

DETERRENCE THEORY IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

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by

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ABSTRACT

DETERRENCE THEORY IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, by Major Jeremy D. Lawhorn, 137 pages.

The events of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have demonstrated the importance of developing deterrence strategies that can be successful in confronting not only traditional, but also non-traditional threats to national security. While the events of 11 September 2001 challenge the traditional notions of deterrence, so too have the events of the past 70 years. Throughout the Cold War and even today, there have been numerous acts of aggression by both state and non-state actors that should have been deterred under traditional notions of deterrence. The fact that these acts were not deterred have caused many to question whether the deterrence-based theories behind the U.S. National Security Strategy are adequate to address the current and future strategic environment. Given the inability of the international system and specifically the United States to deter these acts of aggression there needs to be a serious reevaluation of the theories of deterrence that form the foundation of the U.S. strategy of deterrence. Looking at four case studies, this study finds that while the existing theories do not account for some acts of aggression and limited deterrence failures, deterrence theory in general is still applicable to the current and future strategic environment. While deterrence theory is applicable, it is not static and must continually be improved. The rise of non-state actors require additional refinement in order for deterrence theory to gain further applicability in the future.

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ACRONYMS

JSOTF-P	Joint Special Operations Task Force in the Philippines
LOC	Lines of Control
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNFL	Moro National Liberation Front
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
SOF	Special Operations Forces
UN	United Nations
USSOCOM	United States Southern Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For many people, 11 September 2001 was a watershed event in U.S. history. Some scholars, historians, and policy makers have stated that this event marked a turning point or even a paradigm shift in the geopolitical environment. While the events of 9/11 were tragic and shocking, they were simply an evolution of modern terror attacks that have been occurring globally for decades if not centuries. This was not the first attack against the United States nor the first attack on U.S. soil, but it seemed to shake the very foundation of American's belief in their relative security from major threats of terrorism that were not supposed to occur at home. However, the events on 11 September 2001 proved that even though the United States has the most powerful, sophisticated, and capable military in the world, a minimally funded, non-state actor could conduct simultaneous attacks on multiple targets within the United States. This event, while not the first, demonstrated the ability of non-state actors to conduct simultaneous complex attacks against the United States, which arguably has the most advanced defense apparatus in the world. More importantly, this event has challenged the very notion of conventional deterrence-based theories that have been the cornerstone of U.S. national security policy since the Cold War. The events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that the United States reliance on deterrence as it was understood then is not adequate to address all threats, especially in this new era of asymmetric challenges.

Conventional notions of deterrence and international security are challenged by factors associated with globalization like the advancements in transportation, lower barriers to entry of advanced technology, advancements in communication, less control

of communication, ease of money transfers, and harder to govern spaces. These factors have led to the emergence of non-state actors as major players within the international system. The emergence of these non-state actors such as terrorist and extremist organizations challenge the construct of Westphalian states which forms the basis for traditional concepts of deterrence and international security. Westphalian concepts of the international system posit that states are the primary actors in the international system. This concept was established to regulate state behavior within the international system and is based on collective security arrangements that typically obligate states to act in certain ways with respect to other states. This emergence of hard-to-identify and hard-to-locate terrorist, separatist, criminal, and extremist organizations present fundamental challenges that require a reexamination of deterrence strategy that can effectively accommodate all potential threats.¹

While not a new problem, threats from these non-state actors have grown in visibility during the past decade throughout the world. As these organizations develop in scope, capability, and reach, their chances of success will inevitably increase. Based on

¹ Gregory Gleason and Marat E. Shaihtudinov, "Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia," *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 2 (2005): 274; Paul Kubicek, "Regionalism, Nationalism, and Realpolitik in Central Asia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 4 (1997): 637-665; Lena Jonson, *Russia and Central Asia: A New Web of Relations* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998); Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, "Central Asian Security: Internal and External Dynamics," in *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, eds. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 5-10; Pauline J. Luong and Erika Weinthal, "New Friends, New Fears," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 2 (2002): 61-70; Stephen Blank, "The Post-Soviet States and the Post-Saddam Middle East," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 7, no. 2 (2003): 57-67; Tor Bukkvoil, "Putin's Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy," *Comparative Strategy* 22, no. 3 (2003): 223-242; Roy Allison, "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy," *International Affairs* 80, no. 2 (2004): 277-293.

the concept of availability cascades developed by Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein, as success increases actions will increase and other groups will emerge to challenge the state system in a self-reinforcing cycle.²

The events of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have demonstrated the importance of developing deterrence strategies that can be successful in confronting not only traditional, but also non-traditional threats and challenges from non-state actors.³ While the events of 11 September 2001, challenge the traditional notions of deterrence, so too have the events of the past seventy years. Traditional international relations theory suggests that states are rational actors and always seek survival;⁴ therefore, the threat of destruction at the hands of a superior state should deter aggression at a minimum against that superior state. However, history has proven otherwise as states continue to engage in acts of aggression which could have resulted in their complete destruction, evolved into a third world war, or in the case of Iraq, result in the toppling of a government and the death of its leadership. Such actions demonstrate that the traditional notions of deterrence may fall short in terms of preventing state conflict, ensuring international order, and understanding motivations of international actors. These actions may also suggest that traditional or Western views of rationality may need to be reexamined so as to be a more useful analytical instrument for understanding behavior that may at once appear irrational, but in fact may be rational to the specific actor.

² Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein, "Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation," *Stanford Law Review* 51, no. 4 (April 1999): 715.

³ Gleason and Shaihutdinov, 274.

⁴ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 16.

Understanding deterrence theory and the deficiencies in theory is more important than mere academic inquiry. There are national level implications for both deterrence theory and deterrence strategy as deterrence plays an important role in the U.S. defense strategy and the U.S. role as the unrivaled leader in the international system. The U.S. *National Security Strategy* (NSS) outlines four enduring interests: security, prosperity, values, and international order. Deterrence is an essential element of security, prosperity, and ensuring international order. For this reason, it is important to reexamine the U.S. ability to deter conflict and secure its national interests especially in the current operational environment that consists of a variety of challenges to traditional order.

The Purpose of the Study

Given the inability of the international system and specifically the United States to prevent and deter aggression at large from both state and non-state actors since the beginning of the Cold War, there needs to be serious reevaluation of the theories of deterrence that form the foundation of the U.S. strategy of deterrence. The purpose of the study is to assess the viability and relevancy of the current deterrence-based security approach for achieving U.S. national security objectives in the current and future strategic environments. Ultimately, the objective of this research paper is to develop new insights into which approaches are appropriate for achieving U.S. national security objectives in the current and future strategic environments and consider recommendations for changes to address emerging issues.

The Issues

There are several key issues regarding deterrence and its relevance in the current and future operational environment. Because the U.S. national security strategy is built around the notion of deterrence, not just for the United States but also for our allies, then the gaps in deterrence must be addressed. The United States cannot have a strategy, with deterrence as the cornerstone, if deterrence as it is currently practiced is found to be impractical based on historical failures. This is even more important in the contemporary environment where punishing non-state actors is much more challenging than punishing traditional state actors are.

One significant issue affecting the U.S. strategy of deterrence is that some acts of aggression have not met with equally negative consequences. There are several instances of state actors choosing to push the limits of aggression over the past seventy years with varying degrees of success. In some cases, these actions were met with resistance or other forms of retaliation, but in others, the response was much more limited. These inconsistencies have weakened the U.S. ability to rely on deterrence as a method of preventing hostilities and challenges to the status quo. Because these actions were not dealt with, this demonstrates the feasibility of future aggression by other would-be actors. As mentioned above, when the possibility of success increases, so too does the rate attempts. This continued challenge to deterrence may ultimately undermine the ability of the United States to prevent aggression in the future and lead to greater instability in an already anarchic international system.

Another significant issue is that the United States is the primary actor in the international system that is capable of responding to acts of aggression. This by its very

nature is an issue because the United States has not always demonstrated clear resolve as mentioned above. If the United States is the primary actor and has demonstrated reluctance to intervene, then other states will by nature be even less inclined to intervene. General Raymond Odierno has stated several times that the United States cannot opt out of global security challenges, because the United States the primary state with the capability to prosecute those who threaten the stability of the international order. The United States will increasingly be the primary actor in the world because European states are cutting their defense budgets and increasingly relying on collective defense.⁵ This idea of collective defense means that states may be unable to unilaterally prosecute aggressors and will instead need a broad consensus. Such broad consensus is the reason that the United Nations (UN) has been unable to preserve peace for which it was created. If the United States is viewed as the last hope for deterrence but fails to deter violence, and no other actors emerge to deter aggression, then deterrence may be weakened even further.

Another significant issue at hand is the fact that the United States may not have the ability to handle every situation on its own. With a shrinking defense budget, the United States may have to rely on its partners for assistance in prosecuting aggressors. Relying on alliances and other partnerships is not a viable option for a national security strategy. While alliances can be part of a strategy, they cannot be a critical element that

⁵ Jonathan Beale, "NATO Defence Spending Falls Despite Promises to Reverse Cuts," *BBC News*, 25 February 2015, accessed 1 May 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-31619553>; Denitsa Raynova and Ian Kearns, "Report: Six European Members of NATO Will Cut Defense Spending and Break Agreement Made at Wales Summit," *Atlantic Council*, 26 February 2015, accessed 1 May 2015, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/report-six-european-members-of-nato-will-cut-defense-spending-and-break-agreement-made-in-wales>.

makes up the cornerstone of the security policy. Because every state has its own security policy and national interests, the United States cannot be certain that its allies will always act in ways that are congruent with U.S. interests.

Another issue that challenges the U.S. ability to respond to acts of aggression is political will. The nature of the U.S. democratic system allows for a competition of ideas domestically that often times conflict. In some cases, the ideas cut along partisan lines simply to undermine opposing administrations. The world, specifically those would-be aggressors, are not oblivious to this fact. This lack of solidarity among U.S. policy makers presents an opportunity for aggressors to push the envelope and see what they can get away with. Ultimately, the United States may not have the political backing to prosecute violators of international order thereby degrading the concept of deterrence.

In addition to political infighting, there is a general distaste for war among the population who may choose not to support actions when those acts of aggression are not specifically aimed at the United States. After thirteen years of constant war, the American public has grown tired of war and is more reluctant to support military actions in general. Understanding this war weary sentiment opens up the possibility for would-be aggressors. If an actor is confident that the United States will not react, then they may make the rational calculation to engage in hostile action. This reluctance by the civilian population to deter violent actions by prosecuting aggressors also leaves a gaping hole in the overall U.S. deterrence strategy.

Another factor that has changed the international landscape in general, and deterrence strategy specifically, is the impact of globalization. Globalization has eroded the traditional nation-state boundary and given greater freedom of movement for goods

and services around the world. In general, this is a good thing, but it has also opened opportunities for groups to engage in illicit activities. These non-state actors have emerged to challenge the traditional nation-state system. These groups operate across and between borders without the geographic constraints of states. This provides a certain amount of autonomy to engage in illicit activity for which it is difficult to prosecute. Even more important is that some of these non-state actors, for whatever reason, engage in acts of aggression against state entities. The dynamics of globalization presents a variety of problems in prosecuting these violent non-state actors. The even greater problem is that traditional forms of deterrence do little to prevent non-state actors from engaging in acts of aggression due to the inability of states to effectively prosecute such groups.

Loren Thompson identifies five additional key issues with deterrence. The first issue he identified is that fewer enemies fit the “rational actor” model.⁶ Under the traditional deterrence model, the assumption is that actors (adversaries) are rational. Original models of deterrence were built around the idea of rational deterrence. Thompson highlights that there was no alternative model developed to address what he defines as idiosyncratic craziness. Therefore, the problem with the conventional deterrence model is that it does not work with some of today’s greatest challenges to international security such as non-state actors like Al Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and other criminal organizations as well as some state actors like Kim Jong-un.

⁶ Loren Thompson, “What If Deterrence Doesn’t Work Anymore? Five Reasons To Worry,” *Forbes*, 18 August 2014, accessed 15 November 2014, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/08/18/what-if-deterrence-doesnt-work-anymore-five-reasons-to-worry/>.

Thompson argues that these actors do not meet the traditional Western standard of sane; therefore, the rational actor model does not adequately apply.⁷ Because these groups and individuals do not pursue strategies that appear rational, he argues that the United States is ill prepared to counter them. In an environment of uncertainty, with numerous irrational actors, the ability to deter is greatly reduced. Even in an anarchic international environment where no higher authority exists to regulate violence, Kenneth Waltz argues that states still work towards ensuring their own survival.⁸ Because survival is the ultimate objective, traditional actors were seen as rational and to some degree predictable. The absence of rationality makes deterrence and predicting behavior very difficult.

Thompson also argues that deterrence requires information that is not available to actors that are attempting to deter aggressive actions. Related to the issue above regarding irrational actions, he asserts that in order for deterrence to work, the United States requires a vast amount of information about the actor's intentions and options that is not available. He highlights several key intelligence failures that underscore the inability of the United States to predict behavior, which includes the attack on Pearl Harbor, North Korea's invasion of the South, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the events of 11 September 2001. Thompson argues that these events are evidence that it is not possible understand the intent of potential aggressors, and with so little insight, he questions the ability to deter adversarial action.⁹

⁷ Thompson.

⁸ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 42.

⁹ Thompson.

Another issue that Thompson addresses is that, today's adversaries are hard to hold at risk. He argues that some of the modern adversaries of the United States do not have return addresses; they are elusive.¹⁰ These actors live and operate globally within and between borders, which makes retaliation difficult and deterrence in the traditional sense nearly impossible. The basic precept of deterrence is the ability to punish or at least threaten to punish actors who violate rules or act contrary to a state's interest. Within the context of traditional deterrence, it is believed that the potential consequences dissuade aggressors from committing certain actions; however, in cases where retaliation is limited or not possible, deterring adversarial actions will be challenging. Thompson identifies the challenges in prosecuting Osama bin Laden, which took more than ten years, as an example of the difficulty in prosecuting a non-state entity. Thompson also highlights other examples like cyber-attacks that are conducted by unknown entities, which makes prosecution difficult and deterrence seemingly impossible. He highlights the issue that if non-state actors cannot be identified, it will be difficult to deter them.¹¹

Another critical issue with deterrence theory that Thompson highlights is that it is not possible to know whether deterrence is working until it fails. Thompson argues that deterrence theory cannot be proven valid, it can only be disproven.¹² Scientific philosopher Karl Popper explains this phenomenon as empirical falsification. Popper argued that theories could only be falsified because no number of confirming

¹⁰ Thompson.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

observations can verify that a theory is universally valid.¹³ Much like the Black Swan theory, just because no one saw a black swan for hundreds of years did not disprove the existence of black swans. This means that deterrence theory cannot necessarily be proven effective, but can be disproven in cases where deterrence fails. It cannot be assumed that deterrence is effective based simply on deterrence activities and the lack or absence of aggressive actions by other actors. Thompson goes on to explain that deterrence is a psychological phenomenon that is predicated on the aggressors' perceptions that cannot possibly be measured. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude that an aggressor was actually deterred; any analysis of an actor's behavior is merely speculative.¹⁴ In short, correlation does not prove causation.

Another issue that Thompson highlights is that effective deterrence requires more political resolve than Washington currently exhibits. Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the United States has maintained a doctrine of extended deterrence, whereby the United States has guaranteed assistance to certain foreign nations.¹⁵ While established under the Monroe Doctrine, extended deterrence was a key piece of U.S. strategy during the Cold War. As a way of demonstrating U.S. resolve and stymieing the spread of communism, the United States intervened all over the world to fight and deter aggression. Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. political will has been less demonstrative. Thompson argues that the credibility of such guarantees, like extended

¹³ Karl Popper, trans., *The Logic of Scientific Discovery [Logik der Forschung]* (London: Hutchinson, 1959), 57.

¹⁴ Thompson.

¹⁵ Ibid.

deterrence, depends not only on U.S. military capabilities, but also on Washington's perceived willingness to employ them.¹⁶ When U.S. political resolve is seen as weak or ambiguous, it sends messages to both U.S. friends and enemies. It tells U.S. friends that they should be concerned, because their security may not be guaranteed. This can have second and third order affects. In places where the United States is the balancing power, this can cause regional arms races and other destabilizing effects that create general instability. It tells potential aggressors that the United States may not be wholly committed and they could decide to take advantage of the opportunity, creating other second and third order effects similar to those mentioned previously. Thompson points out the recent international media coverage of the Obama administration's handling of international crises, calling it timid. The administration appears to be reluctant to use military force, but this hesitancy extends beyond the White House to the broader political culture of the U.S. electorate.¹⁷ After over a decade of war, the U.S. public at large is reluctant to get involved in another conflict, especially when the United States has not finished the current one in Afghanistan. U.S. adversaries read these same media reports and observe U.S. responses and nonresponses and develop their own rational calculations. This makes sustaining deterrence difficult if the world suspects that the United States may not have the political resolve to act.¹⁸

¹⁶ Thompson.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

The Problem

The overarching problem is that conflict persists regardless of the costs, destruction, loss of life, or the repercussions. The United States has developed new ways of fighting wars but has not developed a way to effectively guarantee deterrence throughout history. For the United States, this poses a significant challenge not only to our relative position in the world but also to our national interests. One of our enduring national interests that is spelled out in the 2015 NSS is “International Order.”¹⁹ It is in the U.S. interest to maintain the status quo with the United States maintaining its dominant position in the world. As stated in the NSS, “This international order will support our efforts to advance security, prosperity, and universal values, but it is also an end that we seek in its own right.”²⁰

This position allows the United States to reap the benefits of being the only remaining super power and as such dictate the rules of engagement. On the other hand, being the super power also has downsides; there are expectations of the United States as well as a plethora of challenges to the status quo. Those who benefit from U.S. dominance (typically U.S. allies and economic partners) expect certain guarantees, namely security from threats and instability. Those who do not benefit from the current system, may seek to challenge and undermine the system with the United States being the central threat. Because the United States is the sole super power, much of the threats will be focused on attacking or challenging the United States either directly or indirectly. As

¹⁹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), 2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.

such, the United States will play the dominant role in attempting to maintain security around the world. President Obama lays out in the NSS:

Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security—through our commitments to allies, partners, and institutions; our focus on defeating al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the globe; and our determination to deter aggression and prevent the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons.²¹

The ability of the United States to meet and overcome the challenges to deterrence will be the difference between maintaining the status quo and descending into persistent conflict and global instability. As explained in the NSS “without such an international order, the forces of instability and disorder will undermine global security.”²² Since the United States emerged as the sole super power at the end of the twentieth century, it has thus far been unable to deter aggression at times from both state and non-state actors. This presents not only a problem for the United States, but also a problem for the entire international community. Finding a solution to this problem should be the focus of world leaders and policy makers around the world, for no other single problem presents a greater threat to human civilization than the chaos of global insecurity and conflict.

