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THESIS

**DOES THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSSESS
SOLUTIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ISSUES?**

by

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December 2015

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
ISSUES?**

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ABSTRACT

Personnel and management problems are hindering the Department of Homeland Security in its ability to accomplish its mission. Leadership weaknesses, insufficient education and training for employees, and retention problems divide the workforce across many agencies and threaten to undermine the Department's ability to carry out its objective of protecting the United States.

Department of Defense (DOD) practices, however, can serve as a model for change. The DOD has demonstrated a finely tuned system of addressing personnel and management concerns, as developed through the creation of the all-volunteer force and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which restructured the military chain of command. This research explores how the DOD might offer solutions to DHS through lessons learned from 1973 through the early 1990s—some 20 years of hard-earned experience dealing with issues that are very similar to what the DHS is facing in its infancy.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CINC	Commanders in Chief
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DPG	Defense Planning Guide
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO	Governmental Accountability Office
GS	General Schedule
HSC	Homeland Security Council
INSP	Interagency National Security Professional
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NSPD	National Security Professional Directive
OHS	Office of Homeland Security
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SFLEO	Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officer
TPO	Transportation Planning Office

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created to protect the United States from the borders inward by consolidating the “confusing patchwork of government activities.”¹ Therefore, any serious organizational or operational difficulties that DHS might face could severely affect U.S. security. In fact, persistent challenges regarding employee morale, leadership and management, education and training, and retention have plagued DHS, and the agency continues to struggle to resolve these issues. In light of what is at stake—the security of the United States—DHS leaders can look to other U.S. agencies, specifically to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), for alternative models and practices.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The U.S. armed forces did not start out with its personnel management and development policies and practices as currently seen. A series of challenges and developments—the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986—necessitated the refinements that characterize the present system. How can the DOD’s example help DHS solve its personnel and management problems through lessons learned from the all-volunteer force and Goldwater-Nichols Act?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis examines the DOD as a potential source of solutions to issues within DHS. In particular, the thesis will analyze the growing pains of DHS since its inception in 2003, which have fueled specific problems of leadership and management failures along with career development concerns regarding promotions and retention, and education, training, and advancement. These entrenched problems have resulted in DHS posting the lowest employee satisfaction ratings among all federal agencies.² Such

¹ Department of Homeland Security, *Proposal to Create the Department of Homeland Security*, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, June 2002), 1.

² Kendall Breitman, “Federal Worker Job Satisfaction Hits a Low,” *Politico*, December 09, 2014, <http://politico.com/story/2014/12/2014-federal-agency-rankings-job-satisfaction-low-113415.html>.

workforce unhappiness eventually translates into lower cooperation, communication, innovation, and overall effectiveness of the department.

The DOD, from 1973 through the early 1990s, worked to hone a system that focused on improving recruiting and retention, education and training, incentives for the service member and families, and overall unification of the total military force. Additionally, it has honed a system of building performance and leadership into the career trajectory of all its personnel. For example, it has formulated many developmental milestones for enlisted and officer personnel in each of its four branches. This career model, an aspect of what the armed forces calls “force development,” builds leadership and job-specific skills that foster the success of personnel throughout a career. Furthermore, the overall effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces should improve through each successive assignment because personnel advance in knowledge and expertise, which helps ensure a more capable and joint DOD.³ The DOD model can offer approaches that might be adapted to good effect in DHS.

The analysis of the all-volunteer force and the Goldwater-Nichols Act should prove beneficial to DHS and propose ways in which the DOD can assist DHS in improving its force development issues to better the workforce and improve some of the significant concerns troubling DHS in its mission of protecting the United States.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this literature review is to develop an understanding of the arguments with regard to the challenges DHS has faced since its inception. Then, it reviews and focuses on specific issues, including arguments for and against DHS’s ability to reform itself. It also focuses on whether DHS has been successful in its attempts to overcome a myriad of challenges seen through these issues that exacerbate the personnel management, education, and training, and morale issues. Next, management issues within

³ It is important to note that the DOD has not always had a career model such as the current system until the establishment of an all-volunteer force in 1973 and with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which increased the jointness of the DOD in 1986.

DHS are reviewed and analyzed to understand if DHS reform efforts have been successful.

1. Growing Pains in DHS

Before 9/11, the term “homeland security” did not exist in the United States.⁴ With the terrorist attacks of 2001, however, the agency emerged to coordinate efforts to protect the U.S. homeland against terrorism. Five years later, the second edition of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* focused on terrorist threats, but it added catastrophic events to include man-made and natural disasters.⁵ As of 2010, the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* lumped everything together, positing Homeland Security at an “intersection of evolving threats and hazards.”⁶ Still, DHS has struggled to define what homeland security means. As a result, according to Donald Kettl, it is difficult for DHS to understand the scope of its focus, which problems it could and should tackle, and which problems it should let other departments within the federal government handle.⁷

Linda Klitz and James Ramsay propose that defining homeland security requires a multi-lens approach. A method that could be used “is to adapt and blend applicable theories from a number of academic disciplines that have relevance to homeland security issues and challenges.”⁸ These blended theories provide respective lenses of viewing homeland security through the fields of political science, criminal justice, public administration, sociology, and other fields. The overlap of each field, from the respective

4 Jerome H. Kahan, “What’s in a Name? The Meaning of Homeland Security,” *Journal of Homeland Security Education* 2, (2013), ,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 9, no. 10 (July 2013): 3, <http://www.journalhse.org/v2jeromekahan.html>.

5 Department of Homeland Security, *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, October 2007), 9.

6 Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 2010), viii.

7 Donald F. Kettl, *System under Stress: The Challenge to 21st Century Governance*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2014), 69.

8 Linda Klitz and James D. Ramsay, “Perceptual Framing of Homeland Security,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 8, no. 16, (August 2012): 3, <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/230>.

lenses, provides potential answers to helping better define homeland security, which could benefit the Department of Homeland security's focus on its mission.⁹

Alongside the lack of clarity about what homeland security means is the amalgamation of organizations that has affected DHS's ability to conduct its mission properly. Homeland security as a mission, Donald Kettl explains, was not to replace old missions. Homeland security is a mission, which adds to the pre-existing missions of all the various agencies that would come under the umbrella of homeland security with DHS as the central authority.¹⁰ I.M. Destler and Ivo Daadler explain that the centralization of agencies for homeland security is not feasible, practical, or realistic.¹¹ The basic reason is the "centralization alone cannot be the main answer to this formidable challenge."¹² By default, homeland security is a decentralized process through the efforts of federal, state, and local governments working toward the end goal of protecting the United States.¹³

On top of the homeland security mission, Jerome Kahan argues the dual nature of the DHS mission affects its ability to protect the United States. DHS is responsible for ensuring that the non-homeland security tasks happen, while at the same time, DHS must ensure there is no degradation to the primary homeland security mission, except when Congress approves it.¹⁴

Christopher Bellavita points out that there is a gap between the national strategy and national strategy implementation.¹⁵ It would appear that this gap is an important, if not the most important, part of why DHS faced such significant struggles to organize itself for the mission of protecting the United States. If DHS cannot complete the mission

9 Klitz and Ramsay, "Perceptual Framing," 5.

10 Kettl, *System Under Stress*, 51.

11 Ivo H. Daadler and I.M. Destler, "Advisors, Czars, and Councils: Organizing for Homeland Security," *The National Interest* 68, (Summer 2002): 69, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/218399040?accountid=12702>.

12 Ibid., 66.

13 Ibid., 69.

14 Kahan, "What's in a Name?" 6.

15 Christopher Bellavita, "Changing Homeland Security: Ten Essential Homeland Security Books," *Homeland Security Affairs* 3, no. 1 (February 2013): 5, <https://hsaj.org/articles/149>.

it is tasked to perform—focusing on terrorism—the resulting actions, “congressional hearings, budgets, assessments, and documents” lead us to believe DHS has morphed into an organization focused on all potential hazards that face the United States.¹⁶

2. Whither DHS?

Opinions regarding DHS seem to fall into one of two camps in relation to the usefulness of the organization. The first camp maintains that DHS is a successful organization that needs only to look for ways to accomplish its mission better, and the American people must have faith that DHS will work. What is there to lose? September 11th happened under the previous plan to protect the United States and the federal government was not successful then, so maybe DHS will prove to have the answers to keep another attack from taking place.¹⁷

Rick Nelson and Rob Wise champion the opinion that DHS has succeeded and is not a waste of an executive agency within the federal government.¹⁸ “The Department has wrestled with a variety of significant challenges: coordinating across twenty-two agencies, balancing a myriad of congressional committee requirements, and ensuring security and maintaining the privacy of the public.”¹⁹ The naysayers point to these three areas as reasons DHS has been unsuccessful, but the proponents say there has not been an attack since DHS’s inception therefore DHS is a success.²⁰

The second camp embraces the argument that DHS must disband. To put it more bluntly, DHS has proven to be “an unnecessary and costly reorganization of government.

¹⁶ Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security,” 5.

¹⁷ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 158.

¹⁸ Rick Nelson and Rob Wise, “Homeland Security at a Crossroads: Evolving DHS to Meet the Next Generation of Threats,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 1, 2013, <http://csis.org/publication/homeland-security-crossroads-evolving-dhs-meet-next-generation-threats>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

DHS's structure complicates management, frustrates oversight, and encourages wasteful spending. DHS grant programs also distort state and local spending priorities.”²¹

Stephen Flynn argues that it is debatable “whether DHS was a philosophical mistake, there’s no question it has so far proven to be a bureaucratic failure” doomed from the start with lacking support from the Bush administration.²² Jeffrey Rosen concludes that DHS is hard to justify on the grounds of analysis of its costs and benefits. “DHS is one of the most expensive marketing ventures in political history,” and “the best argument for DHS is that the illusion of safety may itself provide tangible psychological and economic benefits.”²³

3. Management Problems in DHS

If DHS were an answer to the U.S. strategy to defend itself from terrorism, Stephen Flynn would argue that DHS and the national strategy are missing the right focus, and that DHS and the national strategy do not fit together properly.²⁴ He says, “The Department of Homeland Security is a confederation of twenty-two agencies that were hurriedly nailed, glued, and stitched together in the wake of 9/ 11.”²⁵ Flynn argues that DHS was an improperly focused attempt to fulfill the national strategy to provide security for the country and to reassure the citizens in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, that the federal government was being proactive to protect the United States. Management weakness is still an issue within DHS, and it poses a risk to “mission accomplishment and efficient and effective use of the department’s resources.”²⁶ One of

21 David Rittgers, “Abolish the Department of Homeland Security,” *Policy Analysis*, no. 683, (September, 2011): 21, <http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA683.pdf>.

22 Stephen E. Flynn, “Homeland Insecurity,” *The American Interest* 4, no. 5 (May 2009), <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/05/01/homeland-insecurity/>

23 Jeffrey Rosen, “Man-Made Disaster,” *New Republic* (December, 2008), <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/man-made-disaster>.

24 Flynn, “Homeland Insecurity.”

25 Joel Brenner, *America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 25.

26 Steven Bucci, Paul Rosenzweig, and David Inserra, *Reforming DHS: Missed Opportunity Calls for Congress to Intervene*,” (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, January 2015), 1, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/stopping-the-chaos-a-proposal-for-reorganization-of-congressional-oversight-of-dhs>.

the glaring issues of weak management is the findings that DHS suffers from low morale, particularly due to “lack of leadership, training, and performance-based rewards.”²⁷ DHS has faced criticism for its personnel management policies. Daniel Gerstein states that DHS is making reforms that are beneficial to the organization. He does argue personnel management needs improving, to fix the problems relating to organizational structure, identity and culture, morale, and job satisfaction levels of employees.²⁸ Gerstein argues the development of a Homeland Security personnel system and career maps would assist with developing capable DHS leader for the future through providing a broad and challenge career opportunities.²⁹

4. Organizational Structure and the Star Model

The present study analyzes DHS’s hierarchical organizational structure to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. In a hierarchy, theoretically, the manager at the top will possess control over all the agencies and departments and be able to effectively manage and lead the organization. The strengths of the hierarchical structure can be seen in a recent business article regarding a survey of employees. According to the article, those employees who understood hierarchical structures valued the clear cut lines of authority, managers of each level that are skilled to perform a specific job function, and a clear promotional path based on the structure because a hierarchy makes it is clear what the next step for advancement.³⁰

As with any organizational structure, there are also weaknesses. Cameron Anderson and Courtney Brown argue that success of the hierarchical structure varies based on a few factors: what must be accomplished, who is the boss at the top of the

27 Bucci, Rosenzweig, and Inserra, “Reforming DHS,” 2.

28 Assessing DHS’s Performance Watchdog Recommendations to Improve Homeland Security: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 3–5 (2015) (statement of Daniel Gerstein, The RAND Corporation).

