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THESIS

**THE DILEMMA OF POROUS BORDERS: UGANDA'S
EXPERIENCE IN COMBATING TERRORISM**

by

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December 2015

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COMBATING TERRORISM**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis looks at how Uganda's law enforcement agencies secure the country without undermining legitimate economic and social activities conducted through the borders. Because porous borders are, by definition, an international concern, this study also explores the regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms in place between Uganda and its regional partners on the one hand, and between Uganda and the international community on the other hand. Ultimately, the study finds that, given Uganda's geopolitical location as a land-locked country, the borders will remain more or less porous. The way forward is to evolve systems that will manage this porosity to the benefit of law and order in Uganda.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACSRT	African Center for Study and Research of Terrorism
ADF	Allied Democratic Front
AFIS	Automated Finger Identification System
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
ALIR	Liberation Army of Rwanda
AMISOM	African Mission to Somalia
AMLA	Anti-Money Laundering Act
AU	Africa Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace Security Committee
AU-RTF	African Union-Regional Task Force
CAR	Central African Republic
CI	Crime Intelligence
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CTA	Clandestine Transnational Actors
CTC	Counterterrorism Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESO	External Security Organization
EU	European Union
FDLR	Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISO	Internal Security Organization
JATT	Joint Anti-Terrorism Force

LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MI	Military Intelligence
NRA	National Revenue Authority
NCS	National Security Council
OSBP	One Stop Border Post
PATU	Police Anti-Terrorism Unit
PISCES	Personal Identification Secure Comparison System
PREACT	Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
RIS	Regional Strategic Initiative
SNA	Somali National Army
SWIFT	Special Wildlife Tourism Intervention Force
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Transnational Federal Government
TFIs	Transitional Federal Institutions
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority

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I. INTRODUCTION

On the night of June 11, 1998, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), a Ugandan rebel force of Islamic extremists based in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), infiltrated Uganda on its western border and attacked students at Kichwamba Technical Institute by setting dormitories ablaze. More than 80 students were burned to ashes and more than 60 others seriously injured; many more went missing.¹ The porous, mountainous Uganda-Congo border facilitated the terrorists' ability to infiltrate Uganda, attack the institute, and retreat to their safe havens in the eastern DRC.

On March 1, 1999, members of the Liberation Army of Rwanda (ALIR), comprising forces that carried out the genocide in Rwanda in the early 1990s and now based in the DRC, infiltrated Uganda in the southwest and launched a terrorist attack on foreign tourists in Bwindi National Park. The reason for the attack was to punish the United States, Britain, New Zealand, and Uganda for their support of the regime in Kigali.² Some 20 tourists were kidnapped and marched into the jungles in the Congo, where English-speaking tourists were separated and killed with axes, including two Americans, four Britons, and two New Zealanders. A Ugandan tourist guide was burned to death. In 1999, Rwanda security apprehended three suspects who were turned over to the American government in March 2003 for trial.

On July 11, 2010, during the World Soccer Championship in Kampala, Al Shabaab launched a suicide terrorist attack. During the attack, several people were killed, including sixty Ugandans, nine Ethiopians, one Irish woman, and one Asian; some 85 were wounded.³ Investigations revealed that the terrorists exploited the porous Uganda-

¹ Human Rights Watch, "HRW Condemns Deadly Attack by Ugandan Rebels on School Children," June 10, 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/news/1998/06/09/hrw-condemns-deadly-attack-ugandan-rebels-school-children>.

² U.S. Department of Justice, *Justice Department Announces Indictment, Arrests of Three Rebel Group Members for Brutal Murders of Two American Tourists in Uganda*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, March 3, 2003.

³ "Al-Shabab Claims Uganda Bombings: Twin Attacks Targeting World Cup Fans in Kampala Kill at least 74 People," Al Jazeera, July 13, 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/2010711212520826984.html>.

Kenya border to infiltrate items used in the attacks. Recently, a number of Muslim clerics have been assassinated in Kampala; senior security officials have linked these targeted killings to the ADF terrorists, who are still operating across borders.⁴

In all these cases, the threat of terrorism in Uganda was exacerbated by borders that are under-secured. To be sure, enhanced vigilance by the Ugandan security apparatus and close cooperation with regional and international partners in terms of intelligence sharing, intelligence training, logistical support, and closer border controls have helped lessen the terror threat. Since the last terrorist attack on Uganda in 2010, Al Shabaab has made several attempts to launch more attacks, but they have not realized their plans. Similarly, while the Congo-based ADF extremists continue to operate active cells in Uganda, they, too, have not succeeded in launching combat operations in the country.

However, the threat remains real and constant—in large part because of the situations on Uganda's borders. Though the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) degraded the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and forced the terrorists to flee the republic, the South Sudan–DRC–Uganda border is still vulnerable because of the persistent insecurity in the DRC and South Sudan. While Uganda has pacified the northeastern region of Karamoja after a successful disarmament exercise, its northeast border remains vulnerable because Kenya has not conducted a similar disarmament exercise.⁵ Furthermore, like the other troop-contributing countries (TCCs), Uganda's role in providing operational and tactical support to the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), continues to position it as a prime target for Al Shabaab.⁶ Thus, for Uganda, like many states in unsettled regions, stability and democracy may begin, literally, at the border.

⁴ "Kaihura Links Killing of Muslim Clerics to ADF Rebels," Radio One, December 30, 2014. <http://radioonefm90.com/kaihura-links-killing-of-muslim-clerics-to-adf-rebels/>.

⁵ Annette Weber, "Boundaries with Issues: Soft Border Management as a Solution?" *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, January 2012, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08869.pdf>.

⁶ Armada Global, "Uganda Al Shabaab Poised to Strike," October, 2013, http://www.armadaglobalinc.com/docs/uganda_al_shabaab_poised_to_strike.pdf.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis examines how porous borders have contributed to or exacerbated terrorism in Uganda. How could more effective border controls contribute to combatting terrorism in Uganda? How does Uganda's law enforcement apparatus exercise its mandate of ensuring secure borders without jeopardizing the smooth flow of goods and services upon which the country depends? What is the role of regional cooperation, and what are the challenges posed by international cooperation? In sum, the proposed research asks how border control fits into a holistic approach to combating terrorism.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

An emerging democracy in East Africa, Uganda is affected by developments within the region, whether or not they unfold within Ugandan territory.⁷ The geopolitical location of Uganda as a land-locked country and its proximity in the Great Lakes region exposes it to adverse effects of instability in the affected states. For example, the volatile situation in the Central African Republic and South Sudan has facilitated the infiltration of small arms and light weapons in the region; some of these weapons are likely to be accessed by terrorists. For another example, in January 2014, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda launched a Joint tourist visa aimed at tapping into the more than 50 million tourists who visit Africa every year; however, this outreach may not be achieved in the face of insecurity in Kenya.⁸ Following the massacre of 150 students by Al Shabaab at Garissa University on April 2, 2015, and other recent terrorist attacks in Kenya, the government is now building a security wall along the 682-kilometer border with Somalia.⁹

⁷ Kivinda Boniface Kilonzo, "Managing Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya." PhD diss., Nairobi University, 2013), 30.

⁸ Uganda Wildlife Authority, "Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda Launch Joint Visa at ITB," March 6, 2014, <http://www.ugandawildlife.org/news-a-updates-2/uwa-news/item/340-uganda,kenya,rwanda-launch-joint-visa-at-itb#sthash.cTr6sFMn.dpuf>.

⁹ Joseph Burite and Ilya Gridneff, "Kenya Failures on Security Weaken Ability to Fight Militants," *Bloomberg Business*, April 6, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-06/kenya-floundering-on-security-weakens-ability-to-fight-militants>.

The rationale and effectiveness of security walls along borders has been an issue of debate among different authorities. From an economic point view, Kenya would have to spend about 32 percent of its annual budget to complete a wall along this border—a staggering sum, particularly in the context of foregone opportunities for alternative investment. As Kilonzo observed, “national resources in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia have been diverted to the security sector in an effort to safeguard national territories.”¹⁰ Without question, a functional sovereign state must guarantee the security of its people, but the risk of regional and cross-border terrorism in East Africa threatens to limit severely, if not to undo, the region’s economic and democratic development.

The stability of the Horn of Africa is of strategic interest to the United States and the international community. The spread of radical Islam, piracy, and other transnational crimes in the region are of strategic concern to the United States and the rest of the western world, hence the need for close cooperation and support to stabilize the region.¹¹ The 1998 twin attacks by al Qaeda on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2002 missile attack on an Israeli airline in Mombasa were signals of the extent of the threat of terrorism on western interests in the region. (The American embassy in Uganda had also been targeted, but the plan was foiled by intelligence). A stable East Africa would, for example, facilitate the western powers’ deployment of assets to collect information about radical extremists with bases in the region and also safeguard political and economic interests of the west in East Africa and the Horn of Africa.¹²

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Different scholars have advanced different definitions and interpretations of the concept of borders. Scorgie defined borders as “barriers of penetration, lines of

¹⁰ Kilonzo, “Terrorism in the Horn of Africa.”

¹¹ J. Peter Pham, “American Foreign Policy Interests,” *The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 27, no. 1 (August 2005): 19–25, <http://www.tandfonline.com/libproxy.nps.edu/doi/full/10.1080/108039290919775>.

¹² David H. Shinn, “Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and The Horn,” *Foreign Service Journal*, September 2004, 42. <http://addisvoice.com/Ethiopia%20under%20Meles/Terrorism%20in%20the%20Horn%20Shinn.pdf>.

separation, and the legal limits of a state's sovereignty."¹³ Herbst argued that states are only viable if they have control over all their boundaries, and failure to broadcast infrastructural power has been one of the factors behind the endemic civil wars in Africa.¹⁴ This fragile infrastructure, particularly at the borders, also contributes to the terrorism threats today.

A historical review of Africa's borders reveals that while establishing national boundaries in Africa, the European colonialists arbitrarily used "latitudes, longitudes, geometric circles and straight lines to split several ethnic and cultural communities" to establish administrative territories of their convenience, which were not effectively controlled.¹⁵ Part of the problem surely begins with the fact that the legal lines of contemporary borders do not necessarily match up with cultural or social practice. In pre-colonial Africa, borders were viewed as a link and zones of contact with the neighboring communities; their permeability was necessary to further this function.¹⁶ With decolonization, these inorganic frontiers became national borders, but they did not always firm up fully in practical terms. Cultural connections have continued to thrive through shared cross-border activities, facilitated by the existence of unofficial entry and exit routes along the frontiers—all of which make borders that much more porous.

Today scholars argue that globalization, which is characterized by internationalization of production, liberalization of trade, and development of communication technology, has led to the erosion of borders.¹⁷ Peter Andreas observes that, contrary to conventional wisdom that in the new world of globalization borders have

¹³ Lindsay Scorgie, "Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?" *The Allied Democratic Forces and the Uganda/Congo Borderland* 100, no. 412 (February 18, 2011): 81, doi: 10.1080/00358533.2011.542297.

¹⁴ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 94.

¹⁵ Freedom C. Onuoha, "Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria," Al Jazeera Center for Studies, September 8, 2013, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/201398104245877469.htm>.

¹⁶ Timothy Mechlinski, "Towards an Approach to Borders and Mobility in Africa," *Journal of Borderland Studies* 25, no. 2 (November 21, 2011), 98, doi: 10.108/08865655.2010.969576.

¹⁷ Peter Andreas, "Redrawing the Line Borders and Security in the Twenty First Century," *International Security*, 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 82–84.

become irrelevant, instead the state intervention through border policing has increased due to the rising risks emanating from clandestine cross-border criminal activities.¹⁸

It is the function of the state to restrict territorial access by deterring infiltration of hostile groups or individuals into the country.¹⁹ The border can be a physical barrier, but it also can serve as a trade and economic opportunity, a balance that states must maintain in their border regimens. At the same time, as the Ugandan case makes clear, the regional aspect of border management underscores the indispensability of cooperation and information sharing. This literature review takes up all three aspects of border management in their turn.

1. Physical Barriers

“Just princes build walls to keep unwanted people out, while unjust princes build walls to keep their own people in.”

—Machiavelli²⁰

Brent Sterling observes that apart from maintaining security, walls as physical barriers give assurance to nationals that the state is doing something about the threat to security, “the image of a fortified border being considered more important than its actual effectiveness.”²¹ He also characterizes fortifications in three types: “refuge—temporary shelter from attack,” “positions for sustained active defense” and “strategic defense including barriers, lines, walls and fences.”²² A border fence or fortification most clearly falls into the third category, at least for proponents of such measures. Sterling further asserts that modern border walls are not just edifices of masonry architecture or wire mesh; rather they are complex physical barriers, flanked by boundary roads, topped by

¹⁸ Peter Andreas, *Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 4–6.

¹⁹ Andreas, *Border Games*, 78.

²⁰ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1940), 81.

²¹ Brent L. Sterling, *Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? What History Teaches Us about Strategic Barriers and International Security* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 115.

²² *Ibid.*, 309.

barbed wire, fitted with sensors, surveillance cameras, and spotlights, and operated under a set of laws and regulations.²³

On the other hand, some scholars have observed that walls are commonly built along borders among states with disparities in wealth. In Africa, for example, Botswana, with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of U.S. \$16,400, has erected a 300-mile electric fence along its border with Zimbabwe, whose GDP is U.S. \$600.²⁴ The primary objective of the wall is to control the threat of the spread of the contagious foot and mouth disease from Zimbabwe to Botswana, which threatens the cattle and beef industry—the country’s second-largest revenue earner after diamonds.²⁵ Also, between 2000 and 2003, Botswana’s population of 1.8 million was under threat of an influx of illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe, who came seeking employment opportunities. About 60,000 Zimbabwe nationals were reported to have entered the country through its porous borders; about 2,500 were repatriated each month. Leaders hoped that a fence would control the illegal movements across the border.²⁶

Taking advantage of a porous border, Palestinian nationals easily accessed Israel in search of employment and basic welfare needs; however, the influx of the Palestinians also provided easy access for terrorists to infiltrate Israel through the West Bank. This situation compelled the Israeli government, in 2002, to erect a “security fence,” 50 to 70 meters wide, consisting two layers of “smart fence” and a buffer.²⁷ While there was a dramatic fall in the number of successful terrorist incidents, the Israeli barrier had several problems. The fence separated Palestinian families, part of Palestinian land was annexed, and this situation has formed a source of conflict between the two states. The

²³ Sterling, “*Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbours?*,” 112.

²⁴ Index Mundi, “Zimbabwe vs. Botswana,” accessed July 10, 2015 <http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/zimbabwe.botswana/economy>.

²⁵ Rory Carroll, “Botswana Erects 300-Mile Electrified Fence to Keep Cattle (and Zimbabweans) Out,” *The Guardian*, September 9, 2003, accessed May 16, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/sep/10/southafrica.zimbabwe>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ “Special Report on the West Bank Security Barrier,” *The Electronic Intifada*, July 15, 2003, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=smart+electric+fence%2C+50+-+70+metres+wide%2C+israel+palestine.

International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled against Israel's unilateral action, and the United Nations (UN), too, condemned it.²⁸ So far, Israel has stuck by its fence as an effective counterterrorism measure. To detractors, however, it is a symbol of a security state gone too far.

In 1999 in the United States, debate over the Mexico–U.S. border was not on whether border control should be escalated, but rather about how and how much to escalate it. Options included deployments of more border agents, better inspection and surveillance technologies, and more collaboration with Mexico.²⁹ At the time, the idea of constructing a wall, fence, or any other physical barrier along the 1,954-mile continental border seemed far-fetched. After 9/11, however, the construction of border fortifications, which was a common feature during the colonial and Cold War eras as a measure for ensuring state sovereignty, resurfaced with a new cachet.³⁰ Fortifying the political boundary with some kind of physical structure seemed to many the only prudent next step in post-9/11 border management.

Reece Jones argues that though such external factors as countering terrorists, insurgents, or drug cartels contribute to states' decisions to build border walls, such internal factors as safeguarding the state's sovereignty, protecting its wealth, and preserving the nation's culture are more compelling reasons for construction of border walls.³¹

²⁸ The International Court of Justice (ICJ), "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," July 9, 2004, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=71&code=mwp&p1=3&p2=4&p3=6>.

²⁹ Andreas, *Border Games*, 146.

³⁰ Elisabeth Vallet and Charles-Philippe David, "Introduction: The (Re) Building of the Wall in International Relations," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 27, no. 2 (2012): 111–119, doi: 10.1080/08865655.2012.687211.

³¹ Reece Jones, "Why Build a Border Wall?" *NACLA Report on the Americas* 45, no. 3 (2012). <https://nacla.org/article/why-build-border-ll>.

