al., *Compound Warfare That Fatal Knot* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2002), 3.

⁸² Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 137.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 138.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 146.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 153.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 154.

⁸⁸ Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts*, 176.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 179.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 182.

⁹² Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 159.

⁹³ Jimenez, *Caesar Against the Celts*, 184.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 186.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 189.

⁹⁶ Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul*, 213.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 221.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 200.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL INCLUSIVENESS AND ROMAN TOLERANCE

The modern world has yielded a view of empire very different from that actually practiced in Roman Gaul. The heavy hand of Joseph Stalin's bureaucracy, for instance, or the efficient colonial administration of Britain's empire were absent in a world limited by slow communication and the great challenges of distance. Rome understood its rule was best exercised with the lightest touch possible. Distance, coupled with the reach of limited resources, often conspired to make this form of indirect rule all that was workable in any case.¹ Rome required local power structures in order to govern and tolerated them and their associated customs as long as they were compatible with its interests. Doing otherwise would have complicated their efforts, incurring resentment among conquered people and weakening the local structures needed to govern.

Existing power structures, after all, could be adjusted and coopted, freeing Roman resources for challenges elsewhere in the empire. Gaul certainly underwent significant post-conquest change. But these societal amendments were not the result of Roman policies meant to impose radically new institutions on the conquered. Rather, it was Rome's light touch, its acceptance of local customs and political structures that ushered in the most dramatic changes by stifling resentment. Roman tolerance for the Gallic status quo bought time for the economic and social benefits of the empire to ultimately seduce the people of Gaul.

Long before the arrival of the Romans, Gaul enjoyed well developed governing institutions. Although simple by Roman standards, they were functional, with each tribe possessing a ruling class capable of exercising its writ on the territory it controlled. In the

years before the Gallic War, Caesar had already coopted many of these ruling elites by helping a chosen few increase their power at the expense of rivals. He understood the value of, and made a concerted effort to develop personal relationships with Gallic leaders he believed might prove profitable in the future.² Caesar leveraged these relationships to influence Gaul. Using the existing power structure he continued a long Roman precedence of ruling through proxy.³ He made no effort to, and was uninterested in, fundamentally altering Gaul's existing political order. The tribal states these leaders ruled, called *civitates* in Latin, all existed before the conquest. Caesar certainly envisioned them existing after it as well.

This is not to say that Caesar, and later Roman rulers, left the political status quo unchanged. Caesar, in particular, altered the balance of power in Rome's favor by empowering pro-Roman leaders, primarily by sharing the spoils of war and awarding tracts of land. In this way, the existing balance of power was altered by Roman actions without fundamentally changing Gaul's political institutions. The leaders of the *civitates* were approved by Rome. They were chosen from local candidates, men who commanded respect in their tribe. These leaders occupied positions that had existed before the conquest, meaning that at the tribal level (where most of the population experienced government), no new bureaucratic positions were created. Within the experience of large segments of the Gallic population, the leaders of Gaul remained Gauls.⁴

The idea of amassing power by earning Rome's favor had a long pre-conquest history among the Gallic elite. Gallic tribes had provided soldiers to Rome as early as the Punic Wars, and these acts of support were duly rewarded with Roman titles and treaties of friendship.⁵ For an ambitious Gallic leader in a tumultuous world, friendship with

Rome could offer real advantage. And so long as their policies were implemented, Rome was largely uninterested in the day to day administration of the tribes. In this way Rome was unthreatening to an elite intent on maintaining its power. This indirect way of influencing Gallic affairs, in effect rule by proxy, continued well after the conquest. In 27 BC the emperor Augustus, intent on reorganizing the province of Gallia Narbonensis, thought it prudent to meet a group of tribal leaders in Narbo.⁶ A quarter century after the conquest, a Roman emperor still saw the value of engaging and coopting the Gallic nobility as part of an effort to effect change in Gaul.

As it did in the political sphere, Rome was relatively tolerant of Gallic cultural institutions as long as they did not threaten its interests. There is no record, for instance, of Caesar forcing Roman culture upon the Gallic tribes he conquered. By the time of Augustus, this acceptance of local custom had become state policy. Even the Druid religion, dominant among the Gauls and potentially disruptive, was treated as legitimate for non-Roman citizens to practice for a hundred years after the conquest. By the time it was banned by the emperor Claudius, other cultural factors had combined to encourage a natural evolution away from the religion in any case. As the value of Roman citizenship became apparent, aspirational Gauls abandoned Druidism, as doing so was required before citizenship was granted.⁷ In this way, Rome encouraged a natural evolution away from Druidism by making the alternative attractive, not by banning it in the early post-conquest years. When Claudius made his anti-Druid decree, Roman styled religion was widely practiced across the major cities of Gaul.⁸ Its presence made the banning of Druidism more tolerable, as many Gauls had already chosen the benefits of adopting the religion of the conqueror. Here again Rome chose evolutionary, rather than revolutionary,

change. Rome banned the local Gallic religion, but only after it had been abandoned by the Gallic elite and large segments of the population. The seemingly drastic act of banning a religion becomes less climactic when viewed in this light.

Druidism did not become a rallying cry for rebellious Gauls because Rome initially accepted its existence. A new Romanized religion, which eventually supplanted Druidism and importantly included local characteristics, developed overtime and was adopted by the Gallic elite.⁹ The temple complex at Trier is illustrative of Gaul's religious development and Rome's acceptance of the native Gallic gods it encountered during and after the conquest. Alongside the bronze statues of Mercury and Venus, which paid homage to two Roman gods, were dozens of inscriptions honoring Gaul's pre-Roman deities.¹⁰ At Trier and across Roman Gaul, the old gods survived as components of a new Romanized religion. This preservation certainly made it easier for Gauls to accept the new religion as their own. As the economic and other benefits of empire manifested themselves in Gaul, only the most fanatical could use religious persecution as an excuse to reject Rome.

Religion was far from the only place Rome chose to respect local customs. For a long time following the conquest, Gallic languages remained admissible for court testimony and some Gallic tribes continued minting their own coins, using some of the empire's recognized denominations.¹¹ With political structure, religion, and language largely unchanged, the culture shock of conquest was mitigated and the benefits of empire given time to win the loyalty of Gaul's people.

The Altar of Rome and Augustus is a good example of the Gallic aristocracy being preserved and represented in the new Roman order. The Altar was a religious site

built where the Saône River joined the Rhône to offer tribute and honor Rome's first emperor. The administration of the *Alta* developed an extensive bureaucracy. It managed an annual festival, minted its own coins, appointed its own officials, and each year elected a leader.¹² The leader was a Gaul chosen by Gallic electors and invested with significant ceremonial, if not actual, power. The Gallic participants in *Alta* activities could look at its leaders and see their countrymen. The *Alta* may have acknowledged the subordination of Gaul's elite to the Romans, but its administration was a powerful example of how Rome allowed them to maintain their status in the eyes of the population.

Even the geographic reorganization of Gaul directed by Augustus in 23 BC acknowledged pre-conquest realities rather than dictate revolutionary change. Boundaries were reordered to ensure Gaul's three major tribes (the Sequini, Aedui and Arverni) became dominant players in their respective Roman provinces.¹³ Augustus had acknowledged the traditional influence of Gaul's pre-conquest powers, institutionalized that influence, and backed its legitimacy with the power of Rome. Although the Aedui and Sequini could no longer vie to control all of Gaul, Rome assured them important positions in the new order and dominance, albeit under a Roman governor, in their respective domains. Importantly, in this way Gaul's great tribes were empowered in many ways, rather than disenfranchised by the conquest, and their institutional status tied to the well-being and existence of the empire.