29 Ibid., 5.

30 Christina DesMarais, “Your Employees Like Hierarchy (No, Really),” Inc.com, accessed October 28, 2015, <http://star.inc.com/christina-desmarais/your-employees-like-hierarchy-no-really.html>.

hierarchy, how power affects the boss, and whether the members of the organization feel able to be involved in the decisions and actions of the organization.³¹

Jay Galbraith and Edward Lawler point out some key reasons why organizations must be adaptive and willing to improve in today's complex operating environment. These reasons are directly related to issues that will be analyzed through the Star Model. Galbraith and Lawler note that "how organizations are structured, how people are paid, how performance is measured, how individuals are trained and developed: increasingly, these are proving to be areas in which successful innovation can lead to improved performance."³²

These very issues are important when exploring the organizational mentalities, and success and failures of DHS and DOD in order to work toward finding solutions for the personnel and management concerns. The Star Model provides the lens through which DHS and DOD can be compared and measured against one another.

The Star Model, by Galbraith, highlights five key design points that require interconnectedness for an organization to function well: strategy, structure, processes, rewards, and people. Galbraith argues that within the fast-paced world of the 21st century, structure is becoming less and less important, and as a result, "there is no one-size-fits-all organization design that all companies—regardless of their particular strategy needs—should subscribe to."³³ Structure is the drawing of the organizational lines and is important, but the focus on structure often becomes too much. Thus, process, rewards, and people are lost sight of within the organization, which significantly affects the performance of that organization. In today's organizations, the design policies of process,

31 Cameron Anderson and Courtney E. Brown, "The Functions and Dysfunctions of Hierarchy," University of California Berkeley, January 2010, 3, http://www.researchgate.net/publication/251530804_The_Functions_and_Dysfunctions_of_Hierarchy.

32 Jay R. Galbraith and Edward E. Lawler, III, "The Challenge of Change: Organizing for Competitive Advantage," in *Tomorrow's Organization: Crafting Winning Capabilities in a Dynamic World*, ed. Susan Albers Mohrman, Jay R. Galbraith, Edward E. Lawler, III, and Associates (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2008), 1.

33 Jay R. Galbraith, *Designing Organizations: An Executive Guide to Strategy, Structure, and Process* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 14.

rewards, and people must be effectively managed and interconnected with strategy and structure in order to ensure organizational success.³⁴

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

DHS is not a perfect organization. Through analyzing the problems and issues, it has become more and more clear that the agency does face significant hurdles and challenges to ensuring the effective protection of the country. DHS must improve and continue to better its operational and organizational capabilities thereby tackling the force development issues faced since 2003.

In some respects, DHS has made progress, but the strides are small, based on the importance of the overall mission and the wide reach of the organizations that make up DHS. Improvement will take time as DHS learns to operate more efficiently. DHS has become a jack-of-all-trades and a master of none, and prone to the mission creep that can so quickly engulf organizations with as many varying missions as DHS is responsible for. DHS has many organizations that are operating in a vertical fashion, but the organizations must improve their horizontal operations, interacting and sharing information between agencies.

The DOD framework takes a myriad of jobs and organizations and unites them under one framework to give a common sight picture and required end state for each organization to be able to move forward to accomplish its mission. It is significant that the DOD is similar to DHS in the realm of scale, operational requirements, personnel numbers, and overall leadership and management challenges. If the DOD can overcome hurdles and challenges, particularly from the 1970s forward, there is hope that DHS can continue to develop into an effective and worthwhile organization held as competent and capable across the board by the federal government and American people.

³⁴ Galbraith, *Designing Organizations*, 14.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis examines the pre-existing issues in which DHS has found itself struggling as the youngest and newest organization within the federal government. The foundation of these concerns stem from understanding how DHS was created, and the resulting conflicting mandates of mission responsibilities. The challenges faced by DHS since 2003 lead into analysis of the key issues of leadership and management of DHS and issues of morale, retention, training and equipment of organizations, which all come together to highlight severely lacking personnel management and leadership development programs within the Department. Inherent in the understanding of DHS's issues, it is critical to have a baseline understanding of its organizational model. Secondly, the Star Model allows the analysis to compare DHS against the two DOD case studies to highlight where DHS can take past performance of DOD and potentially utilize these lessons learned to improve in the areas where it is weak.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis begins with an overview of relevant historical issues, which lead to the personnel management issues of DHS. In particular, the history highlights the lacking focus toward these key issues, but it also highlights the challenges of taking care of a personnel issues in a massive bureaucracy such as DHS. Next, this thesis analyzes DHS through utilizing the Star Model to show where DHS has succeeded and where the organization has fallen short in order to see where improvements can be made. This thesis is not to highlight DHS as a failure; on the contrary, there are successful policies and programs within DHS. The issue is the critical flaws within the personnel programs and policies affecting the entirety of the DHS workforce that are worth being examined.

Finally, the DOD through the creation of the all-volunteer force and the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act will be used as the two case studies from which potential solutions can be provided to help DHS fix itself. The two case studies are good examples because they highlight how DOD dealt with similar issues, which affected the personnel management and leadership development programs of the military between the 1970s and early 1990s.

II. DHS'S CREATION AND RESULTING ISSUES

The second-most disastrous attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor startled the United States, its citizens, and the security enterprise in ways not seen since December 1941. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the defense and security of the United States emerged as a central responsibility of the federal government for which it was not adequately prepared.³⁵ The attacks of 9/11, and the management, execution, and organization of its security structure changed dramatically in the weeks and months to follow jolted the federal government. An understanding of the historical foundation of DHS provides insight into the rationale for how and why this new department came to serve as the answer to protecting the country after 9/11—even amid the challenges that complicated DHS's ability to perform this mission.

An understanding of the historical foundation of DHS provides insight into the rationale for how and why this new department would serve as the answer to protecting the country post 9/11. With a new organization coming into being, there would be resulting challenges to complicate DHS's ability to perform its mission. An understanding of the key challenges facing DHS from the beginning provides a better framework for how the personnel and management issues are still affecting the department years later. The haste with which DHS began to operate started the entire organization off on the wrong foot in regards to authority, budgeting, and personnel and management concerns.

The massive organizational complexity of DHS led to a bureaucracy that is difficult to manage and oversee. Third, the merger of so many distinct agencies created a lack in jointness and unified culture that must be required of DHS. These three areas will bring to light how and why the personnel and management issues came to be within the department.

³⁵ Christopher Bellavita, "Changing Homeland Security: In 2010, Was Homeland Security Useful?," *Homeland Security Affairs* 7, no. 1 (February 2011): 2, <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/52>.

A. A SUDDEN START

The smoke was settling and the recovery efforts still on going in both New York and Washington, D.C., and the federal government was on the hook to do something—anything—to protect the United States better. The prevailing fear was that additional attacks were imminent, and the country wanted assurances—and action. The solution became DHS.

The fundamental premise was that a singular department, ultimately responsible for the protection of the homeland, would keep information from slipping through the cracks. DHS would serve as the focal point to consolidate the “confusing patchwork of government activities” in order to maximize the abilities and effectiveness of the defense and intelligence agencies, as well as federal law enforcement and border protection.³⁶

It was clear, even before 9/11, that the security of the United States needed an overhaul, with its 40 agencies and 2,000 congressional committees mandating responsibilities for how best to provide for the defense and security of the nation.³⁷ The Hart-Rudman Commission worked from 1998 to 2001 to analyze national security for the 21st century. The Commission provided a written report and testimony to congressional committees to recommend how the United States could better organize its efforts. Specifically, the report recommended the development of a comprehensive national strategy to guard against and prepare for terrorist attacks, and the creation of a single agency to be in charge of the myriad of agencies already responsible for protecting the country.³⁸

In the spring of 2001, Republican Congressman Max Thornberry of Texas proposed a bill to combine agencies, specifically Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Border Patrol, and others, under one agency, based on the Hart-

³⁶ Department of Homeland Security, *Proposal to Create*,” 2.

³⁷ David Firestone, “Some Conservatives Question the Value of Reorganizing Domestic Security,” *New York Times*, July 1, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/01/us/some-conservatives-question-the-value-of-reorganizing-domestic-security.html>.

³⁸ Charles Lathrop and Mackenzie M. Eaglen, *The Commission on National Security/21st Century: A Hart-Rudman Commission Primer*, (Washington, DC: Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA, National Security Watch, April 2001), 5.

Rudman Commission. As in the past, the reform efforts failed. Congressional hearings took place, but there was simply no support to reform the homeland security apparatus.³⁹

The terrorist attacks of September 11 ultimately pushed the federal government into reforming the security bureaucracy—almost overnight. On September 22, 2001, President Bush declared the federal government would create an agency to protect the United States and its citizens from future terrorist attacks.⁴⁰ Executive Order 13228 was issued on October 8, 2001, and created two unique agencies within the White House. First, the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) was an executive level agency for which Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was tapped to serve as the first director. OHS received the task to create and oversee the strategy that would unite the federal, state, and local effort to protect the United States from future threats.⁴¹ Second, the Homeland Security Council (HSC) formed a cabinet-level advising agency to the president regarding all matters related to homeland security—envisioned as an analog to the National Security Council.⁴² OHS gave Ridge a voice to advise the president on security matters. Ridge, however, “needed more authority and resources than were provided through the executive order.”⁴³ Secretary Ridge was a proponent of the creation of DHS, and ultimately, so was Congress.

President George W. Bush released a plan in June of 2002 that proposed the creation of a cabinet-level agency responsible for providing the organizational structure and oversight to unite the key agencies with a stake in protecting the country.⁴⁴ DHS was approved through Public Law 107–296.⁴⁵ DHS brought together the “Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, and

39 Department of Homeland Security, *DHS Releases a Brief Documentary History of Department 2001–2008*, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, November 2011), 3.

40 Ibid., 4.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Stephanie Cooper Blum, “Same Priorities, Different Perspectives: Tom Ridge and Michael Chertoff on Homeland Security,” *Homeland Security Affairs*, 6, no. 8 (January 2010): 6, <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/587>.

44 Department of Homeland Security, *DHS Releases a Brief Documentary History*, 5.

45 Ibid., 7.

several other agencies responsible for critical infrastructure protection.”⁴⁶ Along with the proposal for the new department, the Bush administration created the Transportation Planning Office (TPO) to oversee and ensure a smooth transition of all the entities that would transfer under the authority and responsibility of DHS. In July 2002, the White House released the first National Strategy for Homeland Security through OHS.

In the end, the attack of 9/11 served to break down the walls that divided how security was viewed and undertaken at the federal, state, or local government levels. The divisions of labor traditionally seen from the federal government all the way to the local levels were beginning to diminish. It became readily apparent that the line between “home and abroad” was not clear anymore, and the government, at all levels, needed to be involved and have a plan for how to deter threats to the country.⁴⁷ DHS would serve as the mechanism through which this massive undertaking would take place.

With the plan released and sent to Congress for approval, the TPO began to organize the anticipated implementation of DHS. “The Senate approved the Homeland Security Act on November 19, 2002, and the president signed it into law on November 25, 2002.”⁴⁸ Finally, DHS was open for business on January 24, 2003. On March 1, 2003, the majority of existing agencies transferred into DHS and began operating under the new hierarchy. Nine months after the announcement by the Bush Administration of the creation of DHS, all agencies being placed under DHS completed their transition.

President Bush appointed Ridge to get the organization up and running, and DHS would be christened as the end-all-be-all for all things homeland security. In an interview, Ridge alluded to the fact that a business would have had at least a year to get its affairs in order once it received approval.⁴⁹ DHS had less than 90 days from

46 Department of Homeland Security, *DHS Releases a Brief Documentary History*, 5.

47 Charles R. Wise and Rania Nader, “Organizing the Federal System for Homeland Security: Problems, Issues, and Dilemmas,” *Public Administration Review* 62, (September 2002): 44, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/3110169?loginSuccess=true&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

48 Department of Homeland Security, *DHS Releases a Brief Documentary History*, 7.

49 Ehsan Zaffar “Securing the Homeland (Part 1): An Interview with Former Governor and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge,” May 22, 2015, <http://www.ehsan.com/blog/2015/5/22/securing-the-homeland-part-1-an-interview-with-former-governor-and-homeland-security-secretary-tom-ridge>.

authorization to get up and running. It is important to understand the scale and scope of the re-organization that Secretary Ridge and his team faced. DHS possessed a staff of more than 180,000 personnel, needed to create organizational policy, fill vacant positions, and create new positions, not to mention merging all the agencies under the authority of a new department.⁵⁰ With all of these factors, DHS was woefully unprepared to take on the monumental tasks of its new mission.

B. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY:

DHS attempted to combine, in full or in part, 22-plus federal organizations to protect the United States from terrorist attacks.⁵¹ This process still did not take into account the state and local homeland security agencies within all fifty states.⁵² Ultimately, so many agencies were pulled into the new department that it was difficult to manage and organize all the entities effectively and efficiently. Additionally, all the organizations that came together were distinct and jealous of their particular missions in the security of the United States. Secretary Ridge stated in an interview, years after his tenure at DHS, “The second-most significant challenge was creating a collective sense of mission among the disparate entities that form DHS so that every agency appreciated the necessity of newfound internal collaboration among government agencies entities that had previously existed in silo’ed and closed-off entities.”⁵³

A major issues contributing to the lacking sense of mission was that DHS did not have an established policy shop until the tenure of Secretary Michael Chertoff. As a result, DHS required close interaction with the HSC to make decisions and get permission from the directors within the HSC in order to make decisions regarding DHS affairs.⁵⁴ More importantly, it meant that Ridge did not have anyone outlining organizational policy to assist with establishing the operational climate for DHS. With

⁵⁰ Zaffar, “Securing the Homeland.”