2. Balancing Security and Economics

This great and peaceful border must be open to business, must be open to people—and it's got to be closed to terrorists and criminals.

—President George Bush, 2002³²

There is a general consensus among scholars and leaders on the need to balance enforcement of security measures at borders with economic interests. Peter Andreas argues that borders should not only act as obstacles against “Clandestine Transnational Actors (CTAs), but also as filters that do not impede legitimate border crossing.”³³ He also observes that maintaining a balance between guaranteeing border security and at the same time facilitating international trade is one of the biggest technological and political challenges faced by modern states.³⁴ Andreas also observes that while a comprehensive security enforcement strategy is implemented along the U.S borders, at the same time the country unloads about 6 million containers at its ports every year, and about 340,000 vehicles and 58,000 ships enter the country daily. This figure is expected to double in the next ten years.³⁵

Andreas further explains that with an eye toward the trade-frontier aspect of the border, in 2000, the U.S. government signed a “Smart Borders” agreement with Canada. Under the agreement, the United States introduced modern equipment to check travellers crossing the border. The United States also employs the “Secure Trade Program” that minimizes congestion at entry points.³⁶ In addition, the government operates a “Passenger Accelerated Service” to minimize long passenger queues.³⁷ Additionally, joint inspection facilities are provided to customs and immigration officials to facilitate physical inspection away from the U.S. side of the border to avoid delays and congestion.

³² Andreas, “Redrawing the Line Borders and Security,” 96.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 100.

³⁵ Ibid., 96.

³⁶ Ibid., 96–98.

³⁷ Kyle W. Killingbeck, “Caught in the Middle at the U.S.-Canadian Border” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 9.

These programs have survived the significant shift in the U.S. view of its border, which eventuated after 9/11. They thus have mitigated likely friction with Canada, whose border priority is trade, not border security.³⁸ It also assuages the significant number of Americans, including officials in the U.S. states that line the northern border, who are opposed to the excessive security arrangements at borders that are seen to interfere with commerce.³⁹ The relative calm of more a decade in the United States since 9/11 has strengthened the argument against excessive border controls. Killingbeck further observes that rather than stifle trade, many Americans would even forego a certain level of security to ensure trade with Canada is not disrupted.⁴⁰

Africa's share of global exports is only 3 percent. Many scholars argue that though some of the reasons for the low volume of Africa's trade are externally based, others relate it to barriers prevailing within African countries—many of them security expedients. Olusegun Aganga, for example, claims that by 2014, in an attempt to ensure security of goods imported and exported from Lagos to Seme Port, Benin, border, Nigerian security agencies operated 35 check points during the day and 50 check points at night. Needless to say, this regime disrupts free movement of goods and services and also fails to draw a balance between security and commerce.⁴¹

On the other hand, Ann Dumbuya explains that in Sierra Leon, the National Revenue Authority (NRA), the agency mandated to collect state revenue, has in the past few years modernized the processes and procedures of tax collection at its entry points. In June 2012, it introduced the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA); in addition, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with its neighbor, Guinea, which has enabled customs officials to jointly operate under one roof. As a result, time

³⁸ Kyle W. Killingbeck, "Caught in the Middle at the U.S.-Canadian Border," 9.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 79.

⁴¹ Olusegun Aganga, "Trade Policies and Regional Integration in Africa," *This Day Live*, February 12, 2014, <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/trade-policies-and-regional-integration-in-africa/171177/>.

taken by traders and other travellers to cross the border has been significantly reduced, and also a balance between trade facilitation and border security is realized.⁴²

3. Cooperation and Information Sharing

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the emergence of globalization has not only created “a borderless world,” but it also has facilitated the advancement of transnational crimes, including proliferation of weapons, money laundering, corruption and drug trafficking, all of which have reinforced the threat of terrorism.⁴³ The complex nature of modern terrorism dictates that states and security agencies cooperate and share information.

In terms of terrorism, information sharing relates to the exchange of antiterrorist intelligence. Jorg Friedrich defines it as “information given to executive agencies, namely police and the secret services, not only to identify and arrest terrorists but also to act tactically or strategically to prevent terrorist crime from happening.”⁴⁴ International terrorism is a complex phenomenon. According to Rohan Gunaratna and Matthew Levitt,

recruitment is done in one country, training in another, and the attack executed in a third country. In the case of the September 11 attacks, for example, al-Qaeda recruited members from Germany, trained them in Afghanistan, and attacked the United States.⁴⁵

The line between domestic and foreign threats is obscure, and transnational threats are now more interconnected, hence the need for cooperation in a multinational

⁴² Ann Marie Dumbuya, “Sierra Leone: Trade Facilitation and Border Security - Striking the Right Balance,” *AllAfrica*, February 12, 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201505080510.html>.

⁴³ Hans Born, Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills, *International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 20.

⁴⁴ Jorg Friedrich, *Fighting Terrorism and Drugs: Europe and International Cooperation* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 75.

⁴⁵ Rohan Gunaratna and Matthew Levitt, *The Matrix of International Terrorism: The Global Jihadist Threat* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, 2003), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-matrix-of-international-terrorism-the-global-jihadist-threat>.

context—failure to share information among national and international agencies has been presented as a major reason for the success of the 9/11 terrorist attack.⁴⁶

In their study, Denis Caleta and Paul Shamella observed that through such cooperation, intelligence gaps are filled, costs of intelligence collection are minimized, and diplomatic relations are established among states.⁴⁷ Information sharing and cooperation could be between domestic and international partners and may include: sharing of collected intelligence, analyses, estimates, joint operations and interrogation of terrorism suspects.⁴⁸ Strengthening information-sharing mechanisms is seen as the most effective option of countering global terrorism.⁴⁹

Hoffman and Morrison-Taw observe that the lack of cooperation and coordination among authorities in the 1970s and 1980s allowed terrorists in Western Europe to move undetected into France, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. The authors assert that for counterterrorism to succeed, security services and affected states must cooperate. Such collaboration prevents the terrorists from establishing sanctuaries across borders and also curtails the movement of terrorists and their agents.⁵⁰ States must cooperate and coordinate; it is difficult even for the most advanced countries to effectively manage their borders. For example, using routes from South America and connections from Russia and Eastern Europe, about 100,000 Chinese immigrants land at Mexican or North American ports by ship and illegally enter the United States annually.⁵¹

A number of obstacles that limit information sharing and cooperation among intelligence agencies have been identified. At the international level, discrepancies in the

⁴⁶ Branko Lobkinar, *Intelligence and Combating Terrorism: New Paradigm and Future Challenges*, edited by Denis Caleta, and Paul Shamella, Ljubljana, Slovenia: Institute for Corporate Security Studies, 2014, 77.

⁴⁷ Branko Lobkinar, *Intelligence and Combatting Terrorism*, 2014, 78.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 79.

⁴⁹ Born, Leigh, and Wills, *International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability*. 20.

⁵⁰ Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, *A Strategic Frame Work for Countering Terrorism* (N-3506-DOS) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2005/N3506.pdf>.

⁵¹ Peter, Lupsha, "Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State," *Transnational Organized Crime* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 26.

definition of who is and who is not a terrorist affect the extent of information sharing and cooperation. In some cases, states even cooperate with terrorist groups, as long as they further their interests. For instance, in the recent past, though part of the global effort to fight terrorism, Pakistan supported Al Qaeda-allied terrorist groups against its rival, India.⁵² Jorg Friedrichs observed that the sensitivities about national sovereignty and the fear by states that intelligence data could be compromised or even destroyed in the course of international exchange limit cooperation and information sharing. These discrepancies among agencies make information sharing complicated.⁵³

At the national level, competing interests and rivalry among agencies hinder information sharing, while at the regional level, fragile and dynamic political situations, particularly in developing countries, disrupt cooperation. Worse, intelligence agencies often are viewed as being inherently bureaucratic, highly secretive, and compartmentalized; this assumption further limits the extent to which information may be shared.⁵⁴ What's more, different levels of capability and capabilities among agencies limit the extent of information sharing and cooperation. On the whole, information exchange is limited by a combination of a number of factors that may include institutional cultures, varying capabilities, rivalry, confidentiality, state policy, political influence, and mistrust.⁵⁵

From the literature review, it is apparent that the security of borders is a priority concern of all states. In regard to the U.S–Canada frontier, though, a compromise on balancing economic and security interests has been largely realized; this remains so, as long as the United States' security is not threatened. On the other hand, Israel has ignored the position of the international community, including the UN, and continued to strengthen its controversial “Smart Wall” with Palestine. Similar sentiments expressed by Zimbabwe have been ignored by Botswana in defense of its national interests. These

⁵² Caleta and Shemella, *Intelligence and Combatting Terrorism*, 2014, 82.

⁵³ Jorg Friedrichs, *Fighting Terrorism and Drugs: Europe and International Police Cooperation*, Routledge, 2007, 60.

⁵⁴ Caleta and Shamella, *Intelligence and Combatting Terrorism*, 2014, 81–85.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 79–87.

dynamics and such others as the impediments to cooperation and information sharing among countries across borders are of interest to this study.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND HYPOTHESES

Arising from the split of border communities by the colonial boundaries, nationalities across borders cooperate to out-manuever the state to ensure their survival.⁵⁶ The dilemma of Uganda's porous borders is, to a great extent, exacerbated by the state's inability to exert full authority over the "border-landers" who look at the state's enforcement machinery as a threat to their existence.

On the other hand, the informal trade activities conducted by the border communities have a significant contribution to national development. For example, in 2012, Uganda's informal imports contributed 16.1 percent of the total imports, while informal exports contributed 4.2 percent of all exports. Most of the informal imports (46.3 percent) were from Kenya.⁵⁷ However, the illegal routes through which these transactions are made also serve other transnational criminals including terrorist agents. A similar scenario prevails on Uganda's western and northwestern borders with the DRC where criminals have operated across borders, exploiting links between cross-border communities.

Lack of strong, established and well-facilitated structures along Uganda's borders to effectively conduct surveillance and monitor border activities provides transnational criminals with an opportunity to violate the national borders. However, this situation can only be remedied by a regional effort between Uganda and its neighbors through joint border operations and information sharing. Though some improvements in this regard are underway, the development is ad hoc and needs improvement.

⁵⁶David Coplan, "Introduction: From Empiricism to Theory in African Border Studies," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 25, no. 2 (November 2011): 1–5, doi:10.1080/08865655.2010.9695757.

⁵⁷ Bank of Uganda, The Informal Cross Border Trade Survey Report 2012 (Kampala, Uganda: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, August 2013), <https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bou-downloads/publications/TradeStatistics/ICBT/All/ANNUAL-INFORMAL-CROSS-BORDER-TRADE-SURVEY-REPORT-2012.pdf>.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

Given the complexity and unique nature of international borders, each influenced by different historical, cultural, economic, social, and political factors, this research seeks to gain insight into the problem and, at the end, suggest some recommendations. The research therefore employs an exploratory approach to understanding the dilemma of porous borders in combatting terrorism in Uganda. Specifically, it explores how Uganda's law enforcement agencies secure the country without undermining legitimate economic and social activities conducted through the borders.

Through exploratory research, the study explores the regional cooperation and coordination mechanism in place between Uganda and her regional partners on one hand and between Uganda and the international community on the other hand. The research also explores the various strategies in place to combat terrorism in Uganda and the region in general. Because the threat of terrorism and porous borders is a regional challenge, priority of the literature to be explored relates to Uganda's ring states (Burundi, DRC, Central African Republic, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Southern Sudan, and Tanzania). The research uses available primary sources, particularly government documents; and official reports by reputable international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, African Union (AU), East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), on policy matters relating to the borders in East Africa. It also considers selected material from the media. Furthermore, the research uses scholarly secondary material including books, journals, articles, and seminar papers. Also, documents by strategic partners who have been working closely with Uganda in combatting terrorism—for example, the U.S. State Department—round out the source material.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter I covers the background of terrorism in Uganda, the literature review, and the methodology. Chapter II looks at Uganda's border situation to establish the nature and extent of the terrorism threat in Uganda and how the porous borders impact the efforts to combat terrorism. Chapter III examines

Uganda's counterterrorism strategy and evaluates its impact. Chapter IV assesses the regional counterterrorism efforts in East Africa and examines the extent of cooperation and information sharing. Chapter V includes an analysis from the findings in the preceding chapters, draws a conclusion, and suggests recommendations.

II. UGANDA'S BORDER SITUATION

Before independence, African national borders were vaguely defined and physically un-demarcated by the European colonizers. The frontiers were entirely a matter of administrative convenience for the imperialist powers; they had little, if anything, to do with the native geographic or cultural boundaries of the place. For example, Mark Leopold describes a response by a colonial agent when asked to clarify the Uganda-Congo border:

The West Nile section of the border had been defined by treaty between Britain and Belgium as the watershed of the Nile and Congo rivers, and it therefore ran for much of its length along the top of a range of hills. He asked his superior how he was to know which side was which, and was told that, where the streams ran west (towards the River Congo) this was the Congo side, and where they ran east (towards the Nile) that was Uganda. “What about where there are no streams?” he asked, and was told “Then just piss on the ground and see which way it flows”⁵⁸

Like most other African states, after independence, Uganda's international borders became a source of conflict and a conduit for crimes. Peter Andreas remarks that “borders are under siege by clandestine transnational activities.”⁵⁹ Uganda's borders, too, witness a host of hostile activities including human trafficking, smuggling, arms trafficking, and transnational terrorism. This chapter describes Uganda's geography and how it facilitates terrorism; it assesses the situation at Uganda's borders and also explores factors that make Uganda's borders porous.

A. UGANDA'S GEOGRAPHY

Uganda is located in the East African region. It lies along the equator and covers about 91,136 miles—almost the size of the U.S. state of Oregon.⁶⁰ Uganda's borderline is about 1,676 miles. Its northern border with South Sudan covers a stretch of 270 miles;

⁵⁸ Mark Leopold, “Crossing the Line: 100 Years of the North-West Uganda/South Sudan border,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 3 (2009), 470, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531050903273743>

⁵⁹ Andreas, *Border Games*, 142

⁶⁰ “Uganda,” Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations, 2007, <http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Uganda.aspx>.

and political consequences, including infiltration by terrorists.⁶³ In addition, South Sudan offers the largest market for Uganda's exports, yet within five months of the outbreak of civil war, Uganda's export revenue from South Sudan dropped by about 80 percent (from \$73,509,753 to \$14,701,950).⁶⁴ Compared to its neighbors, Uganda has a small strategic depth of only 35.9 square miles of territory per mile of border. The limited strategic depth compels Uganda to take "pro-pro-active strategies to promote regional cohesion, manage the borders better, and deter potential adversaries."⁶⁵

B. THE SITUATION AT UGANDA'S BORDERS

Cross-border trade is the main activity along Uganda's borders. Though the trade is of high economic significance to Uganda and its neighbors, it also poses a challenge to national security. This trade is conducted through foot paths or "panya routes"—"panya" is the Swahili word for "rat." Wafula Okum explains that "illegal border crossing points, usually called 'mice or rat routes,' are used by smugglers who charge a fee ranging from \$15."⁶⁶ Transporters commonly known as "boda boda" facilitate the movement of uncustomed goods across borders because of their familiarity with security officials and other border officials.⁶⁷ Due to the complexity of informal activities along the border, monitoring by security is not effective enough to counter likely infiltration of transnational criminals, particularly terrorists along Uganda's borders.

⁶³ UNHCR, "2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Uganda," The UN Refugee Agency, accessed May 4, 2015, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483c06.html>.

⁶⁴ Patrick Kagenda, "The Lost Merchants of Juba," *The Independent*, May 31, 2014, <http://www.independent.co.ug/features/features/9018-the-lost-merchants-of-juba->.

⁶⁵ Ministry of Defence of Uganda, *White Paper on Defence Transformation* (London: Conflict, Security, and Development Group, June 17, 2004), <http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/pdf/gou.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Wafula Okumu, *Border Management and Security in Africa* (Concordis Briefing 4) (Cambridge, England: Concordis International, June 2011), http://concordis.international/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2011-Sudan-Border-Regime-Briefing-4-BORDER-MANAGEMENT-SECURITY-II_LR.pdf.

⁶⁷ In Uganda, the term "boda boda" is used to mean bicycle or motorcycle taxi. It is derived from the phrase "border to border movement." The term originates from the early 1980s, when bicycles were used to carry travellers to Uganda/Kenya border points of Malaba and Busia because there were no vehicles. Since then, transport by cyclists became popular and spread all over the country. Laura Sellmansberger, "Boda-Bodas: Kampala's Most Efficient Form of Transportation, for Better or for Worse," *Fellows Blog*, October 18, 2012, <http://fellowsblog.kiva.org/fellowsblog/2012/10/18/boda-bodas-kampalas-most-efficient-form-of-transportation-for-better-or-for-worse>.