Primary Research Question

The primary research question for this paper was taken from a list of recommended research topics from the United States Southern Command (USSOCOM)

²¹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 1.

²² *Ibid.*, 40.

J5 Key Strategic Issues List 2014.²³ The question asks whether the deterrence-based theories behind the U.S. NSS are adequate to address the current and future strategic environment. This question seeks to address some of the underlying issues discussed above.

From the USSOCOM J5 Key Strategic Issues List, there were several recommended secondary questions to consider. Of these, the following were chosen for this paper: Are deterrence-based theories appropriate for state and non-state actors? Is prevention of conflict practical? If so, what would a “Prevention Approach” entail?²⁴ How could USSOCOM facilitate a new Prevention Approach? These secondary questions look at specific problem sets within the context of the overarching problem of deterrence.

Assumptions

In some cases, assumptions regarding state actors’ actions will have to be made based on the unavailability of original source material. For example, if a weaker state actor conducts an act attack or other form of aggression against the stronger state, it will be assumed through observed empirical falsification that deterrence was not successful. While it is possible that other domestic push and pull factors may have been at play, it has to be assumed that the deterrence efforts from the stronger state were less effective.

²³ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “SOCOM J5 Key Strategic Issues List as of 4 Sep 14,” U.S. Army, accessed 1 October 2015, http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWEG/_pdf/GRAD/USSOCOM%20J5%20Key%20Strategic%20Issues%20List.pdf.

²⁴ Ibid.

Due to the inaccessibility of first-hand accounts, it will be necessary to make some broad assumptions in order to move forward in conducting the case study analysis.

Definition of Terms

What follows is a list of key terms that may not be understandable without clear delineation. These terms will be used throughout this document therefore it is important to clearly articulate what these terms mean upfront. These terms form the core for understanding the various types of deterrence as well as some otherwise ambiguous terms that must be clear in order to understand the analysis contained within this research project.

Direct-immediate Deterrence: is defined as a situation between two opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an overt attack while the other is threatening retaliation in order to prevent the other state from attacking.²⁵ This is the most volatile instance of deterrence actions. In this case, the threat is specific, there is a crisis or near crisis with war possible.²⁶ In this situation, there is little or no ambiguity regarding the intentions of either state. Therefore, direct-immediate deterrence has the greatest ability to be empirically tested for further academic understanding. While the corresponding actions taken by the individual state actors may not be used with 100 percent certainty to prove causation, a high degree of certainty can be derived from the

²⁵ Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 30.

²⁶ Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), accessed 15 February 2015, <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam034/2002035023.pdf>, 9.

action and counteraction to assume a relative level of correlation to further academic discourse.

Direct-general Deterrence: relates to the general situation where states maintains military capabilities in order to regulate their relations within the international system even though there are no obvious signs of an impending attack from an adversary.²⁷ In this situation actors maintain a broad capability and issue threats of punitive action to any potential threats in order to keep anyone from seriously considering attacking. This is the most common type of deterrence since all states maintain some level of armed forces for at least a defensive capability. This is one of the requirements to guarantee the sovereignty of a state. Unlike immediate deterrence, general deterrence is less intense because all threats are hypothetical.²⁸ With direct-general deterrence, threats are typically broad and not necessarily focused on a specific state. This method of deterrence is related to maintaining broad military capabilities, conducting routine military exercises, and using strategic communication to articulate broad intentions for adversarial action. The United States does this as part of Phase Zero, or steady-state operations. For the United States, the purpose of direct-general deterrence is to demonstrate robust capability in order to dissuade adversaries from attempting actions that are contrary to U.S. interests.

Extended-general Deterrence: The goal of extended-general deterrence is to deter an attack against a state's allies.²⁹ Within the framework of extended-general deterrence,

²⁷ Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, 30.

²⁸ Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, 9.

²⁹ Glenn H Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 276-277.

one (stronger) state assumes the role of protector or defender of another (weaker) state or protégé. This establishes a general position of confrontation and threatens the use of force against any other state that may consider attacking the protégé state. The purpose is to deter any potential aggression against the protégé. The difference between direct-general deterrence and extended-general deterrence is that while both are creating broad deterrence conditions, extended deterrence is focused on protecting a protégé state in pursuit of a national objective, whereas direct-general deterrence is focused on protecting one's own state.³⁰

Major world powers have been the primary states to practice extended deterrence. In a study of extended-immediate deterrence from 1885 to 1984, forty-eight out of fifty-eight cases of attempted deterrence (eighty-three percent) involved major powers as defenders.³¹ Following the end of the Korean War, the United States established an alliance and military presence in South Korea in support of a policy of extended-general deterrence against the threat of another invasion by North Korea.³² While the Korea case is very specific, extended-general deterrence does not have to be specifically against a single entity. For example, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan requires the United States to defend Japan against any threats to peace. The treaty requires the United States to come to the aid of the Japanese with any

³⁰ Paul Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 424.

³¹ Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, 424; Paul Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review Political Science* 2 (1999): 27.

³² Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict," 27.

attack perpetrated within Japanese territorial administration.³³ Of note, this treaty has lasted longer than any other alliance between two great powers since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.³⁴

Extended-immediate Deterrence: is similar to extended-general deterrence; however, the difference is that a specific actor is labeled as an aggressor and there is an active effort to deter that actor, whereas with extended-general deterrence there is no specific threat. This can be characterized by the presence of an aggressor posturing against a protégé state, whereby the defender state is aware of the threat to the protégé and takes steps to actively defend the protégé state. In an attempt to prevent the use of force by the potential attacker, the defender state either explicitly or by the movement of military forces, threatens the use of retaliatory force.³⁵ Examples of extended-immediate deterrence include the crises leading to the outbreak of World Wars I and II, in which Great Britain failed to deter Germany.³⁶

³³ Wikipedia, “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan,” accessed 25 April 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_the_United_States_and_Japan#Specifics.

³⁴ George R. Packard, “The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2010), accessed 19 January 2015, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66150/george-r-packard/the-united-states-japan-security-treaty-at-50>.

³⁵ Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977), 38; Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, 424.

³⁶ Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” 27.

Other Terms

Deterrence and compellence have sometimes been used interchangeably or along a continuum in common discourse to explain actions taken by actors to prevent or stop aggression. For the purpose of this paper, these two terms will be delineated for a clearer understanding. Deterrence at its basic level is an action that is taken by one actor to discourage an action by another with fear of punishment.³⁷ Deterrence is deemed successful when an actor believes that the gains from pursuing certain acts of aggression are outweighed by the costs that would be imposed by the deterring actor.³⁸ Compellence on the other hand occurs once deterrence has failed and the act of aggression has been initiated. Compellence is associated with the application of some level of punishment in order to encourage a reversal of actions by the aggressor. Compellence is deemed successful when the aggressor ceases or reverses actions because the costs imposed by the compelling actor are or will soon outweigh the potential gains of the aggressive actions.³⁹

Limitations

One limitation to this study is the inability to interview state leaders to develop an understanding of their thinking and decision making with regard to deterrence actions taken against their states. Having the ability to interview state leaders would provide insight into how they were or were not affected by deterrence actions.

³⁷ Iowa State University, "Deterrence and Compellence," accessed 25 April 2015, http://www.public.iastate.edu/~pol_s.251/compel.htm.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

Another limitation for this study is the amount of time to assess all of the relevant literature and conduct the case study analysis. All research and case study analysis has to be conducted within a seven-month period, which will limit some of the analysis that may be necessary to provide a greater depth for the subject. Because of this limitation, it will be necessary to dedicate additional time for further research of additional case studies to develop a richer study.

Scope

The scope of this paper will look at a variety of cases of aggression in order to gain a better understanding of deterrence failure and success. This paper will also look at case studies that assess deterrence as it relates to both state and non-state actors.

Delimitations

When analyzing non-state actors, only violent non-state actors like terrorist organizations will be covered. Drug cartels, cyber criminals, arms dealers, money launderers, and others will intentionally be omitted from this study due to the amount of time and resources available to conduct this study.

Significance of Study

The results of this study could be used to help improve military practice and effectiveness in several ways. First, an assessment of current deterrence strategy will inform military scholarship of best practices for deterrence as it relates to the future strategic environment. Since deterrence has been a central aspect of the U.S. national security policy and military posture, it is important to understand the limitations as well

as possibilities of deterrence strategy in order to prevent false assumptions as especially as the strategic environment becomes increasingly complex.

The results from this study could also identify gaps in current understanding of deterrence theory and approach that could be used to inform decision makers to adjust deterrence policy. If traditional deterrence strategy is found to be ineffective for the current and future strategic environment, policy makers can adjust strategy in order to reallocate resources that may be more effective. Ultimately, the results from this study could highlight specific strategies for addressing underlying problems with the current approach to deterring conflict, especially with regard to non-state actors which currently pose a great threat to the international system.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of the study is to assess the viability and relevancy of the current deterrence-based security approach for achieving U.S. national security objectives in the current and future strategic environments. In doing this, it is important to look at the literature that has informed the scholarship and debate regarding deterrence.

Chapter 2 looks at the literature that has been written about deterrence theory and surrounding components that influence the theory. This chapter will specifically look at how deterrence has been defined, the four distinct waves of deterrence theory, the various types of deterrence, the variables that theorists use to assess deterrence, and finally the criticisms of deterrence theory. In looking at deterrence, this section will work from broad assumptions regarding deterrence and deterrence theory and then move toward more specific concepts and subtopics of deterrence.

In general, deterrence is a diplomatic method used to convince an adversary by the threat of military force that the costs of resorting to an act of aggression to achieve foreign policy objectives will outweigh the benefits.⁴⁰ While deterrence has typically been associated with military action, there are other approaches to deterrence. When a state pursues its policy objectives or national interests, it has four primary elements of national power at its disposal to achieve them. The four elements of national power are Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (collectively known as DIME). While much of the literature focuses on the M or military instrument of national power, it

⁴⁰ Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* 61, no. 2 (1982/83): 317.

should not be considered the only or the most important method of achieving deterrence. In theory, all of these instruments of national power should be synchronized and used in support of one another to achieve national interests.

These elements of national power can be used throughout the different types of deterrence. Deterrence is pursued in a variety of ways, but typically falls within these categories. There are essentially two broad categories of deterrence which are concerned with protecting one's own territory (direct deterrence) and protecting another state's territory (extended deterrence) from an armed attack, general act of aggression, or any adverse action that conflicts with a state's national interests. From these two broad categories are two subcategories which included deterrence against an impending short-term threat of attack (immediate deterrence), or a deterrent policy may seek to prevent such short-term crises and militarized conflict from arising (general deterrence).⁴¹

The literature for deterrence theory is typically broken down into four different periods, commonly referred to as waves. While the concept of deterrence is not new to international relations or warfare, the modern scholarship surrounding deterrence evolved in the West after World War II. This first wave of deterrence related literature emerged as a response to the need to understand and analyze the effects of a real-world problem—the invention of the atom bomb.⁴² Without the advent of nuclear weapons, deterrence would have remained an “occasional stratagem” rather than the central aspect of strategy.⁴³ This

⁴¹ Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” 27.

⁴² Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no. 1 (April 2010): 1-33.

⁴³ Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 75-6.

first wave of theorists wrote from the late 1940s through the mid-1960s. The early deterrence theory centered on concepts of rational actors within the realist constructs and was largely deductive in nature.⁴⁴ This deterrence literature emphasized the importance of defining commitments, communicating them to adversaries, developing the capability to defend them and imparting credibility to these commitments.

Although the idea of deterrence has been around for a long time, after World War II deterrence became the dominant way of understanding strategy, especially between the West and the Soviet Union. Because of the danger associated with nuclear warfare, the calculations for engaging in conventional warfare changed dramatically. Ultimately, the development of nuclear weapons changed the way states engaged in international relations and warfare. While states still had to pursue national interests, the existence of nuclear weapons made states consider the consequences of their actions differently. The threat of nuclear extinction made deterrence incredibly important.

Out of necessity, deterrence became a distinctive way of pursuing national interests, national security, and the security of other states or peoples.⁴⁵ In order to prevent large-scale nuclear warfare, deterrence was integrated into strategy with an emphasis on conflict prevention. The role of militaries within nuclear states became associated more with conflict prevention than simply winning wars. Writing in 1946, in his work entitled “The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order,” Bernard

⁴⁴ William W. Kaufmann, *The Requirements of Deterrence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Center of International Studies, 1954), 12; Bernard Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” *World Politics* 11, no. 2 (January 1959): 173-192; Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 6-7.

⁴⁵ Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, 3.

Brodie established the fundamental concepts of nuclear deterrence strategy. For Brodie, the usefulness of nuclear weapons was not based on their use but in the threat of their use. He stated, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”⁴⁶ The theory of deterrence emerged to provide understanding and analysis for international state behavior and was intended to guide the strategy of deterrence.

Deterrence theory gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. Building upon his earlier work, Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always at the ready, yet never used.⁴⁷ This concept of deterrence theory evolved into what became known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which dominated the U.S.-Soviet strategy of engagement throughout the Cold War. While the term MAD became prevalent during the Cold War, there are earlier references to the same concept but on a smaller scale. The earliest known reference to this concept of mutual destruction comes from the English author Wilkie Collins. Writing in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War Collins stated, “I begin to believe in only one civilizing influence—the discovery one of these days of a destructive agent so terrible that War shall mean annihilation and men’s fears will force them to keep the peace.”⁴⁸ This theory of mutual destruction was thought to be

⁴⁶ Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New Haven, CT: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946), 62.

⁴⁷ Bernard Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” in *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 264-304.

⁴⁸ The Wilkie Collins Society, “Wilkie Collins and Mutually Assured Destruction,” *The Wilkie Collins Newsletter* (Spring 2009), accessed 10 January 2015, <http://wilkiecollinssociety.org/newsletter-spring-2009/>.

a method of preventing conflict or mutual deterrence. Similarly Alfred Nobel, for whom the Nobel Peace Prize is named, quoted upon inventing dynamite that, “my dynamite will sooner lead to peace than a thousand world conventions. As soon as men will find that in one instant, whole armies can be utterly destroyed, they surely will abide by golden peace.”⁴⁹ While the theory and scholarship of deterrence has been most prominent since the advent of nuclear weapons, thoughts on deterrence stretch much farther back in history.

The second wave of deterrence theory literature emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. The predominant approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making, much of which became conventional wisdom about nuclear strategy (at least in the West).⁵⁰ Examples include the early efforts of Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Glenn Snyder.⁵¹

Herman Kahn, one of the leading theorists of the time, based his work on systems theory and game theory as applied to economics and military strategy. Kahn argued that for deterrence to succeed, the Soviet Union had to be convinced that the United States had second-strike capability in order to leave the Politburo in no doubt that even a perfectly coordinated massive attack would guarantee a measure of retaliation that would leave them devastated as well. Writing in 1960 in his book titled *On Thermonuclear War*, Kahn stated:

⁴⁹ Alfred Nobel, quoted in James Charlton, *The Military Quotation Book* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002), 114.

⁵⁰ Knopf, 1-33.

⁵¹ Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” 28.

At the minimum, an adequate deterrent for the United States must provide an objective basis for a Soviet calculation that would persuade them that, no matter how skillful or ingenious they were, an attack on the United States would lead to a very high risk if not certainty of large-scale destruction to Soviet civil society and military forces.⁵²

Writing in 1960, Glenn Snyder added to the theoretical discussion about deterrence as it related to rational calculation. He developed the distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. He suggested that denial capabilities worked on influencing the aggressor's calculations of achieving his objective, while deterrence by punishment affects his cost calculations.⁵³ The idea is that by increasing the denial capabilities, one could reduce certainty of success, thereby deterring aggression and increasing stability. Whereas increasing the cost of punishment, the aggressor's actions may be deterred but the threat of instability may increase.

Writing in 1966, Thomas Schelling furthered the scholarship of deterrence theory by suggesting that military strategy had to be viewed in terms beyond simply the science of military victories. Instead, he argued that military strategy had to include the art of coercion or deterrence.⁵⁴ Schelling argued that the capacity to hurt another state is used as a method to influence another state's behavior not to engage in actions that will cause negative repercussions.⁵⁵ He also argues that to deter another state, violence must be

⁵² Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), 557.

⁵³ Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, no. 2 (1960): 163-178.

⁵⁴ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 1-34.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

believable and anticipated but also avoidable by accommodation. Ultimately, Schelling believed that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory, but it is most successful when it is held in reserve.⁵⁶

The third wave of deterrence literature started in the 1960s but gained greater prominence in the 1970s. The third wave focused primarily on statistical and case study methods to empirically test deterrence theory, mainly against cases of conventional deterrence.⁵⁷ The main focus of the third wave was identifying the limitations of deterrence and the inability of deterrence theory to predict or account for certain real-world events. Some scholars also argued that in a policy environment that took for granted the necessity for deterrence, the strategy was not always appropriate. These scholars sought to highlight the circumstances in which deterrence might prove irrelevant or counterproductive.⁵⁸

While the third wave scholars pointed to some of what they considered flaws in deterrence theory, realists continued to argue that states are by nature rational actors. For realists, the core assumption of international politics is that states are first concerned with their own survival and will ultimately act in accordance with measures that ensure their survivability. Existing in an anarchic international environment, states adopt foreign and

⁵⁶ Schelling, 1-34.

⁵⁷ Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," 1-33.

⁵⁸ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 534; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), ch. 3.

defense policies in order to ensure their security amid hostile and threatening outsiders.⁵⁹ Kenneth Waltz added that with nuclear weapons “a nation will be deterred from attacking even if it believes that there is only a possibility that its adversary will retaliate.”⁶⁰ Ultimately, the fear of nuclear destruction will make states refrain from certain actions that will lead to their destruction.

Writing towards the end of the third wave, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein argue that deterrence is an inadequate theory. In their empirical study, they highlighted some of what they consider the more important conceptual failings of deterrence theory. They argue that deterrence theories inaccurately presuppose that leaders are instrumentally rational, risk-prone gain maximizers, free of domestic constraints, and able to correctly identify themselves as defenders or challengers. They argue that all of these core assumptions are unrealistic and contradicted by empirical evidence.⁶¹

Much like the first wave of deterrence literature, the fourth wave has been primarily a response to real-world developments. The first being the collapse of the Soviet Union and the scramble to understand the new security environment in a post-bipolar world. The second real-world development that sparked the fourth wave of

⁵⁹ Arthur Stein, “Domestic Constraints, Extended Deterrence, and the Incoherence of Grand Strategy: The United States, 1938-1950,” in *Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, eds. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 96-123.