⁵¹ Kettl, *System Under Stress*, 62.

⁵² Wise and Nader, “Organizing the Federal System,” 44.

⁵³ Zaffar, “Securing the Homeland.”

⁵⁴ John Fass Morton and Tom Ridge, *Next Generation Homeland Security: Network Federalism and the Course to National Preparedness* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 92.

organizational policies lacking, this exacerbated and contributed to a disunity of the organization, and the eventual personnel and management issues within DHS.

The desired organizational structure of DHS led to redundancies in the system. The DHS organizational structure was so broad, it was unable to know fully what branch, department, or individual was doing what task to accomplish the mission. For instance, the federal government offered, “100 federal terrorism response courses and created more than 100 federal terrorism response teams under the authority of five federal agencies and departments.”⁵⁵ A terrorism response course is a needed and worthwhile endeavor in today’s world, but the unity of effort is not being effectively accomplished and utilized to its greatest potential based on the division of labor within DHS. As seen by this example, it is safe to assume the rest of DHS possessed similar redundancy issues, which waste work force efforts, money, and resources.

The duplication of effort is ineffective in accomplishing the mission. More importantly, this highlights issues of employees unclear how their specific job fits into the bigger mission of DHS. As a result, employees are disgruntled and unhappy because they are not making a real difference in the mission. At the same time, the employees, because of the confusion about even the basic missions of DHS, are neglected, leaving a mismanaged workforce with low morale.

C. JOINTNESS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

All the organizations that came together were unique, possessing their own cultural identity and framework with which they were accustomed to doing business. DHS faced the challenge of creating a culture and joint work environment amongst the collaboration of agencies in order to accomplish its goal of protecting the country. Each respective agency came into the arena of DHS with its own idea of how its mission fit the spectrum of providing security for the nation. Secretary Ridge had to figure out how, in his own words, to “integrate the capabilities of each component agency of DHS in a way

⁵⁵ Wise and Nader, “Organizing the Federal System,” 45.

that was both efficient in terms of the resources committed, while being effective in terms of the outcome desired.”⁵⁶

Before September 11, 2001, federally mandated training exercises showed federal and state agencies were not adequately prepared and able to work together for a terrorist event. Since the mid-1990s, preparedness for a terrorist attack had been a focus of the federal government.⁵⁷ In 1998, President Bill Clinton issued PDD-62, which was intended to exercise and prepare federal, state, and local agencies to help prevent unconventional threats from endangering the homeland and Americans abroad.⁵⁸ The federal government mandated exercises to focus on counterterrorism and consequence management exercises to evaluate the response capabilities of federal, state, and local response forces. As a result, “the exercises have revealed critically deficient capabilities, inadequate response plans, and serious intergovernmental conflicts that would likely emerge in a real situation.”⁵⁹

The federal training exercises highlight the status of the agencies responsible for homeland security prior to the events of 9/11, and as a result, the same manner of issues that would be seen after 9/11. These organizational issues would be inherited by DHS, and then DHS would be tasked with bringing these organizations into a close, systematic working relationship for which the protection of the United States hinges.

The 9/11 Commission focused on the issues of jointness within the efforts of working to protect the homeland and providing solutions on how best to organize. Joint action is necessary by the DHS. If an agency cooperates with another, one agency has already worked to define the issue and therefore is willing to seek assistance in finding answers to the problem. Jointness brings together a multitude of individuals, with diverse backgrounds and capabilities, who can work as a team to better manage the issue and find

⁵⁶ Zaffar, “Securing the Homeland.”

⁵⁷ Richard A. Falkenrath, “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic Terrorist Attack,” *International Security*, 25, No 4 (2001): 147, <http://live.belfercenter.org/files/falkenrath.pdf>.

⁵⁸ William J. Clinton, *Combating Terrorism Presidential Decision Directive/PDD-62* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 22, 1998).

⁵⁹ Falkenrath, “The Problems of Preparedness,” 177.

solutions to deal with or prevent the security risks and issues of the future.⁶⁰ The bar was not high when the agencies were brought together under DHS, and there is much work to be accomplished to increase the capabilities and jointness of DHS. The assumption was DHS would be the ultimate answer to unify all the respective agencies in allowing for better protection of the homeland. The problem was that each agency brought over its respect issues into the purported melting pot of DHS, which initially served to exacerbate already known issues regarding the emergency management programs of the United States.

In addition to the need for jointness, the cultural identity of the organization is a critical component that must be effectively managed in any organization. It is even more important when each of the twenty-two plus agencies brings its own unique and historic identity. The challenge provided to Secretary Ridge and his team was to change the organizational culture and unite the masses. Louis Gerstner, Jr., who was largely responsible for saving the IBM Corporation during his tenure as CEO, said, “I came to see, in my time at IBM, that culture isn’t just one aspect of the game—it is the game.”⁶¹ It only takes a little bit of experience in working in an agency to see that an individual’s respective agency is where an employee’s loyalty lies. “Every organization has its own unwritten rules...who makes the key decisions, how to dress, how best to spin a new idea to win approval” and the list can go on.⁶²

In order to bring DHS employees and agencies together, the identity must shift from each separate organization to that of one unified and focused team. Without the shift in cultural identity, the turf battles and allegiances to a respective organization are going to continue to cause disorder. In the end, it is about the DHS’s mission, not just Customs and Border Patrol or the Coast Guard’s mission. It is about the organization as a whole

60 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 400.

61 Louis V. Gerstner, Jr., *Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance?* (HarperCollins e-books, 2009), 181.

62 Kettl, *System Under Stress*, 52.

maintaining the protection of the United States through making their specific missions adapt to the mission of DHS.

D. CONCLUSION

The hasty beginning, organizational complexity, and jointness and cultural issues all served to contribute to the personnel and management issues that would be seen in the future. One thing that exacerbated these very issues is that DHS did not have a policy shop until a few years after it began operations.⁶³ The lack of established policy directly correlates to lacking guidance and policy for the entire organization because there is no entity with the authority or responsibility to write the policy that will direct and assist the spate of issues that result from merging 22 organizations.

The inability of leaders in the organization to establish policy is a key issue. The personnel and management concerns within the organization relate to the lack of policy to highlight the focus and direction these two key areas should take. With the absence of a centralized policy shop within DHS for the first few years, policy shops were created in various agencies through DHS, which contributes to and further exacerbates the personnel issues.⁶⁴ The policy shop sets the leadership foundation for the agency through outlining expectations and setting the tone for the how the organization will operate.

⁶³ Christos Boukalas, *Homeland Security, Its Law and Its State: A Design of Power for the 21st Century* (London, England: Routledge, 2014), 121.

⁶⁴ Chris Strohm, "Former Homeland Security Officials Debate Reorganizing DHS," Government Executive, May 11, 2005, <http://www.govexec.com/defense/2005/05/former-homeland-security-officials-debate-reorganizing-dhs/19201/>.

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III. DHS'S STRUGGLES

Organizational structure is affecting DHS's ability to find itself capable in overcoming its personnel management challenges. With the creation of DHS, there was a large degree of "difficulty associated with 'retrofitting' basic organizational structure and capabilities."⁶⁵ DHS has struggled to overcome limitations to the merging of so many organizations, each with their own distinct organizational structure, into one capable and focused organization with a unified structure. As a result, DHS is mitigating the institution's overall success.

One way to examine—if not diagnose—a DHS organization is the Star Model. A business-sector approach with relevance for any organization or agency, the Star Model provides five key design policies—strategy, structure, processes, rewards, and people. The design policies of the Star Model help provide the foundation for understanding whether an organization is operating as effectively as possible through ensuring adequate focus and interconnection of each point of the model. From this analysis, DHS will be presented as both a successful and non-successful organization, with the unsuccessful aspects stemming from the personnel management struggles. In light of the gaps highlighted by the Star Model, it becomes clear that DHS has not adequately interconnected its design policies, particularly processes, people, and rewards, and this failure is hindering the personnel management programs of the organization. As a result, the persistent issues of employee morale, leadership and management, education and training, and retention continue to plague the organization and keep it from operating to its fullest capability.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

An organization's structure is what provides the organization with form so that it can fulfill its mission within its operating environment. The bottom-line purpose of the

⁶⁵ Building One DHS: Why is Employee Morale Low? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 112th Congress (2012) (statement of Admiral Thad M. Allen, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard).

organization is being able to achieve its goals and missions. Organizational structure can best be understood as the construct of how employees and groups within the organization come together to perform tasks, responsibilities, and execute authority within the organization.⁶⁶ As far as structure, there are firms that desire a centralized and rigid structure, while other companies might desire a more decentralized construct with less rigidity. Ultimately, the mission, organizational goals and requirements, personalities of the work force, and a host of other dynamics factor into the success or failure of the organization. While organizational structure varies from organization to organization, DHS utilizes the hierarchical structure of organizing its agencies to accomplish the mission.

The hierarchical structure is one of the best-known organizational models because it is used throughout the DOD and the federal government. The hierarchical structure has both limitations and benefits, which are contributing to DHS's problems. The hierarchical structure's limitations manifest most clearly in the inability of the structure to create an "organization that can combine speed, cost effectiveness, product quality, and learning."⁶⁷ With the narrowing at the top, there is a reduction in capacity to be able to respond effectively and in a timely manner. The boss at the top simply has too many decisions that must be made, too little opportunity to give quality time and attention to all-important issues, and too many people who must be satisfied internally and externally within the organization.⁶⁸

To counter these limitations, the hierarchical structure does present benefits for an organization. Hierarchical organizations reach large numbers of people quickly, make clear the chain of command, organize agencies within the department and ultimately provide a rigid structure within which the department and its agencies operate. The

66 Fred C. Lunenburg, "Organizational Structure: Mintzberg's Framework," *International Journal of Scholarly, Academic, Intellectual Diversity* 14, no. 1 (2012): 1, <http://www.nationalforum.com/Electronic%20Journal%20Volumes/Lunenburg,%20Fred%20C.%20Organizational%20Structure%20%20Mintzberg%20Framework%20IJSaid%20V14%20N1%202012.pdf>.

67 Galbraith, "The Challenge of Change: Organizing for Competitive Advantage," 8., *Tomorrow's Organization : Crafting Winning Capabilities in a Dynamic World* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1998), 8.

68 Ibid.

hierarchical structure lends itself to centralizing of DHS's mission, but this may not be the best way in which to organize based on the example of Hurricane Katrina.

Hurricane Katrina presents an example of when DHS's hierarchical structure posed limitations to its mission. In particular, the inability of DHS to coordinate with various federal agencies—DOD, DOJ, and state- and local-level entities—suggests that the hierarchical structure is limited.⁶⁹ DHS requested information of the DOD in the initial days of Hurricane Katrina, but DOD expected the request to come from FEMA, which was a part of the newly formed DHS. As a result, time was wasted, confusion abounded, and unity of command was absent throughout the hierarchical structure, led to “excessive chains of authority which hinder communication, innovation, and flexibility.”⁷⁰ DHS and DOJ clashed over responsibility in regards to who was the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officer (SFLEO) on the ground, due to clashing organizational responsibilities, competition between the two agencies, and lacking federal government policy of which organization was responsible as the SFLEO.⁷¹ These two examples are only a few of the instances of lacking coordination and understanding of responsibility from DHS to other agencies that would assist in the disaster relief efforts. The bigger picture translates into concern over DHS's ability to effectively govern its agencies and work with external agencies effectively through a hierarchical organizational construct.

The hierarchical structure, while not the main focus, problem, or solution of this thesis, does present concerns for the ability of DHS to accomplish its mission. The benefits and concerns of the structure as presented and briefly highlighted with Hurricane Katrina can both serve to help and hinder DHS. In particular, it would seem that if the five policies of the Star Model are not being met and interconnected adequately, the hierarchical structure is a hindrance. On the other hand, if the organization can manage to

69 Daniel P. Prieto, “The Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies for Homeland Security: Goldwater-Nichols and Network-Centric Warfare,” paper presented at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 2006 Conference, 91–92.

70 Ibid., 104.


71 Ibid., 93.

interconnect the five policies of the Star Model, the hierarchical structure lends its overall strengths and mitigates the weakness of the organizational construct.

B. THE STAR MODEL

The design policies of the Star Model by Jay Galbraith provide the answer to five key areas that an organization must adequately ensure are taken care of in order to succeed. As seen in Figure 1, five design policies crucial for any organization:

Figure 1. The Star Model



Source: Jay R. Galbraith, *Designing Organization: An Executive Guide to Strategy, Structure, and Process* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 10.

Strategy is focused on developing the organizational goals and objectives that make up the mission.⁷² Structure is broken down into four areas: specialization, shape, distribution of power, and departmentalization. Specialization is the “type and number of job specialties used in performing the work.”⁷³ The number of personnel comprising departments constitutes shape.⁷⁴ Distribution of power is focused on the vertical axis of the organization and on the important issues of centralization and decentralization. In the horizontal axis of the organization, the focus is on the power between each department

⁷² Galbraith, *Designing Organizations*, 9.