The old institutions of Gaul continued after conquest, albeit sometimes with new, pro-Roman leaders filling long existing positions. After the conquest, however, the most powerful positions were reserved for Roman citizens. If the Gauls had been denied a path to citizenship they would have also been denied access to these prestigious posts and

generally relegated to be second class members of their own society. But Rome maintained a long tradition of offering citizenship, when it deemed it advantageous, to people who had once been enemies.¹⁴ Across its empire, Rome forestalled resentment by tolerating many pre-conquest institutions in the short term. In the longer run, it replaced the old attachments with new loyalties to Roman constructs. That loyalty was earned through the promise of citizenship and the legal, economic, and cultural benefits associated with it. The potential to earn citizenship gave Gauls something to aspire toward, a hope they could reach the empire's most respected (and potentially most lucrative) social layer. Citizenship allowed Gallic leaders to assume positions of power in the Roman administration and in the army that enforced its will. Gaul's subjection, a fact at the end of the Gallic War, was made more palatable over time by the opportunity for the Gauls themselves to join the Roman elite that governed them.

It would be an exaggeration to say, however, that the Gallic aristocracy, even those granted citizenship in the immediate years after conquest, enjoyed parity of status with their Roman counterparts. Norman Dewitt, chairman of the classics department at the University of Minnesota from 1949 to 1964, said it clearest when he wrote "the prospects of a citizen from Gallia Lugdunenss entering the senate, say in 27 BC, were negligible."¹⁵ Discrimination against those born beyond the Roman heartland was ingrained in Roman culture. Romans, encouraged by writers as great as Cicero, thought the pre-conquest Gauls barbarians, and these attitudes took time to change.¹⁶ This type of prejudice worked against Gauls who might have sought influence in Rome itself. But it did little or nothing to hinder their amassing power within the borders of Gaul. The opportunity to gain and exercise influence at home was sufficient in the early years to

coopt an aristocracy that had no expectation of exerting influence in Rome in any case. They were, after all, recently conquered. But as Gaul's ties to the empire deepened, the expectations of the elite changed and, importantly, Rome would successfully find a way of meeting them.

In 48 AD, less than a century after conquest, a group of Gallic aristocrats petitioned the Roman senate for the right to hold the highest degrees of office. The emperor Claudius spoke passionately on their behalf and cited Rome's long history of granting equality to the people it conquered.¹⁷ With this imperial backing the Senate granted the request and allowed Roman citizens from the Gallic provinces to fill the empire's most senior posts. By fundamentally altering its political culture, Rome was able to meet the growing expectations of the Gallic aristocracy. This ability to change relieved the pressure that inevitably built as growing Gallic expectations met established Roman order. The fact that Gaul's aristocracy felt secure enough to petition for the change in the first place is a tribute to how well they had done under Roman rule. Rome's willingness to accommodate them is a tribute to its expanding sense of what it meant to be "Roman." A potential point of friction was removed.

With the senate's action in 48 AD, Gaul's aristocracy became full-fledged members of the empire's elite. But the majority of Gauls existed outside the privileged class. Any political order that failed to acknowledge and somehow empower the general population would be inherently unstable, especially in the delicate years after the conquest. But Rome addressed the aspirational nature of the Gauls when, over time, it opened a path to citizenship for the vast majority. Under Caesar and then Augustus citizenship was automatically granted to anyone who served as a magistrate in what were

designated “Latin” communities. More far reaching was the granting of citizenship to anyone who served as a soldier in a Gallic auxiliary battalion supporting the Roman Army.¹⁸ In the decades following conquest a viable path to citizenship was open for large portion of the Gauls. The Gallic population need not remain second class forever.

Citizenship granted Gauls the rights to marry and inherit from Romans as well as own Roman land.¹⁹ It also granted them access to the Roman legal system, with the implied economic and security benefits that due process and the writ of the state afforded.²⁰ Perhaps most importantly, citizenship conferred upon its holders a stake in the well-being of the empire and an emotional connection to the new Roman status-quo. Acknowledging that the majority of Gauls were not citizens in the early years following conquest, the idea of citizenship remained a powerful force. Non-citizens could content themselves with the hope of citizenship to come. Such hope was fueled not only by the Roman citizens in their midst, but also by Rome’s historical track record as victor.

By the conquest of Gaul, Rome had a long history of granting those it conquered political status in its empire. Latin rights, similar to the rights of citizenship but lacking the ability to hold political office, were conferred on Rome’s neighbors and the residents of Cisalpine Gaul by 89 BC.²¹ A half century later Julius Caesar would ensure Cisalpine Gaul, where he was governor, was endowed with full Roman citizenship, creating a powerful example of what was politically attainable by the conquered people of Rome’s empire. The Gallic tribes who originally inhabited Cisalpine Gaul were defeated by the Romans in the 220s BC. Under Caesar most attained the rank of citizen. The more recently defeated Gallic tribes needed to look no further than their southern kinsmen to believe that full inclusion in the Roman system was, after a period of time, possible.²²

Perhaps the most important benefit of citizenship was access to Roman law. While it would be best to survey Gallic legal institutions as they existed before the conquest in order to contrast them with the imperial codes that followed, no unbiased accounts of Gaul's pre-Roman law, property rights or even the structure of the Gallic family have survived to the modern day.²³ Gaul's residents, once they attained citizenship, likely enjoyed a legal system that was more structured, more predictable, and better able to protect their individual rights, especially their property rights, than the Gallic system that preceded it. What we know of pre-Roman Gaul does not suggest otherwise. But in law as in other political and cultural matters, Rome left much of what it found in place, so long as local legal traditions did not conflict in fundamental ways with their Roman counterparts. While evidence from Gaul itself is lacking, documents from imperial places as varied as modern-day Egypt, Spain, Syria, and Israel all suggest local legal systems were allowed to continue and govern the lives of non-citizen residents and communities.²⁴ Here again, the shock of conquest was mitigated by the maintenance of old traditions. Conquered populations in Gaul could take solace in the familiar legal systems that Rome likely allowed to remain. But they could aspire towards the more sophisticated protections of the imperial codes, available once citizenship or some lesser but still advanced level of status was attained. The attractiveness of Rome's legal code was one of the things that made membership in the imperial enterprise appealing. While the likely maintenance of Gaul's old legal traditions forestalled discontent, it was the possibility of one day accessing Rome's more efficient law that likely encouraged Gallic acceptance of the empire.

For certain people, the benefits afforded by Roman law would have tied them inextricably to the imperial enterprise. Rome, for instance, had no provision for communal ownership of property, something that might have been tolerated under the old Gallic clan-based legal systems.²⁵ The men who were ultimately granted sole ownership of what had previously been communally held property owed their windfall to Roman law and the state that enforced it. The prosperity of these men was tied closely to the Roman state, since Roman law in Gaul existed only so long as the empire lived. It is not clear if this by-product of Rome's occupation empowered a new class of land owners or cemented the privileges of Gaul's existing elite. In either case, however, a group of powerful land owners were made willing participants of Roman rule in Gaul.²⁶ And while it is true that the end of communal ownership necessarily disenfranchised some, in the aggregate the change was advantageous to Rome. The enfranchised men wielded tremendous power. Their loyalty to the empire, especially in the early years, was more important than the animosity potentially generated among society's weaker elements. In any case, the security, economic and cultural benefits of empire would reconcile these elements to Roman rule.