⁶⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (1988): 626.

⁶¹ Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter,” *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (1989): 208-224.

deterrence literature was the impact of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.⁶² The void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, while welcomed by many, especially in the West, created a sense of uncertainty in the international community. Cold War concepts of deterrence that centered on the U.S.-Soviet standoff had to be reviewed for future validity.

During the latter half of the 1990s, studies emerged that looked at concepts of deterrence in a post-Soviet Union era.⁶³ Writing in 1999, within the construct of rational deterrence theory and game theory, Paul Huth explains that for deterrence to work, the deterring state must have both the military capacity to inflict considerable losses and the resolve to use its available military forces.⁶⁴ More importantly, other states or actors must believe that the deterring state is able and willing to use its forces. If the potential aggressor does not believe in the capability or the resolve of the deterring state, then deterrence may not work. This also has the potential to lead to miscalculations, which can have even greater consequences. In addition to looking at traditional state-centric deterrence, some of these post-Soviet constructs also looked at the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the ability to deter terrorist groups from its acquisition and

⁶² Max G. Manwaring, ed., *Deterrence in the 21st Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 124.

⁶³ Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 11; Manwaring, 29.

⁶⁴ Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," 24-48.

use.⁶⁵ However, for the most part, scholars working in the post-Cold War have continued to focus on state actors by producing literature that is centered on the first three waves. Even in the face of rising concerns of rogue states and terrorism nearly all of this research retained a focus on traditional interstate conflict.⁶⁶ While there appeared to initially be a shift in deterrence theory to deal with a post-Soviet world, the state-centric nature of the theory still fell within the framework of the first three waves.

However, in recent years, there have been some attempts to develop strategies rather than theory for deterring violent non-state actors.⁶⁷ This could be considered the actual fourth wave of deterrence theorizing as it looks at a different problem set. The most significant difference that is addressed by the more recent literature is a change in focus from roughly symmetrical (state-vs-state) relations to asymmetric (state-vs-non-state) threats.⁶⁸ Instead of looking at ways to deter state actors, the majority of the recent scholarship is concerned with the challenges of deterring rogue states and terrorists.⁶⁹

This latest wave of deterrence literature addresses the reach rather than the limits of deterrence. It looks more at specific strategies for deterrence rather than grand theories to address problems posed by these groups. Some approaches include deterrence by

⁶⁵ Michael J. Powers, *Deterring Terrorism with CBRN Weapons: Developing a Conceptual Framework*, Occasional Paper 2 (Washington, DC, The Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control Institute, February 2001), 17.

⁶⁶ Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” 1-33.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 4.

denial strategies, deterrence by punishment, indirect deterrence, deterrence by counter-narrative, and deterrence by concession.

Deterrence by punishment is one of the most visible strategies that the United States has pursued in the post-9/11 environment. This involves demonstrating a clear resolve to go after and punish any group that commits attacks against the United States or its interests. Writing just after the events of 11 September 2001, Gerald Steinberg argued that “it is important to identify high-value targets (HVTs), including family and supporters, that will cause even the most radical leaders to weigh the costs and benefits of their actions.”⁷⁰ According to Shmuel Bar, even more important than the severity of the response, is its certainty that a response will occur.⁷¹ This strategy has received mixed reviews primarily because it is difficult to know if any group has been deterred because of these actions and the idea that U.S. actions could have inspired additional acts of aggression.

Another strategy that has been employed is indirect deterrence. This strategy acknowledges the difficulty in pursuing the non-state actor directly, and therefore goes after the facilitating network. In most cases, the facilitators are opportunists rather than wholly committed to the non-state actors’ cause. This means that the facilitators have something to lose; for example, a legitimate business. By going after these facilitators,

⁷⁰ Gerald M. Steinberg, “Rediscovering Deterrence after September 11, 2001,” *Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints*, no. 467, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2 December 2001, accessed 22 February 2015, www.jcpa.org/jl/vp467.htm.

⁷¹ Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Terrorists: What Israel Has Learned,” *Policy Review*, no. 149 (June/July 2008): 42.

the belief is that the non-state actors will have fewer resources to conduct attacks, and therefore be deterred.⁷²

Another approach that is less invasive is called deterrence by counter-narrative or delegitimization, which involves challenging terrorists' justifications for violence. By defeating the terrorists' narrative, the United States can deter additional members from joining these groups, deny assistance from would-be supporters, and create shame for actions that they conduct. By building this counter-narrative, the terrorist groups would lose credibility and their cause would be eroded. If the members of these groups no longer view the cause as legitimate, they will be less likely to sacrifice themselves for that cause. With a strong and credible counter-narrative, certain groups can be deterred from committing acts of aggression. While there is doubt that terrorism as a whole can be deterred, studies on deterring terrorism argue unanimously that it is possible, though not necessarily easy.⁷³

Another strategy that is being furthered in the fourth wave is deterrence by concession. This concept is based on the ability of states to address some of the grievances of non-state actors and grant concessions where possible. By granting concessions for some things, the state will be able to hold those concessions at risk for any violations. Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva argue that accommodating some of the group's political goals and then holding that accommodation at risk may

⁷² Knopf, 10.

⁷³ Ibid.

prevent them from conducting future attacks or cooperating with other groups.⁷⁴ They argue that the ability to hold political ends at risk is a crucial point, because doing so stands by far the best chance of fracturing the global terrorist network.⁷⁵ In some cases, non-state actors emerge in areas where legitimate grievances exist and the state has failed to act. These grievances can range the inability of the government to meet the basic needs of the people, perceived inequality as recently witnessed in the riots in Baltimore, religious intolerance and/or persecution, political repression, as well as other more complex situations that are the remnants of global decolonization. In today's environment, especially with the advent of social media and the proliferation of mass communications, it is difficult to ignore all of these groups. When these legitimate grievances continue to be ignored, some otherwise non-violent groups may become violent and merge with other more dangerous groups for achieving their local goals. There are some proponents to this concept of concession. Some believe that it may lead to a rise in groups with demands that will not be possible to meet.

Looking at the literature that has been developed over the past half-century, there appears to be an either or proposition. On the one side, there are theorists that acknowledge the strength of deterrence theory, while on the other side there are those that do not believe it is valid and therefore irrelevant. In a similar manner, theory has developed to address state or non-state actors in a binary construct. Theorists have gone back-and-forth attempting to develop a holistic understanding of deterrence theory in

⁷⁴ Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 89.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

order to understand actions that actors will pursue. With the rise in non-state actors, many theorists believe that traditional notions of deterrence are no longer relevant. In some ways, it appears that the literature is suggesting that it is necessary to start over because of this new threat. While there are challenges to the existing theories, it is important not move too quickly to discount the overarching concept of deterrence, nor overlook the utility of some of the previous theories. By looking at specific cases, it is possible to develop a better understanding of deterrence theories and determine the limitations of the theories, which is more useful than simply discarding them. By identifying the strengths and limitations of the current theories, a new approach to prevention can be derived that will enable the United States to achieve its enduring interests by being more effective given the rising challenges within the current and future operating environments.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter explains the research methodology chosen for this thesis. It begins by outlining the research question in the context of the methods used for evaluation. It goes on to clarify the purpose of the research and explains the case study. This chapter then describes which cases the researcher selected and identifies which data gathering and analysis techniques the researcher employed. The chapter then outlines what steps the researcher took to obtain the information needed to address the primary and secondary questions. Next the chapter looks at the criteria developed to determine the feasibility of the method used, the relevance of examples, and the credibility of sources. This chapter will conclude with an overall analysis of the methodology used to gather relevant data and the approaches to systematically analyze the data.

Identification and Explanation of Research Questions

The research question for this project looks at the current deterrence-based theories and asks whether these theories adequately address the current and future operational environment. This question has existed since deterrence was conceived as a strategy. This question has been reexamined many times by international relations theorists, military strategists, policy makers, and other academic professionals. It is a question that must be reexamined periodically as the operational environment continues to change at an exponential pace. As mentioned above, changes to the environment are often the result of a specific event like the development of the atomic bomb or the collapse of the Soviet Union. Likewise, the attacks on 11 September 2001 also created a

sense of urgency to develop an understanding of deterrence. The current rise and spread of violent non-state actors like ISIS and Al Qaeda require a fundamental reexamination of these theories to determine what actions work, what actions are obsolete, and where improvements must be made to account for the discrepancies. In order for the United States to achieve its enduring interests (security, prosperity, values, and international order), a thorough understanding of the expectations and limitations of deterrence-based theories is required. As threats evolve, so must the understanding of deterrence-based theories so that adjustments to strategy can be employed.

Purpose of Research

The purpose of this research is to determine whether current deterrence-based theories adequately addresses the current and future operational environment. Essentially, this qualitative research project will identify gaps in the deterrence-based theories as they apply to the selected case studies and use of these generalizations for broader application. If the deterrence-based theories do adequately address the security concerns within the case studies, the assumption can be made that the deficiencies in the theory are applicable for other security situations.

Additionally, because of the prevalence of non-state actors in the current operational environment, a secondary question embedded in this research project is whether deterrence-based theories are appropriate for both state and non-state actors. This is important because even if deterrence works with state actors, the plethora of non-state actors provides additional security concerns that must be addressed. As addressed above, when dealing with non-state actors there are additional factors that must be considered which add additional challenges that may not be present with traditional state actors.

For the purpose of this research project, a case study methodology will be used to analyze historical and current security situations where deterrence approaches have been and are currently being employed. Each case study will be looked at to determine whether deterrence failed or not, to what degree it failed, why it failed, and what the implications are for that failure. By addressing each of these, it will be possible to provide an analysis of the impact on deterrence theory. Because it is much easier to point to failures in deterrence, the bulk of this study will be looking to find the gaps and look for ways to address the gaps in deterrence.

The case study methodology will be most beneficial for this project because case study research helps develop an understanding of complex issues and can extend experience or add strength to what is already known through previous research.⁷⁶ From the selected case studies, it is possible to tease out broad concepts that may be universally applicable in a general sense. While the specifics will tend to differ from case to case, the goal is to illuminate generalities so that it will be possible to make qualified assumptions for future analysis. Case studies emphasize detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships.⁷⁷ These conditions and relationships are important for understanding correlation and in some cases causality and lend support for future analysis.

⁷⁶ Susan K. Soy, “The Case Study as a Research Method” (Unpublished paper, University of Texas at Austin, 1997).

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Selection of Cases and Explanation of Data Gathering and Analysis Techniques

The case studies chosen for analysis are broken down into four categories: direct-general deterrence, extended-general deterrence, direct-immediate deterrence, and extended-immediate deterrence. The first case study examines the U.S. attempts at pursuing a direct-general deterrence strategy by building and maintaining the most powerful military force, politically and economically possible, to deter aggression and provide security for the homeland. The second case study examines how the United States executes an extended-general deterrence strategy on the Korean peninsula in order to maintain security and international order. The third case study examines the standoff between India and Pakistan and a policy of direct-immediate deterrence; it specifically looks at the Kargil War and the implications of the war for deterrence theory. The final case study examines how the United States executes an extended-immediate deterrence strategy in the Philippines against named non-state actors and the implications for deterrence theory.

In order to analyze deterrence theory, four case studies were selected that fit each of the four broad concepts of deterrence (direct-general deterrence, extended-general deterrence, direct-immediate deterrence, and extended-immediate deterrence). Because it is difficult to prove that deterrence is actually working based on some of the critiques posed above, this study looks at instances primarily where deterrence failed to some degree and analyzed those instances. Looking at failures was based on the need to use empirical falsification as an approach. While much of the focus is on the failed attempts at deterrence, the analysis focuses more on the range of failure rather than simply explaining that a state failed to deter aggression. History has shown that deterrence in the purest sense is thus far impossible, so it should be known that deterrence will break down

at some point but how far it breaks down is what is important. Much more important than the fact that deterrence fails are the lessons learned from these breakdowns and how that affects security and international order. Thus, the analysis is based on these breakdowns and what they mean for each case as well as the implications for deterrence theory in general.

In analyzing the case studies, each case is examined to understand the failure of deterrence as defined by any act of aggression taken against the deterring party. Because simply saying that deterrence has failed in such a broad sense, a further analysis will look at the level of failure and the specific implications for the failure. In doing this, it will be possible to develop a better understanding of how to address the gaps in deterrence theory as well as deterrence strategy.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES

Case Study 1: U.S. Direct-General Deterrence

The first case study that was chosen looks at the United States and its ability to engage in direct-general deterrence in order to prevent aggression from external threats against its own interests and citizens. When defining interests in terms of direct-general deterrence, this study looks only at interests that are specifically owned by the United States (for example, U.S. territories, bases, and embassies). As explained above, direct-general deterrence is primarily based on the state's ability to maintain an armed force to regulate the state's relationship vis-à-vis other external entities.⁷⁸

In the international relations field of scholarship, realists argue that international politics is a struggle for power dominated by organized violence.⁷⁹ This struggle for power requires that states build strong military forces in order to negotiate their relations with other states and to deter acts of aggression. One of the core realist principles presumes that states possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the ability to hurt and possibly destroy each other.⁸⁰ In the case of the United States, an assumption could be made that this principle shapes U.S. strategy. The United States spends more on defense than any other country in the world. According to the Stockholm

⁷⁸ Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, 30.

⁷⁹ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 4th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2011), 20.

⁸⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994-1995): 5-49.

International Peace Research Institute, the global military expenditure in 2013 was \$1.747 trillion, with the United States accounting for \$640 billion.⁸¹ In fact, the United States outspent the next nine highest countries combined. All of this military spending would assume that the United States has a credible deterrence capability.

For most Americans, on 10 September 2001 there was a sense of relative security at home based on the dominant power of the United States military. Americans understood that bad things were happening around the world, but for the most part, they were safe at home due to the relative power of the U.S. military. This feeling of relative security was primarily a result of the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower. The United States no longer had a looming threat posed by the Soviet Union, which characterized the Cold War era. Not only was there no longer a threat from the Soviet Union, the U.S. military demonstrated its overwhelming military prowess to the world by dominating the fifth largest army (Iraqi Army) in the world during the Gulf War in less than 100 hours.⁸² The Gulf War left Americans with a real sense of security based on the highly publicized capability of the U.S. military's technological capability.

However, on 11 September 2001, America and the world awoke to an event that not only highlighted the reality of looming threats but also arguably changed the course

⁸¹ Aam Perlo-Freeman and Carina Solmirano, "Trends in World Military Expenditure 2013," *SIPRI Fact Sheet* (April 2014): 2, accessed 14 February 2015, <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1404.pdf>.

⁸² Robert Citino, "Technology in the Persian Gulf War of 1991," The Gilder Lehman Institute of American History, accessed 22 February 2015, <http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/facing-new-millennium/essays/technology-persian-gulf-war-1991>.

of world history. The events of 11 September 2001 had a profound impact on American's understanding of security and changed the world forever. This event also challenged some of the traditional notions of deterrence theory. The presence of an overwhelming military force, that realists assume help guarantee security, was unable to prevent these attacks. The terrorists that committed these attacks were undeterred by the U.S. defense posture even though the United States had the most powerful military capability in the world. These events forced the United States and the world to realize the threat and capability of violent non-state actors and the fact that traditional notions of deterrence may not apply to non-state actors in the way that they appeared to work with state actors.

While the events of 11 September 2001 were eye opening for Americans, attacks and threats against the United States and its citizens did not begin on that day; however, the reality of threats at home did become apparent on that day. During the 1980s and 1990s, there were more than 2,400 incidents of international terrorism directed against U.S. citizens, facilities, and interests around the world.⁸³ During that time more than 600 U.S. citizens lost their lives and nearly 1,900 others sustained injuries in these attacks.⁸⁴

In response to the increasing number of terrorist attacks directed against Americans, President Ronald Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive 138 on 3 April 1984, and established in principle a U.S. policy of preemptive and

⁸³ Michele Malvesti, "Explaining the United States' Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 85-106, accessed 25 January 2015, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=192107>.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

retaliatory strikes against terrorists.⁸⁵ This directive provided an expansion of resources and focus, but the very nature of terrorism still made it difficult to assign responsibility to a specific group unless claims were made by a group; likewise, it is difficult to assign guilt to a certain state often due to the covert nature of the attack. However, by the mid-1980s, Americans had grown frustrated with the inability of U.S officials to stem the increasing tide of terrorism.⁸⁶

This frustration among Americans regarding the increase in terrorism necessitated a response beyond mere presidential decrees and political promises. In response to these incidents and increasing domestic pressure, the United States responded militarily to three incidents during the 1980s and 1990s. The first incident that received a military response was the 1986 Libyan bombing of a West German discotheque, the second was the 1993 Iraqi attempt to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush in Kuwait and the third was in response to the two U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa by Osama bin Laden operatives.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 138, Combatting Terrorism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, 3 April 1984, accessed 22 February 2015, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD138.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Judy G. Endicott, "Raid on Libya: Operation ELDORADO CANYON," in *Short of War: Major U.S.A.F. Contingency Operations*, ed. A. Timothy Warnock (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 4 June 2012), accessed 15 February 2015, <http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120823-032.pdf>, 146.

⁸⁷ Malvesti, 85-106.

U.S. Response to the 1986 Libyan Bombing of a West German Discotheque

On 5 April 1986, a large bomb destroyed the LaBelle Club, which was believed to be targeted due to its popularity among U.S. service members.⁸⁸ The explosion killed two U.S. soldiers, one Turkish girl, and injured over 200, which included more than seventy-nine Americans.⁸⁹ Unlike some of the previous terrorist attacks, with this attack there was proof of complicity from a state actor. Electronic surveillance intercepted two messages from the East Berlin Libyan People's Bureau to Libyan President Muammar Gadhafi that directly linked Gadhafi to the bombing. With this intelligence, President Reagan had the evidence he needed to prove that Gadhafi was sponsoring terrorist attacks. On 9 April, President Reagan authorized an air strike against Libya.⁹⁰

On 15 April 1986, the United States initiated Operation El Dorado Canyon; the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps carried out air strikes against Libyan targets. The results of this retaliatory strike had a lot of negative fallout from the international community. In addition, Gaddafi announced that he had "won a spectacular military victory over the United States."⁹¹ The international community largely condemned the attack. By a vote of seventy-nine in favor, and only twenty-eight against, with thirty-three abstentions, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 41/38. The

⁸⁸ Nathalie Malinarich, "Flashback: The Berlin Disco Bombing," *BBC News*, 13 November 2001, accessed 22 February 2015, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1653848.stm>.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Endicott, 148.