1. South Sudan—Uganda’s Northern Border

Uganda borders South Sudan in the north, with no significant natural barriers between the states. The outbreak of the civil war in South Sudan in December 2013 almost led to the collapse of the state, a fate that was interrupted thanks in no small part to the prompt intervention of Ugandan forces. As a result of the civil war, Uganda’s northern border was overwhelmed by an influx of refugees; some of these were armed deserters who posed a security threat to the country.⁶⁸ Despite the peace agreement signed between the South Sudan government and the opposition rebel leader, war rages on in some parts of the country.⁶⁹ Although there is no evidence of terrorist cells in South Sudan, there is suspicion that terrorists from the Horn of Africa could exploit the country’s porous borders to transit to Uganda and the rest of the region.⁷⁰

The LRA continues to exploit the confusion in South Sudan and the region to maneuver and survive in the vast and difficult terrain, hence remaining a potential threat to Uganda’s northern border. For example, the LRA fighters poach elephants for ivory in the DRC’s Garamba National Park. A source revealed that the LRA sold ivory to Sudan Armed Forces at Kafia King in Sudan and to unidentified individuals flying white helicopters, who in turn supplied guns, ammunition, and food to LRA fighters.⁷¹ Unless regional pressure against the LRA is sustained, poaching of elephants halted, and those involved in the ivory trade apprehended, the threat of the LRA to Uganda’s northern border remains real.

⁶⁸ More than 60 military uniforms and ammunitions were recovered by Ugandan security personnel from the refugee camps in Amuru District. Refugee Law Project, *Sudan Crisis: Impact on Northern Uganda: A Rapid Assessment Report, January, 2014* (Kampala, Uganda: Refugee Law Project, 2014), http://www.refugeelawproject.org/files/ACCS_activity_briefs/14_01_24_Rapid_Assessment_Brief_Impact_of_South_Sudan_Crisis_in_Uganda.pdf.

⁶⁹ Marc Santora, “Salva Kiir, South Sudan’s President, Signs Peace Deal with Rebels,” *The New York Times*, August 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/world/africa/south-sudan-peace-deal-rebels-president.html?_r=0.

⁷⁰ “South Sudan 2015 Crime and Safety Report,” Bureau of Diplomatic Security, January 12, 2015, <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=16898>.

⁷¹ Kasper Agger and Jonathan Hutson, “Kony’s Ivory: How Elephant Poaching in Congo Helps Support the Lord’s Resistance Army” (Washington, DC: Enough Project, June 2013), <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/KonysIvory.pdf>.

2. The DRC—Uganda’s Western Border

In 1996, supported by the then-Congo government, the ADF terrorists established bases from which to terrorize the neighboring western Uganda districts of Kasese, Kabarole, and Bundibugyo, killing more than 1,000 civilians. In Kasese, a border district, by 2001, revenue collection had fallen by 75 percent as a result of the disruption and loss caused by the ADF.⁷² In the DRC, the ADF engaged in a series of atrocities, including “kidnapping and enslaving women and children, human trafficking, forced conversion, forced marriage, torture, summary execution, attacking hospitals, and using child soldiers.”⁷³ Following these atrocities by the ADF, in 1998, the Uganda government deployed its forces to pursue them in their hideouts in the eastern DRC. At the same time, Rwanda also deployed forces in eastern DRC to pursue armed rebels who perpetrated the genocide four years prior and fled to the eastern DRC and now were threatening security across its border. In July 1999, the regional leaders signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, demanding the two countries to withdraw their forces from the DRC. Chapter 4 of the agreement, specifically, provided for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC; Chapter 12 required that the DRC government ensure the elimination of threats posed by armed groups along the DRC’s borders with its neighbors.⁷⁴

Despite the Lusaka Agreement, the situation along the border did not improve. Because the DRC government lacked the capacity to effectively control its eastern region and the UN Mission in Congo was not mandated to dislodge armed groups in the rebel-affected Congo, the ADF maintained their camps, and therefore continued to threaten the Uganda border.

Oblivious to the threat posed by the armed groups along the borders, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1304 (2000), charging that Rwanda

⁷² Kristof Titeca and Koen Vlassenroot, “A Biography of the Allied Democratic Forces,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (February 2012): 159.

⁷³ Daniel Fahey, “New insights on Congo’s Islamist rebels,” *The Washington Post*, February 19, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/19/new-insights-on-congos-islamist-rebels/>.

⁷⁴ Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement,” U.S. Department of State, July 10, 1999, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/22634.htm>.

and Uganda “violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC.”⁷⁵ The UN demanded the immediate withdrawal of their troops under pain of punitive measures.⁷⁶ However, again the actual withdrawal of these foreign forces was not possible because of the continued presence of the ADF near the common borders with the DRC, who persistently crossed over and terrorized local communities. In September 2002, Uganda and DRC leaders signed an agreement for the orderly withdrawal of troops, while the DRC pledged to take measures to deny sanctuary to the rebels.⁷⁷ By this time, the ADF’s capacity to launch attacks in Uganda had been significantly degraded by Uganda forces. In March 2007, the ADF attempted a major comeback to Uganda through the Bundibugyo district but were repulsed by the Uganda forces, with massive losses. While the Uganda military has pacified the Ugandan side of the border, the DRC side remains volatile. A UNSC report reveals that by 2013 the ADF occupied about 162 square miles of the eastern DRC’s—Beni province, along the Ugandan border.⁷⁸ However, in 2014, the DRC and UN forces launched operations against the ADF; the rebels have been uprooted from their bases and are now scattered in the DRC’s jungle-mountainous terrain.

The current challenge to Uganda’s security at the western border is its porousness due to cross-border social relations. Scorgie observes that the familial ties among the Congo (Banande) and Uganda (Bakozzo) borderland communities over the years create “an independent borderland identity” that complicates border control and generates friction in the border region.⁷⁹ Because the border is open and border communities are

⁷⁵ Security Council, “Security Council Demands that Ugandan and Rwandan Forces Withdraw Immediately from Kisangani, Democratic Republic Of Congo” (S/C/110/816), United Nations, June 2000, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000616.sc6877.doc.html>.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Agreement Between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Uganda on Withdrawal of Ugandan Troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cooperation and Normalization of Relations between the Two Countries (Luanda Agreement,” U.S. Department of State, September 6, 2002, [http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/policy_documents/Ug_gov_and DR Congo_gov_security_agreement.pdf](http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/policy_documents/Ug_gov_and_DR Congo_gov_security_agreement.pdf).

⁷⁸ Emilie Serralta et al., *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo* (S/2014/42) (New York: United Nations Security Council, January 23, 2014), 20, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42.pdf.

⁷⁹ Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?,” 83.

bound by cultural and economic ties, individuals and groups move freely across the borders. These movements make it difficult to identify likely terrorists who could infiltrate the country through the border. The geostrategic position of the ADF in a remote mountainous terrain along the Uganda-DRC border has facilitated the survival of the rebels.⁸⁰ The accessibility to Congo's abundant gold and timber, and the ability to penetrate the vibrant cross-border trade using local agents provide the ADF with resources to conduct terror. For example, in the ADF's area of control, timber dealers paid \$300 per chainsaw to the ADF to harvest timber, while defaulters paid \$500.⁸¹ Accessibility to resources by the ADF, coupled with the DRC's inability to deny them sanctuary across the border, perpetuates the survival of the terrorist group.

3. Kenya—Uganda's Eastern Border

The Kenya–Uganda border is the most vibrant of Uganda's borders; it is the gateway for Uganda's imports and exports through the Kenyan coastal port of Mombasa. Like other borders in Uganda, this border conducts a significant amount of trade. Though the bulk of trade is formal, a significant amount of it is informal (not documented by customs). Also along the border, illegal trade by petty smugglers takes place. Informal trade plays a significant role in Uganda's economic development. In 2012, for example, informal imports contributed 16.1 percent of the total imports, while informal exports contributed 4.2 percent of all exports. Most informal imports were from Kenya, contributing 46.3 percent of the formal imports.⁸² In 2013, Kenya received 49.4 percent of Uganda's informal exports. The Busia border point handled the greatest amount of Uganda's informal exports to Kenya, accounting for 33.9 percent (US \$18.2 million).⁸³

⁸⁰ International Crisis Group, *Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU's Lost Rebellion* (Crisis Group Africa Briefing no. 93) (Nairobi, Kenya: International Crisis Group, December 19, 2012), 1, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/b093-eastern-congo-the-adf-nalus-lost-rebellion-english.pdf>

⁸¹ Ibid., 11

⁸² Bank of Uganda, *The Informal Cross Border Trade Survey Report 2012*.

⁸³ Bank of Uganda, *The Informal Cross Border Trade Survey Report 2013* (Kampala, Uganda: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, November, 2014), <https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bou-downloads/publications/TradeStatistics/ICBT/All/ANNUAL-INFORMAL-CROSS-BORDER-TRADE-SURVEY-REPORT-2013.pdf>.

Lack of capital, high taxes, and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures discourage low income traders to engage in formal transactions. Instead, based on speculation, they smuggle a variety of items in small quantities across the border.⁸⁴ Goods are delivered at the border in concealment, temporarily stored, and later smuggled across the border, using head portage or bicycles, through illegal entry points. Among the items smuggled are agricultural products and manufactured items.⁸⁵ The porosity of the border and the cross-border familial ties among such communities as Samia, Gisu, and Iteso facilitates these cross-border transactions, but at the same time jeopardizes security at the border.

4. Kenya—Uganda’s Northeastern Border

Though Uganda’s northeastern border is part of the 580-mile eastern border with Kenya, it is unique in terms of activities and the terrorist threat in Uganda. Karamoja, a region in the northeast of Uganda, is home to five major Karamojong nomadic pastoral tribes, including the Dodoth, Jie, Bokora, Matheniko, Tepth, and Pian. All live in a semi-arid savannah bushland area. The region borders the nomadic Turkana and Pokot communities of Kenya and the Toposa nomadic tribe of South Sudan.⁸⁶ Before 1926, when the British colonialists arbitrarily established the Kenya–Uganda border, the Turkana and Pokot pastoralists of West Kenya lived and shared resources with the Karamojong pastoralists in the then Rudolf Province of Uganda.⁸⁷ The Karamojong share cultural and linguistic ties with the communities across the border.⁸⁸ Whereas informal trade and smuggling are the main activities along most of the Kenya-Uganda border, in contrast, armed cross-border raiding of livestock has been the main activity along the Uganda–Kenya northeastern border.

⁸⁴ Chris Ackello-Ogutu, *Unrecorded Cross-Border Trade between Kenya and Uganda: Implications for Food Security* (Bureau for Africa Technical Paper No. 59) (Washington, DC: USAID, July 1997).

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Kiperer Ngeiywa, “Deterring Cross-Border Conflict in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya-Uganda Border” (Master’s thesis, Nairobi University, 2008), 17.

⁸⁷ Kiperer Ngeiywa, “Deterring Cross-Border Conflict in the Horn of Africa,” 2008.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Cattle rustling, in turn, has cultivated the illegal arms trade in the territory—among other dubious enterprises that today have terroristic potential. The Karamojong and other nomadic communities for decades provided markets for illicit weapons from the region. The first modern rifles in Karamoja were brought by Arab and Swahili merchants in the mid-19th century, when ivory was exchanged for guns with the Karamojongs. Also, the Shifta, a banditry group from Ethiopia and Somalia, supplied guns in exchange for ivory with the pastoralist tribes of Karamoja region.⁸⁹ Though no significant incidents related to terrorism have been registered on the northeastern border, the region remains vulnerable to an influx of illegal arms, which could fall in terrorist hands. Some of the weapons are suspected to originate from terrorist-infested Somalia and infiltrate into the Karamoja region through the porous Uganda–Kenya border. The continued inflow of arms and persistent cattle rustling led to stagnation of development in the northeastern region.⁹⁰

To contain the problem of cattle rustling and to halt the infiltration of arms, in 2001, the Uganda government launched a phased disarmament exercise. The first phase was to mobilize, sensitize, and encourage the voluntary hand-over of illegal guns in Karamoja.⁹¹ The second phase called for military pressure on violent armed warriors to apprehend and prosecute whoever failed to voluntarily hand over the illegal arms. The second phase is also referred to as the forceful disarmament phase, focused on recovering an estimated 40,000 illegal guns in Karamoja.⁹² By 2012, the disarmament process had registered remarkable success, with cattle rustling halted and most of the illegal guns recovered; peace has been restored in Karamoja region.⁹³ So far, Uganda has been

⁸⁹ Ngeiywa, “Deterring Cross-Border Conflict in The Horn Of Africa,” 23.

⁹⁰ Joe Powell, *Karamoja: A Literature Review* (London: Saferworld, March 2010), https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=cattle+rustling+undermine+karamoja+development.

⁹¹ *IRINnews* “Uganda: Army to Begin Forcible Disarmament of Karamojong,” Humanitarian News and Analysis, February 2002, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/30469/uganda-army-to-begin-forcible-disarmament-of-karamojong>.

⁹² *IRINnews*, “Army to Begin Forcible Disarmament of Karamojong.” 2002.

⁹³ UNDP, “Community Policing Promotes Peace in Karamoja Region,” UNDP in Uganda, 2014, <http://www.ug.undp.org/content/uganda/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/successstories/community-policing-promotes-peace-in-the-karamoja-region-.html>.

fortunate that apart from cattle rustling along the porous northeastern border, no terrorist-related activity has been registered. However, the challenge of illegal arms across the borders persists because neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan have not disarmed their warriors.⁹⁴ The permanent deployment of Ugandan security forces along the border to keep guard against suspicious cross-border movements may control cattle rustlers, but does not guarantee safety against infiltration by terrorists.

C. OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO UGANDA’S POROUS BORDERS

Apart from the geopolitical factors that make Uganda’s borders porous, there are also institutional factors that compound the problem of porous borders. Among these are lack of modern equipment, inadequate manpower, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, unresolved border disputes, and poor cooperation with local communities.

1. Lack of Modern Equipment

While terrorism exhibits a high level of resilience and significant ability to adapt to new technology, at Uganda’s entry ports, security monitoring is insufficient, partly because of a lack of modern technical equipment necessary for detection of materials crossing into the country.⁹⁵ Nelson Alusala, for example, observes that inspection of trucks by security at Uganda’s border points is ineffective; verification is manually done because of the lack of such modern equipment as scanners.⁹⁶ At Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport, the body and baggage scanners are unable to detect a variety of explosives. Among other things, the airport needs to upgrade its modern X-ray machines, night-vision equipment, and the intelligent camera system. Bureaucratic procedures and budgetary constraints have delayed the procurement of these items.⁹⁷ Lack of modern

⁹⁴ Xinhua News Agency, “Kenya Says not to Disarm Pastoral Communities,” *China View*, August 11, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/11/content_11864444.htm.

⁹⁵ Nelson Alusala, “Informal Cross-Border Trade and Arms Smuggling along the Uganda–Rwanda Border,” *African Security Review* 19, no. 3 (July 2010): 21, doi:10.1080/10246029.2010.519875

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁹⁷ Tabu Butagira “CAA, Police in Spotlight as Entebbe Airport Bomb Detectors Fail to Work,” *Daily Monitor*, August 17, 2015, <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/CAA--police-in-spotlight-as-Entebbe-airport-bomb/-/688334/2836362/-/cdia6/-/index.html>.

equipment makes Uganda's borders more porous and vulnerable to infiltration by terrorists.

2. Inadequate Manpower

According to Uganda's Ministry of Internal Affairs, while Uganda has 40 gazetted immigration border points, there are more than 300 illegal border points operating along its borders.⁹⁸ Even the gazetted immigration points are ill-manned because the immigration department does not have adequate manpower. Further, security deployments are concentrated at the entry ports, and few are available to patrol the borderline.⁹⁹ Inadequate manpower leaves security vacuums, which exacerbate the problem of porous borders.

3. Corruption

Among the manifestations of corruption is bribery. Alex Tumushabe observes that laxity in immigration control, poor remuneration, and corruption among security officials at border stations complicates the challenge of porous borders in Uganda.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, a 2013 report by a Uganda Parliament oversight committee on borders also reveals that corruption by revenue collectors at some of the customs border posts is prevalent.¹⁰¹

Kambere rightly argues that a porous border does not only mean physical absence of border controls, but also the potential of border posts being manipulated by terrorist agents to smuggle into the country bombs and bomb materials.¹⁰² It is possible that terrorist agents enter and exit the country's border points with ease because of the possibility to bribe officials.