The benefits of imperial law encouraged Gauls to see the Roman occupation as a potentially positive experience. The spread of Roman style education offered additional encouragement and did much to bind the Gallic elite to the Roman imperial enterprise. Included in the spread of Roman education was the extensive teaching of Roman myths, many portraying the Gauls as nothing more than barbarians. Importantly, in keeping with Rome's inclusive traditions, these unflattering myths acknowledged the potential of barbarians to become civilized.²⁷ The potential to improve one's status was imbedded in

Roman mythology and gave the Gauls something to strive for. There was hope that with diligent study they could join the ranks of the “civilized.” Roman education, though undeniably harsh in its initial portrayal of Gaul’s pre-conquest population, was more progressive than it might initially seem. It held as a core principal that barbarians could become civilized. It never taught that Rome was the exclusive owner of civilization, merely its refiner and teacher. Gauls educated along Roman lines could aspire towards civilization knowing that Rome might one day accept them in the ranks of the refined.²⁸

As Greg Wolff has mentioned, many of the early Gallic adopters of Roman education were probably motivated by self-interest, a desire to impress their new Roman rulers.²⁹ But while this is likely true, it is also largely irrelevant. In the end all that mattered was that the Gallic elite adopted the ethos taught by their Romanized system. Knowledge of Latin, rhetoric, and literature certainly endeared the Gallic elite to their Roman rulers and this in turn increased their status and influence in conquered Gaul. Wolff was right when he connected the elite’s perceived well-being to the degree they emulated the Romans.³⁰ The more closely one resembled the Romans; the better off they fared in post-conquest Gaul. Improvement in their status would have validated the primary lesson taught to them at school; namely that the adoption of Roman values led to prosperity, security and happiness. Roman education, and more importantly the tangible benefits it offered the conquered by bringing them closer to the conquerors, further integrated the Gallic elite into the empire.

The post-conquest prosperity of the Gallic elite encouraged them to believe the myths and conclusions they were being taught at school. And as they did so, they become in essence, more Roman. As they came to share the beliefs of their conquerors, they

became more fully vested in the identity and the well-being of the empire, coming to see themselves, by virtue of their education, as fundamentally part of it. Once the Gauls were educated, their sense of belonging was made possible by the willingness of the Romans to accept them as civilized and essentially equal. Romans believed an appropriate education coupled with the adoption of its associated values, not a divine birthright, was what made a person “Roman.”³¹ Both citizenship and Roman identity were inclusive and earnable through education. The Gauls knew that by obtaining a proper education and living its values they need not remain second class citizens.

Roman education, formative as it was for the Gallic elite, was powerless to entice the average Gaul to accept the new Roman authority. Its reach was limited to the small number of families that comprised Gaul’s elite. In spite of the immense influence of the elite, complete integration was not possible without the general population accepting the status quo. Failure could have led to a rebellion against the elite now viewed as foreign. Theaters and amphitheaters, built in significant numbers across Roman Gaul and accessible in a way education was not, provided the Gallic masses with the requisite sense of belonging to the changed society.³² The sheer number of theaters discovered across Roman Gaul suggests they were seen as essential components of the growing Gallic towns, and suggest a high percentage of Gaul’s population would have been exposed to and adopted this Roman form of entertainment.³³

Even with education shaping the views of the elite and the spread of Roman entertainment influencing the masses, a sense of local identity persisted. Especially in the years before Gaul’s population gained access to citizenship, Rome understood the danger associated with attacking this identity. It made efforts to maintain as much of the pre-

conquest status quo as possible. For instance, it continued using local institutions to carry out a function as sensitive policing. Although specific evidence from Gaul is lacking, elsewhere in the western provinces local governments were able, under certain circumstances, to organize and arm their citizens for the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of crime.³⁴ The presence of such provisions in neighboring regions makes it likely that similar provisions existed in Gaul. The local elites were empowered to defend property and lives as they saw fit, without first having to consult an imperial official.

The tolerance of local militias was important for two reasons. First, policing Gaul would have consumed the legions needed to guard the German frontier, rendering such a commitment impossible. But just as Caesar had earlier harnessed the power of Gallic allies, the empire that followed relied on Gallic militia to augment the police power of the Roman military. With the army tied to the Rhine, this allowance for local militia kept the Gallic interior relatively safe and ordered. Absent the militia, Gaul under the Romans would have been a less secure and consequently a less politically stable place.

Second, the tolerance of local militia empowered the Gauls to defend themselves, as they always had, against threats to their property and safety. The Gallic instinct to defend their lives and property was natural, of course, and a right they had enjoyed as free people before the conquest. Based on evidence from the Roman provinces that bordered Gaul, it was one they likely continued to enjoy under the empire.³⁵ The presence of local militia meant the tribes were not disarmed by the Romans, rather the strength of their arms were coopted by the Roman state.

Organized militias seem to be features of urban centers, as evidence for their existence rests largely on surviving municipal charters. Beyond the cities, Gallic society was left largely untouched by the Romans.³⁶ This continuation of traditional Gallic society in the rural areas again forestalled discontentment. It provided a refuge for Gauls who would have otherwise resented revolutionary change. This refuge housed, in fact, most of Gaul's population. Estimates vary considerably, but modern scholarship suggests less than two million of Gaul's 12 million residents lived in urban centers.³⁷ Since Roman administration and culture were concentrated in the cities, the vast majority of Gaul's were left to continue living as they had before the conquest. Migration to the Roman style cities was optional and although many chose the comforts, distractions, and economic benefits of city-life, the majority continued their lives much as before.³⁸ Local aristocrats continued to rule the rural areas, and these spaces rarely interacted with the Roman state. One exception was taxes, but so long as the required amount of money or goods were contributed to imperial coffers, Gallic society beyond the cities was left relatively alone. This continuation of Gallic life in the countryside was important. Although not a conscious objective of imperial policy, it allowed the conquered Gauls to adopt Roman culture at their own pace, with the more conservative remaining in villages and the more ambitious adopting an urban Roman lifestyle. So when the cities grew and filled with Gauls, it was because many chose to abandon traditional life for a Romanized urban future. Most importantly for long-term stability, they chose freely, absent state-directed coercion.

The cities that grew in Gaul after the conquest became centers of Roman culture and ambassadors of new values to those ambitious Gauls who chose to settle in them. The

theaters and amphitheaters taught the masses what it meant to be Roman while the tutors and schools did the same for Gaul's better-off. Rome's policy of settling discharged soldiers on conquered land was consequential as well, providing local cities a Roman nucleus.³⁹ Arles, in modern France, is an early and powerful example. Founded by Caesar in southern Gaul as a veterans colony for the disbanding 6th Legion, its street grid, amphitheater, circus and most importantly its Roman citizenry, brought a piece of Rome itself to the province.⁴⁰

Prejudice on the part of the Romans against the Gauls certainly existed. But just as the Gauls came to respect and then emulate Roman culture, Rome in turn found things to admire about the Gauls. N. J. Dewitt tellingly points out that there was no derogatory term for Gaul in regular Latin usage at the time of conquest. This absence stands in stark contrast to the pervasiveness of Latin slurs against Greeks, in particular, but others as well.⁴¹ Rome's relative acceptance of Gallic virtue undoubtedly influenced, in a positive way, the manner in which it interacted with the conquered Gauls. It allowed the Gauls to visit, work and live in the new Roman cities without facing institutionalized discrimination. This in turn allowed the Gauls to marvel at the urban monuments without resenting their Roman builders. Caesar himself maintained a close Gallic friend named Pompeius and employed a Gallic secretary.⁴² His willingness to build relationships with and employ Gauls in positions of influence set an example for other Romans. The Gauls seem to have been treated as people with potential, reinforcing the idea that with service to the empire full inclusion in imperial life was possible.