⁹¹ Brian L. Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 183.

UN General Assembly condemned the attack by stating, “the military attack perpetrated against the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 15 April 1986, which constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law.”⁹² This condemnation not only demonstrated weakness by the international community to prosecute terrorists and state-sponsors of terrorists, it also undermined the actions of the United States.

Because of the reluctance of the international community to take action or support counterterrorist actions, these groups were capable of continuing to carry out attacks. No amount of military force can deter aggression if there is no credible belief that a state is willing to use it.⁹³ In addition, seeing the criticism that comes from the international community when a state chooses to act also provides motivation for would-be terrorists or state-sponsors to conduct future attacks. This is one of three times when the United States responded militarily against aggression and it was severely undermined by the international community. In cases like this where terrorism is conducted against U.S. citizens abroad, it is imperative to have the support of international partners in order to deter, prevent, and prosecute international terrorism. Lacking support as demonstrated by this case could undermine further efforts to respond to terrorism as well as deterrence in general.

⁹² United Nations General Assembly, “A/RES/41/38,” United Nations, 20 November 1986, accessed 15 February 2015, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r038.htm>.

⁹³ Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” 24-48.

U.S. Response to the 1993 Iraqi Attempt to Assassinate Former President Bush in Kuwait

The second event that elicited a military response was the attempted assassination of former President George H. W. Bush in Kuwait. In April 1993, former President George Bush visited Kuwait to commemorate the Persian Gulf War victory. Later that month, Kuwaiti officials informed U.S. officials that terrorists had attempted to assassinate Bush during his visit.⁹⁴ Kuwaiti officials arrested seventeen people suspected in the plot. During their interrogations, some of the suspects reportedly confessed that the Iraqi Intelligence Service was behind the assassination attempt.⁹⁵

The response that followed was the second time during the 1980s and 1990s that the United States took military action in response to aggression aimed at American citizens. Between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. local time on 26 and 27 June 1993, U.S. Navy ships launched twenty-three Tomahawk missiles against Baghdad.⁹⁶ The target of the strikes was the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the building where U.S. officials believed the Iraqis had plotted against Bush. Speaking in a televised address to the nation after the strikes, President Clinton commented that it was a firm and commensurate response to Iraq's plan to assassinate former president George Bush in mid-April. Clinton said he ordered the attack to send three messages to the Iraqi

⁹⁴ Office of the Inspector General, "Section D: The Bush Assassination Attempt," The FBI Laboratory: An Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives-Related and Other Cases, Department of Justice, April 1997, accessed 15 February 2015, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/fbilab1/05bush2.htm>.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Global Security, "Cruise Missile Strike-June 26, 1993. Operation Southern Watch," accessed 15 February 2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/strike_930626.htm.

leadership: “We will combat terrorism. We will deter aggression. We will protect our people.”⁹⁷ One senior White House official said the United States designed the attack to demonstrate to Hussein that he must pay a high price for aggression. “It is a strong message. It is directed at the heart of his capability . . . but to try to figure out what is in Saddam Hussein’s mind is the path to madness,” he said.⁹⁸ This is the case for any deterrence strategy, as discussed above, it is impossible to know why people make the decisions they do. At the time, it was impossible to know whether these actions would deter him or others. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said, “What we’re doing is sending a message against the people who were responsible for planning this operation. . . . {If} anybody asks the same people to do it again, they will remember this message.”⁹⁹ The idea was to demonstrate resolve and utilize the principle of deterrence by threat for future potential acts of aggression.

Unlike the retaliation against the Libyan bombing, this retaliation received very little international criticism. The U.S. ambassador to the UN argued that the strikes were justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which specifically permits the use of force

⁹⁷ David Von Drehle and R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush,” *The Washington Post*, 27 June 1993, accessed 15 February 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/timeline/062793.htm>, A01.

⁹⁸ Norman Kempster and David Lauter, “U.S. Attacks Iraq to Retaliate for Alleged Plot to Kill Bush: Persian Gulf: Cruise Missiles Pound Baghdad Intelligence Headquarters in ‘Wake-up Call’ to Hussein. He is Blamed for Attempt on ex-President’s Life during Kuwait Trip,” *Los Angeles Times*, 27 June 1993, accessed 15 February 2015, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-06-27/news/mn-7658_1_persian-gulf.

⁹⁹ Von Drehle and Smith, A01.

in self-defense.¹⁰⁰ The majority of states expressed no objections to the airstrike and seem to have largely accepted the legal justification provided by the United States.¹⁰¹ This interpretation of Article 51 is considered a very expansive view of self-defense since no attack actually occurred. This interpretation falls more in line with retaliation rather than self-defense. There are disagreements regarding the actual meaning of self-defense with proponents of both sides supporting restrictive and expansive views.

In general, supporters of the restrictive view argue that an armed attack should be given a very narrow and literal definition. Therefore, the self-defense justification should only be considered valid in cases where an actual attack by a military force has already occurred or is imminent.¹⁰² On the other hand, proponents of the expansive view argue that a literal interpretation of an “armed attack” is actually very restrictive for states and ultimately places undue constraints on a state’s ability to respond legitimately to international aggression.¹⁰³ The restrictive viewpoint has been more prominent during past decades and has traditionally been supported by the majority of the UN Security Council. However, the United States has been the biggest proponent for a more expansive interpretation of Article 51.¹⁰⁴ By doing this, the United States demonstrates its resolve to

¹⁰⁰ Stuart G. Baker, “Comparing the 1993 U.S Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986 Bombing of Libya: The New Interpretations of Article 51,” *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law* 24, no. 99 (1994): 99-100, accessed 15 February 2015, <http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1412&context=gjicl>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., 109.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 110.

prosecute those who would commit acts of aggression against the United States and its interests. By demonstrating this resolve, the hope is that aggression will be deterred.

The shift in warfare toward low-intensity conflict observed between the 1986 La Belle Club bombing and the attempted assassination of former President Bush in 1993, appears to have shaped the international community's view on invocation of Article 51. During this time, it became more apparent that the views of conventional warfare that were prevalent when the UN Charter was written were no longer always valid assumptions. The low-intensity conflict that was being waged through proxies did not abide by the same principles of conventional warfare. This strategy of low-intensity warfare of which state-sponsored terrorism is a significant part is difficult to combat within the confines of UN Charter.¹⁰⁵

The international community's response to the strikes against Iraq in 1993 demonstrate a general shift from a more restrictive view to a more expansionist view of Article 51. While the international community's view on the interpretation of Article 51 may have shifted to deal with the threat of terrorism, that has not stopped terrorists from conducting attacks.

U.S. Response to the Two U.S. Embassy Bombings in East Africa by Bin Laden Operatives

Although the international community tended to support the U.S. use of Article 51 to attack Iraq in 1993 this does not appear to have deterred certain groups from attacking U.S. interests. For example, on 7 August 1998, the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed killing 224 people (including twelve U.S. citizens) and injuring

¹⁰⁵ Baker, 108.

thousands more.¹⁰⁶ In response to these events, Secretary of State Albright pledged to “use all means at our disposal to track down and punish” those responsible.¹⁰⁷

The U.S. response to these events was the third time during the 1980s and 1990s that the United States took military action in response to aggression aimed at American citizens and U.S. interests. After determining who was behind the attacks, President Bill Clinton ordered military action against the perpetrators. On 20 August 1998, the United States executed Operation Infinite Reach and launched missiles as retaliatory and preemptive strikes against training bases and infrastructure in Afghanistan used by groups affiliated with radical extremist and terrorist financier Osama bin Laden who the United States believed was responsible for the embassy attacks. In addition, a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, suspected of making a critical nerve gas component, was destroyed. This was the first time the United States has unreservedly acknowledged a preemptive military strike against a terrorist organization or network.¹⁰⁸

Analysis of Case Study 1

Even with the shift in policy to use both retaliatory and preemptive strikes by broadening the definition of Article 51, terrorists, non-state actors, and state sponsors continued to conduct attacks against the United States. In short, the strength of the U.S.

¹⁰⁶ Gabe Joselow, “Kenya Marks 15th Anniversary of US Embassy Bombings,” *Voice of America*, 7 August 2013, accessed 22 February 2015, <http://www.voanews.com/content/confronting-terror-in-east-africa-15-years-after-us-embassy-bombings/1725139.html>.

¹⁰⁷ Raphael F. Perl, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 98-733, *Terrorism: U. S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A New Policy Direction?* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1 September 1998), 1-6.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

military and the threat of reprisal attacks has been unable to deter attacks, especially those perpetrated by non-state actors.

The overall U.S. response to the 2,400 anti-U.S. terrorist incidents from 1983 to 1998 was viewed by some as moderate. Of these attacks, the United States retaliated militarily only three times in the cases mentioned above.¹⁰⁹ Since 1990, attacks by non-state actors have cost the United States over 7,000 casualties, the damage and destruction of three U.S. embassies, one U.S. Navy destroyer, the World Trade Center complex, the Pentagon, and billions of dollars' worth of material damage¹¹⁰ with an estimated total cost, including economic damages, homeland security enhancements, and war funding of more than three trillion dollars for 11 September alone.¹¹¹

While the United States has conducted retaliatory and preemptive strikes against some threats, Osama bin Laden and others may have interpreted other U.S. responses during this time as a sign of weakness. For example, the U.S. withdrawal from Beirut in 1983 following the bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks could have signaled a weakness on the part of the United States to bear the costs associated with maintaining order there. Likewise, the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1993, six months

¹⁰⁹ Malvesti, 85-106.

¹¹⁰ Larry Romans, "Terrorism: Attacks and Responses." Government Information System, Central Library, Vanderbilt University, accessed 7 February 2015, <http://diglib.library.vanderbilt.edu/ginfo-terrorism.pl?searchtext=WTC&Type=LTR&Resource=DB&Website=FDTF>; "The Global War on Terrorism," The White House, accessed 7 August 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html>.

¹¹¹ Shan Carter and Amanda Cox, "One 9/11 Tally:\$3.3 Trillion," *The New York Times*, 8 September 2011, accessed 15 February 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html?_r=0.

after eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu could have also been viewed as a sign of the U.S. unwillingness to sacrifice the U.S. lives necessary for a more vigorous response.¹¹² This demonstrates that regardless of the military power, it may be that deterrence only works if the deterrer can demonstrate both the capability and the resolve before deterrence can function effectively. The implications of an adversary developing a perception that a deterrer lacks the willingness to respond or the willingness to stay committed to the fight are serious because, once established, such reputations are difficult to change.¹¹³

It is difficult to know why the United States has been unable to deter acts of aggression against U.S. citizens and U.S. interests. While it is probably true that the United States has deterred a number of acts of aggression, it is impossible to calculate just how successful U.S. deterrence has been. What can be calculated is how many times deterrence has seemingly failed. The challenge is understanding why some actors are deterred and why others are not.

¹¹² See News Desk, "Bin Laden's Fatwa," 23 August 1996, *PBS*, accessed 15 February 2015, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa_1996/; ABC News, "John Miller's 1998 Interview with Osama bin Laden (Why We Fight Reminder)," *Free Republic*, 28 May 1998, accessed 17 January 2015, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/833647/posts>.

¹¹³ As Robert Jervis argues, "One of the basic findings of cognitive psychology is that images change only slowly and are maintained in the face of discrepant information. This implies that trying to change a reputation of low resolve will be especially costly." Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," *International Security* 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982/83): 9; Trager and Zagorcheva, 104.

Implications for Deterrence Theory: Findings from Case Study 1

The inability of the United States to deter acts of aggression against U.S. interests both at home and abroad challenges some of the tenants of deterrence theory. One challenge that this case presents is based on the relative power. The United States has unquestionably the most powerful military in the world capable of global reach, yet that has not been enough to deter some actors from engaging in acts of aggression against the United States. One could pose the question: if the United States cannot deter actions even on its homeland with two oceans serving as geographic barriers while maintaining the most sophisticated military force the world has ever seen, what is the future of deterrence?

This case also calls into question the rational actor model. When faced with an overwhelming military power, an assumption for a rational actor would be not to engage in an action that would inevitably lead to death. As witnessed by the actions mentioned above, the calculations for rationality may need to be reexamined for validity. The western notions of rationality may not fit with all actors that the United States is attempting to understand and deter. A broader concept may need to be developed to understand these actors. This is especially the case for certain non-state actors like Al Qaeda that only exist because of a specific cause that necessitates action. These groups cease to exist without engaging in actions; therefore, their rationality must be calculated differently. For example, for these types of groups it would be irrational not to act. Inaction would make them irrelevant. However, this does not mean that the rational actor model should be dismissed; it simply means that a broader understanding of rationality must be looked at in order to understand different circumstances faced by different actors.

While it is possible to assume that the military capacity of the United States has deterred broad aggression against the United States, the assessment that the United States has failed is based on a strict definition of deterrence and strict understanding of the enduring goals of the NSS, namely security and the maintenance of international order. It is not the intent to discredit the actions taken by the United States in the pursuit of deterrence; it is simply to point out some of the instances in which deterrence has not worked. Essentially, what this case study demonstrates is that military capability alone is not enough to deter aggression. States must work on other solutions to deterrence that compliment military power, especially when attempting direct-general deterrence.

Case Study 2: U.S.-Korea: Extended-General Deterrence

The next case study that was selected to inform scholarship on the effectiveness of deterrence theory was U.S. extended-general deterrence on the Korean peninsula. While the Korean War in itself was a challenge to deterrence theory, this case study will not analyze the war but will focus instead on the armistice period. While technically still at war, the armistice between North and South Korea was signed on 27 July 1953, and was designed to “insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.”¹¹⁴ In an effort to preserve the armistice, over the past sixty-plus years, U.S. forces have been stationed on the Korean peninsula as a deterrent force to dissuade North Korean aggression. Forces stationed on

¹¹⁴ FindLaw, “Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement,” 27 July 1953, accessed 25 April 2015, <http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/korea/kwarmagr072753.html> or U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Document for July 27th: Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korea State,” accessed 8 January 2015, <http://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/index.html?dod-date=727>.

the Korea peninsula represent the largest contingent of U.S. forces permanently stationed outside of U.S. territory. The number of U.S. personnel stationed on the peninsula since the signing of the armistice, has ranged from over 200,000 to just under 30,000 today.¹¹⁵ According to Secretary of State John Kerry, “there is no greater sign of the United States commitment to regional security than the 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea”¹¹⁶

While the United States and South Korea have developed a long-standing partnership over the past sixty-plus years and the United States has shown unwavering resolve to defending South Korea, North Korea remains determined to defy international law and commit acts of aggression toward South Korea. North Korea has consistently demonstrated its unwillingness to uphold the tenants of the armistice agreement by violating South Korean sovereignty, abducting South Korean citizens, conducting attacks against South Korea, and pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. These actions by North Korea not only cause regional instability but also challenge the international order, which is one of the enduring interests of the United States.

Over the past sixty years, North Korea has dug several tunnels that are believed to be infiltration tunnels. Since 15 November 1974, four tunnels have been discovered, but there are believed to be up to twenty.¹¹⁷ Upon discovery of the third tunnel in 1978, the

¹¹⁵ NZ-DPRK Society, “Number of U.S. Troops in South Korea,” accessed 25 April 2015, <https://sites.google.com/site/nzdprksociety/number-of-us-troops-in-rok-by-year>.

¹¹⁶ Tony Capaccio and Nicole Gaouette, “U.S. Adding 800 Troops for South Korea Citing Rebalance,” *Bloomberg Business*, 7 January 2014, accessed 25 April 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-07/u-s-adding-800-troops-for-south-korea-citing-rebalance.html>.

¹¹⁷ GlobalSecurity, “Korea Demilitarized Zone Incidents,” accessed 25 April 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/dmz.htm>.

UN Command accused North Korea of threatening the 1953 armistice agreement.¹¹⁸ The South Koreans described this as a tunnel of aggression, and considered this an act of North Korean aggression.

The discovery of these tunnels is significant based on the fact that from 1954 to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed agents into South Korea; a clear violation of the armistice. North Korea's major acts of aggression and terrorist involvement includes the attempted assassinations of President Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974; a 1983 attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan's life in a bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar); and a mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in 1987.¹¹⁹ North Korean acts of aggression have continued in recent years, in the form of armed incursions, kidnappings, and occasional threats to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into "a sea of fire" and to silence or tame South Korean critics of North Korea.¹²⁰

Another form of North Korean aggression against South Korea is the abduction of South Korean citizens. Since the signing of the 1953 armistice, there have been 3,795 known cases of South Korea citizens being abducted and taken to North Korea. Only through significant protests from the South Korea government and various efforts by the

¹¹⁸ William I. Zartman, *Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation* (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 97.

¹¹⁹ Hannah Fischer, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL30004, *North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 20 April 2007), accessed 15 February 2015, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf>, 8.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

Korean National Red Cross, 3,309 people have returned to South Korea.¹²¹ In addition, six others have escaped from the North and returned to South Korea on their own. In December 2007, there were estimated to be around 480 South Korean abductees remaining in North Korea against their will.¹²²

One of the more recent acts of aggression by North Korea was the sinking of a South Korean Navy ship,¹²³ an incident that was considered up to this point to be one of the deadliest incidents between the rivals since the end of the 1950-1953 Korean War.¹²⁴ The incident occurred on 26 March 2010, when the *Cheonan*, a Republic of Korea Navy ship carrying 104 personnel, sank off the country's west coast near Baengnyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing forty-six seamen.¹²⁵ South Korea's military says that military intelligence gathered proves that a torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine sank its Navy ship *Cheonan*.¹²⁶ North Korea has continued to deny any responsibility for sinking the ship and claim that it is a conspiracy against North Korea.

¹²¹ Humanitarian Cooperation Planning Division, Ministry of Unification, Seoul, "Explanations on the Results of the 20th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks and Joint Press Statement," Republic of Korea, 2 March 2007, accessed 25 April 2015, <http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1834&mode=view&cid=31513>.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Namgung Min, "Results Confirm North Korea Sank *Cheonan*," *Daily NK*, 20 May 2010, accessed 19 January 2015, <http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=6392>.