⁹⁸ Tom Malaba, "Immigration Gazettes 16 Border Points," URIN, July 10, 2012, <http://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=43543>

⁹⁹ Okumu, *Border Management and Security in Africa*, 7.

¹⁰⁰ Alex Bwoma Tumushabe, "The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 24.

¹⁰¹ Office of the Clerk to Parliament, *Report of the Sectoral Committee on East African Community Affairs on Oversight Visits Carried Out at the Borders of Uganda with the East African Community Partner States* (Kampala, Uganda: Parliament of Uganda, August, 2013, <http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/documents-and-reports/committee-reports/category/46-committee-on-east-african-affairs>).

¹⁰² Kambere, B. Geoffrey, "Countering Al Shabaab: A Case to Minimize Transnational Terrorist Threats" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 28.

4. Inadequate Infrastructure

Lack of basic infrastructure undermines efficiency in the control of borders in Uganda. The Parliamentary committee report also reveals that many entry ports in Uganda lack sufficient office space and accommodation for border officials.¹⁰³ Such inadequacies undermine motivation to work, create inefficiency, and could lead to unethical behavior among personnel. In addition, though Uganda's road infrastructure has greatly improved, there are some remote border stations, like Suam on the Uganda-Kenya border, that are almost inaccessible during wet seasons.¹⁰⁴ Communication infrastructure, on the other hand, has improved thanks to the numerous mobile telephone networks in the country.

Because of Uganda's delay in institutionalizing the use of national identity cards and also because of failure to effectively guard borders, immigrants enter freely by water and land and settle in the country undetected.¹⁰⁵ The planners of the July 11 terrorist attack acquired residence in Kampala with ease. In the last two years, Uganda has embarked on the exercise of registration of eligible citizens for national identity cards.¹⁰⁶ With the completion of the exercise last December, it is hoped that infiltration into the country by criminal elements, particularly terrorists, will be minimized.

5. Unresolved Border Disputes

Uganda, like many colonial states of Africa, is at conflict with some of its neighbors over unresolved border disputes. For example, since 2004, Uganda has had a dispute with Kenya over Migingo Island in Lake Victoria, on the eastern border. Both countries claim ownership of the one-acre island that is strategically used by their fishermen. The tensions raised serious border tensions and could have led to a clash

¹⁰³ Ibid., 11–14.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Deborah Mulumba and Wendo M. Olema, *Policy Analysis Report: Mapping Migration in Uganda* (Oldenburg, Germany: IMMIS, September 18, 2009), 19, <http://www.immis.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Policy-Analysis-Report-Uganda.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ National Security Information System (NSIS), "President Museveni Launches Issuance of the Uganda National ID at Munyonyo," December 3, 2014, <http://nsis.go.ug/news/president-museveni-launches-issuance-uganda-national-id-munyonyo>.

between the two friendly states, but political intervention saved the situation.¹⁰⁷ There are similar conflicts along South Sudan and the eastern DRC borderlines.

In the disputed areas, there is no clear and deliberate security plan; any attempt to institute security controls such as border patrols would threaten the territorial sovereignty of the neighboring state. Wafula Okumu in his study of Africa's borders argues that, "one cannot control what one does not patrol."¹⁰⁸ These disputes increase the vulnerability to infiltration by terrorists into the country.

6. Resistance by Local Communities

Border communities regard interference in their longstanding economic and cultural cross-border relations by government officials as intrusion. This attitude has led to clashes with border enforcement officials and undermines cooperation of stake holders at borders.¹⁰⁹ Kriestof Titeca and Tom de Herdt cite an incident in 2009 in which Uganda enforcement officials operating along the northwest border with the DRC impounded some jerry cans of smuggled fuel from a group of smugglers. In retaliation, a gang of illegal fuel dealers—calling themselves the OPEC Boys—and other traders raided the offices of the Uganda Revenue Authority and set it ablaze.¹¹⁰ Such tensions between border communities and border officials have characterized Uganda's borders. However, this hostility is being handled through increased training and improved supervision of enforcement personnel, on the one hand, and sensitization of the communities, on the other.

D. CONCLUSION

A combination of geopolitical factors including Uganda's central location in a conflict infested region, a terrain that is difficult to dominate, and the long historical

¹⁰⁷ Jack Shaka, "Misingo Island: Kenyan or Ugandan Territory," *Journal of Conflictology* 4, no. 2 (2013).

¹⁰⁸ Okumu, *Border Management and Security in Africa*, 7.

¹⁰⁹ Kriestof Titeca and Tom de Herdt, "Regulation: Cross-Border Trade and Practical Norms in West-Nile, Northern Uganda," *Africa* 80, no. 4 (October 27, 2010): 580–581, doi:10.3366/E000197201000077X

¹¹⁰ Titeca and Herdt, "Cross-Border Trade and Practical Norms," 587.

cross-border relations among communities that facilitate informal activities, on one hand, and institutional factors including lack of modern equipment, insufficient manpower, corruption, unresolved border disputes, poor infrastructure, and limited cooperation between border officials and local communities, on the other hand, make the borders in Uganda porous. The security of any nation begins with secure borders. Arguably, a successful counterterrorism strategy in Uganda must inevitably consider the combination of geopolitical and institutional factors to avert the terrorism threat along the country's porous borders.

III. UGANDA'S COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES

Whitaker asserts that countries that experience international or domestic terrorism are more likely to comply with the UN international counterterrorism regime than those that are less threatened. This observation holds true in Uganda.¹¹¹ UNSC Resolution 1317 (2001) requires member states to uphold international conventions on terrorism and put in place relevant domestic legislation to implement the agreements.¹¹² By 2002, Uganda had ratified all of the international conventions on terrorism and enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act.¹¹³ Whitaker further observes that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the more powerful states, particularly the hegemonic United States, pressured weaker states to adopt the international counterterrorism regime, pass domestic laws, share intelligence, and track individuals and groups involved in terrorism.¹¹⁴

Uganda complied with the international conventions on terrorism mainly because of its own terrorism threat posed by the LRA and the ADF, which had transnational links.¹¹⁵ The requirements of the international counterterrorism regime converged with Uganda's interest to establish partnerships in the fight against terrorism.¹¹⁶ By adopting the regime, Uganda has not only been able to access external support to fight its own homegrown terrorism, but also to play a leading role in the regional counterterrorism efforts.

¹¹¹ B. Elise Whitaker, "Compliance Among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 3 (2010): 639, doi:10.1017/S0260210510000641

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New Security Frontiers, Old Strategies," *African Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (2006): 78, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2006.9627608

¹¹⁴ Whitaker, "Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime," 640.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 652.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 646.

Like other countries in the region, Uganda has not yet established a formal national counterterrorism strategy.¹¹⁷ However, it has modelled its counterterrorism policies on the regional counterterrorism framework and international counterterrorism strategies. Uganda's counterterrorism measures comprise a combination of law enforcement (police, immigration, and customs), intelligence, military, and diplomatic approaches. This chapter examines the four approaches and assesses their respective impact on combating terrorism in the country.

A. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH

The law enforcement approach primarily uses the law and criminal justice system as a counterterrorism measure. The legislature has enacted several counterterrorism laws. The police, supported by the intelligence services, employ the law to identify, apprehend, and facilitate the prosecution of terror suspects.

1. Legislative Measures

Since 2000, Uganda has adopted several legislative measures to counter terrorism. The following laws have been passed to combat terrorism in Uganda.

a. *The Anti-terrorism Act, 2002*

Although Uganda had experienced acts of terrorism since the early 1990s, most notably by the ADF and the LRA, terrorism-related crimes were prosecuted as capital offences under Uganda's Penal Code Act.¹¹⁸ The 9/11 terrorist attack and UNSC Resolution 1317 (2001) offered Uganda an opportunity to review its own situation and redefine LRA and ADF atrocities as terrorism. Consistent with the UNSC resolution,

¹¹⁷ In the Horn of Africa region, Ethiopia is the country with the most formidable counterterrorism strategy. The strategy emphasizes the supremacy of the political arena over the military and the judiciary. It is a community-based approach, focusing on organizing, training, and arming local communities to provide their own defense against terrorists. The military only comes in when the communities are overwhelmed. To ensure effectiveness, the process of organizing local communities is gradual. As a result of its CT strategy, unlike other countries in the region, Ethiopia has not suffered any large-scale terrorist attack, despite its operations against Al Shabaab/Al Qaeda terrorists in neighboring Somalia. Mehari Taddele Maru, "The Secret to Ethiopia's Counterterrorism Success," *News24*, July 31, 2015, <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/The-secret-to-Ethiopias-counterterrorism-success-20150731>

¹¹⁸ Tumushabe, "The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States," 20.

Uganda enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2002.¹¹⁹ The act criminalizes a series of terrorism-related activities focusing on individuals involved in planning, instigating, supporting, funding, or conducting acts of terrorism. The act authorizes investigations of such acts, including interception of correspondences and surveillance of terror suspects.¹²⁰

While the Act has proved to be one of the most effective counterterrorism measures in Uganda, it has also attracted criticism among scholars, human rights activists, and opposition politicians who view it as a tool to stifle opposition in the country.¹²¹ Alex Tumushabe observes that Uganda's Anti-Terrorism Act does not definitively distinguish between plain criminal acts and acts of terrorism. As a result, there is a risk that authorities might include cases under the terrorism label that were not envisaged by the proponents of the law, bringing more and more serious charges against defendants who otherwise would be processed as criminals.¹²²

Similarly, Maxwell Wright in his study argues that Uganda leadership exploited the counterterrorism rhetoric after 9/11 to suppress political dissent. He claims that the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 was aimed at suppressing domestic political opposition, while at the international level, to win legitimacy for such measures, the Uganda leadership "situated" the country as a victim of terrorism. Citing a speech by a Uganda delegation at the UN, Maxwell states

Ugandan delegates presented the United Nations Counter-terrorism Committee with an initial report detailing the steps they had taken domestically in order to adhere to the requirements of Resolution 1373. In the report, Uganda again situated itself as a long-time victim of terrorism, citing attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces as early as 1988 and 1994...Ugandan delegates to the UN

¹¹⁹ Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 (Uganda), http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Uganda/UG_Anti-Terrorism_Act_2002.pdf

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Tumushabe, "The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States," 21.

¹²² Ibid.

continued to reiterate this narrative throughout the 2000s, often referring to both the LRA and ADF as enduring and notorious terrorist groups.¹²³

Contrary to Maxwell's claims, Fredrick Ochieng observes that using the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002, Uganda has been able to implement preventive and disruptive counterterrorist measures. As a result, attempts by terrorists to attack Uganda have not succeeded beyond the 2010 Kampala terrorist attacks.¹²⁴ Because there is no perfect law, there will always be dissenting views and the need for its amendment. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 is no exception, and the debate about the reach and scope of the act forms part of this refinement process. In the second schedule of the act, Uganda lists the ADF, LRA, and Al-Qaeda as terrorist organizations.

The difficulty is identifying who is and who is not a terrorist under the law. Though the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 does not explicitly define who a terrorist is, still, it clarifies that an individual whose objective is to influence government or intimidate the masses for a political, religious, social or economic motive indiscriminately and in disregard of others' safety or property, commits an act of terrorism.¹²⁵ Because of gaps within the law, the government has proposed amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002.

b. The Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, 2010

In September 2010, after the July 11, 2010, terrorist attack in Kampala, Uganda passed the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act.¹²⁶ The act provides for security agencies to apply for a warrant to a designated judge to surveil or intercept any person's electronic communication, meeting, postal package, mail, or fax suspected to be linked with terrorism. In addition, it authorizes, among others, the searching of any

¹²³ Maxwell Wright, "Rhetorical Facades: Ugandan Counter-Terrorism Discourse in the Museveni Era," (bachelor's thesis, The Ohio State University, July 2015), 30, https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/71524/Wright_Thesis.pdf?sequence=1

¹²⁴ Fredrick Omondi Ochieng, "Learning from the Neighbors: How to Win Kenya's War on Terror," *Strife*, June 7, 2014, <http://strifeblog.org/2014/06/07/learning-from-the-neighbours-how-to-win-kenyas-war-on-terror/>

¹²⁵ Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002.

¹²⁶ The Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, 2010 (Uganda), <http://www.ulii.org/files/Regulations%20of%20Interception%20of%20Communications%20Act,%202010.pdf>

premise, and access to any one's bank account suspected to be associated with terrorist activities.¹²⁷ In justifying the urgency to enact the law, some leaders in government argue that, had this law been in place, the Kampala terrorist attack would have been averted.¹²⁸ Similarly, Tumushabe explains that the reason for empowering security agents to conduct interception and surveillance on suspicious communications and individuals is to ensure safety and freedoms of all citizens, and to protect the national economy against terrorism.¹²⁹ Terrorists, like all criminals, typically plan secretly, and unless security agencies are empowered to penetrate the terrorist's covert activities, counterterrorism would be difficult to enforce.

The act has been criticized by human rights activists, lawyers, and journalists for interfering with fundamental rights to freedom. Journalists also argue that the law imperils the confidentiality of media sources and could undermine the media's investigative role. Also, telephone providers feel the law poses an economic burden to their businesses because it obligates them to incur an extra cost of \$10 million to \$15 million in purchasing the relevant interception equipment. This cost would, in turn, be passed over to the public, making communication more expensive.¹³⁰

Still, the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, 2010, is an effective counterterrorism measure in Uganda. Despite several terrorist threats to attack Uganda, after July 11, security has been able to detect, prevent, and investigate such threats. For example, in September 2014, Uganda's security intercepted a communication between an Al Shabaab terrorist cell in Kampala and an Al Qaeda cell in the Islamic Maghreb planning to bomb Uganda's Luzira Maximum prison to free the eight suspected terrorists under trial for masterminding the July 11, 2010, terrorist attacks. The police took

¹²⁷ Tumushabe, "The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States," 23.

¹²⁸ African Centre for Media Excellence, "Parliament Passes Law to Intercept Communications Following Uganda Attacks," July 23, 2010, <http://acme-ug.org/2010/07/23/parliament-passes-law-to-intercept-communications-following-uganda-attacks/>

¹²⁹ Tumushabe, "The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States," 23.

¹³⁰ African Centre for Media Excellence, "Parliament Passes Law to Intercept Communications."

preventive counterterrorism measures to stop the attack.¹³¹ The success of such a plan by the terrorists would have had devastating effects on the stability of the country and the region, given the extent of loss the July 2010 terrorist incident caused.

c. *The Anti-money Laundering Act, 2013*

In October 2013, Uganda passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA). The act criminalizes money laundering and provides for penalties including seizure, freezing, and forfeiting assets associated with terrorists.¹³² The act also provides a framework for establishing systems to prevent, detect, and investigate money laundering. It also lists measures to be taken by finance agencies such as identification of individual clients, record keeping, and reporting suspicious transactions.¹³³ Furthermore, the act provides for the establishment of a Finance Intelligence Authority, whose primary function is to receive regular intelligence reports from all financial institutions on money laundering.¹³⁴

While the AMLA is an effective counterterrorism tool in preventing, detecting, and investigating terrorism financing, its implementation could be undermined by institutional weaknesses. Peter Edopu observes that corruption and poor recordkeeping within most of the financial institutions are likely to undermine effective monitoring of suspects.¹³⁵ He also argues that because of competition, especially among non-bank institutions, bureaucratic processes that are likely to delay customers—such as obtaining their detailed particulars—are avoided.¹³⁶ Such loopholes can be exploited by terrorists to conduct their activities and penetrate Uganda’s porous borders undetected.

¹³¹ David Lumu, “Police Foil Terrorist Attack on Luzira Prisons,” *New Vision*, September 30, 2014, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/660235-police-foil-terrorist-attack-on-luzira-prisons.html>.