When the emperor Augustus opened the ranks of the army to non-Romans, he gave the Gauls a place to direct that potential.⁴³ Soldiers who fought in Roman units were

exposed to an institutionalized form of Roman religion, which placed the emperor at its head.⁴⁴ Service in a legion accelerated a person's transition from Gaul to Roman by indoctrinating him in the political and religious ideas of empire. Even for those Gauls who served in auxiliary forces, constant contact with regular Roman units encouraged acceptance of Roman values and a respect for the Romans they fought beside. Beyond the strong bonds built in combat, Roman values were spread less heroically but just as powerfully by the merchants who serviced the camps and towns that grew alongside the military bases.⁴⁵ The Roman army had first defeated the Gauls, then under Augustus given them a way to join the conquerors.

It is folly to argue that Rome conquered Gaul for any other reason than its own well-being and unlikely that individual Roman policies were part of a grand strategy to assimilate the Gauls into the body politic and culture of the empire. But even without formal and codified efforts to assimilate, the might and accomplishment of Rome was certainly evident to the conquered Gallic tribes. Its amphitheaters were larger than anything that had existed in Gaul before the conquest and its educational and political structures more sophisticated. And Rome's army was unmatched. Much in the same way Hollywood influences alien cultures today, the power of Rome's image was seductive. But cultural, military, and technical superiority alone were not enough to convince the Gauls to accept their new Roman status quo. Without access to the political benefits, security, cultural distractions and education facilitated by the empire, Gaul would certainly have remained an anti-Roman and restive place. Roman inclusivity made it otherwise.

Rome, for instance, had no policy of barring Greek teachers from establishing academies or offering their services as tutors. Rather it encouraged education by accepting the newly educated Gallic elite as essentially Roman, often granting them citizenship and allowing them to fill important posts in the empire. It encouraged the building of public monuments, theaters, temples, and amphitheaters for the masses to enjoy.⁴⁶ And it provided a path for even the lowliest to earn status and respect, primarily through military service.

Most importantly, Rome allowed these changes to take place organically. There was no forced migration of Gauls to the Roman cities, for instance, and much of the existing power structure remained in place. Even Gallic religion was largely tolerated until the Gauls themselves chose a more Romanized form of worship. The Romans believed their Gods existed among others, so there was no imperative to supplant Gallic religion.⁴⁷ Alongside the might of the Roman army, political inclusiveness and cultural tolerance were critical to Gaul's acceptance of imperial rule. However, it was the economic benefits of empire, and the associated improvement to Gallic living standards, that was probably most decisive.

¹ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 39.

² Ibid.

³ Norman Johnston DeWitt, *Urbanization and the Franchise in Roman Gaul* (John Hopkins University, 1940), 6.

⁴ Ibid., 6-7.

⁵ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 33.

⁶ DeWitt, *Urbanization and the Franchise in Roman Gaul*, 9.

- ⁷ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 221.
- ⁸ Ibid., 221-223.
- ⁹ Ibid., 226.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ DeWitt, *Urbanization and the Franchise in Roman Gaul*, 13.
- ¹² Ibid., 14.
- ¹³ Ibid., 17.
- ¹⁴ A. W. Lintott, *Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration* (London: Routledge, 1993), 161.
- ¹⁵ DeWitt, *Urbanization and the Franchise in Roman Gaul*, 42.
- ¹⁶ Tufts University, "Latin Texts and Translations," accessed 5 May 2015, <http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=PerseusLatinTexts&getid=1&query=Cic>.
- ¹⁷ Tacitus, *The Annals*, trans. Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb, accessed 10 May 2015, <http://classics.mit.edu/Tacitus/annals.mb.txt>.
- ¹⁸ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 40.
- ¹⁹ Lintott, *Imperium Romanum*, 161.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 163.
- ²¹ Ibid., 161.
- ²² Ibid., 162.
- ²³ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 27.
- ²⁴ Lintott, *Imperium Romanum*, 156-159.
- ²⁵ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 155.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 74.
- ²⁸ Ibid.

- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC-AD 260* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 148-149.
- ³³ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 122.
- ³⁴ Christopher J. Fuhrmann, *Policing the Roman Empire: Soldiers, Administration, and Public Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 55.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 57-58.
- ³⁶ Thomas S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians: 100 B.C.-A.D. 400* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 144.
- ³⁷ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 138.
- ³⁸ Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, 144.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 152.
- ⁴⁰ AthenaPub, "Sites and Museums in Roman Gaul: Arles," *Athena Review* 1, no. 4 (1998), accessed 21 February 2015, <http://www.athenapub.com/rhone1.htm>.
- ⁴¹ DeWitt, *Urbanization and the Franchise in Roman Gaul*, 55.
- ⁴² Ibid., 55-56.
- ⁴³ Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, 154.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 154.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., 156.
- ⁴⁶ Angus Maddison, *Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 41.
- ⁴⁷ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 214.

CHAPTER 4

THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF EMPIRE

From as early as the second century BC Gaul had a taste for the material outputs of the Roman economy. Wine in particular was in high demand and as many as 2.27 million gallons were exported annually from Rome into Gaul.¹ Campanian ware, a fine pottery, and bronze drinking vessels were sold to Gallic customers in similarly large quantities.² This significant pre-conquest consumption of Roman goods introduced Gauls to the empire. It seems likely that respect for Roman wine and manufactured products, demonstrated by Gallic demand for those goods, would also encourage some degree of respect for the empire that produced them. In this way, pre-conquest trade eased the way for Gaul's subsequent imperial integration. When Roman armies arrived in the 50s BC, Gauls had been drinking Roman wine from Roman cups for at least the preceding hundred and fifty years. Gallic knowledge of, and a taste for these goods would have immediately given the conquered a familiarity with the conquerors. Roman exports offered an early example of the potential material benefits of associating with the empire.

As prevalent as Roman wares in Gaul were, in the years following its conquest both the overall quantity and the variety of manufactured goods increased significantly.³ Beads, bracelets, knives, and mirrors begin appearing in the archeological record alongside the wine that long dominated Gallic-Roman trade. Early in Rome's occupation, Gaul was technologically incapable of producing many of these products, now in significant demand by a Gallic population exposed to a broad array of manufactured goods.⁴ Gaul relied on the empire to supply the wares coveted by its people, making resistance to Roman rule and the associated disruption to trade largely unpalatable.