⁷³ Ibid., 11.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

and priorities for the accomplishment of the mission between each department.⁷⁵ Finally, departmentalization is the “basis for forming departments at each level of the structure.”⁷⁶

Structure is the drawing of the organizational lines, and is important, but the focus on structure often becomes too much. As a result, process, rewards, and people are lost sight of which significantly affects the performance of that organization. In today’s organizations, the design policies of process, rewards, and people must be effectively managed and interconnected with strategy and structure in order to ensure organizational success.⁷⁷

The processes of any organization are important. The vertical and horizontal axes through which communication take place in an organization are key, but instead of just being vertically focused, these processes have been shifting. In today’s complex operating environment, the lateral axis of the organization provides for better communication and more effective interaction within the entire organization. Today’s organizations must understand that “each department with information about—and a stake in—an issue contributes a representative for issue resolution.”⁷⁸ It is important that information be able to flow fluidly between agencies within a department. Similarly, it is important that agencies do not become stove-piped and so focused on a specific task that the interconnectedness of all agencies involved in the process are minimized or ignored.

The people focus of the Star Model is based on the human resource issues of the organization, and the quality of people that are within the organization. The rewards section of the star provides the incentives for the employees. The rewards must be tied to the structure and processes to ensure the accomplishment of the strategy and to motivate the people to want to achieve said strategy.⁷⁹ It is critical to understand that if one area of

⁷⁵ Galbraith, *Designing Organizations*, 11.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 14.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 38.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 13.

the star Model's points is neglected or not functioning well, the entire organization and the other four points of the Model are affected.

C. WHAT DOES THE STAR MODEL REVEAL ABOUT DHS?

The oversight and management of the design policies within an organization, as outlined by the Star Model, are critical. Part of the concerns with DHS's beginning revolve around so many varying practices of personnel management and leadership development being brought under one umbrella, such as "performance appraisal, compensation and rewards, training and development, and placement and career planning."⁸⁰ Failure to manage these types of issues adequately and effectively in relation to personnel management directly affects the employees, as is seen with the continual reports of low morale and dissatisfaction within DHS. As a result, DHS has struggled to overcome these challenges.

The turbulent and hasty beginnings of DHS have contributed to the personnel management and leadership development problems within the Department of Homeland Security. The timetable for the creation of DHS did not allow ample time for the organizational strategy to be developed with the detail needed to ensure adequate personnel management programs. DHS was orchestrated through meetings that took place secretly and among a small group of senior leaders over the course of several weeks in the White House.⁸¹ With the limited scope of personnel who were a part of the planning process for developing DHS, it is fair to say that things were left off the table that should have been considered when orchestrating the interworking of a department of the magnitude of DHS. In particular, the understanding and realization of the massive undertaking that was DHS, in large part, seems to have been downplayed with a simple desire to get the department open and ready for business.

⁸⁰ Allan M. Mohrman, Jr., and Susan Albers Mohrman, "Catalyzing Organizational Change and Learning: The Role of Performance Management," in *Tomorrow's Organization: Crafting Winning Capabilities in a Dynamic World*, ed. Susan Albers Mohrman, Jay R. Galbraith, Edward E. Lawler, III, and Associates (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2008), 362.

⁸¹ Tom Ridge and Lary Bloom, *The Test of Our Times: America Under Siege...And How We Can Be Safe Again*, (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009), 129–30.

1. Strategy and Structure

Possibly the first and most glaring strategic problem was that the initial strategy of DHS lacked a clear definition of what the term “homeland security,” its stated mission, meant. Before 9/11, the term “homeland security” did not exist in the United States.⁸² With the terror attacks of 2001, however, DHS had to operate within the parameters of a lacking definitional understanding. The initial National Strategic Framework, in 2002, defined homeland security with terms of concerted national effort, reduced vulnerability, minimized damage, and prevention.⁸³ At the same time, DHS included agencies that were not just focused on terrorism (the main focus for DHS at the beginning), but on transnational crime, immigration and customs, money laundering, protection of waterways, and drug smuggling, to name a few.⁸⁴ It was clear from the beginning that DHS possessed gaps in its strategy. The organizations being absorbed lacked clarity on respective jobs to support the overall DHS mission, and DHS did not do a great job of clarifying how each agency fit into the overall mission of protecting the nation. In fact, there were some agencies, which came into DHS without a “mission statement related to their roles in the DHS, nor an acknowledgement of their subordination to DHS.”⁸⁵

The structure of DHS was predominantly predetermined by the plan orchestrated from the White House. The department’s leaders did not get a say because it was understood what specialization, shape, dimension of power, and departmentalization would make up DHS at the beginning. The lack of voice in relation to the structure and the combining of so many entities have strongly contributed to the issues with the department. The strategy and structure of DHS has also contributed to hindering the other three areas of the Star Model, which are critical to personnel management.

⁸² Kahan, “What’s in a Name?,” 3.

⁸³ Bush, George W., *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA407178>.

⁸⁴ Kahan, “What’s in a Name?” 18.

⁸⁵ Jennifer Mitchell and Jason Pate, “The Department of Homeland Security: Goals and Challenges,” *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, April 1, 2003, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/homeland-security-goals-challenges/>.

2. Processes, Rewards, and People

The processes within DHS are hurting when it comes to the information and decisions being shared along the vertical and horizontal axis of the organization. The poor information sharing is not just affecting of the DHS mission, but it is also impacts the employees, exacerbating the divides between departments, increasing turf-battles, and hurting the ability of DHS to blend the cultures into one cohesive organization. DHS has many organizations that are operating in a vertical fashion, but the organizations must improve their horizontal operations, interacting and sharing information between agencies. If the information sharing between departments could be improved, this would drastically help to improve the integration and assist with blending the cultures of DHS and making a one-team, one-fight organization instead of individual organizations that just happen to be operating as a part of DHS.

Even more importantly, DHS has found itself ranking low within the rankings of federal agencies in relation to morale and trust issues with senior DHS leaders, as well as the overall promotion, education, and employment system within DHS since 2003.⁸⁶ There has been a high turnover of senior leader positions throughout the past fifteen years as well, and it is difficult to maintain the momentum of an organization while focusing on taking care of the organization and its people while dealing with consistent, high levels of turn over at the senior leader level. Additionally, it is important to note that senior leader vacancies with DHS have been a consistent factor as well. Between 2006 and 2010, according to a GAO report, these vacancies were due primarily to retirements and resignations.⁸⁷ Still, vacancy rates across DHS, in 2006, 2007, and 2009 were higher statistically than other federal agency.⁸⁸

Management weakness is another issue challenging DHS, and it poses a risk to “mission accomplishment and efficient and effective use of the department’s

⁸⁶ Department of Homeland Security, *Department of Homeland Security 2014 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Results*, Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014.

⁸⁷ GAO, DHS Human Capital: Senior Leadership Vacancy Rates Generally Declined, but Components’ Rates Varied (GAO-12-940) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012), 2, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588472.pdf>.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

resources.”⁸⁹ One of the glaring issues of weak management is the finding that DHS suffers from low morale, due to “lack of leadership, training, and performance-based rewards.”⁹⁰ DHS has consistently faced criticism for its personnel management policies since its doors opened. Daniel Gerstein argues that DHS is making reforms that are beneficial to the organization, but he does go on to explain that personnel management needs improving. Specifically, improvement is needed to fix the problems relating to organizational structure, identity and culture, low morale, and job satisfaction levels of employees.

DHS has been following a similar approach to the DOD in terms of professional development for its employees. DOD follows the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act implementation, which breaks down the civilian workforce into four levels of employment with the General Schedule (GS) pay grades. DHS four level model is called the Interagency National Security Professional (INSP) qualification.⁹¹

Level one, GS 1–9 is the awareness level where an employee has threshold/baseline knowledge, skills, and abilities. Level two, GS 9–12 is the basic and intermediate level where an employee has three to ten years’ experience for planning and interagency exposure via training and education. Level three, GS 12–15, is the advanced level where an employee has 20 years’ experience for strategic thinking and critical analysis to attain and maintain ‘INSP qualification. Level four, GS 14–Senior Executive Service, is the executive level where an employee has 20- to 30-plus years’ experience for DHS INSP Executive.⁹²

The focus and nature of DHS training and education revolve around the senior leaders and employees within the organization. There is little focus on the lower level employees who are performing the day-to-day mission within the level one and level two employee ranks.

DHS is working to make improvements in relation to professional development. In particular, communication, training, diversity, and recognition are items highlighted

⁸⁹ Bucci, Rosenzweig, and Inserra, “Reforming DHS.”

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Morton and Ridge, *Next Generation Homeland Security*, 302.

⁹² Ibid.

that tie into past concerns from federal employee surveys, but these surveys produced results that were similar to those of the most recent DHS employee survey in 2014. To attempt to answer these concerns, DHS established a DHS Leader Development Program to maximize “performance, strengthen the DHS leadership bench, and build leadership competencies at all levels of the DHS workforce, through a coherent and seamless continuum of leader development opportunities across the Department.”⁹³ In 2011, DHS Deputy Secretary approved the Leadership Development Framework for all of DHS. The framework outlines the roadmap with which DHS intends to strengthen all levels of leadership within the organization through identifying five key leadership levels, which cover all of DHS.⁹⁴

Lastly, DHS is attempting to build a more unified DHS through “Senior Executive Candidate Development Program,” “DHS Fellow Program,” “Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan,” and “Secretary’s Award Program,” all aimed at improving issues highlighted by the survey. In 2012, the first Senior Executive Candidate program began to prepare potential DHS employees for further leadership roles and growth within the department.

In 2014, the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) released a Report to the Senate Chairman for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Of note is a table in the back of the report that highlights implementation status of leader development framework mentioned in the 2012 testimony. The leadership development framework is an attempt to gain training experience for DHS employees. The executive program started and offered one course, and the supervisor cornerstone implementation was mostly complete in fiscal year 2013. The manager, team leader, and team member programs have yet to reach implementation within the departments, but DHS scheduled

93 Building One DHS: Why is Employee Morale Low? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 112th Congress (2012) (statement of Catherine V. Emerson, Chief Human Capital Officer Department of Homeland Security).

94 Building One DHS: Why is Employee Morale Low? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 112th Congress (2012) (statement of Admiral Thad M. Allen, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard).

implementation for fiscal year 2015.⁹⁵ The appearance is that while DHS is able to vocalize actions that should be taken, the implementation is ineffective and lacking at best. In order to best capture and maintain a resilient and ready workforce, of which morale is a huge key, DHS must begin to offer incentives and benefits to the lower level employees doing the homeland security mission on a day-to-day basis.

The inability of establishing quality personnel management programs and leadership development policies that are effective in managing the department seems to be due to the power possessed by DHS. DHS has the ability to come up with ideas to fix the issues, but it is lacking in the power to be able to create, standardize, and implement a “federal homeland security professional workforce” which can “only come with sustained structure, management, and funding.”⁹⁶ There must be an office or agency, which DHS gives the power to organize, create, and distribute the education, training, and professional development curriculum to all levels of the agency to help counter-balance the consistent woes of the personnel management workforce. The creation and implementation of a more robust and direct professional development program should help to overcome the personnel management and leadership development concerns, but it would also assist in helping to unite and create a more unified DHS.

Stephanie Kostro, in two roundtable discussions with current and former DHS, industry, and think tank officials, provides some key issues and challenges DHS is facing. Even with current improvement efforts by the current secretary of DHS to unify the department, cultural resistance topped the list. The various agencies within the department do not seem willing to unify to work as a team, and instead, the various agencies in DHS hold allegiance to respective agencies regardless of falling under DHS.⁹⁷ DHS still struggles to unite its agencies and employees under the unified mission.

95 GAO, DHS Training: Improved Documentation, Resource Tracking and Performance Measurement Could Strengthen Efforts, (GAO-14-688) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), 50–51, <http://gao.gov/assets/670/665701.pdf>.

96 Morton and Ridge, *Next Generation Homeland Security*, 294.

97 Stephanie Kostro, “The Department of Homeland Security Unit of Effort Initiative,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 7, 2015, 3, <http://csis.org/publication/department-homeland-security-unity-effort-initiative>.

As a result, it is directly understandable why DHS ranks low in federal employee surveys. While the desire for unification has been expressed, in reality there has been an inability to make a one team, one fight mentality since the organization was created, and this is continually exacerbated by not being able to unite the processes, rewards, and people to fit the strategy and structure of the Star Model in relation to DHS.

D. CONCLUSION

While DHS is striving to make improvements, the Star Model presents interconnectedness concerns in regards to DHS's ability to put all five design policies of the Star Model together to operate efficiently. Each point of the Star Model is struggling, with the majority of the struggles coming from the processes, rewards, and people points of the model. The strategy for DHS is working in relation to the fact there has not been another major terrorist attack since 9/11. Also, the strategy is working because there have been numerous instances of DHS orchestrating with other agencies or in support of local and state agencies, which have led to the arrests of terrorist actors or groups.