¹³² Bureau of Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2014), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf>

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Peter Edopu, “Infrastructure to Detect and Control Money Laundering and Terrorist Funding in Uganda,” in *Tackling Money Laundering in East and South Africa*, ed. Charles Goredema (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, October, 2004), <https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Monographs/No108/Chap3.htm>.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

d. Anti-terrorism Amendment Bill, 2015

Even though in November 2003, Uganda ratified the United Nations Conventions on terrorism financing and is a founding member of the East Africa and South Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, its anti-terrorist law did not specifically address terrorism financing.¹³⁷ To strengthen counterterrorism measures and also harmonize its law with the regional and international anti-terrorism regime, Uganda, in June 2015, passed the Anti-Terrorism Amendment Bill, 2015. The bill seeks to strengthen the power of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) over the control of terrorism financing. Under the bill, provided the IGP has sufficient evidence, he or she can freeze, seize, and forfeit assets and property linked to terrorists.¹³⁸ The bill also seeks to deter terrorism by providing for a stiff sentence—20 years' imprisonment or a fine not exceeding Uganda Shs.10 billion (\$5,464,600)—to anyone convicted of providing or collecting funds to support terrorism.¹³⁹

Civil society activists and opposition politicians criticize the bill on the grounds that the government may use “terrorism” as a pretext to harass and spy on political opponents. For example, they argue that section 17A and 17B of the bill gives the IGP absolute powers to freeze, seize, or forfeit assets of individuals linked to terrorists. In this regard, they claim, the IGP is an investigator, prosecutor, and a judge.¹⁴⁰ They further argue that the bill does not clearly define who is a terrorist and that the definition of terrorist activities is too broad, ambiguous, and subject to manipulation.¹⁴¹ On the other

¹³⁷ Office of the Clerk to Parliament, *Report of the Committee on Defense and Internal Affairs in the Anti-Terrorism Amendment Bill, 2015*. (Kampala, Uganda: Parliament of Uganda, June 2015), <http://parliamentwatch.ug/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/DIA3-15-Report-on-the-Anti-terrorism-Amendment-Bill-2015-Including-Minority-Report1.pdf>.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Library of Congress, “Uganda: Parliament Amends Terrorism Law,” June 26, 2015, http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205404479_text.

¹⁴⁰ Ismail Musa Ladu, “House Passes Anti-Terror Law Amid Opposition Protests,” *The Monitor*, June 20, 2015, <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/House-passes-anti-terror-law-amid-Opposition-protests/-/688334/2758110/-/15mnxuv/-/index.html>.

¹⁴¹ Halima Abdallah, “Uganda MPs Pass Anti-Terror Bill,” *The East African*, June 20, 2015, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Uganda-MPs-pass-anti-terror-Bill/-/2558/2759170/-/123d1lk/-/index.html>.

hand, proponents of the bill argue that the existing law has gaps; for example, it is silent on terrorism financing.

These gaps must be addressed through amendment of the law. Also, they argue that the purpose of the amendment is to align the Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act with the United Nations Conventions on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1999.¹⁴² Uganda, having ratified the international conventions on counterterrorism, is under obligation to align its anti-terrorism laws to the international regime. Besides, alignment would ensure safeguards and protection against excesses that would be in conflict with other international laws, such as the international human rights law. Despite the criticism of the bill and resentment by the opposition politicians, nevertheless, the bill was passed democratically, because it was debated by civil society and passed by a majority vote in parliament.

2. Enforcement Measures

As law enforcers, the national police is the leading anti-terrorism agency in Uganda. In its counterterrorism efforts, it is supported by the intelligence community. Uganda's intelligence community comprises the Internal Security Organization (ISO), the External Security Organization, Crime Intelligence (CI), and the Military Intelligence (MI).¹⁴³ Border control is a joint function of police, intelligence, immigration, and customs. Because of the nature of the terrorist threat in Uganda and given its unique capabilities, strength, and training, the military is also a key player in Uganda's counterterrorism effort.

b. Police Operations

Following the escalation of terrorist attacks by the ADF in Kampala between 1998 and 2002, the Uganda police established the Police Anti-Terrorism Unit (PATU), under the Special Branch department. In 2007, the Special Branch was disbanded and PATU placed under a newly created Directorate of Counter Terrorism. Since then, a

¹⁴² Sulaiman Kakaire, "Terrorism Redefined as Opposition Smells a Rat," *The Observer*, May 2015. <http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/37659-terrorism-redefined-as-opposition-smells-a-rat>.

¹⁴³ Tumushabe, "The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States," 30.

number of other specialized anti-terrorism units have been established under the Directorate of Counterterrorism. These include the following: the Very Important Persons Protection Unit, the Aviation Police Unit, the Intelligence Police Unit, the Bomb Disposal Unit, the Canine Police Unit, and the Tourism Police Unit.¹⁴⁴ The establishment of these units has enabled Uganda's police to develop diverse skills and capacity in managing the terrorist threat. For example, the Tourism Police Unit, with 100 officers attached to Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), is charged with providing security to tourists and investigating wildlife crimes such as poaching and illegal dealing in animal trophies, including ivory that is smuggled to fund terrorist activities.¹⁴⁵ Besides employment of technical skills, the police have promoted mass mobilization as a measure to counterterrorism.

Through community policing, communities are sensitized in detecting suspected terrorists or their materials and promptly reporting to security.¹⁴⁶ Community policing is based on the principle that security begins with the individual, and every individual has a constitutional obligation to protect the nation. Asan Kasingye argues, "Police effectiveness and public order cannot be enhanced unless the community is persuaded to do more for itself."¹⁴⁷ He perceives the community as "an agent and partner in promoting security rather than as a passive audience."¹⁴⁸ Onesmus Bilaliwoalos observes that most people have good will, and their readiness to cooperate is important to build a

¹⁴⁴ John Ndungutse, "Interview with the Director Counter Terrorism Uganda Police Force," *New Vision*, December 12, 2014, <http://www.bridgemedias.co.ug/interview-with-the-director-counter-terrorism-uganda-police-force-john-ndungutse/>.

¹⁴⁵ CITES. *Report on Measures Being Taken by Uganda to Combat Illegal Ivory Trade* (SC63 Doc. 18 Annex 4) (Geneva: CITES, July 2012), <https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/63/E-SC63-18-A4.pdf>.

¹⁴⁶ Gaaki Kigambo, "Uganda Turns to Community Policing to Deal with Changing Face of Terrorism," *The East African*, October 26, 2013, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Uganda-turns-to-community-policing-to-prevent-attacks/-/2558/2048138/-/item/1/-/gmfnf2/-/index.html>.

¹⁴⁷ Asan Kasingye, "Implementing Community Policing: Uganda's Experience," (PowerPoint presentation, The International Police Executive Symposium Tenth Annual Meeting in Bahrain, October 11–16, 2003).

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

harmonious community.¹⁴⁹ On the whole, the general consensus among scholars is that because individuals have a stake in their own safety, community policing is a popular counterterrorism measure.

In the event, since the July 11, 2010, terrorist attack in Kampala, Uganda has not experienced another large-scale terrorist attack, save for the isolated cases of targeted assassinations. In his study of the region, David Goldman observes that “the situation in Uganda is more assuring and it shows a better understanding of how to deal with terror.”¹⁵⁰ One of the reasons for this relatively stable situation is the robust community policing approach. The main idea about community policing is that “if you see something, say something.”¹⁵¹ The community police approach is an effective counterterrorism measure because with minimum resources, intelligence can be received in real time over the entire country.

To enhance border security, the police deploy personnel to patrol the porous borders, focusing on the illegal paths—the “panya routes.” In addition, police counterterrorism experts are attached to field teams to ensure professionalism and effectiveness.¹⁵² Furthermore, the police employ the notion of “target hardening,” which involves increasing the visibility of its uniformed personnel at vital installations that are likely terrorist targets.¹⁵³ Such installations include power stations, bridges, and key government premises. In addition, the police issue terror alerts to the public according to

¹⁴⁹ Onesmus Bitaliwo, “Conceptualization of Community Policing in the Uganda Police Force,” *International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies* (IJPCS) 2, no 3 (October 2014): 60. <http://www.rcmss.com>.

¹⁵⁰ David Goldman, “Uganda Counter Terrorism Measures Better than Kenya’s,” *Strategic Intelligence Service*, May, 12, 2014, <http://www.intelligencebriefs.com/uganda-counter-terrorism-measures-better-than-kenyas/>.

¹⁵¹ Department of Homeland Security, “If You See Something, Say Something™,” It Takes a Community to Protect a Community, Accessed September 25, 2015, <http://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/about-campaign>.

¹⁵² Department of Homeland Security, “See Something, Say Something.”

¹⁵³ Kigambo, “Uganda Turns to Community Policing,”

intelligence received about imminent terrorist attacks.¹⁵⁴ The alerts increase public vigilance against terrorism and are effective in averting likely terrorist surprise attacks.

b. Immigration Controls

To facilitate effective tracking of suspected transnational criminals, especially terrorists crossing borders, Uganda introduced the Personal Identification Secure Comparison System (PISCES).¹⁵⁵ The system is in use at Entebbe International Airport and other key entry points like Busia and Malaba on the Kenya-eastern border, Katuna on the Rwanda-southwestern border, and Mpondwe at the DRC-western border.¹⁵⁶ The PISCES is a good counterterrorist tool that captures data from travelers' passports about their movements. This facility enables Uganda Intelligence to profile suspects and share information with regional and international stakeholders.

To address the problem of inadequate manpower in the Immigration Department and improve border security, last June, the government of Uganda recruited 150 young graduates. This recruitment will increase the country's immigration personnel by 50 percent.¹⁵⁷ The young officers are undergoing a nine-month special immigration course that focuses on border security, including detecting transnational crimes, especially terrorism and money laundering.¹⁵⁸ With the large number of personnel recruited, the ill-

¹⁵⁴ "Police Issues Another Terror Alert," *The Monitor*, April 3, 2015, <http://www.upf.go.ug/police-issues-another-terror-alert/>.

¹⁵⁵ East African Community, *The First Meeting of the Regional e-Immigration Working Group: Report of the Meeting* (Moshi, Tanzania: East Africa Community, April 2010), 5.

https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=meeting+of+the+East+african++regional+e-immigration+working+group.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Shifa Mwesigye, "Uganda: First National ID Set for September," *All Africa*, May 27, 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201405280349.html>.

¹⁵⁸ Aronda Nyakairima, *Statement of the Minister of Internal Affairs on the Recruitment of Immigration Officer Trainees and Immigration Assistant Trainees* (Kampala, Uganda: Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control, June 25, 2015), <http://immigration.go.ug/media/statement-minister-internal-affairs-recruitment-immigration-officer-trainees-and-immigration>.

manned entry points along Uganda's porous borders will be reinforced; more border points could be gazetted to improve border control and check infiltration by terrorists.¹⁵⁹

In December 2014, Uganda began the process of issuing national identity cards to its citizens. Before then, citizens used multiple identity documents including voter's cards, school IDs, driving permits, and introductory letters from local council leaders for identification.¹⁶⁰ This situation complicated security vetting and tracking of criminal suspects and also provided easy infiltration to terrorist elements into the country. The issuance of national IDs by the government of Uganda will strengthen the counterterrorism measures in the country.

Also, to further strengthen border security, last year, the Uganda government started the process of procuring e-passports to replace the current ones that are easy to forge. The e-passports will include security biometrics such as iris data and finger prints; forging them will be difficult.¹⁶¹ The use of e-passports will be a significant progression in Uganda's counterterrorism efforts. As a result of these initiatives, the Uganda government will now be able to build a comprehensive national database, which will assist security institutions to monitor who enters and who leaves the country and also prevent infiltration of terrorists at the borders.

¹⁵⁹ While massive recruitment of immigration personnel is good for the control of Uganda's porous borders, the challenge of maintaining ethical standards and delivering quality services is crucial. Poor pay and hostile working conditions undermine work output and are also responsible for corruption among officials. If not checked, this could create loopholes and hence exacerbate the problem of porous borders. Since the 1990s, however, Uganda has experienced a transformation in its state apparatus. For example, the Public Service is undergoing transformation based on a white paper focusing on three pillars, including the systems in the Public Service, the personnel, and the clients. In each of the pillars, weaknesses are identified and remedies planned. Among the remedies for poor pay, for instance, is the "pay reform through salary enhancement program and monetization of non-cash benefits." Such reforms are likely to motivate workers and also minimize tendencies of corruption. Ministry of Public Service, *Policy Paper on the Transformation of the Uganda Public Service*, March 2011, http://www.empowerconsult.net/publications/Policy_Paper_on_Transformation.pdf.

¹⁶⁰ Mwesigye, "Uganda: First National ID Set for September."

¹⁶¹ Zurah Nakabugo, "E-Passport to be Ready Next Year," *The Observer*, November 5, 2014, http://observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=34762:e-passport-to-be-ready-next-year-&catid=34:news&Itemid=114.

c. Customs Control

In exercising their mandate of ensuring border security, enforcement officials must balance the enforcement of public safety and facilitating the smooth flow of goods and services across the borders. In July 2010, Uganda, with the four other partner states, ratified the East African Community (EAC) Common Market Protocol.¹⁶² With this protocol, goods, services, labor, and capital are able to freely flow among EAC states.¹⁶³ To minimize the problem of lack of coordination among departments and agencies at the border points, it was agreed to establish One Stop Border Posts (OSBP). In this arrangement, border security—comprising members of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), immigration, and customs officials—operate together in the OSBP.¹⁶⁴ The OSBPs focus on a harmonized approach in which the various border officials work together in terms of verification, data capture, and clearing of goods and services.¹⁶⁵ The use of OSBPs minimizes delays due to repetition of activities, maximizes tax collection, and enhances national security. On the whole, the synchronization of the robust immigration-control measures coupled with cohesive, well-coordinated customs and border-security systems will enhance Uganda's counterterrorism efforts.

B. INTELLIGENCE APPROACH

Uganda's intelligence community comprises the External Intelligence Organization (ESO), the ISO, the MI, and the CI. The ESO and ISO are civilian organizations established by the Security Organizations Act, 1987.¹⁶⁶ Their main function is to collect and process foreign and domestic intelligence, respectively, about Uganda. They also advise and make recommendations to the president on action to be taken in view of collected intelligence. On the other hand, Military Intelligence collects

¹⁶² East African Community, "Towards a Common Market," November, 2009, <http://www.commonmarket.eac.int/>.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Nathan Gashayija, "Importance of One Stop Border Post facilities in EAC integration," *The New Times*, January 12, 2015, <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-01-12/184873/>.

¹⁶⁶ The Security Organization Act, November 13, 1987 (Uganda), <http://www.opm.go.ug/assets/media/resources/338/SECURITY%20%20ORGANISATIONS%20ACT.pdf>.

intelligence for the execution of military policies, plans, and programs.¹⁶⁷ The CI collects intelligence on serious crimes for the police investigation department.¹⁶⁸ The MI and CI form an essential part of the national intelligence structure.

Before the 1998 ADF terrorist attacks in Uganda's capital, intelligence sharing and cooperation among security agencies was weak. The weak cooperation among the agencies could be traced from Uganda's turbulent history. Africa and Kwadjo, in their research observed that in 1986 when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) usurped power, the country was in ruins; "the armed forces were in disarray and the intelligence services discredited."¹⁶⁹ He further notes that though Uganda's military has been able to undertake significant reforms, especially after enacting the Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces Act 2005; no parallel reforms have happened in security agencies, save for organizing them under a clear legal framework after enacting the Security Act 1987.¹⁷⁰ Arguably by the 1990s, the security agencies lacked experience, skill, and resources to effectively operate as state institutions, hence the weak cooperation. In 1999, however, overwhelmed by the intensity of terrorist explosions in the city, the intelligence agencies joined hands to form the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT) to counter the terrorists. In 2000, to strengthen, coordinate, and improve oversight on security operations in the country, the National Security Act was enacted.¹⁷¹

Besides providing for the formation of the National Security Council (NSC), it also provides for the formation of JIC at the National, the District and the Sub-County Levels.¹⁷² The JIC comprise members of the intelligence agencies. The Joint Anti-Terrorism Unit (JATT) and JIC have played a significant part in countering terrorism in

¹⁶⁷ The Security Organization Act, 1987.

¹⁶⁸ Uganda Police Force, *Annual Crime and Traffic Road Safety Report 2013*, http://www.anppcanug.org/wp-content/uploads/Resource_Center/Annual_Reports/Police/R_P_annual_report_2013.pdf.

¹⁶⁹ Sandy Africa and Jonny Kwadjo, eds., *Challenging Intelligence Dynamics in Africa* (Birmingham, England: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, 2009), 49–52.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 43.

¹⁷¹ ULII, National Security Council Act, 2000 (Uganda), <http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/301>.

¹⁷² ULII, "National Security Council Act 2000."