Perhaps more importantly, Gaul's widespread use of Roman consumer goods made the Romans themselves seem less foreign. Soon after conquest, for instance, Gauls and Romans shared a preference for the same type of ceramics.⁵ Care should be taken not to discard this seemingly trivial fact too easily, as commonalities between people, however small, often make cooperation possible.⁶

Though many of the new products available in Gaul were cheap, not all could have been inexpensive. But whatever they cost, their sheer volume suggests a Gaul growing wealthier under Roman rule, more capable of buying finished products, a proposition supported by J. F. Drinkwater, professor of classics at the University of Nottingham.⁷ Across Gaul he notes, increased agricultural earnings by the aristocracy gave rise to entirely new social classes, such as artisans to decorate wealthy homes and merchants to import and sell the new plethora of consumer goods.⁸ These new paths to wealth were directly created by the Roman conquest and they tightly tied their Gallic beneficiaries to the well-being of the empire. Artisans and merchants were paid to procure Roman goods and redecorate wealthy homes in the Roman style. And they were paid by a land owning aristocracy growing richer under Roman rule. The empire was generating a host of new economic activity.⁹

Gallic agriculture, the source of the aristocracy's disposable income and the foundation of the Gallic economy, became more productive in the decades after the Roman conquest. The increase in output is partly attributable to the imperial army's demand for Gallic crops.¹⁰ But it can also be attributed, somewhat counterintuitively, to Rome's imposition of taxes since producers who might have previously subsisted now needed a surplus to sell to raise the requisite tax money.¹¹ More importantly, the costs

and benefits of imperial taxation were never felt equally across the empire. Government spending ensured more tax money was spent in Gaul than was collected.

Cambridge professor Keith Hopkins notes that different regions of the empire existed as either net producers or net consumers of imperial taxes. Since the army was the largest consumer of tax money, its stationing on the Rhine meant Gaul was probably a net consumer of taxes.¹² Money raised elsewhere in the empire, in the non-frontier provinces, was spent to pay soldiers and buy provisions in Gaul. This transfer of wealth from the established parts of the empire to Gaul meant Gallic land-owners, artisans and traders probably received benefits in excess of the taxes they paid. In the end, the Roman army that conquered the Gauls was making them richer by consuming the produce and other services Gaul produced. Its presence on the Rhine ensured the continuation of this unequal tax flow and gave the Gauls another reason to support integration into an empire that was essentially paying them.

Critically in terms of economic development, the Roman army effectively secured Gaul from the German invasions that had previously defined frontier life.¹³ The *Pax Romana*, the era of Roman peace, made economic investment secure as villages and fields were now much less likely to be pillaged or destroyed in war. At its height in the 1st century AD, the Rhine army numbered eight legions, probably 100,000 men when auxiliaries are included in the count.¹⁴ Feeding and supporting this army was bringing money from other parts of the empire to Gaul. And behind this Roman wall Gaul's economy would grow, its infrastructure expand, and the lives of its people improve.

Data demonstrating a post-conquest economic improvement in Gaul is disappointingly scarce. That said, plausible estimates of the size of Gaul's population, its

overall economy, and its per capita gross domestic product have been painstakingly assembled by a number of talented scholars. Angus Maddison, building on the work of earlier researchers, lists Gaul's population in 1 AD as 5.75 million, increasing to 7.5 million by 200 AD.¹⁵ Two centuries of Roman rule led to an almost 25 percent increase in Gaul's population, strongly supporting the idea that Gallic agricultural output was increasing, even if precise statistics are elusive.

Gallic agricultural output was probably already increasing before Rome's conquest, as Iron Age improvements to tools took hold.¹⁶ That said, the increased demand for food created by the presence of Rome's large army and the need to satisfy Roman tax collectors, both products of the conquest, likely accelerated the positive trend to production already underway.¹⁷ Roman technology in the form of new crops, new ways of draining marshes, and improvements to agricultural storage and crop processing would have also played a part in the expansion of post-conquest agricultural production.¹⁸

Common sense suggests the *Pax Romana* was important to agriculture as well. When the Rhine frontier was secured from German invasion, some of Gaul's largest pre-conquest settlements moved to less defensible but otherwise more advantageous locations.¹⁹ If whole towns could move once as the frontier was secured, it seems safe to assume that agriculture would have likewise expanded to more productive but previously unsecured locations. This utilization of more productive land, made possible by Rome's guarantee of security, might plausibly have contributed to the overall increase in Gallic agricultural output. But whatever the reasons, the important point is that Gallic farmers

grew more crops after the conquest than they had before. Far from being destructive, the Roman occupation resulted in the growth of Gaul's economy.

An expanded market for agriculture, fueled in large part by the army's demand for food, helped make Gaul wealthier than comparable European regions that existed beyond the imperial frontiers, an important fact when considering why the Gauls seemed willing to accept Roman rule. By 14 AD, per capita income in Gaul may have reached the equivalent of 450 US dollars (in 1990 valuation), a full 50 dollars more than neighboring non-Roman parts of Europe.²⁰ Estimates of Gallic per capita income before the conquest are closer to the 400 dollar level, indicating a post conquest increase of more than 10 percent.²¹ In fairness, the pre-conquest figure cited here dates from 300 BC, more than two centuries before Gaul was conquered, and it is certainly possible that some of the per capita increase took place before Caesar's campaigns. The available literature does not make it clear. But as Drinkwater notes, Rome managed to either maintain a positive economic trend already underway or create the conditions for significant economic growth.²² The truth probably encompasses a bit of both possibilities. Either way, as part of the empire the Gauls were richer than their pre-Roman ancestors and their non-Roman contemporaries.

Trade was another likely contributor to Gaul's rising wealth and its generally improving standard of living. The increased number of manufactured products made available through imperial integration enriched a new class of merchants and introduced Gauls to products they had not previously purchased. The post-conquest change in the availability of goods was, in fact, dramatic. One excavation in what is now northeastern France showed a 300 percent increase in the prevalence of manufactured objects in the

Roman, as compared to the non-Roman, period.²³ By 1 BC, olive oil and fish sauces had made their first large scale appearances in Gaul, both products imported from the imperial regions of modern day Spain.²⁴ This increase in commerce encouraged a post-conquest trend towards urbanization as a network of settlements appeared to provide places where the newly available goods could be traded.²⁵ These new townships provided a place for Gauls to sell surplus agriculture and purchase manufactured goods produced elsewhere in the empire. The economy, which had been largely though not exclusively driven by subsistence agriculture, was growing more sophisticated.

Trade was helping to make Gaul more urban, but the process of urbanization was also driven by the Gallic elite that had come to equate cities with civilization.²⁶ A thoroughly Roman concept spread through the conquest. Urbanization had obvious consequences for the diffusion of Roman culture in Gaul since ideas were spread easily spread in densely packed areas. Roman religion, artwork, administration, and architecture were accessibly on display in the new towns but the growth of these settlements had important economic impacts as well. The great civic buildings created in imitation of Rome required large amounts of raw material such as stone and timber. Construction would have also required a considerable number of laborers. In this way the Roman emphasis on city life stimulated would have driven Gallic demand for the goods and services needed to build them.

This increased demand stimulated Gaul's economy by expanding the quarrying, transportation, construction, and decorative arts industries. The demand is well demonstrated, as Woolf points out, by the region around Besançon, an area thoroughly excavated by modern archeologists. At least twenty-one smaller settlements existed

around Besançon, a *civitas*, or regional capital. One of these secondary settlements possessed a theater and forum, while many others enjoyed lesser buildings such as public baths.²⁷ Mosaics and wall paintings are found in about a third of the settlements, some of which were exceedingly small, indicating a significant labor market for artisans even in relatively poor communities.²⁸ And unlike Besançon, which had existed before the conquest, the empire gave birth to completely new urban centers at Trier and elsewhere, all of which needed civic buildings and decorated homes. The Gauls who earned a living building these cities directly benefited from the conquest and as importantly, their continued economic well-being would have been tied to the empire that protected and inspired the cities employing them.