What is missing is a hard focus on the personnel management programs. With all the changes being implemented and worked on to make the personnel management issues better, DHS is still finding itself ranked low among agencies within the federal government in relation to chronic morale issues. The strategy is there for DHS to work to improve its personnel system, but it is not proving to be effective. The processes, rewards, and people area of the Star Model are lacking an impetus that pushes them toward improvement. Ultimately, the concern is that the personnel management issues of DHS will eventually wear down the ability of the agency to continue to function due to lack of communication, lack of personnel development training, high turnover of senior leaders, and an inability to find the strategy that can make all the points of the Star Model come together.

With an understanding of DHS's strengths and weakness in relation to personnel management, the DOD will be analyzed next to see how it worked through and, for all intents and purposes, succeeded in two major overhauls to its mission—the implementation of the All-Volunteer Force and the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols

Act. The Star Model will be utilized to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the DOD in relation to how it worked through these changes, and as a result, hopefully lessons learned can be taken and applied in order to assist DHS to overcome its challenges.

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IV. THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AND WHAT IT TEACHES DHS

The transition of the DOD to an all-volunteer force highlights that 2001 is not the first time a large government entity has faced challenges within the realm of personnel management due to a major change in how an organization operates. As 9/11 was the impetus to the creation of DHS, the ambiguous conclusion to the unpopular conflict of the Vietnam War led to the creation of the all-volunteer force.

The process highlights systematic steps by the government to ensure the right approach and plan was utilized to change the entire manner in which the DOD gathers its personnel. The use of commissions and studies all served to ensure a realistic understanding of the challenges that would come with the volunteer force transition.

The DOD's transition to an all-volunteer was not perfect, but it has been in place now for years, with the majority of Americans content with a non-conscription service. This chapter analyzes the advent of the all-volunteer force in terms of the Star Model. The strategy, structure, processes, rewards, and people will show the pros and cons of how the DOD transitioned, and the chapter concludes with some lessons that may resonate with DHS.

A. THE STEPS TO THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The change from the conscription military to an all-volunteer force could not effectively take place if rushed. From the president down to senior DOD leaders, the transition needed to be well thought out and eased into in order to maintain the effectiveness of the military branches without causing massive upheaval. The transition to the volunteer military was comparable to nothing the DOD and federal government had undertaken to date.

President Richard Nixon made it clear during the campaigns and upon assuming office that the all-volunteer force needed to become a reality. As early as 1968, President Nixon made campaign promises that would speak to the desire of an all-volunteer military leading to the end of conscription. He stated, "I have looked into this question

carefully. And this is my belief: once our involvement in the Vietnam war is behind us, we [should] move toward an all-volunteer armed force.”⁹⁸ The very thought of ending the draft appealed to the majority of Americans. Without a doubt, the promise to end the draft helped President Nixon to be elected, but more importantly, his election set the stage for a leader who favored draft reform and implementation of an all-volunteer force.⁹⁹

President Nixon’s first step was to create the commission on an all-volunteer force, also known as the Gates Commission, after former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates who chaired the commission. The commission took up its work in 1969 and the results were submitted in 1970. The commission drew the conclusion that the all-volunteer force was capable of fulfilling the needs of the military services and thus capable of ensuring the safety and security of the nation. The commission noted four key areas that needed to be addressed—salaries, conditions of service and recruiting, and a standby draft system in event of war. The initial concern was that the all-volunteer force would not be able to provide adequate numbers of fighting men and women should another World War happen.

The DOD also conducted its own study into the feasibility of ending conscription. Then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird implemented a study within the DOD called *Project Volunteer Committee Report*.¹⁰⁰ Project Volunteer was more specifically focused on the “quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements” the DOD would face if conscription was ended.¹⁰¹ Of the more than 300 items in the report, all four services supported a few recommendations as essential to the successful transformation to an all-volunteer force:

98 Martin J. Holland, “Forging a ‘New’ Army: The End of the Draft and the Transition to an All-Volunteer Army” (master’s thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1996).

99 Gus C. Lee and Geoffrey Y. Parker, *Ending the Draft: The Story of the All-Volunteer Force* (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, 1977), 31.

100 Ibid.; Bernard Rostker, *I want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), 65.

101 Lee and Parker, “Ending the Draft,” 51.

Adoption of a “salary system” for military pay, increased entry pay, use of enlistment bonuses for personnel with critically needed skills, increased educational benefits, including pre-service scholarships for officer programs, increased amounts and quality of bachelor and family housing, expanded entitlements for payment of dependent travel and transportation of household goods to first-term personnel, and increased recruiting and advertising funds.¹⁰²

The incentives were related to pay and benefits of military personnel as an essential element for proper compensation of military personnel. The salary system refers to a revitalization of the military pay system to ensure a more focused and fair pay and compensation system for military employees. Additionally, the military services realized the need to provide bonuses as incentives for those that possessed critical skills that were marketable in the civilian workforce. The DOD needed to ensure that benefits and compensation were as equal as possible with the civilian market to attract and sustain personnel for the volunteer force. These very issues would all become matters of intense focus by the DOD with the ending of conscription in order to better recruit and retain members to serve in the volunteer force.

The President’s Commission and Project Volunteer both had differing assessments of when conscription could be ended, but ultimately, the reports agreed on how to end conscription. The Gates Commission recommended an implementation date for all-volunteer force of July 1, 1971. The DOD and Secretary Laird felt more time was needed to ensure adequate plans were in place and ensure a smooth transition to a volunteer force. Everyone who had worked on the problem of the all-volunteer force with the DOD thought that, “the [Gates] commission had underestimated the difficulties of achieving a volunteer force.”¹⁰³

While the Gates commission ultimately recommended the all-volunteer force, the DOD understood that the process required more than a detailed and coherent plan to ensure a smooth transition. Ultimately, President Nixon accepted the reservations of the

¹⁰² Lee and Parker, “Ending the Draft,” 52.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 67.

DOD with the 1971 date of implementation, but the commission and report moved the country closer to ending the draft, which finally took place in 1973.¹⁰⁴

B. WHAT DOES THE STAR MODEL REVEAL ABOUT THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE IMPLEMENTATION?

It was clear that the DOD needed to make changes to redefine how the American people viewed the military. “The transition to an all-volunteer force compelled the Army to reexamine many of its traditional policies and practices and fostered dramatic changes in the daily life, leadership philosophies, and training practices.”¹⁰⁵ The re-examination of policies and practices held true for the other branches as well. The DOD had to find ways to make military life more appealing and the benefits worthwhile in order to attract recruits who were willing and able to serve and who would make up a quality workforce for the military. The DOD had to examine how to reconfigure daily life, leadership, education, training, recruitment and retention, and a myriad of other factors that could derail the plan, implementation, and future success of the all-volunteer force.

1. Strategy and Structure

It was unclear at the beginning whether the all-volunteer force would be successful. Still, the DOD focused its efforts on ensuring that “the underlying principles were sound, implementation and sustainment appeared feasible, and sufficient management tools were available.”¹⁰⁶ It was not until the second decade of the all-volunteer force that the DOD came to see how it really needed to transform its personnel management programs and system in order to effectively take care of and provide for its workforce, which made the all-volunteer force more successful.¹⁰⁷ The change in strategy

104 *The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force*, (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1970), 8; Rostker, *I Want You!*, 90.

105 Leonard Wong, “From Black Boots to Desert Boots: The All-Volunteer Army Experiment Continues,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute* 19, no. 1 (May 2014), <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/05/black-boots-desert-boots-all-volunteer-army-experiment-continues>.

106 John P. White, “Reflections on Managing the All-Volunteer Force: Past and Future,” in *The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service*, ed. Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Warner (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc., 2004), 43.

107 Wong, “From Black Boots to Desert Boots.”

was key. When personnel are being drafted, personnel and management issues matter less because the force is going to be more easily maintained because of the ability to draft as many numbers as needed to fill the requirements of the military services. Once the draft was no longer in effect, all of the personnel and management functions mattered more as the incentives had to be in place in order to entice personnel to join the military service. The DOD had always possessed a strategy and structure to accomplish the mission, but it now had to connect more with an all-volunteer force through the principles of processes, rewards and people. During a conscription force, the DOD had not previously had to utilize the processes of recruiting, training, equipping, and rewarding personnel to incentivize people to stay in the military service. It was a paradigm shift in how the DOD thought about maintaining the force, the volunteer force, as opposed to the conscription force.

When President Nixon began to study the feasibility of the all-volunteer force, he understood that the transition must be “handled cautiously and responsibly so that our national security” was maintained and ensured.¹⁰⁸ The strategy began with the premise that the transition should be carefully investigated and analyzed over time to ensure that the pros and cons of conscription versus the implementation of the all-volunteer force were adequately studied. The military was not just looking to change how the personnel would come--by force of conscription or volunteering--but even more importantly, how the social expectations of the military would be re-shaped. The country would be able, through the all-volunteer force, to see the military as another place of work, instead of just a place of forced labor waging war on behalf the nation.¹⁰⁹

The initial strategy and structure of changes to implement the all-volunteer force faced challenges. It was not for lack of preparation, but the unknowns of what was to transpire with a full-fledged volunteer force were ominous because it was unprecedented. In 1981, eight years removed from implementation, the DOD found itself on shaky

¹⁰⁸ *The Report of the President's Commission on the All-Volunteer Armed Force*, 5.

¹⁰⁹ Charles C. Moskos, Jr., “The Marketplace All-Volunteer Force: A Critique,” in *The All-Volunteer Force after a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. William Bowman, Roger Little, and G. Thomas Sicilia, (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), 16.

ground. “Inflation eroded pay and benefits. Inadequate defense budgets forced training cutbacks and delays in replacing obsolete equipment. Morale in the armed forces plummeted, and we began to lose many of our most experienced and talented people.”¹¹⁰ It was impossible to predict when these very issues might arise. The DOD had to work hard to overcome and tackle the challenges in order to ensure the all-volunteer force was ultimately successful.

The military manpower policies had to change to encompass a few key differences post conscription that an all-volunteer force required. The issues were fourfold:

(1) Recruit pay must be substantially higher than during the draft; (2) more compensation should be up front in the salary i.e., “visible,” rather than in kind or deferred, thereby allowing for a more efficient operation of the marketplace; (3) military compensation should as much as possible be linked to skill differences of individual service members, again allowing for a more efficient marketplace; and (4) the career force should become a larger proportion of the enlisted force, the presumption being that this will reduce personnel turnover.¹¹¹

One immediate issue was how to increase salaries, benefits (medical, housing, and education), recruitment incentives for enlistees, and recruiting skills and initiatives for the recruiters for the sake of ensuring a wide range and breadth of volunteers to fill the quotas to maintain a functional and successful military force.¹¹² For one thing, when choosing careers or employers, individuals “are also interested in advancement opportunities or the speed of movement between jobs and levels of responsibility.”¹¹³ The DOD had to figure out how to compete with the civilian sector and offer similar

110 Caspar W. Weinberger, “The All-Volunteer Force in the 1980s: DOD Perspective,” in *The All-Volunteer Force after a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. William Bowman, Roger Little, and G. Thomas Sicilia, (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), 2.

111 Ibid., 16; Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, *The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1978), 21–22.

112 *The Report of the President’s Commission on the All-Volunteer Armed Force*, 47–66; Thomas J. Bradley, “All Volunteer Force, Conscription, and Other Alternatives,” *Journal of Legislation*, 7 no. 1 (1980): 125–128, <http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554&context=jleg>.

113 *The Report of the President’s Commission on the All-Volunteer Armed Force*, 199; Bachman, Blair, and Segal, *The All-Volunteer Force*, 20–21.

incentives. The answer was the U.S. military moving toward a more occupational format of service for its personnel and the DOD working to ensure it could maintain end-strength.

2. Processes, Rewards, and People

One of the initial reviews of the all-volunteer force was conducted six years after implementation to address some of the specific concerns the DOD was facing. Of those who participated in the survey, the military scored lower across the board than the civilian sector in the areas of competent supervisors, promotion chances, learning valuable skills, feedback, task significance, and others.¹¹⁴ The report showed that the DOD must train enlistees enough to induce them to “stay by being promoted more quickly and/or assigned to jobs with more favorable career paths.”¹¹⁵ The DOD struggled with finding the right balance for adequately and successfully providing for the workforce initially. The transition to a volunteer force was a slow process that took measuring and understanding what the all-volunteer force needed to survive and the desire to work through the issues as they arose.

From 1973 to 1980, military personnel saw the GI Bill done away with, but there was an overall focus on increasing pay for first term enlistees and the recruiting services were given adequate resources, which was productive in keeping the first term enlistees.¹¹⁶ With the end of the Vietnam War, many officers and Non-Commissioned officers exited the military because of a growing cynicism with the Army, and the army and DOD as a whole saw “declining enlistment rates, low quality recruits, high attrition, and plummeting morale,” all serving as quality indicators that the DOD was struggling in

¹¹⁴ Choongso Kim and others, “The All-Volunteer Force: A 1979 Profile and Some Issues. Research on Youth Employment and Employability Development.” Youth Knowledge Development Report (1980), 54, <http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED203059>.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 84.