Uganda, despite the allegations of human rights abuses by JATT. To date, the police operate jointly with JIC teams and military units to secure the borders.¹⁷³ The establishment of enabling laws in Uganda and the empowerment of enforcement agencies has facilitated counterterrorism efforts in the country. Though the laws have supported intelligence agencies in conducting counterterrorism operations, they too, have created limitations. For example, Chapter 4, Article 23(4)(b) of Uganda's Constitution states that any person

arrested or detained upon reasonable suspicion of his or her having committed or being about to commit a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda, shall, if not earlier released, be brought to court as soon as possible but in any case not later than 48 hours from the time of his or her arrest.¹⁷⁴

The police and security authorities argue that the law is unrealistic because adducing concrete evidence to secure successful prosecution, especially for complex cases like terrorism, needs more time to investigate.¹⁷⁵ Recommendations have been made to amend the law. The proponents for amendment further argue that even more advanced democracies like Britain have amended the law to allow 90 days of detention without trial.¹⁷⁶

Suspicious of likely abuse of the law, human rights activists and opposition politicians argue against amendment. They opine that the remedy is in improving efficiency in the investigation, prosecution, and judicial arms of government, and not amending the law. They also suggest increased facilitation to these organs of government.¹⁷⁷ In all, the effectiveness of intelligence in the counterterrorism effort in

¹⁷³ Martin Okudi and Robert Muhereza, "Uganda Beefs Up Security at All Borders," *The East African*, June 19, 2014, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Uganda-beefs-up-security-at-all-borders/-/2558/23538_24/-/item/1/-/eqly81z/-/index.htmlis

¹⁷⁴ Norah Winyi, "Response to General Kale Kayihura on the 48 Hours Rule/Constitutional Standard," Accessed September 20, 2015, <http://www.fidauganda.org/admin/publications/1412328201Response%20to%20General%20Kale%20Kayihura%20on%20the%2048%20hours%20Rule.pdf>

¹⁷⁵ Sulaiman Kakaire, "Kayihura rejects 48-hour suspects rule," *The Observer*, 13 April 2015 <http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/37290-kayihura-rejects-48-hour-suspects-rule>

¹⁷⁶ Kakaire, "Kayihura rejects 48-hour suspects rule."

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

Uganda will depend on political will to reform intelligence, support it through strengthening the existing laws, and providing the necessary resources.

C. MILITARY APPROACH

As noted, Uganda's military has for a long time engaged ADF and LRA terrorists based in the DRC, the CAR, and South Sudan, where they have safe havens. Besides, Uganda's military is part of the regional effort to engage Al Shabaab terrorists in Somalia. Kristof Titeca and Koen Vlassenroot observe that the deployment of the Uganda Peoples' Defense Force (UPDF) along the porous Uganda/DRC border in 1999 weakened the ADF and significantly curtailed terrorist infiltration into the country.¹⁷⁸ Internally, apart from guarding the national borders against terrorist infiltration, the military also conducts joint operations with the police. Section 42–45 of the Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces Act, 2005, allows the military to provide support to civil authority upon request.¹⁷⁹ In July 2014, for example, upon getting an alert of a likely terrorist attack on Entebbe International Airport and other undefined targets in Uganda's capital, Kampala, the military, police, and intelligence agencies massively deployed.¹⁸⁰ Such joint military/police deployments enhance "target hardening" and visibility of the forces; it also acts as a strong deterrence measure against terrorism.

Apart from supporting police in countering terrorism, the military in Uganda also supports the wildlife department in terms of training and personnel. To ensure the security of tourists, (in 2005), the government established the Special Wildlife Tourism Intervention Force (SWIFT).¹⁸¹ The force was established after the Bwindi National Park terrorist incident at the western border, in which eight tourists from the United States and

¹⁷⁸ Kristof Titeca & Koen Vlassenroot, "Rebels Without Borders in the Rwenzori Borderland? A Biography of the Allied Democratic Forces," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6 no. 1 (April 13, 2012): 159, doi:10.1080/17531055.2012.664708

¹⁷⁹ The Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces Act, 2005 (Uganda), <http://www.ulrc.go.ug/ulrcsite/sites/default/files/Downloads/Laws%20of%20Uganda/Laws%20of%20Uganda%20-%202001%20-2006/U.P.D.F%20Act%202005.pdf>.

¹⁸⁰ Stephen Kafeero, Martin Ssebuyira, and Andrew Bagala, "Terrorism: Police, army take over Kampala," *The Monitor*, July 4, 2014, <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Terrorism--Police--army-take-over-Kampala/-/688334/2371242/-/s25akmz/-/index.html>.

¹⁸¹ BBC News, "British man shot dead in Uganda," November, 9, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4419200.stm.

Europe were killed by terrorists. The SWIFT comprises UPDF personnel and UWA rangers. The joint force's main task is to guard the national parks against infiltration by terrorists and to secure tourists.¹⁸² Since the deployment of the military in support of the wildlife department, no significant case of terrorism has occurred.

As a result of improved security, wildlife in the protected areas has grown, and in the last 10 years, tourism in Uganda has expanded fivefold. Today, Uganda is rated among countries with the fastest rate of growth of tourism in Africa.¹⁸³ A combination of stringent anti-terrorism legislation, coupled with enforcement and military operations have contributed to a strong counterterrorism policy in Uganda.

D. DIPLOMATIC APPROACH

Diplomacy plays a central role in fighting international terrorism. Cofer Black explains that “diplomacy is the instrument of power that builds political will and strengthens international cooperation.”¹⁸⁴ He further notes that through diplomacy, terrorists are denied access to resources upon which their survival depends.¹⁸⁵ To win legitimacy and build a positive image in its fight against terrorism, Uganda employs the diplomatic approach.

Bilateral relations among states facilitate counterterrorism efforts. Daniel Bayman argues that counterterrorism is more effectively fought in a bilateral context than a multilateral setting.¹⁸⁶ He explains that because of the complexity of varying interests and constraints among states in a multilateral setting, harmonization of policies and laws

¹⁸² UWA News, “President Museveni Passes out 430 UWA Rangers,” Accessed November 14, 2015. <http://www.ugandawildlife.org/news-a-updates-2/uwa-news/item/227-president-museveni-passes-out-430-uwa-rangers>.

¹⁸³ Brianne, C. Busey, “Conflict and Tourism in Uganda” (university honors thesis, Portland State University, 2014), <http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&context=honorsthesis>.

¹⁸⁴ Cofer J. Black, “Diplomacy and the War Against Terrorism: Testimony of Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” *Washington, DC. Retrieved on May 5 (2003), 2003*.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Daniel Bayman, *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).

is difficult.¹⁸⁷ In its war against terrorism, Uganda has developed bilateral relations with a number of countries. For example, in 2010, before the collapse of the state, the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) allowed the Uganda government to deploy its military to neutralize the LRA, which had established safe havens in the eastern region of the country and was terrorizing the local population.¹⁸⁸ This bilateral understanding between Uganda and the CAR formed the foundation for the future deployment of the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) to hunt for the LRA terrorists. In March 2002, similar diplomatic initiatives were undertaken between the Uganda government and the Khartoum government in pursuance of the LRA in southern Sudan.¹⁸⁹ As a result of these bilateral initiatives, Uganda has not only incapacitated the ADF and LRA terrorists, but also kept its porous borders secure.

The country has developed strong bilateral relations with the advanced states, especially the United States, in its fight against terrorism. As a result of the relations, the U.S. government has supported Uganda in terms of training, technical intelligence, and logistical support, which have been key in the county's counterterrorism program.¹⁹⁰ Similar bilateral relations have been developed with Canada, Britain, Turkey, France, Kenya, Ethiopia, and other countries actively engaged in the fight against terrorism. Canada for example, closely supported Uganda during the failed peace settlement with the LRA in 2008. It also assists in training the UPDF in preparation for deployment against Al Shabaab terrorists in Somalia.¹⁹¹

Peter Peterson underscores the use of credible and neutral messengers in conveying messages of terrorism to the international community as an effective

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ François Misser, "Central African Republic: The collapse of the Bozize regime," *African Arguments*, January 15, 2013, <http://africanarguments.org/2013/01/15/central-african-republic-the-collapse-of-the-bozize-regime-%E2%80%93-by-francois-misser/>.

¹⁸⁹ Henry Wasswa, "Sudan extends for another month deal that allows Ugandan troops to pursue LRA rebels into Sudan," *Sudan Tribune*, September 12, 2003, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article321>.

¹⁹⁰ Bureau of African Affairs, "U.S. Relations with Uganda," U.S. Department of State, October 2, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm>.

¹⁹¹ Vision Reporter, "Rugunda salutes Canada for fight against terrorism," *New Vision*, October 28, 2014, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/661216-rugunda-salutes-canada-for-fight-against-terrorism.html>.

diplomatic tool.¹⁹² In July 2013, Ugandan officials worked jointly with the U.S.-based Non-Governmental Organization, The Invisible Children, to conduct a conference of civil society and government leaders of the DRC, CAR, and Uganda on the LRA.¹⁹³ A senior LRA defector, one “Major General” Ceasar Acellam, a former intelligence chief of the LRA, was invited to address the conference. He revealed the atrocities of the LRA and appealed to his former colleagues to defect as well. The defection of Acellam and his testimony were widely publicized in the local and foreign media. It boosted support for Uganda’s counterterrorism effort.¹⁹⁴

Arising from the publicity of a video by The Invisible Children, coupled with other diplomatic approaches earlier mentioned, the U.S. government signed “The Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009.” The White House explained: “The Act provides for the U.S government to assist the regional governments of DRC, CAR, South Sudan and Uganda, put LRA leader Joseph Kony out of the battle field and halt the activities of LRA.”¹⁹⁵ On the whole, like the enforcement, intelligence, and military approaches to counterterrorism, the diplomatic approach has been a significant tool in Uganda’s counterterrorism policy.

E. CONCLUSION

Uganda’s counterterrorism policy is shaped by the international counterterrorism regime and also by the terrorist threat the country has suffered since the early 1990s. The multifaceted approach in the employment of a combination of law enforcement, intelligence, military pressure, and diplomatic counterterrorism measures has enabled Uganda to control its porous borders and contain the threat of terrorism, albeit the July

¹⁹² Peter G. Peterson, “Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism,” Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2002, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/public-diplomacy-war-terrorism/p4762>.

¹⁹³ Mark Kersten, “A Rebel’s Escape – An LRA Commander Tells His Story,” Justice in Conflict, July 31, 2013, <http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/07/31/a-rebels-escape-an-lra-commander-tells-his-story/>.

¹⁹⁴ Rodney Muhumuza, “Official: Top Joseph Kony commander captured,” *Associated Press*, May 13, 2012, <http://news.yahoo.com/official-top-joseph-kony-commander-captured-135519166.html>.

¹⁹⁵ Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on the Signing of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009,” The White House, May 24, 2010, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-signing-lords-resistance-army-disarmament-and-northern-uganda-r>.

11, 2010, terrorist attacks in Kampala. The main strength in Uganda's counterterrorism efforts lies in the establishment of strong anti-terrorism laws, the synergy within its security forces, and the professionalism of its military. However, Uganda's lack of a formal, comprehensive, and well-articulated counterterrorism strategy could undermine the sustainability of the efforts in place and also endanger the security of its porous borders against terrorism.

IV. REGIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN EAST AFRICA

“If we do not hang together, we will surely hang separately.”¹⁹⁶

—Benjamin Franklin

Trans-border terrorism can only be contained through bilateral and regional cooperation.¹⁹⁷ In the last decade, African states and regional bodies have embraced the strategy of regional and international cooperation to combat transnational terrorist activities. The threat of terrorism in East Africa is directly related to and influenced by the activities of Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda operating across borders in the Horn of Africa. This chapter examines the regional framework of counterterrorism in East Africa.¹⁹⁸

A. AFRICAN UNION COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN EAST AFRICA

Though efforts to combat terrorism by the African Union intensified after 9/11, there had been earlier efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU—the predecessor to the AU) to put in place mechanisms for cooperation in combating terrorism by member states. For example, in June 1994, in Tunisia, African leaders signed a Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations. The declaration criminalized “all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism.”¹⁹⁹ The leaders resolved to cooperate in fighting terrorism on the continent to ensure stability and development.²⁰⁰ Also, in July 1999, in Algiers, the African leaders endorsed the Convention on the

¹⁹⁶ William Pope, “East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative Conference” (opening remarks at the Conference on the East African Counterterrorism Initiative and Regional Cooperation in Kampala Uganda, April 21, 2004), <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2004/31731.htm>

¹⁹⁷ Patrick Kimunguyi, “Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa,” Researchgate, May 29, 2015, 17, http://www.researchgate.net/publication/267265383_Terrorism_and_Counter_terrorism_in_East_Africa

¹⁹⁸ For purposes of this study, the region of East Africa will also include the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, which form the Horn of Africa—the easternmost part of East Africa. Encyclopedia Britannica, “Horn of Africa Region, eastern Africa,” July 3, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/place/Horn-of-Africa>.

¹⁹⁹ Martin Ewi and Kwesi Aning, “Assessing the role of the African Union in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa,” *African Security Review* 15, no. 3 (2006): 35, doi:10.1080/10246029.2006.9627603

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 35.

Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algeria Convention). Importantly, this agreement provides a definition that distinguishes acts of terrorism from acts relating to the struggle for freedom and self-determination.²⁰¹ Article three of the agreement states,

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.²⁰²

Ewi and Anig observe that because the African definition of terrorism was drawn from its recent historical context, particularly the struggle against colonialism, and that the process of consolidating Africa's independence was ongoing, for legal clarity, it was necessary to distinguish terrorism from liberation struggles with a just cause.²⁰³

Furthermore, the AU architecture provides a clear legal framework that supports member states and regional blocks in their efforts to combat terrorism. Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act of the AU (2000) condemns acts of terrorism and subversion. The article states, "The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles... respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism, and subversive activities."²⁰⁴ In addition, in July 2004, the African Union established the African Centre for Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT) with the following tasks:

organizing functions aimed at improving counterterrorism capacities and cooperation among AU member states...(b) provide capacity-building assistance to enhance national and regional capabilities, (c) create a mechanism for all member states to access expert guidance, (d) build a database to facilitate sharing of intelligence and other related terrorism information; (e) harmonize and standardize domestic legal frameworks

²⁰¹ Martin Ewi and Kwesi Anig, "Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa," 37.

²⁰² Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*, 1999 (Algiers, Algeria: Organization of African Unity, July 14, 1999), <https://search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?p=OAU+CONVENTION+ON+THE+PREVENTION+AND+COMBATING+OF+TERRORISM&ei=UTF-8&hspart=mozilla&hsimp=yhs-002>.

²⁰³ Ewi and Anig, "Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa," 37.

²⁰⁴ African Union, *The Constitutive Act of the African Union* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, July 11, 2000), http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf.

within AU member states and international counterterrorism frameworks;
and (f) disseminate counterterrorism research across the continent.²⁰⁵

The ACSRT is responsible to the AU Commission; it interacts with member states through national Focal Points and coordinates with regional and international stakeholders such as the European Union (EU), the UN Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) over counterterrorism matters.²⁰⁶ However, because of financial and personnel constraints, ACSRT has not delivered much on its core functions, such as building a coherent data base and effectively supporting the national Focal Points. For its operations, the Centre largely depends on external donors, particularly the European Union.²⁰⁷

With the authority of the UN, the AU has deployed troops to combat terrorism in the Horn of Africa by Al Shabaab and the LRA in the Central African Republic (CAR). In January 2007, at its 69th Meeting, the African Union Peace Security Council (AUPSC) formed the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) with a mandate to protect the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), enable the conduct of humanitarian operations, and ensure security to facilitate development of Somalia. Additionally, AMISOM is mandated to support the Somali forces in the conduct of disarmament operations and assist in the settlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs).²⁰⁸ The AU leadership hoped that when the Somali institutions are restored, the country would develop, people's way of life would improve, and in turn, terrorism would effectively be managed at the source. Consequently, spillover effects into the region would be minimized.

Among the spillover effects is the uncontrolled flow of illegal arms and ammunition from Somalia because of the porous borders. Bandits in the region have

²⁰⁵ Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa," 13.

²⁰⁶ Africa Union, "About The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT),," January 25, 2013, <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/2-3591-static-about-african-centre-for-study-and-research-on-terrorism-ACSRT>.

²⁰⁷ Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa," 14

²⁰⁸ Nathan Mugisha, "The Way Forward In Somalia" *The RUSI Journal* 156, no. 3 (June 21, 2011): 27, doi:10.1080/03071847.2011.591084

accessed the arms and used them to terrorize the civilian population.²⁰⁹ The AU counterterrorism framework is supported by regional bodies, which offer political leadership and coordinate efforts in addressing the fundamental drivers of terrorism in the region.

B. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL BODIES IN COMBATING TERRORISM IN EAST AFRICA

Benedikt Franke correctly observes that “Africa’s emerging peace and security architecture rests on a careful balance and clear division of labor between the continental and regional layers of inter-African security cooperation.”²¹⁰ The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) are the three East African regional bodies supporting counterterrorism in the region. Their membership is as follows: IGAD—Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda; EAC—Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda; ICGLR—Anglo, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Because regional bodies are comprised of individuals with expertise and deep understanding of local situations, they assist in evolving appropriate policies and strategies.²¹¹ For example, as a result of its understanding of the region, the IGAD has been supporting the AU and strategic partners in managing the terrorist threat in Somalia, including coordinating regional meetings and planning for the final deployment of AMISOM regional forces. Similarly, from 2012 to 2013, the ICGLR played a significant role in the establishment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo-Intervention Brigade (MONUSCO-IB), which has led to the weakening of the ADF terrorists in Eastern DRC.