Gallic trade with other imperial regions was more nuanced than simply agriculture for goods. In the mid-first century BC, Diodorus Siculus wrote about the profitable sale of Roman wine to the Gauls.²⁹ Modern archeology supports his contemporary assertion, as vessels used to transport Roman wine have been found at sites throughout ancient Gaul.³⁰ But the consumption of Roman wine is less important than the large shift that took place after the conquest. The consumer culture described by Siculus changed as Gaul became part of the empire. Roman Gaul gave birth to a group of Gallic wine producers and Gaul went from being a consumer to a producer and exporter of wine, suggesting another instance of imperial wealth being transferred from other regions into Gaul.

Cultural changes brought by the conquest made wine the drink of choice among the Gallic masses, replacing the locally produced beer that had previously dominated consumption.³¹ This increased demand for wine drove a corresponding increase in Gallic

wine production, rather than simply encouraging additional Roman imports.³² Unlike later European powers who saw colonial markets as places to simply sell finished goods, Rome tolerated the establishment of local Gallic production. This meant the growth in Gaul's wine consumption benefited Gallic producers and not simply Roman merchants. And Gallic producers did more than simply meet local demand. A survey of wine containers found at Rome's seaport in Ostia showed that 13 percent of wine destined for the city in the first century AD (at least that traded by sea) originated in Gaul.³³ Not only had Rome tolerated the growth of Gallic production, its taste for Gallic wine transferred additional wealth from the capital to Gallic producers, as Gaul became an exporter of sought after wines.

Wine production was not the only industry that benefited from the Roman conquest. Complementing Gallic viticulture, manufacturing of Samian ware, a type of red glazed pottery, had moved from the Italian Peninsula to southern Gaul by 10 BC.³⁴ Archeological evidence from across the Roman west suggests that at the height of production, millions of Samian pottery pieces were manufactured annually.³⁵ This would have provided a source of income for the Gallic craftsmen who made the pottery, and it probably enriched the Gallic traders who brought the finished products to imperial markets. This type of production and trade is illustrative of the direct economic benefits afforded by integration with Rome. The conquest allowed pottery production to establish itself in Gaul, as Roman authorities would have certainly opposed its movement from Italy to an area beyond their immediate control. Once established in Gaul, imperial demand created an entirely new industry that never would have existed without the conquest. Since Samian ware was not produced in Gaul before the Roman conquest,

those who benefited from its trade would owe their livelihood to Rome, creating another large group of Gauls with a personal stake in the empire.

While the Samian ware trade was flourishing, other Gallic producers were busy exporting other products and raw materials around the empire. William Davis, in his foundational early 20th century survey of Roman wealth, describes the extent of Gallic trade within the empire. He mentions finished products such as cloth and metal work, along with raw materials such as wool being exported in large numbers from Gaul into Rome and elsewhere.³⁶ Imperial integration had created new markets, stimulating Gaul's economy and transferring Roman wealth to the Gallic provinces.

But markets are only accessible with supporting infrastructure, and Gaul's increased economic activity was facilitated by the roads and ports built by the Romans after conquest. At its height, the Roman road system counted more than 13,000 miles of paved highway in Gaul alone, linking the region to other distant outposts of empire.³⁷ Along this network flowed Roman security, as the imperial army was able to cover great distances in relatively short amounts of time. A well accepted estimate puts legionary movement along roads at 30km per day.³⁸ This ability of Rome's army to move, brought security benefiting the economy by making investments safe and protecting material outputs (such as crops) from theft or destruction. The legionary-road combination indirectly fuelled the Gallic economy by creating the conditions necessary for growth.

The historian Strabo, perhaps writing in 20 BC in a near contemporaneous account, records the establishment of Gaul's first organized road network by Agrippa, governor of Roman Gaul in 39 BC.³⁹ Drinkwater points out how powerful these new roads must have appeared to the conquered people who used them, as they replaced a

much less developed, and less useful, indigenous transportation network.⁴⁰ Importantly, the new Roman roads appeared within a generation, and many who saw them built would have remembered the dirt tracks they replaced.⁴¹ Through this road network, the benefit of Rome was prominently displayed and made accessible to the Gauls who used it for travel and trade.

Advanced as the road network was, the cost of shipping goods by land in the ancient world remained prohibitive, costing as much as fifty times more per unit than shipment by sea.⁴² But the road network nonetheless increased the amount of Gallic land and the number of Gallic people that were accessible to the coast by making land transport at least possible over short distances.⁴³ The roads carried goods to the ports. The importance of sea trade makes it likely that Gaul's economy also benefited from the *Pax Romana* in the Mediterranean Sea. As the presence of Gallic wine in the port of Ostia shows Gaul's merchants were benefiting from a Roman created peaceful sea. By the reign of Augustus, less than three decades after Gaul's conquest, rampant piracy in the Mediterranean had all but disappeared.⁴⁴

Trade also flowed along Gaul's rivers, making additional areas of the Gallic hinterland accessible to the coast. River transport certainly predated the Romans, but the empire ultimately regulated it, making it more predictable, while enhancing the necessary infrastructure.⁴⁵ A harbor built sometime after conquest but before 19 BC in Oppidum Ubiorum on the Rhine River illustrates the improvements made to Gaul's river transport infrastructure.⁴⁶ This river port permitted Gallic traders to supply the Rhine army with grain and other supplies from Gaul's interior. The presence of highly organized groups of riverboat operators, who first appeared in the imperial period operating throughout

Roman Gaul, is a strong indicator of significant river centric trade. Each of these groups was responsible for shipping within a different geographic region, usually along a specific river, covering almost all of Gaul.⁴⁷ The geographic extent of these shipping organizations indicates the port at Oppidum Ubiorum was just one of many built or maintained to facilitate Gaul's flourishing post-conquest trade. The fact that an island at the confluence of the Rhône and Saône became a significant commercial center seems to further demonstrate the importance of Gaul's Roman regulated river system.⁴⁸

Gaul's Roman infrastructure, newfound security, access to imperial markets and ability to supply imperial demand combined to create what William Davis describes as "a fabulously wealthy country."⁴⁹ Some of this wealth certainly existed before the conquest, but much of it was created as a direct result of Gaul's integration into Rome's empire. The vast country estates of the nobility, many located on or near the previously unstable Rhine frontier, are a tribute to how well the Gallic aristocracy fared under the Romans.⁵⁰ The great civic buildings that adorned Gaul's new cities, mostly privately funded, are a testament of wealth to spare. Importantly, some of Gaul's new wealth found its way to the hands of non-aristocrats, as new classes of artisans and manufacturers also grew to meet the economic opportunities of empire. Put simply, Gaul was richer under the Romans.

¹ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 175.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 172.

⁴ Ibid., 180.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Clark, Dorie, “How to Get Someone to Like You Immediately,” *Forbes*, 15 August 2012, accessed 14 May 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorieclark/2012/08/15/how-to-get-someone-to-like-you-immediately/>.

⁷ T. F. C. Blagg and Martin Millett, ed., *The Early Roman Empire in the West* (Oxford: Oxbow, 1990), 211.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁹ Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul*, 156.

¹⁰ Blagg and Millett, *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, 211.