¹²⁴ "North Korean Torpedo Sank *Cheonan*, South Korea Military Source Claims," *The Guardian*, 22 April 2010, accessed 23 February 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/22/north-korea-cheonan-sinking-torpedo>.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

Another recent incident of aggression occurred on 23 November 2010 when North Korean forces fired artillery shells and rockets at Yeonpyeong Island, hitting both military and civilian targets.¹²⁷ The shelling caused widespread damage on the island, killing four South Koreans and injuring nineteen others.¹²⁸ Unlike the sinking of the South Korea ship, with this incident there was no deniability for North Korea; this was a clear provocation by the North. In response to North Korea's aggression, South Korea retaliated by shelling North Korean gun positions. This incident significantly increased tensions on the Korean peninsula and prompted widespread international condemnation of the North's actions. On 18 December 2010, former UN ambassador Bill Richardson said tensions had escalated to become "the most serious crisis on the Korean peninsula since the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War."¹²⁹ This incident along with the 2010 North Korean sinking of the *Cheonan* are in direct defiance of the armistice and considered acts of war.

Another area where North Korea has been defiant and demonstrated international aggression is their development of nuclear weapons. This defiance is in direct violation of international law, specifically the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In October of 2006,

¹²⁷ Mark McDonald, "Crisis Status in South Korea after North Shells Island," *The New York Times*, 23 November 2010, accessed 23 February 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24korea.html?src=mv>.

¹²⁸ "Tensions High as North, South Korea Trade Shelling," *Dawn*, 24 November 2010, accessed 23 February 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/585137/tensions-high-as-north-south-korea-trade-shelling>.

¹²⁹ Jiyeon Lee, "U.N. Security Council to Hold Emergency Meeting on Korean Crisis," *CNN*, 19 December 2010, accessed 23 February 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/12/18/north.korea.richardson/index.html?hpt=T2>.

North Korea demonstrated its aggression to the world by testing a nuclear bomb.¹³⁰ This was a clear act of aggression aimed at South Korea and the United States. North Korean pursuit of WMD has been a critical issue and one that has had a destabilizing effect on the entire region. North Korea uses their pursuit of nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip with the United States and South Korea to get other concessions.

North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated that the presence of U.S. military in the region and the strong commitment between the United States and South Korea will not prevent them from taking aggressive measures against the South. Since the signing of the armistice in 1953, North Korea has committed over 100 acts of aggression against the South.¹³¹ These acts of aggression against South Korea not only have negative effects on South Korea, but also on the region and the U.S. enduring goals of maintaining security and international order.

Analysis of Case Study 2

In addition to creating instability in the region, North Korea's actions also have serious implications for U.S. deterrence strategy. The United States exercises what is defined as extended-general deterrence on the Korean peninsula in order to deter North Korea aggression, ensure regional stability, and maintain international order. North Korean actions over the past sixty years clearly demonstrate that the presence of U.S. troops, the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States, and the overwhelming military superiority have not completely deterred North Korea from conducting acts of

¹³⁰ Fischer, 32.

¹³¹ Ibid., 1.

aggression against the South. While North Korea has not mobilized its military forces in mass and crossed the Demilitarized Zone, these low-intensity actions do challenge the credibility and capability of U.S. deterrence strategy in Northeast Asia. These actions by North Korea could simply be tests to see what they can achieve without provoking a significant U.S. reaction.

This very dangerous game extends beyond the scope of the three-sided security dilemma between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea. This continued ability of North Korea to exercise what could be considered freedom of escalation, threatens the U.S. ability to deter aggression not only in Northeast Asia, but also around the world. If North Korea continues to be successful in conducting limited actions against the South with limited or no reaction by the South or the United States, other actors may attempt to challenge the United States in similar ways. More importantly, if other actors decide to pursue nuclear development as a hedge against U.S. action as North Korea has done, the world could witness a proliferation of WMD around the world causing greater instability. Because the United States took no overt action (outside of diplomatic talks) against North Korea for developing nuclear weapons, other actors may calculate that the risk is worth the reward.

This case also sends other signals to would-be aggressors around the world that even the strongest security alliances do not guarantee strong reaction against aggression. It could be argued that South Korea is one of the strongest allies of the United States. This sixty-plus year alliance, forged in one of the bloodiest wars for the United States, is an example of U.S. commitment. On the other hand, North Korea's ability to act with impunity threatens the credibility of the capability of the United States to deter

aggression. If the U.S.-South Korea alliance is one of the strongest and the United States is incapable of deterring aggression against one of the poorest states in the world, then what should other allies think. What about those allies that are less critical for the United States that face even greater threats from even stronger states than North Korea? What might this mean for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies that depend on the U.S. for support against Russian aggression? While North Korea has not made any substantial tangible gains (outside of their development of nuclear weapons), it has undermined U.S. credibility when it comes to deterrence.

Implications for Deterrence Theory: Findings from Case Study 2

This case study also has implications for deterrence theory in general. While this case study has pointed out several failures of deterrence as it related to deterrence theory, it can be assumed that the presence of U.S. forces has generally deterred the North Korean military from a large-scale war against the South. Once again, this case study is set against the NSS stated goals of security and international order; therefore, in the strictest sense, it must be understood that any violations of these goals or rather an act of aggression, is a breakdown in deterrence.

This case study is important because unlike the ambiguity discussed above when dealing with non-state actors, all of the threats to the South have come from a verifiable state actor, North Korea. Unlike the no return address problem posed by non-state actors, North Korean aggression has originated from verifiable locations under the support of the state apparatus for which retaliation against those actors is possible. Unlike with non-state actors where inaction is sometimes the result of ambiguity in terms of assigning responsibility and not knowing where to retaliate or who to retaliate against, in the case

of North Korean aggression there is much less ambiguity, if any. This creates a credibility problem. When threats are made by posturing forces (U.S. military) in an extended-general deterrence array and acts of aggression are committed and there is no retaliation, the concept of extended-general deterrence becomes less credible. In order for deterrence in general to work, the threat of force must be credible. In an extended-general deterrence situation, the threat of retaliation must be even greater since the extended forces are not protecting their own land. All acts of aggression must be met immediately or the extended deterrence will fail.

This case study is also important because it challenges some of the assumptions embedded in the nuclear umbrella policy. The nuclear umbrella over South Korea is intended to deter South Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons and while maintaining a moderate military capability. However, this policy has not however deterred North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons. In fact, the strong U.S. military capability combined with the nuclear umbrella has been unable to deter North Korea from pursuing the development of their own nuclear capability. While balancing is expected within realist assumptions, the North Korean defiance with regard to their development of nuclear weapons challenges the credibility of the U.S. deterrence posture and deterrence theory in general.

Like the case above, this case also calls into question some of the rational actor assumptions. If it is assumed that the leaders of North Korea are rational, it would make sense that they choose not provoke an engagement with the United States due to the overwhelming military superiority of the United States. The fact that the United States has an unmatched conventional military capability has not deterred what would otherwise

be considered as irrational calculations. On the other hand, it may be the case that the leaders in North Korea believe that threatening South Korea is the best way to receive concessions and maintain their strong internal power base. Convincing the South that the North might be irrational, may inspire the South to try to negotiate more with the North to ease tensions. Likewise, these acts that seem irrational may also be a façade in order to demonstrate the false power of North Korea to the people of North Korea. Thus, acting in defiance to the South and the United States may provide added legitimacy for the leadership. This case study may also challenge what are considered Western notions of rationality. While it may appear that North Korea is acting irrationally, their actions may actually be completely rational for their desired ends. Either way, the rational actor model should not be discarded because it is more complex, but the traditional notions of rationality should be reexamined in order to provide a better understanding of the North Korean situation.

Case Study 3: India-Pakistan Standoff 1999 Kargil War: Direct-Immediate Deterrence

This case study was chosen, not because it is directly related to the United States NSS goals, but because it provides a good example of direct-immediate deterrence and a critique of nuclear peace theory. The India-Pakistan standoff provides a good case of direct-immediate deterrence from which to analyze deterrence theory. The Kargil War specifically provides a set of challenges to deterrence theory that will be explored in detail throughout this case study. Between May and July of 1999, India and Pakistan engaged in a war in the Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of

Control (LOC). This was the third war between the two states since their independence from Great Britain and the partition of Pakistan, which left the Kashmir region in dispute.

The first of the three wars was fought in 1965 following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar. During this operation, Pakistani forces infiltrated Jammu and Kashmir to conduct an unconventional war and incite an insurgency against India.¹³² This war lasted five weeks and caused thousands of casualties on both sides. This war consisted primarily of infantry and armored supported by air and naval assets. The war ended with the Tashkent Declaration and a UN mandated ceasefire.¹³³ However, this ceasefire did not change the views of either of the belligerents.

The second war began in 1971 while Pakistan was engaged in a war against separatists in East Pakistan. When Pakistan was partitioned just after independence, it was further divided into two major regions, West Pakistan and East Pakistan that were separated by more than 1,000 miles on opposite sides of India. While largely a Muslim country, East Pakistan was occupied mostly by Bengali people who have their own history and culture that differs significantly from then West Pakistan. The conflict began in March when Nationalist Bengalis demanded self-determination and the Pakistani military stepped in to quell dissent and extended martial law.¹³⁴ The situation escalated

¹³² "Kashmiris Didn't Back Pakistan in 1965: Gohar," *The Tribune India Online*, June 2005, accessed 2 March 2015, <http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050603/main2.htm>.

¹³³ United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 24 March 1966 from the Permanent Representative of India Addressed to the President of the Security Council," United Nations, 25 March 1966, accessed 13 April 2015, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN%20PK_660110_TashkentDeclaration.pdf.

¹³⁴ Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution?" *The Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 4 (August 1975): 891-911.

following the political crisis and eventually spiraled out of control. In December 1971, India intervened in East Pakistan in favor of the rebelling Bengali populace. On 16 December 1971, Pakistani forces surrendered to the Indian Army.¹³⁵ The conflict was brief but bloody and resulted in the independence of East Pakistan, which separated and became Bangladesh.¹³⁶ This conflict created even greater resentment for India among Pakistanis. Pakistan blamed India for the loss of half of their territory.

The summer of 1999 saw the third iteration of conflict between these two states in the Kargil War. Pakistani forces infiltrated and occupied positions up to fifteen kilometers inside the Indian border. It was possible for the Pakistani forces to penetrate this far because these areas were typically vacated during the winter months due to the harsh weather conditions. The conflict began in May of that year when local residents reported sightings of Pakistani forces to the Indian authorities.¹³⁷ After being informed, Indian intelligence services discovered Pakistani forces in the mountain redoubts along the Indian side of the LOC. Once the existence of Pakistani forces was confirmed, fighting broke out which lasted for almost two months. Conventional forces were employed on both sides as Indian Army units attacked Pakistani forces while the Indian Air Force bombed Pakistani bases in the high Himalayan peaks. One important note is

¹³⁵ Maniruzzaman, 891.

¹³⁶ Ved P. Nanda, "Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities--Islamabad (WestPakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)," *The American Journal of International Law* 66, no. 2 (April 1972): 325, accessed 1 February 2015, <http://www.jstor.org.lumen.cgsccarl.com/stable/pdf/2199032.pdf?acceptTC=true>.

¹³⁷ Sumit Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 55; Praveen Swami, Deputy Editor, Frontline New Delhi, personal communication with author, 15 June 2008.

that the Indian forces were careful to remain on their side of the LOC, but there was concern that Indian forces would have to move into Pakistan to end the war. Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee informed the United States that it might be necessary to push forces into Pakistan, and U.S. spy satellites confirmed that Indian forces were being positioned for a counter-offensive in Rajasthan.¹³⁸ In the end, Indian forces showed restraint and did not cross the LOC. Had they crossed the LOC, the situation could have completely spiraled out of control.

After nearly two months of fighting, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington and through negotiations with President Bill Clinton pledged to withdraw the forces to the Pakistani side of the LOC.¹³⁹ This war involved more than 30,000 Indian forces and 5,000 Pakistani forces and resulted in casualties ranging from 700¹⁴⁰ to more than 4,000¹⁴¹ Pakistani forces and an estimated 1,600¹⁴² Indian casualties.

¹³⁸ Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia," *Asian Survey* 41, no. 6 (November/December 2001): 1071.

¹³⁹ Bradley Graham and Nathan Abse, "U.S. Says Pakistan Will Withdraw," *Washington Post*, 5 July 1999.

¹⁴⁰ Major General Ashok Kalyan Verma, "India Update, The Kargil (Kashmir) War, May-July 1999," University of Texas, Austin, accessed 2 February 2013, <http://www.laits.utexas.edu/solvyns-project/kargil.html>, 126; "Tortured Kargil Martyr's Parents want Justice for War Crime," *Times of India*, 28 November 2012, accessed 2 February 2013, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Tortured-Kargil-martyrs-parents-want-justice-for-war-crime/articleshow/17401759.cms>; Rodrigo Tavares, "Understanding Regional Peace and Security" (Thesis, Department of Peace and Development Research, School of Global Studies, Göteborg University, 2006), 297.

¹⁴¹ B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Over 4,000 Soldiers Killed in Kargil: Sharif," *The Hindu*, 17 August 2003, accessed 17 January 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2003/08/17/stories/2003081702900800.htm>; "Pervez Musharraf 'Crossed LoC before Kargil War'; V. K. Singh Praises ex-Pak Army Chief's 'Courage'," 1 February 2013, accessed 17 January 2015, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Weeks-before-Kargil-conflict-Musharraf-crossed-LoC-spent-night-in-India-Aide/articleshow/>

While some may characterize this event as just another chapter in the long-standing India-Pakistan standoff that has led to several wars and multiple smaller skirmishes, this time things were different. The calculations for this war were much higher. Although India exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1974, its tests in 1998 occurred during a politically sensitive time and led to international condemnation as well as sanctions. On 11 and 13 May, India tested five nuclear weapons in the Rajasthan desert. Pakistan had been working on developing a nuclear weapon, which they tested in the same month as India's detonations. In response, Pakistan claimed to have detonated six nuclear devices—five to match India's recent tests and one in response to India's 1974 test—at an underground facility in the Chagai Hills.¹⁴³ These tests demonstrated to the world and especially to each other that they both held the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons in response to any attack.¹⁴⁴ The initial reaction from the international community was widespread condemnation as it was believed that this would lead to greater instability in South Asia. The possession of nuclear weapons by both countries presents a potentially devastating reality. The majority of scholarship argues that the

18290778.cms; "Pakistan Army Admits to Kargil Martyrs," *NDTV*, 18 November 2010, accessed 17 January 2015, http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/pakistan-army-admits-to-kargil-martyrs-67190?utm_source=feedburner.

¹⁴² "Musharraf Claims Kargil Was a Big Success Militarily for Pakistan," *Greater Kashmir*, 1 February 2013, accessed 25 January 2015, <http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Feb/1/musharraf-claims-kargil-was-a-big-success-militarily-for-pak-46.asp>.

¹⁴³ Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Sources and Prospects of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 148-177; Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 178-204.

¹⁴⁴ Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia," 1064.

likelihood of full-scale war with the possibility of escalation to the nuclear level has become significantly higher in the region since the nuclear tests of May 1998.¹⁴⁵ Two nuclear-armed enemy states, militarily postured along a contested border creates a volatile situation that has the potential to escalate to the point of mutual annihilation. The Kargil War occurred at a very sensitive time with some very important calculations that could have easily spiraled out of control. To assume that this was simply another chapter in the history of India-Pakistani tensions overlooks the devastating potential that could have occurred.

For these two largest South Asian states, the Kargil War represents a watershed event because it demonstrated that even the presence of nuclear weapons do not always prevent conflict and might not appreciably dampen the India-Pakistan security competition in the future.¹⁴⁶ According to deterrence theory, the dual possession of nuclear weapons should act as a deterrent to direct conflict between two states; nuclear weapons are said to confer large-scale stability between nuclear weapon states but this incident demonstrates otherwise. The 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan is the

¹⁴⁵ On this subject, see S. Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, "U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis," No. 57 (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006); Mario E. Carranza, "Avoiding a Nuclear Catastrophe: Arms Control after the 2002 India-Pakistan Crisis," *International Politics* 40, no. 3 (September 2003): 313-339.

¹⁴⁶ Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Med, "Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis" (Monograph, Rand Corporation, 2001), accessed 22 January 2015, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450.html, 1.

only undisputed case of a war between nuclear-armed states,¹⁴⁷ which challenges some of the Cold War deterrence theories, specifically the idea of nuclear peace theory as well as MAD that argue that nuclear weapons provide a deterrence against direct armed conflict.

Analysis of Case Study 3

The Kargil War and the India-Pakistan standoff in general offer a good case from which to form an analysis of critical issues regarding deterrence theory. This war while physically contained to the Kashmir region had lasting effects on the both countries at large as well as the international community. Because this was the first incident in history where nuclear powered rivals engaged in direct open warfare, it sent shockwaves through the international community due to the fear of escalation. The war was ended only through third-party arbitration after the international community, specifically the United States, got involved. Had the international community not intervened, it is difficult to predict what the outcome might have been. In the wake of this event, there has been disagreement over the role that nuclear weapons play in the region.

There are some scholars and defense analysts that argue that the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia actually reduces or even eliminates the risk of war between India and Pakistan.¹⁴⁸ This logic is based on rational actor assumptions. Supporters of

¹⁴⁷ Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Predicting Proliferation," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 304.

¹⁴⁸ For arguments about nuclear stability, see Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry: India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005); John Arquilla, "Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: More May Be Manageable," *Comparative Strategy* 16, no. 1 (January 1997): 13-31; David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97): 87-119; Devin T. Hagerty, *The*

proliferation believed that leaders in both countries realize the significant costs and consequences associate with the use of nuclear weapons and that will be enough to prevent them from using nuclear weapons. They also contend that because leaders in both countries know the effects of these weapons they will be deterred from any military conflict in which there is a serious possibility of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁹ The challenge with this position is that it is impossible to predict which conflicts will be possible of escalating. The Kargil War is an example; this war could have escalated if a third party failed to intervene or if someone within either country made a miscalculation.

Other scholars and defense analysts argue against this position. They believe that the existence of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan increases the likelihood of crises, accidents, miscalculations, and nuclear war.¹⁵⁰ The Kargil War seems to confirm that later assumption rather than the former. It at least disproves the claim that nuclear weapons will eliminate the risk of future conflicts between India and Pakistan. It is also very difficult to know whether either side will refrain from engaging in conflict if they believe there is a possibility of escalating to the point of nuclear employment. In any

Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Sumit Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," 46.

¹⁴⁹ Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia," 1064-1065.

¹⁵⁰ Kanti Bajpai, "The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent" in *India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond*, ed. Amitabh Mattoo (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999), 150-188; Samina Ahmed, "Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-armed Pakistan," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 5 (September 2000): 781-793; Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," *Security Studies* 2, no. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993): 159-191; Scott D. Sagan, "More Will Be Worse" in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, eds. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 47-91.

conflict between one or more states that possess nuclear weapons, there is always a possibility of escalating to the point of employing nuclear weapons.