²⁰⁹ Patrick Kimunguyi, “Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa,” 12. <http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/radicalisation/files/2013/03/conference-2010-terrorism-counter-terrorism-eafrica-pk.pdf>.

²¹⁰ Benedikt Franke, “Organized Complementarity and African Regional Security Cooperation,” *World Politics Review*, June 29, 2010, 97. <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5917/organized-complementarity-and-african-regional-security-cooperation>.

²¹¹ Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar & Jason Ipe, “Enhancing counterterrorism cooperation in eastern Africa,” *African Security Review* 18 no. 2 (2009), 93–106, doi:10.1080/10246029.2009.9627532

Since its inception in 1986, the IGAD has been a rallying point for the region, the AU, and the international community in coordinating counterterrorism efforts.²¹² In 2006, with the funding and technical support of the EU, the IGAD Capacity building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) was established to promote justice, enhance inter-agency coordination on counterterrorism among member states, focus on border security, provide training, and promote cooperation and information sharing among member states.²¹³ In 2009, the IGAD adopted the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) and Extradition Conventions. This is a significant tool in cross-border law enforcement and criminal justice within member states in combating terrorists.²¹⁴ Similarly, within the EAC states, legal frameworks have been made to facilitate extradition of terrorist suspects. In some cases, the effectiveness of the legal framework has been undermined by bureaucracy and weaknesses in national institutions; however, political intervention and cooperation among security agencies has unlocked such impediments. It is out of such cooperation that 13 Kenyans suspected in the July 11, 2010, terrorist attack in Kampala were handed over to Uganda by the Kenyan government. Similarly, last June, Jamil Mukulu, leader of the ADF, was handed over by the Tanzania government to Uganda to answer for the terrorist charges against him.²¹⁵ Figure 2 depicts Jamil Mukulu.

²¹² Rosand, Millar & Ipe, "Counterterrorism Cooperation in Eastern Africa,"

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Denis Edema, "Journalists blocked from Mukulu trial," *The Monitor*, July 22, 2015, <http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/News/Journalists-blocked-Mukulu-trial/-/2466686/2802630/-/format/xhtml/-u6b0xdz/-/index.html>.

Figure 2. ADF Leader Jamil Mukulu, Extradited from Tanzania to Uganda on July 12, 2015.



Source: Sean MacCormac, “ADF Leader Jamil Mukulu Arrested,” Center for Security Policy, April 30, 2015, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/04/30/adf-leader-jamil-mukulu-arrested>

Without these regional bodies, combating terrorism in the region would not be possible. The regional bodies have helped diffuse intra- and inter-state hostilities among member states, which, if not resolved, would undermine efforts to combat terrorists in the region. Such hostility includes tensions between Rwanda and Tanzania, the DRC and Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda, Kenya and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, among others. Through meetings conducted by the IGAD, EAC, and ICGLR, confidence-building measures have been undertaken, mistrust reduced and the strategic objectives of fighting terrorism maintained.

To maintain the strategic focus on terrorism, the regional bodies coordinate and organize regular meetings of heads of state, ministers of defense, and chiefs of services of the armed forces, security heads, and other relevant individuals to assess and address the terror threat in the region. For example, in May 2015, the ICGLR convened a summit in Angola; the heads of state and government strongly encouraged proactive sharing of intelligence among all ICGLR member states, building early warning mechanisms, intensifying border control and consolidating regional efforts to combat terrorism in the


region.²¹⁶ The regional bodies have assisted the East African region to rationalize and cooperate in the use of resources. In May 2013, with the support of the British government, a regional Intelligence Fusion Centre for East Africa was opened in Nairobi-Kenya. The center is fitted with a modern forensic laboratory and investigation equipment that is available for use by member states.²¹⁷

African states and regional bodies on their own lack the financial, technical, and material capacity to effectively deal with terrorism in the region. The international community, particularly Africa's strategic partners, including the UN, the U.S. government, and the European Union (EU), have been working closely with the continent through regional and bi-lateral cooperation to combat terrorism. Figure 3 depicts the counterterrorism framework for the East African region.

²¹⁶ International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), *9th Extra-Ordinary Summit of ICGLR Heads of State and Government*, May 18, 2015, <http://icglr.org/images/Press%20Release%20of%20ICGLR%20Extra%20Ordinary%20Summit%20on%20security%20in%20GLR%20Angola%20ENG.pdf>.

²¹⁷ Oscar Nkala, "East Africa anti-terror intelligence fusion cell opens in Nairobi," Defense Web, May 8, 2013, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30418:east-africa-anti-terror-intelligence-fusion-cell-opens-in-nai

Figure 3. East African Regional Counterterrorism Framework



C. AFRICA UNION FORCES

Presently, there are two AU forces fighting terrorists in the East African region, the Africa Union-Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) and AMISOM forces. Though MONUSCO-IB, like the other two forces, is composed of regional troops, it is not an AU but a UN force.

1. AU-RTF

Following the defeat of the LRA in northern Uganda in 2006, the rebels fled to the eastern DRC, established bases in Garamba National Park, and continued to terrorize civilians. Between 2006 and 2008, pressure from the UPDF compelled the LRA to

request peace talks with the Uganda government. At the last moment, the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, refused to turn up in Juba-South Sudan to sign the negotiated peace agreement.²¹⁸ The LRA returned to the bush and resumed its terror against civilians in the eastern DRC, South Sudan, and the CAR. Regional and international actors, including the African Union, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the EU, and civil society organizations raised concern about the impunity of the LRA against the unprotected civilians in the region.²¹⁹

The LRA's marauding elements traversed the unsecured borders of the DRC, South Sudan, CAR, and Sudan, causing havoc. In response to these acts of terror, in 2001, the U.S. State Department included the LRA on its Terrorist Exclusion List and designated Joseph Kony a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" under Executive Order 13324. In 2011, the African Union designated the LRA as a terrorist group and directed the four affected states (DRC, CAR, South Sudan, and Uganda) to constitute a regional force to deal with it.²²⁰ In October 2011, the U.S. government deployed 100 Special Forces personnel to give technical and logistical support to the UPDF and also to coordinate plans that would encourage LRA defections.²²¹

In 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed a regional strategy to counter the LRA, which has been operating in CAR, Congo, and South Sudan, since its defeat in northern Uganda in 2006.²²² It also mandated the AU to constitute a regional force to eliminate the LRA from its safe havens in CAR and the DRC. The strategy has four main objectives, including ensuring security of civilians; arresting or eliminating Joseph Kony and his senior commanders; aiding defection of LRA combatants; conducting

²¹⁸ Dylan Hendrickson and Kennedy Tumutegereize, "Dealing with complexity in peace negotiations: Reflections on the Lord's Resistance Army and the Juba talks," Conciliation Resources, January 2012, <http://www.cmi.no/file/1918-Dealing-with-complexity-2012-01.pdf>.

²¹⁹ Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection: Aligning Against the Lord's Resistance Army," *African Security* 5, no. 3-4 (2012): 160, doi: 10.1080/19392206.2012.732887

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² UN News Service, "Security Council endorses UN regional strategy to combat LRA threat," *UN Daily News*, June 29, 2012, <http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/2012/29062012.pdf>.

disarmament, demobilization, and resettlement of LRA combatants; and supplying relief to societies affected by the LRA. On September 18, 2012, a force comprising troops from Uganda and South Sudan was formally inaugurated as the AU-RTF. However, CAR and the DRC have not contributed troops because of domestic challenges at home.²²³ Failure by CAR and the DRC to contribute troops to the AU-RTF force undermined operational efficiency. The LRA was able to scatter over the extensive jungle region, which could not be effectively controlled by the small regional force comprising Uganda and a few troops of South Sudan. However, the support by the U.S Special Forces assisted to fill the gap, hence weakening the LRA.

2. AMISOM

After the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991 and the collapse of the Somali state, the country fell into the hands of warlords, clan militias, and youth Muslim extremists. In 2006, the Muslim youth extremists backed by Al Qaeda formed Al Shabaab and launched a guerilla war against the recently formed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia, supported by Ethiopian forces. The failure by Ethiopia to stabilize the situation in Somalia led the IGAD and AU to decide on a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, comprising regional forces. The UNSC Resolution 1744 (2007) was passed authorizing the AU to deploy troops in Somalia. As earlier stated, in January 2007 at its 69th meeting, the AUPSC established AMISOM.

In March 2007, Uganda deployed the first AMISOM contingent to Somalia, comprising 1,400 troops. In December 2007, Burundi also deployed a contingent comprising a battle group—an infantry battalion reinforced with armoured elements. Consequently, Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leon, and Ethiopia deployed troops between 2011 and 2013 in accordance with UNSC resolutions.²²⁴ Africa's strategic partners, in particular the U.S government and later the EU, joined the regional effort by supplying the AMISOM forces with the badly needed logistics, training, and finance. Since 2011,

²²³ UN News Service, "UN regional strategy to combat LRA threat," 2012.

²²⁴ AMISOM, "AMISOM Military Component," Accessed November 14, 2015. <http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/>.

the Al Shabaab has been compelled to abandon its safe havens, it has lost key commanders to the U.S.-led drone attacks and it has been deprived of millions of dollars in revenues from strategic ports and forced taxes (zakat).²²⁵

Many scholars observe that Al Shabaab's loss of strategic towns such as Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kisimayo, Afgoye, Dinsor, Barawe, and Bardhere since 2011 is a sign of a weakened force; its embrace of asymmetric tactics is not a manifestation of strength, but weakness.²²⁶ Audrey Cronin argues that historical case studies confirm that the use of deliberate and violent attacks on unarmed civilians undermines local support to terrorists and eventually to the collapse of the group.²²⁷ In 2013, Bruce Hoffman acknowledged that the ejection of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu by the AMISOM and Somali forces weakened Al Shabaab in Somalia, but he also observed that the terrorists still had a strong hold in South Somalia, upon which they could reorganize.²²⁸ Noel Anderson argues that the Al Shabaab withdraw from the urban areas is not out of defeat but a tactical maneuver to preserve itself.²²⁹ Arguably, it is evident that despite the pressure exerted on Al Shabaab, the terrorists remain potent; unless the challenge of porous borders in the region is addressed, they have the potential to continue crossing over and causing mayhem.

D. AFRICAN UNION'S STRATEGIC PARTNERS

African states and regional bodies on their own may lack the financial, technical, and material capacity to effectively deal with terrorism in the region. The African Union

²²⁵ Matt Bryden, *The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

²²⁶ Noel Anderson, "Peacekeepers Fighting a Counterinsurgency Campaign," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 37, no. 11 (2014): 942, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.952260.

²²⁷ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009): 94.

²²⁸ Bruce Hoffman, "Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36, no. 8 (2013): 643, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.802973

²²⁹ Noel Anderson, "Peacekeepers Fighting a Counterinsurgency Campaign, a net Assessment of the Africa Mission in Somalia," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 37, no. 11 (2014): 942, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2014.952260

strategic partners work closely with the continent both at the regional and bi-lateral levels in countering terrorism; they include the UN, the European Union, and the United States.

1. MONUSCO-Intervention Brigade (MONUSCO-IB)

Like Somalia, the Eastern DRC over decades has suffered a state breakdown. In 1999, the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (UN MONUC) was established with a narrow mandate of, among others, monitoring the implementation of cease-fire agreements and supervising and verifying disengagement and redeployment of ex-combatants.²³⁰ In July 2010, it down-scaled its forces in the DRC and was renamed the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).²³¹ Taking advantage of the absence of state control, more than 25 local and foreign armed groups emerged in the Eastern DRC, including Uganda's ADF and LRA terrorist groups. The availability of safe havens coupled with the porosity of the Eastern/DRC border motivated the Uganda terrorist groups to establish bases in the Eastern DRC. In 1996, the then DRC government offered ADF rebels safe havens in the mountainous region of eastern Congo; the Sudan government provided logistical support and training to the terrorists.²³² Because of the narrow MONUSCO mandate, the armed groups continued to grow unchallenged.

Upon the recommendations by the ICGLR to the AU and the signed "Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region," in February 2013, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2098 (2012), creating the Intervention Brigade within the MONUSCO. It authorized the Brigade to "take all necessary measures to carry out targeted operations to prevent expansion of all armed groups in DRC, neutralize these

²³⁰ Theo Neethling, "From MONUC to MONUSCO and beyond: prospects for reconstruction, state-building and security governance in the DRC," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18, no. 1 (May 3, 2011): 24, doi: 10.1080/10220461.2011.564425

²³¹ Ibid., 23.

²³² Cristiana C. Brafman Kittner, "The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19 no. 3 (September 13, 2007): 308. doi:10.1080/09546550701246791

groups and to disarm them.”²³³ The ADF, LRA, FDLR, and other armed groups are targets.

The intervention force is composed of contingents from regional member states including Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa.²³⁴ The composition of the special brigade deliberately excludes non-African TCCs, based on the conviction by regional leaders that UN peacekeepers in the DRC lack the commitment to fight. In 2013, while addressing an ICGLR Summit in Kampala over the crisis in the Eastern DRC and the incompetence of MONUSCO in dealing with the situation, the Ugandan president described the UN troops not as peacekeepers but, “a bunch of military tourists.”²³⁵ Relatedly, a Uruguayan platoon commander, when asked why his force does not ensure peace in the DRC, explained that, “I have to make the right decision for everyone concerned. I have a wife and a son back home. My men have families too. I want us to get out there, but it’s not safe.”²³⁶ The apathy of the UN personnel in dealing with terrorist groups in the DRC and other negative armed groups and the rigid mandate by the UN partly explain the survival of terrorism in the region. It also calls on regional leaders to initiate regional solutions to regional problems.

Since January 2014, Congolese forces, supported by the newly established MONUSCO-Intervention Brigade, launched operations against the ADF terrorists and flushed them out of their safe havens. The ADF has suffered significant losses, the surviving combatants are now in disarray, and as earlier mentioned, its leader Jamil Mukulu, was arrested in Tanzania and extradited to Uganda.²³⁷ Having no clear objective

²³³ Security Council, “‘Intervention Brigade’ Authorized as Security Council Grants Mandate Renewal for United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (SC/10964), United Nations, March 28, 2013, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm>.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Richard Mgamba, “DR Congo: Peacekeepers or a costly ‘bunch of tourists,’” *New African*, October 24, 2013, <http://newafricanmagazine.com/drcongo-peacekeepers-or-a-costly-bunch-of-tourists/#sthash.ZtDpeY9y.dpuf>.

²³⁶ Jessica Hatcher and Alex Perry, “Defining Peacekeeping Downward: The U.N. Debacle in Eastern Congo,” *Time*, November 26, 2012, <http://world.time.com/2012/11/26/defining-peacekeeping-downward-the-u-n-debacle-in-eastern-congo/>.

²³⁷ Sean MacCormac, “ADF Leader Jamil Mukulu Arrested,” Center for Security Policy, April 30, 2015, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/04/30/adf-leader-jamil-mukulu-arrested/>.

and lack of command, with sustained momentum by the MONUSCO-IB and DRC forces, the pressure by the DRC and UN force, if sustained, could mark the end of the ADF.

2. The EU

The Horn of Africa has had historical ties with European states since colonial times. In addition, the EU is the biggest development partner with the region; it offers the most foreign humanitarian and economic support and hosts the biggest number of diaspora from the troubled Horn of Africa.²³⁸ The growth of terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa threaten Europe's peace and interests in Africa. For example, in 2009, two French intelligence officers were kidnapped from a hotel in Mogadishu. One of them was soon killed, and in January 2013, the French special forces launched a rescue operation on Al Shabaab in Bulormurar—South of Mogadishu—which ended in fiasco.²³⁹ In addition to killing the remaining Frenchman, the Al Shabaab captors also killed two French SEALS involved in the attack—though 17 Al Shabaab were also killed.

In Britain, two suspects arrested in connection with the 2005 bomb attack on the London subway were confirmed to have trained in Somalia with extremists. Also, one Abdulkadir Mohammed Abdulkadir, aka “Kirima,” a Kenyan of Somali origin, is reported to have been coordinating with one Samantha Lewaite, a key suspect in the London terrorist attack.²⁴⁰ In the aftermath of the investigations, it was revealed that there were several British nationals training in Al Shabaab camps in Mogadishu. These and many other incidents explain the need for cooperation and international cooperation in combating terrorism. The presence of such foreigners as the British nationals in Al Shabaab camps in Somalia highlights the dilemma of porous borders in the fight against terrorism; Europeans with an extremist bent are traveling overseas to train, while

²³⁸ Ahmed Soliman, Alex Vines, and Jason Moseley, *The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa: A Critical Assessment of Impact and Opportunities* (EXO/B/AFET/2009-01/Lot 2/11) (Brussels, Belgium: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, September 2012), 14, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/433799/EXPO-AFET_ET%282012%29433799_EN.pdf.