¹¹⁶ Bachman, Blair, and Segal, *The All-Volunteer Force : A Study of Ideology in the Military*, 56; Maxwell R. Thurman, “Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force 1983–1992: The Second Decade,” in *The All-Volunteer Force after a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. William Bowman, Roger Little, and G. Thomas Sicilia, (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), 268.

its all-volunteer force infancy.¹¹⁷ The first ten-year review of the all-volunteer force was pessimistic, at best, and even President Nixon felt that the all-volunteer force might be a failure, and that it might be worthwhile to return to a draftee force.¹¹⁸

The DOD initially faced reductions in recruiting quotas and in the initial quality of personnel who voluntarily joined the military service. “Pay raises, combined with improved recruiting techniques and a poor civilian economy, rectified many of these problems by the early-to-mid-1980s.”¹¹⁹ The 20-year review showed that the all-volunteer force had been widely successful, and it has been successful because the all-volunteer force has been given the resources needed to recruit, train, and sustain the military force, as well as ensuring adequate attention is provided to the important matter of pay, training, and benefits, which are provided to service members.¹²⁰

The very effort of getting people to joining the military service falls into the laps of the recruiters who are responsible for selling the military to the men and women who are thinking about joining. The recruiters and the DOD needed tools at their disposal that would incentivize and assist in reaching recruitment goals for the DOD. It is key that the DOD did not make these changes to processes, people, and rewards overnight. It was into the second decade of the all-volunteer force before the effects of the incentives really began to be realized by the DOD workforce.¹²¹ The challenges were not easy for the DOD, and they highlighted an ever-increasing need for the DOD to be willing to adapt its methods and ideology to recruit, retain, train, and equip its workforce.

117 Wong, “From Black Boots to Desert Boots.”

118 Richard Milhous Nixon, *The Real War* (New York: Warner Books, 1980), 201; J. Eric Fredland, Curtis L. Gilroy, Roger D. Little, and W. S. Sellman, *Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996), ix.

119 Ronald R. Krebs, “Myths of the All-Volunteer Force: Rethinking Military Recruitment and the Fate of the Citizen-Soldier,” Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, [http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~ronkrebs/Publications/Myths%20of%20the%20AVF%20\(complete\).pdf](http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~ronkrebs/Publications/Myths%20of%20the%20AVF%20(complete).pdf).

120 Edward Dorn, “Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force,” in *Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force*, ed., Fredland et al., (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1996), 3.

121 Christopher Jehn, “Introduction,” in *The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service*, ed. Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Warner (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2004), 55.

a. Recruitment and Retention

The DOD began to realize in the late 1970s, that it was not meeting its recruiting goals when all four branches of service fell short.¹²² The DOD found that it must not just focus on the incentives available to potential recruits, but that recruiting is directly tied to issues of retention through what is offered by the respective branch of service once a person enters military service.¹²³ The recruiting process was important, but there was little reason for quality recruiting and recruits if the organization for which a recruit is about to enter is not the best.

The transition to a volunteer force made recruitment and retention a priority. The concern from the Gates Commission and moving forward into the first decade of the all-volunteer force was meeting each military branch's end strength and being capable of protecting the country. During the era of conscription, DOD was able to retrain one in five of its personnel. By the late 1970s, the retention was one in three members served past an initial commitment. By the end of the first decade, the early 1980s, one in two military members reenlisted after the initial enlistment requirement.¹²⁴

The result of the increased retention, thanks to benefits that increased educational incentives, bonuses, increases in salary, etc., allowed the military to boast a more experienced force than that which was seen during the era of conscription. Twenty-one years removed from the implementation of the all-volunteer force, the DOD could boast that 96 percent of its members possessed a high school diploma.¹²⁵ The efforts of recruiters and recruiting initiative to find and gain quality members of society is reflected by this statistic, and this effort highlights the importance and success of the DOD's

122 Mark J. Eitelberg, "The All-Volunteer Force after Twenty Years," in *Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force*, ed., Fredland et al., (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1996), 67.

123 Maxwell R. Thurman, "On Being All You Can Be: A Recruiting Perspective," in *Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force*, ed., Fredland et al., (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1996), 58.

124 Dorn, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force," 10.

125 Ibid., 20.

recruiting efforts to ensure a quality military workforce possessing the education skills that will benefit the respective branch of service and job a member will perform.

b. Fair Treatment

The fair treatment of personnel within the military is a crucial reason for the evolving effectiveness of the U.S. military. Good quality of life for a military family, compensation for long work hours and deployments, and benefits comparable with the civilian sector are huge morale boosters and ensure a workforce that wants to serve.¹²⁶ The DOD hard to change its view that though personnel choose to serve in dangerous roles as military members, the services must be willing to provide a supportive environment. to support the military member and dependents.

Compensation for service is crucial. It was clear in the studies after the implementation of the all-volunteer force, in order for members to be willing to enlist, compensation must be equivalent to that of the civilian sector. If the pay is not equivalent, the members of the armed forces are less likely to re-enlist.¹²⁷ The issue of compensation directly correlates to matters of quality of life and providing for the military member and family that competes with the civilian sectors officers of equivalent skills. The 1980s brought a subsequent pay raise that significantly turned this trend around in 1981 and 1982.¹²⁸ The result was direct policy changes that upped the compensation and improved the retention and morale issues being faced by the DOD. These changes managed to turn the trend around and work to equalize pay across the military and civilian sector.

Related is the issue of promotions. The rates of promotion as a result of the restructuring were not widely affected. The fact of the matter was the implementation of voluntary separation and involuntary separation programs by the DOD assisted in managing and keeping the end strength numbers relatively close to where the numbers

126 Dorn, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force," 17–18 .

127 John T. Warner and Paul F. Hogan, "Walter Oi and His Contributions to the All-Volunteer Force: Theory, Evidence, Persuasion," 2014, 4, <https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2015conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=178>.

128 Dorn, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force," 18.

should have fallen.¹²⁹ As a result, it allowed the branches of service to ensure members were promoted as should be expected and provide a quality incentive to its members.

Finally, the ability of military members to take care of families is crucial to morale and the ability of the military member to focus on a respective job. This correlation of intact families to the success of the volunteer force is a direct reflection of the equality of employment and promotions across the board, which, in turn, directly correlates to a professional force.¹³⁰ It is crucial that the military be able to provide for a family, but it is also important to understand that the quality of life for a military member plays a factor in the family's ability to stay intact, which is, in turn, a factor for military members retaining or exiting from the service.

c. *Uniting the Whole Force*

The key factor that seems to have most dramatically affected the overall health of the military and its ability to take care of its personnel stems from the workforce's ability to trust in and have confidence in the federal government and DOD leadership to unite the entire force, active duty and reserve. The strengthening of the defense establishment had a direct effort on the total force especially when understood that "there was a continuing gap between the policy and the willingness and the ability of the active military leadership and Congress to implement it. Much of the inaction was due to the preoccupation...with the problems of creating and implementing the active AVF."¹³¹ The 1980s brought a renewed sense of trust to the DOD through increasing the amount of money put toward defense spending which would be put toward pay and benefits, compensation, recruiting, and training for the reserve force, which would directly

129 Dorn, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force," 18.

130 Walter Y. Oi, "Historical Perspectives on the All-Volunteer Force: The Rochester Connection," in *Professionals on the Front Line*, Fredland et al., 48.

131 Kenneth J. Coffey, "Our Nation's Reserve Force: Where Do WE Go from Here?" in *Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force*, ed., Fredland et al., (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1996), 104.

contribute to bring the reserve force up to levels equivalent with the active duty force, uniting the whole DOD.¹³²

The active duty and reserve components were both equally revitalized in the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan. The trust was re-established with the president, congress, and senior DOD leaders placing more emphasis on providing adequate funding for resources ranging from recruitment and training to compensation and benefits.¹³³ The all-volunteer force would be ultimately tested during the early 1990s with the Persian Gulf War.¹³⁴ The test of the first Gulf War showed a military establishment that was integrated from the reserve to active duty components, and capable and well-trained through overcoming and working through the challenges of the past two decades to establish the all-volunteer force to be able to carry out the defense of the nation.

C. CONCLUSION

The strong focus of the federal government on the overall well-being of the DOD greatly assisted with improving the overall outlook and focus of the military's ability to provide and maintain quality personnel management programs. These improvements related to key areas of pay and benefits, compensation packages, recruiting initiatives, improved training and education, and integration to the operational mission, as well as a key focus on integrating the reserve force with the active duty component. All of this was crucial in cementing the success of the all-volunteer force two decades removed from its creation.

In contrast to the DOD experience, DHS is lacking in the ability to unite its entire workforce and agencies. There was a strong emphasis for support by the federal government to ensure DOD had the necessary funding, approval for necessary policy

¹³² Cottey, "Our Nation's Reserve Force," 105.

¹³³ Melvin R. Laird, "Introduction," in *The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service*, ed. Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Warner (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2004), 6.

¹³⁴ Martin Anderson, "The Making of the All-Volunteer Force," in *The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service*, ed. Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Warner (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2004), 20.

changes, and overall understanding that the changes would take time, roughly twenty years for the all-volunteer force to take root and for it to be declared successful.¹³⁵

The inability of DHS to unite the whole force is hindering its ability to fully and effectively accomplish its mission. The workforce is suffering, especially at the lower levels, because DHS cannot unite itself. DHS is fragmented into various agencies that are clinging each to their own identity and culture. Each agency brought in its own personnel and management policies, training and requirements, hierarchy, promotion requirements for career advancement, etc. Until the lower level workforce feel the senior leaders, federal government and within DHS, are providing for them, DHS is going to struggle to be united and overcome its personnel and management weaknesses. The all-volunteer force example showcases success “because of the whole-hearted commitment of political and military leaders” to change the system and ensure the best possible success of the all-volunteer force.¹³⁶

135 Anderson, “The Making of the All-Volunteer Force,” 28.

136 Anderson, “The Making of the All-Volunteer Force,” 28–29.

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V. WHAT CAN DHS LEARN FROM THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT?

The late 1970s to mid-1980s highlight the reasons the Goldwater-Nichols Act was required, and three specific military scenarios serve as an impetus to realizing reform was needed within the DOD. It is then important to study some of the specific issues that were hampering DOD's integration and jointness, which led Congress to work to create the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Star Model provides an understanding as to how the military implemented the reform efforts and how the changes to the organization served to benefit the entirety of the DOD and increase the integration and operability of the DOD.

A. WHY THE NEED FOR THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT?

There were three military operations in the late 1970s and 1980s that highlighted the need for reform within the DOD.¹³⁷ The Iranian hostage crisis occurred when the Shah of Iran lost influence with the Iranian people, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power when the Shah left the country, eventually for the United States for medical treatment. The Iranian hostage rescue attempt resulted from Islamic revolutionaries storming and overtaking the United States Embassy in Tehran to demand the Shah's return from the United States taking roughly 53 American citizens hostage. Khomeini would not negotiate with President Jimmy Carter, and instead, the Ayatollah embarrassed the United States and Carter administration. Eventually, President Carter changed his decision, from the diplomatic attempts, to taking military action to attempt to free the hostages, and on April 24, 1980, the rescue attempt would fail to achieve its goal due to a helicopter and airplane colliding on the ground in the Iranian desert.

¹³⁷ Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996), 4–7; Thomas T. LoPresti, *The JCS System Before and After the Goldwater-Nichols*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996), 15; John M. Shalikashvili, "Goldwater-Nichols Ten Years From Now," in *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective*, ed. Dennis J. Quinn, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 66; Charles Nemfakos, Irv Blickstein, Aine Seitz McCarthy, and Jerry M. Sollinger, *The Perfect Storm: The Goldwater-Nichols Act and Its Effect on Navy Acquisition* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 7–8.

1. Hostages in Iran

The Iranian hostage rescue attempt highlighted issues of the DOD in lacking a unified command structure, unclear roles of the military services, and ineffective communication flow between these services.¹³⁸ The majority of the communication taking place during the planning stages for the mission was within the respective services, but there was minimal to no cross-talk between the four services for this massive joint operation. As a result, insufficient information was reaching the decision makers orchestrating the rescue mission.¹³⁹ Because of the compartmentalization of the rescue attempt, the units involved trained separately. After the failure, a large part of the criticism was directed at the lack of “joint training and coordination; the lack of integrated intelligence for use by the joint force; overly complex, service-unique planning by each military service, and communication deficiencies.”¹⁴⁰ The compartmentalization would ultimately cause the Iranian hostage rescue mission to not be successful.

2. Marines in Lebanon

The second concern was as a result of the DOD presence in Beirut, Lebanon as part of a multi-national peacekeeping effort. The United States Embassy was attacked in April of 1983, killing 63, 17 of whom were American citizens. The second attack was at the Marine headquarters building, which killed 241 military personnel in October of 1983. Both attacks were carried out by Hezbollah-linked militants driving two vehicles bearing improvised explosive devices.¹⁴¹ The embassy attack in April of 1983 killed 63, 17 of whom were American, and the Marine headquarters building attack in October of

138 Gregory P. Gass, “Command and Control: The Achilles Heel of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission,” (master’s thesis, Naval War College, 1992).

139 Paul B. Ryan, *The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why it Failed*, (Washington, D.C.: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 10.

140 Nemfakos et al., *The Perfect Storm*, 8.

141 Micah Zenko, “When Reagan Cut and Run: The Forgotten History of when America Boldly Abandoned Ship in the Middle East,” *Foreign Policy Journal*, February 7, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/07/when-reagan-cut-and-run/>.