Under the concept of nuclear peace theory, it is believed that the existence of these weapons will promote strategic stability. While the aspirations of strategic stability are desirable, an important tension may exist between them. Policies that seek to maximize strategic stability through the pursuit of nuclear weapons may appear to some to make South Asia safer, but these same policies could also significantly increase the likelihood of lower-level conflicts on the subcontinent. In instances where nuclear weapons are present, leaders tend to avoid direct conflict (with the exception of the Kargil War), but engage in indirect conflict through limited wars or proxies. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in this throughout the Cold War resulting in a multitude of limited wars as well as large-scale indirect conflicts that could have easily escalated. The fact that they did not escalate does not prove that nuclear weapons were effective.

This phenomenon of small-scale conflicts is referred to by most scholars as the “stability/instability paradox.”¹⁵¹ According to this idea, strategic stability reduces the likelihood that conventional war will escalate to the nuclear level, and therefore reduces

¹⁵¹ A term coined by Glenn Snyder. The issue is whether stable mutual deterrence at the nuclear level encourages aggression at lower levels. If countries are mutually deterred from using nuclear weapons by the fear of retaliation, then they might believe that they can fight conventional wars because both sides would be deterred from nuclear escalation. See Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in *The Balance of Power*, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco, CA: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965), 185-201.

the danger of engaging in either a limited or a conventional war.¹⁵² The consequence of strategic stability is that lowering the potential costs of conflict, makes the outbreak of violence more likely.¹⁵³ This is especially true in the case of Pakistan and India where a territorial dispute is ongoing. Either side can engage in conflict against the other with the belief that neither side will escalate the conflict. In this environment, it is believed that limited conventional conflict is unlikely to provoke an immediate nuclear confrontation. However, in the event that a limited conventional confrontation spirals into a full-scale conventional conflict, escalation to the nuclear level becomes a serious possibility.¹⁵⁴ These costs of nuclear exchange allows nuclear powers to engage in limited violence against each other, but there are no guarantees that escalation will not occur which makes this concept of deterrence very fragile.¹⁵⁵

Many scholars agree that the stability/instability paradox explains the situation of continued conflict on the South Asia subcontinent. For example, Sumit Ganguly argues that the Kargil War “conformed closely to the expectations of the ‘stability/instability paradox,’” according to which nuclear weapons “create incentives for conventional conflicts in peripheral areas as long as either side does not breach certain shared

¹⁵² S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like Cold War Europe,” *International Security* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 127-128.

¹⁵³ Charles L. Glaser, *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 46. See also Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 20. For the original discussion of the stability/instability paradox, see Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” 198-199.

¹⁵⁴ Kapur, 129.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

thresholds.”¹⁵⁶ While the incentive for newly nuclear-armed Pakistan to challenge the status quo is apparent, the fact that it did not escalate does not prove that this event would not have escalated based solely on the fact that both countries possessed nuclear weapons. In fact, neither side deescalated until the international community intervened. Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons inevitably gave them the ability to challenge the status quo given the threat of their newly acquired nuclear umbrella. Kenneth Waltz argues that the ongoing violence persists under the stability/instability paradox because the possession of nuclear weapons “tempt countries to fight small wars.”¹⁵⁷

S. Paul Kapur argues that the stability/instability paradox does not adequately explain the situation between India and Pakistan. The ongoing violence is not due to the expectations of the stability/instability paradox and the belief that there is a low likelihood of nuclear escalation. On the contrary, Kapur explains that the ongoing violence is a result of the belief that there is a serious possibility of nuclear escalation, which has enabled Pakistan to launch limited conventional attacks against India, while insulating itself against the possibility of full-scale Indian conventional retaliation.¹⁵⁸

Not only does the Kargil War represent the first instance of direct conventional war between nuclear countries, it also raises questions about how the presence of nuclear

¹⁵⁶ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 122-123.

¹⁵⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, “For Better: Nuclear Weapons Preserve an Imperfect Peace,” in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, eds. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 122.

¹⁵⁸ Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like Cold War Europe,” 150.

weapons affects strategic thinking.¹⁵⁹ One has to consider whether mutually assured destruction is a valid premise or whether the assumptions of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were misunderstood under the guise of MAD. Instead of considering the retaliation from India, Pakistan may have decided to move into Kargil based on calculations that India's strategic response would be constrained by Pakistan's nuclear umbrella. This implies Pakistan's decisions could be based on risk-taking rather than deterrence, which makes India's possession of nuclear weapons only a potential deterrent against a nuclear attack. At present, the possession of nuclear weapons appears to be unable to prevent unconventional attacks or limited conventional wars like the Kargil War. Pakistan may also view India's decision not cross the LOC as a confirmation of this line of thought.¹⁶⁰

The implications for the India-Pakistan standoff are that Pakistan has the ability to conduct attacks against India with limited repercussions. India has demonstrated its reluctance to cross the LOC to punish the Pakistanis for fear that crossing the LOC could cause the conflict to spiral out of control. Pakistan's first strike nuclear policy is specifically designed as a counter to India's conventional forces. According to Brigadier General (Retired) Naeem Salik, Pakistan's nuclear posture and nuclear use doctrine are specifically designed with India's advantages in the size of conventional forces in

¹⁵⁹ "Kargil: What Does It Mean?" *South Asia Monitor*, no. 12 (19 July 1999), South Asia Program Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed 15 February 2015, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam12.pdf>.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

mind.¹⁶¹ He explains that as a natural corollary of the desire to deny India the opportunity to exploit their size advantage it makes perfect sense for Pakistan to refuse to adopt a “no first use” nuclear posture.¹⁶² Pakistan’s nuclear posture has significant influence on India’s ability to retaliate, as demonstrated in the Kargil War. This has also been seen in more recent events in the 2001 and 2008, when what were believed to be Pakistani state-sponsored actors carried out deadly terrorist attacks on India, only to be met with a relatively subdued response from India. An Indian military spokesperson stated, “Pakistan’s threat of nuclear first-use deterred India from seriously considering conventional military strikes.”¹⁶³ In addition to an already tense situation, Pakistan’s first-use nuclear posture has inadvertently or not, also created a quasi-nuclear umbrella for extremist organizations based in Pakistan that can target Indian cities with virtual impunity.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Retired Brigadier General Naeem Salik, “The Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine,” *Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia* (Monterey, CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Post Graduate School, June 2014), accessed 14 April 2015, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/NuclearLearning/6%20Nuclear%20Learning_Salik.pdf, 71-84.

¹⁶² Ibid., 72.

¹⁶³ Vipin Narang, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability,” *International Security* (January 2010), Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, accessed 4 January 2015, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Pakistans_Nuclear_Posture_policy_brief.pdf.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

Implications for Deterrence Theory: Findings from Case Study 3

While it is important to look at this conflict in the context of historical tensions between these two South Asian neighbors and the regional stability concerns, it is also important to understand how this event affects the broader concept of deterrence. Where many Cold War assumptions claimed that possession of nuclear weapons serves as a deterrent, the case of Pakistan and India add some additional considerations. While Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons does appear to be a deterrent against India, India's possession of nuclear weapons does not appear to have proven completely successful against Pakistan based not only on the Kargil War but also on other subsequent operations conducted against India. The stability/instability paradox adds some insight to this problem but there is no way to prove that these small-scale conflicts will not escalate beyond the scope explained under the stability/instability paradox.

Another implication is the rationality that Pakistan needs nuclear weapons due to its relative disadvantage vis-à-vis India. If Pakistan is capable of conducting skirmishes, limited wars, and even conventional wars as discussed above without the fear of full-scale retaliation, then possessing nuclear weapons may become much more attractive for smaller states or non-state actors to guarantee their security. Pakistan has proven that a smaller military force can operate with relative impunity against another state even when that state possesses nuclear weapons, as long as the threat of nuclear employment by the smaller state is credible. Thus, possession of nuclear weapons may not be a deterrent from aggressive action as much as a deterrent against retaliation. This case study demonstrates that when both states possess nuclear weapons, the aggressor state benefits because of the costs of retaliation if the conflict is elevated too high. For example,

Pakistan can conduct an attack without much concern that India will respond overly aggressively because of the fear of escalation. As in this case, India pushed the Pakistanis back to the status quo line, but stopped short of large-scale retaliation based on Pakistan's first use policy that will be used in the event that they become overwhelmed. This provides an incentive to push the proverbial envelope to see what is possible. For Pakistan, this means a never-ending quest to conquer Kashmir.

The implications of this case study reach far beyond the India-Pakistan standoff. What is learned from this experience can have broad implications for smaller states seeking security guarantees or taking aggressive stances. The same could be said for non-state actors who wish to further their cause by possessing such weapons. While India and Pakistan will be assessing their experience in Kargil, so will other countries as well as non-state actors who have ambitions to acquire WMD. If risk taking under a nuclear "umbrella" is seen as successful, then there will be a heightened interest in these weapons.¹⁶⁵ The possession of a few nuclear weapons and a small-scale unconventional military force could wreak havoc on responsible states and work to destabilize regions and thus the international community as a whole.

Expanding this case study even further, one could look at the events unfolding in Europe right now, specifically Ukraine. Moving forward, it is important to reconsider the power of nuclear weapons but also the limits of deterrence. Pakistan has demonstrated the ability to probe a larger country without the fear of large-scale retaliation, but this can be expanded. For example, what if Russia probes a NATO country? There is a very credible nuclear umbrella over our European allies, but would the United States or NATO be

¹⁶⁵ "Kargil: What Does It Mean?"

willing to confront Russia in a full-scale confrontation that could escalate to the nuclear level? If the possession of nuclear weapons favors the aggressor, then the fact that the United States and other NATO allies possess nuclear weapons as a means of retaliation may not deter Russian aggression. The recent incursions into Georgia and Ukraine can be seen as test cases for Russia to develop an understanding of the international community's response. The greater risk will be when, not if, Russia attempts the same in one of the Baltic States. This will have longstanding effects that could lead to the collapse of NATO as a whole or worst case, nuclear war with Russia. Based on some of the findings from the Kargil War, it is important to reconsider the ability of nuclear weapons and their ability to prevent war as well as the ability to protect aggressors like Pakistan and Russia.

Case Study 4: U.S.-Philippines: Extended-Immediate Deterrence

The Philippines case study provides an example of U.S. extended-immediate deterrence where the United States is attempting to deter terrorist groups located in the Southern Philippines from conducting attacks against U.S. interests and allies. While the United States is committed to the Philippines under a mutual defense treaty, the Philippines also serves as key strategic ally for the United States in maintaining stability in the Pacific. These terrorists operating in the Southern Philippines not only create instability in the Philippines, but their actions have ripple effects that create security concerns throughout the region and increasingly throughout the world. The terrorist actions are a significant concern for the United States, not only because of the effects in the region and the strong partnership with the Philippines, but also because of the larger impact to the United States enduring interest of maintaining international order.

The Philippines has experienced a lot of instability throughout its relatively short history. Born out of an independence struggle from Spain and then the United States, the Philippines has also experienced several internal struggles for power including military coups. These internal struggles have weakened the central government at times and created renewed efforts among different interest groups including terrorist and separatists groups like those in the Southern Philippines to pursue their own interests. In a regionally fragmented, culturally diverse country like the Philippines, these separatist groups create increasing instability, which have the potential to have a domino effect spurring further secessionist movements. The internal instability created by these groups affects the security of an increasingly tense region and runs counter to the U.S. national interests of regional stability. For this reason, it has been important for the United States to work closely with the Government of the Philippines to deter acts of aggression from these groups.

The United States and the Philippines have had a long history stretching back to the Spanish-American War in which the United States defeated the Spanish and subsequently took possession of the Philippines. Since that time, relations have ranged from open conflict to close security partner. After an independence struggle with the United States, colonization by the Japanese and subsequent retaking by the United States following World War II, in 1946 the Philippines finally gained its independence from the United States. Then in 1951, the United States and the Philippines signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, which is still in place today that dictated that both nations would support

each other if either the Philippines or the United States was to be attacked by an external party.¹⁶⁶

Although relations between the United States and the Philippines have waxed and waned based on the internal upheavals the Philippines have experienced, overall they have been generally positive. In the wake of 11 September 2001, the Philippines remained a strong ally as they had a long experience with terrorist activities in their own country. If anything, this event brought the two countries closer together. While 11 September brought the United States and the Philippines closer together and created a strong relationship to address the war of terror, there were prior efforts already underway to address the security issues in the Philippines. For example, the United States established the Joint Special Operations Task Force in the Philippines (JSOTF-P) in 2000 and headquartered it there since 2002 alongside the Armed Forces of the Philippines to help with the internal struggle against insurgents in the Philippines. After 11 September 2001, the United States was eager to get help from Southeast Asian countries in combating terrorism on what was considered the second front. The first U.S response to Southeast Asian terrorism post-9/11 was focused on aid to the Philippines. In November 2001, the United States provided the Philippines a security assistance package of \$100 million in military training and equipment.¹⁶⁷ Then in 2002, the United States deployed 1,200 soldiers to the Philippines as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines. The

¹⁶⁶ The Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines; August 30, 1951," Yale Law School, accessed 8 February 2015, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.

¹⁶⁷ Jonathan T. Chow, "ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11," *Asian Survey* 45, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 311.

purpose of this operation was to support the Government of the Republic of the Philippines counterterrorism efforts while simultaneously achieving U.S. Global War on Terror objectives.¹⁶⁸

The JSOTF-P mission is to:

support the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their fight against terrorism and lawless elements in the southern Philippines and preventing terrorists from establishing safe havens. At the request of the Philippine government, JSOTF-P works alongside the AFP in a strictly non-combat role to defeat terrorists, eliminate safe havens and create the conditions necessary for peace, stability and prosperity in the southern Philippines.¹⁶⁹

The establishment of JSOTF-P and the deployment of U.S. personnel to the Philippines cemented the U.S.-Philippine partnership against terrorism and expanded the extended deterrent provided by the United States to include internal enemies of the Philippines.

This case study is beneficial because it not only provides an example of U.S. extended-immediate deterrence (because it is directed at known terrorist organizations operating in the Southern Philippines); it also provides an example of deterrence against non-state actors, which are considered to be among the most difficult entities to deter. Although difficult to deter, Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva argue that the current approach of the United States and Philippine governments offers a great example

¹⁶⁸ Gordon Arthur and James Hardy, "US, Philippines Start 'PHIBLEX' Drills as Special Forces Mission Draws Down," *IHS Janes* 360, 6 October 2014, accessed 7 February 2015, <http://www.janes.com/article/44106/us-philippines-start-phiblex-drills-as-special-forces-mission-draws-down>.

¹⁶⁹ Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, "Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines Fact Sheet," 1 July 2011, accessed 7 February 2015, http://jsotf-p.blogspot.com/2011/09/type-your-summary-here_20.html.

of deterrence strategies that may work against non-state actors using a variety of accommodation and coercion strategies.¹⁷⁰

The modern terrorist problem in the Southern Philippines is an outgrowth of a Moro struggle for independence and dates back to at least 1899 during the uprising of the Bangsamoro people to resist foreign rule from the United States, although the struggle has arguably existed since the Spanish attempts to colonize the region.¹⁷¹ The Philippine independence from the United States in 1946 did not stop the Moro desire for independence. The Moro people consider themselves distinctly different from the predominantly Catholic Philippines that were subjugated and converted by the Spanish. Prior to the arrival of the Spanish 1521, the Philippines did not exist as a single entity. It was a group of islands with a diverse ethnolinguistic and cultural makeup that was merged together by the Spanish and named after King Philip II of Spain. Prior to the colonization of the islands, the only relations between the islands were informal trade relations among the different small island kingdoms and tribes.

The Southern Philippine islands resisted Spanish colonization and were able to retain their Islamic religion and culture that arrived by earlier Arab traders by way of Indonesia. Although the Philippines was conquered by the Spanish, the Moro people never gave up their desire for independence as they continued to struggle throughout both the Spanish and American occupations. Gaining independence from the United States did not change the Moro people's desire for independence. They have continued to resist any

¹⁷⁰ Trager and Zagorcheva, 89.

¹⁷¹ "Fighting and Talking: A Mindanao Conflict Timeline," *GMA News*, 27 October 2011, accessed 7 February 2015, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/236761/news/specialreports/fighting-and-talking-a-mindanao-conflict-timeline>.

central authority over them including the post-colonial independent Philippine government.

Over time, political tensions and open hostilities have developed between the Government of the Philippines and Moro Muslim rebel groups.¹⁷² These rebel groups are an outgrowth of the Moro people's response to attempted government control and what they view as hostile actions against the Moro people. For example, in 1969, University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in response to the Jabidah massacre where between twenty-eight and sixty-four Filipino Muslims were claimed to have been executed.¹⁷³ Under the MNLF, he also sought to create the Bangsamoro nation.¹⁷⁴ In 1969, the MNLF began an armed campaign to build a separate Islamic state in the southern Philippines.¹⁷⁵ The fight between the MNLF and the Government of the Philippines was an ongoing issue from the inception of the group until the mid-1970s. During one of the fiercest battles of the insurgency in

¹⁷² The Center for Strategy, Enterprise and Intelligence, *The CenSEI Report 2*, no. 13 (2-8 April 2012), accessed 26 January 2014, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/89147694/The-CenSEI-Report-Vol-2-No-13-April-2-8-2012#page=3>.

¹⁷³ Paul F. Whitman, "The Corregidor Massacre–1968," The Heritage Battalion, accessed 9 February 2015, http://corregidor.org/heritage_battalion/jabidah.html.

¹⁷⁴ "Fighting and Talking: A Mindanao Conflict Timeline."

¹⁷⁵ Agence France-Presse, "CHRONOLOGY[Muslim History in Southern Philippines]," *InterAksyon*, 27 March 2014, accessed 9 February 2015, <http://www.interaksyon.com/article/83640/chronology--muslim-history-in-southern-philippines>.

1974, Jolo Island was burned to the ground resulting in tens of thousands of refugees and an unknown number of casualties.¹⁷⁶

After years of intense fighting between the MNLF and the Government of the Philippines, the Organization of the Islamic Conference interceded to broker a peace agreement.¹⁷⁷ In 1976, Libyan politician Moammar Gadhafi brokered the negotiation between the Philippine government and MNLF Leader Nur Misuari. The outcome of the negotiation was the signing of the MNLF-GRPH Tripoli Agreement of 1976.¹⁷⁸ The 1976 Tripoli Agreement essentially made MNLF and the Philippine government meet in a compromise agreement to establish an Autonomous Region in the Bangsamoro Land.