¹¹ Keith Hopkins, “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire,” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 70, no. 1 (1980), accessed 24 March 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/299558>, 102.

¹² *Ibid.*, 101.

¹³ DeWitt, *Urbanization and the Franchise in Roman Gaul*, 26.

¹⁴ Paul Petit, *Pax Romana* (Berkeley: University of California, 1976), 27.

¹⁵ Maddison, *Contours of the World Economy*, 37.

¹⁶ Blagg and Millett, *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, 211.

¹⁷ Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul*, 129.

¹⁸ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 142.

¹⁹ DeWitt, *Urbanization and the Franchise in Roman Gaul*, 26-28.

²⁰ Maddison, *Contours of the World Economy*, 54.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 57.

²² Blagg and Millett, *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, 211.

²³ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 172.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 182.

²⁵ Blagg and Millett, *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, 211.

²⁶ Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul*, 126.

²⁷ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 129.

- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ Alexander Conison, "The Organization of Rome's Wine Trade" (Diss., University of Michigan, 2012), 158, accessed 7 April 2015, http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/91455/conison_1.pdf?se.
- ³⁰ Andrew Fitzpatrick, "The Distribution of Dressel 1 Amphorae in Northwest Europe," *Oxford Journal of Archaeology* 4, no. 3 (2007): 305-40, accessed 11 April 2015, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0092.1985.tb00250.x/pdf>.
- ³¹ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 184.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Conison, "The Organization of Rome's Wine Trade," 164.
- ³⁴ Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul*, 187.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 188.
- ³⁶ William Stearns Davis, *The Influence of Wealth in Imperial Rome* (New York: Macmillan, 1910), 111.
- ³⁷ Henry Joseph Haskell, *The New Deal in Old Rome: How Government in the Ancient World Tried to Deal with Modern Problems* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), 24.
- ³⁸ Walter Scheidel, "The Shape of the Roman World" (Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics, Stanford University, 2013), accessed 5 April 2015, <http://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/041306.pdf>, 20.
- ³⁹ Internet Archive, "Full Text of 'The Geography of Strabo'," accessed 7 April 2015, http://archive.org/stream/geographyofstrab01strarich/geographyofstrab01strarich_djvu.txt.
- ⁴⁰ Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul*, 124.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., 125.
- ⁴² Scheidel, "The Shape of the Roman World," 4.
- ⁴³ Peter Temin, *The Roman Market Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 223.
- ⁴⁴ Fuhrmann, *Policing the Roman Empire*, 23.
- ⁴⁵ Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul*, 124.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 126.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 127.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 188.

⁴⁹ Davis, *The Influence of Wealth in Imperial*, 70.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

For more than two centuries following its conquest Gaul was a relatively stable and prosperous part of Rome's empire. That success was largely caused by the specific policies implemented during the conquest and in the years that followed. Integral to the success of those policies was Rome's willingness to employ extreme violence against those who opposed it. The severing of hands at Uxellodunum is a potent example and the slaughter of woman and children during the campaign against Ariovistus is another. This savagery was coupled with a powerful and visible will to prevail, illustrated by Caesar's two expeditions to Britain and his twice crossing the Rhine. Each of these expeditions took place despite a number of severe challenges, but the Romans were undaunted. Rome made it known that natural barriers, wilderness, and distance would never stand in the way of its army's retribution.

But savagery was made most effective by its tempering with mercy. History is riddled with brutalized people who chose to resist a conqueror despite their torment. Rome was sophisticated enough to understand this and was capable of showing mercy toward enemies who surrendered. The Helvetii, for instance, might have starved after their defeat had the Romans not ordered them fed. And the Aedui, after their treachery, might have seen their villages burn if the Romans had placed a greater value on retribution. Both tribes fought and were defeated and both were subsequently protected by Rome. This dichotomy between extreme brutality and post-conflict mercy contributed greatly to Gaul's decision to accept Roman rule. Because the decision to resist is always a calculation between risks and rewards, neither brutality nor mercy would have likely

succeeded on its own. Rome's willingness to use violence insured the risks were tremendous and its ability to show mercy made it unnecessary to seek the potential rewards, many of which were provided in any case by the Romans. The Romans succeeded in meeting the Gaul's needs.

Abraham Maslow's classic theory is a useful tool to describe how those needs were met.¹ Maslow identified five levels of human need, the most basic of which includes items such as food and shelter. The needs are sequential in the sense that higher levels are not attained until the lower levels have been satisfied. After the basic necessities they proceed in order to security, then love and belonging, then status and prestige, and end with the need to achieve perceived personal potential. If the Gauls had chosen to reject Rome and rebel against its rule they would have likely done so in pursuit of these needs.

But growth in the output of Gallic agriculture, the expansion of cities, and the delivery of water through aqueducts are three examples of how the basic needs of Gauls were met as well or better after the conquest than before. The Roman army's presence on the Rhine and the disappearance of inter-Gallic warfare provided the Gauls a more secure post-conquest existence, satisfying the second level of Maslow's hierarchy. Since Rome did nothing to interfere with the inter-personal relationships of the Gauls and met their need for belonging by including them in the new society that was being built, Maslow's third level was satisfied. Citizenship and titles were granted and governing bodies were open to the Gauls, duly satisfying Maslow's fourth level of human need. And when the Gallic aristocracy believed itself ready to assume positions of power in the Roman senate itself, realizing what they perceived to be their full potential, the emperor Claudius

facilitated their inclusion. Since each level of Maslow's needs require that the ones below it have been satisfied, the Gallic aristocracy in the century after conquest was doing well indeed.² The significance of and near historical uniqueness of including Gauls in the Roman senate, less than a hundred years after the conquest, is perhaps best understood when compared to the colonial experience of another time. If the 19th century British had followed the Roman model in Gaul, parliament would have included at least a few fully participating Indian members by the 1850s.

Rome understood the value of addressing needs in order. The scholar Michael Hagerty would have likely agreed with their methodical approach, as he concluded that modern countries do best when their governments focus on a population's basic needs before trying to satisfy the ones that reside higher on Maslow's hierarchy.³ In other words, Hagerty concluded that the Chinese government is largely correct to focus on GDP growth before contemplating democratic changes, and post-Soviet Russia was misled by a US that advised introducing democratic reforms immediately before addressing the people's fundamental needs. Rome, without the benefit of modern scholarship or access to Maslow's codified hierarchy, nonetheless understood the concept and addressed the Gauls' basic requirements before satisfying their more advanced needs. Food and security were provided to defeated enemies and once the people were fed and secure, citizenship and status met the more sophisticated needs of the Gauls. More modern American operations that often include the establishment of democracy as an early goal seem to miss the importance of tackling needs sequentially⁴.

Rome's ultimate ability to accommodate Gaul's more advanced needs, as they appeared over time, is unusual in history and a key to the success of the Roman Empire in

Gaul. Historically, in the modern European experience at least, most colonial governments met the basic needs of the people they governed and satisfied the most basic portion of Maslow's hierarchy. In French Algeria, for instance, the Europeans took a paternalistic view of the Arabs they ruled, accepting responsibility for meeting their basic needs while simultaneously denying the legitimacy of more advanced Arab aspirations.⁵ Once the basic needs of the Algerians were satisfied they progressed up Maslow's hierarchy and naturally sought a sense of belonging in their country. A few of the Algerian elite would even reach the highest level of the hierarchy and seek fulfillment of their perceived potential. But France proved incapable of accommodating these more sophisticated aspirations. In 1892 for instance, France spent 2.5 million francs to educate 200,000 European children and only 450,000 francs on Algeria's 1.2 million school age Muslims.⁶ It proved impossible for the Algerians to feel a sense of belonging in a country so fundamentally unequal, and among the Algerians the needs Maslow identified remained unmet.