1983 killed 241 military personnel.¹⁴² With the subsequent investigation into the tragedy, key issues again reflected the integration issues of the military services:

ambiguous chain of command, lack of proper oversight by higher levels of command, lack of adequate intelligence support, reporting by military sources of incomplete or inaccurate information, the failure of civilian leadership to heed the advice of senior military leaders concerning the overall risks of the operation, and the inability of the military to anticipate and protect against such attacks¹⁴³

It turned out that there were six chains of command that controlled a U.S. Marine Corps amphibious unit on the ground. As a result, there was a widespread failure to communicate as the military units on the ground were confused as to who was in charge.¹⁴⁴

3. The United States in Grenada

The third military situation that highlighted issues was the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 25, 1983, two days after the Marine headquarters bombing in Beirut. The purpose of the invasion was to rescue American students being held hostage and to work toward restoring the democratic government within Grenada. On the whole, the invasion of Grenada was a success. “The students were freed unharmed, the Bishop government was ousted, Cuban troops were removed, and democracy was restored.”¹⁴⁵

The military forces that comprised the invasion force did not have up-to-date maps, intelligence support was lacking, accidents and issues of fratricide took place, and this was mostly contributed to issues of failed communication.¹⁴⁶ The inability to have the right leaders involved in planning directly led to problems of logistical support once

142 Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, 5; Zenko, “When Reagan Cut and Run.”

143 Ibid., 6; Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut, H.R. Rep No. 11, at 25–70 (1983).

144 Nemfakos et al., *Perfect Storm*, 7.

145 Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, 6.

146 Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury, the Battle for Grenada*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 221–230, 333–342.

the military forces were on the ground.¹⁴⁷ “Army combat units found they couldn’t talk to Navy support ships offshore because their radios weren’t compatible. Navy bureaucrats objected to refueling Army helicopters...a Marine officer balked at flying Army Rangers into battle.”¹⁴⁸ The operation in Grenada was ultimately a success, but it was yet another poorly executed mission. With Grenada falling on the heels of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt and the Beirut bombings, this would be the final straw for the parochialism of the military services which continued to lead to ugly messes that cost American service members their lives. As President Reagan was ramping up the Cold War, the weakness through these military failures was alarming. There was concerns that with the advent of the all-volunteer force over the past decades, that potentially the dire predictions were coming true.

B. WHAT ISSUES LED TO THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT?

The DOD was operating in a fragmented and compartmentalized fashion heading into the 1980s. General David Jones, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) stated in a Congressional hearing in February 1982 that the DOD had made improvements, but “only on the margins,” and the DOD needed to do more in order to be able to effectively defend the country and wage the battles of the twentieth century.¹⁴⁹ Most importantly, Jones stated he had come to understand that reform of an organization was not feasible from the inside, but the pressure must come from outside the DOD structure in order for the DOD to be willing to make necessary changes to how it operated.¹⁵⁰ The CJCS had little to no power to make the changes from inside the DOD system, but it was a land mark statement by General Jones who was willing to admit the DOD needed assistance, and as result, the Congress was able to realize it needed to intervene and assist the DOD with its reform efforts.

¹⁴⁷ Nemfakos et al., *Perfect Storm*, 7–8.

¹⁴⁸ Phil Kukielski, “How Grenada reshaped the U.S. Military,” *Boston Globe*, September 8, 2013, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/09/08/how-grenada-reshaped-military/IZDvWwlt9Ed1chAJufkrvJ/story.html>.

¹⁴⁹ James R. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 34–35.

¹⁵⁰ Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 36.

All four branches of service, pre-Goldwater-Nichols, desired to operate as independently as possible. It seems logical that a branch of the military would desire to operate with autonomy. This autonomy ensures, for example, that the Air Force can focus on the mission given it by the DOD, but also adequately ensure control over resources and funding. An example of this taking place was the Gaither Commission, which proposed larger budgets for each branch of the military. In this event, the military branches would lose the ability to control their own operations. As a result, the military services were all against the proposal.¹⁵¹

One of the inherent issues with the DOD organizational construct was figuring out the balance of control versus autonomy between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the individual branches of service. The desire is for the DOD to have strong centralized control over its branches of service, yet at the same time, to allow the branches to have sufficiently delegated adequate responsibility to carry out its assigned mission. The balance between centralization and decentralization makes this a delicate and tough balance to maintain for the DOD.¹⁵²

As a result of General Jones and others' concerns for the DOD, the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services began a report in 1982 that would take three years to complete. The report was titled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change"; it is commonly referred to as the Locher report, and it formed the basis for the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Locher report outlined 16 fundamental issues for the DOD and how it operated. Among them, there are a few key points that relate to issues currently being faced by DHS.

1. Limited Mission Integration at DOD's Policymaking Level

The structure of the DOD was hindering the integration of the military services and the jointness required in military operations. The DOD was broken down into three

¹⁵¹ Archie Barrett, *Goldwater-Nichols Act Readings: Legislative Activities and Documents Leading to the Passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, (Washington, DC: National University Press, 1983), 14.

¹⁵² Ibid., 25.

organizational components: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organizations of the JCS, and the military services themselves.¹⁵³ The structure directly affected the “integration of service capabilities along mission lines,” which directly contributed to the lack of integration between the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.¹⁵⁴ The JCS had too much power to control the respective branches of service, which caused a stove-piping effect and produced no desire to work jointly among the services.

2. Imbalance between Service and Joint Interests

The DOD and the military branches were operating out of the bounds of their respective authorities. “The overwhelming influence of the four services was judged to be completely out of proportion to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities.”¹⁵⁵ In particular, a few problems were seen. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) was not able to integrate the military forces effectively in order to best accomplish the DOD’s mission. The JCS, which ultimately was responsible for each branch of service, was set up so that each branch of service could effectively override any CJCS decision.¹⁵⁶ These were two critical issues because they highlighted the SECDEF’s and CJCS’s lack of power, but it also showed that the military branches were their own fiefdoms concerned with what was best for each respective branch of service instead of the bigger and broader DOD mission.

3. Failure to Adequately Implement the Concept of Unified Command

The Unified Command concept breaks down the world into geographical areas of responsibility for the DOD. The unified commands, under the plans created by President Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, should have had authority over all personnel and resources within the respective unified command. The unified commanders had limited

¹⁵³ James R. Locher, III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn, 1996): 3, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-13.pdf>.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 42.

¹⁵⁵ Barrett, *Goldwater-Nichols Act Readings*, 16.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 43.

and weak authority to take action as needed.¹⁵⁷ The invasion of Grenada presented an example. The Atlantic Command was responsible for planning the operation, Urgent Fury, to invade Grenada. The issue was that the command was mostly focused on naval forces at the time, but it possessed Navy, Marine, Army, and Air Force elements.¹⁵⁸ The issue is that there was not sufficient unification within the command at any level. The forces had not “trained sufficiently together, established common doctrine and procedures, or made their communications equipment and other systems interoperable.”¹⁵⁹ These failures are highlighted through not having one unified commander designated who could ultimately control and have authority of every detail required of both day-to-day and war operations involving all air, sea, and ground forces within the respective command.

4. Lack of Clarity of Strategic Goals

The DOD faced a weakness when it came to expressing its strategic goals to its military services. As a result, there was a gap between joining the strategic goals to the military services’ mission to better achieve the mission of the DOD. The ability to more effectively apply clear goals to the organization served to enhance the jointness and integration of the DOD.¹⁶⁰ On his way out the door as the CJSC, General Jones specifically addressed issues of the DOD formulating strategic goals. The military services all hold to their own traditions, and as such the desire to take care of one service’s internal needs leads to neglecting the “changing requirements” of the present and future because it is simply easier to live in the past. Additionally, the day-to-day grind that is felt by the JCS makes the immediate the focus versus the strategic, and as a result, the JCS becomes a “total captive of the urgent.”¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, S. Rep. No. 99–86, at 6.

¹⁵⁸ Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 313.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 7.

¹⁶¹ David C. Jones, “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12 No. 2 (Spring 1982): 146–147, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27547798?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

5. Insufficient Mechanisms for Change and Inadequate Feedback

DOD was stymied in its ability to productively confront change and provide quality feedback to the organization. In relation to change, the individual services possessed too much power and control over its own promotion and assignment system. As a result, the services were reluctant to change because there was no incentive to change. In relation to feedback, DOD lacked an ability to provide a worthwhile review of mistakes and issues seen in performance. This inability results in no lessons learned, and the potential is for the military services to repeat past mistakes.¹⁶² As Iran, Lebanon, and Grenada demonstrate, from one mission to the next, the DOD was repeating the same mistakes because of its inability to cohesively unite its force to work together.

6. Failure to Clarify the Desired Division of Work

DOD struggled to adequately delegate appropriate jobs and missions to its military services. One of the “basic mechanisms for enhancing organizational efficiency is to rationally divide the work among various structural components,” but for the DOD, “desired division of work has not been adequately clarified in many instances.”¹⁶³ This failure to divide up the responsibilities throughout the DOD also resulted in a duplication of effort wasting manpower, time, money, and resources. Without a unified command structure within the DOD, the services were performing roles that were specifically assigned the JCS.¹⁶⁴ Without the adequate power by the SECDEF, the CJCS, and the Unified Commands, the services contributed to an inefficient structure. Additionally, the staffs of the SECDEF, CJCS, and service secretaries were large and contributed to a span of control that left the senior leaders struggling to control, let alone manage, the individual services and ensure proper mission accomplishment.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Ibid., 147.

¹⁶³ S. Rep. No 99–86, 9.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Locher, “Taking Stock,” 16.

7. Insufficient Power and Influence of the Secretary of Defense

With the vastness of the DOD, the SECDEF lacked sufficient power to oversee and lead the respective military services. The “institutional forces” served to undermine the Secretary’s ability to lead, and the services were not willing to assist in the carrying out of the organizational mission for all involved because of internal interests.¹⁶⁶ The placing of the SECDEF as the ultimate person in charge of the DOD was significant because it placed a unified leader in charge of the DOD, with an advisor, the CJSC, who was advised by the JCS. The operational chain of command directly linked to the unified commands and commanders so that the operational needs and mission could be adequately provided for and taken care of. In light of the military failures seen previously, the restructuring would be seen as a resounding success during the first Gulf War.¹⁶⁷

8. Inconsistent and Contradictory Pattern of Congressional Oversight

Congress played a critical role in the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but that is not to say that there was not improvements that need to take place within Congress oversight of the DOD. The Locher report highlighted five key reasons that ultimately point to unfocused committees that often times provide contradictory guidance, and oversight, but also extensive micromanagement of the DOD programs and policies.¹⁶⁸

With the need for structural changes highlighted by the Locher report, Congress came down hard on the DOD to cause it to have to change. The DOD would have been hard pressed to find itself capable of reform without congressional intervention. Congressional intervention, in relation to the structural issues of the DOD is important to note, because Congress did not have to act. There was no outside pressure pushing Congress to intervene; however, so over a period of four years from 1982 to 1986, “the

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 10.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 15; Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, 20; Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 445–446.

¹⁶⁸ Lo S. Rep. No 99–86, 11.

Armed Services committees in both houses became familiar with the issue and ultimately passed what most would call a thoughtful, coherent reform legislation.”¹⁶⁹

The structural changes resulting from the Goldwater-Nichols Act serve to highlight that there must be points of innovation with organizations when challenges and problems are faced. The entire organization has to work together to bring about the integration and effectiveness required of an institution such as the DOD. If internal reform, as stated by General Jones, is not possible, then outside influence needs to be utilized to ensure worthwhile and productive measures can secure the success of the essential mission of protecting the homeland, which was a central driving force because of concern for United States to effectively utilize its armed services.¹⁷⁰

President Eisenhower stated in the 1950s, “separate service responsibilities and activities must always be only the branches, not the central trunk of the national security tree...unified effort is not only a prerequisite for successful command of military operations during wartime, today it is also a prerequisite for...defense program in peacetime.”¹⁷¹ The Goldwater-Nichols Act would “accelerate the unification of the U.S. armed forces by fundamentally altering the manner in which they were raised, trained, commanded, and employed.”¹⁷²

C. WHAT DOES THE STAR MODEL REVEAL ABOUT THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT?

The Goldwater-Nichols Act had eight specific intents when Congress passed it in 1986 to restructure the DOD:

- (1)** to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department; **(2)** to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; **(3)** to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and

¹⁶⁹ Thomas L. McNaugher, *Improving Military Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, (Washington, DC: Brookings General Press, 1994), 246.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 247.

¹⁷¹ Martin T. Seely, “The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act of 1986: Genesis and Postscript,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1987).

¹⁷² Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, 1.

specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands; (4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands; (5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; (6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources; (7) to improve joint officer management policies; and (8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.¹⁷³

Each of the eight key areas that were fundamental in changing the structure of the DOD stemmed from the issues highlighted by the Locher report.