For some Muslims in the Southern Philippines this agreement and the idea of autonomy meant a concession to the Philippine government. They believed that under this agreement, the recognition of the Republic of the Philippines subordinates Muslim self-rule to the authority of the national government. For the hardline separatists, the Tripoli Agreement was an example of the failings of autonomy, as it was perceived to neutralize, rather than augment, Muslim self-rule.¹⁷⁹ Because of this brokered agreement

¹⁷⁶ American Embassy Manila to Secretary of State Washington DC, Subject: Jolo City Destroyed in Muslim Rebel Attack, Cable, Wikileaks, 13 February 1974, accessed 21 April 2015, <https://file.wikileaks.org/oc/2474.2/15327.pdf>.

¹⁷⁷ Jacques Bertrand, "Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile," *Pacific Affairs* 73, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 38.

¹⁷⁸ Conciliation Resources, "GRPH-MNLF and GRP-MILF Peace Agreements and Enabling Legislation," accessed 25 April 2015, http://www.c-r.org/sites/default/files/accord%2006_6%20GRP-MNLF%20and%20GRP-MILF%20peace%20agreements_1999_ENG.pdf.

¹⁷⁹ Bertrand, 38.

between the MNLF and the Philippine government, in 1976, the MNLF suffered from internal factionalism due to disagreements between moderates and hardline separatist.

However, the success in dealing with the MNLF did not resolve the overarching conflict of separatists' actions in the southern Philippines. This initial peace agreement resulted in internal fracturing within the MNLF between the moderates and hardliners and led to the creation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). It began in 1977, when Hashim Salamat challenged Nur Misuari for leadership of the MNLF. Although he was unsuccessful in his bid for leadership, several thousand fighters remained loyal to him and broke away to form the new MNLF. This was the more hardline element of the MNLF that did not agree with the terms of the agreement. During their early years, they were forced to move their operations overseas. The MILF finds its support mainly among the Maguindanao and Maranao people. The MILF ideology espouses Islam as its central motivation whereas the MNLF emphasizes the struggle of the Moro "nation" ("bangsa").¹⁸⁰ In 1984, this group renamed itself MILF and sought to establish an Islamic state in the southern Philippines.

This splinter group formed because of a power split, but also partly due to the compromise the MNLF made with the government. The hardliners within the MNLF refused to go along with the government peace agreement. The MILF claimed that they separated from MNLF for two reasons: (1) the MILF believe that the Bangsamoro Land should be an Independent Islamic State; and (2) the Bangsamoro freedom fighters should not negotiate with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. This split made

¹⁸⁰ Bertrand, 50.

negotiations and peace agreements difficult, as there was no longer a single entity for the Philippine government to deal with.

While there was an initial agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF demonstrated a willingness to cooperate, there were several upheavals within the central government that threatened the agreement. As a result, the agreement was violated by both sides at various times that led to further hostility. After additional rounds of negotiations, in January 1987, the MNLF accepted the Philippine government's offer of semi-autonomy of the regions in dispute.¹⁸¹ This ultimately led to the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The MILF, however, refused to accept this offer, further complicating the peace process and continued their insurgency operations.¹⁸²

After a series of violations by both the MNLF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines as well as complications associated with the MILF's refusal to support the peace agreement, in 1996 the government and the MNLF signed a peace agreement that promised greater autonomy for Muslim regions, which is still in place today. This peace agreement marked an important beginning to resolving the longstanding conflict in Muslim Mindanao.¹⁸³ While this conflict between state and non-state actor has not been bloodless or easy, it demonstrates the possibility of resolving conflicts as well as

¹⁸¹ John Carlo Gil M. Sadian, "The Long Struggle to Silence the Guns of Rebellion," *The CenSEI Report* 2, no. 13 (2-8 April 2012): 5-11, accessed 27 April 2015, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/89147694/The-CenSEI-Report-Vol-2-No-13-April-2-8-2012#page=3>.

¹⁸² Trager and Zagorcheva, 113.

¹⁸³ Bertrand, 52.

detering future conflict. While not all of the MNLF's goals have been achieved, they have received recognition, a status within the recognized state system, more autonomy, as well as economic aid. According to Trager and Zagorcheva, the concessions granted by the government can now be held at risk for noncompliance or future aggression.¹⁸⁴ Since the peace agreement in 1996, there have been flare-ups on both sides, but the conflict has been manageable.

However, the MILF continued their struggle for complete independence. During the 1990s, the MILF launched a series of attacks throughout the southern Philippines, resulting in reprisals from the army.¹⁸⁵ In March 2000, President Joseph Estrada ordered all-out military action against the MILF that culminated in July when government forces overran the group's main base, Camp Abubakar that had a significant impact on their ability to conduct operations.¹⁸⁶ The reprisals have forced the MILF to adapt their techniques in their struggle against the Philippine government. In an attempt to achieve some of the ends, the MILF have been accused of terrorist activities as well as having had links to other global terrorist networks. The MILF reportedly had links to Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, which are part of the larger global terror network. Their potential relationship with the larger terror network makes them a strategic problem for the United States. This is true not only because of the importance of the Philippines, but also because this group could provide weapons, safe haven, financing, fighters, and other critical requirements necessary to conduct global terrorist activities.

¹⁸⁴ Trager and Zagorcheva, 87-123.

¹⁸⁵ Chow, 306.

¹⁸⁶ Trager and Zagorcheva, 114.

However, Trager and Zagorcheva provide some important insight into dealing with groups like the MILF. They argue that while the MILF may share some ideological similarities, their local struggles are more important than the larger global jihad, which makes them ripe for deterrence through negotiation and concession.¹⁸⁷ For example, in a study of rebels in Cotabato, Thomas McKenna found that the rebels often mentioned an “enmity toward the martial law regime” of President Marcos and their need “to defend themselves and their families against the Philippine government.”¹⁸⁸ Occasionally, their actions were motivated by a desire “to protect Philippine Muslims and the Islamic faith against attack.”¹⁸⁹ Therefore, the global objectives of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah are not part of MILF’s core agenda.¹⁹⁰ In some instances, the MILF explicitly reject some of the actions carried out by these other groups. For example, in 2001 the MILF rejected the Taliban’s call for a jihad against the United States and its allies after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It specifically condemned the attacks, as well as the Abu Sayyaf Group and the other “terrorists” in the Southern Philippines.¹⁹¹ Accordingly, if the United States and the Philippines pursue appropriate policies in

¹⁸⁷ Trager and Zagorcheva, 115.

¹⁸⁸ Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 186.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Trager and Zagorcheva, 115.

¹⁹¹ Christina Mendez, “MILF Rejects ‘Holy War’ vs. US,” *Philippine Star*, 17 September 2001, quoted in Larry Nicksch, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress TL31265, *Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-terrorism Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 25 January 2002), 5.

dealing with groups like the MILF, these divergent goals may prevent them from future collaboration, which would be much more detrimental.

Much like the MNLF, the MILF have local goals that are much more important to them than the global Islamic ideological goals expressed by more extreme groups. The Philippine government has shown a willingness to accommodate some of their goals through ongoing negotiation. By accommodating some of these local goals and then holding them at risk like the Philippine government did with the MNLF, Trager and Zagorcheva argue that groups like the MILF can be deterred much like the MNLF. From the U.S. perspective, even if an ultimate resolution of the conflict cannot be reached, the threat of U.S. involvement could deter MILF cooperation with al-Qaida, Jemaah Islamiah, and the Abu Sayyaf Group,¹⁹² which are of greater importance to the United States. In dealing with these groups, the United States and the Philippines have developed a tailored approach to deterrence that has had some early success.

There is evidence to suggest that U.S. extended deterrence is having some impacts in the Philippines. For example in November 2002, because of negotiations between the U.S. and Philippine governments and the MILF, the latter promised to help local authorities arrest an estimated one hundred suspected al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiah operatives.¹⁹³ Washington has also considering providing aid to the MILF for

¹⁹² Trager and Zagorcheva, 116.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 117.

development in the province, contingent upon the conclusion of a successful peace agreement.¹⁹⁴

The U.S. operations and support to the Philippine Army in the southern Philippines has drawn criticism from some of the local MILF and Muslim leaders, however the United States personnel have been successful in winning the locals' hearts and minds. The American military remained popular among the Muslim communities of the southern Philippines, as they are seen by Muslims as a deterrent to abuse by Filipino troops. The United States Agency for International Development has also been successful in garnering support in Muslim areas for helping to alleviate "underlying socio-economic sources of conflict in Mindanao."¹⁹⁵

While episodic clashes continue between MILF, the AFP, and police forces, they claim that the peace agreement is still in place. The MILF claim that they are still committed to the peace process and as a result, other groups have broken away from the MILF. As the primary representative of the Bangsamoro people, the MILF have had violent encounters with other break away groups in order to maintain order and negotiations between the MILF and government representatives. While the process has been anything but perfect, and is still volatile, this case illustrates the potential of deterrence through balancing coercion and concessions even against non-state actors and

¹⁹⁴ "Envoy: US Aid to MILF Hinges on Peace Deal," *Manila Standard*, 17 January 2005.

¹⁹⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development, "USAID/Philippines Mindanao Programs Evaluation: Impacts on Conflict and Peace since 2000" (Washington, DC: Management Systems International and Coffey International Development, November 2008, redacted 18 February 2009), accessed 15 April 2015, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACM822.pdf, vii.

highly motivated groups that have engaged in terrorist activities. This case also demonstrates the importance of tailoring the coercive approach to the goals and situation of particular groups. This case also points out the need for countries like the United States that are operating in an unfamiliar area to develop an intimate understanding of local conflicts before becoming involved.¹⁹⁶ Making the assumption that all Islamic groups that have grievances against their governments are terrorists, risks galvanizing them toward more radical global movements that in the end make them much harder to deter.

Analysis of Case Study 4

The U.S.-Philippine case of extended-immediate deterrence provides some great insights into dealing with non-state actors. The idea that non-state actors cannot be deterred based on some of the arguments addressed above is incomplete based on the findings from this case study. While not a panacea for all types of non-state actors and not necessarily a textbook win, this case study highlights some areas where it may be possible to deter non-state actors from engaging in terrorist activities. The Philippines case study has some very specific variables that have to be considered, but from a U.S. policy and strategy perspective, it could be beneficial to consider a strategy that looks at a thorough analysis of non-state actors and analyzing their specific interests, grievances, and goals to see if there is any overlap where concessions can be made.

In some cases, these non-state actors may have legitimate claims that will not simply go away until they are adequately addressed. In the current operational environment, especially with the proliferation of communications technology, it will be

¹⁹⁶ Trager and Zagorcheva, 115.

increasingly difficult to silence these groups. The more legitimate their claim, the more difficult it will be to simply use force to deter their actions. Force in some cases will galvanize not only the group seeking concessions but also unrelated sympathizers. In some cases, non-state actors that are not violent may become violent if their needs cannot be addressed by other means. They may also look across borders for groups with remotely similar interests for support. By denying these grievances, the determination as well as the support network may grow. Groups that are already predisposed to violence will be even more willing to accept these less violent groups, thereby nudging them toward a more violent path to achieve their ends. As the support network grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to deter their actions, which inevitably raises the costs and risk of deterrence.

Many of these groups have what could be considered overlapping goals that can be accommodated without heavy costs. For example, the MILF and MNLF did not want to live in constant conflict as it would continue to undermine their ability to provide for and protect the people of the Southern Philippines, thereby eroding their support structure. Likewise, the Philippine government does not want to continue to have an ongoing conflict that is draining much needed resources. The Philippine government also does not want other groups to make similar attempts for secession. The Philippine government also needs stability in the region in order to prevent the further drain in resources as well as reduce the political instability that arises in the midst of hostilities. For the United States, the primary interests are centered on maintaining stability in the region and deterring and defeating terrorism. This requires that the Philippines remain a stable and reliable partner both in supporting regional stability and countering terrorism.

This means that all parties: the United States, the Philippine government, and the non-state actors all have something to lose if things go wrong. What is important is working to find a solution that is adequate to address all party's needs without forcing one side to give up too much. By forcing one side to give up too much, that group be it the Philippine government or the non-state actors, may cause immediate hostilities, or cause them to lose the support of its constituents resulting in the creation of additional groups competing for power.

What has been important is to find a middle ground where accommodation from both sides can occur. The Philippine government has offered up concessions like limited autonomy and aid. Although these offers do not give these groups entirely what they want, the MNLF and MILF have decided at times to accept these offers as they provide the best means to achieve at least some of their aims. Through this type of negotiation both sides can walk away with a win rather than maintaining a zero-sum adversarial relationship that will inevitably undermined both sides.

By supporting some of the MILF's desires of autonomy, the Philippine government can demonstrate good will, help reduce tensions, provide greater stability, and reduce the significant drain on resources. For the MILF, the acceptance of limited autonomy instead of an independent state will allow them to focus on development projects that are much needed in the southern Philippines rather than engaging in conflict against the central government. The Philippine government has also offered economic aid packages as concessions as well to promote the peace process that will also assist in building local support for the leaders of the MILF. Working on a peaceful resolution and refusing to cooperate with the other Islamic terrorist groups also provides the MILF with

some guarantees that they will not become targets of U.S. military operations. For the United States, this compromise can also be beneficial. While this conflict may flare up at times, keeping it isolated to a local dispute and not allowing the conflict to become part of the larger Islamic terrorist operations, denies additional support and safe havens for global terrorists. The United States can continue to balance the use of carrots and sticks with groups like the MILF that when done successfully can isolate these groups and support the overall campaign against terror. In essence, this is a much more tailored approach to deterrence that uses certain concessions that can be held at risk supported by coercion for non-compliance, all of which limits the negative perception of deterrence when compared to traditional means.

This case provides an example where deterrence is taking a different form. The Philippine government attempted to use violence to defeat and otherwise deter violent secessionist movements in the Southern Philippines and was met with varying degrees of success. They also attempted negotiations, which have been met with varying degrees of success over the past four decades. With the backing of the United States and its extended-immediate deterrence posture, the Philippines is much better positioned to deter these groups, but not necessarily using traditional deterrence methods. By working alongside the United States, using a tailored approach, deterring non-state actors from engaging in violent acts against the Philippine government appears to be a general success. Importantly for the United States, there has been the success in deterring at least the MNLF and MILF from working with other global terrorist organizations that would further complicate the war on terror and run contrary to U.S. interests.

Implications for Deterrence Theory: Findings from Case Study 4

The U.S.-Philippine extended-immediate case study provides some very important lessons for deterrence theory and the way that strategy is developed to deal with non-state actors. The issue of non-state actors is not going to go away, so it is important to understand the dynamics associated with non-state actors, especially violent non-state actors. With the improvements in transportation, communications, exchange of ideas, and other elements that support the growth of networks, non-state actors are going to increase and their ability to influence the world will increase. It is safe to assume that the genie is not going back in the bottle. What has to happen now is to gain an understanding of how to deal with these groups appropriately. Many of the traditional notions of deterrence may not work, but some of the underlying tenants may still be valid. What is certain is that a one-size fits all approach is not going to work. The Philippines case study demonstrates that a tailored approach is the only way that deterrence will work in the future.

This case demonstrates that non-state actors are in reality rational actors. In the past, some people have concluded that non-state actors such as terrorist groups are incapable of being deterred because they are not rational actors. While it may be true that some members are so committed to the cause that they are willing to conduct suicide bombings,¹⁹⁷ which many people would consider irrational, the groups as a whole must survive in order for its cause to continue. Groups like the MNLF and MILF (and Al Qaeda for that matter) may conduct attacks that appear to be irrational, and have some

¹⁹⁷ Edith Regalado, "MILF Suicide Bomber Tagged," *The Philippine Star*, 7 March 2003, accessed 11 February 2015, <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/197933/milf-suicide-bomber-tagged>.

members that are very committed, their ultimate goal is to survive and gain autonomy (or in Al Qaeda's case some other lofty goal). While gaining autonomy is a high priority goal, survival must remain the top priority or the goal of autonomy is pointless. Because survival is the highest priority, there is the possibility of using some rational actor assumptions when developing deterrence strategies for dealing with these groups. In addition, not all members of these groups are fully committed to the cause, which makes deterring them much easier. Members that function as go-betweens, financiers, money launderers, etcetera, may have immediate needs that are much more important than the cause of the group. This means that changing the status of their support and petty crime to a much higher criminal offense may make working with these groups less attractive. For example, a money launderer may be willing to risk minor criminal prosecution for working with a low-level drug dealer due to the benefits associated with the transaction. However, if laundering money for a terrorist group will end up with a life sentence or worse, the benefits may be much less attractive and therefore deter the support necessary to conduct attacks. The same is true for other elements of the network that are called enablers. These enablers are the easiest elements of the network to target because they tend to be tied to a specific location and can be coerced easily that those elements of the group that operate in the shadows. The enablers are also critical requirements for these non-state actors, without these enablers, they will be unable to conduct their operations. Because these enablers and other support apparatus can be coerced, this demonstrates the applicability of the rational actor model. In addition, the desire of the non-state actors to survive in order to carry out their goals, they must at some level adhere to elements of the rational actor model.

In order to apply this model to non-state actors, the same considerations that Paul Huth identified above must be applied. These non-state actors must believe that the deterring state has the capability and the willingness to take action in order to deter their actions. This issue of credibility is especially important with non-state actors due to many non-state actors' belief in the ability to operate in the shadows with impunity. They must understand that the state has the ability to track them, dismantle their support network, and attack them wherever they exist. Without this guarantee, these non-state actors may make the calculation that they can continue to pursue their objectives unencumbered.

This case also offers insights into how aggressive policies galvanized support for some of these groups which actually makes deterrence much more difficult. The application of force and other aggressive policies can create powerful common interests, driving them to cooperate.¹⁹⁸ For example, when force was applied against the MILF, there were suspicions that the MILF reached out to other groups like Al Qaeda for support. If force is the only response in dealing with these types of groups, then they may be forced to cooperate out of necessity. While they may not share the same overall agenda, they may create support networks that complement one another. For example, one group may provide another group with a safe haven, sanctuary, funding, money laundering services, arms, transportation, fighters, or some other critical requirement. In addition, public support for the cause could also grow as has been seen in the Palestinian case. In short, the use of force to resolve these issues could galvanize global support that will make resolution and deterrence much more difficult in the future. As support for these groups grow, deterrence will become much more difficult as the concession

¹⁹⁸ Trager and Zagorcheva, 121.

necessary to end the conflict will be greater. Once a group has sufficient support, the group may increase its demands based on its relative power gained through the larger support network. When looking at deterrence theory and subsequent strategies that accompany it, it is important to use a holistic approach and not simply rely on the threat of force to achieve deterrence.

