



Carnegie Mellon
Software Engineering Institute

CERT
Situational
Awareness

Analysis of the US-CERT DAC

Josh McNutt <jmcnutt@cert.org>

FloCon: Netflow Analysis Workshop

July 21, 2004

CERT® Network Situational Awareness Group
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

*The CERT Network Situational Awareness Group
is part of the Software Engineering Institute.
The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by
the U.S. Department of Defense.*

© 2004 by Carnegie Mellon University



Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 21 JUL 2004	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2004 to 00-00-2004			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Analysis of the US-CERT DAC		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES presented at FloCon 2004, Crystal City, VA, July 2004.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	Same as Report (SAR)	12	



Outline

- Data
- Graphical Displays
- Detecting Trends
- Anomaly Detection
- Roadmap



Data

- **Snort**
 - Signature-based alerts
 - Pre-processor alerts
- **Origin**
 - Multiple networks of varying size
- **Volume**
 - ~30-50 million alerts per month
- **Ancillary Information**
 - Country code
 - Netblock




IDS Data: challenges

- No new attacks
 - Only matches known signatures
- Lack of context
 - Don't know what we are not seeing
- Non-standardized signature rule sets
 - No administrative control
- Missing Data
 - Uncertainty: Sensor failure vs. no intrusion attempts



TCP Destination Port Changes


Comparison of port activity across organizations shows monthly trends.





Share of New Source IP Addresses

Share of new daily source IP addresses stays fairly consistent.






Signature Class Transition

Transition probabilities highlight sequential patterns in data.


- **Current State**
 - Source IP records alert on Destination IP
- **Transition probability**
 - Percent chance for next class of alert recorded
- **Most source/dest combos involve only one signature class**
- **Small transition probability for**
 - Privilege Escalation





Daily Transition Probabilities



Transition probabilities can be monitored over time to identify consistent sequences.





Trend Detection


- Current month vs. previous month
 - Across organizations
 - % changes
- Time Series
 - Fit trend line
 - Arbitrary time period
 - Seasonal Components
 - Regression with ARMA errors





Anomaly Detection


- Goal: Identify data points which deviate from overall pattern of data
- Our current implementation (Figure of Merit)
 - Evaluate hours
 - Record # alerts, # source IP addresses, # destination IP addresses, # signatures
- For each hour, we want measure of how deviant it was.





Mahalanobis distance: 2D case

- Compute distance metric between each hour and the **average** hour
- When measuring **Euclidean** (**Mahalanobis**) Distance, all points along **circle** (**ellipse**) are same distance from the center
 - Points on larger circle/ellipse are greater distance from center
- Shape of the ellipse
 - Function of correlation between variables
- Generalizes to n dimensions (**Ellipsoid**)





Analysis Roadmap

- Incorporate flow data
- Automating trend detection
 - Time series analysis
- Clustering
 - Group sources by similar activity patterns
 - Temporal correlation
 - Targeting similarities
 - Signature usage
 - Look for evidence of possible coordination