²³⁹ Alexander Nicoll and Jessica Delany, “Al-Shabaab targeted after Nairobi attack,” *Strategic Comments* 19 no. 7 (November 26, 2013), xi–xii, doi:10.1080/13567888.2013.868198

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

extremists from Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East are, in the evocative language of a recent U.S. Congressional hearing on the subject of foreign fighters with ISIS, “one flight away” from their western targets.²⁴¹

In 2005, the EU adopted its Strategy for Africa with a focus on promoting regional integration, cooperation and connectivity among the states in the Horn of Africa to defeat terrorism.²⁴² The cooperation is aimed at “strengthening African self-reliance through the empowerment of African partners for successful crisis prevention and effective crisis reaction”²⁴³ The EU particularly viewed IGAD as a convenient vehicle through which the EU could interface with the region and contribute to stabilization of the region. In 2006, the EU established the Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICAPAT) under IGAD with the main objective of dealing with the fundamental causes of terrorism in the region. To facilitate this objective, the EU provided a fund of €1 billion to the AU-Peace and Security Council, through IGAD, to cover a range of programs including counterterrorism, early warning systems, disarmament and other security-related activities.²⁴⁴

In December 2009, “an EU policy on the Horn of Africa—towards a Comprehensive Strategy was adopted.”²⁴⁵ The policy aims at committing member states to implementing agreed-upon measures that would address root causes of insecurity in the Horn of Africa. Between 2008 and 2013, the EU spent €412 million to promote good governance in Somalia, with a focus on social-economic projects.²⁴⁶ Military operations, *per se*, are not a panacea for ending terrorism; causes within the environment must be

²⁴¹ *One Flight Away: An Examination of the Threat Posed by ISIS Terrorists with Western Passports: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security*, 113th Cong., 2 (2014) (statement of Jennifer Laslet et al.), <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=757601>

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Michael Hanisch, “German foreign and security policy: determinants of German military engagement in Africa since 2011” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45864/15Jun_Hanisch_Michael.pdf?sequence=1.

²⁴⁴ Kimunguyi, “Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa,” 17–18.

²⁴⁵ Soliman, Vines, and Moseley, “The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa,” 2012.

²⁴⁶ Conrad Rein, “The EU and peacekeeping in Africa: the case of AMISOM,” *Global Affairs* 1, no. 2 (2015): 193–204, doi: 10.1080/23340460.2015.1036341

addressed. The European Union, by addressing issues of good governance that ultimately target social and economic needs of the Horn of Africa, offers long-term solutions to the fight against terrorism in the region.

Between 2010 and 2013, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) was launched to conduct a training program for Somali National Security Forces in Uganda at Bihanga Training School. By December 2012, about 3,000 Somali soldiers had undergone training by the EUTM.²⁴⁷ The soldiers have formed the nucleus of a new Somali National Army (SNA), which is fighting alongside the AMISOM forces against the Al Shabaab terrorists. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show Somali troops at their passing out ceremony and a team of European Union trainers, respectively.

Figure 4. Somali Soldiers, Trained by the EUTM, March on Parade During Their Passing Out Ceremony at Bihanga-Uganda



Source: Enock Kakande, "Somali soldiers passed out in Uganda," *New Vision*, December 5, 2013, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/650213-somali-soldiers-passed-out-in-uganda.html>

²⁴⁷ Gorm Rye Olsen, "Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: the USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali," *European Security* 23, no. 3 (February 19, 2014): 298, doi: 10.1080/09662839.2014.884074.

Figure 5. European Union Trainers at Bihanga-Uganda



Source: Enock Kakande, “Somali soldiers passed out in Uganda,” *New Vision*, December 5, 2013, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/650213-somali-soldiers-passed-out-in-uganda.html>

In addition to training the Somali forces, the EU supports AMISOM forces in terms of personnel allowances, medical care, communication equipment, fuel and transport, housing, and maintenance costs. By December 2014, the EU had spent about €721 million on AMISOM.²⁴⁸

3. The U.S. Government

The U.S. support to the East African efforts is directed at denying terrorists safe havens, to incapacitate their capacity to traverse the porous borders, recruit, and train.²⁴⁹ The intervention is based on a Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) in which U.S. officers coordinate with regional officials to jointly plan counterterrorism strategies. In October 2008, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) as a component of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established based in Djibouti. It operates in Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Yemen, and the Seychelles. The CJTF-HOA also coordinates and supports anti-terrorism efforts in Tanzania and Uganda. The force

²⁴⁸ Rein, “The EU and peacekeeping in Africa,” 198.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

has been involved in offering special training to regional troops and rendering logistical support, such as airlift of Uganda's troops in AMISOM.²⁵⁰ Training is conducted under the State Department's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.²⁵¹

In 2009, with U.S. backing, regional states including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda established the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). The organization focuses on reducing operational capacity of terrorist networks, developing a counter terrorism legal framework by member countries, improving border security, and checking recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism.²⁵² Through PREACT, the U.S. government has supported Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in terms of technical intelligence, training of quick response units to protect their borders, and responding to terrorist threats.

In 2013, the U.S. and Uganda government signed an agreement for the funding of an Automated Finger Identification System (AFIS) to enhance investigations where biometric data is required.²⁵³ The use of the biometric data has improved control at borders in terms of monitoring terror suspects and information-sharing among domestic and regional security agencies.

By November 1, 2013, the U.S. government had disbursed \$42.3 million of the \$104 million allocated for PREACT since 2009. Because lack of resources is one of the greatest challenges of executing effective counterterrorism programs, the financial contribution by the U.S. government is a force multiplier in the fight against terrorism in the region. Figure 6 shows details of funds provided to each member state during the period.


²⁵⁰ Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa," 15.

²⁵¹ Olsen, "Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy," 297.

²⁵² Bureau of Counterterrorism, "Chapter 2. Country Reports on Terrorism: Africa Overview," Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, ,Accessed November 15,2015. <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm>.

²⁵³ Bureau of Counterterrorism, "Country Reports on Terrorism." 2013.

Figure 6. PREACT Allocations by Country, Fiscal Years 2009–2013



Source: GAO based on State Department data; Map Resources (map). | GAO-14-502

Source: Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., *Combating Terrorism: State Department Can Improve Management of East Africa Program*, (GAO-14-502) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-502>

In addition to deploying Special Forces troops to assist the AU-RTF, as earlier discussed, the United States also passed the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Act in May 2009. The act commits the U.S. government to support African Union efforts to end LRA atrocities and restore stability in the region affected by the LRA’s 25 years of terrorism.²⁵⁴ Also, Washington provided a reward of \$5 million to anyone who would lead to the capture of any of the five indicted LRA commanders.²⁵⁵

In fiscal year (FY) 2010 to FY2013, the United States disbursed \$8.5 million to UNICEF in support of rehabilitation and integration of ex-LRA abductees in the CAR and DRC; between 2010 and 2014, the U.S. had disbursed \$8.72 million to assist LRA victims in various IDPs in the DRC, CAR and South Sudan.²⁵⁶ As a result of the joint effort between the U.S. government and the African Union, the AU-RTF troops have

²⁵⁴ U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Support to Regional Efforts to Counter the Lord’s Resistance Army” (fact sheet), March 24, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/223844.htm>.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

succeeded in paralyzing the LRA. On January 6, 2015, “Brig” Dominic Ongwen, one of the two surviving top LRA commanders indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), surrendered to the AU-RTF forces.²⁵⁷ The Uganda government handed him to the ICC for trial.

E. CONCLUSION

The employment of a regional strategy in combating terrorism in East Africa has been effective in spite of a number of challenges. The AU efforts in coordination with the international community have enabled the establishment of a democratically elected government in Somalia and a gradual recovery of its state institutions. Despite the successes posted, however, the AMISOM force continues to face a number of challenges, including inadequate manpower and equipment to liberate and secure all of Somalia and continuing Al-Shabaab attacks on the TCCs back home, such as the July 11, 2010, bombings in Uganda, the September 13, 2013, Westgate Mall incident in Nairobi, and the April 2, 2015, attack on Garrisa University students in Kenya.

Al-Shabaab continues to infiltrate the liberated areas, exploiting the AMISOM extended lines of communication and also lack of well-defined enemy identity, as well as inadequate and irregular payment of stipends to Somali National Forces. This situation has led to increased desertion; an SNA soldier earns on average \$100 a month. Lack of effective counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) capabilities, political disharmony, and clan politics negatively affect military operations. The capacity of AMISOM forces requires enhancement in terms of troop levels, force multipliers, and training to defeat Al-Shabaab.

In spite of the failure by some of the TCCs to contribute troops to the AU-RTF, the AU-RTF, with the support of the U.S forces, has made tremendous achievements. Out of the five top LRA commanders indicted by the ICC, three have been killed in combat, one surrendered and is now arraigned in the ICC, and another was killed on orders of the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, who is still eluding the forces. The LRA has consequently lost

²⁵⁷ International Criminal Court, “Dominic Ongwen transferred to The Hague,” January 20, 2015, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1084.aspx.

the ability to launch attacks and abduct civilians in the CAR and DRC. In addition, the formation of the UN MONUSCO-IB, comprising regional forces, has been effective in dismantling the ADF terrorist camps in the eastern DRC, several of its combatants have been killed, and its overall leader captured. On the whole, cooperation among regional and international stakeholders is an indispensable strategy in combating terrorism across porous borders.

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The perennial instability among Uganda's neighboring states, coupled with the presence of terrorist safe havens across the country's porous borders, poses a challenge to Uganda's counterterrorism system. Exacerbated by the artificial division of border communities by colonialism and the resultant attempts by the state to restrict cross-border movements and activities of local communities, conflict is the unhappy norm on Uganda's border regions, which also are rife with such underlying structural weaknesses as poor infrastructure and low motivation of border officials. In the late 1990s and mid-2000s, terrorists exploited the failure of the state to exert effective control over its porous borders and caused mayhem. The first line of defense for any country is at its borders. Uganda must refocus attention and resources toward more and better border security. At the same time, while ensuring security at the borders, the state must balance the benefits of economic activities to the nation with security concerns.

No state unilaterally controls its borders; borders are, by definition, shared between two or more states, and their control is a mutual responsibility. For Uganda to have a meaningful and effective border control regime, it must strengthen its cooperation with its regional neighbors and international allies. Fortunately, Uganda and its East African neighbors have done a good job in reinvigorating the EAC, through which various mechanisms have been put in place to facilitate trade across borders, including the establishment of the OSBPs. More work, however, must be done in terms of establishing a coherent security mechanism to guarantee safe borders. Measures to improve security at the borders would include conducting regular and well-coordinated cross-border security meetings by border authorities, effective mobilization and sensitization of border communities on the terrorism threat, and effectively equipping and deploying joint border security teams to conduct routine border patrols and surveillance. Foremost of all, the countries themselves must be stable and capable of asserting control over their borders. Internal stability demands that states address the drivers of their instability—ethnic or religious strife, terrorism, poverty, corruption, etc.

Despite—or perhaps because of—the security challenges faced by Western Europe and the United States, there are lessons of good governance that can be learned by Uganda and the region. Though the concept of good governance has varied interpretations, generally it includes promotion by state or private organizations of freedoms of association of individuals and civil society, rule of law, transparency and accountability, harmonizing diverse interests through consensus, equity and inclusiveness for all (with a particular focus on minorities), optimal use of resources including the preservation of the environment, and accountability and transparency.²⁵⁸ Good governance would further strengthen regional cooperation and more effective border control. Similarly, more effort should be put in strengthening regional mechanisms, such as the ICGLR and the IGAD, to achieve effective cooperation in bolstering border security and combating terrorism. Although the basic mechanisms exist in Uganda and East Africa today, they still lack the muscle to operate effectively on their own. They lack financial independence, and their performance depends on international support. Thus, these measures have only slowly and partially addressed the vicious threat of terrorism at Uganda's porous borders.

Regionalism, multilateralism, and partnership are neither hollow rhetoric aimed at attracting international sympathy, nor are they unidirectional fads. The threat of terrorism in Uganda and the region at large poses a direct threat to the interests of the western world and the rest of the international community. The support from the UN, the EU, and the United States to Uganda and East Africa in the fight against terrorism has incapacitated both the LRA and ADF terrorists. Al Shabaab, too, has been substantially weakened. As a result of a well-coordinated regional approach, Uganda's borders are now safer from terrorism and the other ills caused by or exploited amid porous borders. To the extent that stability, prosperity, and democratic progress hinge on an ordered frontier, these developments, on the whole, have helped Uganda and the region.

²⁵⁸Yap Kioe Sheng, "What is Good Governance?," *United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific*, accessed November 14, 2015. <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>.

Uganda's combined approach of law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic counterterrorism measures has effectively checked terrorist maneuvers and kept the country relatively safe from terrorism in the last decade—save for the July 11, 2010, incident. However, there is still no guarantee that the status quo will persist. First, the national borders remain porous and vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. Second, Uganda's uncompromising stance against terrorism and its frontline position in combating it in the region makes the country a prime target for terrorist attacks. Third, with increasing use of the Internet, terrorists are able to operate without physically crossing borders: they recruit, instruct, fund, and equip their local agents undetected. Recently, the media widely reported that by mid-2016, "Facebook (will) beam free Internet to Africa with satellites."²⁵⁹ Individuals and communities in remote areas of Sub-Saharan Africa are targeted to benefit, including Uganda. Unfortunately, it will not just be cute school kids and eager online shoppers logging on with improved Internet access; terrorist networks also will expand their reach in similar proportions. It is important, therefore, that Uganda puts in place a formal national counterterrorism strategy to address the enduring threat of terrorism. The strategy, among other things, would comprehensively address the question of border control and cyber threat.

Although law enforcement, military, and diplomatic approaches are key to Uganda's terrorism policy, good intelligence deserves special consideration. The security of the state depends on the capacity of its intelligence agencies to penetrate terrorist networks and collect reliable and timely information about terrorist intentions. Given its unstable neighboring states, Uganda must effectively facilitate its intelligence apparatus as an essential element in securing the country's border regions. Resources for human and modern technical intelligence assets must have access and be deployed to the entry points and strategic areas along the porous borders. At the same time, Uganda should continue its democratic intelligence reforms to ensure the democracy, transparency, and accountability of its intelligence operations.

²⁵⁹ Heather Kelly, "Facebook to Beam Free Internet to Africa with Satellites," CNN Money, October 5, 2015, accessed November 13, 2015, <http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/05/technology/facebook-africa-satellites/>.

To achieve democratic control, existing mechanisms of civilian control over intelligence must be enhanced to have an efficient national intelligence system. In addition, intelligence should focus at higher levels of professionalization through training; improved skills in research and analysis; integration of young, well-qualified civilian staff; and better resourced intelligence collection systems. As Uganda reforms its anti-terrorism laws to support law enforcement efforts in countering terrorism, the need for more effective legislative oversight of intelligence becomes more apparent. Enhanced intelligence control will check possible abuse of the law and also improve information sharing and cooperation among JIC members. A combination of improved community policing and intelligence in the border region will minimize the problem of porous borders.

To implement the above reforms, Uganda must consider providing funding in its national budget. For example, to establish and operationalize a national counterterrorism terrorism strategy, resources would be required to fund diverse requirements, including creating supporting structures with their component parts (personnel, logistics, and office accommodation, etc.). Similarly, to reform intelligence, the intelligence community would require funds to hire well-qualified civilian personnel, funding of human and technical assets, and training at different levels. An appropriate legislative oversight mechanism should be put in place to ensure transparency and accountability of the funds, but without compromising the efficiency and security of the agencies.

Most important, to counter terrorism effectively, Uganda must address such structural constraints as poverty and unemployment. Though many scholars deny the relationship between poverty and terrorism on grounds that several terrorists, personally, hail from middle- and high-income backgrounds, it is also true, particularly in third world countries like Uganda, that terrorists recruit desperate youth by luring them with false promises of jobs and attractive pay—or simply easier answers. Addressing the problem of youth unemployment will not only deny terrorists ground for recruitment, but also contribute to a productive population. A productive and stable population in a porous border region could be relied upon by the state in establishing local security mechanisms to check infiltration by terrorists.

Arguably, because of Uganda's geopolitical location as a land-locked country, its borders will remain more or less porous; the way forward is to evolve systems that will manage this porosity to the benefit of law and order in Uganda. Good governance, an enhanced security system, and a well-coordinated regional and international cooperation framework would mitigate the dilemma of porous borders in Uganda.

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