One of the more important takeaways from this case is the use of concessions to deter violence or aggression. While concessions may not always be the answer, in this case concessions have proven useful for dealing with some groups. Concessions become incredibly important when there are legitimate grievances on the line. This also highlights the importance of using a tailored approach when pursuing deterrence. Concessions provide important instruments for deterrence. This case also demonstrates that by first granting conditional concession and then holding them at risk, groups can be deterred from violent action. When a group has nothing to lose, they have more incentives to conduct actions incongruent with the deterring state's goal. For the United States, this case demonstrates that by working with its partners and holding agendas of local groups at risk, instead of relying solely on force or other forms of coercion, the United States and its allies can often more effectively achieve its ends. In this case, the United States is concerned with regional stability as well as preventing cooperation between groups and denying sanctuary to those against which force will have to be used. Groups like Al Qaeda will most likely continue to require force to counter their actions, but pursuing other options with groups that have local grievances can reduce the support network. A concessions-based approach can be much less resource intensive, and less likely to cause disagreements among U.S. allies, spread extremism, and drive terrorist groups together, it

is often likely to prove more effective than traditional methods that rely heavily on the stick.¹⁹⁹ While concessions may not always be the appropriate answer, this case demonstrates the importance of using a tailored approach to deterrence.

¹⁹⁹ Trager and Zagorcheva, 121.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

From this research project, it is clear that deterrence theory is a complex concept that has been evolving over the past seventy years. While some people discount deterrence theory due to the inability to deter aggression at all levels including the attacks of 11 September 2001 against the United States, findings from this research project suggests that deterrence theory is still relevant. While it is true that aggression has occurred even against the world's most powerful country (the United States) by both state and non-state actors, and aggression has occurred between nuclear powers, there are signs that deterrence at some level is working which has generally prevented large-scale conflict and major international instability.

The purpose of this project was to examine some of the perceived discrepancies in deterrence theory in light of the existence of perpetual low-scale conflict combined with the inability of the United States to completely prevent and deter aggression from both state and non-state actors since the beginning of the Cold War and more recently on 11 September 2001. These events created a demand to reevaluate the theories of deterrence that form the foundation of the U.S. strategy of deterrence. The goal of this research project was essentially to assess the viability and relevancy of the current deterrence-based security approach for achieving U.S. national security objectives in the current and future strategic environments. Ultimately, the objective of this research paper has been to develop new insights into which approaches are appropriate for achieving U.S. national

security objectives in the current and future strategic environments and propose recommendations for changes to address emerging issues.

The findings demonstrate that deterrence theory is very much relevant for both the current and future operating environment with some modifications. Like most theories and concepts, deterrence theories must be updated to remain relevant as factors change. The findings explain that the rational actor model, which is one of the fundamental principles of deterrence theory, is still relevant. While the rational actor model has its limitations, most of those limitations are based on being able to understand each actor's own perspective of rationality. Looking at these case studies, it is inconceivable that any actor would act in a way that is not rational and would lead to their own end. The problem lies in the inability to know what rationality means for each actor in the current and future operational environment and how far they are willing to go to challenge the status quo. Working within the rational actor framework will require a lot of analysis to develop a better understanding of how the actor rationalizes their action. Just because it is a very complex process does not mean that the rational actor model is not valid.

The findings also demonstrate that tenets of realist assumptions may not always be adequate to deter aggression. Simply building and maintaining a powerful military force does not mean that some actors will not make calculated decisions to challenge the status quo. Likewise, the possession of nuclear weapons, even by both belligerent actors does not guarantee that one side will not take aggressive actions against the other. Some actors will still make rational calculations of how far they can challenge the status quo even when faced with significant military capability gaps and even in the face of nuclear weapons. While these actions are not supported by deterrence theory in general, these

challenges occur because some of the elements necessary to deter may not be present, like perceived willingness to respond. It is important to understand why these actors are willing to make these challenges and to what level they will escalate. It is also important to send clear signals, ambiguity creates misunderstanding and can cause deterrence to fail and ultimately lead to war.

While the presence of nuclear weapons did not prevent conflict between India and Pakistan, the findings also reinforce the importance of nuclear weapons for smaller military powers and potentially for non-state actors. The possession of these weapons allow both state and non-state actors the latitude to challenge the status quo. Actors like Pakistan and North Korea are capable of conducting acts of aggression that other actors have to respond to carefully because both states possess nuclear capability. A miscalculation by any actor involved could lead to an escalation and use of nuclear weapons. These cases demonstrate why some non-state actors desire nuclear capability. If non-state actors possessed these capabilities, they would have significantly more power without the need for a large force. This case also demonstrates the fact that possession of nuclear weapons gives the advantage to the aggressor. The actor that possess nuclear weapons can take provocative actions, seize territory, conduct an attack, etcetera, but the retaliation against those acts has to be calculated and is often restrained due to the threat of nuclear weapons.

One of the more important findings is that deterrence must be tailored specifically for each situation. The Philippines case demonstrates that military force or the threat of force to deter is not appropriate. This case demonstrates how the use of force or threats can actually make the situation worse and actually make deterrence more difficult in the

future. Developing a better understanding of the situation can lead to alternatives that actually work much better than the threat of force. In some cases, concessions can be applied and then held at risk, which leads to deterrence. This case also demonstrates the negative effect that the threat or use of force can have by galvanizing groups without loosely aligned interests to achieve effects against a common enemy. The findings from this case also prove that non-state actors can be deterred. This is very important given the rise of non-state actors and their ability to carry out attacks globally.

While deterrence theory is not complete, it does provide some insights into the actions that states and in some cases, non-state actors will take. While deterrence theory may not be complete and will need continual refinement as the world evolves, it is important not to discard the tenets, which help predict behaviors. The old German proverb “don’t throw the baby out with the bath water” is very applicable to deterrence theory.²⁰⁰ It is important to focus on the strengths of the theory, identify the weaknesses, and continue to make refinements. The case studies above have addressed some of the strengths and weaknesses, but further study is needed to build on the current literature to address the gaps in deterrence, especially regarding non-state actors.

Recommendations

As mentioned above, further study and analysis needs to be conducted to refine the existing deterrence theory to bring it in line with the current operational environment. Moving forward, the current and future operational environments are becoming increasingly complex. Much of the conflict today and for the near future will consist of

²⁰⁰ German proverb, *das Kind mit dem Bade ausschütten*. The earliest record of this phrase is in 1512, in *Narrenbeschwörung (Appeal to Fools)* by Thomas Murner.

limited wars between state actors and increasingly non-state actors challenging states for power. An analysis of all of the findings demonstrates the importance of developing a tailored approach to deterrence for the future. What is important for the future is to work on developing a solid strategy using some of the tenets of deterrence theory for deterring both state and non-state actors. The following is a starting point that outlines a strategy for dealing with non-state actors that are operating today and will continue to threaten international stability in the future.

One of the most effective methods for deterring violent non-state actors is employing deterrence by isolation strategy. One of the most significant problems with the way that the United States approaches dealing with violent non-state actors is categorization. Because the American public has a short attention span and has grown tired of war, it has become common for the media, politicians, and security analysts to link these groups to what the American people are familiar with and fear most. For many Americans, 11 September was the closest they have come to experiencing war at all and especially on the homeland. Therefore, 11 September serves as a convenient psychological anchor from which the American public can draw their references. The group that is responsible for and therefore associated with 11 September is Al Qaeda. For the American public, Al Qaeda has become the psychological anchor for interpreting violent non-state actors.

While it is important to garner and maintain the support of the American public when conducting operations, it must not come at the detriment of operations. The problem with this anchoring is that it leads to wrongly identifying and characterizing certain groups. One common mistake that is detrimental to deterring and defeating

violent non-state actors, is linking groups together that have little or no affiliation for the sake of garnering public support. This is especially the case with Al Qaeda. The media, politicians, and security analysts are quick to affiliate violent non-state actors that are Muslim with Al Qaeda. This sometimes makes otherwise insignificant groups sensational in the eyes of the public. The problem with doing this is that it can inadvertently create stronger ties between these groups that previously did not exist simply because they are all considered enemies of America. What this does is help expand their network, which can provide critical requirements like sanctuary, training, weapons, money, recruits, etc. all of which make groups on both ends more difficult to deter and defeat.

What should be done instead is to work to isolate these groups from one another by developing a clear picture of the underlying causes of the smaller group's grievances. In many cases, a group that has been labeled an Al Qaeda affiliate may not have the same goals as Al Qaeda. In many cases, grievances are based on local issues that have little or no relevance to groups like Al Qaeda. By isolating these smaller groups from Al Qaeda, the smaller groups will be denied the support necessary to become a larger threat; likewise isolating Al Qaeda will deny their external sources of support, which are necessary for them to continue operations. Isolating violent non-state actors is not a simple task and will require the use of all instruments of national power, but it is one of the necessary steps to deterring violent non-state actors.

Another effective method for deterring violent non-state actors is employing deterrence by concession strategy. Identifying the specific grievance that the non-state actor is attempting to achieve will provide insight into how to deter their violent actions. Using the diplomatic instrument of national power, the United States should work with

foreign leaders to address the possible legitimate grievances of some non-state actors.²⁰¹ In many cases, violence is an outgrowth of a perceived (whether legitimate or not) grievance against the existing authority. In cases where these grievances are legitimate, the United States could help broker a deal between the various parties. In cases where the grievance is legitimate and the foreign power is reluctant to make adjustments, the United States can use other forms of influences like aid as an incentive to persuade the country to act. By providing concessions for legitimate grievances as well as negotiating less legitimate grievances, the country will have something that the non-state actor values that they can hold at risk. The concessions can always be taken away if the non-state actor takes up violence against the state. One of the benefits of concessions is that it can reduce internal instability that in many cases costs more than the concessions. Another benefit is that it denies a support network for the larger more hardline violent non-state actors.

Another effective method for deterring violent non-state actors is employing deterrence by dissuasion strategy. In order to be effective at dissuasion, the United States must work at denying violent non-state actors with new recruits. Developing information campaigns specifically targeted at those most likely to join violent non-state actors can help dissuade new recruits from joining.²⁰² In addition, the United States should actively

²⁰¹ Assaf Moghadam, *The Roots of Terrorism* (New York: Chelsea House, 2006), 45-65.

²⁰² Max Manwaring, "A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil" (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2007), accessed 15 February 2015, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB837.pdf>, 87-88.

support groups that challenge ideologies propagated by violent non-state actors.²⁰³ The United States could also sponsor alternative organizations that provide an outlet for disaffected individuals to express their concerns, turn to for support, and find alternatives to violence.²⁰⁴ The United States should also work to improve its image around the world much like it did successfully during the Cold War.²⁰⁵ The president and the secretary of state could also take a more active role in discouraging allies—those with large populations of discontented citizens—from using state-controlled media to blame the United States for all their domestic problems which is a significant problem in the Middle East.²⁰⁶ This method of deterrence will undoubtedly require the most amount of time, it will be very difficult to measure the success, but it is also the least invasive and arguably the cheapest method. In any case, it is necessary to employ dissuasion in order to support the other deterrence methods.

Another effective method for deterring violent non-state actors is employing deterrence by denial strategy. Deterrence by denial requires hardening soft target and making attacks against the United States incredibly difficult. Deterrence by denial requires hardening targets in the hope of making an attack on them too costly to be tried

²⁰³ Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2006), 83.

²⁰⁴ Adam Lowther, “Deterring Nonstate Actors,” in *Thinking About Deterrence: Enduring Questions in a Time of Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism*, ed. Adam Lowther (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Research Institute, Air University Press, 2013), 208

²⁰⁵ James Forest, ed., *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 394.

²⁰⁶ Nancy Snow, *Information War* (Toronto: Hushion House, 2003), 130-132.

and convincing violent non-state actors and individual members of the state's determination.²⁰⁷ This includes a range of actions like effective security measures at airports, border crossings, seaports, a strong military force, etcetera, which are an active defense that may deter some seeking to carry out terrorist attacks due to the difficulty.²⁰⁸ As the probability of a successful attack decreases, the probability of successful deterrence increases. For terrorists, a failed attack is worse than no attack at all. On the other end of the spectrum, a successful attack increases the likelihood of other attacks. If the probability of success increases, violent non-state actors will have greater motivations to attempt attacks. In some cases, a passive defense may be sufficient to convince an attacker that success is unlikely. Another element of denial is developing effective intelligence gathering, policing, and forensic investigation that make conducting attacks anonymously difficult. If members within a group realize that there is a high probability of being caught due to a lack of anonymity, they may be deterred from acting. Using information campaigns to explain the difficulties in conducting attacks and success in prevention could also help amplify the denial strategy. Deterrence by denial is a very expensive strategy as demonstrated by the post-9/11 security upgrades, but it is one that is necessary to deter violent non-state actors from carrying out successful attacks.

Another effective method for deterring violent non-state actors is employing deterrence by threat strategy. Deterrence by threat also falls on a spectrum ranging for violent targeted strikes to targeting bank accounts that support the network. Deterrence

²⁰⁷ Trager and Zagorcheva, 91.

²⁰⁸ James Lebovic, *Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 147-176.

by threat aims at targeting the things that the group as well as individual group members value. In order for this to work, the United States must be able to hold something the adversary values at risk; the adversary must value what is held at risk over the expected value of taking action; and both the threat of retaliation and the promise not to take action if its conditions are met must be credible.²⁰⁹ Threats can work very effectively against peripheral members of the groups, especially those that are not as committed to the cause. These members typically provide financing and other forms of support either because they are being coerced, or because they have sympathetic leanings toward the group. In many cases, these members value their lives and wellbeing more than the ultimate ends being pursued by the violent non-state actors. If the realization that anonymity is not guaranteed, the threat is severe enough, and the credibility of the threat is valid, these members are likely to be deterred from providing support to violent non-state actors. For the threat to be effective, it must pose greater costs on the target than the reward for altering the status quo.²¹⁰ Credibility is the key if deterrence by threat is to work.²¹¹

While non-state actors will continue to challenge the status quo in pursuit of their desired ends, there are ways of deterring their use of violent action. By synchronizing all elements of national power and employing a strategy of deterrence by isolation, deterrence by concession, deterrence by dissuasion, deterrence by denial, and deterrence by threat, violent non-state actors can be successfully deterred.

²⁰⁹ Trager and Zagorcheva, 91.

²¹⁰ Lowther, 199.

²¹¹ Kahn, 26-35.

In answering the research question for this project, a secondary question was also posed looking specifically at how USSOCOM could facilitate a new Prevention Approach. While deterrence requires a whole of government approach, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are uniquely positioned during Phase Zero to facilitate deterrence activities. Due to their cultural expertise and forward positioning, SOF working with partner forces can develop a richer understanding of the operational environment, contentious issues on the ground, and local grievances in order to help prevent these issues from escalating to the point that force is needed. While SOF may not have all of the resources to solve the problem, they can develop the operational problem using their understanding of the culture, history, and other factors and work with interagency partners to develop a whole of government approach to solving the underlying problems, which can lead to prevention. This underscores the importance of developing a tailored approach to deterrence and prevention.

A Prevention Approach would begin by identifying the issues of contention on the ground to see if there is a possibility of peaceful settlement. Sometimes peaceful settlement is difficult between local groups due to the historical and cultural baggage that they bring to the situation. This is where the third-party SOF personnel can look at the situation from an external perspective and provide assistance in preventing disagreements from escalating to violent action or help reduce already violent actions. While SOF personnel may not have the authority to negotiate on behalf of the U.S. government, they can play a vital role in identifying legitimate grievances that may need to be addressed by other elements of the U.S. government. The role that SOF plays is very important because they operate on the ground in these areas and have a much deeper understanding

of the situation and can help develop a much richer operational picture of the situation than locals who cannot see past their own biases, and U.S. government officials that are far removed from the operational environment. Allowing either personal biases or arbitrary decisions to drive U.S. policy is a recipe for disaster and can elevate small-scale local grievances to large-scale global challenges.

SOF personnel can also build partner capacity to support the deterrence by denial approaches discussed above. By building the capacity of partner forces, U.S. SOF can enable other nations to deny violent non-state actors access and the ability to conduct large-scale attacks. This extended form of deterrence by denial, helps prevent the spread of violent non-state actors' capability to conduct attacks against the United States. Over time, the capability of U.S. partners can be developed to the point where violent non-state actors determine that it is better to concede or negotiate with the government than to fight the superior military forces. Ultimately, by denying these violent non-state actors the ability to conduct successful operations, they are denied from conducting future attacks.

SOF personnel can also operate by-with-and-through partner forces to build and shape narratives against violent non-state actors to support a denial by dissuasion approach as discussed above. These narratives should target the violent groups but also target people on the fringes of society that may be susceptible to persuasion by violent groups. These narratives should focus on the benefits of inclusion in a lawful society and the detriment of joining violent groups. The challenge with developing these narratives is that they must be in line with the actions on the ground. SOF personnel can easily identify the inconsistencies and work with the interagency and partner forces to resolve them.

SOF personnel are also uniquely positioned to understand the networks that develop to support non-state actors, which enable SOF to develop both lethal and non-lethal targets that will help prevent non-state actors from gaining power and resources necessary to conduct operations. Once again, SOF will not be able to do all of this independently as some interagency and partner nation coordination will be needed to track and stop financial transactions, prevent cross border movements, etcetera, but when SOF are on the ground in these conflict prone areas, they can help prevent situations from escalating and moving out of Phase Zero.

Deterrence is a very complex concept that requires continual refinement as the operational environment evolves. As weapons, communications, transportation, and other technological advances improve, so too must deterrence strategies. Looking at the world through a Cold War lens of deterrence limits the ability of the United States to achieve its enduring interests of maintaining international order and will not lead to a better Prevention Approach. What is needed instead is a tailored approach to each situation that looks at problem sets using the whole of government approach and is not focused solely on the military instrument of national power and threats of force. SOF personnel have a robust capability and are uniquely positioned during Phase Zero to identify problems and work with both interagency and partner nation forces to assist with prevention strategies. Moving forward, SOF may provide the best military option to a Prevention Approach due to their small footprint, cultural expertise, minimal cost, and unique capabilities. SOF personnel working in close coordination with interagency and partner nation forces can help maintain steady-state operations and prevent the need to move out of Phase Zero.

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