1. Strategy and Structure

The strengthening of civilian authority was instrumental in ensuring a proper and effective strategy that originated from the leader of the DOD throughout the organization. The Goldwater-Nichols Act set the SECDEF as the leader of the DOD, and as such, it ensured that there was a focal point for who would drive the DOD's strategy.¹⁷⁴ The SECDEF utilized the *Defense Planning Guidance* (DPG), a classified document, which outlines the DOD's strategies, challenges, opportunities, and focuses on the organizational needs over a pre-determined planning period.¹⁷⁵ The DPG also serves as the measuring stick for evaluation of the military services and respective leaders of each branch of service. The SECDEF ensures that Unified Commander's respective guidance is taken into account and implemented through the respective unified command, and that the entities, air, sea, or land forces, that serve within the unified command.¹⁷⁶

The strategy is further aided through having one principle military advisor to the SECDEF. Through having a CJCS who is the only voice that matters to the Secretary, the confusion and issues highlighted in the Locher pre-Goldwater-Nichols were

¹⁷³ *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1986*, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (October 1, 1986).

¹⁷⁴ Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," 11.

¹⁷⁵ Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, 13.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

eliminated.¹⁷⁷ With a unified voice and focal point for the DOD through the CJCS, it enabled the CJS to know that speaking out against issues within the DOD and concerns with strategy could be shared without fear of retribution or lack of unified voice.

The structure of the operational chains of commands was disorganized and burdensome. The chain of command needed to emphasize who was in charge, in relation to respective day-to-day responsibilities and military endeavors around the globe as performed by the DOD. Specifically, the Commanders in Chief (CINC) of the combatant commands needed more authority, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act made the chain of command more clear: President to the SECDEF, to the CINCs. The Chairman of the JCS and the JCS were effectively removed from the decision-making processes. Additionally, the authority of the CINCs were improved through the ability to:

direct subordinate commands in all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command; organize the command and forces within the command; employ forces within the command as he considers necessary to accomplish the command's missions; assign command functions to subordinate commanders; coordinate and approve administrative, support, and disciplinary activities necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; select and suspend subordinate commanders and staff officers; and convene courts martial.¹⁷⁸

These factors inherently took better care of the personnel performing the mission and provided appropriate processes for personnel and management issues within the DOD while also ensuring that the right personnel and leaders had the appropriate responsibilities to perform the mission.

¹⁷⁷ Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, 24; LoPresti, *The JCS System Before and After*, 12, 21; David C. Jones, "Reform: The Beginnings," in *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective*, Dennis J. Quinn, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 8.

¹⁷⁸ John P. White, "Meeting the Needs of the Secretary of Defense," in *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective*, ed. Dennis J. Quinn, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 59; Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, 22–23; LoPresti, *The JCS System Before and After*, 35–36.

2. People, Rewards, and People

The reform for the DOD would force the military services to be able to adequately figure out how to correct the processes of communication and operating in a strictly vertical fashion within their respective domains. When operating in a vertical fashion, and as seen through the three military operations examples, the DOD was ineffective in accomplishing its mission. The requirement and need for jointness requires communication along the horizontal axis of the organization and forces the organizations to work together to achieve the mission for the effective defense of the United States.¹⁷⁹ The personnel system issues were mainly seen through the troubles to put quality officers into joint officer jobs.

There was stigma that was placed on officers who desired to serve in joint officer billets within the DOD. Officers were not prepared academically or through career experience, and the services would actively monitor the allegiance of an officer in a joint assignment to their respective branch of service.¹⁸⁰ The Goldwater-Nichols act placed requirements on the expectations for joint officers that made it more worthwhile to the career of officers, and at the same time, it assisted in the integration and jointness of the military services.¹⁸¹ The military services all maintained a requirement to ensure enough qualified officers were available to fill joint officer billets throughout the DOD.

Operational effectiveness was greatly improved through the Goldwater-Nichols Act. With the military branches unified, the people were better taken care of to perform the mission, and as result, the military commanders dealing with directing and commanding military operations were more capably equipped with a unified force of personnel who were focused because of the improvements of joint training. One key part of improving operational effectiveness was focus by Congress on key issues impacting quality management by DOD leaders. Such issues as an unduly large spans of control, unnecessary staff layers, duplication of effort by the military services, poor supervision,

¹⁷⁹ Jones, "Reform: The Beginnings," 3.

¹⁸⁰ Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," 14.

¹⁸¹ Quinn, "The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization," xi; LoPresti, *The JCS System Before and After*, 44.

and lacking guidance for division of work all revolved around managerial issues within the DOD. Additionally, the effectiveness improved through the creation of Joint Education for military members, joint doctrine, and joint training which helped unite and prepare personnel for the mission, and as a result, the Goldwater-Nichols Act made it easier for the DOD to transform and revitalize itself.¹⁸²

D. CONCLUSION

The Goldwater-Nichols Act highlights the need for change when an organization is struggling to adapt to its mission and struggling to effectively overcome the challenges within the organizational structure. The DOD, through admission of its inability to effectively champion change in itself, looked and allowed Congress to come up with solutions that would be effective to create a more joint and cohesive operating structure to benefit the organization. As a result of the changes, the DOD effectively overcame challenges to its operation strategy and structure, but the personnel and management concerns were assisted and alleviated in large regard because of the effectiveness of the changes.

This is not to say that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was universally accepted on day one. The Commandant of the Marine Corps thought chaos would ensue, and the Air Force Secretary warned the Goldwater-Nichols Act would have grave consequences for overall defense of the United States.¹⁸³ More currently, retired Admiral Dennis Blair, who became Director of National Intelligence, stated, “it took decades to overcome the negative aspects of inter-service rivalry among the services.”¹⁸⁴ Blair is honest in stating he thought the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a mistake, and the solution was something more obvious. He would later admit, “I was wrong. I was flat wrong. The armed forces

¹⁸² Locher, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” 16; Shalikashvili, “Goldwater-Nichols Ten Years From Now,” 69–71.

¹⁸³ James R. Locher, III, “Building on The Goldwater-Nichols Act,” in *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective*, ed. Dennis J. Quinn, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 19–20.

¹⁸⁴ Dennis Blair, “Remarks and Q&A by Director National Intelligence” (speech, Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, DC, April 6, 2010).

are much more effective working together today.”¹⁸⁵ The DOD had to respond and address the issues outlined by Congress, and as a result, it forced the DOD to get behind the processes that made it achieve great success through needed structural reform.

¹⁸⁵ Dennis Blair, “Remarks and Q&A by Director National Intelligence” (speech, Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, DC, April 6, 2010).

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VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis has highlighted significant challenges that DHS has and is facing in relation to its personnel and management concerns. The good news is that DHS is not the only government entity to ever face such personnel and management issues which also relate to structural issues within the department, and there is hope for DHS to overcome these challenges. The issues, however, are not going to disappear overnight. DHS has worked the past 13 years to find the right formula for overcoming its weaknesses, but DHS is still falling short of finding adequate solutions for overcoming its problems.

The study of the DOD highlights that personnel and management and structural issues are nothing new for an organization within the federal government. The DOD serves as a reminder of some of the potential solutions that can be put into place to help overcome the challenges without reinventing the wheel from the analysis of the all-volunteer force and the Goldwater-Nichols Act. From a broader perspective, there are a couple of things that can happen to assist DHS. First, DHS must be willing to focus and tackle one issue at a time. Second, DHS needs outside assistance through better focused Congressional support and pressure to ensure it makes the changes.

A. ONE REFORM EFFORT AT A TIME

The DOD faced two significant challenges in the span of thirteen years that were overcome and weathered through reform. The status quo of previous years was done away with, and change was forced in an attempt to ensure that the DOD could function as effectively and efficiently as possible. First, the reform efforts came through taking care of personnel issues via the all-volunteer force, and second, through taking care of the structural issues via the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Based on the sequence of events, it is not apparent that the sequence was planned in order to make one change benefit from the other. It is clear that the personnel issues being rectified first assisted with having the people in place in order to manage the structural reforms that would come later. It would be monumentally challenging, if not impossible, to focus on reform efforts while tackling working toward changing the personnel system and the structure of an organization.

DHS is in a similar position as the 1980s DOD, working reform efforts that are both personnel and management issues and structural issues all in one. The issue within a DHS, as with any organization, took time to be noticed to fully realize the problems were indeed problems that needed to be addressed. DHS has worked over and over again to find ways to mitigate its personnel and management issues, yet as previously discussed, the morale is still severely low. DHS has worked to find ways to better educate and train its workforce, but continues to focus from the top down rather than the bottom up. There are questions through DHS's short history on whether the department is structured appropriately to even carry out the homeland security mission. Still, DHS, like the DOD, must tackle its challenges of reform by focusing on one task at a time. The focus should be structural, or it should be personnel, but as it stands now, DHS is spinning its wheels trying to overcome both simultaneously.

B. OUTSIDE SUPPORT NEEDED

To add to the conundrum of solving its own problems, DHS has no authorizing statute within which it is to function and perform its mission.¹⁸⁶ The 2002 Homeland Security Act did provide framework for DHS and how it should operate, at least in part, but it did not provide an overall authorization of the department. Without governing authorization, DHS is certainly going to continue to struggle as it strives to make itself better. DHS needs help to reform itself. It would seem intuitive, but if the reform efforts being undertaken by DHS are not having the desired effect (and at this point it is obvious that they are not), then the organization is just wasting its time and resources.

With the all-volunteer force and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, outside actors, Congress and the President, served as the impetus for making significant changes to the DOD. The DOD was not looking to become an all-volunteer force nor was the DOD greatly concerned with its short comings in military operations leading up to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The DOD, as stated by General Jones in his outgoing comments to Congress, was not capable of reforming itself from the inside out, and it needed help.

¹⁸⁶ Daniel M. Gerstein, "Go Back to Basics to Reform Homeland Security," *Politico*, January 27, 2015, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/homeland-security-reform-114657?o=1>.

Congressional oversight of DHS is focused on everything that DHS does. Still, the efforts of Congress, while well-intentioned, are hindering and stifling DHS more than they are assisting as DHS is responsible for testifying before roughly eighty-six Congressional committees. The congressional oversight of DHS is not effectively focused to assist DHS, but the focus poses “extraordinary burdens on the Department” and “makes it far more difficult for the Congress to guide the Departments activities in a consistent and focused way” in order to assist DHS in carrying out the homeland security mission.¹⁸⁷ Currently, Congress’s lack of focus is only exacerbating the issues within DHS, not to mention taking the focus of DHS’s senior leaders away from the mission.

Congress could better assist DHS in its reform efforts through changing from an oversight role of so many committees, to streamlining the oversight to eliminate redundancies, at a minimum. More practical and worthwhile to the betterment of DHS would be an approach by Congress that forces DHS to make changes, such as with the Goldwater-Nichols Act which cemented the chain of command structure of who was in charge, which lead to increase jointness and interoperability amongst the military services, as well as increased education, training, and equipping the force to better perform to protect the United States from external threats.

C. EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF THE WORKFORCE

Education and training are crucial for any organization, but given the important mission of DHS to protect the United States, they are even more critical. As noted with the DOD, education and training were revamped to ensure a force that was qualified and capable to perform the missions of the respective services. Additionally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act focused on the jointness of education and training to ensure adequate interoperability of the military services. The act, and subsequent focus, on joint training and education was key to transforming the military services to be able to break down the previous barriers to inter-service cooperation.

¹⁸⁷ House Oversight Committee on Homeland Security United States Congress, Report on Legislative and Oversight Activities, H. Rep. No 97–097, at 119.

DHS has focused on working to improve education and training since its inception. There was an established DHS training plan from the beginning in 2004 that focused internally on the needs of DHS.¹⁸⁸ Hurricane Katrina, and corresponding lessons learned, served as an impetus for a more focused attempt at ensuring an increasingly intergovernmental professional education plan.¹⁸⁹ It was clearly understood that training and education of the workforce was critical. The focus was shifted from internal to both internal and external components of the homeland security mission to ensure it encompassed the necessary components to accomplish the homeland security mission.

The Hurricane Katrina lessons learned report led to an executive order that would be responsible for professional development for the homeland security workforce.¹⁹⁰ The National Security Professional Direction (NSPD) “proposed to encompass professional development fellowship opportunities, guidelines for career advancement and, most significantly, a plan for interagency and intergovernmental assignments.”¹⁹¹ The NSPD, established through an Executive Order of President Bush in 2007, had the right focus and right initiative for focusing the all-encompassing needs to train and educate a diverse workforce responsible for a myriad of tasks within distinct agencies. Two years after the implementation of the NSPD, and with the change in presidential administrations, the NSPD lost initiative and focus from the administration in 2009.

It has been previously noted that DHS lacks a legislative mandate, so this means that all the good plans that DHS possess for education and training have little support in gaining traction. It is understandable that something without a mandate receives little focus, but this is not effective for the longer term success of the workforce. DHS must receive the support required to improve its training and education, and it must be able to have the horsepower behind the initiatives that would come through Congressional support and action. The reform efforts and much needed mandate for DHS to operate

¹⁸⁸ Department of Homeland Security, *DHS Employee Training Plan*, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, November 2004), 4.

¹⁸⁹ Frances Fragos Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, (Washington, DC: White House, February 2006), 73.

¹⁹⁰ Morton and Ridge, *Next Generation Homeland Security*, 290.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

would greatly assist in being able to propel the NSPD forward to better manage, train, and equip the DHS workforce for the very important mission of securing and protecting the United States.

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