As the Roman Empire spread there was no comparable disparity between Gauls and Romans. Remembering that most Roman expenditures were consumed by the army and not on social programs, the legions stationed on the Rhine guarded all of Gaul equally, benefiting the native Gauls as much as the newly arrived Romans. Where the French failed in 1943 to grant Algerians full participation in political life, Rome succeeded in 48 AD, when it allowed Gauls to hold office within the Roman Senate.⁷ As the Gauls progressed up Maslow's hierarchy the Romans proved accommodating.

While economic development certainly took place in French Algeria, the best land was expropriated from its original owners by and benefited the newly arrived French

more than it did the native Algerians.⁸ Between 1871 and 1900, for instance, almost four and a half thousand square miles of arable land were transferred from local control to the French colonists.⁹ In contrast to their Algerian counterparts centuries later, the Gauls retained control of their land in the years following their conquest. Land sometimes passed from communal to individual ownership, but it remained in the hands of Gauls nonetheless. Therefore, the Gauls themselves benefited from the growth in agricultural output and the establishment of new post-Roman industries such as wine production and the ceramics trade. Where France and other modern European colonial powers consistently failed to meet the rising expectations of those they governed, the Romans succeeded. Beginning with the provision of food and progressing to full political participation, the Gauls successfully worked themselves through every one of Maslow's hierarchy of needs.

The US is unlikely to try and incorporate a conquered region into its body politic the way Gaul was included in the Roman Empire or Algeria into metropolitan France. But it sometimes has a need to occupy and stabilize foreign lands and has, in the last ten years, begun publishing doctrine to guide those efforts (rediscovering in many ways the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, first published in 1940).¹⁰ Army Doctrinal Publication 3.07 and the associated Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3.07 are the latest efforts and in many ways the Roman experience in Gaul validates the tenants that underpin this new doctrine. This is especially well demonstrated by the modern understanding that victorious powers need legitimacy in the eyes of occupied populations, local partners to work with, and a whole of government approach that leverages all the instruments of national power, not just military force.¹¹ Without the

benefits of this modern doctrine, the Romans nonetheless gained legitimacy in Gaul by raising the local living standard, being politically inclusive, and defending the Rhine from German invasion. They developed local partners by cultivating relationships with the Gallic aristocracy and leveraging them to administer and police the regions where those leaders had traditionally held sway. Roman military efforts were complimented, in a whole of government way, by regulating river trade, building roads, and introducing education and law, tasks that today would primarily reside outside of America's Department of Defense.

Rome achieved every one of the five End State Conditions for Stability Operations described in modern American doctrine.¹² The end of inter-Gallic warfare and German invasions provided a safe and secure environment. The introduction of the Roman legal system and its accessibility to the ever growing number of Gauls who held citizenship established rule of law. Social well-being was achieved as Gallic agricultural outputs increased and aqueducts delivered clean water to the new cities and Gauls found a generally welcoming place in the new Roman society. Most importantly, Rome helped create a sustainable economy that benefited large segments of the Gallic population. All of this was presided over and facilitated by the Roman imperial bureaucracy working with and through the local aristocracy to provide stable governance.

What Rome never attempted to do, and what current American doctrine also wisely avoids, was attempt to dramatically re-make the society it governed. Immense change certainly came to Gaul after the conquest but just as Gallic farmers were attracted to the new Roman cities and moved there of their own volition, change was allowed to

develop at its own pace and when it came, it was largely because the Gauls themselves wished it.

Given all of this, the Roman experience in Gaul supports current US doctrine and offers some useful examples for current policy makers trying to fill in any doctrinal generalities. What if the US had built factories in Iraq and a significant portion of the goods found in American ports had been Iraqi in origin? This is exactly what the Romans did, demonstrated by the large amount of Gallic wine found at Rome's port of Ostia. What if the Taliban had been pursued into the mountains of western Pakistan and denied sanctuary? This type of pursuit, after all, is what the Romans did when Caesar twice crossed the Rhine. It is easy in today's complicated world to detail the reasons why such Romanesque actions are impossible. It is also fair, however, to ask whether successful occupations are possible without them.

A definitive answer to that question requires an exponentially more exhaustive study of history's great occupations, but the Roman example in Gaul offers a useful place to begin. The Gauls chose to accept Roman rule because the occupation formula worked: Rome demonstrated extreme violence in war; it offered benevolence and mercy in peace; it ensured widely distributed economic development; it generally and without prejudice accepted local culture; it offered a path to political power and a respectable place in the new system; it ruled by local proxy; it maintained as much of the status quo as possible; and it ensured a living standard higher than what had previously existed.

Future US policy makers may find this Roman formula valuable as they decide where and how to commit US forces in the years ahead. If the US is unable or unwilling to undertake the actions associated with each component of the formula then an

alternative to occupation might prove the best option available. Or maybe additional academic studies will show that in different circumstances different formulas can lead to success. In any case, Rome's tremendous experience in Gaul deserves to be studied by modern scholars of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Success always warrants examination.

Greg Woolf was right when he said "Becoming Roman was a slow process" and it took decades to fully integrate the former Gallic tribes into Rome's empire.¹³ Two full generations had passed, for instance, before Claudius opened the Roman senate to the Gallic aristocracy. But the two most basic components of Maslow's hierarchy, physiological needs and safety, were largely met by 50 BC, only eight years after Caesar began his war of conquest. Since recent US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan both exceeded a decade, the techniques used by the Romans in Gaul are applicable to modern policy makers. The growth of Gaul's economy and the inclusion of its people in the Roman body politic took much longer than either Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. But the Gauls themselves did not demand Roman citizenship and political equality until decades after their conquest. Perhaps the Iraqis and Afghans would have been satisfied with only food, shelter, and security for a significant amount of time if they believed greater political and economic privileges would follow. The Romans understood that change does not need to occur all at once. But they were also invested for the long term.

¹ Saul McLeod, "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs," *Simply Psychology*, 17 September 2007, accessed 17 April 2015, <http://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html>.

² Michael R. Hagerty, "Testing Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs: National Quality-of-Life Across Time," *Social Indicators Research* 46, no. 3 (March 1999): 249-271, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://search.proquest.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/docview/197606335/abstract/7E02A57803FF4E63PQ/1?accountid=28992268>.

³ *Ibid.*, 249-271.

⁴ Daniel Byman, "An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?" *Security Studies* 17 (2008): 599-643, accessed 14 May 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2008/10/iraq-byman/10_iraq_byman.pdf.

⁵ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: Viking, 1978), 54-55.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 60-1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 42-43.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁹ Ian Lustick, "State Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria" (Research, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkley), 57, accessed 20 April 2015, https://www.sas.upenn.edu/polisci/sites/www.sas.upenn.edu.polisci/files/Lustick_StateBuildingFailure_1985.pdf.

¹⁰ Department of the Navy, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-15, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1990), accessed 14 May 2015, <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-15%20%20Small%20Wars%20Manual.pdf>.

¹¹ Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), 3-4.

¹² *Ibid.*, 6-7.

¹³ Woolf, *Becoming Roman*, 7.

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